Lords Sitting of 15 November 1954

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
The Lord Morris of Kenwood—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING BILL
2.35 p.m.
Amendments reported (according to Order).
Clause 2 [Claim holdings, their areas and values, and apportionment of values between parts of areas]:
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (LORD MAN-CROFT): My Lords, I am happy to say that the first Amendment on the Marshalled List this afternoon is quite uncontroversial; it is nothing more than a drafting Amendment. To fix the value of a claim holding by reference to the development charge which is due, as the present text of the Bill requires, would not be practicable. Under the Second Schedule to the Bill, the amount of the deduction to be made from a claim holding depends on the value of the holding. The value of the holding cannot at the same time depend on the amount of the development charge which gives rise to the deduction. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 34, leave out from first ("the") to end of line 38 and insert ("amount credited for the purposes of the pledge by reference to the holding;").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 6 [Supplementary provisions relating to compulsory acquisitions and to sales]:
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this, also, is purely a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 12, line 6, at end insert ("and, so far as required for the purposes of that Part, for the purposes of the Third Schedule to the principle Act").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 7 [Payment where land disposed of by gift (Case C)]:
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, the words "in the same capacity," which are defined in Clause 70(1), have been represented to the Government as being possibly misleading in the present context, because payments under Clause 7 are limited to cases where the claim-holder parted with the whole of his beneficial interest in the land. Therefore, it seems to us better to make it clear from am start that the applicant for a payment must have been beneficially entitled at the time of the gift both to the claim holding and to the related interest in land. To put this matter beyond doubt, this Amendment is put down. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 14, line 7, leave out ("entitled in the same capacity") and insert ("beneficially entitled").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 10 [Payments in cases analogous to Case B]:
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this Amendment is also purely drafting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 16, line 18, leave out from ("merged") to ("was") in line 19.—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 4. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 16, line 25, after ("if") insert ("the interest so affected in the next following subsection referred to as").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, the next, also, is not much more than a drafting Amendment. It is made necessary by the changes made in the clause in the Committee stage, to extend it to cases where the interest which had been damaged was not the interest to which the holding related but another interest in which that interest had merged. Your Lordships will remember that we had quite a debate about merger in the Committee stage. The applicant's title to a payment must, of course, depend on his failure to realise the development value of the interest in land to which the claim

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holding related. This is the only value which can be measured by the value of the claim holding. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 17, line 41, leave out ("relevant interest") and insert ("interest in land to which the claim holding related,").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 13:
Applications for payments under Part I
13.—(1) No payment under this Part of this Act shall be payable unless an application for the payment is made to the Central Land Board in such manner, within such period (not being less than three months from the commencement of this Act), and accompanied by such particulars and verified by such evidence, as may be prescribed by regulations under this section, or as may be required by the Board in accordance with such regulations:
Provided that the Board may in any particular case (either before, on or after the date on which the time for applying would otherwise have expired) allow an extended, or further extended, period for making an application for such a payment.
2.40 p.m.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved in subsection (1), to leave out "three" and insert "twelve" [months]. The noble Lord said: By now I imagine that this Amendment is quite an old friend. We have discussed it on the Committee stage of both the English Bill and the Scottish Bill, when the noble and learned Viscount once more promised to reconsider the matter. As your Lordships are aware, the simple point is whether the time fixed in which claims should be made by persons who have established claims should be three months or some longer period. The Bill as it stands provides that claims should be made within three months. It is true that there is a proviso that the Board may "in any particular case" extend the time, but that is purely discretionary, and it is presumably intended by the words "in any particular case" to indicate that there may be cases where the time will not be extended, and that therefore a person who has failed to make his claim within the three months will be for ever barred. We feel that this is quite unsatisfactory. Inevitably, large numbers of people will fail to make a claim within three months and their fate will be entirely in the hands of the Central Land Board, as to whether or not they exercise discretion in their favour. We have no
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guidance in the Bill on how this discretion shall be exercised.
I know that the noble and learned Viscount has stated that the reason for the short period is that it is desired to make payments as quickly as possible, and that the shorter the period the sooner payments will be paid. Nevertheless, weighing one against the other and recognising that the noble and learned Viscount may be right (although I did not entirely follow his explanation, I assume that he would not give that explanation unless he thought it was correct), I still think that the injury to the general body of claimants which may flow from the claim not being made in time is greater than the advantage which would flow from the possibility of getting claims paid earlier. Therefore, I hope that the noble and learned Viscount will agree to a longer period than three months. The noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, has an Amendment following mine in which he suggests six months. The noble Lord is much more moderate than I am, but in this particular case I should be prepared to accept his Amendment if it were acceptable to the Government. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 20, line 32, leave out ("three") and insert ("twelve").—(Lord Silkin.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, says, we have discussed this matter several times and I am afraid that I have made little progress in impressing on your Lordships the important point on the merits which I feel with regard to this Amendment—namely, that we are all most anxious that those who have been waiting years for their money should get that money as quickly as possible. I explained on the Committee stage of both this Bill and its Scottish counterpart that the amount available for payments under Part V depends on what is left after payments under Part I have been made; and, further, that the amount of the unexpended balance, which governs all payments under Parts II and III of the Bill, depends entirely on what is left after the payments under Parts I and V have been made. The longer applications under Part I take to come in, therefore, the longer every one else must wait for his money.

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On the Committee stage of the Scottish Bill I put to your Lordships that it is an unfortunate quality of human nature that practically no one will act until the last possible moment for action, comes. I was not sure whether your Lordships were prepared to take from me a generalisation on human nature, so I tried to get some supporting facts. I found that under the 1947 Act precisely one-half of the claims were made in the last week in which it was open to people to make claims. That supports the point I have put, as a generalisation, to your Lordships. I do therefore ask noble Lords to consider this point. Many people have been waiting, with great hardship, many years for their money, and it would be unfortunate if, by putting too long a period here, further delay resulted.
The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has fairly and correctly drawn attention to the provision which gives the Board the right to extend the period in any particular case, but there is one other point of importance—and again it is one which I put in the Committee stage of the Scottish Bill. I then drew the attention of your Lordships to the fact that there are two distinct matters relevant in this regard. First, if you look at the clause you will see the words:
"No payment under this Part of this Act shall be payable unless an application for the payment is made to the Central Land Board in such manner, within such period (not being less than three months from the commencement of this Act),"
and then follow the words:
"and accompanied by such particulars and verified by such evidence, as may be prescribed by regulations under this section …"
I want to make perfectly clear that the application (that is the first part of these words) will be a simple matter, a question of giving factual answers to half a dozen simple questions. That is the only thing that has to be done within three months. I want here to give an undertaking that the particulars and evidence mentioned in the second excerpt that I gave from the Bill are not subject to the time limit of three months, and no attempt will be made to make them so. In these circumstances the difficulty which some noble Lords envisage is greatly diminished.
There is another point, which goes some way to meet the thoughts of my noble friend Lord O'Hagan. The period
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specified in the regulations will, I am prepared to agree, be four months and not three months. It is unlikely that the Bill, when passed, can be brought into operation until the beginning of next year, which means that those concerned will have in all rather more—perhaps noticeably more—than four months to formulate their claims. And there is, in any special case, the proviso. I hope that, as I have come very near to Lord O'Hagan's period of six months, he will be prepared to accept my suggestion as a compromise and will not invade the point to which I attach so much importance, the lengthening of the time in which these payments will be made. For that reason, and in view of the undertaking that I have given, I hope noble Lords will not press their Amendments to-day.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
LORD O'HAGAN LORD O'HAGAN had given notice of an Amendment, in subsection (1), to leave out "three" and insert "six". The noble Lord said: My Lords, I do not wish to cover ground that has been well covered by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in the arguments which he brought forward to the Amendment which stands in his name. Having heard what the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor has said, I appreciate that there is a great deal to be said on behalf of the Government in respect of the Amendment which stands in my name. In view of the assurance that has been given to the House I will not move my Amendment.
Clause 19 [Right to compensation in respect of planning decisions]:
LORD MANCROFT LORD MANCROFT moved, in subsection (2), after "powers" to insert "not being statutory undertakers or the National Coal Board." The noble Lord said: My Lords, the purpose of this Amendment is to exclude statutory undertakers and the National Coal Board from the operation of subsection (2) of clause 19 and to leave their position in the matter of compensation to be determined solely by subsection (4). The main reason why land of statutory undertakers and the National Coal Board was included in subsection (2), and so disqualified from being the subject of compensation under Part II of the Bill, is that special provision is made in the

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1947 Act for compensation for planning restrictions on operational land, and therefore it was necessary to avert the risk of double payment. Subsequently, it was realised that though most operational land will have been bought under compulsory powers, and would, therefore, be caught by subsection (2), this would not always be the case; and the present subsection (4), which is drafted directly in terms of operational land, was added to the Bill in another place. No corresponding change was made in subsection (2), and statutory undertakers are, therefore, subject to a double disqualification. The Government now feel that this is clearly wrong. It means that land which had ceased to be operational before the 1947 Act came into force, and was the subject of a claim on the £300 million fund, would be deprived of any possibility of compensation for planning restrictions. This is of particular consequence to the British Transport Commission, though, not, perhaps, of great importance to statutory undertakers in general. The present Amendment which I am now moving, removes this disqualification. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 28, line 2, after ("powers") insert the said words.—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
2.52 p.m.
VISCOUNT RIDLEY VISCOUNT RIDLEY moved, in subsection (2), after "condition," where that word last occurs, to insert:
"imposed for the purposes of amenity, safety or restoration of the land,".
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this Amendment is a variation of one which I moved on the Committee stage, and upon which the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack gave an answer. The noble Viscount did say, however, that he was open to consider further points on this matter. The question concerns the fact that compensation is not payable in respect of conditions of consent for mining operations. When I put this Amendment down I was not aware that substantially the same Amendment was due for discussion, on exactly the same point, in the Committee stage of the Scottish Bill. This Amendment, however, is not quite identical, as I have avoided the use of the word "reasonable"; but it is substantially so. Since
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I put it down I have seen the Report of the debate of the Scottish Bill, which I read very carefully. In that debate the point was made that there was an appeal to the Minister against unreasonable conditions, and the Minister was not unreasonable. I have a feeling that that is, perhaps, not quite strong enough on an important point such as this. I believe that these words, or some like them, would help to clarify the position.
It must be remembered that in many cases operators will have bought or acquired land at different dates at fairly high prices. They may be seriously hampered, and they should, I think, have the right to compensation widened by the addition of words such as these. I do not believe that an appeal is really necessary. An appeal is effective for getting decisions of a planning authority varied, but there will not always be agreement between the person who owns and wishes to develop minerals and the Minister who makes the decision. I will not go into the types of cases which might be the subject of this clause, but they were discussed both during our Committee stage and during the Committee stage of the Scottish Bill. No one will deny that conditions must be imposed for mineral working. If only we could have the word "reasonable," that, to my mind, would be the word one would choose. The words which I propose should be inserted are an attempt to define the sort of conditions which should be excepted. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 29, line 16, after ("condition") insert the said words.—(Viscount Ridley.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, who has tried, as others of your Lordships have tried, to find a formula which will fit in with the purpose of the Bill and will not be too wide to deal with this problem. But I am afraid that we are still in difficulties, as I endeavoured to explain when my noble friend the Duke of Buccleuch moved a similar Amendment during the Committee stage of the Scottish Bill. If your Lordships will not consider it too much of an imposition, I should like briefly to touch once again upon the difficulties which we find in this form of words. The purpose of the conditions that are imposed is normally to reduce the nuisance and inconvenience to the public which such

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workings cause. It is difficult to give an all-inclusive list of such conditions, but I have tried to consider them with those who advise me on this difficult part of the Bill, and I am told that the conditions are not confined to conditions imposed for the purpose of "amenity, safety or restoration of the land," though these will be included.
The most common matters to be regulated by conditions include the location of the plant, the order in which minerals are to be worked and, thirdly—this is a very common one—disposal of waste materials. These matters may coincide with the three matters in the Amendment but also they may not, because proper use of the land may well be a factor in the imposing of conditions. Therefore, after very serious consideration—because, as I say, we appreciate the attempt of noble Lords to meet our difficulties in the matter—we have regretfully come to the conclusion that these words will not cover the conditions that may have to be imposed.
The other matter which my noble friend Lord Ridley mentioned is one which I raised in regard to a point which my noble friend, Lord Stonehaven, pressed, as I understood his speech, in the debate on the Scottish Bill. The noble Viscount, Lord Stonehaven, was afraid that conditions imposed might be so rigorous in character that they would, in fact, make it difficult for the work to go on at all. My answer to that—which I hope was a reasonable one—was that, certainly in the present economic condition of the country and for as many years ahead as your Lordships can reasonably see, no Minister is likely to impose conditions or allow conditions to be imposed which will have that effect. He will be far too anxious about the other side of the account, which is seeing that the operations continue and are efficiently and economically carried out. Therefore I said to my noble friend that I thought the answer to that point, that conditions might be in fact prohibitive, was, in present circumstances, an appeal to the Minister or to the Secretary of State for Scotland. I trust that for such cases that would be an effective answer. I am sorry that we have not been able to find words which will really assuage Lord Ridley's fears. I hope that on consideration, in view of the facts that I have put before your Lordships to-day, he will not press the Amendment. Should he have—as I
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am sure is highly probable—another brainwave in the course of the afternoon, if he will have a word with me or with my noble friend Lord Mancroft, I shall be very pleased to consider it. I am afraid that, for the reasons I have given, I cannot accept these words.
VISCOUNT RIDLEY: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount, and also impressed, for I find he has tried to see whether the words would fit. If the noble and learned Viscount was unable to do so, I cannot conceive that I am capable of having a brainwave in the short space of the afternoon, or even longer, about how to do it. In view of what the noble and learned Viscount has said, I feel bound to withdraw my Amendment, and I beg to do so.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
3.2 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in the proviso to subsection (3) to substitute "seven" for "ten" [years]. The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, this Amendment is proposed in pursuance of an undertaking which I gave in Committee and which your Lordships will find in Vol. 189 (No. 111), col.920 of the OFFICIAL REPORT. I do not think I need go into the reasons for the exclusion. We are dealing here with a relatively small sector of cases where the planning authority consider that the land is suitable for the proposed development but that that development ought to be deferred in the light of the provisions of the development plan or the availability of services. The exclusion from compensation rests on two legs: first, that compensation ought not to be payable merely because development is regulated to keep it in step with the provision of services; and second, that it would be wasteful and vexatious to all concerned to keep paying out money merely in order to recover it a year or two later.
I am aware that some noble Lords may consider that seven years is still too long; but it must be remembered that developers seldom wait until they are ready to start before applying for planning permission. Preliminary steps of this nature are commonly taken a year or two in advance, and this subsection will very likely encourage those concerned to apply even earlier. Therefore the period during which an owner is actually prevented from building without compensation is likely

