Lords Sitting of 1 February 1956

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers

THE EARL OF WOOLTON
The Right Honourable Frederick James, Viscount Woolton, C.H., having been created Viscount Walberton, of Walberton in the County of Sussex, and Earl of Woolton—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE
William Philip, Baron De L'Isle and Dudley, V.C., having been created Viscount De L'Isle, of Penshurst in the County of Kent—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
VISCOUNT INGLEBY
The Right Honourable Osbert Peake, having been created Viscount Ingleby, of Snilesworth in the North Riding of the County of York—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL [H.L.]
Read 2a.
HEYWOOD AND MIDDLETON WATER BILL [H.L.]
Read 2a.
SION COLLEGE BILL [H.L.]
Read 2a, and referred to the Examiners.
ELDER YARD CHAPEL CHESTERFIELD BILL [H.L.]
Read 2a.

COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT CONSTRUCTION
3.9 p.m.
LORD BRABAZON OF TARA LORD BRABAZON OF TARA rose to draw attention to the unsatisfactory situation existing to-day relative to the building of commercial aircraft in this country; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name. It is a Motion which affects a great industry. I always think it wise to declare at the start any interests which one has, because that certainly clears the air. I have absolutely none at all and have never been interested in any aircraft firm at any time. That extends over some fifty years. I do not know whether that was a very intelligent course, because I might have been a millionaire; but I would rather be a Member of your Lordships' House than a millionaire.
A NOBLE LORD: You might have been both.
LORD BRABAZON OF TARA: There is one activity which I must disclose—that is, that I am chairman of the Air Registration Board. That is a very remarkable body which Parliament, in its wisdom, set up by Statute. It grants certificates of airworthiness, and it can ground machines. It has very considerable powers. It is an organisation quite unique in this particular country. It is, I must say, typically English. It is composed of some of the most distinguished and knowledgeable people in aviation in the world. They do an immense amount of work; they carry great responsibilities—and they are paid exactly nothing. I should like to make it clear that I speak this afternoon for nobody except myself. No one will say, I think, that I am not a friend of aviation. I am the looker-on who sees most of the game To-day, however, I find myself in the position of critic; it is not a rôle that I like very much, but I cannot see our position in the world of aeronautics degenerating without raising my voice in protest. We have, as a nation, spent a great deal of money since the war on aviation. A great deal has been spent on research, and all that I consider has been well spent—but then aviation is an expensive science.
This afternoon I want to speak of three civil machines and the building thereof: the Brabazon, the Princess and the

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V1000. The trouble all started with the decision of the Air Staff during the war when they laid down that the resources of manufacture in this country were not to be occupied in making transport machines. A troop transport was not, in their opinion, a war machine. America took a different view, and said that troop transports were war machines. They proceeded to make many of them, and your Lordships will understand that, as a result, their industry started years ahead of ours in developing the great civil machines of the world. They were able to turn over very quickly into making civil aircraft, and they obtained an immense lead by reason of that fact.
After the war, the Secretary of State for Air at the time and the Minister of Aircraft Production set up a committee—a very talented committee—of which they made me chairman. Our job was to express users' requirements as to future civil aircraft to be built. We made various recommendations with which I will not bother your Lordships, but recommendation No. 1 was for a machine that could fly from London to New York non-stop either way. That, of course, automatically calls for a very big machine in order to get a pay-load and to carry the fuel. I should like to make it clear, right at the beginning, that it was not for us to say whether the machine should be built or who should build it. The Minister of Aircraft Production at that time decided to have that machine built. He did not ask who wanted it or who was prepared to use it. That I have always considered a somewhat strange piece of forward planning. It also seemed to come as a sort of afterthought that, in order to fly, the machine had to get off the ground; and in order to get it off the ground an aerodrome had to be constructed by the works which cost an extra £4 million.
The machine was, in fact, years late in delivery, and I do not think that the proper engines for which it was designed have even yet been produced. Lord Beaverbrook, in this House, spoke of the recommendation of my committee—recommendation No. 1—and referred to the machine as "The Brabazon." That name stuck to it, but I cannot say that I enjoy very much being associated with its extraordinary career, because altogether this was a sorry tale and the machine was eventually broken up "un-
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honoured and unsung." That little excursion into building an aeroplane cost the taxpayer just over £12 million.
The next machine I want to speak about is the Princess flying boat. The Brabazon Committee did its best to try to get users to recommend that a big flying boat should be constructed. No operator was prepared to join in such a recommendation, so we were unable to recommend the building of such a machine. The Ministry of Supply, on the other hand, took a different view. They ordered three, and I must say that I congratulate them, even now, on their vision and initiative in getting these machines built. There were some snags. I think it was a pity that they ordered the same engines as were scheduled for the Brabazon. They must have known that the firm were quite incapable of producing them.
Who was to use that machine afterwards? That is another question which might well have been asked. The answer is that possibly South American air lines might have used it—your Lordships may remember that at that time there was a third Corporation which was to occupy itself with flights from this country to South America. The great Air Commodore Brackley was extremely keen on it. He was then the head of South American Airways; and when he died what a loss it was to us! South American Airways disappeared; it was merged into B.O.A.C., who definitely refused to have anything to do with this aircraft. And to this day these machines remain down at Cowes, unused.
That is not exactly a stimulating story either, but there are two observations I should like to make upon it. First of all, I consider it a scandal that at the present day we are running no line at all to South America. It is nothing less than a shame. Secondly, there is the general neglect of the flying boat by this country. America is a continent, and wants great land machines. We are different; we are a great sea empire. The flying boat should be our particular brand of aircraft. Great stretches of water are handy to most of our possessions, but no imagination has been shown by the operators. We have missed here an opportunity of having the most luxurious aircraft in the world—I say that advisedly, because with a big flying boat the hull is necessarily larger

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than that of a land machine, consequently giving tremendous comfort, spaciousness and luxury. Your Lordships will remember the flying boats in the old days, smaller than is contemplated to-day; but even now everybody says that travelling by flying boat was more attractive than travelling by any other machine in the world. You had room to move about in it and were not packed in like sardines as is the modern practice in civil aircraft.
Now I come to the V.1000. This was ordered by Transport Command. I have always thought that it was a strange thing that Transport Command should order such an extraordinary machine, because they could operate it on only a very few aerodromes, owing to the length of the runway required to take off and to land. After the machine had got a long way, this order was cancelled. I should like to quote the official reason why it was cancelled. It was stated in another place [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, V01. 547 (No. 79), col. 1940]
"The R.A.F. decided that it did not want it because it was taking longer than had been anticipated, and because in those circumstances the R.A.F. could, by buying Britannias instead, get the job it had in mind done more quickly and at much less expense on public funds. That is the real reason why the military version was cancelled."
In fifty years' experience of aviation, I have never yet seen an aeroplane which was not heavier than anticipated and which was not delivered late, so those two excuses might indeed have been thought of at the very beginning. But I congratulate the R.A.F. and Transport Command for at least having the imagination to make such a machine, because one has to realise that transport machines for Transport Command and for civil aviation differ very slightly and they might have been developing one which would have been useful for civil aviation.
There seems to be no co-operation between Transport Command and the Corporations. It would appear that B.O.A.C. was not brought into the picture at the beginning, when it would have nursed the machine along, together with Transport Command, because a lot can be done that way, when the operator and the manufacturer get together. Your Lordships will have noticed how Mr. Peter Masefield and Mr. Edwards of B.E.A. and Vickers, working together, hatched the Viscount, which has been
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a great success. But one gathers from the Press that the V.1000 was offered to the B.O.A.C. at the end, and the B.O.A.C. said "No," although it was competitive with the Douglas and the Boeing. Here again, I would quote the official explanation given in another place [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 547 (No. 79), col. 1940]:
"The point here is that it is perfectly clear that we could not launch an aircraft of this size and type on the world market unless it was first bought and run in by a home operator. About that there is no argument, and the firm itself never questioned that."
I do question it. Machines of that type are what one might call empirical models. The equivalent in America, the D.C.8 and the Boeing, are machines on paper. Whether they will come up to their specifications nobody knows. But they have sold 170 of them, and when they put them out to the market they will not have any assured operators. They have sold 170 of these machines, every one of which will cost over £1 million. Yet, because B.O.A.C. say that they will not operate it, the V.1000 is dead. I believe that that decision is much resented in this country, for the reason that it means that we give up being a competitor on the Blue Ribband route of the world, which is from America to this country. The B.O.A.C. have their Britannias to come and they have ordered twenty Comets. But there is no really fast long-range machine in prospect to rival the Douglas and the Boeing, and B.O.A.C. have not even ordered the American machines. Therefore, I ask whether it is the policy of our great Corporations to run tramps in future and not liners.
Mr. Edwards, the designer of the V.1000, says that his machine would be one per cent. slower as at present envisaged, but there are compensating advantages. I should like to draw attention to the fact that the engines that are to be fitted to the American machines are not thoroughly predictable as to performance. Meanwhile, in this country we have produced far and away the best engine for that job—namely, the Conway, and now we have nowhere to put it. It may be that these engines could be adopted by American manufacturers—indeed, they would be wise to use them. But why the taxpayer in this country should help to provide engines for American machines wants a little following. It might be wise to get a licence

