HL Deb 22 November 1954 vol 189 cc1787-800

6.58 p.m.

LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether, before assenting to the purchase of further American civil aircraft by B.O.A.C., a White Paper can be issued setting out the most recent information on comparative estimated performances, delivery dates and costs of the British and American types under consideration, together with a summary of the main causes of delay so far affecting forecasted delivery dates of the British types. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question standing in my name. In doing so I should like to make some brief observations on the issues raised therein. I put down this Question as an unstarred Question in order to give those of your Lordships who might wish it an opportunity to say something on the matter. I believe that the issue raised in this Question, namely, the purchase of American equipment, goes beyond the highly important British Overseas Airways commercial operational considerations, but a decision will have to be taken on those wider considerations about which the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House, spoke just now in connection with another matter.

This is a question which affects the prospects, present and for several years ahead, of Britain's wellbeing in the operational and manufacturing aircraft field. By Statute, and by public opinion, British Overseas Airways are expected to fly on British equipment. Command Paper No. 6712 of 1945 says that it will be the general policy of His Majesty's Government to require the Corporations to fly British types. Any decision to extend to future years, probably well into the 1960's, the use of American equipment on the North Atlantic route, is a major decision for Her Majesty's Government to take. I believe that only Her Majesty's Government can take that decision because only Her Majesty's Government have full knowledge of, and can weigh up, the issues and decide the matter after considering all those issues. If the decision is to be for the use of American equipment, I submit to the Minister that the Government must carry public opinion with them in such a decision. Public opinion cannot be carried by the Government unless public opinion is informed on the matter. Hence the request in my Question for a White Paper.

I suggest that the White Paper should come before the decision is taken, but I should naturally be content if the Minister could reply that there would be an education of public opinion at the time of, or concurrently with, any decision. Neither we in this House nor those in another place, nor yet the public, can take a view on this very important question without more light on the issues than we at present possess. We appreciate the view of the British Overseas Airways Corporation that they must operate commercially and competitively in the world's markets. They must serve the travelling public to whom they have their first responsibility, and must serve them with the best and most suitable aircraft. They must be free to do this, preferably, with British aircraft, but also they must be free to look elsewhere if they feel that British industry cannot meet their needs. With the delays in the Britannia aircraft, and the Comet III only in the development stage, B.O.A.C. are looking to the United States for the new aircraft which they are to operate in 1957 on the North Atlantic, the Blue Riband route. These aircraft, built by the Douglas firm, would have British Rolls-Royce engines.

Those critical of this proposal say that British manufacturers can satisfy B.O.A.C.'s needs by 1958. They say that the delays with the Britannia are not due to serious trouble; that the Britannia is doing well in her trials, and that such delays as have occurred are not entirely the fault of the makers and may to some extent be the fault of, prospective customers. Critics say that if we speeded up our effort we could have British aircraft by 1958 which would be better than the United States can offer us at the present time. The critics of this decision say that the Comet III, with a suitable engine, should be a "winner" by about that time. Finally, they say that before going to America B.O.A.C. should look to other British sources such as Handley-Page and Vickers. who have various projects in hand. The critics say: "Insure the future in Britain, not with the United States. Why not trust British industry for something by 1958, rather than American industry?"

A few conclusions are obvious. A decision must be based on an assumption of what is to happen a good many years ahead, and in dealing with aviation it is dangerous to make assumptions on the future. Secondly, if the order goes to the United States, it will have an effect on British prestige and prospects, particularly in world export markets, affecting the sale of British aircraft, probably until 1970. It may be a bad effect in one direction and yet good in another, allowing Rolls-Royce to sell engines in the world's markets in American airplanes. The next obvious conclusion is that if the order does not go to the United Stales it will be for the Government to insist upon, and to assist in, a tremendous effort on the Britannia, and possibly other British types, on a scale which has not hitherto been in force. If the order does not go to the United States there should be a review of what I would call British insurance types as regards other possible types.

I have tried briefly to summarise and balance the main issues here. I have not given any view as to whether giving an order to America is right or wrong, because I am not competent to do so, and I do not believe that anyone in this House is competent to express that view. But whatever the decision may be, for the sake of the British operator and the manufacturing industry, let it be a swift and definite decision, understood by the parties affected by it and also by the wider public.

7.5 p.m.