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to be a good deal less than seven years. I should be doing less than playing fair with your Lordships if I did not say that, apart from the pressure which was eloquently expressed by my noble friend Lord Hylton for a shorter period, there has been a great deal of pressure in another place for a longer period than ten years—the period has been put as high as fifteen years—and one element in arriving at this decision has been the attempt to strike a happy mean between those points of view. It would be a sad day when compromise is excluded because it is compromise. While, on my side, I appreciate that I have not met all the points that were made, I ask your Lordships to meet my points and to realise the need for compromise in getting agreement in this matter. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 29, line 33, leave out ("ten") and insert ("seven").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, I think we should express our gratitude to the Government for this change in the Bill. I still think this particular part will have to be administered with the utmost care by local authorities if they want to avoid hardship. The noble and learned Viscount gave as an illustration the case of large-scale development. That is always the case which is quoted, but I am bearing in mind the number of small people who have been kept waiting a long time for their compensation and now will have another period of waiting. As the noble and learned Viscount so candidly said, there is no magic in this figure of seven. It is just a good number, midway between other numbers that have been put forward. We hoped that it could have been related in some way with the quinquennial review. However, I do not think we can press the matter any further, except to note that we shall need to be very careful about how it is administered.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
VISCOUNT RIDLEY VISCOUNT RIDLEY moved to add to subsection (4):
"other than subsidence caused by underground mining operations."
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this Amendment is intended to avoid a practical difficulty. I had an Amendment down on Committee stage to remove subsection (4) altogether. This is the part of the Bill which says that compensation is
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not payable if the refusal of permission is due to the liability of land to flooding and subsidence. When I moved a previous Amendment there seemed to be no reason for this provision to be in the Bill, since one would have thought that if the land was seriously liable to flooding there would have been no claim under Part VI. However, in discussion it appeared that there was a possibility that in certain areas of low-lying land there might be a claim under Part VI, but that it might be reasonable to refuse permission.
That being so I would refer to another aspect of the matter. It would appear that the words of this subsection could apply to land liable to subside without flooding— subsidence caused by underground mining. That is a different point from the one I believe to underlie this subsection as written. In replying on the previous occasion, the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor said that one thing I was anxious about was of no importance—namely, that this provision might be used as a means of refusing development because National Coal Board plans for underground mining in future would render the land liable to flooding. He assured me that the subsection did not mean that: I understood that to mean that the words as written are not capable of being interpreted in that way.
However, there is one other point. To my own knowledge, in the coalfield in my own county planning permission has been refused many times on the ground that the land was unstable. In some cases it was on the ground that the land was already unstable, and in others on the ground that the land in future was about to become so. In Committee the noble and learned Viscount dealt with land about to become so. I think this point as to whether or not planning permission should be refused on those grounds is a very difficult one. It seems to me a case of dealing with the facts of each particular application; it can hardly be dealt with in principle. Since the Committee stage, I have made further inquiries about the actual wording of refusals and have obtained some typical cases from my own county planning department. This is the terms of one refusal.
"Underground mining development at present taking place will result in coal being extracted from the site in the immediate future.

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Surface development, through the need to provide support, would involve the sterilisation of coal and interfere with projected workings, which is undesirable in the public interest."
That is a case of land which will become unstable in future. Therefore, it would not be one of the cases we need concern ourselves with: I give it merely as an illustration. I will give this second example. Instability or subsidence are not the only reasons given. This second example relates to a piece of agricultural land, and it is stated that this should be kept for agricultural purposes. It states:
"Other sites within reasonable distance are available."
That is true. But it also says:
"Coal will be worked under the site in the immediate future and this, together with the existence of old workings, renders the site unstable."
I take it that "unstable" means liable to subsidence. What I wish to ensure is that the local planning authority should not give reasons of instability due to past or existing workings as a reason for refusal which would result in the denial of compensation to the owner of land who would otherwise have received it. After all, it is a common practice in a coalfield to build on land where subsidence is going on. There are certain well-known methods of doing that: extra foundations of special kinds are designed, and buildings are erected so that they do not suffer from the subsidence. Therefore, there is the possibility here of a real loss. There is no doubt that in many of these cases there are perfectly good planning reasons, which I do not want to bring into this matter, for refusing consent. I want to refer only to the type of case where planning permission is refused because the ground is unstable and where, under subsection (4), compensation would not be paid. This matter could, I suppose, be dealt with in an administrative manner, but I submit that it needs something careful and precise to secure the object I have in mind. I should prefer—and I think many others would, too—to see something of this sort put into the Bill to make it clear what this provision is meant to cover and what it is not meant to cover. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 29, line 40, after ("subsidence") insert ("other than subsidence caused by underground mining operations").—(Viscount Ridley.)
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, this Amendment raises a difficult question. The noble Viscount who moved it is quite right in saying that if we ruled out from building all land which was subject to the danger of subsidence, we should have to rule out a great deal of land in this country on which there is at present building and where there is no reason why there should not be. There are today well-recognised means of building on land which is subject to subsidence. although it is a little mote costly. I have in mind that one of the new towns, Peterlee, is almost entirely subject to subsidence, but building operations are going on there quite satisfactorily, and nobody has seriously suggested that they should not. Nevertheless, if an application came before the planning authority, and they gave as one of the reasons, possibly quite incidentally—the land may be unsuitable for other reasons, but as a make-weight they may give this other reason—that it is subject to subsidence, then no compensation would be payable. If they had left out that reason and had said that it was good agricultural land, or something of that sort, there would be compensation; but the mere addition of this reason that the land was subject to subsidence, although they might not attach very great importance to it, would deprive a proposed developer of the opportunity of getting compensation. I do not know whether that is the intention, but that is the way the provision would work.
I recognise that one could appeal against the decision, not in order to get permission to develop but in order to get one of the reasons excluded. However, that is not a particularly satisfactory thing to do. The normal appeal is that an owner wants to develop, when he has been refused permission, and for him to appeal merely because he objects to one of a number of grounds, accepting the general refusal, is not satisfactory. But that is what may happen in a good many cases. Whilst I do not know whether the words of the Amendment are suitable, I do feel that, even at this late stage, this matter ought to be reconsidered, so that injustice is not done casually, as may well happen, by including, among a number of other reasons, the fact that the land is subject to subsidence. As I say, if that were the only reason given, in many cases it would be

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a bad reason, because building is possible to-day on most land which is subject to subsidence. There is some land on which it would be unsafe to build, but in the vast majority of large areas of land it is possible to build even where there is subsidence. Therefore, I would ask the noble and learned Viscount whether between to-day and to-morrow—there is not much more time—he would give consideration to this point, to see whether something cannot be done to avoid the injustice which the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, foresees, and which I foresee, too.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I confess that the main point that was in my mind was the first point which my noble friend Lord Ridley mentioned. He will remember that his words on the Committee stage were (OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 189 (No. 111), col.923):
"I wonder whether it"—
that is, the subsection—
"could not be taken to read that the land is unsuitable on account of its liability to flooding or subsidence by actions which are to be taken later—I am thinking of subsidence due to operations of the National Coal Board, for instance."
I want to emphasise that the subsection does mean what it says. Its drafting is directed to the liability of the land, in its existing state, to subsidence or flooding; it was not intended to refer to the land's liability, consequent upon the proposed development, or indeed, other development, to flooding or to subsidence. But to-day my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, have raised another point, and they have really given it its greatest emphasis by saying that they are afraid that this objection will be put in among others rather as a make-weight. I would ask your Lordships to look at the terms of the subsection. It is quite true that it says:
"… if the reason or one of the reasons stated for the refusal …".
But one has to give full value to the next following words:
"is that the land is unsuitable for the proposed development …"
In considering whether or not the land is unsuitable there certainly ought to be taken into account the methods to which my noble friend Lord Ridley and the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, have referred.
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Clearly—especially in view of what Lord Silkin said in regard to Peterlee—these methods of building are something which the authority would have in mind and would take into consideration before coming to the view that the land was unsuitable.
The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, had another fear—and I do not by any means seek to minimise it—that the unusual may be taken to coincide with the possible; in other words, that this unusual course of appealing against one ground of refusal might be considered a novelty. Here it is directly relevant to the question of whether or not compensation will be paid, and I cannot imagine that anyone would underestimate the importance of that consideration. I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, that there is a need for administrative action in order to make sure that the view that I have endeavoured to propound to-day with regard to unsuitabilty should be taken into account. That would meet the noble Viscount pro tanto, if it is made quite clear that unsuitability means unsuitability having in mind the usual methods of building on land, for example, in Durham. With regard to the other point, the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, asked that I should have a last minute look at it. I will certainly do that, but, as he rather suggested, it is difficult to find something in the last twenty-four hours. As I say, I hope that we shall be able to meet the first point of the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley. I will certainly have another look at it, but I do not want to obtain silence by false pretences, or pretend to your Lordships that hopes are very high.
VISCOUNT RIDLEY: My Lords, I am obliged to the noble and learned Viscount. It is a very difficult question indeed. I have never felt clear in my mind whether it was right to give a refusal on instability, because it means that a planning authority decides there and then whether, and at what cost, a building can be built, and whether the building is worth building with that expenditure. I should have thought that the easiest way out was to make that condition of instability one which was not used; because if, for other planning reasons, there is no objection to erecting a building in that particular place, it is surely the responsibility of the person who wants to build it to satisfy himself that it will be sufficiently stable. Many places have been built on top of a

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coalfield. Newcastle was built on a coalfield and the coal has been taken out from underneath, and I know of no more stable or dignified city in this country. As to the liability for future operations, I am perfectly satisfied with what the noble and learned Viscount has said. I do not feel happy on the question of un-suitability, as I am not clear who is to be the decider. I take it that it would be a matter of objection. In the first instance, however, it must be a decision of a local planning authority. I see great difficulty in finding any absolute standard of what is suitable and what is not, and what is possible and what is not. I shall be obliged to the noble and learned Viscount if he will think about the matter again before the Third Reading, as he has promised to do. I should perhaps apologise to him, because on moving the earlier Amendment in Committee I did not refer clearly enough to the point which I had in mind at that time. Rather by mistake. I concentrated upon the future question. To that extent, I would have been able to give more notice by expanding this point more fully in Committee. As he has been kind enough to say that he will think about it again before Third Reading, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
3.24 p.m.
VISCOUNT RIDLEY VISCOUNT RIDLEY moved, in subsection (6), to leave out "prohibiting" and insert "either prohibiting or which in effect prohibits." The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this point arises from another Amendment which the noble and learned Viscount said on the Committee stage he would consider. It deals with planning permission. The Bill says that a planning decision which prohibits the development of a specified part of a piece of land is to be treated as a refusal. The Amendment is that it should read "prohibiting or which in effect prohibits." The noble and learned Viscount quoted one case where this has in fact happened, and said that it was not thought that there are many more or ever will be. Nevertheless, if there has been one there may be others, and even one requires to be dealt with as fairly as the many hundreds of other cases which come in a different category. The point was fully made in Committee, and I do not wish to take up the time of the House. The noble and learned Viscount said that he would be
1426
glad to give the decision of Her Majesty's Government on this matter when we came to the Report stage. In the hope that he has been able to do something about it, I beg to move this Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 30, line 3, leave out ("prohibiting") and insert ("either prohibiting or which in effect prohibits").—(Viscount Ridley.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I am sorry that I am not able to help my noble friend on this Amendment. We have given a great deal of consideration to the point. Your Lordships will remember that one argument used in support of the Amendment was that a condition might be imposed which was so costly in its effect that it rendered the whole development uneconomic. I endeavoured to answer that point. I think it depends, first of all, on good administration by planning authorities, and, secondly, in the exercise of the right of appeal. As I said a few moments ago, I do not think that arty Minister, either now or in the course of the next few years, is going to hesitate to remove conditions which have the effect of making the working impossible, or impossible in economic conditions.
There is one point to which I should like to assure the House we did give careful consideration, and that was the question of the highway corridor, which is one of the problems which arises here. Your Lordships may remember that I referred to it during my remarks on the Committee stage. We tried to meet that point and examined special provisions for this type of case, and we rejected our own efforts for two main reasons. First, it has proved impossible to draft an Amendment of any reasonable length to cover this type of case. Your Lordships will appreciate that the highway corridor would not only cover the width of the highway at the top, but would also cover the pyramid underneath. When I tell your Lordships that our best effort in that direction took a page of close printing to express, your Lordships will see the sort of difficulty which arises. I put the position quite frankly to your Lordships because I want you to know that we have tried, and that that was one of the reasons why we could not meet the matter.
Secondly, the Government came to the conclusion that the highway corridor condition in fact does not impose any undue