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from, say, the great firm of Douglas, to build D.C.8s here and fit them with our engines. The remit would certainly be a hybrid, but your Lordships will be familiar with the fact that Her Majesty on her flight to Lagos flew on just such a machine, a machine designed by Douglas and built in Canada and fitted with English engines. Apart from being an extremely noisy machine, it is one which is very successful.
I think your Lordships will agree that the story of the production of these three machines is really opera bouffe. As a piece of ragtime forward planning, it stands out as a supreme example of waste of opportunity and money. I should like to say here and now that I accuse no Party of being to blame. I accuse no individual of being to blame. Like all great mistakes in history, everything was done with the best intentions. I have tried to put myself in the position of the Minister who is to reply, and I do not think his job will be very difficult. If he deals with the question from the R.A.F. point of view, from Transport Command point of view, he can put up a very good case. If he deals with the situation from the Ministry of Supply point of view, he can advance some convincing arguments and much wisdom. If he deals with it from the Ministry of Civil Aviation's point of view, they have committed no fault, and if he deals with it from the Corporations' point of view, they have done what was more or less expected of them. He can make a case for every one of them. Individually they stand in white sheets, but collectively they stand condemned before the whole nation as being responsible for an incompetent piece of organisation.
Your Lordships may well ask what should be done, and I have the temerity to say what I think should be done. All my life I have been more or less in the position of being a male Cassandra, in which everything I prophesy comes true but is never believed. But here I would put forward something which I hope will one day take place. I have four recommendations that I should like to make. The first is that Transport Command in the future should pioneer new civil types of machines and not rely wholly, as they do to-day, on obsolescent machines to carry troops. They, in conjunction with the operators, would then develop the great future civil machines. That is
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American practice and it is wholly sound. It links up the military with the civil, to the advantage of both.
My second recommendation is that there are too many aircraft firms. This wants attention from the Ministry of Supply, to see that not more than four or five should exist. That would help the design and drawing office staff, and make better use of all those facilities which at present comprise a bottleneck in our aircraft manufacture. Thirdly, I should like to see it laid down as an instruction that in ten years' time the Corporations should fly wholly British machines. Ten years will give them plenty of time to get ready. Lastly, I suggest that we should lay it down that no order should be given for a great civil machine until the following agree to co-operate and operate it: the Air Ministry, the Ministry of Supply, the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Corporations and the independent operators joined with the great shipping lines.
There should be a Committee of three people presided over by a Cabinet Minister, and he should have two colleagues, one a prominent Member of the Opposition, so as to keep continuity and not make it a Party matter but a national affair, and a well-tried civilian with experience—someone like Sir William Farren, Sir Arnold Hall or Peter Masefield. Those are the recommendations that I put before your Lordships. I hope that the Minister in considering them will not turn them down flat but will examine them; and I entreat him not to examine them departmentally, or every one of them will be turned down. If they can be examined at Cabinet level, there perhaps is a chance of the wood being seen and not only the trees.
In conclusion, I should like to say this. The poor old taxpayer makes no fuss at all about his money being spent on aviation, because I think he appreciates more than some of our Ministers do the importance of the subject. In the old days we were judged by the great ships built in this country, that arrived in every port of the world. To-day we are assessed as an engineering nation by the quality of our aircraft as they touch down all over the world. They are bits of Britain that people can see. In this industry we have pioneered and spent much blood and treasure. In the past

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the world has marvelled at our performances. What is so bitterly resented to-day is that from now on, apparently, we are to give up the struggle; we are to admit that we are beaten and have become second class, running freighters while the expresses of the world are in other hands. I will not admit that we are cast in a pigmy mould; nor do I believe your Lordships will agree that all is well. I beg to move for Papers.
3.35 p.m.
VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: My Lords, we have just listened to a most impressive speech, not only for the style in which it was delivered but for the technical knowledge that it showed. I cannot pretend to add anything to the technical case that the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, has just made—it seems to me unanswerable. However, I think I can add one or two general observations from a broader background. As a taxpayer I resent intensely the fact that, taking the V.1000 as an example, we have provided £2,300,000, and at the end of it there is nothing to show for it. I could not agree more with what the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, said about making sure, before we embark upon designing and constructing these expensive machines, that in the end there will be a market for them. It seems to me that the instances that he gave show that, as things are now, we start upon these gigantic programmes without knowing in the least whether anybody is going to make use of the machines in the future.
I venture to compare with that want of method what has been happening in the United States of America. I do not suggest that we, with our much smaller resources, can compete with their gigantic programmes, but at the same time it is worth noting how, quite apart from the money aspect, they have built up the position which they now hold in civil aviation and civil air transport. So far as I can gather, the military and the civil sides have worked closely in touch, and in that way they have been able to make certain of a large market before they started building their machines. Look at the results. I am told that at the present time the United States own 1,250 large transport planes, and that 750 are now on order. I am told, also, that in one month during 1954 orders to the value
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of no less than £100 million were given for civil and military transport machines; further, that at the present moment the United States Government have accepted as the basis of their defence policy—I put it as high as that—the great mobility of aeroplanes and flying boats. At the present moment there is a flight across the Atlantic and the Pacific every fifty-four minutes, bringing the personnel and the material for the American Forces. Every hour of the day fifty-six military personnel, five hospital personnel and ten tons of high-priority freight are being carried across the Atlantic and the Pacific.
I can go back further and point to the fact that during the heat of the Korean War 230,000 men and 60,000 tons of freight were safely carried by air from the United States to Korea. Compare those figures—discount them as you will with the greater resources that are behind them—with what was happening here the other day. We had to send two or three battalions to Cyprus, a proceeding that I should have thought could have gone almost automatically without any trouble at all. Yet we had so few transport machines, military or civil, that we had to take some out-of-date Shackletons from Coastal Command, in every way unfitted to transport troops, having no possibility of carrying guns, no possibility of carrying heavy material and, I am informed, not even seats for the troops to sit on. We had to take them from Coastal Command because this policy which the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, has so well criticised—or this want of policy—during the last ten years has left us with practically no air transport at all.
I suggest that, as things are today, something must be seriously wrong. I ask myself certain questions, and perhaps the Government will consider the right answers to them. I do not suggest that they should give answers to me today, but I put these questions to them. First, is the Royal Air Force Transport Command really necessary if it cannot produce better results than we have seen in recent years? So far as I understand, the Army has no special transport command of this kind, and I would ask the Government to consider whether it would not be better to treat aeroplanes like ships, and let some Department like the Board of Trade make the arrangements with them. Secondly, is the Ministry of Transport the

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right Department to supervise these arrangements? I should have thought the Ministry of Transport was so fully occupied with railway affairs, with the settling of labour disputes and with the arrangements for wages, that any Minister of Transport has far too much on his hands to give the time that is necessary to the development of civil aviation. Lastly— and this is a very bold question on my part—is the Ministry of Supply really necessary in peace time? Perhaps I am conservatively minded, but I have a strong feeling that, however necessary the Ministry of Supply may have been in war time, it is not needed in peace time; and, judging from experiences that have been described to us this afternoon by the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, I wonder whether we should not have got on much better and much more quickly if we had not had the fifth wheel of the Ministry of Transport.
Those are the questions. As I say, they are much too wide for me to expect an answer this afternoon, but they are questions which sooner or later the Government will have to face. That brings me to my two final observations. First of all, the Government should decide at once to make full use of the mobility of air transport. They should regard it as the normal procedure that troop movements should be by air. They should enter into charter contracts with the companies upon the kind of plan that already exists with the shipping companies. The charters would have to be sufficiently long to enable the civil firms to obtain their capital. If that were possible, it would remove from the Government the great responsibility of having to find these large sums of money. Mobility should be the very basis of our defence policy and as far as I can judge, certainly from the case the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, has made this afternoon, we have not been making full use of it, although of all the countries in the world, we are the one that most gains by it.
Lastly, we should make sure of the market for these great machines, costing now more than £1 million each, and in a few years' time probably costing £2 million each. We should make sure of the market, and we should not take a narrow view of it. We should bring into our consultations the representatives of the Dominions, particularly Australia, who in
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recent years has been a pioneer in civil aviation. Bring them in from the beginning. They have a great wealth of expert opinion. I remember them in the early days when they were almost the sole pioneers in the field of civil aviation. Bring them in, bring the constructors in and make sure, before you start building one of these V.1000, Brabazons, or whatever it may be, that there will be a demand for them when they are completed.
3.49 p.m.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, will allow me to congratulate him on what I thought was a most admirable speech. He said that he spoke as a critic. I think he might have said a friendly critic, for we know well in the aviation world that aviation has no greater friend than the noble Lord. I am in agreement with practically everything he said, but there were just two small points I noticed upon which I should like to comment. I think the noble Lord said that the decision that America should build transport aircraft during the war was an Air Staff decision. I am not sure, but I have an idea that it went further than that, and that it was a Government decision and cannot be laid only at the door of the Air Ministry.
The second point was that, at the end of his speech, I think the noble Lord said something about "Have we a feeling that we ought to give up the struggle?"—is there a sort of defeatist atmosphere in these matters? I can only say that I have come across no such defeatist attitude at all and that the aircraft industry and those concerned with aviation are determined that we shall come out on top in the competitive struggle that lies ahead. We shall not content ourselves with freighters and small fry of that sort. The British aircraft industry has grown at a great pace and, from the point of view of finance, communications and defence, it is of the greatest national importance. It is quite fair, though, to inquire whether all is well with it, because of the great Government expenditure involved. Side by side with really great achievements on the part of the industry go many reasons for uneasiness—many failures and many delays. The fact is that to-day neither the R.A.F. and the Fleet Air Arm nor civil aviation have

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the aircraft that they require for performing their tasks.
Money has been poured in, but still we have not the aircraft we need, either civil or military. What we have has been enormously expensive; it has cost beyond all reason, and the delays on delivery dates have been inexcusable. That is the case that the aircraft industry has to answer. Your Lordships will agree that it is a formidable case. The Armed Forces are, of course, the industry's largest customer, civil aviation playing very second figure. Of course, the R.A.F. take the lion's share of output. If we are concerned about this industry, it is because of the remarkable prospects which lie before it. There is the very large export business. Export orders to the value of £341 million have been achieved. The year 1955 was expected to be a better year even than 1954 in exports, and in 1954 export orders were over £56 million. Then there is the revenue from manufacturers abroad, who manufacture under licence. Although civil aviation orders are, as I have said, secondary to the military orders, they are, and will be, very considerable.
Looking into the none too distant future, we may expect to see at least £2,000 million spent on replacements of the aircraft now in service; and of course there will be the engine spares, which are expensive. They will represent a considerable figure. Then again, air traffic is sure to expand, and expand rapidly. In addition, there is an increasing demand for aircraft for what I will describe as odd uses—for surveying, for crop spraying and so on. All these things, added together, mean that tremendous prospects lie before the British aircraft industry. It is for that reason that I feel that the Ministry of Supply are well advised, and the nation is well advised, to have a large, but not too large, and efficient aircraft industry kept in being, although at times it may appear, as the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, has said, that we may have too many firms. About that aspect I hope to say something a little later.
With regard to the finance which is involved, in the course of building an aircraft to Service specification, there is sure to be a great deal of redesigning, the entire cost of which is borne by the
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State, because no firm will give a price until after completion of the aircraft concerned. It may happen that, in spite of all this, an aircraft never gets into production, yet the firm may make very considerable profits. The aircraft industry is an industry which relies very greatly upon research, in the cost of which the State pays the lion's share. The sums involved are great. A wind tunnel may cost as much as £8 million. In three years the Ministry of Supply spent £388 million upon research, much of which, of course, would be due to military and defence requirements and only about one-third of which would be at the door of civil aviation.
In addition to research, development work is also very expensive. As regards the development of the Rolls Royce Avon engine—a magnificent engine—I understand that the figure for that is about £22 million. The development of the Bristol Proteus engine up to the Proteus III has cost, I believe, £13 million. The story of the Proteus engine is particularly interesting. Proteus I went to the scrap heap; Proteus II gave way to Proteus III, and B.O.A.C. have decided upon the Bristol B.E.25 for the Britannia whilst still waiting for the Proteus III to materialise. No wonder £13 million went on development! The arrangement whereby the State pays its share of the finance in these matters is that it pays actual costs "reasonably and properly incurred … with the addition of a profit at non-risk rates." "Incurred"—but who certifies that the cost was "properly incurred"? Has whoever does that the qualifications for deciding whether or not the expense has been "properly incurred"? The reasonable profit which is added, the cost-plus, is 10 per cent. for profit, and 15 per cent. on capital expenditure. A prototype may cost £2 million, so it can be seen that "cost-plus," the addition for profit, can be very considerable.
The published figures bear that out, because between 1949 and 1953 Rolls Royce profits increased from £1¼ million to £4½ million, Bristol's went up from £1¼ million to £2½ million and Hawker-Siddeley went up from just under £5 million, in 1950, to just over £11 million, in 1954. I am particularly anxious not to be misleading in this matter. I realise that part of these enormous profits

