TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING BILL

HL Deb 02 November 1954 vol 189 cc979-1102

4.15 p.m.

Order of the Day for the House to be again in Committee read.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The EARL OF DROGHEDA in the Chair]

Clause 31:

Application of Part III

"compensation on the basis of existing use" means compensation assessed in accordance with the provisions of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, as modified by sections fifty-one, fifty-three and fifty-four of the principal Act, not being compensation calculated on the basis of equivalent reinstatement or on the basis of prevailing use, and excluding any compensation for disturbance or for severance or injurious affection;

LORD MANCROFT

I am happy to think that on this Amendment we start our day's work on this Bill on a completely uncontroversial note. This is nothing more than a drafting Amendment. I say that advisedly, and I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, is not in his place at the moment. Had he been here, I should have offered him an apology, because yesterday I observed that I thought Amendment No. 45 was only a drafting Amendment, and the noble Lord saw fit to differ. On examining the matter, I have come to the conclusion that he was right, and I was wrong. It was, perhaps, a quasi-drafting Amendment, a notional drafting Amendment, but not a purely drafting Amendment. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, will be good enough to convey my apologies to Lord Silkin when he comes. However, this is a purely drafting Amendment. There are two reasons for it. The phrase "acquiring authority" is used in the definition clause of Part III in relation to acquisitions by agreement as well as compulsory acquisitions, which is not very helpful, and in any case the definition here is probably unnecessary. The second reason is that the definition of "compensation on the basis of existing use" comes more appropriately in Clause 68 (1) alongside the definition of "compensation calculated on the basis of prevailing use." That I shall seek to put right in due course. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 38, line 41, leave out from beginning to end of line 13 on page 39 and insert— ("'the relevant interest' means the interest acquired; 'the relevant land' means the land in which the relevant interest subsists; 'the notice to treat' means the notice to treat in pursuance of which the relevant interest is acquired;").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD AMHERST OF HACKNEY moved to leave out the definition of "compensation on the basis of existing use," and to insert: 'Compensation' means compensation assessed in accordance with the provisions of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919;

The noble Lord said: I am afraid that I cannot claim that this is only a drafting Amendment. The object of this Amendment is to reintroduce, in the case of the compulsory purchase of land, the well-tried principle of the open market value, a method which has stood the test of time and had been in operation from 1919 until the coming into effect of the 1947 Act. It is not intended in any way to affect the compensation in the other Parts of the Bill; it deals entirely with compulsory purchase. That there is a difference between compensation for refusal of permission to develop and compulsory purchase has, I think, generally been recognised, and is also referred to in the White Paper which was published in 1952 (Command Paper 8699) in paragraph 30.

That White Paper, as your Lordships know, after discussing the two possible alternative methods of compensation for compulsory acquisition—namely, the existing use value plus the claim, and the market value, eventually decided in favour of the first method. But even in this Bill, in Clause 34, which deals with cases in which the local authority changes its mind, the price to be paid in compensation on compulsory purchase is the market value. I think that shows a little that the Government feel that the market value is, in fact, the fairer way of compensating. We must not forget that, unlike refusal of planning permission, compulsory purchase is an irrevocable step; and that it is necessary I do not think anybody in this House would deny. But it has always been the principle that full compensation, which, in the past—that is, until the 1947 Act came into operation—has always been the market value, should be paid.

I do not dispute for one moment the fairness of the valuation made under the 1947 Act, and if we were discussing this Bill in 1947 I think there would not be a strong case for this Amendment. But even then, one would have to assume that, to be fair, any compulsory purchase would take place soon after the Act had been passed. But since 1947 there have been two important changes. The first, as we all know, is the fall in the value of money. I am sure that the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, knows better than I do the exact extent of the fall in the value of the £ between 1948 and 1954. This, obviously, has to a great extent automatically reduced the value of the claim. The second factor, and one of which we are justly proud, is the success of the Government's housing programme, getting the building going and the improvement in the materials position, all of which has meant that the prospects of early development are better now than any valuer could have foreseen when he was making his valuation under the 1947 Act. Therefore, the deferment factor which he would then have applied would have been a pessimistic one. In fact, in most cases development can probably take place earlier than could have been foreseen.

I submit to your Lordships that these two factors, together with the fact that there is now a free market in land, makes the system of compensation to be paid under this Bill unfair. On the Second Reading a great many cases of anomalies were quoted, and I do not intend to repeat them. I should, however, like to quote one case. It is perhaps a special one as it concerns minerals, and the figures were given to me to show that minerals should be treated differently from other land, as perhaps they should. But I think a great many of the factors in this case apply generally to all land. In this particular case it is assumed that an operating company in 1947 had 100 acres of minerals, and that those minerals would take ten years to work, starting in 1967. I will not go into all the figures, but the result of the calculation is that there is an existing use value of £5,000, and the value of those minerals which are to be worked in 1967 is assumed, in 1947, to be £6,800. Then there is the rental value of the land, which in all comes to £8,700, less the existing use value which is £5,000, giving a Part VI claim of £3,700. When 1967 comes, if that land were to be acquired compulsorily, the compensation would be the existing use value, £5,000, plus the Part VI claim, roughly £3,800, giving a total of £8,800. But the value of the minerals which at that time would be ready to work is estimated to be just over £14,000. So that if that operator had his land compulsorily acquired, and had to buy equivalent minerals elsewhere, he would have to spend over £14,000 to do it. Therefore, he would be out of pocket by nearly £6,000—even assuming that prices remained at the same level as they were in 1947, which in fact we know they have not. Of course, in that example there can be no question that the increase in the value of the minerals was in any way brought about by the efforts of the community; it was due to the efforts of the operator himself.

I feel that what is wrong in that case is the method of compensation. I believe it is wrong that two people living in the same area, planned in the same way, should fare differently if one suffers from the accident of compulsory purchase—because it could operate both ways. In an area in which development is permitted, it is probable that the market value would be higher; but in an area which, say, prior to 1947 had been zoned as an industrial area, and had since been zoned (as might well happen) as a green belt, the local authority might have to pay more under the 1947 Act—that is, more under this Bill as it stands at the moment—than they would have to pay by adopting the basis of market value. In Alice in Wonderland there was only one Red Queen dispensing rather arbitrary justice, but I feel that unless we can do something about this clause, local authorities up and down the country will be forced, however unwillingly, either to commit injustice, or, if they are not going to do that, to buy land which may not be the most suitable for their purpose to avoid inflicting an injustice. I hope that the noble Viscount will be sympathetic to this Amendment to see whether we cannot do something to improve this clause and avoid these injustices. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 39, line 5, leave out lines 5 to 13 and insert the said new words.—(Lord Amherst of Hackney.)

VISCOUNT RIDLEY

I want to say something on this Amendment. The noble Lord who moved it has covered the ground very adequately, but I think it is worth looking at the reasons which might be argued against this Amendment. There is no doubt that the Bill, as the noble Lord said, recognises the fact that compulsory notice can in present circumstances often be unfair; otherwise we should not have put in Clause 34, which is, in effect, an elaborate procedure for giving warnings to purchasers of property of various kinds that if they are not careful they may be badly treated. Further, in Part IV of the Bill, which deals with revocation of planning permission, it is recognised that unfairness would be committed by the compulsory purchase price. Again, in Clause 53, there is a reference to the free market value. It does not operate in the same way as the point we are now discussing, but it does show in the make-up of this Bill that it is impossible to ignore the fact that in many cases the market price will be higher, or possibly even lower, than the compulsory purchase price.

For that reason, I think that a reconsideration of this clause, in the form proposed by the noble Lord or some other form, could be effected without completely upsetting the Bill and without affecting all the other provisions with regard to compensation for planning refusal and so on. In the White Paper the reasons given against the use of market value are mainly those based on the effect of planning. There is the inference there that it is the development plan which creates the value. I do not know that I would go so far as to say that. Is it not the development plan which recognises that in certain parts of the county or county borough there is the need for development and the opportunity for development? The plan is therefore written down on the basis of what the opportunities are. Is it not those opportunities and potentialities of the land and buildings there which create the value and call for the development plan to allow them to be carried out? In the same way, planning permission does not, in fact, create the entire value of the development. It is the person who wants to develop, who has the land which appears to be suitable—he may have taken the trouble to acquire it in the past; it may have come to him in some other way. All the planning permission does is to say to him that it is perfectly right and proper for him to do what he asks permission to do.

The inevitable result is that, where planning permission is given, the value of the property must increase, and where it is refused, it remains at the value given in the earlier parts of the Bill to-day. We cannot deny the fact that planning permissions influence the values of different areas of land. There is no doubt that the tendency is for the value to increase when the person owning the land, wishing to sell it for building, or the builder having bought it for building, gets permission to develop. So I can hardly agree that it is the development plan and the planning consents which create the high values, except that in the case of planning consents, whether you accept the fair market price or not, it is inevitable that the planning decisions will control the price of land.

The other point made is that if the fair market value is used, it will mean that individuals owning property are profiting at the expense of development undertaken by the public in some form or another. Where a factory has been built at the expense of the factory owner, who has bought the land next to it for extensions, it would seem to me that the increase in the value of such land next to the factory, bought for the purpose of extending the factory, would, if it by that means achieves any increase of value, achieve it at the expense and instigation of the owner of the factory who is conducting a profitable enterprise. It used to be said that before the 1932 Act began to operate there was a very strong feeling that many people were—as indeed they were—buying land just because a new road had been built, and profiting in that way. That, I think, was undoubtedly true. But we have now got planning control, and planning control will prohibit that sort of thing in these days. I think none of the arguments are so strong as they would appear to be on the face of it.

The further argument is used in the White Paper that one result will be that local authorities will have to pay much too high a price. No reference is there made to other acquiring authorities, and if the objection is, as it appears to be, the high price of property to local authorities, one must remember that a large number of the properties bought by local authorities are bought with Government grant, nearly always on loan, and the Government will pay some proportion or give some grant towards it. Then there is the further case of the many statutory undertakers Who have compulsory powers; and there I think that this clause becomes even more unreasonable. For example, in the case of a new power station, is there a great difference in the final cost of the power station if you pay what is thought to be the market value of the land under the 1919 Act, or the value agreed to under this proposed Bill? The power station may cost many hundreds of thousands of pounds, and the difference in the value of the land might well be below a thousand. That is one case, but there are plenty of others.

Therefore I ask myself, what are the reasons for this policy? There seems to me no overpowering reason which would prevent the actual payment of these amounts if they were thought to be fair and due. There seem to be very strong arguments against being unfair to people, and very many disadvantages. Still, it could become worse as time goes by. My noble friend said that in 1947 such a proposal as we are now considering in this Bill could have been thought to be reasonable. The values we have got in this Bill are the then values. Since then, values of land have increased considerably. I should feel it perfectly logical to have stuck entirely to the 1947 Act. It was much disliked by many people when it came in, but at least it was logical. I fear that altering it in this way and still keeping the 1947 values will create more inconsistencies than we should otherwise have had. What will happen in future supposing the value of the pound goes on falling?—though one hopes very much that it will not. Will the land to which claims attach last for ever? There will be a time when, at any rate in some areas, there will be no more land with a claim on it. That was the idea of the 1947 Act, and it would have been fair enough. If the 1947 Act could have held values down generally to existing use, there would not have been these disparities which we are having to face. There will be more difference in the market value as we know it and in the value of the prices proposed in this Bill than there is now.

In 1947, in the valuations for these claims, there was a general feeling that the number of years' deferment then introduced was such as unreasonably to reduce the values agreed. I mention this point to emphasise the fact that it seems impossible that we can go on for ever, having once allowed the 1947 rigid system to be altered, as it is to be altered. We cannot go on for ever relying on that principle for these valuations, because it seems inevitable that the disparity will become larger. Something will have to be done. There will be the effect that local authorities will be even more reluctant to do what they feel to be a serious injustice. There are many thousands of people who own small plots of land which they have bought for their own purposes, people who are by no means well off, and it does happen from time to time that local authorities come across these Properties and feel they need to have them. They are reluctant to purchase the properties from people when they feel that they are committing injustices. There was some correspondence in the Press recently from various people engaged in local government who expressed that view—I expect many of your Lordships have already met it. I have met it in local government work, a reluctance on the part of the council to enforce compulsory purchase when they know that the price is unfair. I agree that the change in this Bill, adding the claim to the existing use value, will help in that direction, but I cannot believe that it will be long before market values in general will rise higher still. Something must be done about this problem. Whether now or later, or in what form, is perhaps open to argument, but the method suggested in the Amendment moved by my noble friend is a simple one; it is easy to understand, and it has worked well in I the past.

4.43 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My noble friend who moved this Amendment said quite frankly to your Lordships that it was, if I may paraphrase his words, a peg on which to hang a discussion on the point that compensation ought to be on the basis of market value. I am very glad and welcome the opportunity of that discussion. But I should like, before I deal with the points which my noble friends have raised, just to make one thing clear. So far as the practical results are concerned, apart from the strength or otherwise of the relevance of this Amendment, compensation on the basis which we have suggested, and compensation on the basis of existing use as an element in that compensation which we suggest and which we are moving by the Amendment that my noble friend Lord Mancroft moved a short time ago from this to another clause, is the foundation for the provisions of Clause 32, which lay down that on a compulsory acquisition in future the unexpended balance, or the appropriate share of it, will be added to compensation on the basis of existing use.

It would be idle for me to pretend otherwise than that this is one of the cornerstones of the Bill, that compensation for development value shall be limited to development value existing in 1947. To substitute compensation at market value would require the Government to discard the basic principle of the Bill; and, indeed, if Clause 32 were left to provide in addition for payment of the unexpended balance, acquiring authorities would find themselves in many cases having to pay twice for development value. Therefore, from a practical point of view, I cannot pretend for a moment that I can accept this Amendment but, as I said, I very much welcome the opportunity of hearing and putting some further considerations before my noble friends who have supported it with such strength and eloquence.

I should like to follow their track and go, as they have done, to the White Paper of November, 1952, to which my noble friend Lord Amherst of Hackney referred by its number, and ask my noble friends to look again at paragraph 30 of that Paper, which I hope they will agree crystallises the views announced by the Government on this point. Your Lordships will remember that that paragraph begins: The question what compensation should be paid on compulsory acquisition is more difficult. But in practice the choice must lie between acquisition at current market value and acquisition, as proposed, at the current existing use value plus the 1947 development value. I think that now everyone will agree that the matter is narrowed down to these alternatives. The paragraph goes on: When development plans have been approved, the market value of land will depend in large measure on the prospects of profit from the uses for which, in the light of the plan, permission is likely to be granted. I ask your Lordships to bear that in mind, because I think that it has considerable relevance to the somewhat gloomy prognostications in which the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, indulged just now. That is a factor which must be borne in mind and must always be considered when one is indulging in speculations as to the increased divergence between those two prices, as my noble friend, quite understandably, did in the course of his argument a few moments ago.

The paragraph to which I was referring goes on: Payment for development value at current market prices would therefore expose public authorities to the necessity of paying high prices for sites where, in the light of the plan, those prospects were high, and owners to receiving low prices where the land was reserved, as sometimes it must be, for some comparatively unprofitable use. It was quite obvious that my noble friend Lord Ridley had not only read that paragraph but had considered it carefully, and had been impressed, as everyone who listened to his speech must have been, by the difficulty which that part of the paragraph presents to any one advancing the case which my noble friend advanced a few moments ago. Both my noble friends took examples. I do not quarrel with that for a moment, but the argument on an inductive basis, an argument from examples, is compelling, I say with great respect to my noble friends, only if the examples range over a field which gives one at the end of the day a reasonably inclusive picture from which to make deductions. I should like (I am sure that my noble friends who have argued so fairly would like this to be done) just to give one or two other examples which the Committee must face before coming to a decision in this matter. Let me take, for example, land in the area of a new town the value of which is due almost entirely to public expense. The public would have to pay for that value. There is a balancing factor. I am not saying that I am entirely free from that temptation which besets all those presenting an argument, to take examples favourable to his point of view; but what I am entitled to say is that, if I can quote an example such as that, then the examples of my noble friends are not wholly inclusive in this matter.

