Lords Sitting of 2 August 1956

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
2.20 p.m.
SOUTH OF SCOTLAND ELECTRICITY ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and (pursuant to the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1936) deemed to have been read 2a and reported from the Committee.

CONSOLIDATED FUND (APPROPRIATION) (No. 2) BILL
Brought from the Commons, endorsed with a Certificate from the Speaker that the Bill is a Money Bill, within the meaning of the Parliament Act, 1911, and read 1a.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of August 1), Bill read 2a: Committee negatived. Bill read 3a, and passed.

WELFARE FOODS AMENDMENT ORDER, 1956
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (THE EARL OF HOME): My Lords, the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough asked me yesterday whethed I could say something more about the statutory instrument controlling the allowance of milk in day nurseries, and why the date fixed for the coming into operation of the Order was September 1. I had hoped that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, would be here. However, perhaps I may explain that, as I understand it, this instrument has the effect of bringing the milk allowance for day nurseries into line with that for nursery schools. The choice of date, Septem-
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ber 1, was necessary in order to fit in with the school year. On the question of praying against the Order, it is of course possible to pray against the substance of the Order, if noble Lords object to that, when we return in October.
LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, if, in praying against the Order, the Prayer were carried, would the Government withdraw the Order? I think the point that my noble friend was making was that it would be a farce to pray against the Order after it had come into operation and if the Order would not in due course be affected by the Prayer.
THE EARL OF HOME: My Lords, I suppose that if those who prayed against an Order carried their Prayer, then the Order would have to be withdrawn. That is a hypothetical question, and we had better wait until the day. I thought I would just make the position clear. I have told my right honourable friend the Minister of Health that this is not a very convenient practice and I hope in future, that we shall be able to avoid anything of the kind.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, I think my noble friend's point, too, was, would the Prayer have retrospective effect? We shall not be coming back until the end of October, and there cannot be a Prayer until then. That will take us through till the end of November. If a Prayer were successful then, what would be the result on the people who, presumably, would either have paid extra for milk or would not have had the amount of milk that they are now getting and will get up to September 1? That was really my noble friend's point.
LORD TEVIOT: My Lords, no doubt my noble friend in reply will say that the milk has already been drunk.
THE EARL OF HOME: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Teviot has taken the words out of my mouth.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ROYAL COMMISSION
2.30 p.m.
The following Bills received the Royal Assent:

Finance,

Appropriation,

Transport (Disposal of Road Haulage Property),

Slum Clearance (Compensation),

Department of Scientific and Industrial Research,

Underground Works (London),

Valuation and Rating (Scotland),

Coal Industry,

Hotel Proprietors,

British Caribbean Federation,

Governors' Pensions,

Public Works Loans,

Sanitary inspectors (Change of Designation),

Road Traffic,

Restrictive Trade Practices,

Sexual Offences,

Marriage (Scotland),

Overseas Resources Development,

Millport Piers (Amendment) Order Confirmation,

Aberdeen Harbour Order Confirmnation,

Pier and Harbour Order (Great Yarmouth Port and Haven) Confirmation.

Pier and Harbour Order (Wisbech Port and Harbour) Confirmation,

Huddersfield Corporation,

British Transport Commission,

Leeds Corporation,

Croydon Corporation,

London County Council (General Powers),

Rugby Corporation,

Chertsey Urban District Council,

Manchester Ship Canal,

Newcastle upon Tyne Corporation,

Liverpool Overhead Railway,

Manchester Corporation,

Walthamstow Corporation,

Barnsley Corporation,

Rhyl Urban District Council,

Fylde Water Board,

Felixstowe Dock and Railway,

Heywood and Middleton Water,

Middlesex County Council,

Cammell Laird and Company,

Mersey Docks and Harbour Board,

Grayson, Rollo and Clover Docks.

House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

THE SUEZ CANAL CONVENTION
2.46 p.m.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they recognise the validity of the Suez Canal Convention of 1888 and propose to consult the present representatives of the signatories as to the matters now at issue with the Egyptian Government.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING): My Lords, the answer to the first part of the noble Viscount's Question is, Yes. As regards the second part of the Question, Her Majesty's Government have already been in consultation with the French and United States Governments, with the other Commonwealth Governments and with other friendly Governments. As consultations continue, I regret that I can say no more at this stage.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble Marquess for his most satisfactory reply. Of course, the noble Marquess will realise that the Question is whether all signatories to the Convention are to be consulted. I hope the noble Marquess will not restrain me from raising that point in the debate this afternoon.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, I quite understand the object of the noble Viscount's Question and of course it is open to be argued in the debate that as many signatories as he may wish should be consulted.
LORD REA: My Lords, may I ask the noble Viscount whether he would include the succession States of Austria and Hungary as signatories to the Convention?
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, there are, of course, endless succession States, but the noble Lord the Leader of the Liberal Party will know that I am referring to the succession States of Imperial Russia.

EGYPT AND THE SUEZ CANAL
2.48 p.m.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN rose to call attention to the position in relation to the Suez Canal; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name. In discussing this question we are under two very serious handicaps. The first is that at this moment a debate is taking place in another place on the very same subject and it is difficult to avoid a certain amount of repetition; and we have not, as we usually have, the benefit of having heard authoritatively what is being said in that other place. The other difficulty is that discussions are at this moment taking place between France the United States of America and ourselves which are not concluded, and it is obviously impossible for Her Majesty's Government to make any definite statement as to what their course of action is going to be. For both those reasons our debate is likely to be of a somewhat limited character. I imagine that if we could have postponed this debate for a week it would have been much more profitable but probably less popular. Nevertheless, we say it is better to have a provisional debate of this kind than to disperse without your Lordships having the opportunity of expressing your views on the most critical situation which has arisen since the end of the war, and one which may have far-reaching consequences.
The events of the last week in connection with the Suez Canal are sufficiently well known to your Lordships, so that it is not necessary for me to give you a detailed narrative. I will state only the facts in so far as it may be necessary to explain the outlook of my noble friends and myself on this crisis. Without any notice whatever, Colonel Nasser announced that he intended to take over the Suez Canal Company, and did so within a matter of hours. I say Colonel Nasser, rather than Egypt, because, obviously, this is not the action of a Government, as we understand it; it is the action of a dictator. Whether, in fact, he has consulted the Government, or whether, indeed, there is a Government in Egypt to consult, most of us do not know. But it is important to take into consideration, in deciding on our actions, the fact that we are dealing with one man.
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Perhaps if we had been a little more farsighted we might have anticipated that something of this kind would come along. Colonel Nasser had given a clear warning in the past in connection with his embargo on shipping to and from Israel that he would have no scruples about breaking an international convention when it suited him, and I cannot help feeling, without in the least desiring to be controversial this afternoon, that it is a great pity that we did not take stronger action at a time when it was open to us to do so. And I cannot help feeling that Colonel Nasser has had some encouragement from our silence or lack of action in the past.
He has now decided to nationalise the Suez Canal undertaking, and his reason for doing so is, obviously, in the main, his failure to secure a loan from ourselves and the United States in order to carry out the project of the Aswan Dam. I think we were probably right in refusing this loan. He had made it plain from his actions that he would not be in a position to carry out the financial terms of any such loan. Any moneys that might be available had already been earmarked for payment for arms, and it was exceedingly problematic whether any further sums would be available. Your Lordships will, no doubt, take the view—as I do—that the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company will not, in fact, provide the funds except on the basis of confiscation. Colonel Nasser has stated that it is his intention to pay the market value of the shares in Paris on the day before nationalisation took place, but that remains to be seen.
There are a great many calls on the profits of the Suez Canal Company. Which, I understand, amount to about £10 million a year. There is continuous need to deepen and widen the Canal to take larger and larger ships, and in the period of about 80-odd years during which the Canal Company has been in existence the Canal has been widened on no fewer than eight separate occasions. A widening operation is actually taking place at this moment. It began last year, and the estimated cost of it is about £18 million. There is the service that will be required of the compensation fund, if Colonel Nasser decides to carry out his expressed intention and pay for the shares—which in itself will practically absorb any avail-

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able profits that may arise from the working of the Canal. There are the pension rights of British and French employees. We must not overlook the fact that a good many British and French employees have earned pension rights, and it is at least doubtful whether it is the intention of Colonel Nasser to carry out that obligation. Then, of course, there is the need for constant maintenance and improvement of the Canal. I think it is right to say that during the whole of the period of the existence of the Company they have discharged their obligations in the most meticulous manner—notably in the way in which they have carried out these improvements even though they have been aware of the fact that the term of their lease was coming to an end.
The proposed development of the Aswan Dam is not the only reason for the action that Colonel Nasser has taken. There is also the question of endeavouring to secure the leadership of the Arab Group, which has been Egypt's particular ambition in the last few years. It is very largely a question of prestige. Colonel Nasser is personally ambitious of becoming leader of the Arab world, and a dramatic and spectacular move of this kind is calculated to make a very strong appeal to the Arab world—particularly if the move succeeds. I think it is important for us, in considering the situation, to bear in mind that the position is very different indeed from what it was at the time when the Charter was granted. In 1868, when the Canal Company first opened, the amount of traffic passing through the Canal was relatively insignificant. It amounted to about 500,000 tons a year. Last year it amounted to 115¾ millions tons—an enormous increase. And it is used to a greater or lesser degree by practically every maritime nation in the world. It is, today, beyond question, the largest waterway in the world, and, no doubt, the most important.
It is used to a very considerable extent by us. We are substantially the largest users, and that explains the considerable interest we have in the Suez Canal. Indeed, looking at the figures, I should say that our use of the Canal is greater than that of the next four countries put together. So it is a very substantial interest that we have. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that it is a vital interest, and we should be seriously affected
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economically if anything happened to impede the free progress of shipping in the Suez Canal. It is true that Colonel Nasser has stated categorically that he has no intention of impeding the free use of the Canal, that he will observe the Convention in detail and that no particular changes will be made to the present position. But can we believe that?
One fact which stands out is that an important aspect of this question is the need to keep the Canal going and fit for its present use. It is necessary to spend large sums of money annually on maintenance and to continue to expand it as and when necessary; and it is quite impossible to believe that within the financial ambit of what is available to him Colonel Nasser will be able to carry out these obligations or, for that matter, that he has any intention of so doing. Of course, there is scope for increasing charges, but that is a very serious matter and one that should not be entrusted to one individual. It is an international matter and it should not be in the hands of one individual to effect a stranglehold on transport throughout the world by arbitrarily increasing charges, not according to what is necessary for the maintenance of the Canal, but, in fact, to pay for arms that he has bought from some other country.
There is some doubt about the legality of what Colonel Nasser has done. I do not pretend that the matter is free from doubt. For what my opinion is worth—and I say this with all humility in the presence of far greater international lawyers than I can ever claim to be—I think that what he has done is not legal. I will not bore your Lordships by trying to give my reasons, but, to put it no higher, there is a considerable element of doubt about whether his action is legal at all. I have no doubt at all, however, that the manner of doing it constituted in itself an illegality. I feel that that is a matter on which we can all stand.
I said at the outset that Her Majesty's Government were in a difficulty in this debate—unless anything has happened since twelve o'clock, which I doubt—in making any definite statement on what the course of action will be, but we on this side cordially welcome the statement of Her Majesty's Government:
"that the freedom and the security of the Suez Canal, in peace as well as in war, is of

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world importance and cannot be entrusted to any one nation."
For that reason, we welcome the discussions that are taking place. At the moment, the discussions are between France, the United States and ourselves. Obviously, this is not a matter for Egypt alone. It is also not for ourselves alone, though perhaps that is a little more difficult to realise. It is a matter of world concern. In the view of noble Lords on this side, the more nations we can bring into the discussions, the better. I think that it was a mistake to limit these discussions to France, the United States and ourselves, unless we can regard them as merely preliminary discussions, conducted with a view eventually to bringing in others. I feel that we ought to have brought in the Soviet Union. Once before we made a great mistake in not taking the Soviet Union seriously and bringing her into discussions at an early stage. We must not make the same mistake again.
I do not know, any more than your Lordships do, what the attitude of the Soviet Union will be; but I do know that in 1946 they took the view that international control by the nations concerned through a United Nations agency was essential, and I have no reason to think that they do not take that view to-day. Indeed, it is in their own interests that that view should be taken, because I am sure that they have no greater reason to trust Colonel Nasser than we have and there is no indication that they have done so. So, at an early stage, we should bring in as many other maritime nations as we possibly can, with a view to creating a world opinion; and we certainly should bring the matter within the ambit of the United Nations. We on this side approve also the economic measures that have been taken so far, and we think that we should immediately stop supplying arms not only to Egypt—that is axiomatic—but also to any other nations that have given sympathy and approval to the action Egypt has taken. There are a number of nations who have sent encouraging Notes and whose Press is cordially in favour of what Egypt has done, and I think that that should be noted in dealing with the question of the supply of arms.
As a long-term measure, the suggestion which the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha.
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has put forward in recent days in this House is, I feel, worth considering; but he will appreciate that it is a long-term measure. The Suez Canal took twelve years to complete, I think. It may be that we move faster these days—I am not sure. But at any rate, it is a long-term measure. It is, however, possible to do something less ambitious immediately by the construction of a pipeline over the same kind of territory as the noble Lord has in mind I think that there is one thing we could do. If we are not to supply arms to the nations which are likely to be unsympathetic to us, we could supply arms to the nations that are likely to be sympathetic—I refer particularly to Israel. It may well be that if we find little positive action that we can take immediately, Colonel Nasser will be encouraged to take aggressive action against Israel; and in my view the time has arrived when Her Majesty's Government might well consider supplying Israel with those arms which they might otherwise have supplied to the unfriendly nations
That is all that I have to say We are in this dilemma: but all we can do at this moment is to put forward our own point of view and our suggestions. I would ask the noble Marquess the Leader of the House not to hesitate to call us back, if it should be necessary, in order to get the views of your Lordships' House. We are in a very grave crisis, and I am sure that no noble Lord would feel at all disturbed about having it well-earned rest interfered with if t were necessary in the interests of our nation. We shall watch with great apprehension what is taking place. It is just possible that before the debate is ended, the noble Marquess who leads the House may have a statement to make. If so, of course, he will make it. I beg to move for Papers.
3.10 p.m.
LORD REA: My Lords, I do not propose to follow in detail the interesting and, if I may say so, moderate and helpful speech of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. At this stage in this affair that we are discussing to-day—and a most important affair it is—it is hardly to be expected that each member of each political Party will necessarily agree in full detail with all of his colleagues. That refers to the short-term view. But in the longer term,