1427
financial hardship on the developer because the condition requires support to be left for the site of a proposed road. The operator is compensated for the sterilisation of the site itself. What he is not compensated for are the minerals in the supporting slopes. But that is no different from his position where there is a road already in existence adjoining or within his working area, and where he is required by common law to provide support. Although I sincerely regret that we could not find words which we could insert practically into the Bill, I am reassured on this point by the fact that the injustice, like the baby to which the famous Captain Marryat referred, is "only a little one." For these reasons, I hope my noble friend will not press the Amendment.
VISCOUNT RIDLEY: My Lords, it seems a pity. I appreciate what the noble and learned Viscount has said about the difficulty of wording, and the fact that he has tried to have it drafted. I should just like to point out one thing about the comparison between the road which is planned and the road which is already in existence. In the case of the existing road the person who buys an area for the minerals knows that the road is there; but, in the case of a road which is at present only planned, he may well have bought the land or leased it before anything was thought or planned about where the road was to go, and he may not be in quite such a good position. I hope, therefore, it will be possible to see that some instructions are given to planning authorities so as to make the minimum of difficulties when these cases arise. In view of the difficulty that the noble and learned Viscount has told me of drafting some provision that would really work, I think there is nothing for me to do but to beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 23 [Review of planning decisions where compensation claimed]:
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, during the Committee stage the words of this Amendment were inserted in the parallel passage in Part V, and they ought, obviously, to be included here also. I beg to move, therefore, this drafting Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 32, line 29, at end insert ("applied for").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 24 [Supplementary provisions as to review of planning decisions]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this Amendment is put down in order to meet a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and reported in Vol. 189 (No. 111), col. 938, of the OFFICIAL REPORT. Your Lordships will remember that the noble Lord complained that the clause made no provision for informing those concerned of their right to be heard. It was always intended that, as a matter of practice, they would be made aware of their rights in this matter; but there is clearly no harm in having it on the face of the Statute. The form of words adopted follows that in Section 15 (2) of the 1947 Act, which governs hearings in connection with planning appeals under that Act. It makes it clear that, if either party requests a hearing, the other shall have the opportunity of being heard. Without stressing too much the point that this is a case where I hope I shall acquire a little merit in the eyes of the noble Lord, I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 33, line 2, leave out from ("shall") to end of line 5 and insert ("give notice in writing of his proposed direction to the local planning authority to whose decision that direction relates and to any person who made, and has not since withdrawn, a claim in respect of that decision, and, if so required by that authority or by any such person, shall afford to each of them an opportunity").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, in thanking the noble and learned Viscount, I appreciate that he has tried hard to find some crumb to give us on these Benches. He has found a crumb which he himself describes as doing no harm even if it does no good, and, in any case, it was intended. I accept this Amendment in the spirit in which it was offered.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 26 [Measure of depreciation for assessing compensation]:
LORD MANCROFT LORD MANCROFT moved in subsection (1), after "land," where that word first occurs, to insert "or of an interest in so far as it subsists in particular land," The noble Lord said: My Lords, the series of Amendments to this clause

1429
standing in the name of my noble and learned friend (that is, Amendments Nos. 16 to 21), and the Amendment to leave out Clause 27 (which is Amendment No. 22), can, I think, be conveniently considered together, because they are all really interlocked. The reasons for bringing forward these Amendments are twofold. The first is that Clause 26, subsection (3), does not enable account to be taken, in assessing the depreciation caused by a planning decision, of any previous order revoking or modifying a planning permission which has given rise to the payment of compensation for depreciation. That is a fairly serious omission. A less serious matter, of course, is that account cannot be taken of any compensation payable under Section 22 (3) of the 1947 Act as the result of the withdrawal of a permission granted by development order.
The second reason is that Clause 27 (3) is now defective, because it fails to make clear that what is relevant for the purposes of Part II of the Bill is only the value of the interest so far as it subsists in any land to which the decision relates and which has an unexpended balance of established development value. This defect is the result of drafting changes made in Clause 25 in another place. The net result of the Amendment is, I hope your Lordships will agree, a considerable gain in clarity as well as a saving in words. If your Lordships will agree to it, I suggest that we may on this occasion revert to the practice which we adopted on Committee stage and agree to the taking of the consequential Amendments which I have just mentioned as part and parcel with this Amendment. I can assure your Lordships that this is not a controversial matter. They are genuine, consequential Amendments. I accordingly beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 34, line 36, after ("land") insert (",or of an interest in so far as it subsists in particular land,")—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 34, line 38, leave out ("and the next following").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this Amendment is also consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 34, line 41, leave out from ("arises") to end of line 46.—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this, again, is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 35, line 1, leave out ("of the interest") and insert ("in question").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this also is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 35, line 5, leave out from ("decision") to end of line 7 and insert—
(",by any grant of planning permissions made after that decision and in force immediately before the Minister gives notice of his findings on the claim for compensation in respect of that decision, and by any undertaking to grant planning permission so in force; and
(c) on the assumption that, after the relevant decision and apart from any such permission or undertaking as aforesaid, planning permission would be granted for development of any class specified in the Third Schedule to the principal Act but not for any other development,").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, I beg to move the next consequential Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 35, line 11, leave out from ("Act") to end of line 15 and insert ("or compensation for depreciation within the meaning of subsection (3) of section thirty-nine of this Act, has become, or becomes, payable in respect of another planning decision or in respect of an order to which the said section thirty-nine applies, being a planning decision or order made before the relevant decision in respect of, or of land which includes, the whole or part of the land to which the relevant decision relates, the calculation called for by the last preceding subsection shall be made on the assumption that that other planning decision was a decision to the contrary effect or, as the case may be, that that order was not made.")— (Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 27 [Supplementary provisions as to calculation of depreciation]:
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this also is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 35, line 30, leave out Clause 27.—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
3.37 p.m.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved, after Clause 32 to insert the following new clause:
Application of s. 40 of Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act, 1954
".Section forty of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act, 1954 (which relates to cleared site values) shall apply to this Act."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment. Your Lordships may remember that on the Motion that we go into Committee I apologised in advance for the inadequate drafting of some of the Amendments which we might put down. This is an Amendment which falls within that category. I am quite sure that the Government should not accept it in its present form, but I hope that your Lordships will agree with the purpose behind it. If the noble and learned Viscount is really anxious to give us something of substance before we part with this Bill, here is a good opportunity.
Clause 40 (as it now is) of the Scottish Bill makes an amendment of the law whereby there is a new basis for payments of compensation in respect of cleared sites which contained slum dwellings. Formerly—that is, before the Bill was introduced—the basis of compensation was the value of the site as cleared. Clause 40 of the Scottish Bill introduces a new factor—namely, that there is to be deducted from the value of the site the cost of clearing the site. In explaining this clause the noble and learned Viscount gave as the reason that in Scotland there are a number of stone-built tenements which have become slums and which will be cleared, and which it will be exceedingly costly to clear. It was thought right, he said, that the cost of clearance of those sites should be deducted from the compensation payable to the owner. I agree. Scotland, however, does not consist entirely of stone tenements. I was in Scotland only two or
1432
three weeks ago, and I saw a great many slum dwellings which are not of stone. Yet Clause 40 applies to all slum dwellings which will hereafter be cleared as a result of clearance orders. I want to submit, as I did tentatively in dealing with the Scottish Bill, that similar considerations apply in England.
It is true that we in England have not stone tenements to anything like the extent that exists in Scotland, but in most of the big towns we have large tenement buildings which have become slums and which ought to be cleared, and will, indeed, be cleared as soon as it is possible to provide alternative accommodation. The cost of clearing these tenements will be very heavy, and it seems to me right that the cost of clearance should be deducted from the compensation payable to the owner where it takes place in England, just as it will be in Scotland. I can see no justification for two separate forms of treatment in this respect as between England and Scotland: if it is right in Scotland, it is surely right in England. I do not think that I need labour the point, but we have a vast programme of slum clearance to carry out. Perhaps I ought not to particularise, but Leeds is a very bad case in point, and there are many others. It would facilitate the work if local authorities had the advantage of this provision. I hope that the noble and learned Viscount will see his way to giving to England the benefit of a similar provision to that for Scotland. Undoubtedly he would not wish to put it in the form of my Amendment, but perhaps it could be put in some more appropriate form. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 32 insert the new clause.—(Lord Silkin.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I recognise the reasons which have animated the noble Lord, Lord Silkin—indeed, with his usual courtesy he gave full notice that he had this point in mind. But on considering his suggestion, I do not think that the noble Lord has placed sufficient weight on the difference between conditions in England and those in Scotland. Perhaps I might just illustrate the short point at issue by reference to the case which is common

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to both countries—that is, the slum house which is declared to be unfit for human habitation and is acquired compulsorily by the local authority under current housing law—the Act of 1936 in England and Wales, and the Act of 1950 in Scotland. The house, being unfit, is deemed to have no value, although possibly quite high rents are being collected in respect of it; and payment is made only for the site. Of course, the value of the site is assessed on the basis that the site has been cleared of all buildings and is ready for re-development, which means that the cost of demolishing the house and clearing the rubble falls on the housing authority. That cost is so substantial in Scotland that the Secretary of State decided to alter the basis in the manner which I have described in dealing with the Scottish Bill. In future, apart from the unexpended balance, the owner will get only the value of the site after deducting the cost of demolition and allowing for the salvage value of the rubble.
There are three main differences which, in my view, and in the view of my right honourable friend, make it inappropriate to alter the existing arrangements in England. First, there are difficulties in Scottish Law from the existence of feu owners and vassals. Those of your Lordships who took part in, or read the discussion on, the Scottish Bill will have this point well in mind. Your Lordships will remember that it has been held that on compulsory acquisition the local authority does not acquire the rights of the superior—indeed, when the local authority steps into the shoes of the vassal the feu-duty is, because of the better credit of the local authority, much enhanced in value. Your Lordships will remember that, in what is now Clause 63 of the Scottish Bill, we deal with the consideration in discharge of feu-duty and matters of that sort, and the amounts claimable by the feu owner will, by the effect of their Clause 40, not be unwarrantably enhanced. Secondly, quite apart from this complicated legal point, the circumstances of slum ownership in the two countries are very different. In England and Wales, slum property has a definite value, enhanced by the housing shortage. I think it is right to say that rents are collected without undue difficulty, and the property
1434
continues to be occupied until the local authority intervenes with the declaration of a clearance area. But in Scotland, without any action by the local authority to clear, the incubus of owners' rates makes the ownership of slum property not an asset but a liability. In fact, houses are often offered as gifts or put up for sale without obtaining a buyer; and to escape liability and to show that the house is not habitable, the owner will often remove the roof and leave the building in a derelict state. Much of the slum clearance action in Scotland is thus concerned with property in which the owner has disclaimed all interest.
The third point which I consider important is the one to which the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has already referred—namely, the difference in the structural character of the slum properties. As I said on the Second Reading of the Scottish Bill, the Scottish tenement houses are solid buildings in stone, and the cost of demolition and clearance is appreciably higher than in England; and the view of my right honourable friend the Secretary of State is that there is no reason for making a present of this expensive item to an owner who often disclaims all interest. This state of affairs has made the Scottish local authorities most anxious to secure an improvement, and that is the special basis of compensation which has now been included in the Scottish Bill. These conditions, I submit to your Lordships, do not arise in England, and I think it would be unfortunate if, at a late stage and without a great deal of consideration of the differences between the two countries which I have endeavoured to summarise to your Lordships this afternoon, your Lordships were (if I may use the word without any offence) to pitchfork this new idea into the English Bill. As I say, I fully realise that my noble friend is anxious to see that any improvement can be introduced, but with the greatest respect to him I think the difficulties are too great for us to accept the Amendment.
EARL JOWITT: My Lords, some years ago I had to introduce into this House the Town and Country Planning Bill, which became the Act of 1947, and it is rather interesting to consider the difference that arises when a member of my Party introduces a Bill into this House and when it is done by the noble and

1435
learned Viscount on the Woolsack. Of course the noble and learned Viscount will have his way and will not accept this Amendment; and of course this House will not divide. But I assert positively that, had such an Amendment been moved when I was responsible here for the earlier Bill, and had I been able to offer no more convincing arguments than those available to the noble and learned Viscount I should have been in the gravest possible difficulty; and I should, in practice, have had to meet that difficulty by accepting the Amendment. That is the weakness of this House as it is constituted at the present time. I feel that no case whatever is made out for differentiation between England and Scotland.
It is quite untrue (the noble Viscount has not said, and would be the last to say) that all tenement houses in Scotland are of very solid construction, built of stone. He has not said that all owners of slum property in Scotland make no profit—some make a very substantial profit. The problem here is how to do justice between the community, represented in these cases by the local authority, and the owner of these premises. If it is right in Scotland, in these circumstances, to say to an owner, "We are going to pay you not the value of the site on the hypothesis that it is cleared but the value of the site minus the cost of clearing" then it is right to have the same thing in England. Indeed, the fact that in England these tenements are frequently of more flimsy construction and less solid than those in Scotland is surely a reason which makes it all the more necessary to follow the same course in England, because you will have to deduct less from that which you pay the owner in England than you will have to deduct in Scotland.
I realise the difficulties of the legal position, but that matter does not affect this point. We must try to do justice. What ought we to do when we are taking over, compulsorily, property which is in a very bad condition? My proposition is that, if it is right in Scotland (and it was thought right the other day and the Legislature has thought it right), to mulct the owner of this property by making him pay the cost of removing the buildings on the property, then it is also right in England. With the greatest respect to the
1436
noble and learned Viscount, who has made the best of the somewhat slender material placed at his disposal, and who has made a surprising number of bricks with a very inadequate amount of straw, he has shown no reason at all why in England we should have a different standard of justice and compensation from that accepted in Scotland. I only wish that there were the slightest chance of some noble Lords on the other side of the House taking a hand in this matter and putting some influence upon Her Majesty's Government to try to induce them, between now and Third Reading, to alter the Bill, so that we might have the same principle in England as has been adopted in Scotland.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 33 [Additional compensation for works]:
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, Amendment No. 24 and the next, which is really consequential upon it, have two purposes. The first is more or less formal: to provide that the clause shall not apply where compensation on the basis of existing use includes the full value of permission to develop in pursuance of which the works were carried out. Although the function of the clause was always to provide for additional compensation in respect of unfinished buildings or works, it was thought better not specifically to exclude finished buildings because of the impossibility of defining at what stage a building becomes substantially complete. Theoretically, therefore, the clause would apply even if the whole of the development had been completed, though the amount of the additional compensation payable would be nil. No doubt in practice this process would have been short-circuited but we have thought it better to remove the awkwardness, and this the proposed paragraph (b) ensures. By drafting in terms of the value of the development, the difficulty I have mentioned, of defining when a building becomes complete, is avoided. The second part of Amendment No. 25 deals with cases where the development of part of the land has been completed and the development of the remainder has not. Its practical effect is that the operation of the clause is confined to so much of the development as has not been completed. This is achieved by providing that the clause shall not apply to any part of the