But let me take another the other way. Land shown on the plan for roads, open spaces, et cetera, would be bought, and must be bought, at an unfairly depressed value. I listened most carefully to everything that my noble friend Lord Ridley said, and I confess that I could not see his answer to that point, where the landowner is hit by these depressed values such as I have mentioned. Then I take another. Where the land available for development was restricted to save agricultural land, values would tend to rise, and the rise would be due entirely to a public decision. I am not for a moment saying that my noble friends cannot find difficult examples; they have found them and they have put them before the Committee. I can do it too; we can all go on doing that. Then we have to face the point—and this is what I put to my noble friends: what conclusion do we draw? The conclusion I suggest to the Committee is this: that plans and planning invariably re-distribute values. I do not see how that can be avoided. I have memories at the back of my mind of the rather dramatic words and the new phrases which my old friend Lord Uthwatt put in his Report when he dealt with that point. Despite my language of yesterday he was, as one or two of your Lordships know, an old friend of mine. But that is a fact from which one cannot get away; whether one agrees with the terminology or the conclusions, that effect is inescapable—that planning and plans invariably re-distribute values.

What are you to do about it? I suggest that what you ought to do is to attempt to insulate compensation against the fluctuations. That, surely, is a sound principle, and that is what we have tried to do in this Bill. My noble friend Lord Ridley, in what I hope he will forgive me for saying was the nadir of pessimism into which his speech fell, suggested that the only alternative was to go back and take the 1947 Act. My noble friend did not explain what his conclusion led to—that is, back not only to the £300 million, but back to the development charge. I ask the Committee to consider—if the development charge is to apply, as it did, 100 per cent.—whether that is going to help the wider purpose which my noble friends had in mind, namely, the encouragement of development in this country. I am not going to argue the principle which your Lordships have argued on the White Paper on the 1953 Act, when it was a Bill, and with which I dealt shortly on the Second Reading of this Bill, but I ask my noble friends to consider the inevitable bourne to which they are driven. If I may introduce a little levity after a serious speech, in the words of the old saying, it is: A Bourne from which no Hollingsworth returns. I do ask my noble friends, having had the opportunity to develop the arguments and, I am sure, delighting us all with the development of those arguments, not to press the Amendment at this stage.

VISCOUNT RIDLEY

I should be glad of the opportunity to say a few words in response to the noble and learned Viscount. I think perhaps I gave the impression of having rather more enthusiasm for the 1947 Act than is really the case; but at least it was a logical and complete set-up. Many of us disliked it. I was one of those who was most critical of it; but at least it all hung together—that was my point. I certainly should not have liked to see it continue with its 100 per cent. development charge. I am bound to admit that there are cases, such as those quoted by the noble and learned Viscount, which have quite the opposite effect to those which were quoted when I was speaking, and also many cases which could be quoted. I think perhaps there is a danger, on a subject like this, or on an Amendment, of falling into the error of making a Second Reading speech on the whole question of planning. I wish to avoid that because, of course, the time for that is past. As I see it, the matter will have to be left simply with the statement that almost certainly there will be quite a large number of cases as the years go by, in which people feel they have been hardly treated by this clause, and of purchasers, such as local authorities and others, realising that they are, in many cases, paying less than they ought to. I have a feeling that at some stage or another that difficulty will have to be dealt with. It may be that what this Bill proposes is the right step to take now. I do not know what my noble friend feels about his Amendment, but I feel that that is probably the right view to take of it for the time being.

LORD AMHERST OF HACKNEY

I thank the noble and learned Viscount for his reply. I cannot say that I am entirely convinced by it. I feel that if we cannot go the whole way there may perhaps be some way of making the claims a little more in line with present values, taking into consideration the fall in the value of money. I do not know whether one could add a small percentage to meet that. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD MANCROFT

In view of Amendments which have been made and are proposed to be made in Clause 32, subsection (3) of Clause 31 is now superfluous. I beg to move accordingly that it be deleted.

Amendment moved— Page 39, line 19, leave out subsection (3).—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 31, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 32 [Compensation to include unexpended balance of established development value]:

5.0 p.m.

LORD MANCROFT moved to leave out all words after the words "subject to" in subsection (1) to the opening word "for" in paragraph (b) of subsection (3) and insert: section thirty-four of this Act there shall be added to the compensation payable in respect of the acquisition of the relevant interest apart from the provisions of this section—

1. (a) where the relevant interest is the only interest (other than excepted interests) subsisting at that time in any of the relevant land which has such a balance, an amount equal to that balance at that time less, in a case when the relevant interest is subject to a rent-charge, any rental liability of that interest within the meaning of the Schedule (Apportionment of unexpended balance of established development value) to this Act; or
992
2. (b) where the relevant interest is one of two or more interests (other than excepted interests) so subsisting, an amount equal to so much of that balance at that time as is ascertained in accordance with the provisions of the said Schedule to be attributable to the relevant interest:

Provided that no payment shall be made by virtue of this section if the relevant interest is a tenancy granted on such terms that, immediately before the service of the notice to treat, the person entitled to that interest is prohibited from carrying out any new development of the relevant land. (2) Regulations made under this section shall provide

The noble Lord said: This Amendment and the new Schedule to which it refers, set out in Amendment No. 151, need to be read together. They have a formidable appearance but make no real change in the principles already established in the clause. The main object of these two Amendments is to do away with the need for a set of regulations, and so meet requests made in another place that, as far as may be possible, the Bill should be self-contained. In effect, we now have a Schedule instead of a set of regulations, and I hope that pleases your Lordships. The clause as it stands provides that on compulsory acquisition of land which has an unexpended balance there shall be paid to the owner of each interest which is acquired so much of the balance as is attributable to that interest. Subsection (2) goes on to specify what is attributable where there are only two interests in the land, and subsection (3) provides for regulations to apply subsection (2) to more complex cases where three or more interests subsist.

In dealing with these more complex cases, the draftsman has found it convenient to generalise and to provide a new set of rules which will apply in all cases; those covered by the clause already, as well as those not covered. In doing so, he has taken the opportunity of improving the drafting of the clause and making one or two minor changes (such as the introduction of a reference to rent charges) which would have been necessary if the Schedule had not been prepared. It will be noted that, even as proposed to be amended, the clause still calls for regulations. These are of a purely procedural character and, in practice, will doubtless be included with similar regulations called for by other provisions in the Bill.

It may be helpful if I remind noble Lords of the complication involved in deciding how much of an unexpended balance is attributable to a particular interest. The source of the complication is the practice in assessment of compensation on the basis of existing use value under Part V of the 1947 Act where more than one interest—that is, freeholder and leaseholder—is being acquired. The compensation paid to the freeholder will depend on the value of the right to receive the rent from the lessee for the term of the lease. If that rent is higher than it would be if the lessee were paying for existing use only the freeholder will, to that extent, receive compensation, which is really compensation for loss of development value—regardless of whether the land acquired has an unexpended balance. Since the freeholder is thus getting, under the ordinary law of compensation, something for development value, he ought not to get it a second time from the unexpended balance. That principle, as I have indicated, is settled in the clause as it stands, by reference to cases where only a freeholder and a lessee are in question.

One must also take into account not only what the owner of each interest will get under the ordinary law of compensation based on the right to receive a rent, but also the effect on the owner of each interest of being relieved of such liability as he may have had to pay a rent or a rentcharge. The acquisition will itself relieve those concerned of their liabilities, and the Schedule accordingly balances the relief from no longer having outgoings against the loss of what was formerly coming in. Though a complicated matter, it is not one of principle but only of procedure. This point was made strongly in another place in the course of debates there. By this rather full readjustment and rearrangement, we have, I hope, met that point to your Lordships' satisfaction also. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 39, line 31, leave out from second ("to") to ("for") in page 40, line 38, and insert the said new words.—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 32, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 33 [Additional compensation for works]:

LORD MANCROFT

This is a drafting Amendment, which is consequential on Amendment No. 60. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 41, line 24, leave out from ("constructed") to ("a") in line 27 and insert ("then, subject to the next following section, there shall be added to the compensation payable in respect of the acquisition of the relevant interest apart from the provisions of this section").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 33, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 34:

Protection for prospective purchasers

34.—(1) It shall be the duty of the council of a county borough or county district, on application made to them in writing by a person who proposes to purchase an interest in land in the borough or district, to give notice to the applicant, within twenty-eight days of the receipt of the application, stating whether or not the council propose to acquire within the next five years (whether compulsorily or otherwise) any interest in that land or in any part thereof, or have been notified by any public authority possessing compulsory purchase powers of a proposal of that authority so to acquire any such interest.

(2) If—

1. (a) the council of a county borough or county district have, in accordance with the preceding subsection, given notice to a person that the council do not propose to acquire within the next five years such an interest as is mentioned in that subsection, and have not been notified of any such proposal of another authority as is therein mentioned; and
2. (b) the person to whom the notice was given has within three months after the giving of the notice completed the purchase to which the application related and given notice of the completion to the said council; and

then, for the purpose of assessing the compensation payable it respect of the acquisition of that interest, subsection (4) of section fifty-one of the principal Act shall not apply to any planning permission in force at the time of the notice referred to in paragraph (a) of this subsection.

VISCOUNT GAGE moved to leave out subsection (1) and to insert: (1) It shall be the duty of the council of a county borough or county district to record in a register to be maintained by them for that purpose any notification received by them from any public authority possessing compulsory purchase powers of a proposal by the said public authority so to acquire any interest in land situated within the area of the local planning authority: Provided that no such notification by a public authority shall be recorded in a register maintained in accordance with this subsection unless:—

1. (i) the notification is accompanied by a certified copy of a resolution passed by the 995 public authority determining that the said public authority propose to acquire the land compulsorily or otherwise; and either
2. (ii) planning permission has been obtained or is not required for the use to which the public authority propose to put the land when acquired; or
3. (iii) such a consent is deemed to be granted by virtue of section 35 of the principal Act or of any other enactment; or
4. (iv) the proposed development is permitted by virtue of a development order made by the Minister in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the principal Act or of any other powers enabling him in that behalf.

(2) It shall be the duty of a council of a county borough or county district on application made to them in writing by a person who proposes to purchase an interest in land in the area of the authority to give notice to the applicant within twenty-eight days of the receipt of the application stating whether or not the authority propose to acquire within the next five years, whether compulsorily or otherwise, any interest in that land or in any part thereof, or have recorded any notification from any public authority possessing compulsory purchase powers of a proposal of that authority so to acquire any such interest."

The noble Viscount said: This clause is designed to protect the interests of prospective purchasers, an intention which all noble Lords will doubtless gladly support; but the process by which this protection is given appears to involve a procedure hitherto unknown in town planning, which some think might have very undesirable consequences, and which in any event deserves full consideration by your Lordships. The procedure appears to affect more interests than that of the prospective purchaser. It affects the local authority, the previous owner and the statutory bodies making these notifications. I will examine the position of each of these interests. The position of the purchaser appears to be plain sailing. He has to prove his bona fides. He applies for what I will call, for convenience, his clearance certificate; and either he gets it or he does not. If he gets a certificate he knows that his land cannot be acquired by anybody for five years except at full market value.

The position of the local authority, however, seems a good deal more complicated. Their duties, as laid down by this clause, are twofold: they have to register, and they have to give or withhold certificates according to that register. A small point arises here which can be easily answered but which has caused certain questioning—namely, whether the local authority, in registering these notifications, have to take any initiative. I presume that they have not, and that the initiative in these notifications should come from the authorities who make the notifications. Possibly we could have a reassurance on that point. The registering authorities do not appear to have any power of challenging the notifications. If, for example, some authority notified their interest in two alternative sites, presumably the local authority would have no option but to register both. I imagine that they would have some power of protest if the notifications were not submitted in sufficient detail to enable them to give or withhold their certificates.

Local authorities have numerous other duties. They have, for example, either planning powers or delegated planning powers. I should like to ask specifically whether it is the intention that these notifications should be given official cognisance by the local authorities in their planning capacity, or whether they should not. There is nothing in the clause to suggest that they should, or that the authority would be in any way out of order in giving consent to build, notwithstanding the notification. An authority might well argue that these notifications have received none of the consideration which has hitherto been applied to all planning applications, that no objections to them have been considered and, therefore, that they have no legal status whatever, and if a planning application were submitted, not by a prospective purchaser but by an existing owner, they would be unable to issue any certificate or give any reason for refusing, provided always that the application conformed with the development plan.

That may be so, but it might appear to the public, and indeed to the authority itself, that there was something a little contrary to logic if, as it were, they were to issue warning notices with one hand and planning consents with the other, for quite different purposes and for exactly the same land. I should have thought that the authorities issuing notifications to the local authorities might feel some sense of grievance if, when they came to acquire their land in conformity with their notices, they found it already covered with bricks and mortar. If, on the other hand, local authorities are supposed to take these notices into official cognisance, the process seems to be analogous to the designation procedure of the 1947 Act, without any of the safeguards, either to the owner or to the authority, contained in Section 5 of that Act. Certainly this does not appear in any way to conform with the statement of policy made by the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr, in the debate last week in this House. I cannot believe that that is the intention. If it were, of course, other questions would arise. One question would be whether, if an owner had been refused permission to develop, he had also a claim for compensation. Or would the Minister, on appeal, say that in such circumstances the application should be deemed premature?

Local authorities not only have duties, but they have views. We often hear the term, "the public interest," but there is not always entire unanimity of view as to what the public interest is. There have been suggestions that even in Whitehall the views of Government Departments as to what constitutes the public interest are not the same, as might be apparent to anyone who happened to serve in a Government Department during the war. Indeed, the remark was attributed (probably quite incorrectly) to one prominent Cabinet Minister that "Whitehall is a jungle in which it is a case of every man for himself." However that may be, what is demonstrably true is that local opinion and Whitehall opinion do not always coincide. I would instance the Gatwick aerodrome proposition, over which a battle has been raging for a number of years; the proposal to put a power station on the South Bank of the Thames, which caused a debate in this House; and the question of the retention by the Army of parts of Ashdown Forest, which also gave rise to a debate in this House, and necessitated a personal visit from two Cabinet Ministers. Then there was the proposal of the Gas Board to establish a gasworks in a very controversial position near Oxford. There may be other examples, but I am convinced that for every one such case which reaches national importance there are a score that are of localised importance. With the rise in the rates, many local authorities have got into the habit of taking an almost morbid interest in the creation of new rateable values. I may be wrong but I think that on occasion—not every time —some of those notifications may precipitate a number of controversies that will, as it were, go off at half-cock.

The County Councils Association are concerned, and indeed rather mystified, as to the probable effects of this clause. They fear that some public authorities may think it prudent, particularly when some project is in its initial and, therefore, rather vague state, to notify their interest in much larger areas of land than they will really need, merely to protect their financial interests. And it would not be surprising if they did so, considering the extraordinary disparity between the compulsory purchase price and the market price that already exists in some areas. But if they do so notify, the County Councils Association fear that, even indirectly, large areas may tend to become sterilised, and that the implementation of the development plans may be impeded. They farther point out that there appears to be no limit to the number of times a notification may be repeated, and thus that this sterilising effect may be indefinitely prolonged, though I agree that it would probably be only rarely that that would happen. So they have devised the series of Amendments which appear on the Marshalled List, the effect of which would be, first, to subject these notifications to a more formal procedure, and, secondly, to make them pass through the normal planning machinery. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 41, line 40, leave out subsection (1) and insert the said new subsections.—(Viscount Gage.)