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may have been fairly earned for extremely valuable work, even though it did not yield actual deliveries. Of course, when these contracts are allotted, there are no penalty clauses in them for non-delivery, late delivery or straight failure. Having said that, I hasten to add that nor is there anything in them in the shape of incentive or reward for improving or speeding up production.
The way the matter works is this. For instance, in the case of the Brabazon I, about which the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, told us, the expense was estimated originally at £3 million for two aircraft, for two Brabazon I's. In the end, we got one for £12 million—and it went to the scrap heap, where it realised £12,000 without its engines. Nevertheless, very likely quite properly, a large profit was made by Bristol on that transaction. A profit was also made by Avro on the disastrous Tudors. Then, of course, there were the ill-fated Princesses. I join warmly with Lord Brabazon of Tara in saying that I hope we shall yet see the flying boat come into its own. It is interesting to notice that although, as the noble Lord said, we might be expected to have a use for the flying boat, and America no use, owing to her great land mass, at the present moment it is America who is going ahead with flying boats. I mention those three most unfortunate businesses because we want no more of such costly and unprofitable enterprises. Reverses and setbacks we are bound to encounter from time to time, but there should not be so many of them, and they should not be on such a scale.
Why do many of the troubles of the industry arise? Can it be that we have been trying to produce too many types, with the result that we fail to produce our minimum requirements? May it also be the case that we are far better at designing and engineering than at actual production? Production is a technique in itself, and we shall not get good production unless sufficiently large orders are given at a time. I heard quite recently of a total order for one hundred of a particular aircraft and the order came in instalments, 25 at a time. In this respect, I should like to mention that the Douglas firm would not start on the D.C.8 until they had orders for 80. I understand that three successive orders for the Britannia were respectively for 15, 7 and 11. Orders
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for the Vanguard and Comet IV were 20 each.
"Penny packet" orders of that nature, and too many alterations in requirements after the orders, small though they are, have been given, could and should be avoided. We want more courageous and better planned ordering, which would give us the aircraft on time and would also save money. Complaints come in from engineers, from employees and from shop stewards about the lack of planning in production which results in idle time, wasted hours and the inefficient use of the time of skilled engineers. I have mentioned that the cost-plus system of payment is likely to lead to a "Why worry; what's the odds?" mentality. There is no effective wage structure throughout the industry, and I am afraid that any firm which tried to effect economies in regard to labour would find that it was losing its labour to firms who said, "Well, what the hell!"
What is Britain's position in the aviation world at the present moment in return for State expenditure on our aircraft? Have we been getting value for money? We seem to be concentrating at the moment on three air liners—the Viscount, the Comet IV and the Britannia. The Comet and Britannia have been planned for the Atlantic and Empire routes. I am not quite sure—perhaps the Minister may see fit to tell us—whetter the pressurisation problems of the Comet IV and Britannia have been fully and satisfactorily solved at this moment. Then what is the position in regard to military aircraft? The average output since the war has been from 75 to 150 monthly. Obsolescent Vampires, Meteors and Venoms are still flying, and some of the newer machines are already obsolescent. Obsolete and obsolescent aircraft are ineffective in war, and in peace they create a dangerous illusion of security. Think of the waste which is involved in equipping British and Commonwealth forces with Meteors and Vampires.
I have mentioned the rate of production in military aircraft since the war. By way of comparison I might quote the MIG.15 which was in service two years after its first flight, and for which the production figure in 1951 was 150 a month. The Sabre, developed in America but built at Montreal, first flew in October, 1947. In October, 1949, it was in service with the American

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Air Force. With us the dates between first flight and service seem to vary between two-and-a-half and three years.
My Lords, it is not only I who feel disturbed by this state of affairs. Certainly there has been much to regret—many delays. The late Under-Secretary of State for Air said that the production programme of the Hunter fell badly behind. Again, he said of the Swift programme
"I have made no secret of the fact that this is way below what we expected,"
though he added:
"But this is not a tragic affair. We have merely met considerable development difficulties."
Without going so far as calling it tragic, I think I should take rather a more serious view of this than to brush it aside in that rather lighthearted manner. The noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle, said:
"I do not conceal our disappointment at the delays,"
and Sir Winston Churchill himself spoke of "grave disappointments." So there is no question whatever that there have been delays and there have been disappointments, with the result that the Air Force has not been modernised. When we come to the Fleet Air Arm, we find that it has not one modern strike aircraft in its squadrons. These are incontestable facts. Almost every year at the Farnborough Air Display one hears of wonderful projects and one sees wonderful prototypes, but, like child prodigies, these seem to fade away. Yet by their appearance they prove the super-excellent quality of our designers and engineers. If that is so, why do these projects come to nothing? They astonish only to disappoint, and they seem to flatter only to deceive. Like most of your Lordships I read the White Paper of 1955. It was a long apologia for the fact that the R.A.F. had not its proper aircraft.
Turning to civil aviation, although the war ended in 1945, and this is 1956, there is still no British civil aircraft on the prestige North Atlantic route. We are still "flying American" on that route. I believe that it is hoped that the Comet IV, which supersedes the Comet III, will be in service by 1959. It is difficult to be absolutely certain about such dates
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because they vary so rapidly and almost from month to month. But if that is so (and we hope it will be so), it must be remembered that the Comet IV will not do the London—New York run non-stop and the Bristol 300 long-range aircraft will, I understand, do that flight non-stop with "scheduled regularity," although even with the B.E.25 engine its speed will be only 400 miles an hour. Until that is available, its speed will be 350 miles an hour. I do not know whether we can have any confirmation of the time when the Comet IV will be in service on the Atlantic.
There has been very strong criticism from Sir Roy Fedden, who should know what he is talking about, over the shortage of proper aircraft for the R.A.F. He said that we should by now have 2,000 swept-wing fighters and 500 strategic bombers, as against the 600 and 50 respectively which, he believes, are all we now have. He was very sweeping in his criticism. He said that we had never been so short of aircraft for the Royal Air Force as we are to-day and that in civil aviation we have only "one foot in the door." He blamed those responsible for planning. Her Majesty's Government for lack of imagination, the chief engineers and senior executives of the aircraft industry, and also the Society of British Aircraft Manufacturers for failures. In fact, according to Sir Roy Fedden all concerned in aircraft production had sinned and come short of the glory. Sir Alfred Munnings, lecturing on modern art, could hardly have been more catholic in his condemnation than was Sir Roy Fedden in his criticism of the British aircraft industry. He did manage to screw out a little comfort for us in the end, however, because he had praise for what he called a
"nucleus of trained and disciplined engineers, with unbeatable creative and inventive capacity."
I believe that those are the men who will eventually win for us a leading position in the civil aviation world.
The truth is that America beats us only on production. We beat her on many other counts, and if we put our minds to it we should be able to catch up with her on production methods. But if America beats us in production she is also ahead of us in research and development. What the Americans do in this

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field has to be seen to be believed. I can assure your Lordships that when America builds a wind tunnel she builds a wind tunnel; and I am now informed that the American Government has built six high-altitude test chambers for turbo-engine testing. They cost £5 million each. I believe that we nave one such chamber building, but that there is no information about the date when it will be in use. It will not be available for perhaps a year or more.
The lesson for us from these facts is that research, design and testing must be unceasingly pressed on and backed by more decisive planning and speedier decisions than have come from the past few Governments. Our troubles always come back to this question of production. We design a tine aircraft; we build a fine prototype; and then, through poor production, we fail to reap the reward. As the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, has said, all our aircraft—the Comet, the Viking and the Britannia—are late. Sir Miles Thomas has said quite truly:
"Passengers cannot be carried on promises."
He added:
"British aircraft manufacturers must realise that time is fleeting and that punctuality of delivery is of paramount importance."
What can be done to improve matters? It is no good criticising unless one tries to put forward some suggestions of what can be done. I believe that the industry should be rationalised in proportion to the orders we can place. It might be going too far to cut it down, as has been suggested, to four or five firms, but I believe that there are far too many firms, especially fringe firms. The Minister of Supply has just stressed the great advantage that America possesses in test facilities and numbers of trained engineers. He said:
"We are developing as many civil aircraft as an industry can tackle without over-straining our technical resources."
He implied that we are over-straining those resources. He went on to say that "There may be something" in suggestions that we may have too many firms, and that "Further concentration of firms might well be an advantage." I believe the Minister has advanced very strong reasons for some rationalisation of the industry. The demand for draughtsmen and stressmen forms a bottleneck which
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impedes progress at this moment. I wonder whether all these are at present employed on work of national importance. Perhaps rationalisation in respect of those essential men would be good. I do not know what is the position with the jig and tool makers and draughtsmen, but they have certainly been in very short supply. Production engineers are, of course, of the utmost importance.
Then there is the question of modifications. On the last occasion on which this question was debated we heard of 700 modifications to one aircraft. Can nothing be done to impress upon the Services that the best is the enemy of the good and that they often defeat their own ends by too many modifications? Mark Twain said. "Everybody complains about the weather but nobody does anything about it." The aircraft industry is never discussed without modifications being blamed for many of our troubles. Her Majesty's Government never deny the charges, but nothing happens: the practices continue.
The question of a Transport Command has been touched upon to-day, and here again I have a suggestion to make. We have not a really effective Transport Command such as we should have. Air transport is absolutely essential to air power, and the Fighting Services increasingly need air transport. I believe that the constitution of a real and effective Transport Command, sufficiently large, would be of the greatest help to civil aviation, because the needs of a Transport Command and civil aviation obviously dovetail at very many points., A Transport Command being a common necessity of all three Services, it should be regarded as the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence.
My suggestion would be that responsibility for Air Transport Command and for electronics should be taken away from the Ministry of Supply and vested in the Ministry of Defence. That would take a great load off the Ministry of Supply which, although it is far from being as black as it is painted (as I well know), is nevertheless very over-loaded and consequently runs into criticism from time to time. I think that if those two, Air Transport Command and electronics, could be taken out of the Ministry of Supply it would mean a great easing of the burden on that Ministry. It would also make the Ministry of Defence a far more effec-

