§ 2.45 p.m.
§ Order of the Day for the House to be again in Committee read.
§ Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Mancroft.)
§ On Question, Motion agreed to.
§ House in Committee accordingly.
§ [The LORD MERTHYR in the Chair]
§ Clause 21:
§ Penalties and disqualifications
§
21.—(l) The following provisions shall have effect as respects penalties and disqualifications which a person is liable to incur on a conviction for an offence under section eleven (reckless or dangerous driving) section twelve (careless driving) or section fifteen (driving under the influence of drink or a drug) of the Act of 1930 in connection with the driving of a motor vehicle that is to say:—
(c) a fine imposed on a first conviction for an offence under the said section twelve may be of art amount not exceeding forty pounds and a fine imposed on a second conviction for such an offence may be of an amount not exceeding eighty pounds and may be imposed in addition to any imprisonment awarded by the court and subsection (2) of that section (which limits the period for which the court may disqualify an offender on a first or second conviction) shall not apply to a second conviction;
§ EARL HOWE moved, in subsection (1), to leave out paragraph (c). The noble Earl said: My Lords, my first Amendment on Clause 21 relates to the maximum fine for careless driving, which it is proposed shall be increased from the present maximum of £20 to £40 on a first conviction, and from £50 to £80 on subsequent conviction. I should like to ask the Minister what evidence he has to show that such heavily increased penalties are required. Magistrates to-day have a power to inflict quite severe penalties for careless driving if they wish, but, as was stated in the answer to the question we were debating last night, they do not appear to wish to do so, and there has been nothing to show that the present fines are inadequate. Merely to say that more severe penalties will be inflicted will not necessarily solve the problem. My submission is that no court would dream of imposing such penalties as £40 and £80 for the offence of careless driving. If any such penalty were inflicted, I think people would ask why, if the case were 418 so serious, a charge of dangerous driving, rather than careless driving, was not brought. I do not believe that the Minister would be able to tell us that the maximum fine has ever been imposed for careless driving,
§ Last night a certain amount of play was made with the allegation—which unfortunately we all know is only too true—that there has been an increase in road accidents. But the Government themselves are as much responsible for this increase in road accidents as any driver on the roads. We try perform on roads that everyone knows are inadequate for the traffic which endeavours to use them—be it commercial or private traffic; and we also know that the number of vehicles newly registered is going up by half a million a year. It is quite impossible for this increase in traffic to take place without a certain increase in road accidents. Another point I would urge is that there is a very large increase in the actual mileage covered, as well as an increase in the number of vehicles. I submit that all these factors come in when we are considering the increase in the accident rate.
§ While not in any way wishing to be unduly lenient to offenders in cases of dangerous driving, I feel that it is rather different when only careless driving is concerned. As we all know, there are a number of inexperienced performers on the roads; they often give rise to a certain amount of anxiety to every one of us who uses the roads. But if the police consider that a case is not very serious they do not bring a charge of dangerous driving. On the other hand, in many cases alternative charges of either dangerous driving or careless driving are brought against the driver. The average fine inflicted, I believe, for careless driving is somewhere in the region of £4. I am quite certain that if there were a really had case of careless driving it would be dealt with under the alternative charge, which the police in such cases always bring, of dangerous driving.
§ So I submit that this increase in penalties for careless driving is, on the whole, unnecessary. I think that, if agreed to, it would detract to a certain extent, from the importance of the increased penalties which are to be inflicted for dangerous driving. I say: when you catch a dangerous driver "drop on him." If the case is proved to the satisfaction of the 419 court, let the court come down on him severely, on the lines which have been indicated by the Lord Chancellor. But if it is a rather minor case—it may be of someone who circles a roundabout the wrong way, or commits some other minor offence of that sort—and there is no serious charge, then to increase the penalty up to £80 seems to me to be unnecessary. And I do not believe that there is a single court in the land that would ever impose it or consider it for a minute. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 20 line 33, leave out paragraph (c).—(Earl Howe.)
§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR)As my noble friend has said, this Amendment would have the effect of preserving the existing penalties for careless driving, which it is proposed by this Bill to increase. I should like to remind your Lordships of what that means. The existing maximum penalties are:—on first conviction, a fine of up to £20 and disqualification at the discretion of the court for up to one month; on second conviction, a fine of up to £50 or three months imprisonment, and discretionary disqualification for up to three months; subsequent convictions, as for a second conviction, with an unlimited period of disqualification. There is, of course, provision that a conviction within the previous three years for dangerous driving counts as a previous conviction for careless driving. We propose in this Bill these maximum penalties; on first conviction, a fine of up to £40 and discretionary disqualification for up to one month; on second and subsequent convictions, a fine of £80 and three months' imprisonment and an unlimited period for disqualification.
I am sure, the sense of Parliament is that we want to try to find a method to mark our distress and anxiety at this ever-rising figure of casualties on the road. Therefore the Government have thought it right, in the face of this serious problem, to raise the maximum penalties for the more serious motoring offences. I must remind your Lordships that our proposals were approved by your Lordships in the Bill that was before the House in the last Session and have now been approved by another place. I would also remind my noble friend that 420 the Bill increases penalties for cyclists and imposes restrictions on pedestrians. It is a balanced attempt to help to solve the problem of road safety and, as I said last night, not an attack on motorists. That is the primary point and I submit that that answers the question of my noble friend whether there is evidence to show the necessity for this clause. The evidence is, first of all, the mounting number of casualties; and, secondly, the universally agreed need for a pointer to indicate that to everyone in the country.
I put that first because that is the important matter; but if I were to descend to a lower level, I would point out that the increase in the maximum fines merely reflects the change in money values since the original penalties were fixed in the Road Traffic Act, 1930. That is necessary for two reasons. If the penalties were left at the existing figures, with the decreased value of money they would have less importance, and it is necessary to show the magistrates' courts, who have found difficulty in this matter, that a serious view is taken of this offence and that they have to adjust their minds to the new considerations which I put before your Lordships yesterday. It is essential that the penalties should remain in the discretion of the magistrates, but it is hoped that the change in the maximum penalties will influence them to review the adequacy of the penalties they are in the habit of imposing.
My noble friend says that the maximum penalties have no effect. He has the responsibility of being one of the leading figures in motoring in this country, and I am sure he agrees with me that it is necessary to get a new attitude of mind in every person in the country if we are going to check this appalling slaughter. My noble friend says that the Government are to blame because of our road programme. Surely that is a most defeatist attitude of mind. If we are not going to do anything, if we are going to make no effort until the country can afford to carry out the vast road programme which everyone wishes, then I think we are showing a complete indifference to the sufferings of the relatives of the dead and of the injured themselves. Much as I respect my noble friend's experience, I cannot be a party, 421 and cannot advise the Committee to be a party, to such a defeatist suggestion. If my noble friend will take the circumstances as they are, and between now and Report give us his ideas of how we are to deal with them, I will give them most careful consideration, as I am sure will every noble Lord; but I cannot be party to a negative attitude. I feel that it is necessary, not only with regard to fines but also with regard to the most important penalty of disqualification, that it should go out from this Committee that we are alive to the problem and expect every one of our fellow citizens to follow our example.
LORD GIFFORDI hesitate to differ in any way from the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, but in regard to one point which the noble Earl, Lord Howe, made I would ask whether, if there was any question of causing injury, the charge would not be one of dangerous driving, and not of careless driving. In that case I entirely agree with the noble and learned Viscount that the penalties should be as severe as possible. But, as the noble Earl said, careless driving is a much lesser offence, and it seems to me that possibly we are going a little far in making the maximum penalties so high for what is the minor offence.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORIt would be a happier and easier world if injuries were caused only by dangerous or reckless driving under Section 11. I was thirty years at the Bar and I can tell the noble Lord that a vast number of cases of personal injury arise with no criminal element in negligence at all. If I may put it in words familiar to all, which form a good definition of negligence, it is to leave undone the things which we ought to have done and to do those things which we ought not to have done. That, on the road, while in seine cases it might be below the level which is objectively quantified as dangerous or careless driving, may cause the gravest injury. I think that the second offence, which Parliament in its wisdom inserted in the 1930 Act, fills a useful place in our criminal code and in trying to reach safety on the roads. I am grateful to my noble friend for raising this point, but I am afraid that I cannot agree with his conclusion.
§ EARL HOWEI am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for the minor 422 lifeline he threw out in the closing words of his speech. I should like to make it clear that I am entirely with the Government and the proposals in the Bill in so far as they deal with what the noble and learned Viscount said just now were the more serious offences. But careless driving is a minor offence. The noble and learned Viscount indicated that as we are dealing with cyclists and pedestrians in this Bill, we ought not to object to increased penalties for careless driving. But what real connection has that with this clause or with the Amendment? What the Bill is going to do in connection with cyclists and pedestrians is long overdue. In the opinion of most people, it should have been done years and years ago.
The noble and learned Viscount now recommends that we should agree to these increased penalties in order to keep pace with inflation. If we are dealing with the decreased value of money and the effects of inflation generally, it may be—Heaven forbid that it should be so!—that in a year or two those penalties will be just as inadequate as perhaps it is thought the present penalties are. I am sure that the noble and learned Viscount would not wish to misrepresent me. I did not say that increased penalties have no effect—or, if I did, I certainly did not mean that. What I meant to convey was that if penalties are increased beyond what is a reasonable amount in the opinion of the bench, court or tribunal, the average bench will not impose the maximum. What they will do is to say: "This is a minor case. We will impose a moderate penalty and hope that it will be taken as a warning."
I never said anything with regard to disqualification. But my whole submission to the Government would be: Why cannot we leave the careless driving penalties as they are for the moment? I cannot see that they are inadequate. A penalty for careless driving of £20 or £40 is somewhat "stiff" when one considers the type of offence for which it is usually given. Merely to bump up the penalty—financially, at any rate; I gather that the disqualification period is to remain the same—does not mean that the average court will increase the penalty to anything like that extent; and if they did, it would detract from the importance of the penalties imposed for serious offences 423 such as dangerous driving. Impose whatever penalty may be thought to be adequate for that offence, but in the case of a minor offence, surely, at this stage it is unnecessary to increase the penalty. I cannot think that the case has been made out for that.
I return to where I started. I think the Government—not only this Government, but all Governments—have been terribly to blame for the conditions on the road to-day; and they should admit it. As we all know, there is a deplorable increase in the number of accidents, but to anybody experienced in the use of the roads the wonder is that that number is not greater. You can go up and down any road you like, in any part of the country, and see the amount of commercial traffic, private car traffic and the rest; and the wonder is not that there are so many accidents, but that they are so incredibly few. One hopes that, things will improve; and no doubt the Government are satisfied that they will, or their proposals with regard to the roads would be greater and more effective than they are.
I should like to appeal to the Government, through the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, not to disregard completely the experience of every other country. Every other country but this one is trying to improve its roads, and so they will reduce the number of accidents on their roads. In this they have succeeded. I could quote figures in relation to America and various other countries, but I do not want to weary your Lordships with them now. However, I will give one instance. Casualties in Riverside Drive, in Chicago, went down by about 6 per cent. when Riverside Drive was improved. I suggest that the Government must bear a share of the blame for the increase in the number of accidents. We know that they are doing all that can be done in the existing financial circumstances of the country to deal with it, but the blame still persists. I should like to take advantage of the offer made by the Lord Chancellor, in his concluding words, and I shall be only too ready to consult with him, or with anybody else he cares to appoint, on this whole subject, if the time can be spared to talk to me about it. I submit that the proposals in the 424 Bill are unreasonable. The proposed penalties are too heavy, and I do not think they would be considered for a moment by any court.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGHBefore the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor replies (if he is going to), may I say that we all respect the experience of the noble Earl, Lord Howe, in motoring, and it has been an advantage to both sides of the Committee to hear him. But on this point, whether consideration is deferred or not, noble Lords on this side support the Lord Chancellor. We do not want to be misunderstood about it later. We feel that there is no case for making penalties, as was suggested by the noble Earl, dependent on the result of an accident; we feel that penalties should deal with the actual conduct of the motorist.
§ LORD CONESFORDIn order to avoid any misunderstanding, I should like to say that some of us on these Benches also support strongly the line that my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor has taken. I was surprised at what my noble friend Lord Howe said in first example of careless driving. For instance, he mentioned going the wrong way round a roundabout. I should have thought that even a first offence of going the wrong way round a roundabout might well land the driver concerned in a charge of dangerous driving. If one did that sort of careless driving twice, one would be lucky to get off with only an £80 penalty.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORI intrude further for one moment only to thank the noble Viscount opposite and my noble friend Lord Conesford, and to say this to my noble friend Lord Howe. Of course, my right honourable friend the Minister will continue to do all he can to improve the safety of the roads. But I do want to say this to my noble friend, from many years experience: it does not matter what the road is, accidents are caused by excessive speed; by failing to keep a proper lookout, and by taking a chance where a chance should not be taken. It must go out from this Committee that, while we all desire the roads to be improved, unless our fellow citizens are going to concentrate on those three matters we shall have this continued 425 increase in accidents. Having said that, I shall be delighted to see my noble friend Lord Howe, and I hope that he will be able to spare the time to have a discussion with me before the next stage of the Bill. In the meantime, I would ask him to withdraw this Amendment.
§ EARL HOWEIn view of what the Lord Chancellor has said, I will, with great reluctance, withdraw the Amendment; it would be wrong of me not to do so. With regard to the dictum which he has just propounded as to the cause of accidents, I must profoundly disagree with him. However, I have another Amendment down, and I will say what I want to say when I move that. I beg leave to withdraw this Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHAs I intimated to your Lordships last night, in moving Amendment No. 63, I do not propose to move Nos. 64 and 65. However, I would ask the indulgence of the Committee to be able to return to this subject on the Motion that the clause stand part of the Bill.
§ 3.10 p.m.
§
EARL HOWE moved, in subsection (1), to add to paragraph (c):
if three years or less have elapsed since the offenders previous conviction under that section.
The noble Earl said: The purpose of this Amendment is to ensure that the unlimited power of disqualification shall apply only to cases where the second conviction occurs within three years of the first. Without such a limitation, a driver may be convicted on the first offence of careless driving in his youth—it may occur to one of your Lordships—and forty years on he may again be found guilty of a similiar offence. It seems to me that unlimited power to disqualify because of a previous offence committed a great number of years before is going rather far, and should not apply.
§ I moved a similar Amendment on the Committee stage of the earlier Bill which we considered in this House, and withdrew it on the assurance that it would be considered by the Government. We came to the Report stage of the earlier Bill and the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, said that it was not acceptable. None the less, perhaps there has been a change of heart since then. I feel that it is a reasonable 426 Amendment. To be "jumped on" forty years later for a minor offence that one may have committed in the days of one's youth, seems to me to be going rather far. I appeal to the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, to see whether he cannot consider this point favourably and make a minor concession. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 20, line 42, at end insert the said words.—(Earl Howe.)
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORMy noble friend has proposed his Amendment in such a conciliatory and appealing way that he moves my feelings very much, but, I am sorry to say, my reason not at all. The Bill proposes to remove the limit on the court's discretion as to the period of disqualification on a second conviction of careless driving. My noble friend will appreciate that for most motoring offences the courts have unlimited discretion as to the period of disqualification. I have considered the point, but I do not think there is any justification for fettering the courts, as my noble friend proposes, by saying that it is only where there is an interval of three years or less between the convictions that a period of disqualification of more than three months can be imposed on second conviction.
The fact that the offender has not been convicted during the previous three years is not, in my view, a good reason for limiting the penalty for his later offence, since that should be appropriate to the circumstances of the offence. I would remind my noble friend that the fact that the offender has not been convicted recently can be taken into account by the court in fixing the penalty; and, of course, it will be. What I object to is that it should bind them absolutely. This is a different situation from that under Clause 21 (1) (b), where the court is compelled to disqualify for not less than nine months unless more than three years have elapsed since the previous conviction—I say that in case my noble friend has that in mind. It is reasonable to provide a limit in the case of an automatic disqualification, but I do not think one should impose a limit in the case of a discretionary disqualification, because it is essential that magistrates should make the punishment fit the crime. If the Government propose these increased penalties and then accede to the first request to 427 bite into their own increases, it is going to destroy the effect which I think we all have in mind, of giving a pointer to everyone as to the seriousness of this matter. Therefore, again I must ask my noble friend, for the reasons that I have stated, not to press the Amendment.
