THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE

HL Deb 19 October 1954 vol 189 cc451-8

4.4 p.m.

THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN OFFICE (THE MARQUESS OF READING)

My Lords, may I, in turn, ask permission of the House to make a statement on the Nine-Power Conference? It is, I am afraid, rather a long statement to interject into a debate, but your Lordships appreciate the reasons why it could not be made at an earlier stage. In December, 1950, at Brussels, the Western Powers agreed that Germany must be invited to make a contribution to Western defence. In May, 1952, the Western Powers signed at Bonn and in Paris treaties to restore to Western Germany a wide measure of her sovereignty, and to set up the European Defence Community. In the interval these treaties have been ratified by a number of countries. But at the end of August the European Defence Community was rejected by the French Assembly.

In these circumstances it became necessary to find an alternative solution, and to do so quickly. Unless we could do this, the whole structure of western co-operation and defence must disintegrate and collapse. The entry of Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as an alternative to the European Defence Community has for long past had many advocates. But it was also clear that by itself alone this event could not provide an answer which the Parliaments of Western Europe would endorse. Something more was needed. The European idea must find expression, if not in the European Defence Community then in some simpler form where the presence of the United Kingdom might make up for some of the superstructure. In our search for means to this end, it seemed that the Brussels Treaty, re-shaped and enlarged, could furnish the instrument we needed.

When, therefore, it was not possible to hold the Nine-Power Conference in London early in September, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary decided with the approval of his colleagues, to visit the capitals of Western Europe and to canvass there what were in effect three sets of ideas—the expansion and adaptation of the Brussels Treaty, the entry of Germany into N.A.T.O., and the amendment of the Bonn Treaties to give Germany the wider measure of sovereignty first proposed in 1952. My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary was much encouraged to find on this flying visit that the Governments of the European countries directly concerned welcomed these ideas. Most of them endorsed them wholeheartedly. From conversations in London with Mr. Foster Dulles and from frequent interchanges by cable with Mr. Lester Pearson we found that the United States and Canadian Governments also agreed with us on the practicability of these proposals. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom therefore felt justified in convening the London Conference. I think that we can reasonably claim that our initiative and the contribution which we were able to make during the conference played an essential part in the agreements which were reached.

The decisions of the conference can be broadly grouped under three main headings. It was agreed that the Occupation Régime in the German Federal Republic should be ended as soon as possible. This régime is now an anachronism and I am sure that if it had been legally possible the three Occupying Powers would have been glad to bring it to an end immediately. The position is, however, extremely complicated, since the three Powers will exercise in full agreement with the German Government certain continuing rights and responsibilities for which adequate provision must be made. We cannot leave a legal vacuum. All these matters have been studied in detail by our representatives in Bonn, and when my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary meets Monsieur Mendès France, Mr. Dulles and Dr. Adenauer in Paris to-morrow, they will have before them the draft Protocol and other instruments required to bring up to date and, where necessary, amend the Bonn Conventions of May, 1952. Meanwhile the three Occupying Powers have issued a declaration of intent which forms part of the Final Act of the London Conference, and which will govern our conduct mean while.

The second main decision of the London Conference was that the German. Federal Republic and Italy should join the Brussels Treaty. At the same time the Brussels Treaty will be given important additional functions which will, in the words of the Final Act, make it a more effective focus of European integration. It is certainly not the intention of Her Majesty's Government that the Brussels Treaty should supplant N.A.T.O. or duplicate the work which N.A.T.O. is doing on the organisation of Western defence. It is essential that the two bodies should work closely together and that they should in fact be complementary to each other. The emphasis in N.A.T.O has always been to encourage the maximum contributions to the joint defence effort. The revised Brussels Treaty will lay down maximum levels for the forces of the member States on the mainland of Europe and will institute a system of control under the Armaments Agency to ensure that the agreed levels of forces and stocks of the more essential weapons are not being exceeded. Each country will thus bear its share of the common defence burden but will not be able to build up forces or to accumulate stocks of weapons which would enable it to act independently of, or perhaps contrary to, the defensive strategy of N.A.T.O.