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tive Ministry and give it a far more realistic raison d'être than perhaps it has at the present moment. I believe that this co-ordination of military and civil air transport would give maximum efficiency at minimum cost. I would point out that Boeing, Lockheed and Douglas have all developed fine aircraft on the basis of large orders for military transport aircraft.
I believe that this step becomes more urgent as requirements increase and costs grow enormous. Lack of co-ordination, as the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, has pointed out, very largely accounted for the abandonment of the V.1000 and withdrawal of support from its civil version, the VC.7. I believe these figures to be correct. I have been told that the Ministry of Supply went ahead with that very costly project of the V.1000 on the basis of an order from Transport Command for six of them. B.O.A.C. did not want the V.1000—they said so a long time ago—and even had they wanted it I do not think that they could have wanted more than eight of these machines. Before going ahead on the strength of an order for six aircraft, did the Ministry of Supply consult jointly Transport Command, B.O.A.C. and B.O.A.C.'s empire partners? I believe that now the Ministry of Supply and B.O.A.C. are discussing the possibility of turbo-jet aircraft by 1960 to fly from London to New York non-stop. Are they consulting the Empire operators about this project? Are Transport Command and possible foreign purchasers being brought into such consultations. It seems to me that they certainly should be. I believe that the aircraft will cost at least £1 million. I do not think that B.O.A.C. alone is likely to order the forty which would be necessary to "break even" on the cost. A larger order than B.O.A.C. can give would be necessary to make that project economic. That is why I ask if these consultations are taking place.
In conclusion, I should like to say that I have the greatest admiration for some of the firms in the aircraft industry and for the designers and executives whom I have met in these firms. I most sincerely wish the industry well, for their sakes as well as for the security and prosperity of the nation. I have endeavoured to stick to the facts in what I have said to-day. I hope that the lessons of the past, and, indeed, of the present, will be learned,
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and I am sure that our experience as time goes on will deepen the real confidence which I, at any rate, feel in the future of this remarkable industry.
4.24 p.m.
LORD SEMPILL: My Lords, I should like to re-echo everything which the last speaker, Lord Winster, has said about the weight and usefulness of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara. But I should like to make just a few remarks from the technical point of view. I speak in this debate with considerable temerity since I am the only Member of your Lordships' House who has not, as have all the noble Lords who have spoken and those who will speak, occupied a great position in the aeronautical field as Secretary of State. I entirely agree with what Lord Brabazon of Tara has said (and this was emphasised particularly by Lord Winster) in regard to flying boats. I hope that the noble Earl who is going to reply on behalf of Her Majesty's Government will be able to give us some indication as to when the de-cocooning of these boats that are lying at Southampton and the putting in of suitable engines will take place, because that is a vital line of development which we cannot afford to neglect.
As your Lordships, I think, know, our most outstanding airliner of to-day is the Vickers Viscount. It is the first propeller turbine job in the world, and it is accorded the premier position by the world. I think something over 280 of such aircraft are on order. George Edwards, of the Vickers Company, the designer of the Viscount, has a good replacement machine on the way, the Vanguard, which is slightly larger and capable of carrying more passengers over a greater range. I think we ought to remember that in the international field the Lockheed Electra—which has already been mentioned in this debate, I believe, by Lord Winster—is a worthy competitor. It may be a little larger and a little faster and at the moment it is picking up more orders.
With regard to the Comet, I think that all Lord Winster has said is correct. It is too small, as it now is in its redesigned form, for the job in hand. What we want really is a larger edition of the Comet. The change in the whole aspect in regard to jet propulsion in the United States, which is an affair of the last half

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year or so, is quite remarkable. We, on the other hand, have one excellent answer in the long-range propeller-turbine Bristol Britannia. This machine has already been mentioned. It promises extremely well. But if there is to be a switch over to the turbo type of propulsion, as is the case in the United States, then as your Lordships are well aware, that raises a big question in regard to alteration in aerodrome size. There is also the very great difficulty of the noise nuisance, about which so much has been said in your Lordships' House.
In conclusion, it seems to me that if we want—as I am sure we do—stability and prosperity for our aircraft industry, it would be a good thing for stability if we could engineer a really swift, forward move for aircraft carrying goods by air on a much larger scale than is practised to-day. That would give us bread and butter work for the aircraft industry for many years to come. In view of the technological difficulties from which the roads and railways are suffering, something of the kind is required. I end by once more congratulating the noble Lord who initiated this Motion and by saying that, when Lord Pakenham has spoken, we shall look forward to hearing what the noble Earl who is to speak on behalf of Her Majesty's Government has to tell us.
4.29 p.m.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, I had not intended to take part in this debate, but, having heard the speech of my noble friend, Lord Brabazon of Tara—which I must say I think was one of the most interesting, informed and constructive speeches I have ever heard in this House—it seems to me that he raised matters of such importance that it behoves those of us who have had a certain kind of experience of these matters and who are not, I hope, prejudiced by them but have learned lessons for the future from that experience, to say a word or two to the House on the issues which have been raised. I, at any rate, can claim experience of this sort—and I hope that I have learned from it—having been both Secretary of State for Air and Minister of Civil Aviation.
The first thing I should like to say is that I cannot endorse too strongly what Lord Brabazon of Tara said (and this was supported by the noble Viscount, Lord
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Templewood, another former Secretary of State for Air) on the importance of co-operation between the Royal Air Force Transport Command and, indeed, the whole of the Ministry and the Corporations, and the makers, and that that co-operation should come at the earliest possible stage. I would add that co-operation means thinking together and it means give and take. In deciding on a machine, I think a greater part of the "give" has to come from the R.A.F. and Transport Command, for this reason: that the Corporations are business companies and people can travel by a British airline or a foreign airline according to the service provided and, I might add, according to the safety provided—that is always an important thing in air transport. But Transport Command are not under that limitation. The people they send out in their transports have to go where they are told to go. I do not mean by that that they should not have good transport; but that is the reason why it is more for the Corporations, in reason, to call the tune than for Transport Command.
I would call the attention of your Lordships—or rather recall your Lordships' attention, because what I am saying is a good deal in line with what my noble friend Lord Brabazon of Tara has said—to the prospects in civil aviation over the Atlantic, and I am going to confine what I am saying now entirely to the Atlantic route. After all, that is where the dollars are and where the greatest prestige is; therefore it is the most important. We have a situation to-day where none of the new aircraft is on the Atlantic route and we are doing quite well—incidentally, by British lines largely flying American machines. Presently, the Britannia, which can fly the Atlantic without a stop, will be in service. Then, possibly for two years, possibly for three (because it is true that every aircraft is always late in arriving in service, as more than one noble Lord has said and as those of us who have held any of these offices know from our own experience), the Britannia may win and hold the Blue Riband of the Atlantic. And from what I know of the firm which is making it and the designers, and, indeed, of the reinforcement which has gone to that firm, I believe it will be a first-class aircraft.
After two or there years, the new American machines, the Boeings and the

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Douglases, will conic in. I do not say that they will fully come up to performance: they might be a bit below; they might also be a bit above. What is probably quite certain is that they will be heavier than the estimates on paper, and that, in the natural sequence of development, they will be a great deal faster than the Britannia. The Blue Riband will pass to one of these United States aircraft. Then I know exactly what is going to happen. The B.O.A.C., which will have been flying Britannias successfully, will find themselves up against the competition of the American lines flying faster American machines, and they will do what they have always done—and I do not blame them as a commercial firm; they will say to the bevy of Ministers who deal with this matter, not excluding the Chancellor of the Exchequer who, oddly enough, was left out of the picture when the other Ministers were mentioned as having failed to take these decisions. "If we are to earn dollars, apart from keeping our prestige, we must buy these American machines." We have seen this happen over and over again.
But even if the Chancellor of the Exchequer were to agree that the B.O.A.C. could have the dollars to buy machines, they might not be able to buy them. We have been told of the orders which have already been placed in America for these aircraft while they are on the drawing board, and I have no doubt that these firms, who are also great makers of military machines, will get cluttered up with Service orders. They are also in the guided missile business and it will not be at all easy to add a number of orders. The B.O.A.C. would come in at the end of the queue, and even if the Government gave them permission to buy it would be a long time before they obtained the machines. I do not know that the firms concerned would be anxious to put them up the queue at the expense of somebody who is able to pay dollars.
If I have that picture right—and I think my noble friend Lord Brabazon of Tara will agree that it is a true picture—then, based on the interests of British air transport alone, is there not a strong case for going now for an airliner which will be equal to, or better than, the American? That seems to me a strong case for not
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dropping this Vickers aircraft. I do not know whether it is the best; at any rate, it is the one which was ready to come forward. Looking at the Viscount and the other machines that Vickers have made, and at the close co-operation bettween Vickers with the engine-makers (I think I am right in saying that probably we have the best engine to put into this machine, and that is half the battle), I think a tremendous case is made for reconsidering the decision to drop altogether the new Vickers aircraft, on which millions of pounds have apparently been spent.
There is no Party polities in this question: I take it that it is still the policy of whatever Government are in power to "buy British" and "fly British." After all, when I produced the original White Paper on the future of civil aviation, which was a production of our National Government—the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, will bear me out in this statement—we were all agreed that, if possible, the British Corporations should fly British machines. Then the other side came in and nationalisation was very much to the fore. It was thought a good thing to drop the partnership of shipping lines, which I had arranged. I am not quite sure that the present Leader of the Labour Party would take that view to-day. The point came that we should have a completely nationalised industry—I am not going to argue the merits of nationalisation; the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, need not think that—but never was there any difference about "flying British," if we could, provided always, of course, that there were good enough British aircraft available, because passengers cannot be forced on to the planes. We had to give way to the extent of allowing the Corporation to buy a number of foreign aircraft, because there were not good enough British machines; and if there are not good enough British machines, that will always be necessary, whether the nation owns the Corporation or individual citizens are shareholders in it. That proviso, that there shall be adequate British machines available, surely carries with it this corollary: that it is the duty of the Government, the Royal Air Force, the Corporations—essentially the Corporations—and the makers to do their best in a co-operative and forward-looking spirit to have adequate British aircraft available.