§ EARL HOWEI should like to thank the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor for his reply, and to say that what he has said about the undesirability of limiting the discretionary power of the court is an argument which does appeal to me. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLOROn behalf of my noble friend Lord Selkirk, I beg to move this Amendment. It is consequential on the introduction of the new Clause 28, which is an Amendment to Section 46 of the Act of 1940. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 8, leave out ("subsection (1)") and insert ("the powers conferred by subsection (2)").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ On Question, Whether Clause 21, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHWe are about to pass the clause in this Bill dealing with penalties, and I must confess to considerable unhappiness. I believe that Her Majesty's Government, and we in this House, have failed to rise to the level of events. I moved an Amendment yesterday afternoon which introduced some kind of novelty. I sought to preserve the discretion of the bench, but said that if the bench inflicted a monetary fine that was less than a certain amount, they should be called upon to give their reasons for so doing—and the reasons could be applicable to the facts of the case or the circumstances of the defendant. I received a sympathetic reply from the noble and learned Viscount. I have had the opportunity of reading that reply, and it has not made me feel any happier. We must tackle this job. The noble and learned Viscount, in his reply to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, might have stood at this Bench advocating the very thing that I advocated yesterday afternoon. I would agree with anybody 428 who likes to put all the blame on successive Governments and this Government. I would agree that the dilatoriness of Governments in not keeping the roads of this country in a good condition is a contributory factor to accidents. But, as the noble and learned Viscount has said, we have to deal with this matter as it stands to-day.
In my view, there is only one way in which we can possibly do it we must influence the behaviour of everybody who uses the roads—motorists, cyclists, pedestrians and everybody else. I believe that we are failing to do that. Statistics are notoriously dangerous things to use, but I have tried to find some measurement. I am not going to quote any figures, but I am satisfied in my mind that per million road miles travelled, the accident rate in this country is the highest in the world. I believe we must do something about it. We shall end up this year by killing and injuring on the roads of this country over a quarter of a million people. Approximately 5,000 human beings will be killed on the roads of this country. The number killed in May, according to the Ministry of Transport provisional figures, was forty-one more than for the previous May. Forty-one more dead! If that had happened in any other circumstances, there would have been banner lines in the newspapers. Forty-one more people were killed. The total killed in May was 458 people as against 417 people for May of the previous year. Yet your Lordships would have a job to find that figure in any newspaper in the country the day after the Ministry of Transport published it. The most I saw about it was an inch of print at the bottom of a column.
Why is it? Is it because the people of this country have reconciled themselves to the fact that this slaughter is one of the prices they have to pay for our so-called civilisation? I do not know. But what is our responsibility? The noble and learned Viscount said just now, and quite rightly, that Parliament measures its responsibility by imposing these increased fines. I agree with every one of them, with this proviso: that I see no practical reason for doubling the monetary fines when past experience shows us that the present fines, which are half the size of those contained in this Bill, are, on an average, put into force at the rate of only 10 per cent. I gave your Lordships the figures yesterday afternoon—I do not 429 intend to give them again. I feel that we have to do something. I kept to my bargain that I would not move my other Amendment to-day, because I said I wanted your Lordships to take them all into consideration yesterday afternoon.
Will your Lordships allow me to make a confession? I was rather disappointed that none of your Lordships with far more experience of magisterial benches than I have—because I am not a magistrate—saw fit to speak. I wanted the experience of others because I wanted really and honestly to find out what was in the minds of the magistrates when, in all the cases that I gave your Lordships, running into hundreds of thousands of prosecutions for careless driving, dangerous driving and driving when drunk in charge of a car, the average monetary fine was precisely 10 per cent. of the sum Parliament has said should be the maximum amount. I ask the noble and learned Viscount whether he will give this matter further consideration. The only reason he gave me for not accepting my Amendment was that it might distract magistrates' minds from the fact that they could—and were in some cases obliged to—give the penalty of suspension of a licence, which up to date they have given in only 3 per cent. of the cases where they have a discretion so to do.
I want the noble and learned Viscount to consider whether he will go a little further. I believe we have to try experiments. We are going to spend millions of pounds on the experiment of car testing. Parking places will cost this country millions of pounds. Car testing at £1 per head for 2 million motor cars will cost somebody £2 million—it will cost either the Government or the taxpayer all that money, on what I would call not more than a gamble. It will not do what I think is the right thing to do, and that is to influence the behaviour of people. That has to be done by the salutary method of increasing the punishment for wrongdoing. I want the noble and learned Viscount to think of this matter, because I may put it down at another stage of the Bill. Let us try the experiment of inserting in the Bill a clause on the lines of the Amendment I put down, stating that if the maximum fine for a certain offence is £100, then that fine shall not exceed £100 but shall 430 not be less than, say, £50—because that is halfway—unless the court decides that there are circumstances which may be special to the facts of the case or the position of the offender.
Let us try that out on one offence. The offence I would choose on which to try it out would be that of being drunk in charge of a motor car, which, as I have said before, is one of the foulest of all offences that one can commit on the roads of this country. I might consider putting down that Amendment. If I do, I would ask the noble and learned Viscount to give it more sympathetic consideration. I know it is novel. I know the Home Office will be dead against it; but when the Home Office is dead against anything like this, to me that is one of its virtues. After all, they have some pretty old-fashioned ideas, as is shown by the statement by the Home Secretary in another place the other day to the effect that the amount of vice in this country at the present time did not warrant any further action. He is about the only person who thinks that. Therefore I ask the noble and learned Viscount to consult with his colleagues to see whether we cannot make this experiment in penalties. That is all I want to raise on the Question that the clause stand part. I leave it, unhappy that the traditional perverseness of the magisterial benches of this country in not paying sufficient heed to the will of Parliament will continue in the future as it has unhappily carried on in the past.
§ 3.28 p.m.
§ EARL HOWEI have great sympathy with a certain amount that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, has said, and I should go a long way in agreement with him, but there are one or two things that have been said, either by the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor or by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, from which I must profoundly dissent. Unfortunately, the Lord Chancellor has told us that speed is the cause of accidents. It has been said before by plenty of other speakers in this House that speed is the cause of accidents, became if you brought all the vehicles on the roads to a full stop there would be no accidents. But surely the Lord Chancellor would, on reflection, agree that it is going a little far to say merely that speed is the cause of accidents. With great respect, I submit that it is speed in 431 the wrong place, and very often also at the wrong time, which is the real trouble. It is a question of judgment—often of faulty judgment. I feel that that is just as important.
Do not let us lose sight of the traffic conditions as they exist to-day. I submit to the Lord Chancellor that they are really deplorable. The worst of it is that they are not likely to get better over a foreseeable period of time. It is obviously going to take a very long time and perhaps even a General Election before we get the roads that we ought to have in this country. Other countries have tackled the problem differently. There is hardly a country in Europe that is not hard at work making new roads, properly designed and fitted to new conditions. Some of those are the most humble countries, such as Holland, Belgium and Denmark. Then there are the bigger countries, such as Germany and France. They are all hard at work on this problem, and have been for years. Their road conditions are steadily improving, whereas here they have been completely static. It is not the fault of this Government. Nobody can blame this Government. Except in a general way, nobody can blame other Governments. The fault lies with all of us in Parliament. We know, or should know, the conditions, and we should bring pressure to bear upon the Government of this country to see that they do not, as has seemed possible in the past, lose sight of these deplorable conditions.
The noble Lord, Lord Conesford, took me to task over a random example I gave when I described going the wrong way round a roundabout as careless driving. I agree with the noble Lord that it was a rather random thought; but that roundabout should never have existed—there should have been a fly-over. That is just one of the things that I have been trying to illustrate in my remarks in regard to the overwhelming need for better roads, designed for modern conditions in this country. I am sure this is all wide of the mark in regard to this clause but other speakers have referred to it, and therefore I am perhaps in good company if I have erred. I beg the noble and learned Lord Chancellor, not to concentrate on just one aspect of road conditions and to tell us that speed is the one thing that matters. 432 It is not only speed; there is a lot more to it than speed. I wonder whether it is a Utopian idea to suggest that a Royal Commission should be set up to inquire into the whole question of accidents. I do not know whether that idea would be worth pursuing. If we could get an agreed sort of estimate of what really does cause accidents on the roads, it might be of help to the Government. Be that as it may, I thank your Lordships for having allowed me to intrude, and I thank the Lord Chancellor for what he has said in reference to my remarks.
§ 3.33 p.m.
§ LORD SILKINThe noble Earl who has just sat down has suggested one method of dealing with this problem—namely, the setting up of a Royal Commission to go into the question of accidents. The average period of gestation of a Royal Commission is about six years—that is, from the time it is set up until the time action is taken, and in that period, on the present basis, 1½ million people will have died or been injured on the roads. I do not know whether the noble Earl really thinks that that is a serious method of dealing with the problem. I want to come back to this clause which deals with penalties. The noble and learned Viscount is always so reasonable and conciliatory that one almost hates the idea of disagreeing with him. I imagine that it was in that atmosphere that my noble friend Lord Lucas of Chilworth did not press his Amendments on the question of penalties yesterday. We do not propose this afternoon to vote against the clause, but I should like to put to the noble and learned Viscount one or two thoughts that we have on this matter—possibly afterthoughts—and we may feel that we should like to come back to them at a later stage of the Bill.
There is no doubt that the position as regards road accidents is grave. The Government recognise that, otherwise they would not be introducing these provisions or increasing the penalties. There is no doubt at all that the penalties that have hitherto been imposed—I have in mind the figures that my noble friend Lord Lucas of Chilworth quoted yesterday—indicate that magistrates are not imposing the penalties that they could impose; that, at any rate on the face of it, they do not take so serious a view as we do about the accidents that are taking place, and 433 that in fact people are killed or, very likely, injured. The fact that the number of accidents has increased, and is increasing, indicates that the penalties that are being imposed do not operate as an adequate deterrent. Her Majesty's Government recognise that because they are increasing the maximum penalties. But increasing the maximum penalties is no guarantee that magistrates will take a more serious view of accidents or increase the penalties imposed. It gives them the opportunity, in extreme cases, of imposing a higher penalty than they have been able to do, but the average penalty is so low in relation to the existing maximum—and, of course, it will be very much lower in relation to the new maximum—that unless something more is done than merely to increase the maximum, we have no assurance at all that the penalties that will be imposed in the future will be a deterrent. It was in that spirit that my noble friend put down his Amendment that there should be a minimum penalty, as well as a maximum, with discretion on the part of the magistrates, in circumstances which he set out in the Amendment itself, to go below the minimum.
Reading the noble and learned Viscount's speech again, I note that his objection to that is one that he stated and one that is implicit. The one he stated was that it was undesirable to fetter the discretion of the magistrates by dictating to them in any way the kind of penalty that they should impose. I agree that it is unusual, if not unique, to fix a minimum penalty as well as a maximum one. Perhaps it is not unique, because in certain circumstances magistrates are directed to disqualify. My answer is that these are not normal circumstances. We are facing a grave situation which calls for desperate remedies—it calls for something more than the normal process of the law. But the fact is that the magistrates' discretion is limited, is restricted, even under this Bill. There is nothing novel in limiting their discretion; their discretion is fettered by a maximum penalty. They may think that a certain course of conduct justifies a fine of £1,000, but they are limited under this Bill to £ 100. In that sense they are restricted, and I see no reason why it should not be, if not a direction at any rate an obligation on them in all cases where the person concerned has been found guilty of reckless 434 or dangerous driving, or of diving under the influence of drink or narcotics or drugs, to impose a minimum fine, unless there are the special circumstances set out in the Amendment of my noble friend.
The noble Earl, Lord Howe, skated rather lightly over the mater when he talked about careless driving—I think he referred to it as en "error of judgment". An error of judgment is not a crime. An error of judgment lays the person concerned open to the payment of damages in a civil action, but he cannot be prosecuted or be found guilty in a magistrates' court of an error of judgment. His action has got to go beyond that; it has got to be reckless or dangerous driving.
§ EARL HOWEI was addressing myself to what had been said by the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor on the subject of speed being the main cause of accidents. I said it was not only speed; it was a question of error of judgment as well; the two work together.
§ LORD SILKINI agree on that point, although speed in itself is very often an error of judgment—speed in the wrong circumstances. I have little more to add. I think this is a matter which is so serious that it deserves the further consideration of all of us; and I am sure the noble and learned Viscount will not be too proud to admit that he has given further consideration to the matter and that he feels, on reflection—if such should turn out to be the case—justified, in these exceptional circumstances, in taking the exceptional course of fixing a minimum as well as a maximum penalty. There we leave it at this moment, but we shall probably feel justified in coining back to this question at a later stage.
§ LORD DERWENTI had not intended to intervene in this particular argument, but may I ask the Lord Chancellor to continue to be very careful about this matter, particularly in one respect. Time and again local benches of magistrates find that accidents occur—I am not talking about accidents caused by drivers who are drunk in charge—at a particular spot or spots, due to the fact that a particular spot is what we call a "black spot". Whereas, in the ordinary way they would say the man was driving 435 dangerously, they are very apt—and quite rightly in my submission—when accidents take place at such a spot, particularly when the person concerned is a stranger to the neighbourhood, to take a more lenient view. I believe that is an important point. I am merely drawing it to the attention of the noble and learned Viscount.
§ VISCOUNT THURSOI wonder whether I might say one word on this Question, whether the clause shall stand part of the Bill? I have listened with great interest to this debate and to the remarkable contributions made by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, on this side of the House. Of course I agree with them and with other noble Lords about the importance of improving the road system of this country. To my mind its main importance is from the economic standpoint. I am very doubtful about the direction relationship which is sometimes asserted to exist between the width and straightness of the roads and the number of accidents. When I first became Member for Caithness, in Sutherland, the roads in Sutherland were execrable. They were bumpy; they were narrow; they were twisty; they were steep. If you met another car on a hill there was no way of passing it. You had to back your own car, perhaps down a steep hill, with a cliff on one side and a precipice on the other. But there were never any accidents on those roads: everybody was much too careful. Since then the roads have been greatly improved and accidents have begun to occur.
Nevertheless, if we are going to build great wide new autobahns, it will be necessary, and most expedient, to include in them these fly-overs to which the noble Earl, Lord Howe, referred just now. Nor do I think it quite proper to emphasise quite so much how much worse our accident figures are than those of other countries. I do not know whether other noble Lords happened to read in the newspapers this morning that to-day is Independence Day in America, and the National Safety Council of the United States of America have announced that the forecast of their statisticians is that the number of people who will lose their lives between six 436 o'clock yesterday evening and midnight tonight is 130. That is in America, with its magnificent roads. That only emphasises that point I was making just now, that there is no direct relationship between the width and straightness of the roads and the number of accidents.
The noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, said that we are missing a great opportunity; that we ought to act more strongly, more resolutely, to increase the penalties; and that that would be a blow which we could strike for the safety of the public on the roads. I think we have to be very careful not to go in front of public opinion in this matter. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said that he was very much afraid that the magistrates might not even enforce the penalties—I do not think this is putting an unfair gloss on what he said—that we are putting into this Bill; and he was wondering how pressure could be brought to bear upon them. I feel that if we put a large number of high penalties in the Bill it will set up resistance on the part of the magistrates: it will encourage resistance on their part. The Bill will get a bad name; it will be thought an impracticable Bill. I cannot help feeling that, as between leaving things as they are, which I agree with Lord Lucas of Chilworth would be wrong, and going too far in advance of public opinion and making the penalties Draconian, the Government have in the Bill, and we have in the House, just about found the happy medium. For my own part, therefore, I shall gladly vote for the clause as it stands.
LORD REAMay I add my support to the Lord Chancellor in the stand he is taking about this imposition of a minimum fine, which seems to me an improper thing in principle? We are authorising a maximum fine—indeed we are doubling what was the maximum fine. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, wants a minimum fine. It is there. The minimum fine is one penny or one shilling, or such nominal sum as you care to think of. It is surely up to the court to go between these two points, the minimum and maximum, according to the circumstances of the case they are considering. I agree with the noble and learned Viscount that it would be most unfortunate to intefere in this respect with the privilege and duty of the court. I say this merely for the purpose of the Record.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORMay I say, with great sincerity, how grateful I am to your Lordships for the debate which we have just heard? I think it is an excellent thing that this matter should go out from this House as one of the most serious social problems of the day. I should like to express my particular pleasure that the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, has joined in this debate. It is always a joy to his old friends to hear his voice, and he made one important point on which I feel I should, with the greatest respect, make one supplementary remark.