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I feel that I am probably speaking for all Members, in all quarters of the House, when I say that we loyally support Her Majesty's Government in all the action they are taking and the efforts they are making at the present moment. At this stage of this difficult case one must make a little reservation about the future, because this crisis—if I may call it a crisis—is by no means resolved, and it may take one form or another before we know exactly where we are. But even though we may reserve that right of criticism, I would repeat that we support Her Majesty's Government to-day in all that they are doing.
It is regrettable to know that in this new world of ours, where young nations, and what used to be called "backward" nations are coming more to the front of that world picture in a way where inter-State independence is much more important than before, there are in those younger countries unfortunate elements of xenophobia and nationalism which do not help that quick progress, and do not really represent the best feelings of the best statesmen in those younger countries. It is particularly regrettable that this unrepresentative element, as to a large extent it is, should have reared its head in this country of Egypt, which has been our friend for so long; which has in its background a high civilisation, and which has been so near to Western culture for so many generations. Those of us who have had the pleasure of visiting Egypt have met statesmen and others there who I am sure are most uncomfortable and most unhappy that this apparent dictator is taking a line which does not represent what is in Egypt's best interests, and is known to the Egyptians as such. It is, of course, necessary that we should deal with this matter with cool heads and with meticulous examination. It is easy to be affronted by this insulting approach which has injured our amour propre, but I know that your Lordships will agree that in such cases it never pays to retaliate in the same temper.
It is difficult in this debate to go into much of the detail, because there is so much on which we still await information —information which, perhaps, is not readily available, even to Her Majesty's Government. But I hope that the noble Marquess who is speaking next for Her Majesty's Government will be able to tell us something about what led up to the
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present situation in respect of the Aswan Dam: what were the negotiations between us and Egypt and us and America; and what was the reason why we did not take the action that we might have taken when shipping to Israel was interfered with in the Canal?
Is it true that if Egypt had not taken the action she has done, the position in 1968, when the Suez Canal Company Agreement comes to an end, would have been roughly as it is now? In other words, is this a mere anticipation of what was to come? If that is so, I would join the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in saying that we agree with the Prime Minister that this international highway should not be in the hands of one nation; in fact, we think it should be looked after by the United Nations, or as many of the United Nations as can be made interested in it. That does not quite accord with the conference which existed in 1888, referred to in a Question earlier this afternoon by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, because the members of that conference did not include Russia and did not include the United States.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: They did include Russia.
LORD REA: I beg your Lordships' pardon. They did include Russia, but not the United States. If that conference is to be revived, I think it should be revived under a much wider umbrella, which would be represented only by the United Nations; and there should be no hesitation in asking, pressing and begging both the United States and Russia to come in and deliberate with us on this international question. It must be remembered that there are many maritime States who do not appear to be very important in that part of the world but who yet depend fully, as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has said, on this international highway. It is interesting to know that Norway comes high up in the list of users, whereas Russia is low down; but both of them must be interested from the international point of view.
We are at a disadvantage, too, in that there has been no really full statement from Out Prime Minister, although some of us know something of what has gone on in another place to-day. Nor, as yet, has our Foreign Secretary given us any indication of his views. However, that is natural, because the whole situation is

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still in a state of flux. That is why I rather doubt whether it has been wise to initiate these two debates in the two Houses of Parliament at this stage. The function of debate, surely, is query and suggestion and criticism; and I doubt whether, at this stage, we can offer to Her Majesty's Government any constructive criticism, make any constructive suggestions or raise any queries which would not be normally answered if they were suitable to be answered. Therefore, I feel it is regrettable that arrangements have been made, presumably by the two larger political Parties, for this debate to take place to-day.
I feel that it should have been left until the situation had crystallised and come more into perspective, in order that the Government should have a quiet time for intense and level-headed consideration, especially if there is contemplated any question of military action which would need careful consideration. I am sure that the opinion of the people of this country would have to be sounded before any such step could even be advanced at all. Therefore, if this matter does crystallise in such a way that we can usefully help, I do beg the noble Marquess who leads the House to be good enough to remember the promise that he kindly made last night, that the House will be recalled if there is any indication that its reassembly can help in this vital, dangerous and delicate situation.
3.18 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, it will, I hope, be in accordance with the wishes of the House if I intervene at this early stage in the debate and endeavour to give some indication, as fully as is possible in the circumstances of which your Lordships are aware, of Her Majesty's Government's attitude towards, and the principles which are guiding them in, the undoubtedly grave situation that has arisen in Egypt. I regret that I am not in a position to give your Lordships any fuller information as regards the present discussions than was given earlier to-day by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in another place; but if there is anything that can be said at a later stage, my noble Leader, who will wind up on behalf of the Government in this debate, will, of course, include it in his speech.
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I have called it a grave situation; and such it undoubtedly is, both in its intrinsic character, and also, and perhaps even more so, in the attendant circumstances. By the recent Egyptian move the best-known and most widely used international waterway in the world, the essential traffic link between East and West, the creation of which resulted in untold saving of time and money to peaceful commerce between nations, has been abruptly snatched into the hands of one Government alone—and that a Government headed by a man who, so far as we and our friends are concerned, has now proved himself, beyond doubt, hostile, rancorous and irresponsible.
We had genuinely hoped that, with the signing of the Agreement for the evacuation of the Canal Zone, an era of cordial relations with Egypt might begin. In spite of all our efforts and our approaches, it was not to be. Colonel Nasser's own ambitions. and the seething torrent of Egyptian nationalism, which he and his associates have done so much to excite and exploit, and so little to moderate and control, have swept aside all our endeavours and all their protestations. After a series of alternations of moods, in which the angry ones grew always more angry and the calm ones less calm, Colonel Nassar has now purported to nationalise, in purely Egyptian interests, this great international shipping route, and to appropriate its revenues to internal Egyptian uses. There can scarcely be a country whose shipping benefits from that Canal which does not feel itself shocked and menaced by such high-handed action. Your Lordships may have noticed that President Eisenhower said yesterday, in this context, that the continued efficient use of the Canal was vital to the economy and future welfare of the United States —and there are many countries who would echo that sentiment from apprehensive hearts.
The Egyptian Government claim that they have taken this step by way of retaliation. Retaliation for what? Not for the withholding from them of something to which they were entitled as of right. but for the withdrawal, in changed circumstances, of an offer which they themselves had not accepted but had complicated by a whole series of provisos, qualifications and reservations; an offer to furnish them with generous financial aid.

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And because that aid is no longer to be made available, they claim to be justified in measures of retaliation. The noble Lord, Lord Rea, asked me for the circumstances in which that offer had been withdrawn. I think they were made reasonably plain at the time: that the course of the Egyptian economy which had been followed by the Government in the interval between the original offer and the time of its withdrawal was such as to shake confidence in the fabric of the Egyptian economy and to make it extremely doubtful, to put it mildly, whether it was an economic proposition to make available to them the resources which had originally been offered.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: May I ask the noble Marquess a question on that? Was the offer withdrawn by the World Bank, or was it withdrawn by the State Department?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: The offer was withdrawn by the State Department.
It may well be that the refusal to produce funds for the building of the Aswan High Dam was not the cause but the excuse for the purported nationalisation of the Canal Company. Indeed, the speed with which the intricate legal instruments necessary to carry out their purpose were sprung upon the world is at least some indication that they were already in cold storage, awaiting a propitious moment. If that is so—and I would certainly not rule it out—then it may well be that this is only a further, though a more flagrant, step in a deliberate policy to undermine and destroy by stages our whole position in the Middle East. But in either event the world cannot sit idly by whilst the Canal lies at the mercy of fitful gusts of wrath or of studied political plots.
But, say the Egyptian Government, why are you in the United Kingdom complaining, when you yourselves not so long ago nationalised your coal, iron, steel and transport? That was a very different story. These were purely British concerns, the shares in which were British-held, and their nationalisation affected no foreign country. Moreover, ample notice was given, and the principles and procedure to be followed were agreed by the then Government with those concerned. Here the Suez Canal Company have very important
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and very large foreign shareholders; and, what is still more serious, its function is to operate an international waterway which is of vital concern to many other countries.
The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in his speech, made some remarks in passing, if I may so characterise them, as to the legality of the Egyptian measure. I am disposed to agree with the conclusion at which he arrived, but I do not think that it would be a profitable exercise, or one perhaps easily conducted, to expound at great length the reasons; nor are they perhaps for this purpose very material.
The point is: What is the declared purpose of this nationalisation? It is to procure revenue—the declared purpose of the Egyptians—not for the more efficient operation and maintenance of the Canal but for the construction of the Aswan High Dam. It is true that the Egyptian Government have now made a feeble effort to contend that the reason lay in the fact that the Company was neglecting the Canal, but everyone, not excluding the Egyptian Government, knows that that allegation is utterly untrue. Only last year, as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, remarked, a costly new scheme of enlargement was put in hand. If this was the reason—if the reason really was that the Suez Canal Company was failing in the task committed to it—why carry out the operation of nationalisation from one hour to another? Why not gradually, and by agreement? The inference is, of course, only too plain—that it was done at this moment as a vindictive challenge to the West, even if it be also part of a longer-term plan. It is a challenge to far more countries than the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France. And it is a challenge that can be neither palliated nor ignored. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin—and the noble Lord, Lord Rea, made the same point—said that our action in this matter should not be unilateral; and I am wholly in agreement with them. It is because Her Majesty's Government share that view that these present consultations are proceeding in London.
We cannot, great maritime nation that we are, accept the proposition that a vast international service, such as the Canal supplies, can be recklessly milked of its resources for the construction of a Dam for the international benefit of

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Egypt alone. What a prospect for the future of the Canal! Its relatively modest revenues are to be charged not only with the payment of compensation to shareholders, but with the cost of this immensely extensive engineering enterprise as well. And the Egyptian Government would presumably maintain that, when all this money had been earmarked for these uses, for the Dam and for the compensation, there would still be a sufficient surplus to carry out the expansion of the Canal itself for which they now try to say the Company has failed to provide: an expansion which, as has already been noted, becomes from year to year the more necessary and on a larger scale because of the increase, not only in traffic but in the size of the ships which constitute that traffic. It would be difficult to calculate the level to which the Canal dues would have to be raised if all these heavy burdens were to be discharged. No one country, certainly not Egypt in its present mood, can safely be left in what my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, recently called "unfettered control" of this indispensable artery.
Colonel Nasser announced the nationalisation in a speech in which historic distortion and political venom were nicely blended, a speech which seemed a tragic echo of styles that we knew too well in the inter-war years and had hoped would never assault our ears again. How can we and other countries confidently entrust the smooth, efficient and impartial administration of the Canal to hands already shaking with passion? How can the Canal be properly operated by men who are held to their posts by threat of imprisonment? The threat in itself is surely a breach of International Law.
If we were tamely to submit to this coup de theâtre, with the Arab nations as the audience, Colonel Nasser would not be satisfied but stimulated. No dictator can ever afford to be satisfied. What would follow? At his will, a stranglehold on our essential oil supplies; by his caprice, a stoppage of troop movements, supplies and commerce; at his word, an exhorbitant increase in Canal dues. Moreover, such examples are infectious, and there are others in his neighbourhood who are not wholly immune from a similar virus. It may have been that it
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was to a large extent a question for Colonel Nasser of increasing his prestige. We have a prestige, too, and we are determined to maintain it. In Her Majesty's Government's solemn and considered view, there is only one solution. We cannot afford to lay ourselves and our future open to such hazards. The Canal must be placed under effective and trustworthy international supervision and control. It is to secure that object that we are at this moment engaged in careful consultation with France and the United States. That is the basic decision of principle. I hope and believe that it will commend itself to the whole House. It was not lightly taken; it will be steadfastly pursued.
3.33 p.m.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I thought it would be more convenient and seemly if I spoke from this Bench, in case at any point I happened to disagree with my noble Leader on the Front Bench. I do not think I shall. I went to another place this morning and I can correctly and sincerely say that I found much more reason, common sense and conviction in the Prime Minister's speech than there was in the rather heady wine which was produced by my own Front Bench. We are all agreed that we will be firm—that is a most important thing. The Liberal Party is going to be firm; it is going to be united. Those are two most remarkable phenomena. We are all agreed that the House must rise to-day —that is very important. We are all agreed that there must be a conference and we are all rather vaguely in our minds aware that nothing much will be done. That seems to me to be the whole picture.
I admire the eloquence of the noble Marquess the Minister of State. I enjoy it but I wonder what he is going to do. If a man has committed a crime—I am not a lawyer; I hope some legal Member of your Lordships' House will speak to-day—I understand that there are three things involved. First of all, you must frame a charge; secondly, you must have a court and, thirdly, you must have a means of imposing your judgment. What is the charge? My noble friend below me, who is a lawyer, says in a vague way that he thinks, though he "will not at this moment weary your Lordships with the particulars," that there is a breach of, not the Concession,