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The Government are quite justified, in my opinion, in putting a good deal of pressure on the Corporations in this matter. I was greatly interested to read a report of a speech of the new Leader of the Labour Party, made, I think, somewhere in the country, and what he said about nationalisation. I believe I summarise correctly his words by saying that he said his Party must take a new and somewhat wide look at nationalisation; that nationalisation was not a virtue in itself, and the justification for it was that it should be applied to an industry only if it was necessary in order that that industry might serve the broad national interest in the best way. I think that is broadly the line that he took, and I do not disagree with it.
If I were debating nationalisation (which, of course, I am not) I should agree that there is a good deal to be said for that point of view. But if you take that point of view—and we who are less addicted to nationalisation than some members of the Labour Party can justify it to ourselves only on the ground that we can get better national results by it—surely it gives the Government the right, and indeed, as I think, the duty, to say to these Corporations that they must take the long view over this matter and co-operate with the Government and the Air Ministry to get the right kind of British aircraft in the future. It is only if that policy is so comprehensively regarded, looking so far forward, that I believe we shall avoid the disaster that the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, forecast if we do not take timely action. This is a debate full of constructive suggestions, some of them critical—but then we must be critical. After all, I believe we are all criticising ourselves, because we have all been in this matter, more or less; and if we cannot be critical of ourselves and of each other sufficiently to learn from the past for the future, then we are not much good as a Government, or an Opposition or, as it were, an elder statesman sitting on the side line. I am sure it is in that spirit that my noble friend who is to reply will accept this debate.
In conclusion, I should just like to join in the plea for the flying boat. When I was at the Air Ministry and, later on, Minister of Civil Aviation, I was always a champion of the flying boat, and I agree that it is the most comfortable air-
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craft to fly in. The air operators, here and in America, are against it, but air-fields can be more and more expensive, and if we have these flying boats, we should use them. Look at the places where we operate. I remember Dr. Colijn, the Dutch Prime Minister of many years ago, long before the First World War, having an intimate talk with me about what should be done in the Dutch Indies—I hope that I am not revealing Cabinet secrets. The Admiralty had said to him: "What you want are some nice ships." But ships were expensive, even in those days. Dr. Colijn said to me: "What do you think about it?" My noble friend Lord Cilcennin will no doubt riposte that I was at the time Air Minister—no, I do not think I was; I think I was Colonial Secretary. So I was really quite unprejudiced.
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (VISCOUNT CILCENNIN): Before the last war; not before the First World War.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: Yes, before the last war. I ventured to say to Dr. Colijn: "You could get some flying boats much more cheaply than you get these destroyers and other ships. After all, look at all the little bights and bays all through your islands. Might not the flying boats come in most useful?" I still believe that the flying boat has an actual and a potential use which is quite worth while. Do not let us lose the technique and the capacity for making them and flying them. I have spoken for longer than I intended, but what I have said is the fruit of experience in these offices. I believe that we all ought to look at the future on the lines that my noble friend Lord Brabazon of Tara and others have indicated to us.
4.48 p.m.
LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, we on this side of the House were hoping that my noble friend Lord Ogmore would speak this afternoon, but pressing duties have detained him elsewhere and I have been asked to step into his place more or less at the last minute. However, it is a real privilege to take part in a debate initiated with such great distinction by the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, who has been followed by others very eminent in this field. It is also a special pleasure to follow the noble Earl, Lord Swinton.

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He mentioned that he had been Minister of Civil Aviation and Secretary of State for Air, but, with his customary modesty, he did not mention that he is the only individual, noble Lord or Member of another place, who has occupied both those positions; and therefore he speaks with an authority on these topics that may clearly be regarded as unique. I shall be returning to one or two of his observations later, but I would say now that I think I have listened to every speech made on civil aviation by the noble Earl in the last ten years, and always with the utmost enjoyment, except on one occasion, and then perhaps I was a little biased, because he was calling for my instantaneous removal from office.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: I am glad that I failed.
LORD PAKENHAM: That is extremely handsome of the noble Earl. I was going to say that he made out such a strong case that for a moment I was not certain whether he might not be right, and I was lucky that my noble friend Lord Attlee did not take his view of things. I remember that on that occasion the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, was down to speak, and who knows what he was going to say? Unfortunately, he was poisoned at lunch, so he was unable to take part. If we knew what he was going to say we might know who poisoned him, but that has never been revealed. I should like to say to the noble Earl that when I was Minister of Civil Aviation I owed a tremendous amount to the advice of his great mentor, the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara. And the work that the noble Lord did all through that period, and has done since, as head of the Air Registration Board, is something that only those concerned with civil aviation can appreciate at its full value. He stands apart in the field of civil aviation, as we all know very well.
It is difficult in a sentence or two or, shall I say, in a few minutes, to sum up in a fair way the performances or failures of this great industry. I would offer the humble opinion that the Society of Aircraft Manufacturers—among whom I had, and I hope shall have, even after this speech, a number of friends—have rather over-played their hand. They have made it seem that it is almost committing
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sacrilege to criticise the aircraft industry—almost like criticising Buckingham Palace, the Royal Navy or Westminster Abbey. That, I think, has bred a kind of counter-irritation, so that quite a number of people are going about and saying that the whole thing is a shambles. That, of course, is an exaggeration in the other direction. This afternoon we have tried to strike a fair balance. I am bound to say that I think the aircraft industry, at any rate taking a short-term view—I think they have to take a long view—will benefit greatly from the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara. He feared no one; he spoke his mind, and he described the whole affair as an incompetent piece of organisation. I feel those were the most operative words that have so far been uttered this afternoon.
I know that there are many achievements to the credit of the aircraft industry since the war. A friend of mine who has just come home from Vienna, where he is serving the country, informs me that the British aircraft industry is a great national asset, and that the arrival of the Viscount in Vienna sends up our stock every time it occurs. Of course the Viscount is a wonderful aircraft, but when we take the last ten years of civil aircraft manufacture, what does the achievement boil down to? The only major success is the Viscount, though we have the minor success of the Dove and the Bristol Freighter. I speak in the presence of those who know these things better than I do, but I should be surprised if these sentiments can be challenged by the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, who is himself an airman and is to speak with all the authority of the Government in a few minutes.
It is worth asking ourselves, therefore—and this is what we are all trying to do, in our different fashions, this afternoon—what has gone wrong. All this good will, as the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, said, and yet here is the result—"buckets" of money spent and only the Viscount, and one or two other minor successes, to show for it. We have had references to nationalisation. When I was preparing, rather hastily, my remarks, I was wondering whether it was bringing in a red herring if I referred to nationalisation this afternoon. However, the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, whom I follow wherever possible, has set me the example, and I would make just one observation.

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The noble Earl was talking about the national Corporations. No one can say that they are private enterprise in the ordinary sense; they are completely dependent on the Government. The grand old virtues claimed for capitalism can hardly he ascribed to the aircraft industry—the circumstances do not make it possible. On the other hand, they are not nationalised; they are somewhere betwixt and between. I think it can be argued (though I am not in any way this afternoon presenting a case for nationalisation, and it certainly is not a case that I have come here to explain) that in the aircraft industry at the present time we in this country are getting the worst of both worlds. I am afraid one is bound to feel that.
Let us try to be constructive. I have come down with one or two general thoughts and, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, has made us think hard and fast in the brief but cogent speech that he has delivered to us. Before coming to one or two suggestions of my own, may I refer briefly to one or two of the noble Lord's suggestions that were not in my own mind? He suggested that the Corporations should be required to "buy British" exclusively within ten years. That seems to me reasonable. To turn back to the theme developed by the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, that is really in keeping with his own ideas and the ideas, I think I can fairly say, of all of us. Therefore, I see nothing unreasonable in asking that within ten years this should be accepted as an objective.
There was one other suggestion the noble Lord made which he had not time to develop, for I know that he never likes speaking for long—he is a model to all of us—and that is that Transport Command should accept a new and special responsibility. I should not like to criticise that proposal before knowing more fully what was in his mind. I quite agree with the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, that obviously there must be co-operation between all parties, and Transport Command may well come into the picture there. The noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, was asking that Transport Command should take over the main part of the responsibility for developing civil aircraft. Without the opportunity of consulting my colleagues, I should ques-
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tion whether that was the right course and, therefore, I should certainly like to reserve the views of myself and anyone associated with me. I would much rather see the responsibility placed still more clearly on the Corporations; bat if that is done, then they must be remunerated more adequately for the responsibility so assumed. At that point, in so far as I was able to follow the noble Lord's argument, I wonder whether he would wish to press his suggestion.
Coming to various other points which he made, speaking with all his personal authority, and which some others of us had in mind, I would say that I agree entirely about the need for concentration. I suppose one can think of concentrating either on particular types while keeping the firms intact—with which proposal I think we all agree. The Minister in another place seemed to suggest that that was Government policy. Or one can think of combining the resources of particular firms for particular purposes, and that idea also has many attractions. The noble Lord did not stop there, and I am glad he did not.
The noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, came flat out for reducing the number of firms to four or five, or sonic such number. There again, I have not had the opportunity since he spoke of full consultation, but I should be surprised if that idea did not prove attractive to many of my own colleagues; and certainly, speaking for myself, I see strong advantages in it. I am sure that there are too many firms engaged. The noble Lord put his finger on a point which must be fully explored. Indeed, I feel that what was in his mind was right and true. I would also suggest (I do rot think this aspect was dealt with by the noble Lord) that we must find some method if we can—I know it is not easy—of improving the arrangements under which contracts are entered into with a firm. At present there do not seem to be sufficient rewards for success or sufficient penalties for failure. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, when he replies, will say a few words on that matter, or at any rate indicate that he is sympathetic to some new approach to the contract system.
Finally, among the many points he raised, I would come to his suggestion of a committee. When we talk about committees, we all begin building schemes on paper which look attractive until they are