1437
land, the existing use value of which includes the full value of permission to develop so far as it is relevant to that land. It is obviously a common-sense provision. I beg to move the first Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 42, line 3, after ("apply") insert ("(a)").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: This Amendment is consequential upon the previous Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 42, line 9, at end insert ("or
(b) if the compensation on the basis of existing use payable in respect of the acquisition would be the same whether or not the said subsection (4) operated;
and where, if the notice to treat had extended to a part only of the relevant land, the amount of the compensation on the basis of existing use payable in respect of the relevant interest in so far as it subsisted in that part would have been the same whether or not the said subsection (4) operated, this section shall have effect as respects the acquisition of the relevant interest as if the notice to treat had extended only to the remainder of the relevant land.")—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this Amendment and that which we propose to make to subsection (3) of Clause 34, merely tidy up the interrelation of these two clauses. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 42, line 14, leave out (" then, subject to the next following section,").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 34 [Protection for purchasers]:
3.58 p.m.
VISCOUNT GAGE VISCOUNT GAGE moved to leave out subsection (1) and insert:
"(1) Subject to Regulations made by the Minister under this section it shall be the duty of the council of a county borough or county district to record in a register to be maintained by them for that purpose any notification received by them from any public authority possessing compulsory purchase powers of a proposal by the said public authority so to acquire any interest in land situated within the area of the county borough or county district council.
(2) It shall be the duty of the council of a county borough or county district on application made to them in writing by a person who proposes to purchase an interest in land in the
1438
area of the authority to give notice to the applicant within twenty-eight days of the receipt of the application stating whether or not the authority propose to acquire within the next five years, whether compulsorily or otherwise, any interest in that land or in any part thereof, of have recorded any notification from any public authority possessing compulsory purchase powers of a proposal of that authority so to acquire any such interest."
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I should like, with your permission, to speak on both my Amendments, Nos. 27 and 36, at the same time. I will, of course, move them separately. Both cover the same point: the desirability of giving a little more formality to these notifications for which provision is made in Clause 34. On the Committee stage the noble and learned Viscount cleared up a number of points, and we were grateful for those explanations. We were told that the authorities receiving notifications will not have to take any initiative; and, more important, the noble and learned Viscount said that those notifications were not to be taken into planning account, at any rate in the first instance. However, when we submitted that these notifications would, by their very existence, have a blighting effect on all land to which they referred, and that therefore they should be confined to the minimum area that would ultimately be required, the noble and learned Viscount accepted the point but said that it would be dealt with by circular, which would lay down the procedure.
Some noble Lords—I think the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, was one—asked that the procedure should be laid down by regulations rather than circular, because regulations would have a more binding effect on the authorities and because these could be discussed in Parliament; and the noble and learned Viscount said he would consider that suggestion. In my second Amendment I am simply giving expression to that course of action which the noble and learned Viscount said he would consider. In my first Amendment I am, I know, introducing a certain formality which the noble and learned Viscount does not like. I do so because the County Councils' Association still feels that where so much money is at stake one cannot avoid formality. This is, up to a point, rather an old story. The noble and learned Viscount will know that the question of registration was the

1439
subject of the Report of the Committee on Local Land Charges which, I think, was issued in 1952 (Command Paper 8440). In that Report the Committee recommended for the protection of the purchaser that anything affecting the purchaser's interest should be registered. They added this:
"We have been informed, and many members of the Committee know from their own experience, that land threatened with compulsory purchase is practically unsaleable."
That is what we have been saying. The Committee go on to say that while they feel that the potential purchaser's interest must predominate
"at the same time, a line must be drawn somewhere according to the degree of probability that a compulsory purchase will follow up some previous action."
I admit that our fears spring in part from an uncertainty, which still remains, as to the Government's intentions regarding the working of this clause. The noble and learned Viscount explained their intentions up to a certain point, and, in a sense, by actual Amendment, has already gone some way to deal with some of the doubts and to tidy up the clause generally. But the doubt still remains as to how these nebulous proposals can be sufficiently crystallised to avoid what I might call the blight descending upon an unnecessarily large area of land, and, further, how frequent changes of intention can be avoided. In this connection, I appreciate that we were told that these notifications were separate from planning. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that the sooner they are brought into the planning machine, the easier it will be to avoid changes of intention. I would give a simple illustration. Some of the electricity board's plans regarding lines of pylons have been very much modified as the result of local discussions when they have been submitted for planning approval, and it would be somewhat ridiculous for notifications to be given of proposals of this sort which possibly quite soon afterwards would be materially changed. I feel that if the noble and learned Viscount could give us the gist of what he intends to put in the circular or in the regulations, and if he could deal with the points I have raised, it would make it much easier for us to judge whether the Amendments which I am proposing are necessary or not. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 42, line 31, leave out subsection (1) and insert the said new subsections.—(Viscount Gage.)
LORD TEVIOT: My Lords, I wish to say one or two words on this Amendment. It seems to me that the Amendment which my noble friend, Lord Gage, has just moved, goes a long way towards what I asked for in the second part of my Motion On October 27, in regard to the designation of compulsory purchase. I feel very strongly that what the noble Viscount has said means that it is necessary for the authorities definitely to define the area they are going to deal with, and not, as seems to be the case at the moment, in order that they themselves may be on the safe side, mention an area which, in all probability, is far larger than they will want to use. I beg to support my noble friend's Amendment.
4.5 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I should like to respond to the spirit of the remarks of my noble friend, Lord Gage, as supported by Lord Teviot, and to give your Lordships a picture of how we see these proposals working. I am sure Lord Teviot will remember that this clause was introduced as a protection to those who were about to purchase land, and, in fact, through the efforts of Lord Gage, it has been extended in its purview. There are two purposes in the Amendments which my noble friend, Lord Gage, has discussed. I will deal with them separately, because I think he would agree with me that the second is more important and perhaps of more general interest than the first. The first is whether the Council should be required to keep its record of notifications in the form of a register. The second is what regulations should be made to define what is meant by a proposal to acquire.
As regards the first point, I considered it and, on the whole, I came to the conclusion that there is no advantage in requiring the local authority to keep its record of notifications in the form of a register. The position of the authority under the clause is clear. They are required to state whether they have been notified of any proposal to acquire a particular piece of land. Obviously, they must take such steps as are necessary to enable them to deal with such inquiries. They have to keep records. Obviously,

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too, if they receive a notification so vague as to leave them in doubt about precisely what land is referred to, they must remove that doubt. All these things go for clarification. But they are not required to satisfy themselves as to the bona fides of the notification. I think your Lordships will agree that it would be an unconscionable interference of one local authority in the affairs of another if they attempted to do so. So much for the first point. I have endeavoured to make clear what the duty is, and, if there is any doubt, that clarification can be carried further.
I said, and I think my noble friend agreed, that the second point is one of greater importance. I want to make it clear that it is certainly not the intention of the Government that the clause should be used by local authorities to sterilise land which they think they may possibly require. That is a danger which we must have in mind. On the contrary, the Government consider that only land which the authority are reasonably certain they will require should be the subject of notification. At the same time, this is not a field in which, in the Government's opinion, regulations can serve any useful purpose. We feel that this is a matter on which more assistance can be given and better results are likely to be obtained by a circular. Regulations can lay down formal qualifications for a notification, and they can require it to be supported by a resolution of a local authority, or some similar decision, but that is no safeguard against an unscrupulous local authority—and it is local authorities who are far and away the largest buyers of land for development. There is nothing, in theory, to stop the Blankshire County Council from passing a resolution to acquire the whole county of Blankshire. We feel that what is needed is not formal rules but guidance and admonishment to acquiring authorities about their responsibilities under the clause. There is also the need to ensure that the total area of land reserved in this way represents a realistic estimate of what they are likely to need over the period.
VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble and learned Viscount for a moment? He has been speaking, I think, as though the circular is being addressed to local authorities. He has mentioned Blankshire, but he has not mentioned any Government Department.
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We of the county council world rather think that Government Departments are likely to be equally unscrupulous.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My noble friend is quite right to raise that point, and I immediately cry "touché," because there is such a fear. But I assure him that I was just corning to that point: I had not forgotten that aspect of our national existence. What I was going to say, and I think it is no secret to your Lordships, is that the Treasury have for years past issued circulars to Government Departments on matters of general policy affecting their land transactions, and these circulars form the basis of the instructions and guidance issued by the Department to the authorities to whom they are responsible. Pausing here for a moment, I realise the anxiety of my noble friend on this matter. I do not want to re-traverse the road travelled by my noble friend Lord De La Warr and underlined by my noble friend Lord Salisbury in his reply to Lord Teviot's Motion recently, but I hope your Lordships will take it that not only the points made by my noble friends, but also the spirit which I think your Lordships will agree animated both their speeches, are incorporated in what I say now.
Coming back to the question of procedure, the first step will be to give guidance, and guidance in that terse form in which, I assure my noble friend, the Treasury are very accustomed to give it, to the other Departments. That will form the basis of the instructions and guidance given by the Departments to the authorities. I at once give a firm assurance that a circular will be issued laying down how the clause is to be administered, and that it will be made quite clear to acquiring authorities that they should measure their notifications strictly against the amount of land likely to be required for their various statutory purposes. I include in that, as my noble friend has asked me, the assurance that that will be conveyed sternly and strictly to Government Departments who are involved. I hope these steps will ensure both uniformity in the administration of the clause and a reasonably clear standard by which all concerned can judge how they should act. In my view, both purposes can be better achieved by a circular than by the more rigid instrument of regulations in which, I would I say, after many years' experience of

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drawing them, it is very difficult to put either precept or example, whereas I believe that that can be done if a circular is issued.
I should like to say one word about another point which the noble Viscount has so often shown is very much in his mind—that is, the absence of any link between the machinery of this clause and the ordinary machinery of planning. I do not want to go into this point at great length, but I should like my noble friend to know that we have had his doubts and anxieties very much in mind. The clause makes no change in the nature of a planning authority's responsibilities and does not alter the problems. Planning authorities always have had to decide on their merits applications for permission to develop, even though they may well know that some public authority or other has the intention of buying the land. No one knows better than my noble friend Lord Gage that that is one of the many difficult planning problems which planning authorities have to handle. What I say to my noble friend on that point is that the clause makes the position no worse: it merely gives public authorities an opportunity of notifying their requirements formally and they will commonly do it after satisfying themselves that planning permission is likely to be forthcoming. Although they are not strictly relevant to the points my noble friend has raised today, I have made these comments because I know how much anxiety my noble friend has had on these points. I want to assure him that this question of a circular is not merely a matter of going through the motions in answer to his Amendment; it is a matter on which the Government feel strongly. I assure him that I will take steps to see that the course I have indicated is brought into active operation.
VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, I am grateful for the tenor of the noble and learned Viscount's answer. It may be said that it is rather in vague and nebulous promise, but I am satisfied. He has shown us the greatest consideration. I am satisfied that he will be as good as his word, and that a great deal of care will be exercised in the drafting of this circular, which I think will be a very difficult instrument, because this is one of the oldest problems in planning—
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namely, that of deciding the moment at which to define your intention on a map. However, we must hope for the best. I presume that, even though it does not come officially before Parliament, such a circular may always be discussed in your Lordships' House. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in subsection (1), to leave out all words beginning "a person who" down to "stating" and to insert:
"any person with respect to particular land in the borough or district, to serve on the applicant, within a period of twenty-eight days from the date of the receipt of the application, a notice".
The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, the purpose of this and the other Amendments to Clause 34 which stand in my name is to meet a number of points raised during the debate on Committee stage. Perhaps it would be enough if I put before your Lordships the changes of substance. The first is that the notice is to state the name of authority who intend to acquire. This will help to discourage authorities from notifying an intention to acquire far more land than they need, as my noble friend Lord Gage feared they might. What he said will be found in Column 998 of the Official Report for November 2. It will also go some way to meet the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Rathcreedan, in advancing his Amendment, which your Lordships will remember with particular pleasure.
It is not thought that it would be of advantage to require the council to state either the estimated date or the purpose of acquisition. The date would, in many cases, be little more than guesswork, since everything depends on when the necessary Ministerial sanction is forthcoming and whether compulsory purchase has to be employed. To specify the purpose may give rise to difficulty where a number of alternative powers are available or where security considerations are involved. We have met the points of the noble Lord, Lord Rathcreedan, to the extent of the name; and of course, if that is given, the applicant who has the name of the proposed acquiring authority can, if he is interested, make further inquiries direct. The second point was

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raised on the Committee stage not only by the noble Lord, Lord Rathcreedan, but also by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. In answer to that point, a failure to reply within the prescribed period of twenty-eight days is to have effect as if the authority had notified the applicant at the end of that period that there was no intention to acquire any part of the land. I think that meets the point raised. The third point is in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds. The responsible authority are to be at liberty to charge a fee of 5s., as he advocated, and as I think lie told as he advocated at the instance of the Association of Municipal Corporations.
As regards the remaining Amendments, those at lines 9 and 28 are designed to secure uniformity of language throughout the clause, while those at lines 43 and 47 are consequential on the addition of the two new subsections. The first Amendmem is largely drafting. In view of the proposal to allow the charging of a fee, it is thought better to drop the reference to a "person who proposes to purchase," which might, in any case, give rise to administrative difficulties. Again we have tried to meet useful suggestions, if I may be so allowed to term them, put forward from all parts of the House. While I am not seeking bouquets, I hope that noble Lords will believe, at any rate, that I have an open mind in considering any suggestions put forward. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 42 line 32, leave out from ("by") to ("stating") in line 35 and insert ("any person with respect to particular land in the borough or district, to serve on the applicant, within a period of twenty-eight days from the date of the receipt of the application, a notice").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD RATHCREEDAN: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble and learned Viscount for having to such a great extent met the points which I brought up in the Committee stage. I naturally felt that he would do so, and he has done so to an even greater extent than I expected. Only one point which I raised on the Committee stage now remains, and it is still concerning members of my profession who have to protect prospective purchasers. It is this. If a local authority reply in the negative, they may then, as the noble and learned Viscount points out, during the twenty-eight days receive some notification from
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the statutory authority; and the noble and learned Viscount suggested that they might then inform the applicant of that notification. The position of the prospective purchaser would be that he would have to wait the twenty-eight days, in any event. It is probably the intention of the Government that he will have to wait twenty-eight days before being able to enter into his contract with any certainty that he will not get a reply at a subsequent stage to say that, although they were not notified, they have now been notified of some application.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: My Lords, as one of those who took part in the debate on this point, I should like to thank the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack for the concessions which the Government have felt able to make. I am asked by the Association of Municipal Corporations to express their satisfaction with regard to the discretion now given to local authorities to charge a fee if they think fit. The other Amendments, which were put forward by my noble friend Lord Rathcreedan, were moved largely at the instance of the Law Society, and as representing the profession may I say that I am sure that they will be grateful, particularly for the provision in subsection (3), to the effect that if the notice has not been served within the twenty-eight days then the purchaser may deem that, in fact, no expectation of purchase will arise.
I am sorry that the Amendments do not provide for the proposed purpose to be indicated, because it might be most informative to a purchaser to know whether the purpose Was one likely to be achieved at an early date. That is one point of view. If, on the other hand, the purpose was not one that was likely to be carried out for many years, or if the purchaser, forming his own judgment felt that it was not, he might still, not withstanding the notice of the possibility of prospective purchase, be willing to complete the purchase. I appreciate, as the noble and learned Viscount has said, that it will be open to the purchaser to inquire again from the local authority as to the purpose. At the same time, I feel that it would have been a safeguard to purchasers had local authorities been bound to give information as to the purpose for which they were proposing to purchase. Your Lordships will remember the Crichel Down case where, if I