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but the Convention. The noble Marquess, Lord Reading, gave some support to that view. I hope that someone will tell us exactly what the breach is. There is an affront—there is a violent affront. There is a lot of propaganda which is very bad indeed. But I cannot discover—and I have read what the newspapers have said; there was something in The Times this morning or yesterday by a lawyer—that legally speaking Colonel Nasser has done anything in breach of the law. That is the first point. I hope that one of the Law Lords will illuminate this matter for us.
Before what court are you going to bring this man? You cannot bring him before the Hague Court, because it is not a governmental affair. You cannot bring him before the United Nations, because it concerns an Egyptian company. The only court you can bring him before is the highest Egyptian court in the land. I cannot remember all the details now, but a few years ago the British Government had a dispute with the Canal Company about whether the payment on the debentures or the ordinary shareholders should be in gold francs, or something of that kind—I did not understand it. But the British Government took the Canal Company to the Egyptian courts to have the case tried. I rather fancy that we won our case. Therefore, if you go to court, so far as one can make out from information that one can gather, the only court before which the case can be tried is an Egyptian court, and it has not been possible, except in the inferential way which my noble friend mentioned, to frame a charge.
We are all very angry about this affair; everybody is very angry about it. Colonel Nasser has behaved in an unconscionable way. If you read back a little in The Times—you need not go very far back—you come to the time when Colonel Nasser was the "blue-eyed boy" when we offered him the money; when the International Bank offered him the money, and when he felt that the conditions were too severe. It is not important, but as a matter of fact I talked to him for about an hour at Christmas-time on this point, and he said: "I am very friendly". He is a very friendly man—I am speaking in a social sense; I am speaking not in a national sense but in a personal sense. He said: "You and the Americans offer us money, but there
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are so many conditions, such as, 'You have got to make peace with the Jews', 'You have got to make an agreement with the Sudan', and 'You have got to do something about this and that.' But when the Russians make an offer, they say simply, 'There is the money'."
I said to him, "Are you not aware that it may be very dangerous to have a vast horde of Russian technicians here? You may get Communists amongst them, for I am afraid there are Communists even in engineering." He said "I do not know anything about the Russians. I want the money. I understand I can have both." I understand it is the International Bank which decides the economic points. The State Department decides the political points; Congress decides that foreign aid must stop. Your Lordships know what Congress is like at the end of a term. Suddenly their State Department gives an order "It is off", and, of course, we, the British, had to follow suit. If your Lordships will look at The Times about a fortnight ago, you will see streamlined an alleged statement by Mr. Shepilov, that the loan was "not a live affair". How we chuckled! How we rubbed our hands and said, "We will show this fellow Nasser!" Then, all of a sudden, he got the loan; all of a sudden he reared his head; all of a sudden he gave us this terrible punch on the nose which has hurt our prestige and has angered the whole of the nation. That is the situation, as I understand it.
I want to make a short interlude here, if your Lordships would be patient, about the views of the Egyptian people themselves. I know Egypt pretty well. I first went there 53 years ago. I have been there in the Services and engaged in negotiations. I was the guest of my noble friend Lord Killearn over there. I have been there in various capacities. What this country has got to understand is (because the only service we can render in this House is to produce the facts) that a complete revolution has taken place in Egypt. For nearly a hundred years, with our participation, an Albanian House which was detested by the people of Egypt was ruling Egypt. After a great deal of hesitation and misunderstanding with the French, in the 1880's we took on the job of being responsible for the stability of the régime. The Rulers did not like us but they were glad enough that we were there. I was there for five

579
or six months in 1946 negotiating with King Farouk. I do not really think he wanted us to evacuate the Canal at all. But we were the backbone.
Ismail was financially, as we all know, a scamp of the worst order. People were lending money to Egypt at exorbitant rates and it was being wasted or spent on paying the Sultan to enlarge the privileges of the Pasha. Finally, we made our scoop and Mr. Disraeli—or Lord Beaconsfield, I think he then was—paid the £4 million and got the Khedive's shares. I hope your Lordships will forgive me, because I am trying to bring facts forward which must be well known to your Lordships, and to shape them into a little picture. Your Lordships must realise that this is how the Egyptian peasants look at the Canal and at us. When the Concession was given, the corvée was brought in and when Nasser speaks about the thousands of lives lost he is speaking the truth—the Egyptians know it; it was done by the corvée. To the great credit of Lord Cromer and of our intervention, we abolished the corvée in Egypt. Therefore, to the Egyptian peasant the whole transaction merely represents a foreign Power, Great Britain, supporting and manipulating an alien ruling House with the fellaheen nowhere at all. I leave the matter now. But it is very important that people should realise what the great mass of Egyptians who are going to the polls in a few weeks, really think about this subject.
Disraeli was an amusing writer and he wrote to Lady Bradford the day after he had made the great scoop—a Sunday, I think it was—when the Rothschilds got the £4 million and we bought the Khedive's shares. He wrote to Lady Bradford:
"We have had all the gamblers, the capitalists, the financiers of the world, organised, platooned in bands of plunderers."
That is what Disraeli said about the financial arrangements which launched the Canal. It is a long time ago and it is easy to say that this is all past history, but it is what the Egyptians are thinking about in regard to this talk of how much they may spend on the dam, and what right they have to the Canal and what they spend on arms from abroad, and what price they get for their cotton. To the Egyptians, all this means the return of an international control of the budget,
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and there is nothing you can do which would irritate and inflame them more than making suggestions of that kind.
I myself do not think that necessarily the situation is bad. When I said that Nasser was a friendly man it was received with derision. I do not think he wants to make trouble, but he wants to justify his revolution; and to do that he must have money, he must have the dam and he must irrigate the desert. He says that nothing in this action is an infringement of any international obligation. although politically it is a most insulting thing to do. There is nothing, he says, that is internationally illegal. I hope he will seek an interview with my noble friend below me, who can explain these doubts and fears to the President of the Egyptian Republic.
There is a simple solution available. An instrument is ready to hand. No doubt your Lordships have read it. My noble friend Lord Rea read it, because he put in the point about Hungary and Austria. This Convention is a marvel of organised machinery for controlling the international use of the Canal. Its drafting is wonderful. Not only does it lay down everything for which people are asking, but it also sets up a body that has to meet annually in Cairo to see that it is being done. It says that the agents of all the signatories are to meet in Cairo every year. I should like to ask the noble Marquess—of course, he cannot answer right off—whether he would ask the Foreign Office what happened to that Committee which was set up, I think under Article 17 of the Convention—I do not know the exact number. The Convention said that not only would this agreement be operative but that there would be a watchful body which would meet annually to see that it was operative.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Is that the Committee of Agents? That is Article 8.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Yes, that is right. I just wonder what happened to it. It is an Agency. The thing is all framed up. If you put in Russia, as Lord Rea wants and I think everybody wants —apparently the United States, too—then you have got your Agency and you can see that the international use of the waterway is assured and our rights are protected, and there is no need for any trouble at all, if it is agreed to. It is a practical

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suggestion, and I dare say would not be entirely unacceptable to the Egyptian Government.
Now I want to say just a word about economic measures. I am not at all a business man. I am sorry the House is rising to-night because I had it in mind to put a Motion on the Order Paper objecting to the Statutory Instruments under which these measures are taken. If I had had the chance to do that, then a Minister would have come here and explained it all to us. I suppose that it is all right. Certainly the French are in a difficult position, as they have immense assets in Egypt. As the noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle, knows, we ourselves have £200 or £300 million worth of property at the Base, including Centurion tanks, so that before one starts to get "rough" on money affairs one needs to look round very carefully. I do not know. but it may be all right. I am perfectly confident that Her Majesty's Government have all that in mind.
As regards the other suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, for a new canal, that may be a good idea, though I do not know whether there is anything against it in the Concession. I have read the Concession which we gave to de Lesseps. In that we said that we would not allow any other Concession on the Isthmus. Whether or not the canal proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, would be banned by the orginal Concession I do not know; but at any rate he proposed a canal which would run up some hills in Israel and down some other hills in Israel, and then land in an Egyptian lake. On the whole, it does not seem to be a very profitable or constructive idea, but no doubt the noble Lord will explain it to us later.
Speaking generally about Israel, may make a suggestion—and it is one with which, I believe, Israeli statesmen would agree: do not attempt to use Israel as a pawn in the game in fighting the Arabs. That would be a fatal mistake. The Israelis do not want it. The place for Israel is as an honoured, skilful and valued member of the Middle Eastern community—that is the real place for Israel and people who think that they will make her a fifth Dominion, or get a base at Haifa, or anything of that kind, are doing the worst possible disservice to that State. The existence and prosperity
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of Israel is, in my judgment, the most important thing in the Middle East. Anyone who has been there quite recently will have seen how these people work, how they lose their country. We need not give them aid, although they may want guns and other things to defend themselves; but everyone there is burning to defend his country. It is vital that that country should be protected. I do not want to disagree with Her Majesty's Government, but it is unfortunate that, for reasons of caution, or because we did not want to offend the Arabs, or because we thought we could play in with the Egyptians, we did nothing at all when a flagrant break of law did occur, such as has been the subject of all this eloquence tins afternoon. That in itself has "blotted our copy book"—not fatally, I agree. But at any rate it is a fact that the whole world knows we would not stop Egypt blockading Israel.
The Canal is only one instance of a world-wide anti-Semitic blockade which is going on through the Arab Bureau. Now, we ourselves are affronted on this same point. I want to ask the noble Marquess the Leader of the House, when he replies, to say something about the islands at the mouth of the Gulf of Akaba. I believe that (no doubt to keep the peace with the Arabs) we have an arrangement by which we undertake to give private notice when we are going through channels which we are entitled use without any prior notice. Something of that kind happened in Albania, and we took them to court. As a result, we got a cheque for a large sum, although of course it was never honoured. I should like to ask a question on this matter of freedom of passage (I tried to put it in a supplementary question the other day), because I believe that the freedom of water is vital and must apply to the Gulf of Akaba as well as to the Canal of Suez. I believe that we are internationally justified on that point.
We can bring into active operation the Convention of the Suez Canal; I was very grateful for the Answer which I received to my Question on that subject to-day. We can say to the Soviet Union: "You signed the Convention. You always had an interest in the Mediterranean. Join with us." After all, although we fought the Russians in the Crimea in the late 1850s, by the 1870s they were back and joining in an international Convention

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governing Egyptian affairs; so that it is not an impossible task for us to do what I am sure they themselves would wish —namely to bring them into the Great Power Group of the United Nations dealing, I should hope, with the Middle East. I do not think that means they are to be won away. I do not believe for a moment that the Russians want war. I do not believe that they want to stir up anybody else to make war; but, of course, a little trouble among other people is always a comfort to a diplomat.
My Lords, just one other point: what are you going to do? I was deeply stirred, as I always am, by the eloquence of the noble Marquess, Lord Reading. He said that when injustice is done, justice is bound to follow; and that crime will be followed by punishment. I was delighted to hear that. But what punishment? How are you going to start? Supposing this man is absolutely wicked, and says: "I do not care a snap of the fingers for you; I am going ahead."? What do you do then? In June, 1882, there was a bloody riot in Alexandria, and though we were very annoyed, we did not do anything at the time. Peace was restored through Arabi Pasha, who is the political ancestor of Nasser, who is the lineal representative of the Egyptian revolutionary of 1881. That was the affair in the Rue des Soeurs. I have read of it for, having nothing to do when the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, sent me to Egypt. I just read books.
In those days of might, when we had the spirit shown by the noble Marquess. Lord Reading, to-day, we did not like a thing like that to happen; so a month after the whole thing had been settled, mostly by the intervention of Arabi Pasha, we sent twenty-two warships. To-day, I do not think we have got twenty-two warships altogether. When we sent those warships to Alexandria, Admiral Seymour saw somebody (I do not know whom) and said, "Unless you stop building that mud fort I shall bombard it." The Egyptian said "I will not stop." So the Admiral bombarded it with his twenty-two warships. Then Sir Garnet Wolsey appeared and marched with one battalion and took Cairo. I wonder whether there is anybody who really believes that the whole of the Disraelian affair was a success? I do not
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think so. I think it was a great failure. It has all "gone to pot" now—the Indian Empire, the Suez Canal, the Sudan, the Boer War—all gone. If I were going to make a peroration (which I am not) I should suggest that we reassess our problems and look at things anew. That is what we have to do. So long as one is a Kipling man, and really believes that Disraeli was right with his methods, his bombardments and his battalions flying the flag—that Union Jack which, when I was in Cairo in 1946, still flew bravely on the tuzrrets of the Citadel—if one believes in all that, then this is the way to act. But if we do not, if we think that the British Commonwealth has a mission. then we have to look elsewhere and consider what is the effect of this.
I want to ask the noble Marquess. Lord Salisbury, when he replies, to answer some of these not very difficult general questions. Her Majesty's Government have talked about taking action. If they are not going to take action, then the sooner the House rises and we have a conference (once Luxembourg and San Marino have accepted invitations), which eventually peters out, or there is a Test Match or something like that, the better. That is the best solution of all.
Her Majesty's Government have talked very bravely about taking action. Suppose that they take some violent action, put Sir John Slessor on to it—he is "atom-happy" and believes in might—what is going to be the effect on our British Commonwealth and on the world in general? Let me catalogue the countries of the Commonwealth. Canada has not sent a note of reproof to Nasser; South Africa has not sent a note of reproof to Nasser. India—well, I do not know; but the matter was not discussed at Brioni. That is all we know from Mr. Nehru. Then, is Pakistan going to join in this great attack on Egypt? What becomes of the Baghdad Pact? Have you asked Nuri Said about it? He is in London now. What does he think of this business? What about Persia? The Shah of Persia has just paid a very friendly visit to Russia. And what about Jordan? Fifteen million pounds a year we are paying to Jordan at present. A nice friendly telegram was sent by Jordan to Nasser—at the expense of the subsidy, of course—congratulating him on what he had done.