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put into practice. It is much easier—and I suppose no one in this House knows this better than does the noble Earl, Lord Attlee—to work out a paper scheme for co-ordinating all the relevant Departments than to bring such an arrangement to perfection.
I feel that the Ministry of Supply must not be left with the sole responsibility in this connection. The veil is not torn away during the lifetime of an individual Government and I do not know what machinery exists for co-ordination, but I do not think I am making an improper disclosure—and, if I am, I shall very soon be rapped over the knuckles—when I say that the noble Viscount, Lord Addison, who was so beloved in this House, played a most important part in co-ordinating the activities of the Departments concerned, directly or indirectly, with the ordering of aircraft. I am talking now not of the day-to-day activities but of long-term ordering and the arrangements for drawing up the programmes. I would venture to think that certainly a Cabinet Minister—perhaps the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, himself, who has, no doubt, wide duties but not duties which have been previously disclosed to us, or, possibly, one of his colleagues—perhaps the right honourable gentleman, Mr. Butler—might assume the chairmanship of the committee concerned with this question of ordering aircraft over a long period ahead.
The noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, had in mind a committee. He mentioned something which sounded agreeable, but I wonder whether it would be quite within the atmosphere of our Constitution. He suggested that this committee should have as chairman a leading Cabinet Minister—I entirely agree with that—but he thought there should also be included a prominent member of the Opposition, to preserve continuity. 1 wonder—perhaps one day we shall hear the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, speak on this subject—whether that would be a sound constitutional practice. Noble Lords may recall sonic examples from the early days of the Committee on Imperial Defence. There may be precedents, but it is a matter on which the Government of the day would have to accept full responsibility. I wonder, therefore, whether a prominent member of the Opposition could be associated with it in
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quite that way. By all means have some expert who is thought to have Opposition views, so that there shall be as little danger of a break as possible; but I question whether one can take one of the leading members of the Opposition and put him on to a committee whose operations, conclusions and results may be controversial and must, therefore, make it difficult for the gentleman in question if his Party and the Government fall to disagreement.
I do not wish to detain the House for more than another moment or two, but I should like to say that any fair-minded person coming here this afternoon and listening to the discussion would feel that all was not well with the aircraft industry. I do not think anybody could feel that we were malicious in our criticisms, but no one could feel that the matter should be left where it is. Various suggestions have been made. I have no doubt that, when the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, conies to reply in a few moments he will, with his usual courtesy, pay a tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, whose speech will be described as "a memorable speech"; the debate will be referred to as "a memorable debate," and that will be that. This question, within Government circles, will then go into winter quarters for another year. That is the real danger. I feel that some sort of teeth ought to be put into this Motion. We all have our separate ideas. I do not pretend to be the only person or the main person to understand the problem. There is unanimous agreement among those who care for the aircraft industry that things are going wrong and have been going wrong for quite a while, completely irrespective of Party politics.
Therefore, it seems to me that a serious inquiry is the only step that can reassure the public or ultimately serve our country. I put this forward with great diffidence in the presence of the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, because, when the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge, suggested an inquiry on some other matter the other day, the noble Earl told him that he, Lord Beveridge, had volunteered for every inquiry in the last twenty years and he thought there had been too much of that kind of thing. I apologise, because I see that I am clearly misrepresenting the noble Earl. I hope that the idea of this inquiry will be taken seriously by

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Lord Selkirk. I can assure him that here I am speaking for the Opposition. This is not a last minute idea of mine; this is the considered view of the Opposition, and surely there can be no possible Party question in this. The desire to rationalise the aircraft industry—I am not talking of "nationalising"; I am talking of "rationalising"—must be something, surely, which is unconnected with Party.
The noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, if I may put it to him crudely, will not carry the House or any fair-minded person with him this afternoon if he comes along and says that, on the whole, things are pretty good, and pays the customary tributes. I do not think anybody would be satisfied with that. There is disquiet completely unrelated to politics. In all seriousness, speaking for the Opposition but putting a point of view which has no special connection with any Party or group in the State, I beg the noble Earl to consider that there are widespread fears and, so far as we can judge, justified fears that things are wrong with the aircraft industry. In those circumstances, I say to him that it is the duty of the Government to allay the disquiet and to deal with this situation as constructively as possible by setting up a full and thorough inquiry.
5.7 p.m.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (THE EARL OF SELKIRK): My Lords, at one time I thought the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, was going to make all my speech for me. I should have been grateful to him. I thought he might have gone on to thank the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, and to say a number of other things which would have helped me. I must say straight away that I think this debate has been unnecessarily depressing. We have in front of us the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Douglas of kirtleside, who to-day is flying exclusively British aircraft—and they are not bad aircraft at all. I do not want to draw the noble Lord, but I think it is fair to say that.
The noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, speaks with great authority on this subject. Although some of us may think the Brahazon Committee Report an absurd document and too closely connected with the Brahazon aircraft, speaking for myself I was amazed at the vision shown in that document of twelve to
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thirteen years ago, viewed in the light of what we know to-day. It is very easy, on this subject, to be wise after the event, but, in fact, of the five aircraft proposed, four were brought substantially to maturity. That was no small achievement. With great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, to say that we have given up the struggle, that we have thrown in our hands on passenger aircraft and have gone in for freighters, is carrying the argument a little too far.
I must for a moment underline the difficulty of this industry. After the war, of course, we were going through a period of flux and change. Many expensive mistakes were made—there is no doubt about that. Of course, one of the difficulties was that of getting an assured user. The Corporations had not settled down at that time, and it was not easy to get a user. It is worth remembering just what is involved in this business at the present time. I agree that it is a matter which should be examined at the highest level. I find myself in full agreement with what the noble Lord says there because the problems necessarily involve pretty high policy.
First of all, let us remember, taking an aircraft like the Britannia, that there is about £ 30 million tied up in that project. And that is only one project. A project of this size will take anything from, say, six to seven years, and quite likely nine years, to mature. It is worth noting that that is longer, or may well be longer, than the life of any normal Government; so that, necessarily, anything started by one Government will necessarily go on into the period of the next Government. That is the point which the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, made about making the proposed committee to some extent representative of both sides of the House. I very much appreciate what the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, said. Anybody in the Opposition who finds himself on such a committee would be in considerable embarrassment if he found himself in total disagreement with what the committee said. I do not know whether he would get up in Parliament and make a violent speech, which would of course wreck the committee, or whether he would sit down and accept a measure of responsibility. It is an attractive idea, but I think it contains real difficulties of that sort.

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The nature of the work to be done is exceedingly complex. I mention this only as an instance. The Comet which is being built now contains, I believe, two million items; each one is numbered, each one has to be drawn, and each one has to be manufactured—this quite apart from things like nuts and bolts. Then, when that process, such as it is, has been gone through, whilst the design may be entirely successful, the aircraft may be noncompetitive because, in the meantime, someone has built a better one. I say this only because it constitutes a real problem in the international field. I am told, moreover, that there are somewhere in the order of 2,000 medium and large aircraft in scheduled service. If we give them a life of ten years, that means that there are about 200 required each year. To provide those 200 aircraft something like ten substantial firms are seriously endeavouring to take part in the venture. When we remember that in one way or another America produced last year 14,000 military and civil aircraft, it is, I think, easy to see that the capacity to-day is far in excess of what is required for the commercial market. The fact is that it is an extremely speculative business; it is a difficult and exacting task and, without the military background, it is difficult to cover overheads and put this development on a sound economic basis.
I see that the President of an American airline said this, in describing his attitude towards buying new aeroplanes:
"We are buying aeroplanes that have not yet been fully designed, with millions of dollars we do not have; and we are going to operate them off airports that are too small, with an air traffic control system that is too slow, and we must fill them with more passengers than we have ever carried before."
This is a well-known airline in America, and it indicates that even there there are those who want to be depressing and those who say that the future contains difficulties. We are facing these problems.
There has been a good deal of reference to Transport Command. I am sure that that is perfectly right, although we are not talking about military aircraft to-day. If I can, I want to confine my remarks substantially to commercial long-range aircraft. In any industry it would be nice to throw over the overheads to some other activity. What is being asked
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for, putting it in the simplest way, is a concealed subsidy; that is really what it amounts to. That is a very nice thing, and I have no doubt that that is what is happening, in America. I would say to the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, that a great deal of military work is done by long-term charter.
The real difficulty which we are facing to-day is that of quantity production. That is the really distinguishing feature which exists between ourselves and the United States of America. Some of your Lordships may have seen The Times article on this subject the other day, which showed that for each of the big Douglas, Lockheed and Boeing aircraft made since the war—that is, the Constellation, the D.C.6 and the Stratocruiser—there have been about 500 orders, spread between the military and civil authorities. That presents an entirely different position from anything which we are able to do. Moreover, of the aircraft produced in the United States about 90 per cent. are military, and their military orders are over ten times, and perhaps considerably more, the size of ours. They are, therefore, dealing with an entirely different problem. We have to be much more careful in the way in which we develop.
There has been a great deal of emphasis in regard to the need for the closest possible co-operation in the earlier stages. The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, speaking with his great authority, dealt with that matter. We agree with that point, of course, but we think that that is what is happening to-day. On the civil aviation side, certainly, there is a much closer link than there was formerly.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: But was there in regard to this particular aircraft?
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I am coming to that. Perhaps it would be convenient to deal with it straight away. B.O.A.C. were interested in the V.1000 from the beginning, when it was ordered by Transport Command. It is rather interesting to me to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Winster, should think that Transport Command were wrong ever to order it.
LORD WINSTER: No.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I understood from the noble Lord that he thought that six was an absurdly small number to order; but I may be wrong. Transport

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Command decided that they did not want it. I do not propose to argue why they did not, but they decided in that way. They then pressed B.O.A.C., and B.O.A.C. were pressed to take a civil version. B.O.A.C. also said they did not want it. You may argue that B.O.A.C. were wrong. But should the Ministry of Supply then have given a development contract for an aircraft for which there was no purchaser at all? I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Winster, who said that the Douglas Company would not build an aircraft until they had eighty orders. Would we be right to encourage anyone in this country to build an aircraft where there was no demand? I think we should have been quite wrong to do so.
LORD WINSTER: The only question I wished to ask was how much development work was put into the V.1000 on the strength of an order for six aircraft. I understand that a considerable amount of development work was done at great expense, and that a great many design man-hours were absorbed in it, apparently all on the basis of an order for six aircraft.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I think that that is one of the points in regard to an aircraft which one cannot help. Whether six or a thousand are being built, the design period is roughly the same. That is the fundamental difference between a ship and an aeroplane. The amount of expenditure in design of an aircraft is so great that there must be some production features which are not necessary in a ship. Whatever number are required, the design period is the same. The difference between the Brabazon and the V.C.7 was that, when it appeared that the aircraft was not wanted, the development was not started. Noble Lords may argue that that was wrong.
I am not going to cast my mind forward into the early 1960s, six years ahead. It is easy to do so, but it is a little harder to do so from this Box than from somewhere else. I am not going to say what aeroplanes can or cannot do, but I can assure noble Lords that the points they have made are very much in mind. It may be that the next pure jet to fly on international routes will again be a British aircraft, as was the first.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: I do not want to interrupt the noble Earl unduly, but, with great respect, he seems to me not to be answering the most important aspect of the matter which was put to him. Of course we accept it when he tells us that when the work on the V.1000 had gone a certain way Transport Command said they did not want it, and that B.O.A.C. were brought in at the beginning. But he also said that when Transport Command did not want it they tried to get B.O.A.C. to take it—which does not look much like co-operation from the start. But the point is this. I am not being critical when I ask him, even if neither B.O.A.C. nor Transport Command would buy an aircraft, ought we to have gone on making it? Looking forward to the time when the Britannia has, not exhausted its usefulness but rather ceased to be anything like the best machine crossing the Atlantic, when the Americans come in with new aircraft, will not B.O.A.C. at that time need an aircraft able to compete with the new American machines? Will not Transport Command also need an aircraft, and cannot there now be co-operation to try to get an aircraft which will suit both? That was the whole point of what I said.
THE EARL OR SELKIRK: My Lords, I fully appreciate the noble Earl's point and I can tell him how we propose to do that. I will not speak in terms of aircraft for it is not practicable for a Government to prophesy in detail what will be the performance of aircraft in six or seven years' time: it would be most unwise to do so. In our approach to this problem we agree with what has been said: that the Corporation must take responsibility for the aircraft which they order. That is unquestionable. It is useless to seek to encourage them to take an aircraft which they do not want. We have a Transport Aircraft Requirements Committee which meets at the Ministry of Supply. On it are senior representatives of the Air Ministry, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, the Treasury, the Ministry of Supply, B.O.A.C. and B.E.A. The object of the Committee is to ensure that the Corporations and the Air Ministry—the operators mainly concerned—are fully informed on what is likely to be available, so that when they make their decisions they may know the position. It is to ensure also that the