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remember rightly, the purchase of land was made compulsory for one purpose, and then at a later date the land was transferred to a local authority and was proposed to be used, or was, in fact, used, for another purpose. I had hoped—and so had the Law Society—that the necessary information would be given so that the possibility of such a happening might be avoided. In the circumstances, however, I feel that we must be grateful for small mercies, and we are obliged to the noble and learned Viscount and to the Government for the concessions they have made.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, as one of the beneficiaries I should like to pay my tribute to the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack for the Amendments which have been introduced into this clause, and though he says he is not seeking bouquets—I am sure he is not—I gladly offer him at least a verbal bouquet. I should like to say that we do appreciate the way in which he has tried, though not always successfully, to meet the points we have put forward. The moral that I derive from all this is that if we really want an Amendment carried we must put up my noble friend Lord Rathcreedan to move it. We shall certainly bear that very much in mind.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I have explained this Amendment in the course of my last speech. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 42, line 41, after ("notice") insert—
("(a) any such public authority by whom the council have been so notified; and
(b)").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the same applies here. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 43, line 9, leave out ("giving") and insert ("service").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the same applies here also. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 43, line 28, leave out ("time") and insert ("date of service").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the same applies to this Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 43, line 40, at end insert—
("(3) If, in the case of an application under subsection (1) of this section, at the expiration of the period mentioned in that subsection the council have not served the notice required thereby, then, for the purposes of subsection (2) of this section, the council shall be deemed to have duly served on the applicant at the expiration of the said period such a notice as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of the said subsection (2) with respect to the whole of the land to which the application related.
(4) Without prejudice to the duty imposed by subsection (1) of this section on a council to whom an application under that subsection has been made, the council may require the applicant to pay to them a fee of five shillings.").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this is consequential to Amendment No. 26 in Clause 33. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 43, line 41, leave out ("The two last preceding sections") and insert ("Section thirty-two of this Act").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this Amendment comes into the group I was moving a short time ago. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 43, line 43, leave out ("the last preceding subsection") and insert ("subsection (2) of this section").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the same applies to this Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 43, line 47, leave out ("last preceding subsection") and insert ("said subsection (2)").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
VISCOUNT GAGE VISCOUNT GAGE had given notice of an Amendment to insert the following new subsection:
("(4) Regulations made by the Minister under this section shall define the meaning of "proposal" for the purposes of this section and may specify conditions subject to which it shall be incumbent upon the council of a county borough or county district under subsection (1) of this section to register a proposal notified to such council by a public authority possessing compulsory purchase powers.")
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I was quite satisfied with the Lord Chancellor's explanation that the circular was a better method, and therefore I will not move this Amendment.
Clause 36:
Additional payments in cases where no claim has been established
36.—(1) If, in the case of a compulsory acquisition to which this Part of this Act applies, it is shown to the satisfaction of the appropriate authority that the relevant land or some part thereof does not constitute or form part of the claim area of any established claim, but that a claim or claims in respect of one or more interests in that land, or, as the case may be, in that part thereof, would have been established if made, there shall be issued by or on behalf of the Treasury a certificate specifying—

(a)whether or not, in the opinion of the person signing the certificate, section thirty two of this Act would have applied to the compulsory acquisition if the claim or claims aforesaid had been established; and

(b) if so, what in that person's opinion would have been the amount of the additional compensation calculated by reference to the unexpended balance of established development value of that land or that part thereof which would have been payable under that section in respect of the acquisition of the relevant interest.

(2) Where an amount has been specified as aforesaid and, after taking into account all the circumstances, the appropriate authority is of opinion that it is just and reasonable that a payment should be made in addition to what would be the compensation payable in respect of the acquisition of the relevant interest apart from the provisions of this section, there shall be added to that compensation such amount as the appropriate authority may direct, being an amount not exceeding that specified in the certificate aforesaid.
4.32 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "it is shown to the satisfaction of the appropriate authority" and insert "the appropriate authority is satisfied." The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, this Amendment is put forward in order
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to express more precisely the Government's intention for the working of the clause. This is the clause which was designed to prevent repetitions of what has become known as the "Pilgrim case." Your Lordships will remember that during the Committee stage anxiety was expressed that the various appropriate authorities which will have to operate the clause may act independently and inconsistently, and it was suggested that either regulations should be made or practice notes, as they are called, issued. It is a common matter of administrative machinery that, when a statutory obligation is laid upon a number of different authorities, arrangements are made by instruction to those concerned to secure co-ordination and consistency.
In the present case, the Treasury will initiate discussions with the various appropriate authorities to this end. The aim will be to ensure that all straightforward cases are picked up at the outset, and that there is no delay or argument about including the supplement in the price offered. I am bound to admit that there will be some cases which are not quite straightforward. But there will, in any event, be administrative arrangements for ensuring that consultation takes place among the appropriate authorities, that advice is given on any cases where any doubt arises, and that all the appropriate authorities act on similar lines. If experience suggests that anything in the nature of practice notes would be practicable and useful, that suggestion will be borne in mind. I hope that, to that extent, that satisfies the first point about the getting of consistency and a common basis of action between the various Ministers and Departments involved.
The second point with regard to procedure is closer to the immediate point of the Amendment. The implication of the clause as it stands might be taken to be that nothing happens unless someone shows to the satisfaction of the appropriate authority that a claim could have been made—that is, that the initiative rests with the owner of the land in question, or possibly with the acquiring authority. That is a point which was worrying your Lordships, and which was expressed during the Committee stage. I want to meet that point, because it is the intention, not that the claimant should have to hunt and pursue the Government Department, but that the Government

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Department should go and look for the claimant who is in this position and satisfy his needs. In practice, the appropriate authority—that is, the confirming Minister—would not be precluded from taking the initiative.
I want to assure the House that the intention, in fact, is that at the earliest stage at which price or compensation comes in question, the person negotiating the purchase on behalf of the acquiring authority will make a point of drawing the attention of the owner to this clause, and it should be in the minds of both the parties throughout the negotiations. The idea is that the Minister and his Department should draw attention to this supplement that is given by this clause. Care will be taken to ensure that the person negotiating is in a position to act on the view of the appropriate authority without delay. The point of the Amendment is to delete the implication—to eliminate the fear—that it will be up to the owner to inform himself of the effect of the clause. Your Lordships will appreciate that the procedure will need to be gone into thoroughly with the appropriate authorities, and I cannot at this stage give a detailed forecast of how it will work in every particular. However, I hope that the assurances that I have given will allay the disquiet which has been felt on these two points. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 44, line 22, leave out from ("applies") to ("that") in line 23 and insert ("the appropriate authority is satisfied").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD HYLTON: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble and learned Viscount for the two assurances that he has given us on this subject. These points were fairly fully discussed on the earlier stage of the Bill, and there seemed to be large gaps and occasions where confusion could arise from the unco-ordinated efforts of the Ministries, Departments and local authorities concerned. The noble and learned Viscount has to a certain degree set our minds at rest on the first point. It appears that the draftsmen of circulars will be fairly busy over the next few weeks. There will be another circular, this time from the Treasury, to co-ordinate the various authorities and Ministries who are compulsorily acquiring these properties. The
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second point, I think your Lordships will agree, is equally important, because, if I understood the noble and learned Viscount correctly, the onus of initiating action will lie with the authority or Department. That will be a great help to any small owner, or large owner, too, who receives the statutory notice to treat for a compulsory purchase order and who is a non-claim holder—that is to say, one of those persons unfortunate enough not to have established a claim under the original 1947 Act. I should like to thank the Government for the action they have taken on these two points, which will be of considerable value to many thousands who, in future, will have compulsory purchase orders served upon them.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
4.38 p.m.
LORD HYLTON LORD HYLTON moved, after subsection (1) to insert:
"(2) Provision shall be made by regulations under this section—

(a) for enabling the person from whom the relevant interest was acquired, if he wishes to dispute the decision of the appropriate authority as to whether a claim referred to in this section would have been established if made or the calculation of the amount of the additional compensation specified in the said certificate, to require the said decision or the said calculation or both to be referred to the Lands Tribunal; and

(b) for enabling the said person to be heard by the Tribunal on any reference under this subsection; and

(c) for requiring the Tribunal, on any such reference, either to confirm or to vary the said decision of the appropriate authority or, as the case may be, the amount of the additional compensation specified in the said certificate."

The noble Lord said: My Lords, perhaps your Lordships will allow me, in discussing this Amendment, to refer also to Amendment No. 39, which comes immediately after this, and Amendment No. 41, which is consequential on Amendment No. 38. On the last stage of this Bill, the noble and learned Viscount asked us to attune our minds during the intervening days to the Government proposals. I should like to say that a number of my noble friends and I have done our best, by frequent consultations between ourselves and with those who have greater practical knowledge of the practical effects of this clause, to do as he asked. We have bent our minds, to the best of our abilities, to the difficulties

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arising from the hardship clause, because this is a hardship clause which is intended to help all those who are subjected to a compulsory purchase order while not being claim-holders. Although we have done what we can to think round this matter, there are still two main points where we feel that under the Government proposals something is being subtracted from the rights which the individual owner had under the 1947 Act. Briefly, what the owner loses is his right of appeal. Under the 1947 Act an owner had a right of appeal against the Government valuer if the Government valuer would not agree that he had established a claim. That is the first stage in these negotiations: an owner has to establish a claim. Under the 1947 Act, an appeal lay against that decision. That we thought, and still think, is a valuable safeguard to any owner of land who is attacked by, or subjected to, a compulsory purchase order. There are a good number—I think we all agree now, certainly on this side of the House, and I think generally on all sides of the House—of non-claim-holders who to-day and in the near future—and in the far future, too—will, in the course of events, have compulsory purchase orders served on them without their having a claim. As what we call lard with claims is used up, the local authorities and Government Departments will, of necessity, have to move to "no claim" land. That is already beginning to happen.
The Amendment seeks to do two things which would put the persons with no claim to-day in exactly the same position in which they would have been if they had attempted to establish a claim under Part VI of the 1947 Act. The first part of the Amendment gives owners a right of appeal to the Lands Tribunal against a decision by the appropriate authority (and in most cases, we are told, the "appropriate authority" is the Minister) that a claim would not have been established. Under the clause, the Minister, in his discretion, can say that no claim would have been established. Nobody could say that under the 1947 Act because there was a right of appeal, The second half of the Amendment deals with an appeal to the same body—that is, the Lands Tribunal—against the amount of the additional compensation to be paid. It is a valuation question, and although it is subject to the discretion of the Minister, the proper
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amount of additional compensation is a question which can well be argued on both sides. Although the Minister, at the wish of the Government, is allowed discretion, we say that the discretion should not be so wide as to exclude any appeal against the amount of the compensation.
These two appeals under the 1947 Act were part of the safeguards for the individual against the all-powerful State when he has his land compulsorily acquired. They were referred to in another context, the designation of land, by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House as right and proper safeguards. The clause as it stands to-day contains no safeguards except what is described as being, in the opinion of the Minister, "just and reasonable." That, of course, is a discretionary power. I think the noble and learned. Viscount made considerable point on the Committee stage that the Minister was to have a quite unfettered discretion in these matters: that he would have discretion to award less compensation than was arrived at on a valuation by a Government valuer, but that there was to be no appeal against any such figure. In effect, this takes away this right of appeal under the 1947 Act because the original owner of the land did not do one thing: he did not fill up a form; he did not make a claim. That is the only reason why these non-claim-holders exist—they did not fill up the claim forms. That is their sole crime. Admittedly, they were wrong. They were told by every means possible at the time to fill up these forms to establish claims: they were told by the Central Land Board; they were told by the Government, and they were told by the wireless and in the Press. But the fact is that they did not do so.
Many of these people are small land owners and many are ignorant. There are many circumstances and motives in individual cases which affected their decisions. It was wrong of them not to fill in these forms, but surely it was not so wrong that they should be denied any form of appeal under this new legislation, discretion of the Minister or no discretion of the Minister. That is the case we are making this afternoon. None of the major commandments has been broken by these owners, although they did break the Government's instructions at the time. The altitude that if you do something rather wrong you must be punished for it is surely not an attitude that can be adopted