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You may say these are just niggling little points. In a way they are details, but they are part of a bigger picture. There is a group of countries, centred on India and spreading over the Middle East, which does not desire to get involved. Like Nehru, they want a peace-loving area which will not join in the ancient Imperial fights. If Her Majesty's Government take action against Egypt I believe it is, if not inevitable, almost certain that the whole Arab League, and all their friends, will join in the other side. That is something which must not be thought of. It is all very well for the Daily Mail and the Daily News—yes, and the News-Chronicle, whose desertion of Liberal principles is one of the most shocking features of the Press to-day; but I beg Her Majesty's Government to hear these things in mind.
It is dangerous to quote poetry in this House, but there are some lines of Kipling which I should like to repeat. I detest most of Kipling's poetry, but some of it is very good. May I quote just four lines from a poem which I consider very moving and very apt in the present connection? The poem is entitled The Old Men, and I address these lines with great respect to your Lordships:
The Lamp of our Youth will be utterly out: but we shall subsist on the smell of it,

And whatever we do, we shall fold our hands and suck our gums and think well of it,

Yes, we shall be perfectly pleased with our work, And that is the perfectest Hell of it!

With those few words, I beg leave to support—I suppose that is the word—the Motion of my noble friend Lord Silkin.
4.2 p.m.
VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: My Lords, we always listen with attention, if not always with agreement, to the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate. I cannot think of any four lines which would better epitomise his point of view or his speech than those lines of Kipling's which he has just quoted. I think it is just as well that he speaks from the Back and not from the Front Benches. I would categorise his speech in his own words—a lot of niggling little points. When I listened to the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, I was reminded of days before the last war when former Liberal statesmen called upon a great German dictator and fawned upon him
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In considering this subject to-day, I think it cannot be too strongly emphasised that we confront the gravest of situations which has arisen since 1939. I believe that the fate of the whole of the free world as well as of this country depends upon the actions and the policies of Her Majesty's Government in the coming days. The Suez Canal is a vital artery for the whole world, and above all for the Western Nations who, of course, own the preponderance of the maritime fleets of the world. Europe, if she is to maintain in economic progress and momentum n the face of great competition, must have oil supplies from the Middle East. I take it—and this being so my speech will be very short—that the facts are plain. They have not even been obscured by the speech of the noble Viscount. They are plain both to Europe and Asia, and I hope they are equally plain to the United Stales of America.
The facts are that if Colonel Nasser gets away with this action, in the long term he will blackmail and bleed the West of their oil supplies, nominally for the building of the Aswan Dam but primarily for the gratification of his sense of power. The Egyptian dictatorship will slip from him if he fails. But if he is successful in his present course the whole of the interests of the West in the Middle East will disintegrate. Those are the plain facts. I should welcome a world conference upon this question. But if there is to be a summons to Egypt it must be in unequivocal terms. It must ask Egypt to come on the basis of internationalisation of the Suez Canal, and not to a conference at which the internationalisation is to be discussed. That must be the summons.
Lord Stansgate was right in asking Her Majesty's Government what they intend to do. There must be an "either or". Where I differ from him is that I think we have the power and the right to insist, if necessary by force of arms, upon the proper answer to our question. There is no way round. If the matter runs into the sands, not only the fate of this country but the fate of the West, and with it the fate of the United States, will be settled and a third world war will be measurably nearer. Therefore, I welcome the speech of the noble Marquess because it was a strong speech. I hope the actions of Her Majesty's Government—for they have not

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only the right but the duty to lead in this matter—will be consequent on that speech. Colonel Nasser, I feel sure, is saying that possession is nine points of the law. We have the tenth. But it is a point which will rust if not used. I beg Her Majesty's Government not to delay but to bring these matters to an issue in the shortest possible time.
4.7 p.m.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, it would be tempting to preface my observations to your Lordships by saying "I told you so", but that would not be very helpful, although it would be completely true. I should not even have thought of mentioning the fact that I did tell you so but for one of the observations made by Lord Silkin when he opened the debate. He referred, I think, to the question of Egyptian good faith. I could not help remembering how from that Box—it was the only time I have ventured to speak from that Box—I expressed a doubt to the House on that very point. It was in regard to the 1936 Treaty of Alliance with Egypt. That Treaty was approved with acclamation by the Egyptians, and when it came to signing it they sent to this country as signatories the heads of all the Egyptian Parties. I think there were some twelve or thirteen of them. They signed with the greatest joy and acclamation. I ventured at the time of the evacuation talks to remark to your Lordships that the good will and the good faith of Egypt were not all that good, as instanced by the tearing up of the 1936 Treaty though signed by all Egyptian parties thereto.
I would now turn to the issue before us. We are all agreed that the issue which we are now discussing could not be graver. It is, in fact, a direct and deliberate challenge of the highest and most sinister political significance. Are we prepared to let Nasser get away with it? Make no mistake about it. This is a testing time. It is not a testing for Nasser alone. It is a testing for all of us. It is a testing for this country. Such at least, is my view. I feel very strongly that this is a time when we have a great opportunity, and I hope, and I believe, that we are going to take it. The issue before us, it seems to me, falls under two heads. One, the long-term, is the
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ultimate fate and the securing effectively of the rights of free navigation of the Canal as prescribed in the Constantinople Convention of 1888. There is the other and what I might call the shorter-term answer. That comes more on the political side, to which I have just alluded. So far as the long-term issue is concerned, we know that it is now actively engaging the attention of Her Majesty's Government in concert with others. I personally hope that, in pursuing it, whatever the arrangement agreed upon may be, it will take some international form—the form of an international guarantee of some sort deriving from the prescriptions which regulate this right of free navigation laid down in the Constantinople Convention
Some doubt has been expressed in certain quarters as to why we are making all this "song and dance" over the nationalisation of an Egyptian company. I disagree with that argument. I believe that we have a legal case. It is not for me to go into it, but surely when you have something—I am talking about the Canal Company—which has, as its sole object and sole subject a full-blooded international Treaty behind it, you cannot reasonably say that this is a normal question of the nationalisation of a normal national enterprise. I believe that we should have a good case if this came to law.
In another place this morning we heard some fine declarations, which have done us all a power of good. I only hope and pray that we do not get held up by technicalities and petty legal points, and so let the thing drag on; because, as I said at the beginning, this is essentially a political question, and a political question of the highest and most serious import. I repeat, it is a deliberate challenge. I have used that phrase before and I use it again. Your Lordships may remember that the day before yesterday a leader in The Times described Nasser's action as "piracy". That is a very good expression—it is piracy. Pirates are pirates, after all, and when we catch a fellow at it, he deserves short shrift. He ought to be treated like the pirate he proves himself to be. That is generally recognised as the right thing to do. Moreover, it is certain that if this is allowed to pass, the example will spread. It has already been said by one speaker to-day that this sort of poisonous example is

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bound to spread. And so it will. That is all the more reason for us to act, and act quickly.
I come back to my point, even ad nauseam: that this is primarily a political matter, as was so clearly and admirably enunciated by the Leader of the Opposition in another place to-day, in an altogether admirable speech. There are political issues of the gravest import at stake, and accordingly it is a great relief that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to be courageous, even at some risk; and, as I hope and believe, have given and are giving the nation that strong and firm leadership which the public have the right to expect and are so eagerly awaiting. With the full and unanimous support of your Lordships' House, let Her Majesty's Government act swiftly and, if necessary, drastically. In my humble opinion, we have already delayed too long.
I end as I began, with this question: are we going to let Nasser get away with it? I hope and trust the answer is, No.
4.14 p.m.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: My Lords, the only useful purpose of this debate, which takes place in the middle of other and more operative discussions, could be to show our resolve and our solidarity; and I think that both have been shown, with one possible exception (though I am not sure that it is an exception): that of my noble friend Lord Stansgate.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: No, my Lords. I must correct my noble friend—he is my noble friend. My only dissent was that I preferred the Prime Minister's speech to that of my noble friend Lord Silkin. That is all.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: My statement has had the valuable effect of re-emphasising that opening remark of my noble friend, but I thought that in some statements which he made—I hope he will correct me here, too—he was rather presenting the point of view of Colonel Nasser; and that he did, I am sure, out of his well-known balanced sense of justice. It is important that we should have that point of view, of course, and I am sure that the noble Viscount does not completely identify himself with it, despite certain doubts which he submitted.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I do not want to interrupt my noble
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friend, but he must be well aware that it is the duty of anyone in this House to try to present the facts. If he is trying to pretend that I would support, or would have supported, the action of Colonel Nasser, he is wrong. I neither said nor did anything of the kind. If the noble Lord wishes this to be a House that hears only the side of one person, he is right. But my contention is that this House has this; wonderful feature; that people can present other people's cases in order to help. That is the whole point.
VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: My Lords, if the noble Viscount takes that point of view, does he understand that Mr. Gladstone was Prime Minister in 1882?
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I am glad that the noble Viscount has found that out. Of course, he was Prime Minister—but what has that to do with it? Is he going to take strong action on that? I hope that my noble friend Lord Hore-Belisha, when he has finished with me, will give a few hints to the Government on how this "firm action" is going to take place—it ought to be this week or next. What are we going to do?
LORD HORE-BELISHA: My Lords, I think that after that elucidation I may leave the speech of my noble friend—and he is my noble friend—to speak for itself. I have no desire to misinterpret it, and, like everybody else, I enjoyed it.
I agree with the noble Viscount that this issue will be determined, not by anything which we say here to-day, but by what we do to-morrow. It is not a week since the Canal Company was nationalised. I think that the Prime Minister expressed the mind of the nation in his firm reaction. I think that he interpreted the true instincts of a maritime country. He did not take any narrow point of protest against the principle of nationalising a company. He did not dwell on any legal niceties. He did not even confine himself to insisting on free passage through the Canal. I had myself anticipated that in the first instance he would confine himself to that step, because in that he could have had no possibility of opposition from any quarter outside Egypt. But he went further and has insisted, on behalf of the Government, that the Canal shall he administered internationally. That is the clear policy enunciated by Her Majesty's Government.

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There can be no retreat from that policy without a complete loss of our respect and prestige in the Middle East. That is where we stand. The Prime Minister, in a powerful speech, has reiterated that position this afternoon.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, the noble Lord is making a most interesting and constructive speech. I never realised that this international body was to take the place of the Canal Company. Is it to hold their shares? I should like more details.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: My Lords, my noble friend is not quite so innocent as he sometimes pretends to be. What the Prime Minister said was that:
"No arrangements for the future of this great international highway could be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single power which could, as recent events have shown, exploit it for purely national policy."
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: That is the 1888 Convention.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: Let us not put any gloss on the Prime Minister's statement. I think it is far better if, as a nation, our policy should be clearly stated and understood, as I think it is understood. I do not think it is necessary to confuse it in any particular. That is the policy of Her Majesty's Government. A conference of three of the principal Powers is being held, as I understand it, to discover a means of implementing that policy. I take it—and the country and the world have taken it—that the policy represents the fact not only that we intend to carry it out but that we have the means of carrying it out. The next step, we are told, will be perhaps a wider conference. I have complete confidence that we shall not fall into the trap of merely summoning a conference of the Powers to discuss this matter generally. Otherwise Colonel Nasser will continue to administer the Canal and the outcome of the conflict of attitudes will be postponed until the Greek Calends. It is important that any conference which is summoned should he summoned on the basis of this declaration of Her Majesty's Government, in order to establish machinery for carrying it into effect. I assume that that is what will be done; and if that be done I feel that Nasser will have his complete answer and that our prestige will he restored in the Arab world.
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There is another aspect of this matter on which I would desire to say one or two words It has been said—and it was said, I am told, by a Foreign Office spokesman—that we were taken by surprise. If that should be so, this is only the first of the surprises. There are going to be other surprises so long as Nasser is the ruler of Egypt and people of his conviction are in control. It was not a surprise to most of us, because it is in the complete logic of events. This is part of the irresistible logic of nationalism, and anybody could have seen four or five years ago that this was bound to eventuate in some form or other. I must say that I rather deplore the criticism that is sometimes made—and I do so with great respect—of any constructive suggestion of a long-term character on the ground that it does not solve our immediate difficulties. Five years ago I put forward this idea of another canal. In fact it is not my idea. It may interest the noble Viscount who has just spoken and who quoted de Lesseps to know that de Lesseps, as I have been informed, actually considered a possible route leading into the Gulf of Akaba.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Yes, that is so; and Sosotris constructed a canal to the Red Sea in 3,500 B.C.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: But not by the route I am advocating.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: No.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: And it was not a canal that would serve much purpose at the present time as the Suez Canal does.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: It is only a matter of history.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: What I am saying is this: that whenever we have a crisis of this kind and anyone comes forward with a long-term suggestion, which may take months or years to implement, he is told: "We cannot attend to that matter now"; and when the crisis is over or in suspense then everybody forgets about it. If five years ago we had undertaken a project such as I have been advocating, I think we should have been in a better position. The mere threat of building an alternative to the Suez Canal would have had a powerful effect on Colonel Nasser's actions. I have