LORD OGMORE

My Lords, I am very glad the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, has asked this Question, and, despite the fact that the hour is, by our standards, somewhat late, I feel we can well afford a few minutes to consider this very important matter, one vital for the future of the British aircraft industry. My first knowledge of this development was a statement to the Press by, I believe, the chairman of B.O.A.C.—at all events, a statement of the interest of B.O.A.C. in the Douglas aircraft which would be equipped with powerful new British turbo-propeller engines produced by the Rolls-Royce Company. I myself, and presumably everybody else, was surprised at this development, especially as the public concluded that B.O.A.C. were perhaps not entirely confident in the Britannia.

I asked myself the reason for this loss of confidence, if such it were, in the Britannia. It has been extraordinarily difficult to get any information at all on this question. The information I have—and I have been to great trouble to get it—has been contradictory and conflicting. The noble Earl the Paymaster General, who is, I understand, to reply, would be performing a great service this evening if he could give us concrete information on this subject. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, that it is almost impossible for us to form an adequate view of the situation when we lack any information upon which to form that view, and that the only people who have such information are Her Majesty's Government. The position is that less than a year ago Sir Miles Thomas was making public speeches on this subject and addressed the Institute of Transport on the Britannia and other aircraft. He said that the long-range Britannia was one of the most important aircraft then on the order book for B.O.A.C., and added: and we confidently expect to be operating by 1958 an aircraft that will carry more than eighty people at a speed in excess of 400 miles per hour with a still air range of greater than 5,000 statute miles. The aeroplane will have a profound impact on international routes. Flying on great-circle courses, particularly in the Northern Hemisphere, it will make modern standards of East to West travel seem comparatively short hops. One of the features of high altitude jet-flying is that the atmospheric conditions do not vary so much as between the Pole and the Equator as they do at lower altitudes. Later, Sir Miles said: When we have our B.O.A.C. twin round-the-world routes established as we mean to establish them with our already-ordered Comet IIs and IIIs and Britannias; when we can confidently see their successors to meet impending competition; and when we are consistently making a profit—then I think we can really feel that British Airways have made a worth while impact with gas turbines on civil aviation. There seems now to be a distinct difference between the view of B.O.A.C. and that optimistic spirit.

I remember two or three years ago talking to Sir Miles Thomas on more than one occasion, and it was a matter of public knowledge at the time that B.O.A.C. were looking to the Comet for the long-range aircraft and to the Britannia for the Empire routes and also for the tourist-type travel across the Atlantic—that would mean with one stop, possibly two. Now when you go to the two parties, as it were, to B.O.A.C. and to the aircraft industry, you find distinct differences of view as to whether this particular aircraft was ever intended for the Atlantic route. A good deal turns on that question. The makers of the aircraft, I believe, would say: "In the beginning this aircraft was intended for use on the Empire routes—that is, for comparatively short hops to the Far East or to Africa—and it was not intended for the North Atlantic route. But, as the result of changes of policy, by B.O.A.C. or by the Government, this aircraft has come into the North Atlantic travel sphere at a later stage, because of the necessity to use these aircraft on the North Atlantic route. This has meant that we have had to make a large number of alterations, and these alterations have caused delay."

This is, in fact, the crux of the whole matter. Was the aircraft intended in the beginning for the North Atlantic route? As I have said, there is a difference of opinion on that question. Has change of policy meant that during the last five years or so the company have had to make a large number of alterations in the design? In a statement issued by B.O.A.C. to the Press, dated November 12, the Corporation said: B.O.A.C.'s original contract for 25 Britannia aircraft was signed in July, 1949. Since that date, more than five years ago, no individual Britannia aircraft has yet flown pressurised for more than a total of 120 hours … No order for the Britannia in any of its various forms has ever been cancelled or reduced…Since the Britannia contract was placed five and a half years ago no material changes in the air frame specification have been requested by B.O.A.C. So there is a distinct difference of evidence, so to speak, between B.O.A.C. and the aircraft makers. On that point it is only the Government who can really give us the final word—and a very important word it is. Whatever the reason may be, can they enlighten us on B.O.A.C.'s apparent lack of confidence in the Britannia, whether it is lack of confidence in the aircraft—and I do not believe that is so—or whether it is lack of confidence in the ability of the Bristol Company to supply the aircraft at the date they have undertaken. Whatever the reasons may be, the decision of B.O.A.C. to purchase American aircraft or even the inquiry by B.O.A.C. in America for American planes is a devastating blow at the British aircraft industry, though I admit that, as the noble Lord has said, it is also a proud feather in the cap of the great firm of Rolls-Royce, which, I presume for the first time, would be supplying Rolls-Royce engines for American civil planes.