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in what I can only describe as an adult democracy. I do not think it is wise to treat people as if they were very much younger and more inexperienced than in fact they are. This attitude really savours more of the schoolmaster and the bad boy, or the schoolmistress and the naughty girl, than of ordinary transactions between grown-up people. I feel that many of your Lordships may well think that, in these circumstances, there should be an appeal against the appropriate authority's refusal of the establishment of a claim, which it is able to do under the first part of this clause, and that such an appeal should be to the Lands Tribunal.
On the question of the second right of appeal, namely, that on the amount of the compensation payable, we urge the Government to look at that matter also. As your Lordships are aware, the sum of the additional compensation is assessed by the Government valuer and represents the difference between the existing value and the development value of the property in question. As was said on the Second Reading, as was said in Committee, and as I propose to say again to-day, it is without question known that in these matters of valuation between individuals and the district valuer, there frequently occurs a large gap between the district valuer's valuation and the owner's valuation; and in many cases this gap cannot be closed without going to arbitration or appeal. In this clause there is no such right, and we think that there should he one.
I do not wish to detain your Lordships, but we have referred to previous Motions in your Lordships' House, all devoted to one point—that there shall be a right of appeal by the individual when his property is affected and when he feels he is suffering from injurious treatment. This is new legislation, and we are told that everything is to be "at the discretion"—that this is merely a hardship discretionary payment. Is that right? Should it merely be left at the discretion of a Minister? If the Government believe in the proper ownership of private property, your Lordships may well think that the two safeguards to the owner which are in the 1947 Act should be now inserted in this Bill. Before I sit down, I should like to ask the noble and learned Viscount (who I hope is to reply) whether he will
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indicate in his reply whether the Government, while not being able to accept the whole of the Amendment I am now moving, would be prepared to accept the next Amendment standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Ridley. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 44, line 38, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Hylton.)
4.53 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, the noble Lord who has moved the Amendment and his friends have directed their minds to a dilemma which I think is apparent on the face of Clause 36 as it stands. As I see it, before the Minister can exercise his discretion at all as to whether it is just and reasonable that he should make some payment, there has to be a certificate by an official of the Treasury that Clause 32 of this Bill applies—that is, that a person had a claim but did not make it; and, secondly, the same person has to certify the amount. As the clause stands, there is not even a statutory opportunity for the person who is affected to be heard. Strictly speaking, on this clause the Treasury officials can make their decision without giving the applicant any opportunity of stating his case. Whether or not in fact there will be another circular issued directing the Treasury officials to hear persons, I do not know; but obviously this is of no value unless the applicant has an opportunity of stating his case. If we are out to give people satisfaction, to make them feel that justice is being done, they ought at least to have an opportunity of saying everything they possibly can, both as to whether they would have had a claim and on the amount.
So far, I think, we are on common ground on both sides of the House. But I am not so sure of the remedy—and here I want to repeat something that I said on the occasion of the Committee stage of the Scottish Bill. It is entirely in the hands of the Minister as to whether or not, in the end, the payment is made; he has to decide whether it is just and reasonable, and so far we have heard no indication as to the basis upon which he will make such a decision. The remedy proposed in the Amendment is that the applicant shall have the right to go to the Lands Tribunal if he is not satisfied. The noble Lord who moved the Amendment

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drew a parallel with the 1947 Act. But there is this distinction: that in the case of the 1947 Act, if you made out your case and had a claim, it was intended that eventually you would be paid out. The question of payment was not a matter within anybody's discretion: having made his case, automatically, in due course, an owner was to be paid.
It seems to me a little difficult now to encourage people to go to the Tribunal, to make out their claim, establish that they would have had a claim, establish the amount, and then leave them liable to be turned down by the Minister, on the ground that the additional compensation is not just and reasonable. It seems to me, that if this Amendment were to be accepted, the Minister would be virtually forced to make a payment in every case where the applicant succeeded. Having put these small people, as they often are, to expense and trouble, and having held out hopes to them that if they went to the Lands Tribunal and succeeded they would be paid, I cannot see any Minister, in practice, then saying: "I am sorry; you would have had a claim if you had made it. This is the amount agreed, but nevertheless, it is not just and reasonable that you should be paid." I feel that the Amendment falls down on that ground. I imagine that by giving himself a discretion, the Minister intends that he shall not have to pay in every case. There will be cases when he will not pay, and I think the noble and learned Viscount on Second Reading gave some illustrations (which I imagine were not intended to be comprehensive) of the kind of cases in which the Minister might not pay. I think we have to be careful, if it is intended that this power is to be purely discretionary, that we do not hold out too high hopes to people that, automatically, they will get paid if they establish that they would have had a claim. In that case the injury would be far worse than to have held out no hopes to them at all.
What, then, is the solution? The applicant ought to have an opportunity of putting his case. The method of doing so laid down in the Amendment is cumbersome, expensive and likely to hold out too high hopes to the applicant if he succeeds. It will tend to take away from the Minister the discretion which, under the clause, he is intended to have.
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I should prefer that before the Treasury official makes a decision adverse to the applicant, he should give the applicant an opportunity of coming and talking things over. Whether that is done by regulation or whether it is put into the clause itself, I do not much mind. It would require some Amendment because the clause does not at present provide for making regulations. But, in the long run, it would be far more beneficial to the applicant himself to give him a chance of making his case informally, rather than putting him to the formidable expense and trouble of going to the Land Tribunal, only to find that he may not get this compensation because it is not just and reasonable that he should do so. That may not be a very helpful suggestion, but we are all rather thinking aloud in this very difficult matter. I feel that this can better be done by administration.
5.2 p.m.
VISCOUNT RIDLEY: My Lords, I was very interested to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said on this Amendment, though I do not entirely agree with him that this is holding out too high hopes. As I understood from what was said in the debate on the Committee stage, it was intended that all these claims should be paid except in exceptional cases. Perhaps we are in danger of getting on to the subject matter of the next Amendment, dealing with the Minister's discretion, but that matter must come in. Where an owner had bought the land since the claim, at a price based on the 1947 existing or near existing use values, and makes a claim, he clearly could not expect to get anything. I do not believe such a person would be disappointed or that the Minister in such a case would have any difficulty at all in exercising his discretion by saying the claim was not reasonable or fair. But it does make us consider how obscure is the procedure laid down in Clause 36. The very fact that the appropriate authority becomes satisfied means that there has been the use of a valuation of some sort. It must be done by the district valuer. The establishment of a claim must differ between the existing use value and the unrestricted use value of 1947. So that before the appropriate authority (in this and nearly every case, the Minister) makes any decision, he has to go to the

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valuer to find whether or not a claim can be made, and that involves valuation. After that, the valuer has to make the calculation as to what would be the claim under this Act. There is enough complication there to bear out the contention that a person who wishes to make a claim at least has a right to make representations.
The matter is so complicated that an applicant has not a chance unless he can go as a right and argue and bargain with the valuer who is deciding on behalf of the authority. Further, it would seem only fair that as, under the 1947 Act, he had the right of appeal, we should give the right of appeal here, too. I think it is right to say that unless an Amendment of this kind is made, the procedure under this Bill will be the only process or procedure under any of the various Acts which operate which does not provide for a right of appeal against a valuation made on behalf of the Government. I am open to correction but I know of no other. That would be a bad precedent to make now—that Government valuations are never to be subject to challenge—particularly on this Bill, which is intended to put right mistakes which might arise and to avoid doing injury to people who might suffer as a result of planning decisions. It would seem, therefore, that unless such a right of appeal is given, not only will this establish an exception in the procedure as between a Government valuer and ordinary people, but, also, it will establish a case where no discussion can be held. So far as I can see, no points could be put forward in attempting to substantiate a claim. It is important that this Amendment should enable a decision of that kind, made entirely within Government circles and announced by the Minister, to be challenged in some way, so that everyone may feel that he has had a chance of making his case and receiving justice.
5.8 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I appreciate the anxiety which noble Lords feel on this matter, but if my noble friend Lord Hylton will permit me to say so, I take some exception to his description of this clause as one to punish the wrongdoer. Its whole purpose was to give somebody who had not taken the
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course he might have taken under the 1947 Act a right from which that person, by his action, had debarred himself. I feel that my noble friend's reproach was a little severe, since the whole intention of the Government here is to give a right and to give it as freely as may be possible. If my noble friend has it in mind to go further and, at this hour of the day, to try to upset the whole basis of these claims and to create at this moment a state of things where anyone (not someone in Mr. Pilgrim's unfortunate position) is to be able to use this machinery as a method for trying to prove, seven years later, that he had a development value of which he had not the slightest idea or conception in 1947 or 1948, let me say that that is not the purpose of the clause.
LORD HYLTON: My Lords, nothing is further from my mind. This, surely, is a clause to redress hardship and not to reopen claims that have never been made. It is entirely a question of raising a clause to redress hardship where it arises to a non-claim holder where notice to treat has not been served.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am glad that my noble friend and I have moved towards each other sufficiently for him to realise that this is a clause to remove hardship and not one to punish the wrongdoer. That is quite clear, and I am glad the noble Lord abjures the other suggestions, so let us say no more about it.
May I come to the general point which was made by Lord Silkin with regard to the prerequisites? The certificate, as the noble Lord said, deals with the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b). I think he will agree with me, from his great experience, that paragraph (a) will, on every conceivable example, be used only in favour of the claimant. It will be used when a claimant can get market value under Clause 34. It is not barring a claimant's advantages; it is adding to them, by taking him to a higher scale. Paragraph (b) is a matter of notification. I gathered from Lord Hylton that, while he preferred the whole of his first Amendment, he would be prepared to consider the second Amendment, and he is largely concerned with this question of qualification. Now may I make this point perfectly clear? I have always

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proceeded on the assumption that the claimant would see and negotiate with the district valuer. As I have understood it, there is nothing to stop him from doing that. It has never occurred to me that it would be possible for the district valuer to prevent the claimant from seeing him. I have proceeded on the basis that he can not only write to the district valuer, but can see him, argue with him, and put his case to him. No one with whom I have been discussing the Bill has any doubt about the claimant's right to do that. If noble Lords have any misgivings, I will have another look before tomorrow, and if there is any doubt at all that will be put right.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, if the noble Viscount will allow me to interpose, perhaps I can describe—I will not say explain—the procedure as I understand it. Under the 1947 Act, the first thing is that the district valuer makes a determination. Before that, you do not see the district valuer at all. He makes his determination on the facts that he is given. There is no consultation about this determination, and it is only if you appeal (you are told that you can appeal within, I think, sixty days after the determination has been made) that you can have discussion with the district valuer as an alternative to proceeding with the appeal. The intention of noble Lords on both sides of the Committee is that discussion should take place as of right with the person who is going to issue the certificate before he makes up his mind. That is not the present practice.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am glad that Lord Silkin has raised that point. The practice, as I envisage it, and the practice which I am told will be put into operation, is this: that the Minister who is the authority in the matter will hear, either from sources open to him inside his Department, including the acquiring authority, or from the claimant, that the two prerequisites are complied with—namely, that there was no claim but that there was a right to a claim. As I told your Lordships in introducing my own Amendment on that point, the Minister who is the appropriate authority will have the duty of seeking out the claimant in the matter; and whey he has sought him out and conveyed the fact that the Minister is satisfied that the two prerequisites have been complied with, then the matter
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will go to the Treasury official, who will be the district valuer, to discuss the two questions under paragraphs (a) and (b). In any example I have been able to see, paragraph (a) can be applied only to the benefit of the claimant, because it means that he moves out of this field of compensation and into a better field Paragraph (b) is a matter of quantification. The claimant is put in touch with the district valuer and they will discuss the matter. That is a point I want to make clear: that, so far as that stage is concerned, no one can imagine that the district valuer would not see the claimant if there was any doubt on that point. I am told that, according to the Central Land Board, the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, is mistaken in saying that, even under the present procedure (of course the procedure may have changed since his day), there is no discussion preliminary to a determination. But, be that as it may, there will be discussion here. If there is any doubt about that I will clear up the point by tomorrow; but as I have said, I do not think there is. I think the basis of this is that there will be discussion.
Now we come to the next point, which is really the gravamen of Lord Hylton's suggestion that there should be an appeal. On the Committee stage I endeavoured to put to your Lordships the difficulties which exist here. And I do ask your Lordships again to consider the broad points. I do not want to repeat all my arguments, which some of your Lordships have heard, as to the difference between proceedings on a real claim and proceedings on a hypothetical claim. The real claim—the claim that existed—was established in relation to the various interests in the land at the time when they existed, and each owner of an interest was able to apply to the Central Land Board, each in respect of his own interest, with all the incidents and liabilities to which it was subject. And the Board were able to determine the question on a basis of facts and on the applications before them.
My Lords, put yourselves in the position of trying to formulate the rules for this appeal on the assumptions that have to be made. The facts about interests in the land at the material time may not be readily available. But assume that they are. One has then to make assumptions as to whether all the interests which might have claimed did claim; and it would be necessary to define the

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assumptions in a code of rules for the guidance of the Tribunal. The third stage is to ascertain what would be the amount of the unexpended balance and the amount of the claim, and to get them settled. Again, it would be necessary to provide a set of rules by which the Tribunal could assess the effect of the various acts or events which ought to come into the reckoning. Some of those which come into the reckoning on a real claim ought not to affect a hypothetical one—for example, compensation for planning restrictions is not payable where there is no claim, and it would be necessary to adapt the provisions of the Bill to ensure that deductions were not made as if such compensations were payable.
I know that your Lordships have a well-grounded suspicion of any Minister who raises procedural difficulties, but your Lordships are putting me in the position where I have to raise difficulties because your Lordships are driving me, or seeking to drive me, to apply justiciable procedure to hypothetical cases in which the Tribunal that ultimately decide the cases have to make these assumptions in order to find the barest prerequisites of justice. That is the position, and I am very anxious that noble Lords should not think I am entertaining for a moment the idea that injustice should be put in the way of the claimant here. This is an exceptional procedure, kept flexible in order that justice should be done. To show my good faith in this matter, if your Lordships will allow a slight procedural irregularity, I am prepared to accept the spirit of the next Amendment in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, which changes the onus in this matter. That Amendment seeks to add to the clause:
"Where an amount has been specified as aforesaid, the appropriate authority shall authorise the addition of that amount to what would be the compensation payable in respect of the acquisition of the relevant interest apart from the provisions of this section:
Provided that, if it appears just and reasonable to the appropriate authority that any lesser amount should be so added, that lesser amount shall be added."
I am not marrying myself to the noble Lord's words—he would not expect me to do so—but I am prepared to accept the spirit of his Amendment.
At the moment, the subsection says that the Minister shall make what payment he thinks is a just payment. I am
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prepared to accept that it should be put the other way: that he should make payment unless he thinks it is just and reasonable not to do so. It may be thought that there is no great difference between the two processes of thought, but any noble Lords who have dealt with political matters know that there is all the difference in the world between a Minister's having to justify a refusal and merely having to express a positive view. If it is put in the way the noble Viscount suggests, it puts a heavy onus on any Minister turning down a claim. I accept the principle and will have the words before your Lordships to-morrow, to show that it is not my intention, or the intention of the Government, to put difficulties in the way of the person whom we have in mind in this clause. As I said in introducing the Second Reading of the Bill, this clause was included to prevent other "Pilgrim cases" arising in the future. I have already amended subsection (1) in order to make it easier for a claimant and to place on the Minister a duty to seek him out. I am prepared to ensure that the claimant is entitled to put his case to the district valuer before the district valuer comes to a conclusion as to the assessment, and I am also prepared to accept the spirit of Lord Ridley's Amendment and put the onus the other way. But what I cannot justify myself in doing is to build this misty and ill-defined superstructure of hypotheses in order to give an appeal which, as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has said, would have a very doubtful effect in the reality of people's lives.
I have tried to show, as I have tried to show throughout the Bill, that I am not unreasonable; that I am always ready to accept a view, discuss it and consider it. But there are some things which I think are wrong. Again, I would remind the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, whose voice was one of the strongest and most persuasive, of the danger of town planning legislation which, in trying to meet every point, confronts the ordinary citizen with a legislative structure utterly beyond his comprehension. I have considered the rules and regulations that would be necessary in order to deal with this point. I cannot speak for your Lordships' comprehension, I speak only for my own, and I find great difficulty in seeing how I could comprehend what is suggested in this case. Therefore, I hope your Lordships will meet the spirit of