I would invite the particular attention of the House to the German Chancellor's undertaking that certain weapons, including atomic weapons, will not be manufactured in the Federal Republic. This voluntary renunciation was made at a difficult moment in the Conference. Its importance was at once recognised and it enabled the Conference to resolve a problem for which no other acceptable solution was in sight.

The third main group of decisions concerned N.A.T.O. Before the Conference met it had been agreed by all of us that we must assure the full association of the Federal Republic with the West. It was also agreed that a German contribution to Western defence must be made through N.A.T.O. It was therefore accepted that as part of the system we were constructing Germany should become a member of N.A.T.O. The Conference agreed to recommend this to the North Atlantic Council and at the same time to recommend that N.A.T.O. machinery should be strengthened by increasing the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, over all the N.A.T.O. forces under his command. This is an important provision.

I now come to the assurances of continued participation and support given by Mr. Dulles and Mr. Pearson. We all recognised at the London Conference that only a united effort by the free countries of Western Europe could solve what was primarily a European problem. None the less we value most highly the understanding and encouragement which we received throughout from Mr. Dulles and Mr. Pearson. The assurances which they gave during the Conference, and their approval of the Final Act, were essential to the success of our work.

If I have left the undertaking of Her Majesty's Government until the end of my survey, it is not because I underrate its importance. As my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary said at the time, this was a formidable step for us to take. But I am convinced that Her Majesty's Government were right to take it and that if we had not done so the whole Conference would have failed, with disastrous consequences for us all. Our action in giving this undertaking has been generally welcomed both in this country, in the Commonwealth, and in the free world as a whole.

These were the main decisions reached in London. Expert groups in Paris, London and Bonn have since been working on the detailed arrangements which will give effect to these agreements. I am glad to say that very good progress has been made. When the Ministers meet in Paris to-morrow and on the following days we hope to be able to complete the work quickly. If these hopes are realised, we shall have done all that lies in our power to give effect to the general settlements worked out at the London Conference. The results will then be submitted to the various Parliaments for their approval. Monsieur Mendès-France has told us that he intends that the French Assembly should reach its decisions before the end of the year. This is most encouraging and I have no doubt that arrangements will also be made for this House to have a convenient opportunity to pronounce upon them.

A number of problems still remain, chief of which is that of the Saar, which is being discussed by Dr. Adenauer and Monsieur Mendès-France in Paris to-day. But the rapid progress so far made encourages Her Majesty's Government to hope that none of the remaining difficulties will be allowed to delay this great consolidation of Western Europe, including Germany. These plans, now so nearly completed, are aimed at no other Power. On the contrary, once the unity of the free nations of the West has been achieved we shall be the better able to move on towards even wider projects, including, let us hope, a relaxation of tension between East and West. Much has been said and written in these last months of the importance of a German military contribution to the West, and I should be the last to underestimate this. But, for my part, if our hopes in these agreements can finally be realised, my greatest measure of satisfaction will lie in the fact that Germany can find her place in joint membership with countries she has in the past invaded. In no other way can we hope to rebuild our shattered Europe. And so, at long last, out of the sufferings of the past may come peace for the future.

EARL JOWITT

My Lords, it is quite obvious that this matter of immense importance cannot be discussed now by question and answer. Noble Lords will agree that we must have a debate upon it in the near future. I know the noble Marquess the Leader of the House and I agree that it is inconvenient to have a debate in your Lordships' House at the same time that a debate is being held in another place, and I understand there is to be such a debate. Thereafter, without undue delay, this subject must be debated, and I should prefer to defer any observations I may have to make until then.

4.18 p.m.

LORD LAYTON

My Lords may I, on behalf of Liberal Peers, thank the noble Marquess for the statement which he has just made. It is full of issues of the utmost importance. As your Lordships' House is to have a debate shortly, this is not the right moment to discuss the statement; but may I digress to the tributes paid this afternoon to the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack who has joined us. Much has been said of his legal qualifications; but he has also been responsible for one of the most remarkable achievements in the international field since the war, for he was chairman of the Committee which produced, drafted and worked through in the Committee of Ministers the Convention of Human Rights which has just come into effect. I hope, therefore, that in our foreign affairs debate we may have his intervention and the fruits of his tremendous recent experience in international affairs.