It is absolutely true, as he said, that we must never create offences and penalties that are so out of tune with public opinion that the lack of enforcement will lead to bringing the law into disrepute. But when we believe that penalties are properly in tune with our opinion of the offence, then there is another duty on us. We are, after all, the leaders of this country. We cannot, as leaders, accept public opinion as a static matter. It is something which we, as leaders, have dynamically to change if we believe that it is lagging behind. I am sure the noble Viscount will agree with me in that. And this is what we are trying to do at the moment.
I come to the very thoughtful speech of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth. The difficulty which I endeavoured to put yesterday is the one which has been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Rea. Really there is a dilemma in this matter. On the one side there are those, including the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, who wish to fix a minimum penalty. The noble Lord said that yesterday, and his Amendment included giving discretion to the court not to affix the minimum penalty in special circumstances. That was Lord Lucas of Chilworth's thought, and I entirely sympathise with his approach. But let me pose the difficulty. On the one hand there is the view that a minimum penalty is not wanted; on the other hand once you give a discretion one gets into the doubt whether one is really advancing the matter a great deal. Of course, as Lord Lucas of Chilworth will appreciate, one is also in this difficulty: that when one introduces special circumstances, these may vary in different parts of the country. You may get a lack of uniformity in that 438 way. These were the practical difficulties that I saw, and I re-state them merely in order to let the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, have them in mind when he is giving consideration to this matter before the next stage of the Bill.
The other point which I made was rather dramatically illustrated in our debate, and that was that the emphasis on fines might deflect people from disqualification. The noble Lord will remember that Lord Elton moved an Amendment—I think it was the next Amendment—and stated that a chairman of a bench of magistrates who was a legal authority did not know of the power to disqualify. The noble Lord will remember the point—I do not think I am being at all unfair to Lord Elton. That shows that certainly one wants to do everything possible to stress the importance of disqualification for the two reasons that I gave: first, that it is a deterrent; and, second, that it keeps offenders off the road, to the public safety. Again, I emphasise to-day that we should bear that point in mind. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, tock me up for saying excessive speed was a cause of accidents. I did not say it was the only cause. Of course, I meant excessive speed in the circumstances of the case, and I should like to remind my noble friend Earl Howe that I bracketed it with two other shortcomings. I said excessive speed, meaning excessive speed in the circumstances of the case, failure to keep proper look out, and taking a chance when one ought not to do so. From my thirty years' experience of accident cases I still say that those factors have come into all but an infinitesimal number of the accidents which I have had to consider. We cannot get away from that.
I ask the noble Earl, Lord Howe, to put the Royal Commission out of his mind. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, mentioned this point. I think it was the grandfather of the noble Marquess who leads the House who was the first to say that the primary purpose of a Royal Commission is to provide a good method of shelving a difficult question. If he was not the first to say it, he was certainly one of the most famous people to make such a remark. But this matter is far too urgent for that. It muse be dealt with on the facts a; they exist. Lord Silkin, I think, is the only person who has been logically and mentally ruthless 439 in suggesting a minimum penalty, and he has put it on the basis that here we are dealing with so serious a situation that the ordinary concomitants of the rule of law should be abrogated for the moment. I am not convinced on that point.
I should like to give the noble Lord an example from the experience of a friend of mine who is a very experienced magistrate. He said to me, with regard to the offence of being "drunk in charge", that he often went to his court feeling: "Now I must send someone to prison for being drunk in charge of a motor car." He held exactly the same views concerning that offence as Lord Lucas of Chilworth expressed to-day. But he went on to say to me this: "When I come to the case, it always turns out that the person who is before me has been driving for twenty-five years, that he has a completely clean record, that he has never been in the habit of taking drink in excess before, that there was a family celebration which caused his condition on this occasion, and that he has a wife and children who will starve if he is sent to prison." Naturally, my friend was exaggerating, but that illustrates the point which Lord Rea made: that the particular circumstances of the case may contain social difficulties and social tragedies which make it extremely difficult to impose a minimum penalty. I put that to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. I know that he, with all his experience, will consider it and that he will appreciate that there is a difference between the fine and disqualification that (I do not want to occupy too much time) I need not elaborate to-day.
I take the point which Lord Derwent has made, and I shall not forget it. But one comes to this position: that we are all agreed that we have an extremely difficult, extremely serious and extremely human problem in front of us. Her Majesty's Government have tried (and this is the reason I mentioned earlier the measures with regard to cyclists and pedestrians) to make a comprehensive attack on this problem. Your Lordships, or some of your Lordships, after debate, are doubtful whether we have gone far enough. We have gone a considerable way, and I, for one, do not want to do what my noble friend Lord Thurso has spoken of, and bring this matter into unenforceability. But my mind is never 440 closed in regard to this subject. I shall certainly give the most serious consideration to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, with regard to taking up a pilot scheme, if I may put it in that way, and also to all the other proposals that have been made. But I come back to what I said. We all have a duty to impress our fellow citizens with the seriousness of this problem, and I hope that your Lordships will not only do that in this Bill but will continue to do so until we bring home to everyone that their first consideration is not to disregard the life and safety of other people.
§ Clause 21, as amended, agreed to.
§ Clauses 22 and 23 agreed to.
§ Clause 24:
§ Offences against s. 35 of Act of 1930
§ (3) In section six of the Act of 1930 the proviso to subsection (1) (which empowers a court to limit a driving disqualification to the driving of a motor vehicle of the same class or description as the vehicle in which the offence was committed) shall cease to have effect.
§ 4.3 p.m.
§ LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE moved to leave out subsection (3). The noble Lord said: On behalf of my noble friend Lord Teynham, who expresses his regret that he is unable to be here to-day, I beg to move this Amendment. Subsections (1) and (2) of this clause deal with the offence of driving a motor vehicle without the required legal insurance cover, but subsection (3) seems to me to have a much wider issue; and it is the removal of subsection (3) that this Amendment proposes. Subsection (3) appears to remove, not only in the case of conviction on an insurance offence, but in all cases, the power of the court to limit the disqualification to the class and description of vehicle with which the offence was committed. If my reading of the clause is right, we are tagging on something which goes much wider than subsections (1) and (2). I suggest that this deprivation of the freedom of the courts to confine disqualification to a particular class of vehicle will create hardships and anomalies.
§ Let us take the case of two young men who go out on motor bicycles on a Saturday afternoon and commit an offence which carries with it disqualification. Let us assume that one is an engine 441 driver for the rest of the week and the other is an agricultural tractor driver. In the case of the engine driver, the young man would rightly be deprived of convenience and amenity if he were disqualified from driving all classes of vehicles; but in the case of the agricultural driver, who must drive his tractor from one part of the farm to another and often along the high road, he would be deprived of his livelihood. When we compare the two cases, I say that that is unfair and unjust. I submit that unless there is a differentiation between mis-behaviour on duty, as it were, and mis-behaviour off duty, one young man is in a much worse position than the other and is affected all his duty time by something he has done off duty.
§ I think that there can be a case for universal disqualification for drunkenness. I am not sure that it would be just to make this differentiation between these two young men in the example I have given; but where it is not a case of drunkenness, I consider that there is an anomaly. I hope that the Goverrment will feel able to reconsider the retention of this subsection, and that when he replies the noble and learned Viscount will tell me two things: first, whether my interpretation is right and that this subsection has a wider application than the offence to do with an uninsured vehicle; and secondly, why is it necessary to alter what has been within the power of magistrates for many years past.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 11, leave out subsection (3).—(Lord Balfour of Inchrye.)
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORMay I answer the last question first? The reason we desire to alter the law is that the present position is unsatisfactory. The existing power of the court to limit driving disqualification is contained in the proviso to Section 6 (1) of the Act of 1930, which enables a disqualification to be limited to the driving of a motor vehicle of the same class and description as the vehicle in relation to which the offence causing the disqualification was committed. That is unsatisfactory, first of all, because we think that to limit driving disqualification in cases where the offence leading to disqualification is one involving the way in which a car is driven, or driving whilst drunk, is not justifiable. I think that my noble friend is inclined to agree 442 with me on drunkenness. After all, if a person is drunk when driving one class of vehicle, that is no reason why he will not be found drunk driving another class of vehicle.
§ LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYEI cannot see why we should say that someone who is drunk in charge of a motor vehicle on a Saturday afternoon should necessarily be drunk for the other six days on his tractor or when driving a railway engine.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORI disagree with my noble friend. Anyone who is drunk in charge of a motor vehicle on a Saturday afternoon is better off the road. If the noble Lord were to turn up drunk at his job or was drunk in circumstances which would carry danger to other people, he would expect to lose his job. If a man is drunk on Saturday afternoon when driving a vehicle, he causes the risk of death and dismemberment to other people on the road, and in my view there is no logical reason for leaving him available to drive other classes of vehicle. I say the same with regard to dangerous driving. If a man has been convicted of driving dangerously to such an extent as to justify disqualification, he is a person who has been convicted of an offence about the seriousness of which your Lordships have been talking for the last hour with great seriousness and justification, and I feel that it is quite wrong that he should be allowed to drive particular classes of vehicles.
I agree that when it is a question of not being insured, different considerations occur, because it might well be the case—and here I think the noble Lord's differentiation between driving on duty and driving for pleasure becomes relevant—that a man is driving one of his employer's vehicles, thinking, with good grounds, that his employer had provided for insurance. It would be asking too much of him, as one of many drivers in the employment, to go to his foreman and say: "Is this vehicle insured?" He would assume that it was, because any reasonable employer would insure. Yet in those circumstances he will have committed an offence for which, under the existing law, he would be liable to automatic disqualification. But by this Bill we have changed that—my noble friend may take it from me that that is the result of the preceding subsection— 443 so that henceforth disqualification for driving without a policy of insurance will be a discretionary one, and it will be for the court to impose in proper circumstances.
Those are the main reasons why we have done this, and I think we have been logical. To go back on our suggestion with regard to "drunk in charge" and dangerous driving would, I believe, be contrary to the whole feeling of this Committee as expressed to-day and yesterday afternoon. With regard to the insurance case, as I say, that has been met by making it a discretionary remedy. There are other difficulties—namely, that the words "class or description" provide technical difficulties which have been mentioned in the courts. That no longer applies because, as I say, it is a discretionary disqualification. I hope that my noble friend will not regard what I said at first as being any reflection on the undoubted human sympathy which inspires him with regard to a man's sticking to his job. But we must think of the wider content of humanity that is involved, and the drunkard who drives, or the dangerous driver, must know what he is risking if he takes that course.
§ LORD SILKINI should like to ask the noble and learned Viscount one question on this matter. Will it still be open to the courts to disqualify in respect of a particular vehicle if they choose to do so?
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORAs I understand it, no. They can refrain from disqualifying in the insurance case, but they cannot pick out a particular class.
§ LORD HORE-BELISHAI should like to say a few words arising out of what the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, has said. Obviously none of us would wish to hold a brief for drunkenness. The case put forward by my noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye, as I understood it, was that if a man were convicted, not necessarily of being drunk in charge of a car, but of careless or dangerous driving of a motor cycle or motor car, under the existing law he could still continue his occupation as a tractor driver. He may not have been drunk at all; he may simply be a man who misconducted himself on a particular occasion on the roads by carelessness. There must have 444 been something in the minds of the Lord Chancellor and the Law Officers at the time to give the magistrates this power of disqualifying a man from going on the road, but of allowing him to continue to drive his tractor where he was not likely to meet any other traffic. I suppose that Lord Haldane was the Lord Chancellor at the time, and Sir Patrick Hastings was the Attorney-General. There must have been some argument present in their minds to induce them to put in this merciful provision, and not to ruin a man in his professional career because of an offence committed in quite different circumstances.
If the man were perpetually drunk, that would be another matter. None of us would put forward any defence of my noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye in the circumstances envisaged by the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor. If my noble friend came to this House completely drunk and made a speech on this Traffic Bill, we should not pay the same attention to his views on the Hanging Bill next week. But it is not quite that case, and there must have been some reason for putting in this exemption and giving the magistrates this latitude; and there must equally be some reason for taking it away. I think that both cases are arguable, but I personally feel more inclined to take the path of mercy unless there is some valid reason to the contrary.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORMay I give my noble friend Lord Hore-Belisha exactly the sort of case which I believe Lord Sankey (he was the Lord Chancellor in 1930; and for a moment I hoped that my noble friend Lord Hore-Belisha was the Minister of Transport, but it was just before his day) had in mind, and which I think covers the point? It was a case called Burrows v. Hall. There a lorry driver, who had earned his living in that way for eighteen years, was convicted of driving a private car without proper insurance. But the disqualification automatically resulting from his conviction, there being no special reason for not disqualifying him, was limited to the driving of a private car. My noble and learned friend the Lord Chief Justice described the case as a very proper one for the exercise of the power. I think that that is what the Law Officers had in mind. It was most important—and nobody knows 445 it better than my noble friend Lord Hore-Belisha, because of his time at the Ministry of Transport—to drive home the need for vehicles to be covered by third-party insurance; and therefore the automatic disqualification was invoked. This loophole was intended to provide for that sort of case. So far as I know, that was its main purpose, although, of course, I cannot say it was the only purpose.
In my view, there is all the difference in the world between that case and a case of "drunk in charge" or dangerous driving. As I said in my earlier speech to your Lordships, that is now dealt with in the case of insurance provision, because it is a matter of discretion and not automatic disqualification. But in the other two cases, where someone has been found guilty of driving a car while under the influence of drink or drugs, or has been convicted of either dangerous or careless driving, in circumstances that have made the magistrates think that he should be disqualified, I do not think this discretion is justified. The magistrates would impose disqualification, where it is discretionary, only in a serious case. If it is an automatic disqualification, they are the cases which we think are ipso facto serious. In these cases I do not think it is right that a man should be allowed on the roads until the time has come when he has made the usual application to be freed from his disqualification. We cannot, with one mouth, at eighteen minutes past three, solemnise over the bloodshed on the roads, and with another, at eighteen minutes past four, as soon as we get the first opportunity, make the penalties Wore easy.
§ LORD DERWENTI should like to put a case to my noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye and the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor. Is there not in this matter a danger of acquittal when there should not be an acquittal? May I go back to the tractor driver on a Saturday night who goes to a dance, which is a gay party; he drinks nothing but lemonade; he is a youngster and he gets on his motor-cycle when he comes out of the dance, and in a bit of youthful stupidity drives round the local roundabout twice in the wrong direction. There is no traffic, and he does not hit anybody. A policeman sees him and, quite rightly and properly, "runs him in" for dangerous driving. He comes up in front 446 of the magistrate. No actual damage has been done but there has been dangerous driving. The Bench is then told "If you find this man guilty, he is going to lose his livelihood." They may in fact think that in this particular case they ought to convict, but it is a case of youthful high spirits. They may—and I should like the views of the noble and learned Viscount on the matter—acquit him in that particular case when he ought not to be acquitted. I do not know whether the noble and learned Viscount agrees.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORI wanted to check up the penalties so that I could deal exactly with my noble friend's point. On the case that he has put, where the man is sober and there is no question of a charge of drunkenness but he is convicted of dangerous driving, our proposed maximum penalty for a first conviction is £100 or four months imprisonment or both, with discretionary disqualification. It is a matter for the magistrates, but I cannot imagine, in the circumstances which my noble friend Lord Derwent has set, when somebody has gone twice round a roundabout the wrong way without any other traffic about, that the magistrates would impose a discretionary disqualification on him. The case that he has set is a potentially hard case, and if hard cases make bad law, obviously hard cases that are unlikely to happen would be an infinitely worse thing.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHI have listened carefully to what the noble and learned Viscount has said, and I think we must express the view that we agree with him completely. I am glad that the insurance angle has been taken care of. But if someone shows himself incapable of sufficient self-control to abuse a mechanical contrivance on the roads to the danger of other people, he must pay the penalty. If his livelihood is at stake, then that must make him all the more careful. In our daily lives we have always to consider whether the conduct which we display will have an effect upon that side of our lives, and I do not think there should be any "let up" on that sound rule in this particular case. In view of the discussions we had previously, I do not think we can do anything else at this stage. I agree completely with the noble and learned Viscount.
§ LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYEI do not press this matter unduly, but, on the other hand, the noble and learned Viscount would, I am sure, agree that the previous discussion, important as it was, should not in any way sway our judgment of the merits or demerits of the proposal in this particular Amendment. None of us can hold any brief for the drunken person, and I should be willing to see universal disqualification for all classes of vehicle continue in the case of the drunk. But I am not entirely happy about the case of the young man on the motor cycle who is normally a tractor driver. Would the noble and learned Viscount be so good as to consider between now and the Report stage whether there should be any limitation in this universal disqualification for all types of vehicles, without in any way encouraging those who should not be on the roads to continue to be on the roads? My noble friend Lord Derwent has a powerful point when he says that this universal disqualification may, in fact, make the magistrates hesitant to disqualify when they should. Would the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, be willing to consider whether there should be any limitation of this universal disqualification, while at the same time keeping it for all proper cases?
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHDisqualifying a tractor driver does not take his living away. A tractor driver need not have a licence.
§ LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYEHe must if he takes the tractor on the road.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHYes, but how often does he do that? A tractor driver can still drive his tractor with a plough behind him on a farm or for any other use that does not involve driving a vehicle on the road. Perhaps the most a tractor driver does is to drive across the road from one field to another. "Taking his living away" is perhaps a little colourful.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORThe noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, is, of course, absolutely right—all it means is getting someone to take the vehicle across the road. I shall, of course, read carefully, and we shall all consider and discuss, every word that has been said in this debate. But I should be less than 448 honest with your Lordships if I held out the slightest hope that my mind will be changed on the matter.
§ LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYEIn view of the words of the noble and learned Viscount, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment, on the understanding that we may consider this matter again on the Report stage.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Clause 24 agreed to.
§ Clause 25 agreed to.
§ Clause 26 [Additional provisions as to production and surrender of driving licences, etc.]:
§ THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (LORD MANCROFT)Amendments Nos. 68 and 69 go together. The point is purely one of machinery: it is a tidying-up point, and uncontroversial. It is twenty-six minutes past four and we have a long way to go, so I propose to say no more about it. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 38, leave out from ("him") to end of line 44.—(Lord Mancroft.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ LORD MANCROFTThis is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
§ Amendment moved—
§
Page 23, line 40, at end insert—
("(5) Subsection (4) of section one hundred and twelve of the Act of 1930 (which provides for the seizure and disposal of documents in relation to which an offence has been committed under that section) shall apply in relation to a licence, certificate or other document produced in pursuance of this section as it applies in relation to documents produced in pursuance of the provisions of that Act.")—(Lord Mancroft.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ 4.28 p.m.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRK moved, after Clause 27, to insert the following new clause:
§ Amendment of s. 46 of Act of 1930
§ ".—(1) The powers conferred by subsection (2) of section forty-six of the Act of 1930 (which authorises the making of orders regulating traffic on roads) shall be exercisable as respects any road where it appears to the council or Minister exercising the power that it is expedient so to do—
- (a) for avoiding danger to persons or other traffic using the road or any other road, or
- (b) for preventing damage to the road or to any building on or near the road, or
- (c) for facilitating the passage of vehicular traffic on the road or any other road, or
- (d) for preventing the use of the road by vehicular traffic of a kind which, or the use thereof by such traffic in a manner which, is unsuitable having regard to the existing character of the road or adjoining property.
§ (2) The provision which may be made by order under the said subsection (2) shall be any provision prohibiting, restricting or regulating the use of a road or any part of the width thereof by vehicular traffic or by such traffic of any class or description specified in the order, either generally or subject to exceptions so specified, and either at all times or at times, on days or during periods so specified and, without prejudice to the generality of this subsection, any provision—
- (a) requiring such traffic to proceed in a specified direction or prohibit its so proceeding,
- (b) specifying the part of the carriageway to be used by such traffic proceeding in a specified direction,
- (c) prohibiting or restricting the waiting of vehicles or the loading and unloading of vehicles,
- (d) prohibiting the use of roads by though traffic,
- (e) prohibiting or restricting overtaking,
- (f) regulating the speed of vehicles.
§ (3) An order made in the exercise of the said powers by any council to which the said section forty-six applies which contains no provision other than provision—
- (a) prohibiting or restricting the waiting of vehicles or the loading and unloading of vehicles, or
- (b) prohibiting or restricting the use of footpaths or bridleways by bicycles and tricycles, or
- (c) revoking or varying any such prohibition or restriction,
§ Provided that—
- (i) this subsection shall not apply to any trunk road; and
- (ii) where before the coming into operation of this section an order has been submitted to the Minister for confirmation but the Minister has neither confirmed the order
450 nor determined not to confirm it, the order may be proceeded with as if this subsection had not been passed.
§ (4) The following provisions shall have effect as respects the proviso to subsection (2) of the said section forty-six (under which no order may be made with respect to a road which would have the effect of preventing reasonable access for vehicles of any class or description to premises on or adjacent to the road):—
- (a) for the purposes of the application of the said proviso to vehicles any class or description premises shall be treated as adjacent to a road, whatever their distance therefrom, if they are accessible for vehicles of that class or description from, and only from, that road;
- (b) the said proviso shall not have effect in relation to an order confirmed or made by the Minister in so far as the authority making the order is satisfied that, for avoiding danger to persons or other traffic using the road to which the order relates or any other road, or for preventing damage to the road or buildings on or near it, it is requisite that the said proviso should not apply, and it is stated in the order that the said authority is satisfied as aforesaid;
- (c) a restriction on the loading or unloading of goods shall in no circumstances be treated as preventing such access as may be reasonably required if the restriction does not prevent loading or unloading for more than six hours in all in any consecutive period of twenty-four hours.
§ (5) In subsection (8) of the said section forty-six (which specifies the councils to which that section applies) the reference to urban districts shall (but subject to subsection (7) of this section) include, and be deemed always to have included, a reference to boroughs, not being county boroughs.
§ (6) The power conferred by subsection (6) of section twenty-nine of the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933, of making regulations for prescribing procedure shall include power to make regulations for prescribing the proceedure to be followed in connection with the making by a council of an order which by reason of subsection (3) of this section does not require confirmation and the holding of enquiries in connection therewith.
§ (7) The said section forty-six, and subsections (4) to (6) of the said section twenty-nine, shall cease to apply as respects the London Traffic Area, without prejudice, however, to any order made, or having effect as if made, thereunder before the coming into operation of this section, and any such order in so far as it relates to the London Traffic Area may be varied or revoked by regulations under section ten of the London Traffic Act, 1924.
§ (8) In subsection (2) of section forty-six of the Act of 1930 for the words from 'for any' to 'of traffic' there shall be substituted the words 'containing any such provision as is specified in subsection (2) of section (Amendment of s. 46 of Act of 1930) of the Road Traffic Act, 1956' and in subsection (4) of section twenty-nine of the Road and Rail 451 Traffic Act, 1933 for the words from 'restricting' to '1930' there shall be substituted the words under subsection (2) of section forty-six of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 which'.
§ (9) In the application of this section to Scotland for references to the Minister there shall be substituted references to the Secretary of State."
§ The noble Earl said: This is a long piece of drafting, as your Lordships will see. It is an Amendment to Section 46 of the 1930 Act, which deals with powers to restrict the use of vehicles on specified roads—that is to say, things like no waiting, one-way streets and unilateral parking, mainly outside London. What I propose to do is to go through this clause and explain it broadly to the House, drawing your Lordships' attention particularly to those subsections which are new. The first subsection merely describes the consideration which has to be in the Minister's mind before he uses the powers given later. They are the usual things: danger to persons, damage to roads and the through flow of traffic. That is paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). I should particularly like to draw attention to paragraph (d). There is a new factor there. It may be that the traffic is unsuitable, having regard to the existing character of the adjoining road and adjoining property. I draw that particularly to the attention of my noble friend Lord Conesford, who I know is interested in that aspect. Subsection (2) describes the various methods which may be employed to achieve the objects contained in subsection (1). They are: one-way traffic, dual carriageways, no waiting, diverting through-traffic, restricting overtaking, regulating speed limits and regulating weight. This is largely clarification and restatement.
§
When we come to subsection (3) we are entering a controversial field. I will be quite frank in explaining to the Committee just what the controversy is. On the one hand, there are those—they are substantially the local authorities—who want us to go further than we do. They want more powers than we are giving them here. On the other hand, there are the operators and users of vehicles who think that we are giving too much power to local authorities. If your Lordships will observe subsection (3), paragraph (a), you will see that what we are in fact doing is giving the local authorities the power of
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prohibiting or restricting the waiting of vehicles or the loading and unloading of vehicles
without confirmation of the Minister, as is at present required. The other two paragraphs, (b) and (c), prohibiting and restricting the use of footpaths or bridle-paths and revoking or varying such prohibition, deal with comparatively small matters, so far as the motoring public is concerned. The issue is really a matter of principle: whether or not all these small regulations all over the country, in large or small towns, should have to be submitted for the approval of the Minister and his Department before they can become effective.
§ The regulations covering these matters constitute a substantial number of the regulations made under Section 46 at the present time—indeed, I am told that these restrictions on waiting and the unloading and loading of vehicles take up at least half the time of the Department dealing with the regulation of traffic. The clause, therefore, represents quite a substantial measure of decentralisation. In passing, I would suggest to the Committee that these are local matters, which essentially affect local people. Whether a car is allowed to stop or whether it is not is really a matter which the local people are essentially competent and qualified to decide.
§ I will pass on to subsection (4), which deals with the question of access. This was especially referred to in Section 46. Your Lordships will see that paragraph (a) extends the description of access and includes in access roads adjacent to the point in question. That means to say that the consideration of access is on a rather wider basis. Paragraph (b) does not make very much alteration. It says merely that considerations of access may be reduced in cases where there is danger to persons or for preventing damage to roads or buildings. Paragraph (c) deals with restriction of access and says that in restricting loading and unloading for certain periods during the day, the total restriction shall be limited to six hours in the twenty-four. I am aware that the question of whether it is fair that it should be possible to restrict loading and unloading for a period of six hours is also a matter of controversy. I say straight away that I am not going to stand very firmly on six hours. I think that the restriction of periods of loading and unloading in 453 our big cities will become increasingly necessary if we are to keep through-traffic moving. We should recognise that such restriction will become an integral part of the ordinary traffic regulations which exist in different places.
§ The only other part of this new clause I need mention is subsection (6), which gives the Minister power to make regulations prescribing the procedure which local authorities will be required to go through in order to make their regulations. In every case, if they are going to use the powers under subsection (3), they will have to advertise and, of course, it may lead to public inquiries being held by the local authority. I have had extensive consultations with both the local authorities and the users of the roads on this clause. I shall not pretend that agreement has been reached between them, because it has not. I am afraid it is the sort of clause where there may be a certain difference of opinion, and where a certain conflict of interest must exist. We have tried here to make a balance between the various interests which may be concerned. If I may, I will deal subsequently with the Amendments to the new clause, but I hope that the general principles on which the clause is drawn will commend it to your Lordships. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
After Clause 27, insert the said new clause. —(The Earl of Selkirk.)
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEESThere are various Amendments to this clause. The first one stands in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Conesford. Then come two Amendments standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Teynham. I do not know whether your Lordships have corrected copies of the Third Marshalled List, because on the top of page 5, after the Amendments down in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, which might be described as Amendments to the new clause, there are Amendments to Section 46 of the Act of 1930 standing in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk. They have been left out. The same thing should apply to the next Amendment—" Leave out subsection (4)"—in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Teynham. That should also be described as an Amendment to the new clause. I think that will make the position clear.
§ 4.36 p.m.
§
LORD CONESFORD moved, as an Amendment to the Amendment, after the proposed new subsection (1) to insert:
(2) It is hereby declared that, without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of the foregoing subsection, an order under subsection (2) of the said section forty-six may be made for the purpose of preserving the amenities of any road or the area through which it passes for the benefit of pedestrians, riders of horses and others.
§ The noble Lord said: I am certainly not going to raise any opposition to the general principles of this clause, though I am going strongly to commend my Amendment to the friendly consideration of my noble friend. I should like, if I may, to remind the Committee of the existing law. The existing law on the subject is contained mainly i t Section 46 of the Act of 1930, as amended by Section 29 of the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933. That enables restrictions on the classes of traffic that can use particular roads to be made. The words of the main Statute, in Section 46 of the Act of 1930, looked 10 the layman to be fairly satisfactory. It looked to the layman as if it would enable the authorities—I will not trouble the Committee with w hat the authorities are—in a proper case to make the appropriate restrictions on traffic using a particular highway, but the legal advice given to successive Ministers of Transport was that those powers could be used on the ground of safety and so forth but could not be used on the ground of amenity.
§
That fact was deplored by the Ministry of Transport themselves. If I may tell the Committee something of which it will not be aware, although it is very much before my mind, I am enabled by this Amendment to advocate something which I nearly brought into law almost exactly seventeen years ago. In the summer of 1939, as a Private Member of the House of Commons, I obtained the Second Reading of a Highways Protection Bill and carried that Bill through the Committee stage upstairs, with the full support of my friends the Ministers at the Ministry of Transport. In the tragic events of that summer, this amendment of the law that I proposed could not be carried further. If I may give the Committee the Long Title of my Bill, it was called the
Highways Protection Bill: A Bill to make provision for the preservation of amenities of
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certain highways by the prohibition or restriction of traffic thereon.
The splendid words of the opening operative section were these:
For the purpose of preserving the amenities of unmetalled roads for the benefit of pedestrians, riders of horses and others.…
§ Let me tell the Committee exactly the roads that I had in mind—and I believe that every noble Lord present will sympathise and agree with my object. What I was thinking of was the green roads of England, of which perhaps the most superb and best known example is that road at the top of the Berkshire Downs, on a section of which you can walk from above Wantage to the White Horse. I think this road will he familiar to many noble Lords; it is one of the most glorious roads in England, which means that it is one of the most glorious roads in the world. It is a prehistoric highway and it has been enjoyed by pedestrians and riders of horses for over 7,000 years. That is a not uninteresting fact, and I think we should be enthusiastic to preserve the amenities of such a road for its proper purpose. It is an unmetalled road, but in law it is a public highway.
§ I think we all desire, as the Ministry of Transport certainly desired at the time of which I speak, and I think have desired ever since, that the highway authority or the Minister, or some appropriate authority, should be able to restrict the use of such roads to pedestrians and riders of horses, and, of course, to such necessary things as farm vehicles and vehicles wishing to approach premises that can be reached only from the Ridgeway. What we do not desire is for it to be used as a general road for motor traffic, which, incidentally, would completely ruin the surface.
§
My noble friend, in moving the insertion of this new clause, quite rightly drew my attention to paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of the new clause. I agree with him that it may be argued that that goes rather further in the way of enabling amenities to be protected than the words of the existing Statute. Nevertheless, I am bound to inform him that any layman would have thought the words of section 46 of the 1930 Act were sufficient. May I remind the Minister of those words. The authority has to be satisfied that the vehicles which it prohibits from using the roads
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cannot be used, or cannot without restriction be used, on that road without endangering the safety of the vehicles or the persons therein, or of other persons using the road, or that the road is unsuitable for use or for unrestricted use by any such vehicles.
Those words struck most laymen as being sufficient to enable the Ridgeway to be protected in the manner that I have suggested. Nevertheless, the legal advice that was tendered to my noble friend's predecessors was that it was insufficient to protect a road on the ground of amenity.
§
I am not willing, and I do not believe noble Lords in any section of the House will be willing, to run the risk on this occasion of the lawyers saying anything of the sort about whatever provision we insert to-day. We want to place it beyond a shadow of doubt that the powers that this section confers can be used on the ground of amenity. That is the reason why I have set down my Amendment. I do not prejudice anything at all that the Minister has already provided, but for the sake of placing it quite beyond doubt I seek to insert these words:
It is hereby declared that, without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of the foregoing subsection, an order under subsection (2) of the said section forty-six may be made for the purpose of preserving the amenities of any road or the area through which it passes for the benefit of pedestrians, riders of horses and others.
§ I commend this Amendment to the Committee. I have tried to make its purpose clear. It would be wrong for me to try to anticipate what my noble friend may say in reply to my Amendment, because I shall no doubt have a chance to reply to what he says; but I can conceive of his saying two things. I can conceive his saying that, by reason of the subsection to which he drew my attention, my words are unnecessary. I have already given the answer to that: let us be on the safe side. Even though his present advisers may consider them unnecessary, if they are harmless and produce the result that I have suggested, let us have them. The other thing that he may say is that there are words or phrases in my Amendment which go a little too wide. Well, I hope I am a reasonable man, and of course I will consider any criticism of the actual wording which I have put down, though I do not think there is much wrong with it. But I commend to the Committee the principle of placing beyond the slightest shadow of doubt, that, when this Bill, 457 with this new clause, goes in to the Statute Book, the Berkshire Ridgeway and the green roads of England can be preserved for pedestrians, riders of horses and others and not used as general motorways for motor traffic. I beg to move.