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reason to know that that was the case from the reaction to the speech I made two and a half years ago, reviving this suggestion. I did not say that we should build a canal immediately. I quite recognised that that would take some time. I did, however, suggest that we should make a pipe line immediately, and that is a question of a few months' construction at extremely small cost. We have great experience of these matters and the terrain is not an obstacle. The thirty-inch pipe line which goes for 555 miles between Kirkuk and Banias was laid by the Iraq Petroleum Company in seventeen months at a cost of £41 million; and it is estimated that a medium borehole pipeline between Akaba and Haifa, which would be about 290 miles long, could be laid for somewhere between £10 million and £20 million. I feel that this matter should be considered.
The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, says that a canal is impracticable. That is exactly what Lord Palmerston said about the Suez Canal. Some extremely strong language was used by Lord Palmerston (I forget if he was then Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary) and I have one quotation here. He said:
"The British Government will use all the influence it possesses to frustrate the realisation of this project."
That was said of the Suez Canal on which we are told to-day we vitally depend and without which we could not exist. Lord Palmerston went on to say that the Canal
"is physically unpracticable "—
which is exactly what my noble friend Lord Stansgate was saying this after-noon—
"and would be far too costly to earn any return."
Everybody knows that the annual revenue of the Suez Canal is two or three times the original capital cost, so nobody could dispute that those who advocated that canal showed some foresight.
All I plead for—because we are not out of the wood—is that this matter should be seriously investigated. The whole tenor of the speech of the Prime Minister to-day was: "The Canal is indispensable to us; it is not big enough, the traffic on it is crowded. In the next 10 to 15 years"—and that is a long-term policy if ever there were one— "it will have to be vastly enlarged". But this Canal—the Suez Canal—will remain in
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Egypt; it will still be the sole highway; it will still be subject to sabotage, whatever new arrangements we make. And if the present legal arrangements are allowed to he fulfilled, in 1968 the Egyptian Government will become the undisputed legal owner of the Canal. I therefore plead with Her Majesty's Government to consider this matter seriously. The Shell-Dutch group announced only two or three weeks ago that they were projecting a pipeline from Marseilles to the northern ports of Europe at a cost of £100 million. What is the use of a pipeline between Marseilles and Northern Europe if the oil cannot get into the Mediterranean at all? So, without desiring to examine in detail the engineering difficulties, I plead for a serious study to be made of this subject, and I am sure that the foresight will be justified.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I do not. take the view of Lord Palmerston—but, of course. I am glad to be put in that category. However, I want to ask the noble Lord whether he will tell us if he has dealt with the free entry into the Gulf of Akaba. That is the whole point.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: I am glad to have that interruption. Now we are told —and it is the sole objection raised, so far as I can understand, to the construction of a pipeline, and a fortiori of a canal—that the entrance to the Gulf of Akaba can be menaced by batteries on the Egyptian and Saudi-Arabian coastlines. The use of force on a free waterway, to prevent the right of innocent passage being exercised, is not only an act of piracy, but an act of war. Are we to be told that Britain and the whole Western world is going to submit to a threat of that kind, and allow itself to be denied access through art open waterway? It is of the nature of waterways that they are commanded by the contiguous land. We do not accept from any other Powers in the world, or any other nations of the world, threats of that kind.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: The noble Lord must know that for several years we have been not only submitting, but conniving, in the imposition of this blockade.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: I do not think that that is a comprehensively true statement. I think it has certain aspects of truth in it. But, as the Prime Minister

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said this morning, Israel's shipping through the Canal has been stopped, and it has also been stopped through the Gulf of Akaba. The United Nations have taken cognisance of the matter and nothing effective has been done. But this is a matter of far wider import, and if we are going to insist on the right of passage through the Canal, as we are going to insist, it will cover Israel presumably in the future, and we will also insist on similar rights in the Gulf of Akaba. The rights are there. Whether we wish to knuckle down and say to anybody who seeks to obstruct us, "All right; if you do not wish us to take this route we will go round the Cape," well and good. That would be a base surrender.
It is also said that some of the Arab countries would not deliver their oil if it had to pass through Israel territory. If suppliers of oil, on which they are entirely dependent for their welfare, are going to impose dictation upon us of the routes which our commerce is to take or not to take, it would be inconceivable that we should accept. We do not accept from suppliers of our tea and copper and all the other commodities which we use a dictation as to the routes which the goods will take after the commodity has been purchased. But I do not think for one moment that the independent sheikdoms on the Gulf would take that attitude. They are entirely dependent, as we are dependent in another sense, on this oil supply—they for selling and we for buying. If, however, we lie down before this threat from Colonel Nasser, then we shall not have any case against anybody in the future. This is a test case, as has been said by my noble friend, and I plead with the Government—while assuring them that I, amongst many millions of other people, are behind them wholeheartedly in this matter, as is the whole country and, I think, the whole of democratic Western. Europe—that we may not confine ourselves merely to a consideration of the short-term measures which could be taken, but that we should look forward imaginatively to longer and more constructive proposals which will ensure our future independence in oil supplies and, indeed, in all commodities.

MESSAGE FROM THE QUEEN: THE ARMY RESERVE
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty to inform the House, in pursuance of the Act of Parliament in that behalf, that, the present state of public affairs and the extent of the demands on the military forces for the protection of the interests of the Commonwealth and Empire constituting in the opinion of Her Majesty a case of great emergency within the meaning of that Act, Her Majesty deems it proper to provide additional means for the military service, and therefore Her Majesty is by Proclamation about to order that the Army Reserve shall be called out on permanent service.

EGYPT AND THE SUEZ CANAL
4.24 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD JEFFREYS: My Lords, may I say, in the first place, how much I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, that the scheme which he mentioned should at least have serious study? I would go on to say, if I may, that it was a great mistake on our part, when Neguib and Nasser first brought off their coup, not to have acted then; and acted quickly. We had certain obligations which were obligations to the legitimate Government of Egypt. We had no obligations whatever to a revolutionary Government. We then had the troops on the spot, and we could have acted, and acted effectively. I think it is a great pity that we did not do so. Now, Nasser has brought off another coup—another "try-on", I should call it, because that is what it is. If, again, we do not act, further coups will be made possible—to begin with, the seizure of such installations as we have left on the Suez Canal. But certainly other coups will be brought off or attempted.
The word has gone round in the East that we are weak, and that we do nothing more than talk when we are affronted or when injuries are inflicted upon us. That is a fatal reputation to have in the East, at any rate, and the sooner we show that it is not correct the better it will be for us and our Allies. We must show that this seizure of the Canal Company

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is going beyond the limit. We must act firmly; and not only firmly but quickly, to stop it. I would say that there must be no argument as to whether there was any legal right on Nasser's side. The Suez area, prior to the formation of the Canal, was barren desert with no inhabitants. The Canal is not a natural feature of Egypt in any sort of way. Its construction is due, first of all, to the genius of M. de Lesseps and to European, largely French, enterprise, and to European skill. It is not due to Egypt in any sort of way.
The argument that the Canal Company is an Egyptian company is, I think, based on the fact that at that time in the 1860's —at the time of the Canal's formation—this was thought to be a method of internationalisation of the Company, because at that time Egyptian companies were practically unknown; there were practically no such things in Egypt at all. Nasser knows very well that this action was unjustified. Not only was it unjustified, but he knows that this country is now the largest shareholder in the Canal since the purchase of the Khedive's shares by Mr. Disraeli. I would venture to say that firm action must be taken, and taken quickly, to stop it. The right of shipping to pass through the Canal is of the utmost importance, not only to Europe but also to Australia and New Zealand, to name only two of the countries to the southward and eastward of the Canal.
Then there are the oilfields. These are of importance, not only to Europe but to America as well. If America is not ready to co-operate to the full with us, we must act without her. We know that it is the year of the Presidential Election, and that at such a time America is traditionally against strong action. But we have no such handicap, and we should act at once and, if necessary, alone, though no doubt France would be on our side. Whilst agreement amongst the Powers is highly desirable, and agreement with the United States particularly so, yet time is passing; and all delay, I would say, encourages Nasser. If we do not stop him, our interests, and Western interests in general, will suffer. All the Arab States are watching to see if we take this lying down—because that is what it comes to.
Let us have no conferences, international or otherwise; no conferences of the United Nations and no conferences of any kind. Let us act. Conferences merely
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waste time. Let us have action. If the United States will not co-operate, I suggest that we act alone, and quickly; for immediate action is necessary, with no further delay and with no concessions of any kind to Egypt. If there are any appreciable concessions to Egypt of any kind, Nasser will use them as an argument and say, "Well, at any rate, we have gained something." During the war, when we needed United States money, troops, ships and air power, we made several bad mistakes, owing to United States influence and advice. We must make no more mistakes now. Colonel Nasser must gain absolutely nothing by his action—that is very important.
I venture to say that, if Colonel. Nasser will not agree to our terms, we should treat him as we treated Arabi in 1882. The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, referred to Arabi. if I may venture to say so, I think, he made one slip, at any rate, in referring to the Royal power of Egypt which Arabi was working against, because there was no Royal power in Egypt in those days. It was the Khedive of Egypt who was the Viceroy of the Sultan of Turkey. It was not a Royalty at all. We should, I think, if necessary—and I am not saying that it will he necessary—treat Colonel Nasser as we treated Arabi.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: We sent Arabi to Ceylon. How are you going to get Nasser to Ceylon?
LORD JEFFREYS: I am saying that we treated Arabi by making war against him, and, if necessary, we should make war against Nasser, if he will not come to heel. For that purpose, we should make the fullest use of our Armed Forces, on land, on sea and in the air. If anyone should ask in what manner Armed Forces could be used, my reply would be that that is a matter for the Chiefs of Staff, whose advice should be taken. The essentials are that action should be immediate and not in any way delayed, and that the forces employed should be adequate. We mast not think that, because we have, perhaps, not a very high opinion of Egyptians or their fighting power, two men and a boy, or the equivalent, will be sufficient for the purpose. I venture to urge that we should act very strongly and immediately, because every delay counts in favour of Nasser and against us.
4.42 p.m.
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, I feel that there is one comfort in considering the political acrobatics of Colonel Nasser to which the noble Lord, Lord Rea, has drawn attention, and that is that, with differences of emphasis, we in this country are agreed; and when the three political Parties find themselves in agreement, it somehow restores our confidence. It seems to me that on big occasions—and surely this is a big occasion—we find suddenly that we become both the servants and the masters of international destiny. It is in the light of standing up to that kind of test that we have to make our contribution. It is tempting to take the line which the noble Lord, Lord Jeffreys, has advocated, to react at once to injury and insult. Our instinct is to "go it alone," if necessary, while others perhaps argue and dispute. It is as making a contribution to an international settlement of an international problem that I believe that we shall be judged in future years.
In any argument I can contribute I am anxious to start by being scrupulously fair to Egypt. For example, I want to tackle the question which has been raised several times in the debate about Egypt's action in relation to Israeli ships passing through the Canal. I do not think it is entirely fair to Egypt to draw attention to a contravention of the 1888 Convention. After all, through two world wars the enemy did not observe the freedom of the Suez Canal, and if, by chance, the Germans had found themselves in the position of holding the Canal, does anybody suppose that we would have refrained from bombing the Canal in honouring the 1888 Convention? Egypt's position in relation to an armistice has always been that an armistice is a pause in a situation of war and not a step towards peace. It is no good the Security Council or anybody else lecturing Egypt. Egypt says, "It is our right to hold up ships passing through the Canal on the way to Israel." I think that is a fairer way—and I am going out of my way to be fair to Egypt—to regard Egyptian action in relation to Israeli ships passing through the Canal.
Secondly, in general terms it is strangely true that, as the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, said. Egypt is still able to deny that she has broken any international agreements. I find the situation in which two companies, one in Paris and one in
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Cairo, both claim to be the Suez Canal Company extremely bewildering, but the experts will tell us that that is due to a gap in international law. Therefore, if we were to use immediate force to restore the situation, we should technically be the aggressor and the whole of the Arab world and indeed the Bandoeng world would be the first to draw attention to that position. Thirdly, in being fair to Egypt, in spite of what the noble Marquess told us about American aid, I am not entirely convinced that there is not ground to suppose that the Americans had led the Egyptians to believe that they were going to receive some 50 million dollars over several months for the first stage. I shall not stress that point, but I believe that that is the kind of attitude to which the Egyptians would draw our attention
It seems to me that the Government are perfectly right in attempting first to seek an international background to any action that is taken. Before we say more about the international content of such action, I should like to look back for a moment and try to analyse in some detail the situation to which the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, referred. May I fill in the figures? In Alexandria Colonel Nasser, in taking this action, said that he was raising money towards the construction of the High Dam. The sum that Egypt would have to raise without international contribution would be in the region of £300 million to £500 million. In 1955, after meeting all costs and allowing for depreciation and new improvements in the Canal, the Suez Canal Company paid £10,704,000 to its shareholders. Therefore, that is about the sum that can be regarded as available towards the High Dam. But, as has been pointed out, compensation has to be paid at the same time to the founder shareholders, and the price of those founder shares on the Paris Exchange on July 26 was £81,724,000. To that you have to add £3 million in payment of the debentures. In all, a sum of about £85 million would have to be paid, and a rough calculation shows that the surplus profits presumably would have to be used to pay off the shareholders for the first eight years or so after nationalisation
Meanwhile, of course, improvement has to go on. The 60,000 and 80,000-ton tankers which are now going through the Canal, or are attempting to do so,

