THE MIDDLE AND FAR EAST (Hansard, 8 March 1955)

§ THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY)

My Lords, I make bold to interrupt the business of the House to repeat to your Lordships what I am sure you all feel is an important personal account by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary of his recent tour in the Middle and Far East. My right honourable friend has just given that account in another place, and I felt that the House would certainly wish to have it here. My right honourable friend said:

"A journey of 16,000 miles in sixteen days, including a conference of three days' duration and important discussions in several capitals, can clearly not be surveyed in a brief statement to this House. It may therefore be convenient it I compress the account of my voyaging and deal with it under three main headings: the Middle East, South East Asia and the Formosa Straits.

"The Middle East: I found in the Middle East a general acceptance of the need to organise a safe shield of defence to protect the area from aggression from without. There is also a recognition that the security and prosperity of the area cannot be fully realised so long as the present disruptive relations Persist between the Arab States and Israel, now unhappily aggravated by further recent incidents. Thirdly, all the States I visited, Egypt, Pakistan, Iraq and the Lebanon, were anxious to be able to pursue the plans for economic development on which they have embarked. Her Majesty's Government are in sympathy with all these aims and are ready to help in so far as they can to realise them.

"While in Bagdad, I discussed with the Prime Minister of Iraq the questions which would arise if Her Majesty's Government were to accede to the Turco-Iraqi Pact. I hope before long to give the House further information on this subject. Our aim is to forge a new association with Iraq which will bring our relations into line with those already existing with Turkey and our other partners in N.A.T.O. New weapons and changed political conditions should be reflected in a fresh approach to our joint arrangements for 795 resisting external aggression in this area. Our common needs can now best be provided for in different and more up-to-date ways than those which were embodied in the Anglo-lraqi Treaty more than twenty years ago.

"South East Asia: The first meeting of the Council of the Manila Treaty was held in Bangkok from the 23rd to the 25th of February. I told the House, when we discussed the Treaty on November 8, that this first meeting would be chiefly concerned with setting in hand the arrangements for military and other planning for the defence of the Treaty area. So it was. But it was none the less important for being concerned mainly with questions of organisation.

"Our decisions have been set out in the full communiqué published by the Council, which I have arranged to make available to the House. Permanent representatives are being appointed to maintain consultation when the Council is not in session, and they will be assisted by a small permanent secretariat in Bangkok. Military advisers will be attached to the Council. These have already held their first meeting and have made the necessary arrangements for their further work. Their duty will be to plan how the resources available for the common defence of the area can be used to the best advantage should the need arise. There are also to be early meetings of experts to discuss economic questions and measures for meeting the danger of subversion.

"Full use will be made of existing agencies such as the Colombo Plan, the importance of which is increasing steadily. For this reason we decided that it was not necessary to set up any permanent economic organisation within the Manila Treaty. Another example of the work now going on is the excellent co-operation which has been established between the police authorities in Malaya and in Siam to deal with problems created by Communist terrorists on either side of the common frontier.

"To sum up, the Bangkok Conference worked out an acceptable programme for defence policies and economic problems between the 796 countries who are member States; it also did nothing to hinder the subsequent association of other countries in this area. However this may develop I have confidence that we shall see steadily improving relations between all the free countries in this part of the world whether they be members of S.E.A.T.O. or not. But we recognise that this work of regional co-operation represents only one means of strengthening peace and stability in South East Asia.

"Another essential contribution to the same end was the agreement concluded at Geneva last summer which ended the fighting in Indo-China and established the independence of the three Associated States. The Governments represented at the Bangkok Conference reaffirmed their determination to support these States in maintaining their freedom and independence. When I went on to Singapore after the Bangkok meeting I discussed the situation in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia with Her Majesty's Representatives in those States. This formed part of a wider meeting with the Commissioner General in South East Asia and our civil and military representatives throughout that region. This discussion was most valuable to me.

"My visit to South East Asia has brought home to me how closely the countries of the area cherish their independence. Each country wants to develop in its own way and their ways may differ widely. They want to shape their own destinies with the minimum of outside interference or pressure. Democracy in these countries will grow stronger as they gain confidence from its practice and example.

"From Singapore I flew to Malaya and spent a memorable day, with the help of helicopters, in seeing the work of our Commonwealth forces. The spirit in which these men are facing their daily ordeal of foul discomfort and danger is beyond praise. The success they have won is a splendid tribute to their leadership and to them. Now, finally I will say a word about the Formosa Straits. While I was at Bangkok I had separate and helpful discussions with Mr. Dulles about the situation in Formosa and the coastal islands. I also maintained, during my 797 journey, the contacts which had been established with Moscow and Peking and which are still continuing. In the light of these exchanges I again considered whether any further progress could be made through a conference or other discussions. I had valuable conversations about this on my way home with the Prime Minister of Burma and with Mr. Nehru, who received me with the utmost kindness as the first British Foreign Secretary to visit the Indian capital.

"After these talks and on the basis of the information about the attitude of the Chinese Government which reached me from Peking, I came reluctantly to the conclusion that the necessary conditions for progress do not yet exist. We are, however, going on working to try to bring them about and meanwhile to prevent incidents and further fighting. We cannot, of course, impose our views upon the parties most directly concerned, nor decide for them where their own true interests lie. Nor can the many different aspects of this tangled problem be settled all at once. But the House will wish to know what is the position of Her Majesty's Government in this situation and what, in their view, are the lines along which progress is to be sought.

"Its main elements seem to me to be these. First, the United States Government have already given positive proofs of their desire to relax tension and reduce the risks of war. I am convinced that they wish to see conditions created which would put an end to active military hostilities in the area and reduce the dangers of a wider conflict. In their Treaty with Chiang Kai-shek they have explicitly limited their own formal commitments to the defence of Formosa and the Pescadores. They have effectively restrained the Chinese Nationalists in recent weeks from initiating attacks against the Chinese mainland. They have persuaded the Nationalists to evacuate the Tachen and Nanchi islands.

"Second, the Chinese People's Government for their part have refrained from attacking Quemoy and the Matsus. Her Majesty's Government trust that they will continue to exercise this restraint and that they will make 798 it apparent that while maintaining intact in all respects their position in regard to Formosa and the Pescadores they will not prosecute their claims by forceful means. It is equally desirable (and this is the third point) that the Chinese Nationalists for their part should also do two things. We should like to see them withdraw their armed forces from the other coastal islands. We would also hope that they would let it be known that they too, while maintaining their claims, will not prosecute them by forceful means and will abstain from all offensive military action.

"If these objectives could be realised, consideration could then be given internationally at an appropriate stage to the problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations and to the future status of Formosa.

"Any attempt to make progress along these lines clearly raises grave problems of timing, of presentation and of policy. But there is no problem, however intractable, which with time and patience cannot be made less so. And if the attempt is not made in the case of Formosa and the coastal islands, the consequences may be grave indeed. That is my justification for giving the House this outline of the main elements of the problem as they appear to Her Majesty's Government."