§
Amendment to the Amendment moved—
Line 23, at end insert the said new subsection.—(Lord Conesford.)
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHNo-one who has any love of the countryside will disagree with anything that the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, has said, and he can count upon support from this side of the House. I endorse precisely what he said: that too many times are we fobbed off with the statement that the existing wording covers what we want, and then, five years afterwards—as has been our experience this afternoon—-we find that it does no such thing.
In an effort to help the Minister and to save the time of the Committee I want to make my observations upon tie new clause in general. I do not suppose it will in any way prohibit the adoption of Amendments, but it will save a little time. I find myself in a difficulty because I think the Minister has given us a hard choice. I have a lot of sympathy for him. I served in this Department for quite a time and I know of the flood of recommendations that come from every local authority in the country for ministerial approval. But while I am prepared to admit that the "gentleman in Whitehall," as the popular expression goes, does not know everything—indeed, there are occasions when his knowledge is sadly lacking in anything—I am not going to say that Mr. Bumbledom of Slopeombeon-the-Slush knows any more. I agree precisely with what the Minister says.
The things that the Minister wants to decentralise, if I may use that term, are highly commendable. But the Minister may not realise that he is slightly in error when he says that all these things are purely local concerns—they are not. My fear is this: that these are powers that you are going to hand over to local authorities without any reference to the Minister, and which, as I read it, the Minister cannot undo when they are done. The noble Earl was fairness itself in presenting this to us. The subsection uses these words: 458
shall not require confirmation by the Minister, and the Minister shall m t have power to revoke or vary any such prohibition or restriction contained in an order made by or on the application of any such council.I take it that the obverse is true. If the local authority decides not to put in one of these restrictions, no body of opinion in that area can call a public inquiry. And what happens if a public inquiry is in favour of putting in a restriction which the local authority refuse to do?The best thing I can do is to cite a practical case, and I have only to turn to a city that has been the subject of discussion in the Press and in Parliament regarding congestion of traffic; that is, the City of Oxford. The city authorities of Oxford have had the power that is contained in this Bill for a long, long time. They have not exercised it. The greatest congestion factor on the main road—it is not a purely local affair— is that the High Street of the City of Oxford is a bottleneck, because lorries and goods vehicles from Carfax, 300 yards to the East, are loading and unloading and parking there all day long, on both sides of the street. So what should be a four-carriageway road to carry the traffic is narrowed to two. If that road were cleared, together with one or two other bottlenecks of a like nature on both sides of the four cross-roads, there would be hardly any congestion in the City of Oxford.
Why is it not done? The reason these things are not done—and I am not going to make the direct accusation in this particular case, though I suspect there is more than a modicum of truth in it—is the high pressure of vested interests on local authorities. It is more prone to happen in local authorities than in central government. You have the lobbying of the Chamber of Commerce or the Chamber of Trade shopkeepers represented on the local authority say "No," and this wrangling goes on and on until nothing is done. Nothing could be more disadvantageous to he shopping interests and business interests in any town or city than congestion. It frightens away the money that is brought into any rural town and city from outside. How is the Minister going to get ever the problem?
May I quote another example, Horsham. The Minister who graced Oxford with his presence many years 459 ago—not too many years, but a fair number of years ago—knows the problem there. He also knows the problem in Horsham. I could tell him the problem, and so could the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, in nearly every town and city in this country through which a main road passes. If we had universal bypasses all round every crowded town and city, I should not mind if the local authorities wrangled about a matter like this till the cows came home. But do not forget that some of our principal roads run right through the cities. And would the noble Earl like to have the conglomeration of one-way traffic schemes that are being put in by some of these local authorities? At the present time we have the saving grace that the Minister can say "No".
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKOne-way traffic will still require the confirmation of the Minister.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHI am obliged. And will the thirty miles an hour limit?
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKYes.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHWhat does not require confirmation is:
So really the main point is the prohibiting or restricting of the waiting of vehicles, or the loading or unloading of vehicles. I am glad the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, is here, because I am going to pray him in aid of my argument. In regard to the restriction of the waiting of vehicles, if the authorities have a real "blitz" on this, where are they going to push the vehicles to? Ought there not to be some provision here that they should provide adequate parking space for the vehicles that they are going to push off the roads? We come back to the same problem which we discussed yesterday. What is the good of putting any prohibition on the parking of vehicles—"waiting," is only a polite term for parking—either by meter or by regulation such as this, unless there is some place into which to drive the vehicles? That 460 is the difficult choice which I think faces us.
- "(a) prohibiting or restricting the waiting of vehicles or the loading and unloading of vehicles, or
- (b) prohibiting or restricting the use of footpaths or bridleways by bicycles and tricycles, or
- (c) revoking or varying any such prohibition or restriction."
I am not prepared to say that this clause is going to be exercised in a wise manner. I know I ought to say that, but one has only to be in a Department like the Ministry of Transport for a little time to lose all faith, or nearly all faith, in the wisdom of public authorities, local authorities, up and down the country. Again, I should like to relieve the Minister of a lot of the detail. Trunk roads—the noble Earl will correct me if I am wrong—are not going to be taken out of the control of the Minister. When 1S a trunk road not a trunk road? In other words, what happens to the trunk road when it comes to the local authority boundary? Is it then a trunk road? Let me cite again the High Street at Oxford, which is really part of the A.40, although there is a by-pass; I believe I am right in saying that the main road through Oxford, the High, is a continuation of the A.40. Does the Minister retain authority over that road in respect of these prohibitions? Do they still have to be submitted to the Minister, and can the Minister say "You must have them" if the local authorities say "No"? Those are some of the difficulties that I foresee. I should like to see more delegation of power if we can have proper safeguards.
May I put another case to the Minister? Take the stopping places of buses, one of the worst features in some of our most congested towns and cities. They pay no regard to through-traffic. After all, a local authority, which is supposed to be representative of its citizens, will designate bus stops for those places most suited for the passengers who want to travel by bus. And yet, at the same time, they may cause the greatest congestion in that particular city. Oxford again is a typical example. There is not only a bus stop in the most congested part of the High but there is a conductor and driver change-over point. This means that there will be two or three buses standing there for quite a substantial length of time—and the spot is right opposite the Mitre Hotel, which is known to many of your Lordships. What safeguards have we against this?
What I am afraid of is that in our attempt to decentralise we shall have confusion worse confounded. I support the Minister if he can, either now or at some 461 other stage, have sufficient safeguards, both pro and con; because I agree that not only in provincial cities and towns, but in London also, we shall never get any sense into our methods of dealing with the road accident problem unless, recognising that congestion is a contributory factor to road accidents, every section of the community gives way a little. The trade unions have got to give way 0.1 this matter of loading and unloading. It is no good their adopting a clog-in-the-manger attitude. And it is no good vested interests adopting a dog-in-the-manger attitude. Some of the streets in London are absolutly impassable—I mean that literally—because of cars parked on either side of the carriageway and vans loading and unloading in the middle. I do not think I need say any more. I have expressed my fears, and if the noble Earl can relieve them in any way, I shall be indebted to him. To come back to the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, we support him one hundred per cent.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKShall we dispose of this Amendment of Lord Cones-ford's right away? Lord Conesford has indeed touched my heart. To think that he has for seventeen years been endeavouring to put what is contained in this wholly desirable Amendment on the Order Paper! I am delighted to accept it in principle. We think, however, that it would look better drafted as part of subsection (1), and I am suggesting that it should go into the Bill as paragraph (e) in subsection (1) instead of in the Form in which it is put forward.
IORD CONESFORDI have never known an Amendment which has peen drawn up by an amateur accepted in its initial form by Parliamentary draftsmen —arid quite rightly so. No doubt what the noble Earl suggests is a much better way of doing this, and I am grateful to him. I now beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ 5.4 p.m.
§ LORD WALERAN moved, as an Amendment to the Amendment, to leave out paragraph (c) of subsection (2). The noble Lord said: My noble friend Lord Teynham has asked me to move this Amendment for him and to express his regret that he cannot be here. I think it might be convenient for 462 your Lordships if I spoke on this Amendment and the next one together. The first is to leave out paragraph (c) of subsection (2) of the new clause and the second to leave out paragraph (a) of subsection (3). I can deal with them quite briefly, as Lord Lucas of Chilworth has very well covered much of the ground which I was going to cover
§ My noble friend lord Teynham, the motoring organisations and I are very much worried at the idea that these restrictions can be imposed by local authorities and need not be referred to the Minister if there is an argument. If I may give your Lordships an example to support the case I am putting, it was not long ago that the City of Manchester tried to introduce traffic regulations which would have banned the loading and unloading of vehicles in some of the streets of Manchester. Several associations raised objections to the proposal, with the result that the Minster ordered a public inquiry. As the result of the inquiry, the Minister refused to ratify the proposals, recognising the necessity for allowing free access to premises and the loading and unloading of goods. If the proposed new powers set out in the new clause had been available to the Manchester City Corporation they could have imposed the restrictions they wanted without reference to the Minister. I hope that, somehow, the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, will see his way to laking some provision so that if there are a large number of objections at least a public inquiry can be held. I think that the new clause also applies to passenger vehicles and interferes with the right of the public to be picked up and set dawn at the specified stopping places. This matter is already dealt with fully by the traffic commissioners, I believe, under Section 72 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. I submit to your Lordships that it will create an impossible situation if lie powers of the traffic commissioners, already exercised after proper investigation, can be frustrated by the total prohibition which might arise from the application of this provision in the new clause. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved——
Leave out paragraph (c) of subsection (2) of the proposed new clause.—(Lord Waleran.)
§ LORD DERWENTI am speaking bluntly and frankly on behalf of a great 463 many thousands of commercial road users. I do not think that the Minister's problem is necessarily as serious as he imagines. The matter that is particularly concerning commercial road users is this question of loading and unloading in general. Any regulations made by a local authority would, in general, probably be in the best interests of the commercial firms. At the present time, however, there is such a claim on road space, and in local politics there are so many other factors taken into account which are extraneous to the subject under consideration, that commercial road users feel very much alarmed lest, in a few cases, questions of where loading and unloading shall be permitted, and the times, will be judged not on their merits but on something quite extraneous, and without any right of appeal to the Minister. I think that what they have in mind particularly is that, in cases which are not apparently big enough for a public inquiry, they might have the power to refer the matter to the Minister, who would be able to give a ruling or order a public inquiry if he thought fit. I am not putting that forward as a detailed scheme. I believe that if the Minister does reserve some powers to himself he will still get rid of the work at the Ministry which he is now trying to get rid of. The other point is that on this particular problem, a considerable friendly feeling has grown up between commercial road users and Ministry officials. The Ministry officials understand this problem thoroughly, and I think it is right to say that they are trusted by the commercial road users, whereas, quite frankly, local authorities are not.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI am delighted to hear the high testimony paid by the noble Lord to the Departments of Transport and Civil Aviation and to their judgment and understanding. None the less, my right honourable friend is anxious, if he can, to decentralise any powers which can be decentralised while keeping the balance between all users of the road. May I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, that I am not prepared to say whether the High Street at Oxford is a trunk road or not, but I do know that if it is, the restrictions 464 under subsection (3) do not apply. They remain with the Minister.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHThis is especially important because this is the case with many roads. Take, for example, the Great North Road, running through Grantham and Stamford. If these parts are going to be eliminated, that puts a different complexion altogether on it.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI am glad that the noble Lord is supporting this. I would draw his attention to the proviso to subsection (3) of the new clause, which says:
Provided that—(i) this subsection shall not apply to any trunk road;I think that that covers the point. In regard to initiative, the Minister can act in matters of restriction and prohibition only on the initiative of the local authority, so that outside trunk roads, he has no initiative. For that reason, I suggest that there is not such a big difference as the noble Lord might be held to suggest in his remarks.
§ LORD DERWENTAm I right in thinking that at present the Minister has to give final approval, even when there is no inquiry into a scheme of this kind?
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKThat is correct. At the present time every scheme regulating roads—and there are hundreds of schemes every year—has to go to the Department. We are trying to shed as many of these as we can. I believe that your Lordships are fully in agreement with us in trying to get as much moved out of the Department as we reasonably can.
LORD GIFFORDOne thing is not clear to me. Subsection (6) speaks of an order which:
does not require confirmation and the holding of inquiries in connection therewith.It seems to me that the local authority are quite unfettered, though perhaps I am wrong.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI should like to take advice on that. My guess is that it means that inquiries are not obligatory, but that, where they are necessary, they are to be held. The noble Lord, Lord Waleran, brought up the question of bus stops, and I would say that this 465 matter is dealt with in the Amendment to the clause which stands in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, to insert "other than public service vehicles." We are willing to accept that in principle, though I am not quite satisfied with the words. If, in due course, the noble Lord will withdraw the Amendment, we will put in words which would allow for that. The reason is that stopping places of public service vehicles are matters for the traffic commissioners and will have to be dealt with differently from other stopping places.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHCannot the noble Earl take into consideration the question of appeal, if there is a conflict between the local authority and the traffic commissioners as to the best place for bus stops? I am certain that local authorities do not want to exercise the power which the noble Lord wants to give them, only to find that they are frustrated by bus stops placed there by the traffic commissioners. I think that there must be some appeal to the Minister on that point.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI think that that is the proposal. I should not like to say what form the Amendment will take, but I accept it in principle.
In regard to the Amendment to leave out paragraph (c) of subsection t2), I think that the noble Lord really had in mind paragraph (a) of subsection (3), because I do not think that your Lordships wish to leave out that paragraph. In regard to paragraph (a), there are two elements. There is the prohibition or restriction on waiting, and your Lordships made little objection to that. The point that was emphasised was the loading or unloading of vehicles. I wonder whether the noble Lord would agree to allow the clause to go in as it stands, on the clear understanding that we will have discussions about whether or not the words "loading or unloading" should go in, or should go in with some restriction or with some subsidiary arrangement that would meet the point he has in mind. I shall be very glad to discuss it. This is a big step forward. I hope it will be possible for your Lordships to agree to the clause because we are anxious to take everything we can away from the Department.
§ LORD HORE-BEL1SHAI am a little perplexed. The Minister has put down a new clause to the Bill. I do not know what has been discussed in the last few moments, because it was not clear to me, but the fact is that a new clause has been moved and the central part of that clause concerns the loading or unloading of vehicles. If there be one cause of traffic congestion and delay greater than any other, except parking, it is this loading or unloading of vehicles on the public highway. If noble Lords endeavour to come to this House through King's Road or almost any other main road, the likelihood is that they will be held up by some large lorry loading or unloading goods. Until we get rid of this nuisance there cannot be a free: flow of traffic on the highroads. Therefore, I had hoped to compliment the Minister on doing something in this matter. I am not quite sure what it is he is doing, but he is obviously doing something.
One thing is clear: he is giving to local authorities power to restrict this nuisance. I do not k now that they have shown much enthusiasm for doing so in the past. I do not know of any case of any importance where this loading or unloading is restricted, but I understand the Minister to say, and the clause says, if I read it aright, that local authorities will henceforward be able to say that there Shall be no loading or unloading of vehicles in specified streets at certain hours, at rush hours or some other time of the day. That is an entirely salutary proposal, going to the root of the problem, and the Government are to be congratulated very much upon it. I quite understand that: certain vested interests should come here—
§ LORD DERWENTI am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but I was one of those who asked the Minister to take certain steps about this loading or unloading. Everyone agrees that control is necessary. I should not like it to go out from this Committee that what the noble Lord calls "vested interests" are against the regulation of loading and unloading. The noble Lord was not here during our discussion. We were asking that the Minister should retain a certain slight control himself.
§ 5.20 p.m.
§ LORD HORE-BELISHAI do not think there can be any difference between the noble Lord who has interrupted me any myself. He got up this afternoon and said, quite frankly, that there was an interest in this matter which he wished to represent—that is to say, the interest of the traders. It is by no means illegitimate that the noble Lord should come here and say that and it is equally legitimate that I should say that it is natural that vested interests should come here and say it. Quite clearly, there is a conflict of interest between the public and those who have business to do in a particular street. The duty of the State is to hold the scales evenly between them, and in this particular case to see that the roads are used for the best purpose. There is nothing wrong or immoral in that. We are here to decide the question.