I also want to point out that independent buyers are doing exactly the same as B.O.A.C., and they have not come under any criticism at all. The statement by B.O.A.C. has undoubtedly had an effect on overseas and on home buyers. It is for that reason that I think a statement from the Minister should, if possible, be forthcoming to-night. It may be said that it is only a question of insurance by B.O.A.C.; that they have not really lost faith in the Britannia, and that the fact that they are going to America for aircraft does not mean that they have not got faith in British aircraft. But, in fact, it will be represented, and it is being represented abroad, that one of the great State airlines in this country has no longer confidence in a great machine produced by a great British company. That is calculated to have a bad effect and is having a bad effect, and although there is no evidence whatever, I am glad to say, of lack of faith in the aircraft, I think we should be told whether there is lack of confidence in the ability of the makers to deliver in time or whether it is a question of insurance.

May I turn to this question of insurance, in the sense that B.O.A.C., owing to the difficulty with regard to the Comet, want to have an aircraft that can fly the North Atlantic in 1958 to 1959. Presumably, they are not quite sure whether the Britannia will be ready to fly in that time. They want to be assured that they can have modern aircraft at that time, especially in view of the fact that independent operators are now ordering—as I understand it—American machines with Rolls-Royce engines. Is it possible, I should like to ask, for British aircraft manufacturers to produce aircraft which will take these new Rolls-Royce engines and have them ready at the time when the American company will have their Douglas machines ready and equipped with Rolls-Royce engines? If our aircraft industry can do that, it will meet all the difficulties. It is a challenge to the British aircraft industry and I cannot see why the British aircraft industry does not meet the challenge.

In the first place, the Rolls-Royce engine which is to be used in the American machine is available for anyone to buy. Anyone can order such an engine. Any British manufacturer who wishes to equip his aircraft with this engine can order it from Rolls-Royce. Therefore I am wondering whether the Minister could give us some enlightenment on whether it is possible that some British manufacturer will come along and say: "Very well; we will accept the challenge. We will produce for B.O.A.C. in the middle of 1958 (which is as soon as the Americans will be able to do it) a machine with these new Rolls-Royce turbo-propellor engines which will be as good as anything the Douglas company can produce—and, possibly, better." If they can do that, I feel certain that it will meet all requirements in this matter. First of all it will be a British machine, and there will be no reflection on the British aircraft industry. Secondly, it will mean that the Rolls-Royce Company will be able to test their engine some 6,000 or 8,000 miles nearer to Derby than if it is fitted into the American Douglas machine which is going to be tested in Los Angeles or some other place in California. That, of course, will he a tremendous initial advantage. It will be an enormous advantage to the British aircraft manufacturer on the spot.

I would suggest that even if he cannot reply to-day the Minister should look at that point carefully and seek to find out from the aircraft industry whether they can meet the challenge in that way. The question the noble Lord has asked is whether the Government will publish a White Paper. I think it would be an excellent thing if they would. But in addition to publishing a White Paper, it is important that the Minister should give us as much information as he possibly can to-night, so as to squash the rumours which are flying around both as to the Britannia and also as to the ability of the. British aircraft industry to meet the challenge of our times.

7.20 p.m.

LORD GIFFORD

My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, that it would be most regrettable if a British airline should have to purchase further American aircraft, even if those aircraft were fitted with Rolls-Royce engines. I consider that it should not do so unless it is absolutely essential. I certainly think it would be a set-back to our aircraft industry for such a thing to happen, though I cannot agree that it would be a vital blow, as I think both the previous speakers have said. After all, in spite of the failure of other British types, Vickers Viscounts are "selling like hot cakes" all over the world, including America.

There is another point of view to be considered. Both B.O.A.C. and B.E.A. have built up a fine reputation for safety, comfort, punctuality and good service, and they cannot afford to jeopardise this reputation which they now have with the travelling public through not having the right aircraft at the right time. Running an airline is a very competitive business, and if good service does not continue it is easy to lose passengers to the many foreign lines who are waiting to take them. I think there is still another point of view to consider. My experience in the travelling world is that our clients do not ask who built the aircraft, any more than they ask who built the ship in which they travel. When a ship or aircraft is in service it becomes a Danish ship or an Argentinian ship, even though the vessel was built on the Tyne or at Barrow. In other words, passengers care much more about the flag under which they sail or fly, and the service which a particular line gives, than about the constructor.