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all the time demand that the Canal should be widened and deepened. Colonel Nasser was clever enough to say that he regarded the nationalised Canal Company as a contribution towards the cost of building the High Dam. Well, you can take one Egyptian pound and put it into a High Dam account and regard it as a contribution. The deduction, surely, is, as the noble Marquess has hinted, that Colonel Nasser knew as well as anyone else that the Canal revenues could never really make any impact upon the building of the High Dam, and that the refusal of American aid was an excuse to take a step which may or may not have been contemplated, but which, as we know, represents an appeal to national hysteria such as small men thrive on in their quest for popularity
I repeat that we seem to have arrived at the position not so much of two alternative approaches, but of two aspects of the same approach. In the first place, we can "go it alone," but in the conditions which operate we may not be able to do so. We have the Commonwealth to protect, we have the oil of Europe going through the Canal, as well as the oil of the North Atlantic Powers. All this is part of the general standard of political morality which we are facing. The modification which it seems to me Her Majesty's Government are contemplating is to organise international support. Where would that first course lead us? We should be involved in a landing again—a re-occupation. It may solve the problem for a year or so. But should we not be back again in the old cycle? Suppose that such action led to the disappearance of Nasser, who would take his place—the Wafd? More emphatically, where should we then be in 1968 if, in the meanwhile, we had been unable to establish what is so urgently needed—namely, some permament international responsibility for the Suez Canal, and with it, I suggest, an international responsibility for other such waterways as the Isthmus of Kra?
I speak of an international dispensation, but I do not necessarily invoke the aid of everybody. I suggest that it is logical to suppose that the aid and interest of those who use the Canal should be invoked. We do not presume
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to tell the Soviet Union or the Soviet satellites how the Danube shall be used.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I beg the noble Lord's pardon. The Danube Convention has been one of the most controverted international matters in the last twenty years.
LORD BIRDWOOD: I apologise to the noble Viscount if I have made a mistake, but I have never of recent years seen in the newspapers any reference to the Danube Convention I am not aware that any British ships use the Danube.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: The Danube was internationalised after the Crimean War, and after the last war there were many discussions. I do not know what the situation is now, but the internationalisation of the Danube was one of the most debated questions in Europe.
LORD BIRDWOOD: Then I put it this way: that if there were a controversy on the Danube, I do not believe the British Government would bother very much about it. The argument has been used—and it is a forceful one—that if Egypt were in sole control, then no Middle East State with oil would escape this nationalisation infection; that the process which was initiated by Dr. Mossadeq would receive a fresh impetus. It is a logical argument. But I do not suggest that the use of force immediately is the only answer, or that force is necessarily the only limiting factor in the spread of this fever of nationalisation. For myself, I doubt whether any of the oil States would be really anxious to nationalise their oil if they knew that the only circumstances in which the oil could be nationalised were that the profits and the personnel and everything would be subject to international control. In passing, I am reminded that there is a method for dealing with Middle East oil which has, as yet, I believe, not received prominence—an alternative even to the canal which Lord Hore-Belisha has suggested. I am told that it is perfectly feasible from the technical point of view to consider the piping off of oil in the Middle East—and I think particularly of Iraqi oil—into Turkey and removing it from the Turkish port.
I have one reflection which covers all action, whether it be action by force or by diplomacy or by one Power or a number of Powers. I believe that any

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decision taken will fall down if no steps are taken simultaneously to defend and explain it before a watching Arab world. I am going to make a practical suggestion—namely, that at least one million Arabic pamphlets should be printed, telling the Arabs the truth about the Canal and its construction. This is rather a different note of truth from that to which the noble Viscount referred. It may be too late to tell Egypt and the Egyptians, but there are a few million Arabs in the surrounding countries who have never been told that, had it not been for one Frenchman and his initiative, enterprise and energy, the Canal from which Egypt hopes to gain these profits would never have been built. Why not go further while we are about it? Why not also tell them that a few Englishmen in Egypt managed to double the acreage of crops, harness the opium trade, build railways, organise the police and build the first Aswan Dam? That is only the truth.
The Egyptian Government speak direct to the people of other Governments with the language of diabolical misrepresentation. We have not yet started to speak the language of truth. I suggest that we could make a start by jamming the "Voice of the Arabs." Perhaps that is not quite the note upon which to end a plea for international intervention. Once before. in 1882, an international convention was summoned, and we and I think the Italians and the French were supposed to take action. Finally, for various reasons, we were left alone to "face the music." Let us hope and pray that that may not happen again. Certainly, so far as the French are concerned, it seems that they will stand by us. Let us regard this matter as a challenge and our chance to create and not merely accept in international affairs this international responsibility and interest. But if we fail, and if, in accommodation of international political interests, one country or another fails us, then I am sure that there would be no alternative but to act alone on behalf of an international family incapable of decision. If it came to that, I am quite certain that we should all be behind Her Majesty's Government.
5.0 p.m.
LORD GRANTCHESTER: My Lords, I think it is right to try to sort out, as several Lords have done in this unfor-
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tunate episode, the international and commercial aspects, and to distinguish them. But first we must all recognise—and I think in all parts of the House everyone has recognised—that this action by Colonel Nasser is a blow to good will. It is even worse than this. It is done, if not with malice aforethought, at least in utter disregard of the effects that the action may have on other peoples. In effect, Colonel Nasser says, "If I can't have what I want, then I will do as much damage as possible, irrespective of the people to whom that may bring disaster."
Now this is the kind of action which provokes war, and in terms of international morality, which the United Nations is trying to maintain. I think we should say that it is a criminal act. It is a criminal act to take action which, because of its consequences, may bring war. If such an act is deliberately done, the perpetrators have no right to complain if force is used against them. But this may not be the best way, and I believe that Her Majesty's Government are right in exploring an approach which does not involve the use of force. at any rate in the first instance.
LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? Would he help myself and other noble Lords on this point? Does the noble Lord argue that what has already been done is a breach of International Law?
LORD GRANTCHESTER: My Lords, I think it is a breach of what I may call the international morality which we are trying to build up through the United Nations, that no-one should act in a manner likely to bring, war between peoples. If someone behaves so recklessly as to have no regard for the rights of other nations, then retaliation in the form of force is likely to be provoked. I hold that it is a criminal act to act in a way which may bring about such a state of affairs. I am looking at this action, for the moment, from the point of view not of International Law but of international morality which we are seeking to build up in our support of the United Nations Organisation. It is the purpose of that Organisation to lead the nations so to conduct their affairs that they do not act in a way regardless of the consequences upon other peoples. I believe that this act is therefore to be

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condemned on the grounds of international morality as a criminal act.
Having said that, I should like to look for a moment at the international and commercial aspects. The international obligation appears to be to maintain freedom of passage through the Canal. We may con rider that this freedom of passage through the Canal is in jeopardy, but it has not yet been stopped. I know that International Law is very different from private law, and I would ask whether, in circumstances of jeopardy, application can or cannot be made to the International Court with any prospect of success. If security is put in jeopardy in the control, for example, of a borrower, it is possible, in a national court, to plead that the security is being placed in jeopardy.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, may I ask whether the noble Lord is alleging a breach of the Convention of 1888?
LORD GRANTCHESTER: My Lords, the answer to that question is: perhaps not yet, but a breach is threatened. I want to ask if, prior to a deliberate breach, when it is thought that there is likely to be a breach of rights under an international Convention, a plea of jeopardy can be made at the International Court. If that cannot be done, I suggest that the machinery which exists for the settlement of disputes is deficient. One of the main purposes of the United Nations Organisation is to provide an alternative to violent action, and it is leaving things too late if one has to wait for a breach to occur. A breach may clearly be threatened, as in this case. Is it possible to take a case of jeopardy to the International Court? I should like to know the view of Her Majesty's Government on this matter. I should also like to bring it to the attention of those who are interested in international organisations charged with the duty of preserving peace.
Next, I should like to say a few words on the commercial aspect. Here we must emphasise—and I am very pleased to do so from these Benches—how undesirable and dangerous it often is, even if, a Government are acting within their sovereign rights, to nationalise an industrial enterprise. Immediately after nationalisation, any commercial act of buying, selling or fixing prices or charges
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for services becomes a Government act, with possible international repercussions. With all due respect to what was said by the noble Marquess in distinguishing this case from other cases of nationalisation, I think my argument applies. There is always export business to be considered. When a private person charges what is thought to be too much, that does not cause international repercussions; but when a Government charges what is thought too much, a friendly country often feels that it is being held to ransom.
It is a very topical question for, obviously, one of the possible reasons for nationalising this Canal is to put up the dues. By a company under Egyptian sovereignty that is an act which may cause international repercussions. The act of nationalisation takes it beyond the field of ordinary commercial activity. Irritation over prices can thus become an affront by one nation to another. It is a lesson which we should all be careful to learn: that it is better for Governments to keep out of business and leave it to private citizens to conduct their business on commercial principles within the law.
If the Suez Canal Company threatens to exploit its customers, those customers will soon find an alternative. It may well be that the action of the Egyptian Government has focused attention upon this desirability. It might be as well to draw the attention of the great Arab oil States to the fact that oil has an economic price in competition with other fuels. If the cost of transit is increased, those Arab States which produce oil may be faced with a fall in their revenue, if not immediately, then in the near future. If this is understood, other Arab States may well rue the day when Egypt dealt them this blow. The oil interests are resourceful and can be relied upon to take care of any commercial difficulties raised by the Egyptian action.
This does not, however, absolve successive British Governments from a charge of lack of foresight. Over a period of many years British Governments have been in negotiation with the Egyptian Government on the subject of the Suez Canal. The British Government also have a substantial direct holding in the oil industry and appoint directors to some of the most important oil companies operating in the Middle East. Being

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involved in this way, they must show reasonable business foresight, and I should like to ask what consideration has been given to the arrangements that they thought would have to be made in 1968, when the present Concession comes to an end. At least it was necessary to foresee a rearrangement of the Concession terms in 1968. I should like to ask whether it is the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to try to negotiate or to take part in negotiations, during the proposed International Conference which they are calling, for a new Concession relating to the maintenance and management of the Suez Canal, or whether the International Conference is to be concerned only with the guarantee of freedom of transport, leaving the Concession arrangements to be commercially negotiated'? I think it is important that the international aspect and the commercial aspect should be kept distinct.
One final word. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will confine their action to the international issues involved without engendering too much bitterness by action against individual private citizens in respect of their private money and accounts. I hope that, as soon as plans have taken shape and have been set in motion by Her Majesty's Government, exchange regulations applicable to private citizens will be cancelled.
5.12 p.m.
EARL DE LA WARR: My Lords, if I were an enemy of this country I should feel that the time had come for me to walk extremely carefully when I saw all three Parties in this country in complete agreement. Ours is a country which enjoys free speech and criticism, and Oppositions do not lightly give up the right to criticise Governments. What has happened means that the red light has appeared. It is evident from this debate in your Lordships' House, and from what little some of us have been able to hear this morning in another place, that the main issues are extremely plain in all our minds. It may be that neither in another place nor here have Her Majesty's Government yet been able to say very much but their attitude is clear. I know I am speaking for your Lordships in saying that we are very well satisfied and very happy about that attitude.
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We have had laid before us a picture of a threat to communications of vital importance to a great part of the world, of a threat to the lifeblood of countries living on both sides of the Canal. The threats have been both commercial and strategic in their nature. We have seen how your Lordships are most profoundly unimpressed by the promise by Colonel Nasser of free passage through the Canal and of compensation. After all, as we know. Egypt in the past has denied the right of the use of the Canal. She tore up the Treaty of 1936. She is now tearing up the Concession twelve years before it expires. We know perfectly well that she lacks the wherewithal—even if we thought for a moment that she had the will, which we do not—to pay. Finally how can we expect a decent, proper or efficient arrangement after the way in which the announcement was made in the speeches of Colonel Nasser which we have read since? There was no warning and no discussion there was insult and vituperation. It was obvious from the beginning that this was a very definite and very conscious challenge, a challenge to our prestige and to the prestige of the whole West. It is a bid—as I think the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and the noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle, both said—by an Egyptian dictator for leadership, as he himself said, from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf.
If this bid succeeds—let there be no illusion about it—we shall mean nothing from then onwards in the Middle East. Nor can we hope to isolate the effect upon our prestige merely to the Middle East. In addition, every oil agreement in existence will be in danger. Every trade agreement also will be in danger. Every friend of ours in that part of the world will be thinking how he can get on to the right band waggon, which he will not consider to be ours. Every enemy will be considering how he can take action with the least danger and at the greatest profit to himself at the expense of ourselves. In fact, the challenge is a challenge to our communications, to our oil supplies and to our strategical existence. Above all, in this part of the world it is a challenge to our prestige. That, I think, is quite clearly recognised. Almost every noble Lord who has spoken has emphasised it.
There is, however, one point which has not been made so far in the debate and

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which I think is worthy of your Lordships' attention and consideration. One reads that Arabs and certain colonial peoples are taking great pleasure at the present moment in what they feel to be the humiliation of the West. I am informed—I did not hear it myself—that on the radio this morning there was a report of a speech by Mr. Nehru it which he said that this is only another example of the weakening hold of the West. Do not those countries, which for the sake of brevity I will call the under-developed countries, realise that to no one more than themselves is this a greater blow? Every agreement of this character that is broken is against their interests. Every time there is an Abadan or a Suez episode. it must make it harder and harder for them to get the money and the skilled assistance they need for their development.
I am informed that, even now, it is becoming increasingly difficult to persuade financial houses, not only in the City of London but in other great financial centres also, to invest money in under-developed countries. This includes even our Colonies. This situation can become only more acute as self-government grows. How, for instance, does the Gold Coast hope to get the money it wants for the Volta scheme if confidence in under-developed countries is destroyed by actions such as that of Colonel Nasser? I hope that our information services are taking note of this matter for use in all under-developed countries. This conflict may be carried on as a cold war or as a hot war. Certainly alt of us hope that it can be settled in terms of a cold war. If so, this is a very important point, and every effort should be made to mobilise opinion in the vast mass of under-developed countries.
We shall, I hope, hear a little later of the policy of Her Majesty's Government. It may be that we shall hear of it later this evening, or it may be that we shall have to wait a little longer. But I think it is clear from what the Prime Minister has already said that it can be summed up shortly in the words, "international control, in some form or another, of the Canal." There is such full agreement on that point that I will not weary your Lordships with any comments on it, but I would add that, if force is required, it is essential to exercise it. There is a general feeling in the House which the
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noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, tried to ridicule. What we are all saying is that the Government should be firm. The noble Viscount is right. We are all agreed that that is our desire. It is an easy thing to say, but no one has a right to make such a request of the Government unless he is prepared to back, the Government if they are driven to the use of force, realising that, once a start on the use of force has been made, it is impossible to say where it might stop.
Having said that, I do ask the Government to be firm, if possible in concert with the United States of America. But if the United States of America will not come with us, I trust that we shall not allow ourselves to be deflected from our right policy. Finally, may I reiterate the hope expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that Her Majesty's Government will not hesitate to call the House back? I should like to support that plea especially if, for any reason, the Government feel driven to take a less firm line than we have to-day been given the hope that they will take.
5.23 p.m.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I should like to endorse from these Benches every word the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr, has said. We are strongly behind the Government, as I think are the majority of the Labour Party, in whatever measures they may care to take. I agree with the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord De L'Isle, when he says that this is probably the gravest event that has happened since 1938. I think that it will go a long way towards increasing tension in the Middle East, and in many ways the results in the future may be incalculable. On the other hand, it has probably done one good thing—it has opened our eyes to Colonel Nasser. The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, put it very well when he said that he thought that up to this coup Colonel Nasser had been regarded as a "blue-eyed boy".
I have recently returned from a visit to Israel and I can assure your Lordships that they saw through him a long time ago. They regard him, and have regarded him for some years now, as a kind of Arab Hitler who is out to destroy them. In fact, he tells them so through his "Voice of the Arabs" almost every day. I think that the danger to Israel has increased greatly since this coup. If strong