5.20 p.m.

LORD HYLTON

I should like to support what the noble Viscount, Lord Gage, has said on this matter. The noble Viscount has explained his Amendment with such clarity that I do not intend to keep the Committee far longer than is absolutely necessary. I do not wish to cover ground which has already been so well covered, but I should like to say this: that the administration of town and country planning depends almost entirely on the confidence that the public feel that they are getting a fair deal under this type of legislation. If a position arises, as described by my noble friend, in which a district council, or the council of a county borough, on the one hand, is registering these notifications and, on the other, is dispensing planning permission which does not take into account these notifications—and I do not see how they can take them into account—the public will be not only mystified but extremely annoyed, because this sort of "double dealing," as it were, the issuing of planning permission when it is known that somewhere in the background there is a notification that something different is going to be done at some future date, will not appeal to the public. Moreover, I very much doubt whether it is going to be of much value for what is intended, the notification of the prospective purchaser. Finally, the owner is the last person, so far as I can see, to receive any notice that any notification has been received. I hope that when he replies, the noble and learned Viscount will put some of these fears at rest, because as it stands I do not believe that this clause is practicable or will effect what it purposes to do.

LORD SILKIN

I could not help feeling some slight amusement at the speeches of the noble Lords who moved and supported this Amendment. The 1947 Act provides for what is called designation—that is to say, notification to the public at large that it is the intention of the local authority to acquire certain land. That provision has been very much criticised. It was criticised in the speeches of noble Lords opposite during the Second Reading of this Bill. I think it must have been overlooked that the intention of designation was not only to protect the owner of land, to put him on notice that his land will probably be acquired within a certain period, but also to protect the purchaser, who is entitled to know that the land he is proposing to buy may be acquired compulsorily. It seems to me that the objections failed to take into account the interests of the purchaser.

In Clause 34 we have a similar provision in this Bill. Here again, the Government are deliberately going out of their way to make provision for notifying a prospective purchaser that the land in which he is interested may possibly be acquired. I should have expected noble Lords opposite, who were so opposed to the principle of designation, to have moved the deletion of this clause altogether. I know that the noble Viscount has an Amendment down to delete Clause 34, but his serious proposal is to amend it and make it more efficient; so he is not really opposed to the principle of designation at all, nor is the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, who supported him. That is a great comfort to me after the criticisms which the principle of designation has received.

Coming to the Amendment itself, I feel that while the intention of Clause 34 is excellent, and I would congratulate the Government on that clause (possibly it is the only one on which I could conscientiously congratulate them), I feel that it does not altogether carry out the intention and will create difficulties, which I think the Amendment is designed to meet. It deals with proposals. I wonder what is a "proposal" to acquire land. It is not an intention; it is something which may take place over a period of five years. A proposal which may not materialise for five years can be a very vague sort of proposal. In his Amendment the noble Viscount wants to crystallise that by saying that such a proposal must be approved formally by the acquiring authority. If that were the case, the period of five years is quite unnecessary. If an acquiring authority really intended to acquire land compulsorily and had gone through all the procedure, I should have thought they would do it in far less than five years. Therefore, I imagine that it is the intention of the Government in this clause not to go so far as a definite decision in their conception of a proposal; it can be just a somewhat vague intention, or an idea that the authority might acquire land within that period.

I should like to ask the noble and learned Viscount what is the duty of a local authority who believe that they may want a piece of land but are not certain whether or not they will want it within five years. Is that a proposal such as he has in mind in Clause 34? What are they to do about that? Ought they to notify a prospective purchaser that, while there has been no decision on the matter, it is on the cards, so to speak, that they might purchase within five years? Then there is the point that both the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, and the noble Viscount raised. In such a case—or even if the position is a little more definite but falls short of a definite decision—what is the duty of a planning authority who receive an application to develop this land? Ought they to grant approval or can they refuse, and on what ground can they refuse? I realise that if they gave approval and work was carried out within the period of five years, then they would be raising the price against themselves. The existing use value of that piece of land will have been enhanced by the additional value of the work carried out. But that is not a justification for refusing permission. What is their duty?

I am raising these questions not because I have a ready answer to them, but because I think the noble Viscount has rendered a service in putting down an Amendment of this kind, which enables us to thresh out the right way of dealing with this problem. There is a problem. It is inherent in the fact that in most cases the market value of the land will be higher than the existing use value. Incidentally, if I may be a little out of order, I enjoyed very much the noble and learned Viscount's speech on a previous Amendment, but I do not think he was very convincing when he put forward a plea that because there will be some cases where the market value will be less than the existing use value, therefore it is legitimate that in other cases it should be more. It is no comfort to the man who gets less to know that somebody is getting more. He may regard it as amusing, but it would not comfort him in the least.

These are difficulties. I know that the Government are sincerely anxious to afford proper protection to a purchaser, because they realise—they must do—that a purchaser who acquires land without knowledge that it is going to be acquired compulsorily will probably lose money, and a purchaser ought to be put on notice. On the other hand, they have got to be fair to the local authority, and I think they have a duty to make clear to the local authority what their course should be if an application for planning development is made; and also what their course should be if their intention of acquiring land is something less definite than an actual decision of the council, but is, nevertheless, in their minds. This is by way of being a general discussion on the clause, but I think it is relevant on the Amendment moved by the noble Viscount, who has tried to crystallise these ideas, I am afraid not altogether with complete success, but, at any rate, I congratulate him on his attempt.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken for propounding these questions. I shall do my best to answer them all, but if I do not answer any of them I hope that any noble Lord will not hesitate to put them to me again. If my noble friend Lord Gage will allow me, I will begin by dealing with the points raised in his Amendment, because he was good enough to inform your Lordships that he was speaking on behalf of the County Councils' Association, and, if I may say so with respect, anyone who has been three years at the Home Office is greatly indebted to the County Councils' Association for suggestions in a variety of fields. I should like to deal with what they suggest now. There are really two suggestions in the Amendment. The first is to require a register to be maintained by the local authority; and the second, to ensure that notifications from other public authorities are acted upon by the local authority only if, first, the public authority in question have passed a resolution expressing their intention to acquire, and secondly, planning permission has been obtained or is not required for the development the public authority have in mind. May I deal, first, with the question of the register. The objection to that, in our view, is that it would introduce unnecessary formality into the relatively simple work of the local authority under the clause; and it would involve provision of opportunity to the pubic at large to examine it. Until my noble friend spoke, I understood that the associations of local authorities had not hitherto sought to suggest that a register would be desirable. I would ask all noble Lords to consider that point of the introduction of unnecessary formality, which I have put quite briefly.

With regard to the other point, I agree that it would probably be valuable to be able to define, as the Amendment seeks to do, at what stage a proposal to acquire becomes eligible for notification—I believe the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, had the same difficulty in mind when he spoke. I can assure your Lordships that we have considered the possibility, but it had to be abandoned in view of the difficulty of defining a stage in the proceedings of public authorities who, as your Lordships are aware, do not conduct their business on a basis of resolutions—I have in mind Government Departments, statutory undertakers and the like. I agree that the point in the Amendment is obviously of importance, and we have it in mind. But I would put this to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, with his experience as Minister of Town and Country Planning, as well as to my noble friends who are looking at it from the point of view of their local authority experience: that this is a matter which might well be dealt with more usefully, helpfully and profitably, by a circular, which would explain and would be able to deal with a number of circumstances and give guidance in that way. I am well ware that it is now a longer period than I care to think since I first had to deal with Bills at a Ministerial level, and that anything that suggests that something should be dealt with outside the Bill, instead of in it, is always greeted with a certain amount of suspicion. But I do put this to your Lordships most earnestly for consideration: that this is the sort of field, when the Ministry have considered the matter and considered how best guidance could be given, where a circular might be more helpful.

LORD SILKIN

Perhaps I might make this suggestion, as we are all rather thinking aloud on this question. Would the noble and learned Viscount consider a regulation? That is subject to discussion in either House, whereas a circular is not subject to discussion at all.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

In the same happy way of thinking aloud, I shall, of course, be pleased to consider it. I would suggest to the noble Lord, however, that you can get greater detail in a circular—perhaps illustrations, and so on—which it is difficult to put in a regulation. But I will consider the point, and I am sure the noble Lord will consider the suggestion that I have made.

I now want to deal with a point which my noble friend Lord Gage raised about the initiative in this matter. On that, I would reassure him that this is not a question where the local authority are supposed to show initiative. There is no occasion for the local authority to go in search of public authorities who are thinking of acquiring; they merely want to be notified, and that ought to be a simple and straightforward matter. They are not required to consider the rights or wrongs of what any authority proposing to acquire may do. So far as that is concerned, from every angle, the noble Viscount may be reassured that there is no initiative expected in that way. The second point which the noble Viscount had in mind, and which I think comes in most clearly at this stage in my argument, is that the onus of action to protect a public authority against the working of the clause lies with the public authority themselves. In this regard, what the public authority and the local authority will have to do should really develop quite simply. The public authority have to make up their mind what they want and tell the local authority. There is no question of authorities going round on each inquiry, wondering whether they have to tell or not.

If, as I have envisaged in these words I have been saying to your Lordships, you have a public authority and a local authority, the public authority informs the local authority and then the local authority know whether they should notify or not; so I do not think they are put in any great difficulty on this point. They have to deal with that as a matter of common sense. If they can honestly say to themselves, "We have not been notified by a public authority," then the answer to the inquiry that they get is "No." If they feel that what the public authority has told them does not amount to any notification on their part, then they pass on a negative answer, and then it is, if I may put it colloquially, the funeral of the public authority if it finds that it has to purchase land covered with bricks and mortar, or the preparations for building, instead of the land in its original state. I hope that that deals with some of the points which my noble friend raised.

Now I come to the question which I understood is worrying my noble friend Lord Gage more than any other, and that was the suggestion that planning permission for a public authority's development should be a prerequisite of any action to be taken. I want to make it quite clear that the working of the clause is quite independent of planning permission in this sense, which in the view of the Government does not come into the picture at all. Again, if I am right, I think that was the answer that my noble friend Lord Gage wanted. At any rate, that is the position, and I believe that to introduce the requirement that the local authority should first grant planning permission would inevitably make for confusion in this matter. It must be borne in mind that planning permission is not, under the Act of 1947, a document of title. It runs with the land and inures for the benefit of anyone for the time being interested in the land. The job of the planning authority, apart from the preparation of plans, is to consider applications regardless of whether the applicant has an interest in the land or is considering acquiring one. If the land is suitable for the development proposed in the application, it is the planning authority's duty to grant permission, notwithstanding that they may know that some other public authority is thinking of buying the land for the purpose of doing something different for which permission might also well be granted. I think that answers the query of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. It is intended to answer it quite forcibly and clearly, and that is the view which we take of this matter.

May I give it in the form of an example? If a private developer wishes to build houses, he is entitled to be granted permission to do so unless there is some planning objection, even if the housing authority is itself known to be thinking of buying the land for the same purpose. It does not follow, from the mere fact that the housing authority is interested, that they will be empowered to proceed. That is the position we wish to see: that the knowledge of the local authority of what a public authority, whether itself or another, is proposing to do should be passed on. But we do not think that it is necessary for planning action to be taken, and we think that it ought to give planning permission unless there is an objection.

It follows from that that if a notification could not be accepted by the local authority until the public authority had assured itself of planning permission, the interests of private people might well be prejudiced and the issue of notices to prospective purchasers would certainly be delayed. I think that follows quite clearly, and I have been glad to note that all your Lordships who have spoken—and I gather that it is the sense of the Committee as a whole—are anxious that the purchaser should be protected in this way. The only thing which worries your Lordships is the procedure which may be adopted. I believe that the purchaser is entitled to that consideration. I have tried to deal with the difficulties that have been raised, and I make the suggestion that those of your Lordships who are interested might be good enough to look at my speech. I know how difficult it is, apart from my own defects, to pick up the points in a speech on a technical subject as we go along. When your Lordships have had the opportunity of considering it, if there are any points which I have not explained I shall be glad to try and explain them again. Of course, it is always open to your Lordships to act on the next stage. I think we have had an interesting preliminary discussion on this point, and I hope, in view of the other numerous points before the House, your Lordships will be content with this discussion of this part of the Bill.

VISCOUNT RIDLEY

The noble and learned Viscount has explained this at length, but could he add just a little more? There is one point which he did not cover. I am looking at it from the point of view of the planning authority. It would seem to me that, without planning permission, which implies that the public authority have had to make their case, there would be a tendency on behalf of many of them to notify a considerable number of sites as alternatives. I do not think the noble and learned Viscount quite covered that point. I think there is a fear that many statutory undertakers, for example, may wish to preserve their position, and, so far as they know, all they have to do is to say, "In five years time we may want to buy this land."

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

That was the point I covered by the colloquial words, "that is their own funeral." If they like to notify that they may do something in five years, and then the purchaser, who is the beneficiary under this clause, gets his planning permission, the purchaser can carry out his development. Then the local authority will have to buy the land with the additional expense of the development, and so much the worse for them. They have not been able to make up their minds.

LORD SILKIN

Would not the practical effect of a notification of a purchase be that he will not buy? Most people are not likely to buy to establish a claim to get back what they paid for their land; they buy because they want to enjoy the land. If they are told that this land is likely to be acquired at a so-called market price, they will not buy, and then the owner suffers because he has unsaleable land. We do not want to multiply unnecessary notifications. I am sure that in protecting the purchaser we do not want to inflict a hardship on the owner. I do not know whether that is the point the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, had in mind.

VISCOUNT RIDLEY

I am grateful to the noble Lord—that is just the point I was coming to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

May I say one word on that matter? Of course, the people with whom we are dealing do not live in watertight compartments, shut off from each other without communication. It is one of the chances that people must take. What we are seeking to do is this. If the purchaser of land, who purchases in order to develop, gets these conditions: first that he knows whether there is the threat, and then, in the conditions laid out in the clause, gets the protection after some time, it is surely no disadvantage to him to receive that notification; it is a very great help to him. If he thinks—and we all know that these things do happen—that it is one of those notifications that hang like a miasma over the land but never descend upon it, then he has his remedy of developing and being compensated if the development takes place. That is the answer to it. But I would come back to this point—and this is really what I ask my noble friend, Lord Ridley, to consider—that surely it is a great advantage that a purchaser should be given that notification, and it would be a very great disadvantage if he had to wait to get that notification till all the steps of obtaining planning permission had been gone through.

VISCOUNT RIDLEY

I appreciate that. But there is the other case, where there may be no purchaser at all. This clause is intended to protect purchasers, and may, and I suppose will, produce a large number of notifications. They may attach to land which nobody is thinking of buying or selling, at any rate under the terms of this clause. The result of that may be that some present owner in a year or two's time may want to develop. Will he find his land is in the same position as it would be without the notification? There are two possibilities: either he decides to sell and it has not the same value, or he applies for planning permission. Is it not possible that some planning authorities will say "This land is notified land and we should not give permission." I think a very clear circular from the Minister would be very important. It looks rather as if notified land is going a long way towards being designated land. I think one has to look at the case not only when there is a purchase in contemplation but when there is not.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I ask my noble friends to draw a great distinction between notification and designation. In my view they are a number of degrees apart. If one keeps that in mind—because that is the idea behind the clause—I think some of the difficulties will disappear. I hope that my noble friends will now consider that we have had sufficient discussion for the moment. If there are any other questions, I am open to see any of them when they like.