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these remarks of mine. I have agreed, irregularly perhaps, that I will meet the spirit of the noble Viscount's point; I have met Lord Silkin's point by saying that I will ensure that the claimant may see the valuer and be able to put his case; and I believe that, if that is done, this clause will secure substantial justice for the person whom we have in mind. I hope that your Lordships will be able to meet us on this point.
5.26 p.m.
VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, the noble and learned Viscount has indeed been reasonable in many directions. On this clause there appears to be a difference of opinion between my noble friends and other Members of your Lordships' House about the purpose of the concession, so-called. It has been represented as a great and generous gesture in which the claimant throws himself upon the mercy of the Minister and hopes for generous treatment, even though it be vicarious generosity at the expense, at least a great deal of it, of the ratepayer. Other noble Lords think that this ought to be a right, but that technical considerations, which I have no doubt are very great, prevent it from being a right and have made it necessary for Ministerial discretion to be given.
We talk in a very judicious manner in this House, but things happen outside this atmosphere which cause one to cogitate at times. I happened to see in a local paper that a man had his laid acquired at a price which did not appear to him to be fair, and he felt upset, rather in the same way as Mr. Pilgrim felt upset. His reaction, however, is different from that of Mr. Pilgrim. His line of conduct is to wait until the contractors of the local authority have built houses up to a certain level; then he proceeds to demolish them with a pickaxe. He is saying that he will go on doing that until he is put in prison or his price is paid. That is very regrettable and reprehensible. I would point out that the Press heading under which this case appeared was "Mr. So-and-So versus Officialdom." It is not a case of "versus officialdom" but of "versus the Act." I do not say that I stand for that kind of thing for a moment. It is going to embarrass local authorities enormously. But I hope we shall not get into a position where concessions are made and cases are met because people do
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irregular and violent things. That would make our position quite untenable.
I think people ought to feel that they have certain rights, and I find it extraordinarily difficult to understand the reason why the district valuer's verdict on the assessment of these claims cannot be subject to arbitration. The noble and learned Viscount dwelt at some length on the technical difficulties. It may be as he says. But when we come to appeals on rating assessments, for that purpose the valuers have to go back to the position in 1939. It is extraordinarily difficult to understand why it is so hard to assess the position in 1947 for one purpose and, when it comes to rating assessments, it is possible to go back to 1939. I do not believe that the public are going to be satisfied with the feeling that they have to establish themselves as good suppliants at the Minister's throne.
We have been told remarkably little. The noble and learned Viscount talked about nebulous hypotheses, and so forth; but we are under a great difficulty in understanding the somewhat nebulous hypothesis on which hardship is going to be established at all. My noble and learned friend indicated in his speech that he could see technical difficulties about questioning the Minister's discretion, dealt with in the first Amendment; but it is difficult to understand why it is so impossible to re-establish the position in regard to the district valuer's assessment, dealt with in the second Amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has indicated that if the Lands Tribunal arrived at a certain result the Minister would be bound to pay, unless there was a good reason against it. Frankly, I feel that that is not a bad thing. I do not know whether we can have any further explanation as to why the district valuer's figure cannot be appealed against.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If my noble friend will allow me, before he sits down will explain that point and make it clear. If my noble friend will look at the words, he will see that they are:
"… what in that person's opinion would have been the amount of the additional compensation calculated by reference to the unexpended balance of established development value of that land."
The difficulty is that, in order to arrive at that figure one has to start at the

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original claim and go through everything that has happened to the land since that time. Therefore, under the second proposal one comes back to the same position as in the first. I am sorry to have inflicted myself on your Lordships again.
5.32 p.m.
EARL JOWITT: My Lords, I confess that, on the whole, I am on the side of the angels—and by that I mean that I agree with the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor; I feel that he has made out a good case. However, I should like to take up, perhaps slightly irregularly, an observation he made. I believe the vice at the bottom of all this town and country planning legislation is just as he said: I believe that we have made it so complicated that the ordinary man does not understand what it is all about. That leads me to say this. I hope that, when this Bill is passed, the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, will put this Bill on his consolidation list, and try to consolidate it with the other Act, and, in doing so, use all the influence he can to induce the draftsman to use as simple language as possible, to see whether we cannot get a code which is more understandable to the ordinary people. I was glad to hear him say that he had found difficulty in understanding the Act. When I had to expound it I had the greatest difficulty to understand what it was all about. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, was not then in this House; I wish that he had been, because it would have made it much easier for me.
The only other point I wish to make is this. It should be quite easy to make it plain that the person, whoever he may be, in carrying out his obligation under paragraph (b), should give an opportunity to the claimant to make his case. As the Lord Chancellor is going to look at this matter again, perhaps I may humbly make this suggestion to him. If he will look at paragraph (b), I think he will agree that it could be easily done by making the words read:
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"if so, what in the opinion which that person has formed after giving the claimant an opportunity of presenting his case …"
If some such words as those were put in, then it would be clear beyond any peradventure that the district valuer, or the official carrying out that obligation, before coming to a conclusion would have to give the person concerned a chance of stating his case. I suggest to the noble and learned Viscount that he might, in the still watches of the night, consider whether some Amendment on those lines would not meet the difficulty and make it clear to us all that a man will have a chance of stating his case.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, if your Lordships will allow me to speak again, I should like to say that I shall certainly consider that suggestion.
LORD HYLTON: My Lords, we are grateful to the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, for what he has told us. He has said that the claimant (and this is a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin) would have free power to negotiate with the district valuer. That point was also made by the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, and I think the Lord Chancellor agreed about that. That helps us a little, but it does not give us the appeal that we ask for. The noble and learned Viscount spoke of the great difficulties of establishing an appeal, and told us that hypothetical assumptions were difficult to make. To the best of our ability, however, we have consulted those who practise in these matters, and I believe that the difficulty is not so great as we have been told to-day. We are grateful to the Government for saying that they will accept the principle of my noble friend's Amendment, No. 40 on the Marshalled List; but that does not give us the right of appeal for which we have asked when compensation is being assessed. These things are valuable in themselves, but they do not meet the point that we have so earnestly stressed and which we so much desire to see put into this Bill.
On Question: Whether the Amendment shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 18; Not-Contents, 26.

CONTENTS

Buckinghamshire. E

Goschen, V.

Monson, L.

Mansfield, E.

Ridley, V. [Teller.]

O'Hagan, L.

Selborne, E.

Saltoun, L.

Broughshane, L.

Somers, L.

Bridgeman, V.

Chesham, L.

Strathcarron, L.

FitzAlan of Derwent, V.

Digby, L.

Wolverton L.

Gage, V.

Hylton, L. [Teller.]

NOT-CONTENTS

Kilmuir, V. (L. Chancellor.)

Munster, E.

Carrington, L.

Onslow, E. [Teller.]

De L'Isle and Dudley, L.

Salisbury, M. (L. President.)

St. Aldwyn, E.

Ebbisham, L.

Cholmondeley, M.

Selkirk, E.

Hacking, L.

Reading, M.

Shaftesbury, E.

Hampton, L.

Hawke, L.

Albemarle, E.

Furness, V.

Lloyd, L.

De La Warr, E.

Swinton, V.

Mancroft, L.

Dundonald, E.

Rea, L.

Fortescue, E. [Teller.]

Aberdare, L.

Teynham, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
LORD HYLTON: My Lords, in view of the opinion of the House which has just been expressed, I do not propose to move the next Amendment.
5.47 p.m.
VISCOUNT RIDLEY VISCOUNT RIDLEY moved to leave out subsection (2) and insert:
"(2) Where an amount has been specified as aforesaid, the appropriate authority shall authorise the addition of that amount to what would be the compensation payable in respect of the acquisition of the relevant interest apart from the provisions of this section:
Provided that, if it appears just and reasonable to the appropriate authority that any lesser amount should be so added, that lesser amount shall be added."
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, in moving this Amendment, I am encouraged by what the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack has said. I hope that he is still of the same mind as he was before he recently found what was the opinion of the House on Amendment No. 38. In effect, this Amendment means exactly what the noble and learned Viscount said—that the Minister makes this payment unless he can prove that it is better not to do so. There is a change of emphasis here which I think will give a good deal of reassurance to people who have these claims to make. It may make people feel that prima facie they have a right to the additional compensation and that they would be denied this claim only in circumstances which were exceptional. I think it is a reasonable thing to ask. I would have tried to support it by examples in other legislation where the
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onus is one way unless the opposite can be proved, but as the noble and learned Viscount has said that he is willing to accept the spirit of the Amendment, I feel that it is better that I should move it briefly and rely upon him to find words to express what I intend. I confess that I hold no brief for the words I have put down. I am glad that the noble and learned Viscount has appreciated the intention of the Amendment, and that he is willing to incorporate something to give effect to it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 44, line 39, leave out subsection (2) and insert the said new subsection.—(Viscount Ridley.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, if I may at once take up what my noble friend has said, I assure him that when I make a pronouncement like that it is not conditional upon the mover voting in the same Lobby as myself. I should like to assure my noble friend that what I shall put down to-morrow is an Amendment to meet the spirit which he has suggested just now, though not, perhaps, in exactly the same words.
VISCOUNT RIDLEY: My Lords, I should be more than satisfied if the noble and learned Viscount would do that. I am obliged to him and I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 37 [Compensation for severance, injurious affection and disturbance]:
LORD MIANCROFT: My Lords, this is only a drafting Amendment. The point is that the "other interest affected"

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referred to in the paragraph may subsist in a wider area than the "interest affected" which is primarily under consideration. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 47, line 5, at end insert ("in which the interest in question subsists;")—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 41 [Exchequer contribution towards compensation in certain cases]:
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, the regulations to be made under paragraph (d) of subsection (2) will have to provide, first, for deducting the amount of any contribution paid by the Minister under this clause from the unexpended balance and, secondly, for ensuring that no deduction is made in so far as the contribution has been recovered by the Minister under the next clause. To achieve this involves more than a strict application of the provisions of Part II, mainly because the contribution is not recovered directly from the developer but is deducted by the Minister from the compensation for depreciation which the developer is required to refund. The Amendment is little more than drafting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 52, line 20, after ("applying") insert ("with any necessary modifications").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 42 [Recovery, on subsequent development, of compensation under s. 22 of principal Act]:
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment too. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 52, line 25, leave out from beginning to ("shall") in line 26 and insert ("subsections (1) to (8) of section thirty of this Act").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this is a consequential Amendment on Amendment No. 44 which has just been agreed to. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 52,line 28, leave out ("it has") and insert ("they have").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 44 [Right to compensation in respect of past planning decisions, or past revocations, etc., of planning permission]:
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this and the next three Amendments to Clause 44 (that is, Amendments Nos. 46 to 48) are consequential on the amalgamation of Clauses 26 and 27. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 54, line 39, after ("land") insert ("or of an interest in so far as it subsisted in qualified land").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 54, line 41, leave out ("and twenty-seven").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this again is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 54, line 45, leave out from ("if") to ("and") in line 3 on page 55 and insert ("the reference in subsection (1) of the said section twenty-six to Part II of this Act were a reference to this Part of this Act;").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 55, line 6, leave out ("the said subsection (1)") and insert ("subsection (2) of the said section twenty-six").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, Clause 19 (5), which this Amendment proposes should not apply to decisions given before the Bill comes into operation, relates to cases where compensation is payable under Section 22 (3) of the 1947 Act in consequence of the withdrawal of a planning permission previously granted by development order. Compensation in these cases is assessed as if the permission in question had been revoked. For the future, the compensation payable on a revocation will, as the result of Clause 39, cover the whole of the loss or damage caused by the order, and it is quite right that nothing further should be payable. But in past cases a claim should lie,