I should like to ask one other question. Has the intermediate course been considered—that is to say, in the case of a hiatus before the arrival of the new British types, is it possible to tide over that period by chartering American or other aircraft? I know that this suggestion may not be practical, but it is one which should not be lost sight of. To sum up, I hope that it will be possible to avoid any further purchase of American aircraft, which I feel would be most regrettable. On the other hand, I trust that no undue pressure will be put on B.O.A.C. which might result in a deterioration of the quality of their services, which have such a high reputation at the present time.

7.23 p.m.

THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (THE EARL OF SELKIRK)

My Lords, I very much appreciate the anxieties which noble Lords necessarily have on this subject. The noble Lord used the words "lack of confidence" in the Bristol company. I would emphasise, with all the force I can, that there is no lack of confidence in the Bristol company; and anyone who advances that argument has to face up to the fact that there has been no cancellation by B.O.A.C. of twenty- five aircraft which they have on order. I think that is sufficient to show that there is no lack of confidence. I think it is fair to say that to-day we are all very proud of the services which B.O.A.C. provide all over the world and to recall that they have received no financial assistance from the Government for three years. In the course of the next few years, it will be found necessary to replace the Strato-cruisers and Constellations on the North Atlantic route by more competitive aircraft. This route, of course, is of quite special importance to us because it links North America with Europe and because nearly half the passengers between North America and Europe go by air. As my noble friend Lord Gifford has said, the competition in air transport there is more keen than in any other place in the world. During the summer an average of somewhere between sixty and seventy aircraft cross the Atlantic every single day. No aircraft built in the United Kingdom has ever been in regular commercial operation on the North Atlantic route.

Moreover, in the course of the next few years it is likely that the piston engine will give way to the jet engine, and that will be a very important step. We have planned two outstanding aircraft for that purpose, the Comet III and the Britannia Mark 300. Of the first, for obvious reasons, I can say nothing, and of the second I will say a word in a minute or two. But I want to emphasise now that noble Lords need not have any illusion that Her Majesty's Government do not fully appreciate the importance of this subject. The noble Lord who raised this matter has asked for a White Paper giving information in regard to the relative performance of certain British and American types of aircraft.

LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE

Estimated.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

Obviously, it will be estimated; but even so I am afraid that I must try to dissuade the noble Lord from such a course, because it would be neither desirable nor appropriate. Before doing so, however, may I refer to the original White Paper Comd. 6712, which the noble Lord mentioned, which preceded the legislation setting up the air corporations. It indicated that it would be the general policy of Her Majesty's Government to require the corporations to "fly British," but your Lordships will recall that, as a result of war-time impediments, it was recognised that some alternative temporary arrangements might have to be made for routes for which no suitable British aircraft was available. Naturally, that remains their general policy to-day.

I should like to look at this proposition. In the first place, the choice of aircraft is primarily the responsibility of the board of the corporation concerned. They have been charged by Statute with certain duties, and one of those is to exercise their commercial judgment in the light of their experience in seeing that the equipment is suitable for its purpose. The purchases of aircraft are subject, of course, to Government approval of capital expenditure, but this does not mean that Her Majesty's Government select the aircraft which are to be purchased. However, if the expenditure involves the use of foreign currency, then the approval of Her Majesty's Government will be necessary. The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore mentioned the question of independent flying. British aircraft are not now available for that type of service. What we are really talking about is the future. The second point I should like to emphasise is that figures of performance and delivery of aircraft which will be two or more years ahead are necessarily far from firm, and decisions as between competitive types must rest on those best capable, in the light of their experience, of reaching a considered and expert judgment which takes account of both ponderables and imponderables. My noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye said that it was difficult to make assumptions, and we think that it would be going too near the realm of prophecy for the Government to commit themselves on this now. Moreover, a wide range of factors have to be taken into account. The noble Lord is quite aware of that and emphasised this wide range, fully recognising that it goes far wider than simply a comparison of performance figures. The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, mentioned the question of insurance and I quite agree that that is one of the factors that will be taken into account, amongst others, when these factors are considered.