The loss of E.D.C. at the end of August was clearly a sharp challenge to the evolution of post-war international policy, and there was great danger that we should fall away and that much of the ground that had been made good in the direction of international co-operation would be lost. If that danger has been averted, it is largely due to the imagination and persistence of the Foreign Secretary. This is the first opportunity since the London Conference that your Lordships' House has had to express its appreciation of his initiative and the success which befell his efforts. I know your Lordships will wish to avail yourselves of that opportunity. Before the band begins to play about the great success of the London Conference, however, we should await the action of the French Assembly. Speaking for Liberal Peers in this House, I may say that we support the words of the Prime Minister when he indicated that this is not now an occasion for conducting an auction and that the issue of the London Agreement is not one open for indefinite discussion. I am very grateful to the noble Marquess for the statement which he has made.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

My Lords, perhaps I may put myself in order by prefacing what I have to say with the words: "May I ask the noble Marquess one or two questions?" The only reason I ask them now is that conclusions are being arrived at and things are being done which cannot be undone. It appears to some people that, so far from these plans being plans which will unite Europe, they contain the elements of plans which will divide Europe. In particular, I would say to Lord Layton that I think that he, as a distinguished ornament of the Council of Europe, should consider how far the work of that Council does or does not contain elements which are really likely to divide Europe instead of uniting it. I should like to say something upon this subject on a suitable and more orderly occasion, but in the meantime may I ask the noble Marquess, and through him the Minister for Foreign Affairs, this question: Have the Government considered the effect of these plans on the unity of Germany? Is it the fact that a real majority of opinion in Germany would consent to any plan which looked like imposing permanent division on Germany? Further, I would ask the noble Marquess: Have the Government considered the effect of these plans which they are about to put into operation, before a debate in the House, upon opinion in the East of Europe—particularly opinion in Poland? I am not speaking about Russia but about Poland. It is a question which must be considered, and though it is true that we are apt to indulge in this sort of post-mortem instead of diagnosis, I hope that the noble Marquess will say something on the matters which I have raised.

THE MARQUESS OF READING

My Lords, I think it would be inconvenient and inappropriate if I were to enter into any disquisition on the questions raised. Of course, we have had to consider opinion in all the different countries concerned. Certainly, it has been in the minds of Her Majesty's Government throughout that the question of the unity of Germany is one of the dominant thoughts in the minds of the German people as a whole. Certainly that was borne in mind in arriving at these conclusions. I think there is little more that I can say, or ought to say, at this stage.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

I was much interested to hear what was in the noble Marquess's mind, but I wonder what conclusions came out of it. The unity of Germany, we understand, was very much in his mind. Does he consider that the plans which he has proposed this afternoon will make for the unity of Germany or will tend to promote the permanent division of Germany?

THE MARQUESS OF READING

It is, as it has always been, the policy of Her Majesty's Government that Germany should become unified. That policy has not been altered by the London agreements. As I said in the statement, it is hoped that when these agreements have been concluded they may lead, as a next step, to a relaxation of tension. The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, may not think that that is right, but that does not mean that the Government have not considered it and have not come to their own conclusion about it.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Of course I am only a private Member, and I can only express my personal opinion; but would point out that the noble Marquess has not answered the question which I put. Perhaps he does not think it wise to do so. The question I put is this: Is this a plan which will tend to unite Germany or to divide Germany?

THE MARQUESS OF READING

I am not sure that that question is capable of a direct answer. This is a step for the unification of the free countries of Europe as a preliminary, and we hope that, if that step goes well, other steps which we may then be able to take will bring about the relaxation of tension between East and West, leading to the fulfilment of what has always been, and still is, our policy—the unification of Germany on terms, of course, which are in our view proper terms to enable that state of affairs to be brought about.