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views of operators, both military and civil, are taken into account before any development contract is placed. I thought the noble Lords, Lord Pakenham and Lord Brabazon of Tara, wished to step that Committee up to a higher level. That suggestion will be very carefully considered along with the other points made.
The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, made an interesting suggestion upon what may take place with the Britannia. There are two ways in which his point could be answered. I am not prepared to say that this is a matter for Government decision because where such a decision is made the responsibility of B.O.A.C. in this matter is automatically undermined. The decision has to be made, with the fullest knowledge, by B.O.A.C., who must come to the Government and say: "This is the aircraft we wish to buy." It is then for the Government to make up their mind whether or not to give a contract. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, asked about pressurised cabins. This problem has been solved in both the Comet and the Britannia, but as the Comet IV is not yet built, while the difficulty has been solved in theory the solution has to be proved in practice. Both aircraft will, of course, go through tank tests. The noble Lord was worried about cost-plus contracts. Civil contracts are no longer placed on that basis. Development contracts are given with a fixed amount for each, to encourage economy in cost.
A good deal has been said about flying boats. It is well known that flying boats are commercially unattractive and a former Government was severely criticised for pressing on with the three Princesses. That, at least, was a development of flying boats which appeared to them, at that time, to be wise. The noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, deplored the absence of services to South America. That was, of course, a direct result of the Comet accident. I agree with the noble Lord that it is of the utmost importance that those services should be resumed as early as possible.
The noble Lord, Lord Winster, spoke of putting Transport Command under the Ministry of Defence. Transport Command is, of course, at present under the Air Ministry. I do not know whether his suggestion included the development of transport aircraft. The difficulty is that
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those on the civil aviation side are always rather suspicious when Ministers primarily interested in military aircraft are responsible also for their aircraft. Noble Lords will remember that that was the position before the war, when the Air Ministry were in charge of civil aviation. The position was not very popular with civil aviation operators. I believe I have now answered a large number of those questions which have been asked and I will only add—
LORD PAKENHAM: If I may interrupt the noble Earl, as he seems to be drawing to a conclusion, may I point out that he has not yet referred to the idea of a thorough inquiry?
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, I am not enamoured of an inquiry; neither perhaps is the noble Lord, although he was responsible for a very historic one, for which he has always been given the greatest credit. The noble Lord mentioned the matter in his very last words and I should not like to turn it away cavalierly. But the question arises: what sort of inquiry does the noble Lord really wish to have? Does he want an inquiry to decide what should be the structure of the industry or an inquiry on how aircraft should be built? Such inquiries are unlikely to be of value. The noble Lord must be aware that the general structure of the aircraft industry is constantly under observation by the Ministry of Supply who, I believe, have not been quite as unsuccessful as has been made out.
I thought the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, dismissed the Britannia a little easily. After all, as the noble Earl knows, the Britannia may well be the best Atlantic aircraft for a period of years. It is a material achievement.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: That is what I said. I am not decrying the aircraft firms; I said quite deliberately that the Britannia would certainly have the Blue Riband of the Atlantic for three years, and possibly more, and that I was quite certain that, with all the skill in the factory which is making it, it would be an absolutely first-class machine. If that is decrying something, then I do not know what praise is.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, I am very grateful for what the noble Earl has said. That puts the matter in a much fairer light.

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The problem with which my right honourable friend the Minister is concerned is one which has been emphasised a number of times to-day that is, the number of firms. I think it is generally recognised that in the engine world we are probably rather better off than in the airframe world. That may be due to the fact that there are fewer design firms in the engine world than in the airframe world. What my right honourable friend is certain of is that, whether there are too many firms or whether there are not, there are too many projects and that the number of projects to be taken up should be reduced considerably.
Whether we should do that by amalgamation of firms I should not like to say. I hesitate to suggest compulsory amalgamation, because compulsory associations are not often altogether successful; but a great deal might be done, I think, by emphasising that certain firms should receive major contracts and then allowing them to draw together other firms, whether by sub-contract or sonic other sort of association. But I do not feel that it would be wise to abrogate our responsibility in some measure—if I may so put it—by having an inquiry. This is a matter which I admit we discuss in a non-Party way. It is a matter in which those who are concerned have a responsibility somewhere. Whether it be B.O.A.C., B.E.A., Transport Command or the Ministry of Supply, they have a big responsibility of one sort or another.
I have no doubt that, whatever is done, they will be criticised. We may be accused of showing lack of imagination in Government Departments, but it must be borne in mini that imagination is very often shown by Government Departments by spending large sums of Government money. If we did that we should be accused of being spendthrifts. On the other hand, if we took up every good idea brought to our attention we should not have enough money to enable anyone ever to bring a project to maturity. It is not true that there are "buckets and buckets" of money available. If we try to concentrate on a few designs, and to bring them on with the fullest support we can, we shall no doubt be accused of interfering too much in the industry and of being dictatorial and selective. But that is the policy which we intend to pursue. The Minister believes—and I
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feel certain that he is right—that that is the course most likely to bring forward the most suitable aircraft. We have a small industry and we are facing a giant competitor in the United States of America. That competitor's salesmanship, I would remind your Lordships, makes a very considerable impression.
Frankly, I believe that we are in a stronger position than we have been in at any time in the last ten years. I think it is fair to say that we have the best medium-range aircraft, and it may well be that next year we shall have the best long-range aircraft. I do not say that that is enough, but I think there is a real chance that by the time the big American jet aircraft get going we may well have something which can adequately compete with them. Do not forget that the advertisements for these airplanes relate to a period five years hence—which is a long way away. I do not wish, in view of what has been said in the debate, to give the slightest idea of complacency on the part of the Government. I merely say that we will consider most carefully what has been said. I have tried to make the situation seem less depressing than it has been painted by Lord Brabazon of Tara and other speakers. I would emphasise that we are most grateful to noble Lords for giving us their views on this complex subject, to which, I must say frankly, there is no simple organisational answer.
5.34 p.m.
LORD BRABAZON OF TARA: My Lords. I must first thank those noble Lords who have followed me in this debate. A debate on this sort of subject brings to mind what Mark Twain said about Coney Island—"If you like that sort of thing, that is the sort of thing you like." So it is with a debate of this nature. Either you like it, or you do not. The noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, asked me whether I was in favour of some form of contracting by the Ministry of Supply whereby a firm received a reward if they were good and suffered a penalty if they were bad. That seems to me to be a first-class idea, but we must remember that in the case of the three machines of which I have been speaking, two never had proper engines and the last one did not fly. So how that matter would be adjusted from the point of view of contract it is difficult

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to imagine. Just one word about Transport Command. It is true, of course, that if Transport Command is used in conjunction with civil aviation that is, in a way, giving a concealed subsidy. But, as I have said, it works extremely well in America, and I cannot see why it should not do the same here. Transport Command is not always busy running troops round the world. There are periods of calm in which they could be usefully employed developing these new types. But that is a subject which might he considered as a separate debate.
The noble Earl who replied on behalf of the Government said that I had overstated my case in saying that we should become a second-class operating nation. The fact remains, does it not, that in planning for big machines it is a nine-year proposition. We are anticipating a good time of successful operation with the Britannia, but what is to happen after that? The point I am putting to the Government is this: if you are going to be successful after that you have to do something about it now; but you are doing nothing about it now. The noble Earl has suggested that the Government attach considerable weight to the question of whether B.O.A.C. will ask for a machine. I can assure him that B.O.A.C. is an ad hoc organisation that takes opportunities only as they occur and does not go in for long-term planning. It is because I am afraid of that, because I am afraid that they will not ask for a machine, and that the Government will not make a machine that will hold its own in the future, that I leave this debate, as I have left many others, feeling very dissatisfied. But I should not like to divide the House, and so I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

LONDON AIRPORT COMMUNICATIONS
5.38 p.m.
VISCOUNT THURSO VISCOUNT THURSO rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have yet decided on the best method of improving communications between the centre of London and the airport at Heathrow, either by means of mono-rail or by the construction of a new branch line between the airport and one of the London stations; and when the work is expected to begin. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, my only source of consolation as I rise this afternoon is my confidence in the indulgence which it is the custom of your Lordships to extend to those who address the House for the first time. In the year of the Coronation of our Gracious Queen, it was a constant theme of public speeches and newspaper articles that we were entering a second Elizabethan Age. In the first Elizabethan Age our national leaders foresaw, and events have proved, that our destiny lay upon the Seven Seas. In the second Elizabethan Age, those of your Lordships who have contributed to the important and searchingly critical debate to which we have just been listening have shown us that we shall be able to fulfil our destiny only if we are strong in air defence and if we win for our country a leading place in the rapidly growing sphere of air commerce, both for passengers and for freight.
Our Mercantile Marine has been served by great seaports—London, Bristol, Liverpool, Glasgow and many others. There is room indeed for well-equipped airports, but for a long time to come London, with its satellites, will remain, as it is now, the principal centre of international air communications, both for this country and, I believe, if we are wisely led, for Europe as a whole. So to-day I cast myself for the rÔle of the Derby dog, cantering along behind the important debate to which we have been listening, in order to draw attention to one of the deficiencies of London Airport, a deficiency which has been publicly criticised by its principal users.
I shall not attempt to detain your Lordships to-day by discussing the failure of successive Governments—though I think it a possibly dangerous failure, and certainly one which is hampering the operations of the airport—to provide a fog-