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measures are taken against Colonel Nasser, it may be necessary for him to try to bring off another coup; on the other hand, if they are not taken, he will be encouraged all the more. Whatever happens, the danger of war in the Middle East has greatly increased. I do not want to anticipate in any way what the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, will say, except to hope—if I may say so with the greatest respect—that he will say more than the noble Marquess. Lord Reading.
I think there is one thing that the Government can do: that is, to send defensive weapons to Israel. I simply cannot understand the Government, and certainly no one in Israel can, when they keep on maintaining this farce that the balance of arms is still on Israel's side. What do they mean, when enormous quantities have been sent by ourselves and by Iron Curtain countries to Egypt in particular and to other Arab States? I can only assume that they are taking into account the superior calibre of the Israeli soldier. I can think of no other reason. I think we should send Israel sufficient defensive weapons to act as a deterrent. I know that there are some people who would say that this would lead to an arms race, but we had a kind of arms race after World War Two when we formed N.A.T.O That was an arms race, but it did not lead to war; on the contrary, it preserved the peace. And this is what Israel wants at the moment—sufficient arms to deter Nasser from attacking, so that he will know that if he attacks them. he will get hit back, and hit back hard. I beg the Government to take that into account and not depend on the blood of the people of Israel, even though they may have soldiers superior to those of some of the Arab States.
I believe there is a feeling, too, that Israel herself might be aggressive. I do not know on what that feeling is based. The "Voice of the Arabs" broadcasts aggressive anti-Israel propaganda almost daily, saying frankly that they wish to destroy Israel and give the refugees back their stolen lands. In parenthesis, I would say that I have a great deal of sympathy with the refugees, although Israel's offer to give them compensation as part of the general peace settlement has never been accepted. But it is said quite categorically on the Arab radio every day, "We
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are going to attack and destroy Israel". Colonel Nasser said it the other day, as the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr, pointed out. On the other hand, when has Israel said that she is going to attack one of the Arab States or that she is going to expand her frontiers? I can only think of cases when Israel sometimes strikes back, usually as a defensive measure, against these constant infiltrations across the borders. It is really a case of
"Cet animal est tres méchant; Quand on l'atttaque il se défend."
That, with due apology for my French accent, is how Israel is regarded by Her Majesty's Government. Her ships are blockaded from passing through the Canal. We are getting worried now that our ships may be stopped from going through the Canal, but it has been happening to Israeli ships and to the ships of other nations going to Israel for some years now. We did nothing about it, but when it happens to one of our own ships, it is very different. Whatever long-term action the Government may take, as their immediate policy they should try to repair this balance so that Israel is less at a disadvantage. I am glad to see that they have at last seen the light so far as Egypt is concerned and have stopped sending arms to her. But I think that it would now be a stabilising factor in the Middle East if Israel had sufficient arms to defend herself, particularly against any coup which Egypt's dictator might be planning at present.
5.30 p.m.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, I doubt whether any of us has ever listened to a debate in which there was a greater unanimity of opinion. The only breach of that was the difference of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, with the noble Lord, Lord Silkin.
LORD PAKENHAM: May I interrupt the noble Lord? I have heard some observations from his own immediate vicinity which go much further than I, and I should think a good many others, would wish to go.
LORD COLERAINE: I am sorry for that, and I hope that nothing the noble Lord hears from me will prompt such an observation from him. I believe, in spite of what the noble Lord. Lord Pakenham. has just said, that there is a general feeling among your Lordships that Her Majesty's Government are

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handling the present crisis with patience, skill and steadfastness. For my part, I would go a little further than that and say—though I know that not every noble Lord would agree with me—that Her Majesty's Government have no cause whatever to stand in a white sheet for any part of their policy towards Egypt and Colonel Nasser in recent years. I do not believe that the Agreement of 1954 was a mistake: and I do not believe, for my part, that if we had 80,000 troops now beleaguered in the Zone it would have made any difference to Colonel Nasser's action. I think the only effect would have been that our continued presence in the Zone would have been a great source of irritation, not so much to Colonel Nasser, because I do not think that that matters, but to large sections of public opinion in this country, and to a great many people among our Allies abroad. Her Majesty's Government may well be disappointed in the results of the Agreement of 1954, but the fact that they sincerely endeavoured to tread the path of friendship with the Egyptian dictator has beer of great advantage to us in the new situation which faces us to-day. If it had not been for that, I very much doubt whether we should have the unity that we have to-day at home, or that degree of unity which I hope we have among our Allies.
What is the new situation that faces us? I think the first and most striking thing about it is that it is not a new situation at all; it is an old one; it is twenty years old. We have all of us been this way before; we have all of us seen these things before. We have seen the battery of microphones, the gesticulating puppet behind them, the crowds roused to frenzy and intoxication, intoxicating in their turn, until they drive beyond the bounds of reason the dictator himself. We have seen before the sudden violent act and then the soft words; the reasonable explanations. the pleas of justification and the promise how, now that this matter has been settled. everything will be all right in the future. What we are seeing to-day is the Rhineland, twenty years later.
If I say that I greatly enjoyed the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, I hope he will not think it an impertinence on my part. I do not know when I 'have ever enjoyed a speech more.
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But I do not know when I have ever listened to a speech which was so unconstructive and so irrelevant to the serious problems we are discussing. I thought that the speech of the noble Viscount was wrong for two reasons. In the first place, he was examining the situation under a microscope. You can, perhaps, examine a legal situation under a microscope with profit; but I do not believe you can examine a political situation under a microscope, because you do not see it in its whole perspective.
The second reason why I found his speech unconstructive and ineffective was this: I had heard that speech, too, twenty years before. If only you transpose the name "Nasser" for the name "Hitler". and the Egyptians for the Germans, your Lordships will remember hearing that speech many times in January, 1936: "What is the charge against them? Going into their back garden. What is the court you are going to haul them before? There is none. You cannot understand Hitler unless you understand the German people and how they have been oppressed and how they have suffered." This is the Rhineland again. I think there is no doubt of this, at any rate: that if we had acted in January, 1936, with firmness. we should have avoided the Second World War. It may be that we had even more time than that, and that if we had acted later with firmness we should have avoided it but it is certain, I think, that if we had acted with firmness in 1936 we should have avoided the war. We failed to take that chance, and it was, perhaps, the last chance we had. This may be the last chance we have now of avoiding a Third World War.
To say, as the Government do, that the action of President Nasser has got to be upset is not Jingoism; it is not talking about national honour. It is true, as my noble friend Lord Reading said earlier on. that British prestige is important; but this is something far more important than British prestige. It is fundamentally and simply a question of checking, before it is too late, international anarchy; and if we do not check it we acquiesce in the destruction of Western civilisation: indeed, I believe that we promote it. The path on which we have embarked, as my noble friend Lord De La Warr reminded us, is a dangerous one; it is filled with peril and risk. But if we do not tread that path, and tread it firmly to the end,

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it is not just a question of risk but a question of suicide—suicide for the West.
I think that most of your Lordships agree that the objective of Her Majesty's Government is the right one: to put this Canal under international control. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, raised the question of the Soviet Union, and said that he would like to see the Soviet Union on the Board of Control. So would I. I have always wanted and hoped to see the Soviet Union co-operate in international bodies—in the United Nations, for example. But what we have to consider is something more than whether it would be agreeable to have the Soviet Union associated with the management of the Canal. What we have to consider, first and foremost, it seems to me, is whether the Soviet Union, associated with the management of the Canal, will co-operate to make the international venture successful, or whether they will use it once again as an instrument and a sounding board of propaganda. Unhappily there is not much comfort to be derived so far from what has been said in Moscow. If we decide that the Soviet Union would only use this new international instrument as a propaganda sounding board, then, in my judgment, it would be folly to associate them with it.
I am sure that the goal which the Government have set before themselves in this matter of international policy is the right one. I think it would have been well if we had done that, not two years ago, but when the war came to an end. I thought then that that is what we should have done. I still think that that is what we should have done. For it seemed to me, as it must have seemed to many of your Lordships at that time, that the old conceptions of the nation State were outdated; that if we did not watch out the new wine would crack the old wineskins; that a new international society was in travail, and that it was much in our interest to assist its birth.
Now much has been done since then, and the degree of international cooperation is very great. But it seems to me that the moral which Colonel Nasser points very clearly is this: Western civilisation—and I include in that term not only European peoples and peoples of European descent but peoples all over the world who have absorbed European ideas of freedom and forms of Government—
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is opposed by a vast monolithic power. It is not opposed by Colonel Nasser; it is opposed by a vast monolithic power which stretches across the world and which will use Colonel Nasser or any other puppet that it can get hold of. I do not, for my own part, believe that we are going to be able to compete with that power unless we achieve a greater degree of unity than we have to-day.
This is one of the great climacterics of history. What we know as Western civilisation has always been outnumbered in the world, but until now it has always been secure because Western techniques have assured us of our security. But now the whole world has those techniques, or is getting them. Our civilisation, which has always been outnumbered, is in danger now of being out-classed as well. And it seems to me to be absolutely vital for the future of this country, of Europe, of the United States and, as my noble friend Lord De La Warr reminded us, of India and the economically underdeveloped countries, that we should somehow achieve a degree of political unity such as, even with the great advances made since the war, we have not yet achieved.
5.44 p.m.
EARL ATTLEE: My Lords, at this late stage in the debate there does not seem to me to be much that I can add to it. My view has been largely expressed by my noble friend Lord Silkin and, in an admirable speech, by the Leader of the Opposition in another place. I was struck by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine; it seemed to be a forceful speech, taking a wide view; and I think that we have to take a wide view of this problem. It is part only of a very much wider problem, and I entirely agree with the view that has been expressed by the Government as to what our objective should be. Our objective should be that this great waterway should be open and free to all nations, and should not be used, as it might be used, as a method of blackmail for levying money out of other nations. I think it is worth while remembering in that respect that it is not just a matter of Britain, or even a matter of Europe. We must remember that, if we are dependent on oil coming from the Arabian States, those States, equally, are dependent on selling that oil; and a blackmail might be levied on them just as much as on us.

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What seems to me to be outstanding in this matter is that if our objective is an international waterway, our means of attaining our end must also be international. I was struck by what was said in another place. If we allowed this to be a purely British move, or even an Anglo-Franco-American move, we should lay ourselves open to the charge of carrying on what is regarded as an old Imperialist tradition in which, in the past, we had certain possessions which we kept to our own advantage. Therefore, it is essential in this matter to carry the greater part of world opinion with us, and also to see that any actions we take are consonant with world opinion.
I was a little disturbed by some of the speeches I heard, which seemed to indicate that we must take action in our own interests, regardless of International Law. The fact is, as I think has been brought out, that the mere fact of nationalisation by Nasser is not a breach of International Law, and we should be very chary of putting ourselves in a position in which we might be charged with aggression. After all, only a few years hence and this waterway would have passed to Egypt by ordinary process of law. That position would have to be faced by people in charge of our affairs at that time. How would they face it? Clearly, I think, it must be dealt with on the ground that, whatever may be the national claims of Egypt, this is a matter of such vast importance to the whole world that it cannot be left with a single Power. Therefore, we must act through the United Nations.
The one thing missing from this debate —and I think we are all conscious of it—is that we are without any knowledge of what action is to be taken, whether by us or by anybody else. It is still under discussion, and whether we shall be told at the end of this debate what is proposed, I do not know. Of one thing I am sure: that nothing would be worse than for us to plunge into this business on our own. I was struck by what the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, said about the change in the world. I agree with him. Perhaps we might have acted sooner. The fact is that, much as we may object to Nasser—and I think he is a thoroughly objectionable type of dictator—we must act within the sphere of International Law. I am bound to
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say that I listened to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, with interest, and to his comparison with what happened twenty years ago. I could not help being reminded, also, of the debates that we had about arms for Republican Spain. There, again, we were told, You must not have a race." With regard to Israel, we have been constantly told, "You must not join in an arms race in the East." That is all very well. Of course, it is not a race if one gets left at the post because he is tied and the rest have a long start. That is exactly what is happening with regard to Egypt and Palestine.
I believe that there is a strong case now for a complete change of policy—not that we should endeavour to make Israel pull the chestnuts out of the fire for us, but that they should be in a strong enough defensive position to stand against the aggression of the Egyptian dictator. I myself think that, if we had taken a stand earlier on the question of the passage of ships through the Canal, and the tiring on our ships in the Gulf of Akaba, we might have been spared this trouble. That has not been done and we now have to face up to a worse situation, as this is. My only point would be that, without subscribing to the somewhat bellicose statements that I have seen in some papers, we support the Government in whatever action is necessary, provided that we act within the sphere of International Law, because this issue is something which transcends our British interests: it is an interest of the whole of the civilised world.
5.52 p.m.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, I rise to say the last word in this important debate. At times of international tension, and especially during very delicate negotiations, I believe it is a golden rule that the less that is said the better. I shall, I hope, therefore be commendably brief. But, equally, I would freely agree that in times of national anxiety it is not unnatural—indeed, it is entirely right—that Parliament should regard it as its duty to obtain as full information as is possible on matters of grave moment to the country. And especially must this be true when Parliament is just about to rise for a long Summer Recess. In that connection,