I said that I wanted to congratulate the Government on doing this. I do not think it takes us very far, because the local authorities have not in the past been particularly forthcoming—perhaps because they have some doubt about their powers. I hope that no qualification will be introduced now that the principle has been brought before the Committee. We want to stop this loading and unloading. The point of the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, was that there should be an appeal to the Minister.
§ LORD DERWENTIn certain cases.
§ LORD HORE-BELISHAYes, in certain cases. I do not think there should be, because the local authority is the proper body to decide, as the Minister said when he introduced the clause a few minutes ago. They know in Manchester, Leeds, Huddersfield or Oxford what the condition of their streets may be, and if they cannot discharge that responsibility without cluttering up the Ministry of Transport there is no point in local government at all. The Minister comes here and says: "I want to free my Ministry. My officials are having two-thirds of their time on this subject taken up in confirming orders made by authorities who really know their own business." I want the Minister to stick to his guns, unless some good reason is produced to the contrary. I think it is natural that the traders should represent their point of view in this Committee, but I feel that the public interest should be safeguarded. 468 The noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, appealed to me and said: "What are we going to do with these vehicles that we keep off the road? They would simply clutter up other streets." I do not think that is so, because we shall keep them off the streets during certain hours and they will remain in their garages.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHThe noble Lord will forgive me for interrupting. The Minister proposes not only restrictions on loading and unloading, but also a restriction on waiting—in other words, parking.
§ LORD HORE-BELISHAI think the noble Lord has a good point about waiting generally. But as regards loading and unloading, these big lorries will remain in their sheds except at certain hours, and we shall all get the benefit of that. This Bill is a progressive Bill; it is an experimental Bill: and it institutes one or two important reforms. I supported parking, and I wanted to go much further. I think we have got to get cars off the road by building garages where they can be put: I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, about that. We shall have to be bold about that in the future—this Bill is not particularly bold about it. That is one aspect of the solution, and this stopping of loading and unloading is another, which I feel is one of the most important parts of the Bill. Whilst I do not complain at all that my noble friend Lord Selkirk, who has been so conciliatory and patient, besides being so extremely efficient and knowledgeable, should discuss this matter, I felt it right that another point of view should be put, and particularly as it comes from one who wholeheartedly supports the new clause he has introduced.
§ LORD DERWENTI should like to apologise to my noble friend Lord HoreBelisha for having interrupted him. I thought he started his remarks by saying that he had not been here during our discussion on this point.
§ LORD HORE-BELISHANo; I was here. I hope that there is no conflict between us.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHWould the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, clarify one point? I am assuming that subsection (2) (c) of his proposed new 469 clause gives to the Minister, for the first time, the power of
prohibiting or restricting the waiting of vehicles or the loading or unloading of vehicles".and that subsection (3) (a) puts that responsibility on to the local authcrities. If I am right, the only point between us is: Should the Minister retain it, or should he hand it over to the local authorities? There is no difference in the Committee as to whether the Minister, or somebody, should have the right to do it. Then, if he hands it over to the local authority, should there be sufficient safeguards to ensure that the local authority actually gets on with the job. This is an important point, and I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, says about decentralisation. My experience is not that the local authorities are the proper people to do something like this. I have known local authorities, when the pressure group in control of the local authority comprises mainly shopkeepers, who would be absolutely antagonistic to any proposal to prevent them from enjoying the liberty of loading and unloading at any time of the day, irrespective of the inconvenience caused to other forms of traffic. I want the Minister to have power to step in and say to the local authority: "You have got to do this."
§ LORD HORE-BELISHAIf we have read this clause aright, what it does is to give the local authority power to do it without seeking confirmation from the Minister. I have said that I do not think that will take us very far; but it does take us some way. It does not deprive the Minister of the right; in fact, it gives him the right, in the first part of the clause, to do it himself.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKNo, that is not correct. The initiative lies with the local authority.
§ LORD HORE-BELISHAIn the second part.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKIt lies with the local authority in both parts. It is then for the Minister to confirm, except, of course, in London.
§ LORD HORE-BELISHASubsection (3) uses the words "shall not require confirmation."
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKShall not require confirmation in other cases, but will require confirmation.
§ LORD HORE-BELISHAI see.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKThe real crux of the matter is that unilateral waiting, or prohibiting through-traffic and overtaking will, in tact, all require the confirmation of the Minister.
§ LORD HORE-BELISHAThere is no power of initiative.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKNo, there is no power of initiative in this, broadly speaking. I am grateful for what the noble Lord, Lord Here-Belisha, has said. We are trying to take a step forward here. It may not be a big step, but I think it is an important one I am anxious not to weaken the power of local authorities, and I am anxious at the same time to be fair to those who use the roads. If the noble Lord, Lord Waleran, has any real difficulty here, I believe that it could be met under Clause 6 in regard to procedure by regulation. I am not sure how serious is the point which the noble Lord wants to make. I now have an explanation of the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Gifford. The answer is that under subsection (6) the Minister has the right to prescribe the procedure to be followed in connection with, first, the making by the council of an order and second, the holding of inquiries in connection therewith. So that the Minister can lay down the circumstances in which the order can be mace, and can also lay down the circumstances in which an inquiry would be held. If the noble Lord, Lord Waleran, will withdraw his Amendment, I shall he glad to have a discussion with him and the noble Lord, Lord Derwent; and I will bear in mind the firm line that the noble Lord. Lord HoreBelisha, has taken in not giving way.
§ Amendment to Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ LORD GIFFORD moved, as an Amendment to the Amendment, in subsection (3) (a), after "waiting of vehicles" to insert "other than public service vehicles". The noble Lord said: I will he brief in 471 moving this Amendment, in view of the assurance by the noble Earl. As I am sure he agrees, public service vehicles of various classes are different from other vehicles, in that we have traffic commissioners who have, since the passing of the 1930 Act, dealt with this type of vehicle. I think the noble Earl will also agree that what happens is that if the local authority wishes to take some action, the traffic commissioners or the licensing authority investigate it, and the approval of the Ministry is more or less formal. This procedure has worked well since the 1930 Act was passed, and it would be a great pity to interfere with it, particularly as matters relating to public service vehicles are not, as a rule, purely local matters. They concern probably more than one local authority area, particularly some of the longer distance services. I gather it is the noble Earl's wish that I should withdraw the Amendment now.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKIf my noble friend would care to move it, I should like to say a word upon it.
§
Amendment to Amendment moved—
In subsection (3), paragraph (a), line 1, of the proposed new clause, after ("vehicles") insert ("other than public service vehicles").— (Lord Giflord.)
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKThe noble Lord has a real point here, and I am happy to accept his Amendment in principle. What I should like to do is to look at the wording and see the best way in which this can be done. Perhaps the noble Lord will withdraw his Amendment at this stage.
§ Amendment to Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ LORD GIFFORD had given notice of a further Amendment to the proposed new clause, in subsection (3) (a), after "loading of vehicles" to insert "other than public service vehicles". The noble Lord said: I should like to say one thing on this Amendment. Probably the words, "loading" and "unloading" were never 472 intended to apply to passenger service vehicles. In fact, in many regulations there is a qualification that the term, "unloading" does not apply to them.
§ LORD HORE-BELISHATherefore, the Amendment to the Amendment is not necessary. It would read perfectly well if the Amendment to the Amendment were inserted in the first part of the subsection.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI think that is quite true.
§ LORD HORE-BELISHAThe paragraph would then read:
prohibiting or restricting the waiting of vehicles other than public service vehicles or the loading and unloading of vehicles…
§ LORD HORE-BELISHAThe loading does not apply to them.
LORD GIFFORDIn view of what the noble Earl has said, I will not move my second Amendment to the Amendment.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHDo I understand that we are accepting this clause for insertion in the Bill, on the understanding that the noble Earl will look at these various points between now and the next stage?
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKThat is right.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHIncluding the words by which we want to put more "teeth" into it?
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI will certainly look into it.
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ 5.35 p.m.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRK moved after Clause 27 to insert the following new clause:
§ Amendments as to traffic regulation during road repairs, etc.
§ ".—(1) Where under section forty-seven of the Act of 1930 (which provides for traffic regulation in consequence of the execution of works) a highway authority make an order under subsection (1) of that section or issue a notice under subsection (6) of that section, the authority may by order make as respects any alternative road any such provision as is 473 specified in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (2) of section (Amendment of s. 46 of Act of 1930) of this Act:
§ Provided that where the highway authority for the road as respects which the order or notice under the said section forty-seven is made or issued is not the highway authority for the alternative road, then
- (a) if the alternative road is a trunk road, the power to make orders conferred by this subsection shall be exercisable by the Minister on the application of the highway authority for the other road;
- (b) in any other case, the order under this subsection shall not be made except with the consent of the highway authority for the alternative road.
§
(2) In connection with the making of an order under the last foregoing subsection the authority making the order shall publish the like notices within the like time, and in the like manner, as is required by subsection (2) of the said section forty-seven in the case of an order under that section:
Provided that the notices required by this subsection need not contain any description of alternative routes.
§ (3) Subsection (4) of the said section forty-seven (which limits the time for which orders under that section may continue in force without the approval of the Minister) shall apply to orders under subsection (1) of this section made by highway authorities other than the Minister, and subsection (7) of the said !section forty-seven (which relates to offences) and subsection (9) of that section (which contains a saving for tramcars and trolley vehicles) shall apply to orders under subsection (1) of this section.
§ (4) The proviso to subsection (2) of section forty-six of the Act of 1930 (under which no order is to he made which would have the effect of preventing reasonable access) shall apply in relation to orders under subsection (1) of this section as it applies in relation to orders under the said subsection (2), subject however to the provisions of subsection (4) of section (Amendment of s. 46 of Act of 1930) of this Act.
§ (5) In subsection (1) of the said section forty-seven for the reference to works being executed or proposed to be executed on a road there shall he substituted a reference to works being executed or proposed to be executed on or near a road.
§ (6) Subsection (8) of the said section forty-seven (which provides for an appeal to the Minister against restrictions and prohibitions imposed under that section) shall cease to have effect; but—
- (a) subsection (4) of the said section forty-seven shall as respects any order to which it applies have effect with the substitution for the words 'three months' of the words 'six weeks';
- (b) where the Minister has refused to approve the continuing in force of an order made under the said section forty-seven, then except with the approval of the Minister no subsequent order shall be made under that section as respects any length of road to which the previous order related unless at
474 least three months have expired from the time when the previous order ceased to have effect:
§ Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply to any order under the said section forty-seven made before the coming into operation of this section.
§ (7) The maximum period for which a notice under subsection (6) of the said section forty-seven may continue in force shall be extended from seven Days from the date of the notice to fourteen days therefrom.
§ (8) The provision which may be made by order under subsection (1) or notice under subsection (6) of the sail section forty-seven shall be any such provision as is mentioned in subsection (2) of section (Amendment of s. forty-six of Act of 1930) of this Act.
§ (9) An order under subsection (1) or notice under subsection (6) of the said section forty-seven, or an order under subsection (1) of this section, may suspend any statutory provision of a description which could hate been contained in the order or notice, and any such provision (other than one contained in the order or notice) shall have effect subject to the order or notice.
§ (10) In subsection (1) of this section the expression alternative road' in elation to a road as respects which an order under subsection (1), or notice under subsection (6), of the said section forty-six is mare or issued, means a road providing an alternative route for traffic diverted from the fin t mentioned road or from any other alternative road, or capable of providing such an alternative route apart from any statutory provision authorised by the last foregoing subsection to be suspended by an order under subsection (1) of this section."
§ The noble Earl said: This is an Amendment in clarification of Section 47 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, which deals with the power of a highway authority temporarily to prohibit or restrict traffic on roads while repairs or the execution of works are bring carried out, and the procedure to be followed. Experience has shown that the present powers are not adequate to permit steps to be taken which are necessary, and that such safeguards as were formerly inserted are largely illusory. Subsection (1) deals with the powers to regulate traffic on alternative routes in order to relieve congestion where necessary. This is much desired by highway authorities. Subsection (2) deals with the advertisement before such action is taken. Subsection (3) says that arrangements for alternative routes may be in force for six weeks without the authority of the Minister. Subsection (4) places an obligation on the highway authority to afford access, subject, however, to the conditions in subsection (4) of the class se we have just 475 been discussing. Subsection (5) permits powers to be exercised when work is done, not on the road, but near the road. This is to meet the point where works such as demolishing a house or bridge are taking place just off the road and it is necessary to control the traffic.
§ Subsection (6) is important, because it does three things; and I should like to be frank with the Committee. First, it abolishes the appeal to the Minister which, in practice, has been found to be quite illusory as a safeguard and impossible to handle. Very often the works have been finished before the appeal can be properly dealt with. Secondly, it reduces from three months to six weeks the period during which the order of a highway authority is effective. This is intended in some way to counterbalance the abolition of the appeal to the Minister and, moreover, to give the local authority a certain incentive to get on with the work. Thirdly, after the six weeks are up, the local authority cannot just carry on by making a new order, but must get the permission of the Minister to continue if the order is to remain in force. Subsection (7) deals with emergency. In such cases, local authorities may make orders which will last for a period of fourteen days. This is an extension of seven days on the present time. That means that they make an order specially regulating traffic during the whole of the fourteen days. This is quite an important extension of the responsibility of local authorities. It gives them additional power to enable road works to be carried out with a minimum of inconvenience, and it puts a certain pressure on them to get on with it as quickly as possible. Works on roads are always a nuisance. They have got to be done, and I think this is a useful way of enabling them to be done in the quickest possible way and with the minimum of inconvenience. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
After Clause 27, insert the said new clause.—(The Earl of Selkirk.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause 28:
§ Traffic signs
§ 28.—(1) In Part III of the Act of 1930 and in this Act the expression "traffic sign" shall mean any object or device (whether fixed or, portable) for conveying warnings, information, requirements or prohibitions of any description 476 prescribed or authorised under subsection (2) of section forty-eight of the Act of 1930 to traffic on roads or any specified description of traffic, and any line or mark on a road for conveying such warnings, information, requirements or prohibitions.
§ LORD MANCROFT moved, in subsection (1), after "requirements," where that word first occurs, to insert "restrictions." The noble Lord said: The next three Amendments, Nos. 72. 73 and 74, all go together, and I can explain them to your Lordships quite shortly. Section 49 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, makes it an offence for a person to fail to conform to the indication given by traffic signs of certain classes which are lawfully placed on or near a road under Section 48 of that Act. The object of the three Amendments is as follows: first, to extend Section 49 to any traffic sign which is lawfully placed under Section 48; secondly, to define in what cases a traffic sign may be treated as lawfully placed, so as to make its disregard an offence under Section 49; and, thirdly, to provide that the penalties for an offence under Section 49 shall not include imprisonment.
§ The reason for this Amendment is quite simple. Some doubt has been placed, both in the courts and in your Lordships' House during the passage of the Bill, upon the authenticity of one or two of the traffic signs appearing on or near the highway. There are signs which most private motorists quite cheerfully and willingly obey, and if they did not obey them they would be in trouble with the police for obstruction. Since doubt has been placed upon the authenticity of certain signs it is right and proper that we should make them now as legal and watertight as we can. That is what these Amendments seek to do. There is no point of controversy here and, as your Lordships will observe, there is no chance of going to prison if you fail to obey these signs. I beg to move Amendment No. 72.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 24, line 9, after ("requirements") insert ("restrictions").—t(Lord Mancroft.)
§ 5.41 p.m.
§ EARL HOWEThe whole of this clause refers to traffic signs, whether as amended by Amendments 72, 73 and 74 or not. I want to ask the noble Lord something. I have not put down any Amendment —I am not sure whether I could under this 477 clause—but the point is this. Where roads are de-restricted there are these miniature de-restriction signs but, where roads are restricted, there is no replica of the restriction sign. It is almost impossible at times under conditions of modern traffic, to be quite sure whether you are or are not in a restricted area. I want to know whether the Minister cannot ensure that, where roads are restricted, the restriction sign can be repeated. I have recently been driving in Wales where there are a great number of 30 m.p.h. limits. The limits apply to roads that are not obviously roads which one would expect to find in all cases restricted, but which are, fact, restricted. The worst of it is that you may easily find yourself in a restricted area and be quite unconscious of it. When you are approaching a restriction sign, there may be a vehicle in forth of it and it may not be possible for you to see the sign for some reason like that. I consider it is just as important that the restriction sign should be repeated as to have those little de-restriction plaques which we see on lamp posts and so forth when roads are de-restricted. I want to ask the Minister whether he will not consider having these restriction signs repeated, as in the case of the de-restriction signs.