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because the compensation payable under the 1947 Act excluded compensation for depreciation. The purpose of this Amendment is to put that matter to rights. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 55, line 13, leave out ("(5)") and insert ("(4)").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD HYLTON LORD HYLTON moved, after Clause 48 to insert the following new clause:
Joint claim holders.
".When two or more persons are jointly entitled to a claim holding the unexpended balance of established development value attributable to that claim holding shall, subject to any agreement to the contrary, belong to all the persons jointly entitled to the claim holding in such proportions as they are entitled to the claim holding and any sum which comes to the hands of any of them on account of such unexpended balance of established development value shall be accounted for accordingly."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I am moving this Amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lord Coleraine, who recently left for the United States of America. This Amendment is quite uncontroversial. It tries to rectify a position with which I do not intend to delay your Lordships very long, of a dissolved partnership where there is an agreed claim for loss of development value and in the terms of the dissolution of the partnership it has been agreed that the compensation shall be shared equally between the parties concerned. Under this new Bill, a new position arises, because the compensation is now attached to the land. But the partner who left the partnership has no longer any interest in the land, and therefore finds himself in a position where he can establish no basis on which to claim his share of compensation with his late partner. I do not know whether it is the right place for such an Amendment to appear, but certainly in the opinion of my noble friend Lord Coleraine there is a point that requires elucidation, if that is possible. I do not wish to detain your Lordships. I think I have said enough to show the purpose of this small Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 48, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Hylton.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this is a very troublesome point because the purpose of the Amendment is
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to enable a person who is a part owner of a claim on the £300 million fund to benefit from any payment which may be made for the unexpended balance of established development value founded on the claim. It is an attempt to provide for the situation which arises when a partnership has been dissolved during the currency of the unamended 1947 Act, and the land previously owned has fallen to the share of one or more of the partners, but the claim holding has been retained in the ownership of the partnership. Undoubtedly the effect of this Bill is that, once the operation of Parts I and V has been completed, the claim holding ceases to be personal property or to have any value in itself. It merges in the unexpended balance of established development value, and that balance is an incident of the land. The 1947 Act divorced the development value from the land. The remarriage of the two is fundamental to this Bill. That is why, wherever one's sympathies may lie, what this Amendment proposes is fundamentally unworkable.
I should like your Lordships to consider what would happen—because I think this tests the workability—when the land was built on or, if minerals were in it, when the minerals were worked. As the development value was realised, the unexpended balance would be correspondingly reduced, and when the land was fully developed the unexpended balance would have been used up, although no payment had ever been made on account of it. Would your Lordships consider again what would happen if the erstwhile partners had already sold the land. The new owners would have bought in the expectation that the land carried certain rights to compensation which apparently this clause would destroy. Or, again, the partner who took the land might have died and his estate have been distributed. When one considers all these points, I am afraid that it is quite impossible to do what the clause attempts to do and to treat the unexpended balance as a piece of personal property separable from the land. We can only hope that the partners have made provision for dealing with this matter in the partnership agreement, and that they are still able to settle it between themselves. I am sorry that I cannot agree to this Amendment.
LORD HYLTON: My Lords, I am obliged for the answer given by the noble and learned Viscount. I shall have to communicate with my noble friend Lord Coleraine. In the circumstances, I am afraid that it will be rather cold comfort for him. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 49 [Provision of information as to unexpended balance, etc.]:
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this Amendment and the next four on the Order Paper in the name of my noble and learned friend all deal with a single point, and, with the permission of the House, I will try to discuss them all together as briefly as I can. Subsection (2) provides for the issue to an acquiring authority of a certificate stating the amount of the unexpended balance at the date of notice to treat. Subsection (3) already provides opportunity for those concerned to dispute any new apportionment involved in the calculation. But there is a second element involved which may lead to differences of opinion, namely the extent to which the unexpended balance should be written down under Clause 18 (4) to take account of any development of the land. The Amendments which I am now moving provide for this also to be the subject of representation and reference to the Lands Tribunal. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 60, line 45, after ("apportionment") insert ("or, in the case of a certificate under the last preceding subsection, involves the calculation of a deduction from the original unexpended balance of established development value of the land by virtue of subsection (4) of section eighteen of this Act").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 61, line 8, after ("apportionment") insert ("or calculation,").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this is also consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 61, line 9, after ("apportionment") insert ("or calculation").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this is another consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 61, line 15, after ("apportionment") insert ("or calculation").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this also is consequential. I beg to move.
Page 61, line 20, after ("apportionment ") insert ("or calculation,").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
6.2 p.m
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this Amendment does two things. It makes a certificate issued to an acquiring authority under subsection (2) of the clause conclusive evidence of the unexpended balance. Since those concerned will have had full opportunity of carrying the matter to the Lands Tribunal before the certificate is issued, there should be no question of their being able to contest it again in arbitration proceedings under the Acquisition of Land Act, 1919. The second part of the new subsection obviates the need to produce evidence in support of any facts stated in a certificate under subsection (1), unless they are contested. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 61, line 44, at end insert—
("(6) A certificate under subsection (2) of this section shall be conclusive evidence of the unexpended balance shown therein, and a certificate under subsection (1) of this section shall be sufficient proof of any facts stated therein unless the contrary is shown").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 50 [Cancellation or reduction of liability for development charges]:
LORD MANCROFT: This is merely a drafting Amendment, designed to remove a contradiction within the clause. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 63, line 45, after ("section") insert (",except in subsection (4) thereof,").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 51:
Exchequer grants to local authorities
(4) The amount of any grant paid to a local authority in accordance with regulations made under this section—
(a) where that amount is calculated by reference to annual costs incurred or treated

1477
as incurred by the authority in respect of the borrowing of money to defray expenditure in respect of which the grant is made, or by reference to the excess of such annual costs over the receipts, or the annual value of receipts, mentioned in paragraph (b) of the last foregoing subsection, shall not exceed an amount equal to fifty per cent. of those costs, or of that excess, as the case may be;
6.4 p.m.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved, in subsection (4) (b), to leave out "fifty per cent." and insert "the specified percentage". The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment. It is in similar terms to the Amendment which was moved by Lord Luke on the Committee stage, and I am glad that my Amendment has been rendered respectable by having associated with it the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley. We discussed on the Committee stage this question of playing fields and there is not much that I am able to add to the arguments that we then put forward and which I thought made some impression upon the noble and learned Viscount. He may remember that the Amendment was supported by a considerable number of noble Lords, and he gave an assurance that the matter would be considered again.
The purpose we have in mind is that there should be encouragement in the form of increased grants given to local authorities towards the establishment of playing fields and allotments. This is often regarded as a matter affecting only urban areas, but I should like to assure the noble and learned Viscount that it affects the countryside just as much. I know a great many villages where there are no playing fields and no alternative attractions of any kind, and children are just allowed to go wild and get themselves into mischief. They organise themselves into bands for the purpose of making mischief, and instead of having organised games they have organised gangs. This is a real problem. In some villages I know young people get together for the purpose of letting loose cattle or pigs, and quite often a number of animals are found walking around the streets looking for an owner, the animals having been let loose by the young people. I am sure there is nothing in it except the fact that they have no other means of occupying their time. It is particularly the rural authorities that are not in a position to provide playing fields out of
1478
their rates unless they receive considerable assistance.
I make this plea, first, on the ground that it is essential that in regard to providing playing fields the local authorities should be no worse off than they were under the 1947 Act—and this Bill makes them worse off; and secondly, on the ground that we should deliberately encourage local authorities to provide playing fields by differentiating between playing fields and other services. I have considered the case put up by the noble and learned Viscount and I realise that the 50 per cent. grant which this Bill provides is in substitution for a series of different grants and it therefore simplifies the grant system. It may be that local authorities are no worse off than they were before, and some will be better off. Furthermore, they have, I understand, accepted this arrangement. Nevertheless, I am not arguing this case on behalf of the local authorities. I am not even suggesting that they are dissatisfied with the arrangement—I do not know. What do say is that we ought deliberately to encourage them to provide playing fields, by giving them a higher grant than they would normally get in respect of the other planning services.
It is for that reason that I hope, even at this late stage, the noble and learned Viscount will not only express sympathy with the idea (I am sure he is sympathetic) but will do something to help in the provision of these playing fields. They are an urgent necessity all over the country. I am not qualified, to argue the case for encouraging amateur sport, or anything like that. I do not put it on that basis, although no doubt some noble Lords would. I put it simply on the basis that this is an essential service for the welfare of young people; that we are dreadfully short of playing fields, both in town and in country, and that anything we can do to encourage their provision we ought to do. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 65, line 28, leave out ("fifty per cent.") and insert ("the specified percentage").—(Lord silkin.)
VISCOUNT RIDLEY: I should like in a few words to support what the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has said. I took the Opportunity of putting my name to the Amendment after he had tendered it. My noble friend Lord Luke was not

1479
able to be here to-day, otherwise I am sure that he also would have wished to add his name to ours. There is no point on which I can say anything different from what has already been said by Lord Silkin. I should perhaps try and stress what I think is an answer to the point made by the Lord Chancellor on the Committee stage—namely, that this flat rate had been agreed by local authorities and local authority associations. That, of course, is true, but I do not think it is any bar to their agreeing to a modification such as the one we are asking for here. It proposes only a permissive increase; that it shall be within the control of the Minister in any particular case to give a higher percentage grant. I think there is no doubt that, unless he can do that, the expenditure in regard to playing fields will create a difficulty, inasmuch as the special development charge which was in the original Act has now gone, and there is no other inducement whereby local authorities, who have not always substantial resources, can take the provision of playing fields seriously.
Local authorities spend large sums on playing fields for schoolchildren, but the sad thing is, as I have no doubt other noble Lords who are members of education authorities will agree, that young people can play on those playing fields belonging to the schools only while they are actually at school. Local authorities badly need playing fields which are not attached to the schools. It is for this particular kind of playing field that we are now seeking this special grant. If you build a new school, you get a grant of more than 50 per cent. in regard to its establishment and administration; and that school includes playing fields which are not available at all times of the year—I wish they were; but for a great many reasons, which do not concern us here now, they are not. I feel that that is a terrible thing, particularly in many of the rural districts where there is not much money—in some, for instance, a penny rate produces only £343. It is not easy, therefore, to get playing fields constructed and the more the central Government can help with money, the bettor it will be for the children. Of that I am quite sure.
LORD O'HAGAN: My Lords, I should like to speak in support of the noble Lord's Amendment. I have already spoken on the subject of playing fields in your Lordships' House. I spoke also on the Committee stage of this Bill. There is a great dearth of playing fields in many parts of the country, and it would be deplorable if the State did not do everything possible to see that this very necessary service is provided for the children.
6.11 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, may I very briefly put my attitude in this matter? As I said at the Committee stage, I could not be more favourably disposed to the idea of playing fields. No one who has been Home Secretary and responsible for the less fortunate section of the youth of this country could have any other views than that playing fields are greatly desirable. But as a matter of administration and science of government, this Amendment is unfortunate, because, as I explained at some length on the Committee stage, when you get a figure that applies to all local authority grants then it is a great disadvantage, from the point of view of good government and administration, if you vary the grants or vary the classes of authorities which are to get those grants.
I do not want to repeat my arguments, as I inflicted rather a lecture on your Lordships when this point was discussed before. But there is one other duty that I have; that is, to take into account an immense and almost unanimous expression of opinion in your Lordships' House when that is given in debate. Although, owing to altruistic restraint, few noble Lords have spoken to-day, in our last discussion on this matter a great number spoke most forcibly on this subject. I am therefore prepared to go this far—although with misgivings which I frankly stated: if the noble Lord and my noble friend will withdraw the Amendment to-day I am prepared to put down an Amendment which will, I believe, work equitably. It will be in terms of public open spaces only. After all, nobody here has spoken on the allotments aspect, and that is a different problem which I ask your Lordships to exclude, in order not to complicate the matter. The Amendment will be in terms

1481
of public open spaces, which includes playing fields because it is not practicable to distinguish playing fields; but it will not include allotments. The Amendment will be on the basis of a discretion to increase grants to up to 75 per cent. having regard to the amount of the expenditure and the financial circumstances of the authority. I hope that noble Lords will consider that that is a reasonable compromise and will feel that I have fulfilled one of my duties—to try to interpret the views of your Lordships' House.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, the noble and learned Viscount has done extremely well on this Amendment. I am prepared to throw overboard the allotments aspect and restrict the matter to playing fields, because that was, after all, the case made both on the Committee stage and here this afternoon. With gratitude, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 57 [Contributions to Ironstone Restoration Fund]:
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, the substance of the proposed Amendments to Clause 57 is contained in the Amendment which follows, No. 63, but Amendments Nos. 62 and 63 are interrelated and it will no doubt be for the convenience of your Lordships' House if I discuss them briefly together. The main Amendment was suggested by the National Council of Associated Iron Ore Producers and is accepted in principle by the Ironstone Royalty Owners' Association. Representations on the point have, however, only recently been made and that is the reason for the late stage at which the Amendment is being moved. Its main purpose is to establish a uniform basis for the payment of the royalty owner's contributions to the Ironstone Restoration Fund by deleting the provisos (a) and (b) which at present apply to Clause 57 (2). The effect will be that in every leasehold case where an ironstone producer has to pay 2¼d. a ton of ironstone to the Fund (being his own and the royalty owner's contribution) he will have the right to recover the royalty owner's share by way of a deduction from the royalties or other payments under the lease. A secondary purpose is to ensure that the right to deduct from royalties applies also to an operator
1482
working under an award of working rights by the High Court under the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act, 1923. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 74, line 8, after ("lease") insert ("or by the person granted a right to work minerals by an order under Part I of the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act, 1923,").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential upon No. 62. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 74, line 10, leave out from ("lease") to ("(which") in line 28 and insert ("or order, be deducted in accordance with the provisions of that Schedule from payments by the lessee under the lease or by that person under the order, or may be otherwise recovered in accordance with those provisions by the lessee or by that person:
Provided that this subsection shall not apply to any mining lease made after the fifteenth day of February and before the first day of August, nineteen hundred and fifty-one, which contained a provision expressly excluding the operation of paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of section six of the said Act of 1951").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 58 [Recovery, on subsequent development, of payments under s. 59 of principal Act]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment is identical with one moved by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, at the Committee stage which I promised to consider. The effect is to delete the provision whereby anyone developing land within six months of the coming into operation of the Bill would have become liable to repay any payment made under Section 59 of the 1947 Act which might subsequently be registered against the land. Noble Lords will remember that the retrospective land charge was objected to by the Law Society and by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in this House. We have met that point of view by this Amendment which I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 75, line 29, leave out paragraph (b).—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, once more may I express appreciation of the favourable consideration which has been given to this Amendment?
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Seventh Schedule [Enactments amended]:
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, you will be happy to hear that there is nothing left for me to say which will disturb the harmonious tone of the conversation which has just ensued. This and the three or four Amendments consequential upon it are all uncontroversial and all arise out of Amendment No. 62, to which your Lordships have just given approval. I beg to move accordingly.
Amendment moved—
Page 106, line 11, after ("lease") insert ("or by the person granted a right to work minerals by an order under Part I of the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act, 1923,").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 106, line 13, leave out from ("lease") to ("which") in line 28 and insert ("or order, be deducted in accordance with the provisions of that Schedule from payments by the lessee under the lease or by that person under the order, or may be otherwise recovered in accordance with those provisions by the lessee or by that person:
Provided that this subsection shall not apply to any mining lease made after the fifteenth day of February and before the first day of August nineteen hundred and fifty-one,").—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 106, line 39, leave out "and".—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 106, line 44, at end insert ("and
(d) after paragraph 7 there shall be added the following—
"8. This Schedule shall apply with any necessary adaptations in relation to an order under Part I of the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act, 1923, as if that order were a lease and the person granted thereby a right to work minerals were the lessee under that lease".")—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.

PHARMACY BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
POST OFFICE SAVINGS BANK BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
TRUSTEE SAVINGS BANKS BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
FOOD AND DRUGS AMENDMENT BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to with Amendments: the said Amendments to be printed.

TRANSPORT CHARGES &c. (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) BILL.
Returned from the Commons with the Amendments agreed to.
House adjourned at twenty minutes past six o'clock.