VISCOUNT GAGE

The noble and learned Viscount is always so courteous to us that I feel we have no option but to do what he suggests. I cannot pretend I am happy about this clause. It seems to me, to say the least of it, illogical, and as there is a great deal of money involved in this kind of certificate procedure I feel that some of the best legal brains will be turned on to seeing what they can make of the possibilities of this clause. I feel that if the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, were minded to return to his previous activities, there would be a great prospect in front of him in connection with the Bill generally and this clause in particular. But I quite agree that we must consider the full effect of the noble and learned Viscount's speech. I am grateful to him for saying that he is going to inform local authorities of what is expected of them. I think that is most necessary. In regard to what he said about the difficulties of registration, it did not seem to me that those difficulties were so great, but let us by all means consider that supposed difficulty, and, as I have another chance of speaking on a later Amendment, I will say nothing more but withdraw this Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.56 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved to add at the end of subsection (1): specifying in the notice any part of that land to which any such proposal of the council or other authority does not extend".

The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment and the other two Amendments in my name, page 42, line 8, and page 42, line 32, go together, and if your Lordships would give me the indulgence of discussing them together I think it would be helpful. They do three things. First, they provide more effectively for cases where the local authority are aware of a proposal to purchase part of the land. As the clause is at present drafted the would-be purchaser would have to make a second inquiry in respect of the part of the land not earmarked, in order to secure the protection of the clause. The second thing they do is to extend the clause to cases where the intending purchaser has not completed the acquisition when notice to treat is served, but is bound to do so under an enforceable contract. That is the effect of Amendment No. 63, and I hope my noble friends will note it, because it has a material effect on the question of time. Your Lordships will appreciate that there might be many cases where there would not be enough time to get completion but there is enough time to get to the stage of an enforceable contract. It is common practice in the building industry to take up the land contracted for only as it is required. The purchaser is at risk in such circumstances, because the vendor would be in a position to compel him to complete. The third thing these Amendments do is to make a number of drafting improvements in the clause. I am not going into the metaphysical point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, as to the difference between a drafting Amendment and a purely drafting Amendment. I should be inclined to say that these are, on the whole, drafting Amendments but not purely drafting Amendments, and leave it to your Lordships to take the difference. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 42, line 4, at end insert the said words.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD RATHCREEDAN moved at the end of subsection (1) to insert: A notice which states that a council propose to acquire any such interest shall also state the purpose and the estimated date of the acquisition, and a notice which states that a public authority have given notice of a proposal to acquire any such interest shall also state the name of that authority and the purpose and the estimated date of the acquisition. (2) If a council give no such notice to the applicant within twenty-eight days of the receipt of the application they shall be deemed to have given notice that they do not propose to acquire any such interest within the next five years and have not been notified by any public authority possessing compulsory purchase powers of a proposal of that authority to acquire any, such interest: Provided that if at the time of receiving such an application as aforesaid a council do not propose to acquire any interest in the land which is the subject of the application and have not been notified by any public authority possessing compulsory purchase powers of a proposal of that authority to acquire any such interest they may give notice to that effect to the applicant without allowing a period of twenty-eight days to expire.

The noble Lord said: I rise with some diffidence to move the Amendment standing in my name, because this is the first time that I have had the temerity to take part in your Lordships' deliberations, and I would not do so this evening only I am one of the few practising solicitors in your Lordships' House and probably the one who, owing to the fact that he seldom attends your Lordships' House, has had the experience of dealing with a great many prospective purchasers. As this clause is designed to protect the prospective purchaser, your Lordships will realise that the prospective purchaser will expect aid and assistance from a solicitor, but I am sure your Lordships will realise that it is becoming increasingly difficult for members of the solicitors' profession to carry out their duties and to satisfy their clients in this respect. This Bill and this clause in particular do not make that task any easier.

The Amendment Which I propose really deals only with three small points. The first is that, in the notice which the council give that they propose to acquire the land, they should also state the purpose for which they wish to acquire the land and the approximate date when the purchase will be made. It is surely not difficult for the authority to give this information, because they must have given consideration to the reasons for which they wish to acquire the land. It will also prevent the possibility of the bare notification that they may wish to acquire the land. As the noble and learned Viscount on an earlier Amendment to this clause stated, he thought that some of these councils would err on the side of safety and therefore put in a notice that they wished to acquire the land, in order to be on the safe side. I feel that, if they have to put forward the purpose for which they wish to acquire the land and the approximate date, this will ensure a fewer number of notices given just to safeguard themselves.

The second point is that, although it is stated in the clause that the council shall reply within twenty-eight days, the position if the council do not reply within twenty-eight days is not clear. My Amendment suggests that, if they do not reply within twenty-eight days, they shall be deemed to have given notice that they do not wish to acquire the land. The third point is a proviso. Again, it is not clear, when a prospective purchaser applies to the local authority, whether they, the local authority, have to wait for twenty-eight days to see whether there is going to be an application from any public authority or whether they can issue the notice within the twenty-eight days if they have not received any notification. I hope that, if this Amendment cannot be agreed to, at least the noble and learned Viscount will put my mind at rest with regard to these points. It is possible that they are already in some measure covered, but there are doubts on these points and it would be of great assistance if they could be cleared up. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 42, line 4, at end insert the said words and subsection.—(Lord Rathcreedan.)

6.3 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

It must happen on comparatively few occasions that so junior a Member of your Lordships' House as I am has so great a pleasure as I have in congratulating the noble Lord on the speech that he has just made. If he will allow one who is old in speech-making, if a junior Member of this House, to say so, I thought that his speech had exactly the mixture of modesty, learning and clarity which most delights the heart of the hearer. I am sure I am speaking for everyone in the House when I say that it is our desire that the noble Lord will often address us again. After the speech, I should like to be able to say that I accept the Amendment and that that is an end of the matter, but, if the noble Lord will allow me, I will take the next best course. I hope he will allow me to consider these points again, in view of what he has said. With regard to the first point, he has made a case, and put it most reasonably, for the information on the subject mentioned in his Amendment. I should like to have another look at that. I started with the view that it was not necessary, but the noble Lord has certainly convinced me that the matter is deserving of further consideration on that point.

With regard to the second point, I thought that the local authority would be subject to the usual machinery affecting someone who disregards a statutory duty laid upon him. Although that is rather a heavy piece of machinery, I thought it was enough. It is rather difficult by Statute to compel the conclusion to be drawn that the noble Lord suggests in his Amendment, because that might introduce further complications which would make the position of the local authority very hard indeed. While I will not at this Box ask for special treatment, either for Government Departments or for local authorities, I think that everyone in this House, and especially noble Lords on both sides who, if I may put it this way, have a local authority background and experience, would agree with me that the successful working of the clause depends on a reasonable outlook and reasonable efficiency being maintained, both by all acquiring authorities and by the local authority as administering authority. I should not like to put in any provision which would imply that one was expecting dilatory conduct or which might be taken in that way. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his Amendment for the moment, on my promise to consider the point. And if your Lordships will allow me, I should like again to congratulate him on his speech.

LORD MILNER OF LEEDS

We on these Benches should also like to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Rathcreedan, on his maiden speech. In our view, the Amendment which he has moved is a very important one. As my noble friend knows, though he did not mention it, it has the support of the Law Society, who feel strongly that these are necessary steps to ensure that a solicitor who is making inquiries on behalf of a prospective purchaser should have the necessary information on which to give adequate advice. We hope—I certainly hope—that the noble and learned Viscount will consider the proposals and adopt them. They all seem to me to be practical and, as there is no sanction if a local authority does not give the information required within twenty-eight days, it would seem necessary either to impose a sanction or to do what the Amendment proposes to do, enable the prospective purchaser to deem that there is no purchase in prospect.

LORD SILKIN

I, too, should like to congratulate my noble friend on his maiden speech, and to assure him that we shall often call upon his services now that we know his capabilities. I rise only for one reason—namely, that the noble and learned Viscount seemed to be under the impression that there was something of an innovation in having a provision saying that if a local authority did not reply within a certain period certain inferences were to be drawn. On a number of occasions, in the course of the discussion on the Committee stage, the noble and learned Viscount has referred to the 1932 Act, which I imagine he would regard as having most respectable parentage. I should like to assure him that in that Act there is a similar provision—that where there is an application for planning consent and the local authority do not give a decision within two months, the applicant is entitled to regard that as a permission. That was altered in the 1947 Act to work the other way: that it there is no decision within two months it is to be treated as a refusal. But the principle is just the same: that under both Acts certain action follows from the failure of a local authority to give a decision. Therefore, this would be no innovation. It seems to me that that was the real case which the noble and learned Viscount made against this Amendment. I hope that he will take these respectable precedents into consideration.

LORD RATHCREEDAN

I should like to thank the noble and learned Viscount, not only for his reply but for the very kind things he said about my speech. I value his remarks, coming from such a great speaker and from someone who has had such great experience, very much indeed. I should like to raise one further point. I do not think the noble and learned Viscount gave me any reply to the question as to whether the local authority could reply within 28 days, or whether they have to wait for 28 days to receive any notice from a statutory undertaking.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I should have thought they could reply at once, and that if they got any further information within the 28 days it would be common sense, and I think courtesy, to send it on. That is how I should have thought the matter should be dealt with.

LORD RATHCREEDAN

I thank the noble and learned Viscount for that reply. In view of what he has said, that he will look into the matter, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

6.14 p.m.

LORD MILNER OF LEEDS moved to add to subsection (1): On any application under this subsection the applicant shall on request pay to the council to whom the application is made a fee of five shillings. The noble Lord said: I move this Amendment at the request of the Association of Municipal Corporations. The reason why the point is raised is that it seems that a quite considerable amount of work on the part of county borough or the county district councils will be involved in operating this clause. Obviously, it will be necessary for local authorities to keep a register, and it also seems probable that solicitors acting for a purchaser are likely to make an inquiry under this clause every time they submit a local land charges search, as they do of course at present.

Section 15 of the Land Charges Act, 1925, which requires the appropriate officer of the local authority to register certain local charges, makes provision for fees to be paid for any certificate of search in the register and for the search itself. The local authorities are also entitled to charge for supplying information, apart from that which is required to be recorded in the register. It is true that not all local authorities make a charge, but the power is there. Therefore it seems to the Association of Municipal Corporations—and also, I think I may say, to my noble friends and myself—that since inquiries will become common form under this clause, whenever an application is made for a local land charges search it is not unreasonable for local authorities to charge a reasonable fee. There is provision in Clause 48 for a fee in the case of inquiry from the Central Land Board. That fee is, I think, 5s., and a similar fee is suggested in this Amendment. I think the local authority should have the same advantage under Clause 34 as it is proposed should be given to the Central Land Board in somewhat similar circumstances under Clause 48. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 42, line 4, at end insert the said words. —(Lord Milner of Leeds.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I had anticipated that one of the arguments on this Amendment would be that what is sauce for the Exchequer goose is sauce for the local authority gander. For Lord Milner of Leeds' information, what he has in mind is contained in Clause 48, where the Central Land Board are empowered to charge a fee. But I am told that the two clauses are not at all comparable in the amount of work they will entail, and that the fee charged under Clause 48 will in no way cover the expense of examining records and supplying the necessary information; and it is not meant to do so. It is meant just to cause the applicant to pause for a moment before he asks for unnecessary information. But under Clause 34 any prudent purchaser of land will want information about the possibility of compulsory purchase, and it will cost very little for the local authority to provide it. Presumably, they will have a file of notifications, and they will have only to consult the file and send a reply. I do not wish to delay the Committee, nor to spend time arguing about whether or not there should be a 5s. fee. I am very anxious that no difficulty should be put in the way of the purchaser, but in view of the fact that Lord Milner of Leeds has said that the Association of Municipal Corporations are behind this Amendment and are anxious to have it, I will willingly have another look at it. I hope he will allow me to do that. I will communicate with him when I have come to a decision.

LORD BURDEN

I am very glad that the noble and learned Viscount has agreed to have another look at this Amendment. I would say that the work under this clause will not be quite so automatic and routine as he has rather implied. I think it will be incumbent upon the local authority to put a responsible officer in charge of the work, to see that inquirers get accurate information; otherwise, if the work is given to a junior to carry out, serious consequences may ensue. We all know that local authorities are today very hard pressed on financial grounds, and even 5s. flowing in regularly from numbers of inquiriers might be of assistance. I am glad that the noble and learned Viscount is to have another look at this point.

LORD MILNER OF LEEDS

Having regard to the suggestion made by the noble and learned Viscount, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is one of the Amendments which I explained with a previous Amendment. I hope the Committee will allow me to move it formally now. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 42, line 8, leave out from ("propose") to ("is") in line 18 and insert— ("and have not been notified of any proposal of another authority, to acquire within the next five years any interest in any land specified in the notice (in this subsection referred to as 'the specified land'), being the whole or part of the land to which the application related; and (b) the person to whom the notice was given has within three months of the giving of the notice completed, or entered into a bona fide contract for, the purchase of an interest in the specified land or any part thereof and given notice of the completion or, as the case may be, of the making of the contract to the said council; and (c) that interest, or that interest in so far as it subsists in any part of that land.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment, agreed to.

VISCOUNT GAGE

Amendment No. 67, in my name, is consequential upon the Amendment which I have withdrawn, and is therefore not moved.

LORD HYLTON

This Amendment is purely practical and is considered as improving the period during which this notice must be given. I believe the period of three months is insufficient for the purposes for which it is intended. I note that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, who has far greater experience than myself in legal matters, has been good enough to add his name to this Amendment. In view of the legal weight that will be attached to his opinion I propose only to move this Amendment and I hope the noble Lord will support it. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 42, line 14, leave out ("three") and insert ("six").—(Lord Hylton.)

LORD SILKIN

I realise that Her Majesty's Government have here gone some way towards meeting the difficulty by relating this provision to contracts instead of to completed purchases. Nevertheless, since the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, has referred to the weight of my experience, I would say that in my experience it is quite common for negotiations resulting in a contract to take more than three months. To insist on a contract being completed in three months is to encourage people to make another application and get a further notification shortly before they are about to complete a contract. It would be much wiser, and would hurt nobody, if the period in the Bill were to be six months as against three months.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I had hoped, as I indicated with an appealing glance towards the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, on an earlier Amendment, that my introduction of contracts as opposed to completions had met the point. If, in the view of two noble Lords of the experience of Lord Hylton and Lord Silkin, it is not thought to be sufficient, I will have another look at it and see what are the disadvantages. There is no point in arguing the matter. This is essentially practical, and unless I can find practical reasons to advance to your Lordships then of course I shall try to meet you. But I should like to go back and consider this question from the various practical points of view and deal with it on the Report stage. I will therefore ask my noble friend if he would not press it at this stage.

LORD HYLTON

I am much obliged. I have found great difficulty in certain circumstances in completing contracts within so short a period, and doubtless other noble Lords have found the same difficulty. In view of the assurance of the noble and learned Viscount, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is the third of the three Amendments which I have explained. Again, with your permission, I will move it formally. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 42, leave out lines 32 to 44, and insert— ("Provided that—

1. (i) if at the date of the publication or service of the first notice in connection with the acquisition such as is referred to in paragraph (c) of this subsection, the purchase mentioned in paragraph (b) thereof has not been completed, this subsection shall not have effect unless the contract mentioned in the said paragraph (b) remains in force at that date;
2. (ii) this subsection shall not have effect in relation to a purchase by a company from an associated company within the meaning of section forty-seven of this Act.