It is for all these reasons that I feel it would be undesirable for the Government to give a full declaration of the sort of considerations which might come into their minds at this time. What I can say, however, is this. No decision has been reached, and no decision will be reached except after the most careful consideration of all the factors, including those which have been mentioned by noble Lords and those which have been raised in the Press. I can say this, too: that if any decision is made, it will be the Government's business to bring the public with them and to explain the reasons which have brought them to their conclusion.

The noble Lord referred in the course of his speech to delays in the production of the Britannia. I do not think I need remind him—he is well aware of it—what an exceedingly complicated business it is to produce a modern aircraft. But I should like to emphasise one point, because I think it is one which can be underestimated. It is that the rapid scientific development which is constantly taking place at present makes it most difficult to know how far these ideas can be incorporated. Any development which comes along may bring with it a whole range of other ideas, and at some point in the process of manufacture the manufacturer has to say that he must stop accepting any new ideas because, if he does not, the aircraft will virtually remain a prototype for all time. It is that point which makes is so difficult to know at what time the manufacturer is to standardise and produce the aircraft. That difficulty faces every aircraft manufacturer, and it is not one which can be got over, because it is impossible to anticipate what science is going to make practically available in a year or two. The Britannia has this problem like any other aircraft.

I should like to show the sort of effect this problem has, partly with the development of engines and other things. The Britannia, when it started in 1947, was an aircraft of gross weight of 90,000 lb.; to-day it has a weight of 150,000 lb. Originally it was designed to carry 32 passengers; it is now to carry 90 passengers. It had a piston engine, in the first place; now it has a gas turbine. In fact, there are three different types of gas turbines which may he incorporated in aircraft in the course of the next two years.

LORD OGMORE

In view of that fact, of which I was aware, how is it that B.O.A.C. have put out a statement that there have been no changes in construction and design in the last five and a half years?

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

I should not like to be responsible for everything said on behalf of B.O.A.C. I hope that the noble Lord will excuse me if I do not take up that point.

LORD OGMORE

It is most important.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

If the noble Lord wants an answer, I must ask him to tell me where the statement comes from, so that I can judge the circumstances. I hope he will not press me, because I do not know the full answer at the moment. However, I can give some explanation. I am given to understand that the aircraft did not reach its final form as a fuselage until 1951. I cannot think that the statement was made in that form, referring to five and a half years ago. I must get the whole background before I can give an answer.

In 1949 B.O.A.C. ordered twenty-five aircraft. In May, 1953, it was decided that fifteen of the aircraft should be Mark 100, with Proteus engine mark 705, and ten Mark 300, with the improved Proteus engine mark 755. Delivery dates have been postponed from 1954 to 1955. This gives a delay on present estimates of some fourteen months. Of this, I think six months can be attributed to the loss of the Britannia in the Severn early this year, and the remaining eight months are attributable to changing requirements, in part due to the need to incorporate the fruits of later development and design. The manufacturers hope that the Mark 100 aircraft will be delivered to B.O.A.C. next year and the Mark 300 the year after. This means that the time taken from the drawing up of the initial specification to the granting of a certificate of airworthiness will be rather over eight years. This is not an unusual period of development for a large and advanced type of aircraft, especially having regard to the very special evolution of the de- signs that have taken place. Moreover, this is only a month or two longer than two other United Kingdom post-war civil aircraft, both of which took over eight years for the same process of development. I understand that the figures for well-known American aircraft are not dissimilar. But here we are dealing with a new type, rather than evolving a new machine from an older model. It is, therefore, I think, fair to say that the period of development, though of course slower than some people would like, has not been unreasonable. I should like to make this point. Important as delivery is, it must always be subordinate to the requirements of higher quality in the final aircraft.

I should also like to say that we have real reason to hope that the Britannia will show itself to be an important land-mark in the development of British civil aviation, and the long and distinguished record of the Bristol Aircraft Company lends support to that. The noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, will remember the Bristol fighter, which was, I think, the finest aircraft of its day; and he will remember the Blenheim, also the finest aircraft of its time. There is no reason to suppose that a company with a long and distinguished record of this sort will not succeed in maintaining the position which it has occupied in the past. I feel that we may re-echo—and I hope that those engaged in working at Bristol will also re-echo—the words of Sir Miles Thomas, when he said: "We need and believe in the Britannia." I have endeavoured to answer the points put to me by the noble Lord. I have said that no decision has been made, and that if a decision is made information will be made available as to the reasons which have brought the Government to their conclusion. I hope that the noble Lord is satisfied.

House adjourned at twenty-three minutes before eight o'clock.