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I should like to say immediately, in answer to a question that I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in his opening speech, that if the situation should require it Her Majesty's Government will not hesitate to recall Parliament at any time that it may be necessary. As I have said, the situation is inevitably at the present time delicate, and I am quite sure that your Lordships will understand if I appear to be particularly careful to avoid skating on too thin ice. But, within that limitation, I can assure your Lordships that I shall try, so far as I am able, to deal with at any rate some of the points that have been raised.
As to the broad facts of the situation, I think there is very little I need add to what has already been said by my noble friend Lord Reading. The action of the Egyptian Government in taking over the assets and operations of the Suez Canal Company came, I think, as a surprise and a shock to most people. I make no apology that that should have been so. It is indeed possible—in fact, I think it is probable—from the speed with which this manœuvre has been carried through, that plans for the eventual nationalisation of the Canal had been prepared some time ago—that, I think, is the conclusion that most of us will draw from what has happened—and probably they were prepared deliberately as a means, or partially as a means, of humiliating the West. But it is equally possible, if we look at the personality and character of Colonel Nasser, that he seized the issue of the Aswan Dam as an excuse for putting his plans into effect. To that extent, it probably was a sudden decision. It was, if I may put it in this way, the violent way in which a violent man reacts to unwelcome news.
In any case, whatever the explanation, if he will forgive my saying so, I could not quite accept the picture which was painted for us this afternoon, interesting though it was, by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate; and in one particular I should just like to say a word. I do not know from where he got the story, if I understood him aright, that the loan for the Aswan Dam was to be made dependent on peace with Israel. I would assure him that there is no truth whatever in any such suggestion.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: No. That was what the Colonel told me. He named
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number of different reasons which he alleged were obstacles. That is where the story comes from.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Far be it from me to contradict Colonel Nasser, but I would say that it is what might be called a subjective view. In any case, whatever view anyone may hold as to these negotiations for the High Aswan Dam, I quite agree with what has been said by almost every speaker this afternoon: that no one must underestimate the gravity of the issues that have been raised by Colonel Nasser's action. He has struck a savage blow, in my view, at good faith in public engagements, which, if it were allowed to go unchallenged, would certainly be the precursor of others, possibly even more serious, either by himself or by others who sought to profit by his example. To my mind, it never has been more necessary that we should maintain a firm front. That determination, as I see it, should inform our every action at the present time.
I have been asked a number of detailed questions and I will try to answer them, though some of them perhaps are not entirely relevant to our main theme. Two questions were raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate. First, he asked what had happened to the Committee of Agents which was appointed so many years ago under the 1888 Convention. I am sorry to tell him that, from inquiries I have made, the Committee may indeed have sat, but at any rate it was abrogated as far back as the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904. He may tell me that that is a great pity. That may very likely be true, but I hope he will not blame the Government, or indeed his own Party, for that.
Then he asked what is the position with regard to the Gulf of Akaba. Is it an international waterway? The answer, as I understand it, is this. These Straits of Tiran have always been an international waterway, in exactly the same way as every other international waterway —that is to say, the right of innocent passage is applied to it. It is true that a practice grew up of giving notice of a passage of ships.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: That is it.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: That practice began when the late Labour

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Government were in office: I do not know the reason. The noble Viscount is probably in a better position than I am to find out.
The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, spoke of the interference with Israeli ships, and there has been further reference to this matter in later speeches. As your Lordships know, that Egyptian interference began, I think, in 1948, and in 1950 the Government of the day—the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, will correct me if I am wrong—put the matter into the hands of the United Nations. As we all know—or, at least, all those of us who have had anything to do with such matters—resolutions have been passed by the United Nations Organisation from time to time calling on the Egyptians to stop interfering with these ships; but no effective action, I agree, has been taken by the United Nations oil this particular matter. Perhaps I may make just this one comment —it is really a repetition of what has just been said by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. Once the matter has been referred to an international body, it becomes a matter for that international body as a whole; and although all members must take their share of responsibility, the full responsibility does not rest with any particular member. Therefore, that being the case, to try to suggest, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, did, that the whole responsibility rested on the British Government was, I think, inaccurate and misleading.
LORD STRABOLGI: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Marquess. I did not suggest that. I merely tried to point out that we did not get worried until we saw a threat impending to our own ships.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble Lord says "we"; but, of course, it is in the hands of the United Nations. 'The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, usually request that this and other questions should go to the United Nations; but when the United Nations do not do what they want, they are rather inclined to throw the blame back on the British Government. That is perhaps human nature, but I felt it necessary to say just a word about it.
Then, the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, again raised the extraordinarily ingenious plan which he put forward the
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other day for the building of another Canal into the Gulf of Akaba. Whether or not that is a practical proposition I am not in a position to tell him, because, in any case, I am not an engineer. Of course, this is an immense proposal, requiring the most careful consideration; and no doubt it could be carried through, if it was carried through at all, only as an international undertaking. However, my noble friend Lord Reading told the noble Lord that the matter was under consideration with all these other and varied solutions which must come before Her Majesty's Government and every other Government in connection with this difficult position, and I can repeat that assurance to him this afternoon.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: I am much obliged. Does that apply also to the pipeline?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I should think it would apply to every proposition there could possibly be in this extraordinarily thorny situation.
There are one or two other things I ought to say. As my right honourable friend the Prime Minister explained in another place this morning. Her Majesty's Government have thought it necessary to take certain precautionary measures of a military nature. The object of these measures is purely and simply to strengthen our position in the Eastern Mediterranean area and our ability to deal with any situation that might conceivably arise. As my right honourable friend said, these measures include the movement from this country of certain Naval, Army and Air Force units, and the recall of a limited number of Section A, Category reservists, and also a limited number of officers from the Regular Army Reserve of Officers. In addition, we shall, I am afraid, have to recall a strictly limited number of men who are specialists and skilled in certain essential tasks. I am told that these men are in Section B of the Regular Army Reserve and in Category II of the Army Emergency Reserve. This recall necessitates the issue of a Proclamation, notice of which was given to your Lordships only a short time ago by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor.
Finally, my Lords, I was asked certain questions—or, at any rate the matter was raised frequently—about the legal position

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with regard to the Canal. As we all know, Colonel Nasser has claimed that he is acting completely within the law. I have been asked certain questions about this. Of course, the legal aspect, as nearly always happens in my experience when we touch the sphere of International Law, raises every kind of intricate consideration. My noble friend Lord Reading has already dealt with it broadly, and he is far more qualified to do so than I am, because I am not a lawyer, and I advance on such issues only with great preoccupation. But, very simply (and perhaps I may say this especially to the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, who mentioned the legal aspect), the considerations present themselves to me particularly in this way. It seems to me that the sole purpose of the granting of a Concession to the Suez Canal Company—indeed, the sole purpose for which the Suez Canal Company was originally formed—was to create and to maintain a great international waterway.
As I see it, that fact was underlined and buttressed by the signature in 1888 of the Suez Canal Convention, which gave international authority and protection to its operations. It was for that purpose that capital was raised which alone made the project possible. It clearly follows, therefore—at least, it does to me—that for the Egyptian Government unilaterally, and without agreement, either with the Company or with the signatories of the Convention, arbitrarily to take over the Company for the purpose of diverting its funds—which should be used for maintaining the waterway—for completely different purposes at the whim of that Government, is entirely contrary to the basic purpose for which the Concession was granted and for which the Company was formed; and contrary, I should have thought, to every possible principle of equity, which is the basis of all the civilised life which we enjoy. To my mind, that would apply equally whether Colonel Nasser needed that money for the purchasing of arms from Russia or for the building of the High Dam at Aswan.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: This is very important. Would it be possible to submit a case to the Brussels Court, so that we may know clearly whether he is infringing International Law or not?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I think the noble Viscount meant the International Court at The Hague.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Yes.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: One of the difficulties is that the Egyptian Government have not signed the optional clause, so that it would be clearly in their hands as to whether they go into any International Court or not. I should think the chances of their availing themselves of the opportunity were remote.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: That is not so clear. The Court at The Hague is, I understand, a Court for Governments. Would not the Government be able, with the consent of the Egyptian Government, to have this important issue clarified? It is a most important issue.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I do not think I can go any further than I have done at the moment. Moreover, to my mind—and I was saying this, too, to the noble Viscount—this does not seem to me merely a legal question; it is a political question, as has been said frequently in the debate. It might also almost be called a moral question, for what is inherent in it, in effect, as I see it, is the whole issue of international good faith. Is it to be accepted as an ordinary principle of public life that Governments can tear up agreements into which they have solemnly entered whenever it suits them, for reasons of national policy? That is a general proposition and, as we all know, this is not the only time that that particular issue has been raised in the life of most of us. We can all think of other cases, though I have mentioned only the one.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, whose thoughtful speech, I think, impressed us so much, my mind turned immediately, when I heard of the action of Colonel Nasser, to the case of the remilitarisation of the Rhineland. There was a case where a Government which had solemnly undertaken not to remilitarise an area of its own territory, as soon as it was convenient, broke its word and did what it had undertaken not to do. I cannot help thinking that this, in many ways, is a similar case to-day. As I see it, if we allow that action to pass unchallenged we shall debase the whole currency of international relations. And,

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moreover, we know, from our bitter experiences in the past, where passive acquiescence is likely to lead us.
So far from disaster being averted by methods such as that, the offending Government has always merely been encouraged to worse breaches of conduct; and then, when, in due course, a stand has had to be made, there has occurred a disaster far more terrible than if we had stood firm in the earlier stages. If Colonel Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal and his breach of agreements to which his country was a party were acquiesced in now, to my mind the whole stability of the Middle East would be placed immediately in mortal peril. I have no doubt that we should see similar steps taken by other Governments, one after another; and when, ultimately, a stand had to he made, we should all bitterly regret that we had not stood firmly now. It was for that reason that, in a statement made by the Prime Minister on Monday, Her Majesty's Government made it quite clear—and I will repeat the words which have already been quoted to-day [OFFICIAL REPORT, (Commons) Vol. 557, No. 202, col. 923]:
"No arrangements for the future of this great international waterway could be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single Power which could, as recent events have shown, exploit it purely for purposes of national policy."
By that statement we stand, and for that principle we are prepared to take all such measures as may be necessary.
As your Lordships know, that is the situation which has been under consideration during the last two days by the representatives of Her Majesty's Government and the Foreign Ministers of our two Allies, Mr. Dulles and M. Pineau, who have underlined the importance which they attach to this issue by coming themselves to discuss what should be done about it. Those talks are still going on. and I am afraid it is clear that there is nothing more I can say to-day. It is for that reason that I shall refrain from following the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, into the very interesting issues which he raised in his speech this afternoon. That does not mean that I do not agree with a great deal of what he said, but I am afraid that in such a situation I am not in a position further to develop the theme. I am sure that the noble Earl
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will understand that, and I mention it only because I am most anxious he should not feel that I am guilty of any discourtesy to him.
Then the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, delved into the future. He asked me a number of pregnant questions as to what Her Majesty's Government propose to do. I do not think the noble Viscount really expected an answer to those questions. I feel hey were what I was taught at school to call rhetorical questions, and the great point about such questions is that they do not require an answer. I do not regard the noble Viscount's questions as requiring an answer, arid I am afraid that he will not get one.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, the noble Marquess has reverted to the charming badinage of his more pedestrian style. The issues I raised were what is to be the result of a conflict with Egypt with all that group of Powers in the East called the Bandoeng group. That is a question to which the noble Marquess can give a general answer and which cannot be evaded by a rhetorical flourish.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I do not think anyone can give an answer to that question. 'The noble Viscount asked other questions about what Her Majesty's Government were going to do, and I cannot answer them either. I have done my best to answer those questions which I can. The last thing I wish to say, and one thing I would establish beyond any doubt, is that this is not a matter on which we can or will weaken; and I hope that we shall receive the support of everyone who believes, as I do most profoundly, that it is only on a broad base of good faith between nations and peoples that a new and better world can ever arise.
6.14 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, the debate that we have just had was bound to be of a limited character, but has been none the less valuable for that. We have clarified our minds on a great many questions connected with this problem. Some of us have come rather fresh to it while others 'have lived with it for a long time. I believe that the result of this discussion has been that we are now all much more familiar with the situation and we have been given many facts of which we were not before aware. It is true that Her

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Majesty's Government have not been able to give the House a clear statement as to what was going to be done, but obviously they cannot, and I make no complaint whatever. They are in consultation with our friends and are not able to make a statement alone.
One of the values of this debate has been that it has enabled some of your Lordships to express your views to Her Majesty's Government. I feel we should all agree that, on the whole, the feeling of your Lordships' House is pretty solid, There has been a difference of emphasis here and there, but by and large we are all agreed on what Her Majesty's Government seek to achieve, and there has not been a great deal of difference as to the method. There I would leave it, except to congratulate the noble Marquess on having put forward to this House a legal explanation which I rather hesitated to do. If the noble Marquess does not mind my saying so, that was exactly what I had in mind; but with rather more courage than I possess he explained the legal position to your Lordships. I believe he is right. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.