(3) The two last preceding sections shall not apply for the purpose of assessing any compensation to the assessment of which the last preceding subsection applies: Provided that if the compensation payable in respect of the acquisition of the relevant interest would, apart from this proviso, be less than it would have been if this section had not been enacted, the last preceding subsection shall not apply in the case of that acquisition").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

6.27 p.m.

VISCOUNT GAGE moved to leave out Clause 34. The noble Lord said: I had put down this Amendment to try to discover from Her Majesty's Government why the certificate process provided for in this clause is necessary at all, and why the same protection to the prospective purchaser (which we all agree is most necessary) cannot be provided through the medium of the planning consent itself. We all want to avoid hardship. One of the ways in which we can seek to avoid the inflicting of hardship is by not misleading the public. It is misleading to issue an official document—as we are doing to-day—telling a man he can build a house when we do not necessarily mean that he can build anything at all. It may mean that next day his land is compulsorily acquired at a very low price for some quite different purpose. The clearance certificate which we have been discusing is only another way of saying that a planning consent has, for at least five years, the meaning it purports to have. Further, as noble Lords have heard in the course of this debate, it has been the practice to attach to consents so issued a number of conditions, many of which, after being in use for many years with the knowledge of the Ministry, are, we are now told, ultra vires and illegal. That again is misleading.

I should at once agree that these fictional aspects of town planning are by no means confined to the actions of local authorities. Applications which we receive from individuals as often as not do not mean what they purport to mean. An applicant may put in an application to build when he really wants a refusal for building, thus establishing a claim for compensation. Under this Bill that is the only way he can get compensation. An applicant may be putting in an application to build not because he desires to build but because he wishes to speculate in land values. So we have the peculiar position that an applicant may ask for permission to build without having any intention of building, and he may receive a consent which does not necessarily mean what it says, and possibly imposes conditions which are entirely illegal. To complete the picture, we are to issue warnings under this clause that land is wanted for a particular purpose, while giving consent to the development of the same land for an entirely different purpose. Is it surprising that the ordinary man-in-the-street should be considerably bewildered by all this mix-up? Is it really impossible to devise a system of control in which words would have more of the meaning usually attached to them in the dictionary? Could we not possibly make a new start by devising a form of consent that is legal and at the same time valid—by that I mean that no Government Department or local authority should be enabled to override it except by paying the full value of that consent?

Would it not be possible to discourage mere speculation in land values by giving these consents quite a short life—say five years in the normal term? Surely if somebody wants to build a house he can normally do so to-day within five years. For large-scale plans a longer period could, of course, be agreed. But I do not see why anyone should expect to get indefinite protection from compulsory acquisition by the simple process of not carrying out their expressed intention, nor can I see why any statutory bodies should be completely outside planning law. After all, if statutory bodies want to safeguard their future interests, why should they not use the designation procedure specially provided in the 1947 Act for this purpose? Lord Silkin said that he was amused because we had opposed this procedure when he introduced his Bill in 1947. I think that in this House a certain amount of apprehension was expressed, just as there has been apprehension expressed about the effects of this clause in possibly sterilising land, but I do not remember that we divided against that suggestion. I was always of opinion that there was a great deal to be said on both sides. If the designation process for some reason does not work, cannot it be made to work?

I make these suggestions with great deference because I know well that it is almost impossible for a layman to make any constructive proposals in this highly complicated subject that will not be shot down—any proposals that will stand up to criticism. But I submit that the situation is serious. I do not believe that the public will discuss this measure in the same calm and dispassionate way that is traditional to this House. I doubt whether they will discuss it at all. But they will discuss—and in a far from dispassionate manner—some of the results of the Bill, which I do not wish to exaggerate. In my own county we have been advised to take the almost unprecedented step of setting up a special committee to consider each case of compulsory acquisition from the angle of hardship. I think this committee will have a difficult task because of the extreme disparity between some of the existing values and the compulsory purchase price. I mentioned one figure during the Second Reading debate. I have now heard of another case in which a sale contract for £30,000 actually exists, but the compulsory purchase price is £4,700 including claim. I am not defending these inflated values, but I say it is going to be difficult for the local authority to decide what is their best course in that kind of situation. We are told that this double price system is basic to the Bill, and we must accept that. Even so, it seems to me that we should endeavour to the best of our ability to remove all possible causes of misconception from the public mind. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Leave out Clause 34.—(Viscount Gage.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I hope that my noble friend Lord Gage will agree—indeed I think all your Lordships have seen that it is so—that I have tried to deal with all the points on this clause as they arose. Therefore, I hope that Lord Gage will not think it discourteous of me if at this stage I do not go at length into the wider issues which he has raised on this Amendment, which is, in fact, the converse of the Motion that the clause stand part of the Bill. There are just two points to which I should like to direct your Lordships' attention, and that for only a moment or two. The first is the broad question that Lord Gage had so much in mind and of which he spoke so feelingly, the complication of legal drafting in this subject matter. I hope that he will believe me, and I hope that I speak for all lawyers in the House, when I say that we do not want it, and we do our utmost to avoid it. But when one has spent many years considering legislation, both legislation in Parliament and the war-time legislation, the very search for security, the very desire to make sure that every possible interest that might be affected is secure against wrongful action, drives one again and again to this intricacy in drafting which alone can bring home that security. I think all your Lordships would agree that there is no field in which it is more necessary to see that these protections exist, and in which it is so difficult to combine protection with clarity of words. I can only say to my noble friend that we shall try hard to achieve the combination of simplicity and exactitude which is the draftsman's dream.

My second point is with regard to the clause itself. I must say that I am reminded of that famous statement of M. de Talleyrand, which he made leaning on that raised balustrade of the Travellers' Club: "Beware of your first intentions—they are usually good." I cannot help feeling that the lesson of this clause is to beware of the good intention of seeking to help the purchaser who may be caught by the prospective development of the public authority. As I have said, I know that your Lordships will not, after the many times I have addressed you on this clause, think I am being flippant in the matter. I know that the objective of your Lordships is to give the purchaser that protection, and at the same time to find the best method of doing this. I have given my reasons. If there are any improvements that may be suggested, I am prepared to consider them. I hope that my noble friend will now allow us to have the clause and to proceed to the next subject, in which, I know, a great many of your Lordships are interested.

VISCOUNT RIDLEY

I should like to add one word to what my noble friend Lord Gage has said. I think the arguments he has developed on the complication of the planning situation almost lead back to the argument we had on the 1947 Act: that there should be only one form of consent, whether for the individual, the public authority, the statutory authority, or even for the Government itself. If we had such a thing, and if it were known that there was one certain plan made for whatever piece of land it might be, we should, I think, remove the difficulty about this insurance scheme for the purchaser. In practice, quite apart from the position of the purchaser under this clause, there are great difficulties for planning authorities in having to fit in their decisions on planning with decisions on planning made by other people. There will always be a difficulty so long as there are these two sets of decisions being made concurrently.

VISCOUNT GAGE

I thought I had given the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor notice about this point. I have no wish to delay the proceedings. I feel very strongly about this matter, but we must leave the development of that argument until another time. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 34, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 35 [Compensation to include benefit of planning permission in certain other cases]:

On Question, Whether Clause 35 shall stand part of the Bill?

LORD SILKIN

The Committee may remember that yesterday, on Clause 6 of the Bill, I raised the question of the position of a person who had a dead-ripe certificate under Section 80 of the 1947 Act. It was a technical point. I asked how a person, who by virtue of the certificate did not make a claim and therefore had no established claim, could recover his development value if his land were compulsorily acquired or if he had sold it for less than the market price, and would otherwise have been eligible for payment towards an established claim. I did not imagine that the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, would have been able to answer that question there and then, and I said that I would raise it at the earliest opportunity and this is the opportunity. I leave it to the noble Lord.

LORD MANCROFT

The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, is quite right. I had some knowledge of this matter at the back of my mind, but when I went to the back of my mind I found it was an even darker and murkier place on this subject than I imagined. I have taken advice on the point and I understand that the effect of the Bill on the dead-ripe certificate will be as follows. To get a dead-ripe certificate the owner must have had valid permission for the development covered by the certificate. The owner is assured of the benefit of this permission in any eventuality. If permission is refused, he will be compensated in full, under Clause 38. If the land is compulsorily acquired, the compensation payable will include the value of the right to carry out development in the certificate—that is in Clause 35, which we are now discussing. No compensation will be payable otherwise, unless in 1947 the land had a higher development value for some development other than that specified in the certificate and a Part V claim was made for the difference. That, I understand, is the position in regard to the dead-ripe certificate. I hope that it satisfies the noble Lord and answers his query.

LORD SILKIN

I will reply as the noble and learned Viscount has so often replied: may I consider it and come back to it if necessary?

Clause 35 agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after Clause 35, to insert the following new Clause—

Additional payments in cases where no claim has been established

".—(1) If, in the case of a compulsory acquisition to which this Part of this Act applies, it is shown to the satisfaction of the appropriate authority that the relevant land or some part thereof does not constitute or form part of the claim area of any established claim, but that a claim or claims in respect of one or more interests in that land, or, as the case may be, in that part thereof, would have been established if made, there shall be issued by or on behalf of the Treasury a certificate specifying—

1. (a) whether or not, in the opinion of the person signing the certificate, section thirty-two of this Act would have applied to the compulsory acquisition if the claim or claims aforesaid had been established; and
2. (b) if so, what in that person's opinion would have been the amount of the additional compensation calculated by reference to the unexpended balance of established development value of that land or that part thereof which would have been payable under that section in respect of the acquisition of the relevant interest.

(2) Where an amount has been specified as aforesaid and, after taking into account all the circumstances, the appropriate authority is of opinion that it is just and reasonable that a payment should be made in addition to what would be the compensation payable in respect of the acquisition of the relevant interest apart from the provisions of this section, there shall be added to that compensation such amount as the appropriate authority may direct, being an amount not exceeding that specified in the certificate aforesaid.

(3) In this section, the expression "the appropriate authority" means—

1. (a) where the compulsory acquisition of the relevant interest by the acquiring authority requires authorisation by a single other authority, that other authority; or
2. (b) where the acquiring authority is a government department and the compulsory acquisition does not require the authorisation of any other authority, the acquiring authority; or
3. (c) in any other case, the Treasury or such other authority as the Treasury may in any case or class of cases direct."

The noble and learned Viscount said: The purpose of the new clause is to implement the undertaking which I gave during the Second Reading debate to enable acquiring authorities to make additional payments for development value which existed in 1947 but which was not the subject of a claim on the £300 million fund. The clause requires that the appropriate, authority, which, in accordance with subsection (3) will generally be the Minister confirming the compulsory purchase order, shall be satisfied that a claim would have been established, if made. If the appropriate authority is so satisfied, a certificate is to be issued on behalf of the Treasury stating whether Clause 32 of the Bill would have applied and specifying the amount of the unexpended balance which would have been payable. Up to that point, of course, there is a right to have the claim formulated—a point which was in the minds of some noble Lords. Subsection (2) provides for additional payment by the acquiring authority up to the amount specified in the certificate, if the confirming Minister is of opinion that it is just and reasonable that a payment should be made. That raises another point which I know is in the minds of many noble Lords—namely, the discretion which is vested in the Minister. In the Government's view it is necessary that the confirming Minister should have discretion, as the clause provides, on the point whether a payment should be made and of what amount within the maximum.

Noble Lords may have approached the matter by asking whether the Minister ever refuses. May I give an example which I think disposes of that point? If the clause conferred an absolute right to a payment, there would be no means of avoiding payment in cases where it would be plainly inappropriate. One such type of case would be where the landowner himself bought the land at existing use value during the currency of development charge but did not develop. There have been such cases in the courts, where the practice has been discussed. These are cases in which I can see no possible merit in a subsequent claim for the claim, if I may put it in that way. In the event of compulsory acquisition after the coming into operation of the Bill, the proper compensation would be the existing use value, notwithstanding that a claim could have been established if made. If anyone has bought at the existing use value the compensation should be at the existing use value. Another class of case is that of great institutions in a powerful financial position, which had every opportunity of being advised but decided not to make a claim and then afterwards want to change their minds. I am afraid they ought to take the consequences. I give these two examples of why there should be a discretion, and the first is the greater.

Then I come to the question about the vesting of that discretion in a Minister of the Crown. May I first deal with it from the procedural point of view? To provide for a payment as of right would entail the laying down of precise and elaborate rules to bind the authorities concerned and the Lands Tribunal. Of course, there will be no appeal to the Lands Tribunal, as it is a Ministerial discretion. It would be necessary to construct hypothetical claim holdings with all the apparatus for the determination of real claims and to take into account all the possible occasions for payment provided for in the Bill in connection with real claims. I am not building up hypothetical difficulties: this is what it would be necessary to do if this were established on a basis of legal right. The Bill requires the value of claim holdings to be reduced by payments under Parts I and V and the amount of unexpended balances to be reduced by payments for future planning restrictions and the carrying out of development. The rules for these hypothetical claims, which have not been made, would have to distinguish the acts or events which ought to come into the reckoning and those which ought not.

The noble Viscount, Lord Gage, has just made an eloquent appeal to your Lordships to avoid over-complication. If this were put on a basis of right, I cannot imagine a greater jumble of hypothetical legal possibilities having to be constructed in order that all claims should be met. That is one reason but there is a simpler reason. This is a case where the quantification of claims dealt with in subsection (1) is a matter to which the claimant is entitled. After it has been quantified, the Minister has to say whether he is to pay anything and how much he is to pay. That is the sort of point on which the Minister will be and should be subjected to Parliamentary discipline and Parliamentary pressure, if your Lordships like to use that term. The Minister has to decide what is just and reasonable and if he does not do what is just in the opinion of your Lordships, then it is right that your Lordships' House should call attention to it. It is not a question where the Minister will be pressed on carrying out a legal matter or a judicial matter of fixing the price; he will be pressed on his opinion as to whether it is just and reasonable. I think that that is right and healthy.

Many years ago the noble and learned Earl who leads the Opposition introduced me to this fascinating subject, as I have already informed your Lordships, by making me Chairman of a Committee of Inquiry into town and country planning. The subject was whether there should be a Minister at all, or whether we should construct one of these Commissions—your Lordships may remember that some years ago it was rather fashionable to consider having Commissions which would take certain subjects out of politics. It was decided that town and country planning could not be kept out of politics because of the interest that people, both inside and out of Parliament, would show in decisions taken, and my noble friend Lord Gage has given us a number of subjects which have aroused that interest. It will undoubtedly arouse interest if the Minister's views on what is just and reasonable do not accord with the views of each House. Therefore, facing it bluntly, facing the fact that he may have pressure put upon him, I feel that this is the healthiest and best way of dealing with it.

I have tried to put the points with complete frankness. The only other matter is the question of retrospection. I said on Second Reading that while we were ready to consider whether any case could be dealt with in the ways which are familiar to your Lordships, we could not accept the principle of retrospection. By that I must stand. I hope that I have dealt adequately with the point, and I am sure that everyone in this Committee will be glad to know that any case like that of Mr. Pilgrim, which has worried your Lordships and worried the country, will be prevented in the future by the machinery of this Bill. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— After Clause 35, insert the said new clause.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

6.53 p.m.

LORD SILKIN

We are all obliged to the noble and learned Viscount for introducing this new clause, and for the way in which he has done it. The Government have had considerable difficulty in dealing with the kind of case which this clause is intended to cover. On the one hand, they have had to stand by the principle, which I think is right, that they could not, as a matter of right, reopen claims which had not been submitted at the proper time, and give everybody the opportunity of making such a claim; on the other, we are dealing with hardship. Once they took the view that they were not prepared to give everybody an automatic right to reopen the question of a claim, then of course, something of this kind had to be done for the purpose of dealing with hardship; and it had to be discretionary. Therefore, for my part, I feel that on the whole the principle of this clause is right, and I believe that most noble Lords will agree that, short of departing altogether from the principle of the Bill, this is the best that could be done.