§ LORD MANCROFTI think the noble Earl has a sensible point there, if I may say so. I have not had time to consider it carefully, but it seems to me that Clause 36 (2) may provide the answer to the noble Earl's question. If he would like to look at it, we might have a discussion afterwards to see if we can help him in his difficulty. I think that provides the answer.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOR OUGHMay I at this stage interpolate a question which apparently is not covered at all by the new clause, but I think this is the only point in the Bill at which I can raise it? It concerns not one of these traffic signs which is likely to lead to an offence which is punishable, but to cautionary signs, some of which are provided by local authorities and some of which are not. I mean, for instance, such warnings signs as "Cattle crossing". There appear to me to be difficulties in regard to the matter of interference with cattle crossing where farms are intersected by roads. You should he 478 allowed ipso facto by the county council to erect a sign giving a caution of the cattle crossing. The difficulties in that respect are real. I wish tin t point could be looked into. I dc not want to trouble the Parliamentary Secretary too much now, but this is about the only point in the Bill at which I could have raised this question.
§ LORD MANCROFTI quite see the point about cattle signs. I he only cautionary note I want to sound is this. I am certain that the noble Viscount is not suggesting that anybody who wishes to put up any sign, however limited the sign may be, such as a cattle warning sign, can give it legal authority merely by putting it up.
§ LORD MANCROFTThese signs are put up by local authorities and achieve legal authority. The noble Viscount is not suggesting that signs put up at random should automatically acquire authority by going up.
§ VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHI am not asking for that. What I am asking is that the disability at present on farmers of heir g prevented from erecting a sign at all in some areas should be considered.
§ LORD MANCROFTThat surprises me. I will certainly look into the point very carefully for the noble Viscount.
§ VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHI thank the noble Lord.
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ LORD MANCROFTThis Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 24, line 13, after "requirements") insert("restrictions").—(Lord Mancroft.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ LORD MANCROFTThis Amendment, too, is consequential. I beg to move.
§ Amendment moved—
§
Page 25, line 9, at end inert—
("(7) (7) In section forty-nine of the Act of 1930 (which makes it an offence to fail to conform to the indication given by certain traffic signs lawfully placed on or near roads) the words 'being a sign for regulating the movement of traffic or indicating the route
479
to be followed by traffic, and being' shall cease to have effect, but for the purposes of that section a traffic sign shall not be treated as having been lawfully placed unless either—
and where the indication mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection is of the general nature only of the prohibition, restriction or requirement to which the sign relates a person shall not be convicted of failure to comply with the indication unless he has failed to comply with the said prohibition, restriction or requirement.
§ (8) So much of subsection (2) of section one hundred and thirteen of the Act of 1930 as provides for imprisonment in the case of second or subsequent convictions shall not apply to convictions of offences under section forty-nine of that Act.").—(Lord Mancroft.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause 28, as amended, agreed to.
§ Clause 29 [Experimental traffic schemes in London]:
§ 5.45 p.m.
§ LORD WALERAN moved, in subsection (6), to substitute "six" for "twelve" [months]. The noble Lord said: I can explain this Amendment and the next very quickly. Clause 29, as your Lordships know, empowers the Commissioner of Police, with the consent of the Minister, to make regulations for the purpose of carrying out experimental traffic alterations. The policeman, or somebody duly authorised in his stead, can put up "No Entry" signs or "Turn Right" signs. As matters stand now, an experimental traffic scheme can continue in force for a period up to twelve months and, if the Minister so authorises, for a further twelve months, making a total of two years.
§ It seems to me and to the motoring organisations that the authorities do not have to wait two years to make up their mind whether an experimental scheme is right or wrong. I can tell your Lordships, from my own experience as a member of the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee, 480 that we knew within a period of six months whether a thing was good or bad. It might be difficult to get certain local authorities to agree to it, for other reasons, but the only possible excuse I can think of for having twelve months is to try to get objectors to the scheme, not for traffic reasons but for other reasons, around to your point of view. As this is a traffic Bill, I suggest that we should make the original duration six months and the extension six months. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 26, line 4, leave our ("twelve") and insert ("six").—(Lord Waleran.)
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI think the noble Lord is quite right in what he says, that in the great majority of cases it is perfectly clear within six months whether a traffic experiment is working out or whether it is not. In fact, it is quite often perfectly clear within about forty-eight hours whether a scheme is working. The difficulty we are in—and I will be quite frank with the Committee here—is that, once we have decided that a new scheme is a good scheme, we then have to put it on to a permanent basis. That involves submitting it to the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee, who do not meet very often, and they have to consider it in detail before it becomes a permanent regulation.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI know they meet every month, but I am told that the scheme would require to be put on a permanent basis of organisation for working it. It would take a considerable time. The noble Lord may know more about that detail than I do, but I am told that the administrative steps to put it on a permanent basis may take as much as twelve months. What I am prepared to suggest is this. I will accept the noble Lord's first Amendment but not his second. That means to say that the experiment as such would be for six months, but if, at the end of that time, it seemed to be successful, then there would be twelve months during which to put it on a permanent basis. If that would suit the noble Lord I should be glad to accept the first Amendment.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HELLSBOROUGHI have some sort of hesitancy in my mind about this. Was the period of twelve months put in so that the experiment could be tried in all seasons of the year? Some of these things may be affected by light, by weather, by fog conditions and so on.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI can assure the noble Viscount that we have been into that point. I personally asked that question of those who are supposed to know the answer, and I have satisfied myself that they are quite happy with this period.
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ 5.51 p.m.
§ LORD MANCROFTThis Amendment is both consequential and drafting. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 26, line 19, leave out from ("London") to end of line 20.—(Lord Mancroft.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause 29, as amended, agreed to.
§ Clause 30 [Powers of police to erect traffic signs relating to special traffic regulations]:
§ LORD MANCROFTThis is consequential. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 26, line 26, leave out from ("signs") to ("vehicular") in line 27 and insert ("indicating prohibitions, restrictions or requirements relating to").—(Lord Mancroft.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ LORD MANCROFTThis, too, is consequential. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 26, line 30, leave out from ("1839") to ("under") in line 31.—(Lord Mancroft.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause 30, as amended, agreed to.
§ Clause 31 [Temporary signs for dealing with traffic congestion and danger]:
§ LORD MANCROFTThis, too, is consequential. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 27, line 2, leave out from ("signs") to ("vehicular") in line 3 and insert ("in
482
dicating prohibitions, restrictions or requirements relating to").—(Lord Mancroft.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause 31, as amended, agreed to.
§ Clauses 32 and 33 agreed to.
§ 5.53 p.m.
§ LORD MANCROFT moved after Clause 33 to insert the following new clause:
§ Lighting-up time
§ "34. For the purposes of the Road Transport Lighting Acts, 1927 to 1953, the expression ' the hours ix' darkness ' shall mean the time between halt-an-hour after sunset and half-an-hour before sunrise as well during the period of summer time during the remainder of the year."
§
The noble Lord said: This Amendment concerns lighting up It has caused a good deal of discussion behind the scenes, but I hope that we have now come to some arrangement which will meet with the approval of the Committee. At present, "the hours of darkness" are defined in Section 1 (4) of the 1927 Act as meaning:
As respects the period of summer time, the time between one hour after sunset and one hour before sunrise; and as respects The remainder of the year, the time between half an hoer after sunset and half an hour before sunrise.
We have received representations from a number of well-informed sources that this definition is technically unsound and clearly potentially dangerous. It takes no account of the shortness of twilight during equinox periods and, at certain periods of the year, while summertime is in force, it legally permits vehicles to be on the road without lights after the end of twilight, with consequent danger to other traffic.
§ A large number of other alternatives have been considered. The one that attracted most attention was that suggested by the Nautical Almanac Office which would have related the expression "the hours of darkness" to some specified degree of depression of the centre of the sun below the horizon. This would have -been technically correct and, I understand, foolproof, but it would have involved every conscientious driver in carrying a compass, a slide rule and Whitaker's Almanack; and so it has been rejected. After full consideration it has been considered preferable to recommend the simpler expedient which a lot of 483 people have suggested—namely, of maintaining the relationship of lighting-up time to sunset, but to revoke that part of the existing provision which makes it one hour, instead of half an hour, after sunset during summer time. That is the effect of the Amendment standing in my name.
§ Your Lordships are no doubt aware that one effect of this change will be to require lights to be shown on motor vehicles in midsummer, before it is dark, in places like Northern Scotland. But this appears to be so even under existing law, and there is no way of avoiding all the anomalies without adopting the complicated solution referred to above. The solution proposed will have the great advantage of removing the dangerous anomaly which now permits unlighted vehicles to be legally on the road after dark in all parts of the country at some periods of the year. It may well be argued that we have substituted one particular anomaly for another. In a way we have, but this anomaly is a safe one, whereas the previous one was clearly a dangerous one. We tried at one moment to consider including in the provision some reference to lighting up during fog or smoke or snow, but that has not been found possible, because it is so much a matter of personal opinion and personal eyesight. I think we have now reached a satisfactory compromise and one which at least has the merit of being understandable and is a great deal simpler and safer than the previous law. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
After Clause 33 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Mancroft.)
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHSome of us were a little confused in regard to the reference to Whitaker's Almanack, slide rules and other things; but the noble Lord can have our approbation and our congratulations if he will inform us that he is moving the Amendment on the Order Paper.
§ LORD MANCROFTWhat did the noble Lord think I was moving?
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHWe are in some doubt about that.
§ LORD MANCROFTI think the noble Lord came in just at the moment when Amendment No. 80A was called and 484 not moved. Did the noble Lord think I was moving Amendment No. 80A?
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHNo, Amendment No. 81—that referring to lighting-up time. I heard what the noble Lord said. My noble friend beside me asked me whether I could understand it, and I said that I thought I should understand it after the noble Lord had gone on a little longer; but the longer the noble Lord went on the more confused I became. However, now I am quite satisfied and I congratulate the noble Lord on this Amendment. It is the only sensible thing to do. It is a compromise. The only other thing the noble Lord could do would be more confusing—that is, to have separate lighting-up times in different zones right up to the North of Scotland, down to the West and across to the East. Obviously, this is a most sensible thing, and we congratulate the noble Lord on his ingenuity.
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause 34 [Amendments as to conditions of carriers' licences]:
§ 5.59 p.m.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKThe first three Amendments to Clause 34 really pick up an omission in the clause as it was drafted. I do not think they are much more than drafting. I beg to move the first Amendment.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 28, line 43, after ("with)") insert "or a direction may be given under subsection (3) of that section)".—(The Earl of Selkirk.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 29, line 18, after ("licence") insert ("or give a direction").—(The Earl of Selkirk.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI beg to move this Amendment.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 29, line 24, at end insert ("or, as the case may be, the direction given").—(The Earl of Selkirk.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKThis is really no more than a tidying-up Amendment. I beg to move.
§ Amendment moved—
§
Page 29, line 41, at end insert—
(4) So long as the provisions of section twelve of the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933 (which relates to holding and subsidiary companies) have effect, references in subsection (1) of this section to the holder of the licence or his servant or agent shall include references to the subsidiary company (within the running of the said section twelve) or any servant or agent of that company."—(The Earl of Selkirk.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKThis is purely a drafting Amendment.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 29, line 42, leave out ("section sixteen") and insert ("Part I").—(The Earl of Selkirk.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause 34, as amended, agreed to.
§ Clause 35:
§ Amendments as to suspension or revocation A and B licences
§ 35.—(1) There shall be included among the grounds on which an A licence or a B licence may be suspended or revoked under subsection (1) of section thirteen of the Road and Rail Traffic Act. 1933 (which provides for the revocation or suspension of carriers' licences in certain circumstances) or a direction may be given under subsection (3) of that section, the following additional ground, that is to say, that the holder of the licence has been persistently charging, for services which consist of or include the carriage of goods by road in any of the authorised vehicles, sums insufficient to meet the cost of rendering those services and has thereby placed other holders of licences at an undue or unfair disadvantage in competing with him as respects the carriage of goods by road.
§ (2) The proviso to the said subsection (1) (which proviso imposes certain conditions on the powers of the licensing authority to revoke or suspend a licence) shall not apply to any revocation, suspension or direction made or given by virtue of this section, but, if the holder of the licence requests the licensing authority to hold a public inquiry, the licensing authority shall not make or give any such revocation, suspension or direction except after holding such an inquiry.
§ (3) So long as the provisions of section twelve of the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933 (which relates to holding and subsidiary companies), have effect, paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1) of that section shall apply in relation to subsection (1) of this section as they apply in relation to Part I of that Act, and references in subsection (1) of this section to charges made by the holder of the licence and to competing with him shall he construed accordingly.
§ 6.1 p.m.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved to leave out Clause 35. The noble Lord said: This is one of the most 486 peculiar clauses that could ever find its way into a Road Traffic Bill. What it seeks to do is to set up the twelve traffic commissioners appointed under the Act of 1930 (and now re-designated licensing authorities) as arbiters of business morals. The history of this clause is very peculiar. When the Road Haulage l3isposal Bill was going through the other place, the Government, as a result of their realisation of the failure of their road haulage vehicle disposal scheme, introduced a provision to make it legal for the British Transport Commission to keep a larger number of vehicles than the original Act provided. That, of course, disturbed some of the supporters of the Government who sit on the Back Benches of another place, who were then "after the Minister's blood," saying that he was giving the British Transport Commission almost as big a monopoly of road transport under the Road Haulage Disposal Bill as they had before. I will not reiterate all their arguments, that it was a "breach of Election pledges", and this, that, and the other.
§ When it came to the Committee stage of this Bill, they assailed the Minister so vigorously in another place that he introduced a clause to make it possible for independent hauliers to go to the licensing authorities and substantiate, if they could, a claim that they were receiving unfair competition from the British Transport Commission vehicles. If they could substantiate that claim before the licensing authority, they could have the A and B licences of the British Transport Commission revoked. That brought a storm of protest from any fair-minded individual, and eventually the Minister gave way and made it possible fir this particular clause I am talking about to operate both ways, so that the British Transport Commission could lodge a case of unfair competition by under-cutting—persistent under-cutting, I think, was the.; expression—by private hauliers, and vice versa. That, again, created such trouble that it eventually took itself out of the Road Haulage Disposal Bill and found its way into this Bill.
§ The astounding thing is that under this clause a private haulier or anybody engaged in the road haulage industry can go to the licensing authority which is charged with issuing A, B and C licences and complain about unfair competition, vis-à-vis another private haulier or the 487 British Transport Commission. This licensing authority can then hold a public inquiry as to whether this firm, whoever it may be, is guilty of persistent price cutting. They are ill-qualified to hold such an inquiry. They are not accountants. Most of them are excellent men; most of them are ex-civil servants. Here is a Road Traffic Bill purporting to do something for road safety, which brings in a completely new idea of judging whether or not business conduct is proper. I have never heard such a fantastic thing. We have at the same time awaiting the Committee stage in your Lordships' House, which we shall reach next week, the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill, which is supposed to have as its objective, the opening of competition for the purpose of lowering prices to the public.
§ The next stage in this comedy is that the Government have extracted some kind of promise—I do not know what it is worth—from the British Transport Commission, that they are going to freeze certain rates. Supposing the British Transport Commission, as a public duty, being a nationalised industry, peg all their road haulage rates for twelve months and costs go up, and therefore the independent haulier feels bound to put up his charges. Under this clause, he can bring a case against the British Transport Commission for persistently undercutting him by running services in an unremunerative way—yet the Commission may well be doing it to uphold the policy of Her Majesty's Government. Have your Lordships ever heard such a farce, and such a farce as to put in a Road Traffic Bill? If you will read this clause, that is precisely what it purports to do. Really it is an impossibility. It is wrong in principle. What is one of the main objectives of the present Government? That there shall be price competition for the benefit of the consumer. Yet here in this clause the Government are inciting all the haulage contractors, nationalised or not, in the road haulage industry, to "gang up" together and agree on everything they possibly can—in other words, to create the monopoly which the Government do not want to have.