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dispersal apparatus, such as was used by Bomber Command during the war. Nor shall I discuss the failure to provide a free customs area at London Airport, although London Airport is now losing traffic to Amsterdam and Frankfurt, where such free trans-shipment areas have been established. The most obvious and glaring deficiency at London Airport, and the one most loudly and constantly lamented by its users, is the inadequacy of communications with central London. Travellers fly into London over the Atlantic Ocean and across the Continent of Europe and debouch on to a road which is congested and ill-lit.
It was for these reasons that I ventured to put down a Question to Her Majesty's Government a year ago. I asked whether the rail development plan, of which we had then just been told, included provision for the improvement of the communications of London and other principal airports and whether they were considering the use of the mono-rail for this purpose. Unfortunately, I was unable to attend your Lordships' House on the day the Question was called and my noble friend Lord Rea was good enough to ask it for me. The noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, replied on March 1 that Her Majesty's Government had had this matter under constant review and that they would be glad to entertain proposals of a practical character. The noble Earl threw a douche of cold water over the mono-rail, and referred optimistically to the Cromwell Road extension. But that extension will serve not only London Airport, but also the whole of the private car and lorry traffic between London and die West Country; and the increase in that traffic will rapidly choke the new artery between London Airport and the city.
On July 13, having learned that the practical proposals which the noble Earl had requested had been submitted to Her Majesty's Government, I raised the question afresh. I found that the noble Lord, Lord Hawke, was still standing with his feet firmly on the Cromwell Road extension, but wish one eye cocked at the memorandum which had been presented to him from British European Airways. I received no encouragement from him on July 13, and accordingly, on November 30, I tried again. This time the noble Lord, Lord Hawke, assured the House that the possibility of providing a rail link
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between London Airport and one of the London stations had been the subject of considerable discussion in the Department, that the proposals of the British Transport Commission and of British European Airways were being studied in detail, but that he could not encourage me to hope that he would be able to report progress before Christmas. So I thought it better to leave it for a little time. I hope the noble Lord will now agree that we have left it long enough.
Meanwhile, Mr. Masefield, the former chief executive of British European Airways, has published some calculations about the effect of the construction of a mono-rail. The traveller would be conducted from London Airport to the centre of London in five minutes, compared with something like thirty to forty minutes under present conditions and even longer w hen the conditions are unfavourable to motor traflic. The journey from London to Glasgow by Viscount would be reduced by 1· to 2 hours if there were a mono-rail. When pressed on this suggestion, not only by me but also by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and others, noble Lords representing the Government have suggested that the mono-rail is not a practical method and that in America they have dismantled sore of the mono-rails. That is not the view which is now taken in Germany, for on December 23 in Cologne a plan for the construction of a mono-rail from Cologne to Opladen was approved by the Cologne City Council. It is now just on a year ago since the noble Earl, Lord. Selkirk, told your Lordships that Her Majesty's Government had had this matter under constant review. Meanwhile, the Germans in Cologne have acted.
Whatever the Government's decision may be, no one will say that they have rushed it. No one will say that they have left any stone unturned or any expert unconsulted. For my own part, I will cheerfully accept whatever the noble Lord may offer me this afternoon, whether it be a rail link or a mono-rail, but I hope that Her Majesty's Government will be able to announce a decision to-day, or at least tell the House what they propose to do to improve these deplorable communications. Perhaps the noble Lord would also be kind enough to add, as I put at the end of my Question, when the work will begin.
5.48 p.m.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, I would not quarrel with any statement of fact that the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, has made. So far as I am aware, his facts are perfectly correct, though I am awaiting corroboration of the Cologne monorail scheme. Meanwhile, I will tell him what the present position is. We are well aware of this difficulty, which occurs not only in London but in every major city in the world. The usual method of reaching an airport is by road. I believe that Moscow and Brussels are the only exceptions, where a rail link is provided. But for London we are thinking beyond the road: for the alternative airport of Gatwick the main approach will be by rail and, as the noble Viscount knows, schemes for rail access to London Airport itself have been studied and are being studied at the moment.
The noble Viscount twice asked Questions on this subject last year. In each case I had to reply that in the first instance we relied on the Cromwell Road extension as providing a considerable relief for the next few years. I did say, however, that we were fully aware that it could be argued that, further ahead, something more than road transport would be required. One development which provides relief straight away is the establishment of the new B.E.A. terminal in the Cromwell Road curve. Admittedly that is some distance from the centre of London and from Waterloo, but it is not necessarily farther away from the residences and hotels of travellers, and it is expected to reduce the ordinary road journey from an hour, which is the approximate time taken from Waterloo, to some thirty-five minutes. That is a fairly substantial reduction. If we were able to do it in thirty-five minutes at the moment, London Airport would compare not at all unfavourably with most of the other airports in the world.
What about the future? First of all, we have eliminated certain suggestions or projects. There is, first, the suggestion of helicopters which is sometimes put forward. We think that that would be much too expensive and would create great problems of air access. Then there is the extension of the existing underground railway, which would be a feasible proposition, but would bring us to the point that the underground railway exists to run stopping trains, and unless one carried out
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some major engineering works any trains on such an extension would have to continue to be stopping trains to the centre of London. That would not be much good, because it takes quite a long time. Therefore that suggestion has been ruled out. Then there was the possibility of the rail link-up with the Great Western Railway into Paddington. That was ruled out, I believe, on the score that it would cost more than the Southern link.
In the middle of September there was an inter-departmental committee of the operators, the British Transport Commission and the Ministry, appointed to study possible rail routes to the airport. Its first job is to find an alignment, and then to have an engineering survey carried out; and meanwhile it can go on making what one might call statistical inquiries about potential passengers, operating costs, and so on, and deficit, if any—I would call the attention of the noble Viscount to the word "deficit." When this committee have finished their task it is then for the parties concerned—that is to say, the operators, the British Transport Commission and the Minister—to decide whether to sponsor the scheme or not, in order to get it inserted in some capital programme; and if so, how the loss—again I dwell on the word "loss"—is to be met. The committee have worked out what seems to be a reasonably good alignment by Whitton Junction, Barnes and Clapham. There are certain alternatives in the middle of that, but those have not yet been evaluated. That link could lead ultimately either to Victoria or Waterloo, whichever is convenient, but it would probably go to Victoria, because I understand that B.E.A.'s tenancy of their terminal at Waterloo ends in 1957. There is quite a good deal of engineering involved in this link; tunnelling under the airfield itself; a possible doubling of quite a fair section of the track; and even a possibility of having to add an extra line on the bridge over the river into Victoria. This means that it is a somewhat extensive undertaking, but it does seem to be the best rail link available.
In addition to this orthodox study, the International Mono-rail Company have put forward a project for a mono-rail starting at the new B.E.A. Cromwell Road terminal and running down the Cromwell Road and Bath Road, suspended on great pylons over these roads

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down to the Airport. Incidentally, I may say here that I understand the sponsors reckon a journey time of eighteen minutes at a maximum speed of 50 m.p.h. So that if the noble Viscount's five minutes is correct, and for the centre of London we take the Cromwell Road curve, I leave him to do the precise arithmetic, but it would require a speed of something in the neighbourhood of 150 m.p.h., and I do not think the Member of Parliament for the people en route would have a very light post-bag on that subject.
This particular scheme involves a unique adaptation of an almost unique principle. I understand that in this particular patent no mono-rail has ever been constructed. It involves engineering problems of great magnitude, and it must have an unknown impact on the life of the community through which it would run, particularly if the astronomical speeds which the noble Viscount proposes were to be considered practicable. And., of course, questions of safety would arise, on which the railway inspecting officers would have a lot to say. My information is that this type of project is still at the drawing-board stage, and even a large-scale model has not yet been erected. It would therefore be a bold decision indeed by Her Majesty's Government, not only to pin all their hopes for ready access to the Airport on so untried a scheme, but to submit many thousands of Londoners to be the preliminary guinea pigs.
Another study is proceeding on the question of traffic congestion on, around and near the Airport. It is possible that the people who are conducting that inquiry may interpret their terms of reference rather widely and may make recommendations which would have effect on traffic further back into the middle of London. So one can say that studies are being made on mare than one front, but it is all for the long term. For the short term, we regard the Cromwell Road extension improvement, which is due to be completed during the year 1959, and which I am informed should reduce the journey time to thirty-five minutes, as a reasonable contribution.
LORD GIFFORD: May I ask whether that time includes the fly-over at Hammersmith Broadway? If it does not, I think it is very optimistic.
LORD HAWKE: I understand that it does not include the fly-over at Hammersmith Broadway, so that with the fly-over one should get something better. When my right honourable friend gets reports from the Transport Commission and the Air Corporations he will have to satisfy himself on what he would like to see clone, but I am afraid it is quite impossible at this moment to guess whether it will be done. Large sums of money are involved, and large quantities of steel. If the decision had to be taken at this moment, I think there would be little doubt that it could not be a favourable one, in view of the financial situation and the steel situation. There are many other much more urgent traffic projects which need to be carried through—for instance, the C tube scheme. If the noble Viscount were to send a reliable observer to Oxford Circus station between the hours of four and half-past five, he would be horrified at what he saw. Hundreds of thousands of Londoners are travelling under the most uncomfortable and tiring conditions, all due to lack of capital expenditure—to say nothing of the trunk roads, the Great North Road, and so on. All these would have to compete with this scheme. I appreciate that the noble Viscount has a fear that the situation may get progressively worse. If it does, there are other works besides rail works which can he called into aid. But in the present state of our finances and the transport problems of this country, it would be very difficult for any Government to justify spending something like £ 10 million of public money on reducing by a further few minutes the time of the air travellers from London Airport. I apologise to the noble Viscount for not having been able to give him a softer and smoother Answer, but I believe that I have given him a realistic one.
6.4 p.m.
VISCOUNT THURSO: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord for the full and courteous answer which he has given me this afternoon. I am glad to hear that so much work and study has been going on, of which hitherto we have not heard very much. At the same time, I trust that further consideration will be given to the two major proposals for preventing what is already a bad, and will become a deteriorating, situation at London Airport—the mono-rail and the

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link with Victoria or Waterloo. For the rest, I hope that the ameliorative proposals of which he has told us will be successful. I was not quite sure about the economy in time of this new terminal at Cromwell Road. It seems that it will cut down the time to thirty-five minutes, but only for those who live near Cromwell Road. Of course, the importance of London Airport from the point of view of the economy of the country is the facility it affords for the transaction of business, and those travellers will be going to and from the City of London. Perhaps the noble Lord will permit me on some future occasion to revert to this matter to ask him how things are going.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, I have so often seen the noble Viscount sitting in his place that it never occurred to me that it was his maiden speech we have heard. I offer him belated congratulations for an excellent speech. I will not go further, because I may tell him that he was quite out of order in speaking a second time, and so am I.

CROSBY CORPORATION BILL
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.
House adjourned at six minutes past six o'clock.