On the question of machinery, however, I am not so sure that the Government have given the matter sufficient thought. There are two things that have to be established. The first is whether or not the person concerned would have had a claim under Section 32 of the Act—that has to be certified by some person who signs a certificate. We are not told who that person is, and there is no appeal against his decision. The certificate, I presume, would be issued by or on behalf of the Treasury, and I suppose that the person signing the certificate would be a Treasury official. On the face of it, if he declined to sign a certificate, then that would be the end of the matter, because there is no appeal. There is no one whom one can approach, I imagine, because the person is anonymous. If the decision is not favourable, one can write to the Treasury and ask to see the person who would have had to sign the certificate, but one has no right to receive a reply; one just has to accept the ipse dixit of some person working in the Treasury as to whether or not the hardship is removed.

The second thing that has to be established is whether, in the opinion of this person, there would have been an unexpended balance of established claim if the person concerned had put in a claim. There again, the same objection applies. It could be a debatable question as to whether or not there would have been a claim. As the noble and learned Viscount knows, there are still a considerable number of claims outstanding after a good many years. There is the question whether Section 63 of the 1947 Act (that is, the de minimis provision) applies—whether a person who did not make a claim would come within the provisions of Section 63. All that is to be settled by the opinion of some unknown person in the Treasury, who cannot be approached and cannot be challenged. I should have thought that if you were going to confer upon a person suffering hardship an opportunity of having his case properly considered, and you were going to make him feel that his case was going to be properly considered, he should have an opportunity of arguing the point and of approaching somebody if his claim was turned down.

I hope that the noble and learned Viscount has not said the last word on this matter. I imagine that he has put up this provision as a sort of cock-shy so that we can all have a go at it and put forward objections if we wish to. I hope that the noble and learned Viscount has put it forward in that spirit, and that he will be prepared to look at the clause again to see whether the person who is suffering hardship cannot be given a further right of making representations and of seeing somebody or talking to somebody, on these two points: first, as to whether he comes within Section 32, and secondly, whether he would have had an unexpended balance of established claim if he had done the right thing at the right time.

On the question of discretion, frankly I do not see what more the noble and learned Viscount could do. If this is to be a discretionary claim, then it is put into responsible hands, and it must be for the appropriate authority to decide what is fair and reasonable. That point stands in a different category from the other two. What is fair and reasonable is a matter that one has to decide on the basis of one's own conscience. But the other two matters are questions of fact and questions of law and, possibly, mixed questions of fact and law. I think it is unsatisfactory to leave those decisions in the hands of an unspecified person without any right of appeal or approach in respect of such a decision. I do not put these points forward in any controversial spirit, but I believe that they are worthy of consideration if we are to meet these cases of hardship in the spirit in which I believe the Government intend to meet them.

EARL FORTESCUE

I think it would be convenient if the Committee were now to adjourn until a quarter past eight.

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

May I ask your Lordships' indulgence for one moment? I have a dinner engagement, like many noble Lords, and I was not committed to constant attendance on this Bill because it is not a subject with which I am deeply conversant. But there is one small point which I should like to make on this new clause, and I should be greatly obliged if the Committee would allow me to do so in less than five minutes. The intention of this new clause is one with which we shall all agree—to prevent cases of real hardship, such as the Pilgrim case, from arising again. But I venture to doubt whether the clause, as it stands, will carry out this intention. There are, to my mind, two classes of case which will not be altered, and I should like to ask the noble and learned Viscount whether he would be kind enough to address his mind to these two classes of case. In the first place, this new clause will not apply in cases where a local authority have already acquired land under compulsory powers or, indeed, may acquire land before this present Bill has passed into law: it is not retrospective. I know that the noble and learned Viscount says that it cannot be retrospective, but perhaps on this stage of the Bill he would amplify his reasons in a way in which he was unable to do during the Second Reading debate.

The other class of case is this. This clause will not apply in cases where local authorities acquire land or have acquired land by agreement with the consent of the owner. It seems to me that if the object of the clause is to prevent injustice to an individual land owner, then it is quite irrelevant whether the injustice arises out of a past purchase or a future purchase, and out of purchase by consent or purchase by compulsory powers. This injustice will not be put right unless cases of this kind are covered by a clause in the Bill. I should be much obliged to the noble and learned Viscount if he would address his mind to those two points, and I should like to thank the Committee for their indulgence in allowing me to put this matter forward.

(The Sitting was suspended at four minutes past seven o'clock and resumed at a quarter past eight.)

LORD HYLTON moved, as an Amendment to the Amendment, in subsection (2) of the new clause, to leave out all words from "aforesaid" down to and including "section." The noble Lord said: I beg to move the first Amendment to the Amendment. Perhaps with the permission of the Committee I may be allowed to deal with Amendment No. 73 at the same time; I think that might be convenient. Your Lordships on all sides of the Committee will be grateful to the Government for adding this new clause. There is, I think, no shadow of doubt that the public conscience was shocked that a situation could arise under which great loss could occur to an individual owing to the application of a compulsory purchase order on his property if he was not a claim-holder. I do not propose at this late hour to explain again how it came about that, in the Lord Chancellor's words, a good number of claims for loss of development value were not made by the appointed date; nor why it is that at the present time local authorities find themselves in a position where, in the public interest, they feel they ought to acquire such "no claim" land or property because such land or property has no claim. Thereby, of course, the public interest suffers, because the authorities are not able, or are unwilling, to purchase land or property which may in many cases be best suited for the exercise or the purposes of their statutory duties. These points were fully gone into during the Second Reading debate.

I think it appropriate to try to view the Government's new clause against the background of what has been said many times in your Lordships' House during the last ten years, at the very least, and to try and paraphrase the sentiments expressed in this House. They were these: that the powers of Ministers have been increased; that the individual has very little safeguard against such increases, and that in many cases hardship does arise. That was particularly noticeable in Lord Teviot's Motion in this House last week on the question of compulsorily acquired and requisitioned land. Your Lordships will recollect that the noble Lord, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, gave a quotation from an address delivered by, I think, Professor Hamson, of Cambridge University. I will not refer to that any further, because it will be in the minds of many of your Lordships, but I would draw attention to what the noble Marquess the Leader of the House said, particularly regarding the safeguards to the public included in the provisions regarding the designation of land procedure. I believe that those remarks were relevant to the question that is now before the House.

The noble Marquess made a considerable point in the following words—I quote from the OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 189 (No. 109), col. 774: A most elaborate process of inquiry"— that is, into the designation proposed— has to take place, most of which consists of safeguards"— I should like your Lordships to observe that word "safeguards"— which were inserted by Parliament in the interests of the owner or owners of the land. Finally, he went on to say: All those safeguards were approved by Parliament, not in the interests of the State but, I would repeat, in the interests of the owners and others in the area. That was referring, no doubt, to a designation area. Those words, falling from the noble Marquess the Leader of the House, of course, influenced your Lordships on that occasion, and it is against that background that your Lordships would wish to examine the Government's new clause.

Your Lordships would expect to find some safeguards for the individual under the new clause after Clause 35—some safeguards for the individual, under two heads: first under subsection (1), (a) and (b). Those two paragraphs deal with, first, the establishment of a claim under Section 32 of the Act and, secondly, what in the opinion of the person signing the certificate would have been the amount of the additional compensation calculated, and so on. Under those two paragraphs there is no safeguard at all to an individual trying to establish a claim. The Government valuer makes a valuation (this point was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in replying to the noble and learned Viscount), but there is no safeguard after the Government valuer has made his valuation because there is no machinery whereby the owner can have consultations or argue about the correctness of the valuation; nor can he appeal against this valuation when it is made. In all other claims for loss of development value under the 1947 Act there was an appeal to the Lands Tribunal. It was a right of appeal; nobody could prevent any person, trying to substantiate a claim and who failed to agree with the Government valuer, from making such an appeal; he had a right to it. Under this clause, he is denied that right. It no longer exists. I would ask your Lordships whether you think that is a provision that should remain in this clause or whether it should be the subject of an Amendment.

Secondly, when the loss has been calculated, perhaps to the satisfaction only of the Government valuer, there is no safeguard that the owner will receive the sum. All that subsection (2) does is to say that "the appropriate authority," which appears to be the Minister in all cases, after taking into account all the circumstances and being of the opinion that it is just and reasonable, can authorise the payment of any amount which is not in excess of the amount of the certificate. It is quite clear that there is no real safeguard here, and it is not easy to see that the owner, under certain conditions, will receive the amount certified. When introducing this new clause the noble and learned Viscount said that there were two exceptions. I am sure he will forgive me if I quote him inaccurately, because it was somewhat difficult to follow the whole gist of his argument. One was, when an owner had bought land at existing use value, and then a compulsory acquisition order was served upon him, he would have no right to any loss of development value. I think that may be an arguable proposition. On the other hand, he may have bought this land and a development value may arise, and on compulsory acquisition he would get only the original price that he paid for the land, although a considerable number of years may have elapsed. The other point—I am not quite clear on this; I hope the noble and learned Viscount will put me right when he replies—was when no claim had been made by some body or owner who might reasonably have been thought to have made a claim, or should have made a claim. That I find difficult to understand, because there may be many reasons. I do not see how a Minister can differentiate between different classes of persons on this sort of matter. There will be borderline cases—cases where there may be an element of ignorance, an element of wilfulness. I ask tile Committee this question: how is a Minister to judge fairly in such a case? How can he determine the motives that lay behind the fact that no claim has been made? The motives may be mixed. I would suggest that any Minister who found himself asked to judge in this sort of matter would be put in a most distasteful position. I think those were the main exceptions which the noble and learned Viscount outlined just before we adjourned.

Now I should like to examine a little further what the Minister has to do. He receives this certificate from an individual called "the person signing the certificate" for a certain sum of money. He is bound not to pay more than the face value of the certificate. I suggest that it will be impossible for him to pay less, unless you take into consideration the two exceptions that the noble and learned Viscount mentioned. I believe that, with those two exceptions, if they are valid (I am not quite sure that they are) he will be bound to pay the amount in the certificate, and I would remind noble Lords that the amount in the certificate is simply a valuation of what one man—one Government valuer—thinks. Many noble Lords will have had experience of dealing, arguing and conferring with Government valuers on this matter; I doubt whether any noble Lords have ever accepted a valuation at the first instance. There are innumerable factors to be considered and everybody knows that a district valuer's first valuation is seldom the one finally adopted. I say that with some personal experience of such dealings. In 99 cases out of 100, after the most lengthy dealings some other figure, perhaps more, perhaps less, is finally agreed upon; but it is hardly ever the first attempt of the district or Government valuer at establishing this loss of development value.

I would ask noble Lords to consider who will be the authorising or appropriate authority. I believe that "authorising authority" cannot include fewer than ten separate Ministers, at the very least. There would be the Minister of Education dealing with educational matters; the Minister of Housing and Local Government dealing with matters coming within his province; the Minister of Health for local health authorities; the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries for smallholdings; the Minister of Fuel and Power for electricity boards and the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation for the British Transport Commission. Then we have the three Service Ministers and the Home Office, I understand, in dealing with police authorities. Then, jointly, there are the Ministers of Health and Agriculture for matters dealing with river boards. That is a formidable list of authorising authorities. How and by what means do Her Majesty's Government expect these widely scattered Ministers, with their widely differing powers and duties, to produce a co-ordinated system that will, in each case, be related to the actions of the other Ministers? I see no possibility of that being done. We are frequently told that each Minister is a power in his own house and that no other person is allowed to interfere with him in departmental affairs. I cannot conceive how these multitudinous Ministers are to formulate common policy and common practice in dealing with these cases of hardship.

I turn now to the purpose of my Amendment and I apologise for detaining your Lordships for so long. Taking the two Amendments together, they seek to do two quite simple things. They seek to ensure that when the Government valuer certifies that an individual has lost a specified sum he shall be entitled to receive what he has lost—nothing more and nothing less. It may be necessary that the sum certified should be confirmed by the appropriate authority, and I think your Lordships would see no objection to that. These Amendments are supported by the Association of County Councils. I can only say they have gone most carefully into this matter with a body of those who have to deal with these problems every day of the week. This consists of a panel of clerks of county councils, county planning officers, county treasurers and county valuers. They constitute an exceedingly practical, well-informed body. Finally, I would say that we would earnestly ask the Government to look into this Amendment or consider an Amendment on similar lines, because there has been a great shortage of time in producing reasoned Amendments to Government clauses, or new clauses which have been issued only a few days ago. If there are drafting mistakes or mistakes of substance in the Amendments, I hope I shall be excused, owing to the shortage of time, for not producing more satisfactory Amendments. I beg to move.

Amendment to the Amendment moved— Line 19, of the new clause, leave out from ("aforesaid") to ("there") in line 24.—(Lord Hylton.)

8.37 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

If I might, I would first of all deal with the two points which are included in Lord Hylton's Amendments—because he was good enough to make it clear that he was discussing two of his Amendments at the same time. The first point is really directed against the discretion to pay less than the sum found. I did give two examples. I do not want to repeat what I said earlier, but the first of those examples, I submit to your Lordships—that of the transfer of land at existing use value—is a justification for the existence of the discretion. In these circumstances, land has been bought at existing use value and is being compulsorily acquired at existing use value, and no amount of going through other cases will get away from the existence of that case. And if there were nothing else which could be in the imagination of your Lordships as to other possible cases, that would justify the maintenance of the discretion.

The second point I would ask my noble friend Lord Hylton to consider again. I realise that this requires time and that he has not had sufficient time, as he says, to consider in detail the argument that I put forward with regard to rigidity. The noble Lord has himself been one of the most eloquent exponents to your Lordships of the dangers of making an over-complicated structure which defeats itself by its very complexity. I have considered this aspect, and those who have more experience in the subject-matter, if, perhaps, not more experience in the art or occupation of putting forward and pressing the claims, have come to the same conclusion as t do: that the hypothetical structure, which must be one of a great variety of hypotheses, is something which might well drive off the claimant by the very complexity with which he is confronted. I do not put that forward as a debating point but as a point of great seriousness, and I would ask my noble friend to consider it in the light of the words which he himself has used on this point.

I see that the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, is here and I think it may be convenient if I deal with the points that he raised, so far as I can at the moment. If he feels that they need any further adumbration, I feel sure he will let me know and I will do my best on a further stage of the Bill. The first point which the noble Earl made was that the clause does not deal with cases of compulsory acquisition which are current, which (to put it colloquially) are in the pipeline, and in which notice to treat is served before the Bill comes into operation. As the noble Earl has mentioned, I said during the debate on Second Reading that it would not be possible to make the provisions of the clause retrospective, and that for the purpose of the clause the starting point must necessarily be the coming into operation of the Bill. The reasons are, first, that it would be quite wrong to impose on the acquiring authority retrospectively an obligation to pay in certain cases sums which they did not know they would have to pay at the date on which they bound themselves to acquire at the price laid down by the law as it then stood—that is, the date of the notice to treat. Such provision would be most difficult to defend against an acquiring authority aggrieved at being required to pay a totally unexpected supplement, and, in my view, would establish a most unfortunate precedent.