§ Surely the Government will withdraw this clause. I think the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, whether he agrees with me or not on my argument, will agree that my facts are correct. This is what this clause pur- 488 ports to do. For the life of me, I cannot see how it ever found its way into this Bill. It is against the declared public policy of the Government, and we on this side of the House cannot agree with it, because we have agreed to support the Government in its efforts through the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill to have competition in all forms of trade for the benefit of the consumer. This gives any Tom, Dick or Harry the right to go to the licensing authority, who have nothing to do with this aspect of trade at all, and say to them, in effect: "My competitor has been persistently under-cutting me". He can force his competitor into open court (the proceedings will be in public) and make him disclose all the facts and figures relating to his business in order to get the revocation of that competitor's A or B licence. Is that the practice to which the Government are going to lend themselves? How can the Government sustain that, in face of the speech made by the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor from the Woolsack when he commended the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Bill to your Lordships in this House?
§ What is the policy of the Government? Is it really free competition? There is no question here of damage to the employee; he is well covered and we can leave it to the transport unions to see that this does not mean the cutting of wages. This is cutting competition. It is not a case only of the British Transport Commission vis-à-vis private haulier, but it can be private haulier vis-à-vis private haulier. I cannot imagine a more vicious thing than this; to have official recognition by the Government of one competitor dragging a fellow competitor to open court for the purpose of having his facts and figures and costs (because the licensing authority cannot get at the facts unless they have the costs) made public, with a view to showing that he has been running at a loss. I hope that the noble Earl will accept this Amendment. I do not think I need say any more. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 35.—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)
§ 6.12 p.m.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI always listen to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, with rapt attention, and never more than when he is explaining what 489 he thinks Tory policy ought to be. It is fascinating. Having listened to what he has had to say to-day I have noted that he has made a number of most interesting comments. He said that he had never heard anything so fantastic as this clause, and never heard anything more vicious. The thing that absolutely amazes me is that this clause was introduced by Mr. Ernest Davies in the other place on behalf of the Party of noble Lords who sit opposite. I am amazed at what the noble Lord said. I feel that he has hardly done his colleagues in the other place justice in pouring scorn on their efforts to deal with this matter, in the Transport (Disposal of Road Haulage Property) Bill.
If I may examine what the noble Lord has said a little more closely, may I say that we have never stood for cutthroat competition, least of all in the road transport industry, where by cutting costs to the lowest level you might very well run into safety problems. We do not want cut-throat competition. We think it would be quite wrong to have it. If the noble Lord had argued, as he might well have done, that this clause should be strengthened, there might have been some sympathy with him. Frankly, it is going to be no mean task to get this clause into operation. It will operate only in the most gross and flagrant cases. And if anyone does get his licence suspended under the operation of Clause 35 (1), then I say he jolly well deserves to get it suspended.
Let us look at what has to be shown before a licence can be suspended. You have to show that there has been persistent charge for services; second, you have to show that what has persistently been done is insufficient to meet the costs; then you have to show that what has been done has been to the undue, and unfair disadvantage of others competing with the alleged offender. Finally, if that is not sufficient, a public inquiry can be held on this matter. If anyone really gets caught up by that, then all I can say is that he is doing the one thing which I believe all of us in all parts of the House would agree in condemning: he is seeking to ruin a competitor in order to set up a monopoly. I do not believe that anyone in this House wants to see that happen. We on this side certainly do not. I do not say that this 490 is a very powerful weapon, but something which will be held in terrorem In over anyone who might seek to put a small competitor out of business by making a corner and then completely wiping him out. Frankly, the clause will have not the slightest effect whatsoever on legitimate competition. That is the position. I hope that the noble Lord will not think too unkindly of the work of its colleague Mr. Ernest Davies, who is very seriously interested in transport. I really think that in the circumstances this clause should receive a slightly warmer welcome from noble Lords opposite.
§ 6.16 p.m.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHI thought the noble Earl would fall into the trap. His well-known anxiety to score debating points would, I suspected, lead him into this pit before very long. What are the facts of the case? They are that there was originally a clause in the Transport (Disposal of Road Haulage Property) Bill which aroused violent protest from the Opposition in another place because it was levelled against the British Transport Commission. The remit of that violent protest was that a bargain was made between the Minister and Mr. Ernest Davies by the terms of which if the Minister gave way on tie one-sided clause and made it cover the whole field" the British Transport Commission and the private haulier, then Mr. Ernest Davies would propose that clause when this Bill reached the Report stage in tile House of Commons. And Mr. Ernest Davies prefaced his remarks in this way—I shall have to ask your Lordships to forgive me for a breach of your Rules of Order, because one is not supposed to quote in such a connection as this. Indeed, I cannot pretend to quote Mr. Davies's exact words because I have not got them with me. But what he said in opening his remarks amounted to this: "Never in my life have I ever moved an Amendment with greater reluctance than I move this."
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKBut he moved it.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHWait a minute —do not be so quick. Mr. Davies said "Never in my life have I moved an Amendment with greater reluctance than I move this; and if the Minister will only refuse to accept it I can assure the Minister that I shall not proceed to a 491 Division." Mr. Davies had to move it; that was the bargain. He had to accept half a loaf because if he had not agreed to move the Amendment—that is, the clause as it is in the Bill—the Minister would have used the Whips in another place and would have forced through the one-sided portion of the Bill which operated solely against the British Transport Commission. That was a cheap debating point to which I hardly thought the noble Earl would sink. I was waiting for it, though, for I know that he likes to make a debating point. He fell into the trap. What I have said, as he very well knows, is true.
Now as to his flight of oratory. I used to listen to him when I was a poor, humble member of the late Government and the noble Earl used to speak from the Opposition Benches. A lot of my flights of oratory I learned by listening to the noble Earl. This clause, says the noble Earl, is intended purely to stop the building up of a monopoly against the small man. What a lot of nonsense that is. The noble Earl has forgotten that this is a revised form, not the original form to which he was a party as a member of Her Majesty's Cabinet. The little man can attack the little man. You do not think that the British Transport Commission, trying to wipe out a deficit of £70 million, growing because, by refusing the application they made to the Transport Tribunal, the Government will not allow them to meet their charges, are going to trouble about lowering their prices to push the little man out of business. Of course not. If the noble Earl will take the trouble to study the price rates in the road haulage industry, he will find that the Commission's prices are much higher than those of the independent hauliers, by about 15 per cent. The reason that their business is growing is because their service is infinitely better.
The vicious thing that the noble Earl is afraid of can be used by one small unit in this industry against another. If I were a competitor of the noble Earl in the road haulage business I could, under this clause, bring an accusation against him for persistently undercutting or unfair competition, or any of the other things which the noble Earl said that this clause was put in to stop. The matter would go to the licensing authority and all the figures about my business and the noble 492 Earl's business would be displayed to the public gaze. But I would not want redress; I would want a weapon to force one of my competitors out of business. Perhaps the noble Earl, who has spent his life in the pure if rarefied atmosphere of politics, does not know what it is when you get down to real competition in industry.
What is unfair competition? The Government of which the noble Earl is a member have just produced a Bill which stops collective price maintenance and competition in price will now be the rule. There is nothing in the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill to say that that shall not operate if it is unfair. In the world of commerce all competition is unfair, in the view of the man who has to meet the competition. If you want this kind of thing, why do you not put it in the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill? Why put it in the Road Traffic Bill? It has nothing to do with this Bill.
§ LORD MILNER OF LEEDSIt is probably out of order.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHI think it would be out of order in the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill and that it is out of order in this one. That is my reply to the noble Earl. I am doing the job that Mr. Davies was prohibited from doing in another place because he had his hands tied behind his back. He had either to accept the vicious clause of discrimination against the British Transport Commission or he had to accept this one That is why he began by saying. "Never have I moved an Amendment with greater reluctance." I am sorry that the noble Earl had to bring Mr. Davies in. It is wrong to put this responsibility on the Commissioners; they were not set up for this purpose. They are not a court of public morals. The noble Earl says that we want to stop competition because it might reflect on road safety. Does he hold in high regard all the road safety precautions which the Ministry of Transport have to operate, under which the police can stop any commercial vehicle they think unsafe and its licence can be suspended there and then? That is the Minister's idea of road safety precautions for commercial vehicles. This is a pure sop to the rebellious Back Benchers in another place, who did not like the British Transport Commission being given 3,700 vehicles—
§ VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHBeing allowed to keep them.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHNot given, but allowed to keep, to give a service which the entire industry of this country insisted should not be broken up. I think the noble Earl would be doing a service to withdraw this clause.
§ VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHAfter that speech by my noble friend, I should have thought that the noble Earl would make some reply. My noble friend had a serious imputation made against him: that he was deliberately going against what was apparently the general Labour policy in another place. In view of what has beer said by my noble friend I should have thought that the noble Earl would have changed the somewhat scathing comment he -made. I think that would be reasonable. In any event, I have heard no real answer at all to the case against this clause, having regard to the Government's general policy. That is an amazing thing to me. The noble Earl has ridden off on another issue, of whether some form of control of the different forms of road transport is necessary or not to stop certain practices. As has been said, there are ample provisions in other Statutes which could be amended in this respect. The ordinary Member of your Lordships' House cannot understand why this clause comes into this particular Bill, even if its object is carefully put into the Title. L has practically nothing to do with all the other provisions of the Bill.
If we take exception to the part of the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill which is going to allow existing restrictive practices to remain, with a new power of enforcement in the High Court to the detriment of the consumer, it will be difficult for the Government to justify what my noble friend complains of in this clause. The two policies are completely irreconcilable. Look at the position mentioned by my noble friend. The nationalised services have been the first to respond to the stabilising of prices. They have been told forcibly that they must do something about stabilising prices for a considerable period to come. If they therefore go on maintaining those stabilised prices in future, although their costs may be constantly rising, they then may easily become subject to some action by indivi- 494 dual hauliers, or an association of hauliers, under this clause. We have had no real answer to that point, in my view, other than a riding-off. I should have thought that the noble Earl would have been kind enough to give an adequate reply to my noble friend.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI hope the noble Lord did not think that I was discourteous in not replying. I am always willing to make as long speeches as the House will stand. Mar I take one small point? If the noble Viscount looks at the title of the Bill, I do not think he will have any doubt that this is a proper Bill to deal with the matter of suspending the licences of goods vehicles. There is another clause which deals with that question on a slightly different basis. I was interested to hear the noble Lord say that beyond peradventure this would in no way affect the Transport Commission. I am glad to hear that. He will say that it will operate only between the small competitors.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKThe noble Lord said that the Transport Commission were 15 per cent. higher and gave a better service. If they are 15 per cent. higher, there is not the slightest chance, in any circumstances, of their being affected by this Bill.
VISCOUNT ALEXA NDER OF HILLSBOROUGHI feel that I must defend my noble friend there. I listened carefully to what he was saying n his second set of comments, and what he said was that this would certainly not only apply to the Transport Commission but would include individuals one against the other, thought that was a point he stressed t and, in fact, in his earlier remarks, which I thought the noble Earl had not answered, he gave the case of the Transport Commission being laid open to the kind of action now permitted under the new clause. If they had to keep their prices down under stabilisation, and the costs rose against them, others could take action against them under this clause.
§ THE EARL of SELKIRKThe, words which the noble Lord used were that charges were generally 15 per cent. Higher, and that they got their traffic because their services were better. I have 495 no reason to suppose that the Commission will be adversely affected. What did impress me was the view that competition is so important. I am delighted to hear that. The noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, has always been a keen co-operative man. If he found someone who was persistently charging insufficient sums, and those sums were to the undue and unfair disadvantage of people competing with them, would he think that a good thing?
§ VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHMost certainly, in the interests of the consumers. We in the Co-operative Movement have always maintained a strong policy; that is to say, we insist that, so far as our goods are concerned, we do not ask for a minimum price to be fixed but we ask for a maximum price to be fixed. That is the difference in the policy of the noble Earl and our policy. As I say, we ask for a maximum price to be fixed. If there is undue cutting, by reason of the fact that somebody is sweating employees in order to get lower costs, that is another matter. We have laboured hard and long to get a trade board set up, with some success, for putting a bottom into the rate of wages in the distributive trades, although we have to pay higher wages, according to trade union standards. I am not afraid of the noble Earl on this issue.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI am most interested. The noble Viscount thinks it proper to compete with people who take unfair and undue disadvantage. With respect, I do not agree with him. I am amazed to hear that that is done in the Co-operative Society. I do not think it should be done anywhere.
§ VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHThe noble Earl overlooks the fact that it is not necessarily done by cutting labour costs. We have other means of stimulating proper competition. As I say, we have worked hard and long to get trade boards, and in other cases it can be done by proper trade union organisation.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKNo doubt it can. But the noble Viscount now says that he is happy to see unfair advantage in competition.
§ VISCOUNT ALEXANDER of HILLSBOROUGHI did not say that.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKThat is what the noble Viscount said. I do not think that is necessary. I am at a loss to find anyone who is likely to be at a disadvantage in this if he is continuing in legitimate competition. The noble Lord has not suggested anybody who continues in proper competition and who will be disadvantaged. The word "persistent" does not mean that you are cutting anybody: it means that you are doing it deliberately, unfairly and unduly. I think this is a proper clause to be in the Bill. It will prevent people from being "cornered" and ousted out of business, which is in line with what we have in mind. I am sorry that noble Lords find it so objectionable. If noble Lords stood for "cut-throat" competition, that would be different; but I did not think they did.
§ VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHAgain speaking from my Co-operative experience, what I can say about it is this. We certainly did not like all the forms of licensing in 1933, and we never have liked them. They were not suitable for a Movement that works on our principles. If the noble Earl would get this Government to work in all respects for proper conditions of employment, on the one hand, and maximum prices to the consumer on the other, and not to proceed against people who legitimately can come within these maximum prices and go lower, and give the advantage to the consumer, then he would be on the right lines. But he has said that our Co-operative organisation, where we have a large organisation which can conduct trade at a lower rate for the benefit of the millions of members, because we are not a profit-making body, can be dragged before this court—just as it is proposed in the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill to drag us in under the individual firms clauses.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI should like to ask the noble Viscount one question. Would not the Co-operative Society run on a C licence? That does not apply here at all.
§ VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHThere is no doubt that, because of the conditions of the 1933 497 Act, against which we have always contended, we have had to rely, in the main, on C licences. But I am talking about the kind of case mentioned here. If we had the real freedom to do what was best for the consumer in this matter, we could do it the other way.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHWe could carry on this discussion for a long time, but I do not intend to do that. The noble Earl is batting on a particularly sticky wicket. The Monopoly Commission, every Commission that has been set up, and the Report on which the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill is based, all say that anything that prevents competition and lowering of prices to the public is against the national interest. There is not one word in the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill about competition and protecting the trader; it is all about the public interest. This seeks to stop it. Under this clause I have not to prove my case. If I am a road haulier, I have only to make the allegation to the licensing authority that my competitor is persistently under-cutting, and doing all these things, and I make my case. I have my competitor's books and everything else thrown open to the public—because the heating is in public. Then, when the verdict goes against me, and the licensing authority says: "Your accusations are completely unfounded", I say: "I have achieved my object; I have had all my competitor's costs shown to the world." That is what this means.
If the noble Earl is sincere in this matter, we had better amend the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill when it comes before the House and put in safeguards, that you can have price maintenance, and collective price maintenance, if it means that your competitor is indulging in unfair competition. So bring it all back again, because everybody who is affected by the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill and the outlawing of collective price maintenance would say: "All price competition is price-cutting, and it is unfair." The noble Earl is batting on the stickiest wicket he has ever had. I am going to withdraw this Amendment—at least, I think I am on one condition. Will the noble think he will, in fairness—withdraw what I thought was not a very fair attach on me in connection with my right honourable friend in another place? I think it 498 was particularly—I will not use the word "shabby", but I will say unfair, of the noble Earl, because he knew the facts as well as I did. He knew the pressure on my right honourable friend, and in scoring, or trying to score, rather a cheap debating point, the noble Earl was doing himself less than justice. Perhaps I could have a reply on that.
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKI am glad to hear that the noble Lord is considering withdrawing this Amendment. I merely recited the facts because it seemed to me that, if they had not been recited, the House would not nave been in full possession of them.
§ LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTHWhy did not the noble Earl recite them? Why did he let me contradict him before reciting them?
§ THE EARL OF SELKIRKThe noble Lord did not contradict anything I said. He: merely enlarged upon it with a large number of glosses entirely his own.
§ VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHThat is a pure evasion.
§ On Question, Amendment negatived.
§ Clause 35 agreed to.