Secondly, it would be most unfair that persons who have agreed the terms of sale to a public authority, who acquire their land under compulsory powers, but have not completed the conveyance, should be unable to benefit. Such people entered into a contract knowing that, if they stood out against the authority, their compensation would be on the statutory basis of existing use value, as laid down by the Act of 1947. Of course, their contracts are binding and enforceable, and to all intents and purposes they are in the same position as one on whom a notice to treat is served to-day. But if we sought to legislate now to improve the position even of those on whom notice to treat is served—that is, possibly, the awkward man who persisted in argument—we should be doing an injustice to the man who did not wish to argue but agreed with the authority about the price he ought to be paid. We should be unable to help the latter type of man, because one cannot go about tearing up contracts fairly entered into and containing, in many cases, terms which have nothing to do with price—agreements about fencing and access and so on.

I do not think the noble Earl's second point is a matter of difficulty. His suggestion was that acquisition by agreement in future was not covered. It has never been customary to lay down by Statute what should be paid by a public authority possessing compulsory purchase powers when they buy by agreement. All concerned know that in the last resort the powers can and will be used, and terms are agreed on the basis of what the compensation would be if the powers were exercised. Neither the 1947 Act nor Part III of the Bill legislate for agreement cases, but there is no doubt that trans actions will continue to take place by agreement in the light of the compulsory purchase provisions which the Bill does contain or, as proposed to be amended, will contain.

It may be thought that the fact that the supplementary payment for which the clause provides is at the discretion of the appropriate authority may make the clause difficult to operate, but I am advised that there is no difficulty. Those concerned in settling the price will be able to find out very readily from the appropriate authority whether a payment would be made under the clause if there were compulsory proceedings, and to take it into account in the negotiations. It must be noticed that on the side of the acquiring authority negotiations will usually be in the hands of the district valuer, and he will have a large part in the working of the system which the clause provides. The noble Earl will excuse me for this rather difficult explanation, but I have put it in as succinct a form as I can. I thought it would be useful to him to have it in the OFFICIAL REPORT and be able to consider it, and I shall be ready to meet the noble Earl if there are any points on which he is still not satisfied.

The other point on which I should like to say a word or two is that raised by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and the noble Lord, Lord Hylton—namely, the position of the signatory on behalf of the Treasury. I do not see that the two parts of subsection (1) are so divorced as the noble Lords seem to fear. I agree that the signatory on behalf of the Treasury has to form his opinion—the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, drew our, attention to that fact—but the appropriate authority is a Minister of the Crown. He has to be satisfied under the first part of Clause 1 that the land does not constitute or form part of the claim area, and also that a claim or claims in respect of one or more interests in the land would have been established if made. After that it becomes a matter of machinery for the Treasury representative to do the calculation. I will, of course, look into the point, but I should have thought from these facts—first, that the appropriate authority has to consider the prerequisites, and secondly, as noble Lords suggested, that the person generally involved would be the district valuer, who, as I have just said in answer to the point made by the noble Earl, is a person who is in constant negotiation on the point—that there would be no difficulty of access or any arm's length handling of the matter. I will look into the suggestions made on this point, because I want the clause to be as effective as possible.

I hope I have shown my real desire to meet your Lordships on all points on which I can possibly help, but it would not be fair or right to say that I can see any possibility of departing from the discretion point, both as to the question of excluded cases and as to the question of procedure. I have tried to impress upon the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, how seriously I feel about the difficulty of complicating the procedure, and I feel that the discretion has to remain. But, apart from that, I am willing to consider any improvements in the machinery which are suggested. I hope, with that, that the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, will not press his Amendments to-day but that, having had more time to consider it, he will attune his mind to the problem before Report. If there are improvements, as I say, any suggestion of his or the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, or anyone else in your Lordships' House will receive the most careful attention from me.

VISCOUNT RIDLEY

The noble and learned Viscount has satisfied us a good way on the point of Ministerial discretion. His reference to procedure is one which carries great weight. He quoted two cases in which he would feel that the appropriate authority—that is to say, the Minister—

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Will my noble friend allow me to interrupt? I apologise to your Lordships, because I meant to mention this in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Hylton. The second case—another quality which I said was necessary—was that of an owner in such a position that there would be no doubt that he had had full opportunity of considering the making of a claim. I was really thinking of a large corporation or society of some kind. I wanted to make that clear. I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend.

THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES

I think the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, was speaking to Lord Hylton's Amendment to the Amendment. I think we must clear that out of the way first before we go back to Amendment No. 71.

VISCOUNT RIDLEY

I was meaning to speak on Amendment No. 72, which does concern the Minister's discretion. I should like to make one point there. The noble and learned Viscount said that any large institution or body which could have made a claim and did not would, in his view, be excluded. Could there not be cases in which either large institutions, fairly well off people or owners of any kind, thought, in the circumstances which then existed, that it would be better for them not to make a claim? Is it right that they should in fact be excluded? It shows the difficulty of leaving it to Ministerial discretion without laying down in regulations your terms of guidance. For example, an owner might have said to himself that he did not want to make a claim on account of a piece of land near his garden or his house because he hoped that it would not be developed. He hoped that it would remain in agricultural use or open space, and thought that if he made a claim there might be more tendency for it to be built upon. He was fully conversant with the law, had good professional advice, and so on. The time may come when the land is acquired from him compulsorily. I ask, is it or is it not right that he should be allowed to go back and make a claim? I would have thought he should, but I cannot really question the clause on that particular point because it does not say what the Minister should or should not do. I think it simply emphasises the difficulty which comes from giving the Minister the discretion. If, in fact, the only certain case which should be an exception is that of the person who has bought the land without a claim on it since the claims were agreed in 1947, would it not be possible to specify fairly easily that that kind of person should be an exception?

Then there is a further point upon which the noble and learned Viscount could help us. As I understood him, his answer to the questions raised by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, was that you could not go back and expect an acquiring authority to pay the difference between present use and the claim value. But is that not very similar to the payments which will be made under paragraph (b) of subsection (1)? I should have thought the procedure there could have been almost identical. I hope, therefore, that the noble and learned Viscount will try to improve this part of the clause, because it is with this part of the clause that the Amendment is concerned, so as to define more clearly the Ministerial responsibility in deciding whether or not a claim should be paid. Perhaps he could also tell us the reason why the Minister, having decided that a claim should be paid, still has discretion to pay less than the amount certified. I do not think he covered that point. He quoted cases where he thought it would be wrong to make any payment at all, and no doubt one must agree that in some cases it would be. But so far as I can see, he did not say anything about cases where it would be appropriate to pay less than the amount referred to in subsection (1) (b).

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I do not wish to detain the House—I am afraid that I am taking a great deal of your Lordships' time to-day. I, think my noble friend really answered that point himself, when he said that he was unable to predicate an answer because it was a matter of discretion on the part of the Minister. I always try to avoid being legalistic in dealing with a general matter, as lawyers are so apt to be. I think all my profession in this House would say that one of the basic principles of English law is that, when a discretion is given, that is a free discretion, and that in general one tries not to interfere or to put in a straitjacket a discretion of that kind. Although, in the examples I have given, I frankly admit that to my mind it would be difficult to find a halfway house, I do not for one moment claim that my mind is the fount of all knowledge and wisdom, and I consider that it is a healthy thing to give the Minister the right to say, "In this case I think that a reasonable person would have put in a claim" or, in the other case I gave, "I think that although there has been a sale at existing use value there are certain circumstances which can be met by a portion of the claim." In other words, it is to protect the full discretion, and to allow the Minister to do justice as he sees it, that we have left the matter in that way. I do not think I can help my noble friend further on this point, but I think it is a sound one.

LORD SILKIN

Might there not be cases where a person paid a little more than the existing value but not the market value, and would that not be a case where discretion might be properly exercised? I gather that the noble and learned Viscount is going to look at this question of the person who signs the certificate. I am a little worried about the fact, that there should be no opportunity on the part of the person aggrieved to question, and that it should not appear in the Bill itself that he has that right. I know that he can always approach people, but it is very unsatisfactory if it is not made quite clear that he has a right to approach the person who decides that he has no case. I should like the noble and learned Viscount to look at that point again.

LORD HYLTON

I should like to reply briefly to what the noble and learned Viscount has said. I should have thought, on the Lord Chancellor's main point, that land bought for existing use value and not developed should not receive any consideration in this matter. That point could be met by a proviso saying that the amount of compensation to be paid in these cases should not exceed the existing use value or the price originally paid by the owner, whichever was the greater. I throw out that suggestion and I hope the Lord Chancellor will look at it in the course of the next few days.

I am most grateful to my noble friend Lord Ridley for what he said on this matter. His experience is great. I am still unable to see why the amount to be awarded by the Minister should be less than that on the certificate signed on behalf of the Treasury. I heard, and no doubt your Lordships heard, what the Lord Chancellor said on this point, but it would appear to me, speaking as a layman, that, if a certificate from a Treasury official is handed to a Minister, there could be no reason why that certificate should not be honoured. I submit that that is a valid point. We have discussed this matter for some little time, and I should like merely to add this: that both the Government's new clause and my Amendment to it have been down only for a matter of two or three days. That being so, I believe that it would be beneficial if they could both be examined at greater length before the next stage of this Bill. On that basis, I am perfectly prepared to withdraw my Amendment No. 72 and not to move No. 73.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

9.3 p.m.

LORD HYLTON moved, as an Amendment to the Amendment, after subsection (2) of the new clause to insert: (3) The Minister shall make regulations governing the procedure to be adopted by the appropriate authority before arriving at a decision—

1. (a) that it is just and reasonable that a payment should be made in accordance with subsection (2) of this section; and
2. (b) as to the amount to be paid where such amount is less than the amount specifield in the certificate referred to in subsection (1) of this section."

The noble Lord said: We have gone into this matter lightly in my previous remarks, but I have suggested to your Lordships the great difficulty that will exist if over ten Government Departments, each acting under its own powers and acting on its own views of this matter, act independently. Although the Minister may not be able to produce a satisfactory set of regulations, I believe that some form of practice notes, or a code of procedure, should be issued to give confidence to the public that all these Ministers and Government Departments are acting on the same lines. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Line 27 of the new clause, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Hylton.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I have indicated to your Lordships my own fears as to laying down a procedure which may be rigid and complicated. My noble friend Lord Hylton has approached this from a slightly different slant by suggesting a procedure for co-ordinating the action of all Ministers. I still think that it would be unfortunate to lay down regulations which would rigidify the procedure, but again I will promise my noble friend to look into the point. I hope that at this stage he will be content with that offer.

VISCOUNT GAGE

Although I quite agree with what the noble and learned Viscount has said, is it intended to make any public pronouncement or issue any circular about how these claims are to be made? Is the claimant going to throw himself on the clemency of the Minister in a sort of medieval manner? I ask this question because I do not believe that local authorities are going to be too content with being put into a position of the villain of the piece when they make a compulsory purchase order which is going to create a great deal of resentment, and the Minister comes in like a kind of fairy godmother to put everything right. I think we should be greatly helped (it would avoid a rigid procedure being laid down) if we had some indication of the basis on which Ministers are going to act—whether they are going to proceed on the basis of a means test or some other test, whether a rich man gets certain treatment and a poor man gets other treatment. All this is in the dark, and although I quite agree that rigidity should be avoided I think it would be a good thing if some information were produced for the benefit both of the public and of local authorities.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I will certainly consider that point. I do not think it would be to the advantage of anyone if I were, "off the reel," Ito give my views as to how the action should take place; but I will consider the point, and I hope I shall be able to make a statement on it at a later stage of the Bill.

LORD HYLTON

I am grateful to the Lord Chancellor for what he has just said. Far be it from me to wish to have absolute rigidity, but there is some lesser degree of a uniform practice, and when there is this great number of Ministers all dealing with the same subject, to my mind it seems not only desirable but essential in the public interest that there should be some guidance. However, I will withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment to the Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 36 [Compensation for severance, injurious affection and disturbance]:

9.8 p.m.

LORD MANCROFT

We now come to a whole series of Amendments which are either drafting Amendments, consequential Amendments, or Amendments containing no point of controversy. I think it might be for the convenience of your Lordships at this hour if I were to indicate which clause contains Amendments of a drafting or non-controversial nature only, and then perhaps, if your Lordships agree to that, the Lord Chairman might put them in a simplified form to the Committee. If that is agreeable to the Committee, perhaps I might indicate that both Amendments Nos. 75 and 76 to Clause 36 are solely drafting Amendments. Accordingly, I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 43, line 21, leave out from beginning to ("for") in line 25 and insert—

("(1) In connection with a compulsory acquisition to which this Part of this Act applies—

(a) any compensation in respect of an interest in land")

Page 43, line 31, leave out from ("disturbance") to ("shall") in line 32.—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 36, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 37 [Effect of Part III on unexpended balance of established development value]:

LORD MANCROFT

Here, again, all the Amendments, Nos. 77 to 82 inclusive, are either drafting or consequential Amendments. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 46, line 13, leave out from ("land") to ("had") and insert ("in which the interest acquired or sold subsisted")

Page 46, line 19, leave out from ("and") to ("for") in line 25 and insert ("unless immediately after the acquisition or sale there is outstanding some interest (other than an excepted interest) in that land to which some person other than the acquiring authority is entitled.")

Page 46, line 29, leave out from beginning to ("and") in line 38 and insert— ("(ii) if immediately after the acquisition or sale there is outstanding any such interest as aforesaid, then for the purposes of any other Part of this Act there shall be deducted from the said original balance an amount equal to any part of the relevant balance which is not, or which in the appropriate circumstances would not have been, attributable for the purposes of the said section thirty-two to any such outstanding interest")

Page 46, line 43, leave out ("that other person's") and insert ("any such outstanding")

Page 47, line 7, leave out from beginning to ("or") and insert ("relevant land")

Page 47, line 11, leave out ("to which the sale related") and insert ("in which the interest sold subsisted").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 37, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 38 [Amendment of s. 22 of principal Act]:

LORD MANCROFT

Both these Amendments are either drafting or consequential. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 48, line 15, leave out ("this Part of")

Page 48, line 19, after ("and") insert ("in this Part of this Act").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 38, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 39 [Registration and apportionment of compensation for depreciation]:

LORD MANCROFT

This is also a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 49, line 8, leave out ("Subsections (2) and (3)") and insert ("Subsection (2)").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 39, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 40 [Exchequer contribution towards compensation in certain cases]:

LORD MANCROFT moved, to add to subsection (1): Provided that the amount of any such contribution shall not exceed—

1. (a) the amount of the compensation for depreciation paid by the local planning authority; or
2. (b) the unexpended balance of established development value at the date of the making of the order of the land in respect of which that compensation was paid."

The noble Lord said: Having achieved the almost record number of ten Amendments in under a minute—which is not less than the standard achieved in the Mines and Quarries Bill last week—I must now halt our breakneck speed and ask noble Lords to spend a moment on this Amendment, because it is rather more than drafting. Subsection (1) of Clause 40 provides for the making of contributions by the Minister towards the compensation for depreciation paid by a local planning authority in consequence of their having revoked or modified a planning permission. The amount of contribution is to be the compensation which would have been payable under Part II or Part V of the Bill if the permission had been refused in the first instance, or granted as subsequently modified. This may go wrong if there has been a marked fall in values between the date of the original decision and the date of the revocation or modification, or there has intervened some payment of compensation or development of the land which has reduced the amount of the unexpended balance. The result might be, on the one hand, that the Minister's contribution would be more than the amount the authority had paid out or, on the other, that the amount of the unexpended balance would be exceeded. This Amendment is designed to provide against both these possibilities. It is a desirable Amendment and I think noble Lords will agree that it is uncontroversial. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 49, line 47, at end insert the said proviso.—(Lord Mancroft.)

LORD SILKIN

Are these provisions (a) and (b) to stand as alternatives? Is it to be whichever is the less or the greater?

LORD MANCROFT

They are alternative.

LORD SILKIN

In the option of the Minister?

LORD MANCROFT

I do not see why an option should arise.

LORD SILKIN

Are there, then, two separate contingencies which may arise?

LORD MANCROFT

Yes.

LORD SILKIN

I will have another look at it.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 40, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 41 [Recovery on subsequent development, of compensation under s. 22 of principal Act]:

LORD MANCROFT

This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 50, line 25 after ("Act") insert ("except subsection (9) thereof").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 41, as amended, agred to.

Clause 42 [Scope of Part V]:

LORD MANCROFT

The words we propose to leave out here might have the result of making compensation payable in respect of land which was not the subject of a claim on the £300 million fund, if it happened to be held in the same ownership as other land affected by the same decision which was the subject of a claim. That was not, of course, intended, and would be quite contrary to the basic principle of the Bill. This Amendment is intended to set that matter right. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 51, line 30, leave out from ("holding") to ("and") in line 31.—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment has two purposes. The first, which is only a matter of drafting, is to make it somewhat clearer than the present wording does that the only land which can be described as "qualified land" is the land to which the relevant holding relates. The second purpose of the Amendment, the new subsection (3), is to make the new Clause 16 (3) apply to compensation in respect of planning decisions made before the Bill comes into operation in the same way as it applies in respect of decisions made after that date. The purpose of that subsection, stated briefly, was to make it possible to pay compensation in cases where buildings or works were constructed to meet the requirements of a local planning authority, although they were not formally required by condition. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 51, line 38, leave out from ("Act") to end of line 41 and insert ("in relation to a claim for compensation in respect of any such claim holding so subsisting as aforesaid, any such land is referred to as "qualified land" and the claim holding is referred to as "the relevant holding." (3) Subsection (3) of section sixteen of this Act shall have effect for the purposes of this Part of this Act as it has effect for the purposes of Part II of this Act, with the substitution for the reference to a planning decision made after the commencement of this Act of a reference to a planning decision made before the commencement of this Act.").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 42, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 43 [Right to compensation in respect of past planning decisions, or past revocations, etc., of planning permission]:

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment is drafting. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 52, line 4, after ("if") insert ("(i)").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT moved, in subsection (1), to leave out all words from the first word "land" down to "interest." where that word occurs a second time, and to insert: or

1. (ii) having been entitled to an interest in any qualified land at the date of the decision or order, he sold that interest (otherwise than to a public authority possessing compulsory purchase powers) in pursuance of a contract made after that date and during the period beginning with the eighteenth day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-two, and ending immediately before the commencement of this Act,

and the value of that interest or of another interest which has merged therein or, in the case of an interest extending to other land, the value of that or of that other".

The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment and of the consequential Amendments which follow is to provide for cases where land which was the subject of a planning restriction was sold between November 18, 1952, and the coming into operation of the Bill, and the claim on the £300 million fund was retained by the vendor. The planning restriction may be a refusal or conditional grant of planning permission or an order revoking or modifying a permission previously granted. As the Bill stands, no payment could be claimed by the holder of the claim holding in these circumstances, either under this Part of the Bill or under Part I, although he may have realised in the sale only a fraction of the unrestricted value of the land. The effect of the Amendment is that in these circumstances the vendor will be able to claim compensation for any depreciation caused by the planning decision in the same way as if he had not parted with the land. The consequential Amendments make certain necessary adjustments in the ordinary procedure for determining the amount of the compensation payable. It would obviously be unfair to the vendor if his compensation could be affected by any grant of planning permission, or undertaking to grant permission, made after the terms of sale were fixed. I think that your Lordships will agree that this rectifies a possible injustice, and I beg to move the Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 52, line 5, leave out from ("land") to ("interest") in line 7 and insert the said new words.—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment is to deal with cases where a mortgagee of land has taken an assignment of the relevant Part VI claim as part of his security. As the Bill stands, neither the mortgagor nor the mortgagee would in such circumstances be able to claim under Part V of the Bill. The proposed subsection which I am now discussing is on similar lines to Clause 10; the mortgagee is to be entitled to whatever the mortgagor could have claimed had be remained the holder of the claim holding. Where the mortgagor retained the claim holding, the position of the mortgagee will be safeguarded by the regulations to be made under Clause 65. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 52, line 21, at end insert— ("(2) A person who is entitled to the relevant holding as mortgagee shall be entitled to such compensation as aforesaid, notwithstanding that he does not satisfy the conditions set out in paragraphs (i) and (ii) of the preceding subsection, if the mortgagor would have been entitled to such compensation if he had continued to be the holder of the relevant holding.")—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT moved in subsection (2) to leave out "or order." The noble Lord said: This Amendment and Amendment No. 96 lay down a new basis for measuring the depreciation caused by an order revoking or modifying a planning permission. As subsection (3) is drafted, it requires this to be assessed in the same way as the depreciation caused by a planning decision; but the method laid down for this purpose, in Clause 28 which involves assumptions as to a decision to the contrary effect, does not seem to be quite appropriate. In the case of a revocation or modification order, depreciation can be measured without difficulty by the ordinary "before and after" method, with which some of us are familiar. The proposed subsection (4) sets out certain matters to which regard has to be had in assessing the compensation. Paragraph (a) is to ensure that any compensation already paid under Section 22 of the 1947 Act in respect of expenditure on works rendered abortive by the order, or similar loss, can be taken into account. Paragraphs (b) and (c) contain provisions similar to paragraphs (b) and (c) of the present subsection (2). I appreciate that it is difficult for the noble Lord opposite to follow this, but I think that when he looks at it at leisure he will find that it works out correctly. Regard is to be had to any planning permission granted or undertaking given after the date of the order and liability to development charge is to be ignored. I apologise, because this is a technical point, but I think that what we are doing here is obviously desirable. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 52, line 24, leave out ("or order").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 45. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 52, line 29, after ("provisions") insert (", other than in subsection (3) of the said section twenty-three,").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 91. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 52, line 35, at end insert ("and in the application of the said subsection (1) in a case to which paragraph (ii) of subsection (1) of this section applies, no account shall be taken of any grant of, or undertaking to grant, planning permission made or given after the making of the contract of sale.")—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment is consequential on No. 93. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 52, line 41, at end insert— ("Provided that, in a case to which paragraph (ii) of subsection (1) of this section applies, for the reference in the said section twenty-two to the Minister's giving notice of his findings in respect of the claim for compensation there shall be substituted a reference to the making of the contract of sale.

(4) In determining for the purposes of a claim for compensation under this Part of this Act whether, or to what extent, the value of an interest in land was depreciated by such an order as aforesaid—

1. (a) regard shall be had to any compensation which has become payable to the person entitled to that interest in respect of that order under section twenty-two of the principal Act otherwise than by virtue of the proviso to subsection (1) of that section;
2. (b) any grant of, or undertaking to grant, planning permission made or given during the period between the making of the order and the time when the Minister gives notice of his findings in respect of that claim, being a grant or undertaking which is in force at the end of that period, shall be taken into account as if it had been in force at the beginning of that period;
3. (c) Part VII of the principal Act shall be deemed not to have applied after the date when the order was made:

Provided that, in a case to which paragraph (ii) of subsection (1) of this section applies, no account shall be taken of any grant or undertaking made or given after the making of the contract of sale.

(5) Where the interest to which the holder of the relevant holding is entitled or, as the case may be, which he sold, is or was an interest in reversion immediately expectant upon the termination of a tenancy granted after the planning decision or order and on or after the eighteenth day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-two, the preceding provisions of this section shall have effect as if that tenancy had not been granted").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 43, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 44 [General provisions as to amount of compensation for past planning decisions, revocations, etc.]:

LORD MANCROFT

This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 53, line 13, leave out from ("if'') to end of line.—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment provides for the possibility that the same person may be able to claim compensation under Part V of the Bill in respect of more than one interest or more that one claim holding relating to the same land, and that I think would be an undesirable state of affairs. Under Clause 43 (1) the claim holding does not have to relate to the particular interest which was depreciated before a claim for compensation can be made, and therefore it would be possible for a person owning two claim holdings, but only one depreciated interest, to recover the depreciation twice over. The Amendment provides against thin and against a number of other perhaps undesirable contingencies. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 53, line 17, at end insert— ("Provided that where the same person is entitled to such compensation as aforesaid in respect of more than one relevant holding or in respect of more than one interest, or in respect both of more than one relevant holding and of more than one interest, the aggregate principal amount payable to that person by way of such compensation in respect of all interests in respect of which he is so entitled in so far as they subsisted in the same land shall not exceed whichever is the less of the following amounts, that is to say—

1. (i) the aggregate of the amounts by which the value of each respectively of those interests in so far as it subsisted in that land was depreciated by the decision or order; or
2. (ii) the aggregate of the fractions of the respective values of all relevant holdings of which that person is the holder which attached to that land").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

The next three Amendments are all drafting Amendments. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 53, line 18, leave out from ("If") to third ("the")

Page 53, line 20, leave out ("was") and insert ("is")

Page 53, line 25, leave out ("were and were") and insert ("are and are").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 44, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 45 [Claims for compensation under Part V, and review of past decisions and orders]:

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment is only drafting. It substitutes a specific reference to the relevant provisions for the rather vague form of words in the Bill. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 53, line 28, leave out from first ("of") to ("shall") in line 30 and insert ("sections twenty-five and twenty-eight of this Act").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment is consequential on the one we have just agreed. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 53, line 32, leave out ("section twenty-five of this Act") and insert ("the said section twenty-five").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment and the other two remaining Amendments on this clause have the effect of excluding revocations and modifications of orders from the Minister's power to review decisions in respect of which compensation is claimed. Considerable changes will be necessary in the clause as at present drafted before it would function properly in the case of revocation and modification orders. There is little likelihood that the powers would be of value in this field, since a strong case has always to be made out before such orders are confirmed. It has therefore been thought best to limit the power of review to refusals of planning permission and conditional permissions. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 53, line 41, leave out ("in such a case") and insert ("the claim is in respect of a refusal of permission or of a grant of permission subject to conditions and").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

The next two Amendments are consequential on Amendment No. 104. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 54, line 1, leave out from ("relates") to end of line 2 and insert— ("In this subsection, the reference to a decision more favourable to the applicant shall be construed—

1. (a) in relation to a refusal of permission, as a reference to a decision granting the permission, either unconditionally or subject to conditions, and either as respects the whole or as respects part of the land to which the application for permission related; and
2. (b) in relation to a grant of permission subject to conditions, as a reference to a decision granting the permission applied for unconditionally or subject to less stringent conditions")

Page 54, line 14, leave out subsection (5).—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 45, as amended, agreed.

Clause 46 [Payment of compensation under Part V, and supplementary provisions relating thereto]:

9.26 p.m.

LORD MANCROFT moved to insert at the end of subsection (2): Provided that if at any time an amount becomes recoverable under section thirty of this Act, as applied by the subsequent provisions of this section, in respect of that compensation, then, for the purposes of Parts II and III of this Act, paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection shall have effect as from that time as if the principal amount of that compensation had been reduced by a sum equal to seven-eighths of the amount which has so become recoverable.

(3) Where in the case of any claim holding (in this subsection referred to as "the parent holding") compensation under this Part of this Act is payable in respect of the depreciation of an interest in land by one or more planning decisions or orders, and any such decision or order did not extend to the whole of the area of the parent holding, then, both for the purposes of the last preceding subsection and for the purposes of Parts II and III of this Act—

1. (a) the parent holding shall be treated as having been divided immediately before the commencement of this Act into as many separate claim holdings, with such areas, as may be necessary to ensure that in the case of each holding either any such decision or order extending to the area of that holding extended to the whole thereof or that no such decision or order extended to the area of that holding;
2. (b) the value of each of the separate holdings respectively shall be taken to be that fraction of the value of the parent holding which then attached to the part of the area of the parent holding constituting the area of the separate holding;
3. (c) the authority determining the amount of any such compensation shall apportion 1056 that amount between the areas of the separate claim holdings to which the decision or order in question extended in such manner as appears to that authority proper, and the portion of that amount apportioned to the area of any separate claim holding shall be taken to be compensation payable under this Part of this Act in respect of that claim holding."

The noble Lord said: We now pass to a slightly different matter. This Amendment seeks to do two things. First, it provides for the case where compensation paid out under Part V of the Bill becomes recoverable on subsequent development of the land. So far as compensation paid under Part II is concerned, Clause 30 (9) makes the necessary adjustment by laying down, in effect, that for the purpose of calculating the unexpended balance no deduction shall be made from the original unexpended balance on account of any compensation which has been recovered. Clause 46 (3) purports to apply this provision for the purposes of Part V; but it will not function in the context of Part V, because compensation paid under that Part is deducted not from the unexpended balance but from the original claim holdings before the balance comes into existence. What I understand is needed now is a provision to the effect that recovered compensation shall not be deducted from the claim holding in arriving at the amount of the original unexpended balance. This is what the Amendment seeks to apply. Your Lordships may be a little puzzled by the sum of seven-eighths which occurs. The reason why only seven-eighths of the compensation recovered is to be disregarded in this way is that under Clause 17 (2) a capital supplement of one-seventh is added to what remains of the claim holdings in order to arrive at the original unexpended balance. The second purpose of the Amendment is to ensure that when a compensation payment is made in respect of part only of the area of a claim-holding it is debited against the fraction of the value of the holding appropriate to that part and not against the holding as a whole. The method adopted and the wording follows that used in Clause 15. It is again rather a complicated Amendment, but I think it is uncontroversial. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 55, line 9, at end insert the said proviso and subsection.—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

The next Amendment is consequential on No. 107. I beg to move—

Amendment moved— Page 55, line 11, after ("Act") insert (", except subsection (9) of the said section thirty,")—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 46, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 47 agreed to.

Clause 48:

Provision of information as to unexpended balance, &c.

48.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Central Land Board shall, upon application therefor being made to them at any time by any person, and may at any time, if they think fit, without any application being made therefor, issue a certificate in the prescribed form with respect to any land staring whether or not any of that land has an original unexpended balance of established development value and, if it has such a balance—

1. (a) giving a general statement of what was taken by the Board for the purposes of Part VI of the principal Act to be the state of that land on the first day of July, nineteen hundred and forty-eight; and
2. (b) specifying (subject to any outstanding claims under Part I or Part V of this Act) the amount of that original balance,

and any such certificate may, if the Board think fit, contain additional information with respect to acts or events in consequence of which, by virtue of any provision of this Act, a deduction falls to be made from that original balance in determining the unexpended balance, if any, of established development value of any of that land at any time thereafter.

LORD MILNER OF LEEDS moved, in subsection (1), to leave out all words after "land," where that word first occurs, and to insert instead: showing the unexpended balance of established development value, if any, of any of that land immediately before the issue of the certificate.

The noble Lord said: This is an important clause concerned with the provision of information as to the unexpended balance or balances of development value. Your Lordships may remember that it was introduced at a late stage—namely, the Report stage—in the other place. It arises ultimately from a paragraph in the Government White Paper (Command 8699) which said: Provision will have to be made for registering against the land the maximum compensation payable and any payments made … In his speech in another place, when moving the adoption of the clause on July 13, the then Minister of Housing and Local Government mentioned that it had been thought at one time that a register of unexpended balances could and should be established which would be open to search by those interested. He went on to say, however, that whilst that was an ideal, it had been found on closer examination that an up-to-date register would involve a volume of work out of all proportion to the benefit to be derived.

The Law Society have given some consideration to this matter and, whilst they have always taken the view that nothing Short of a complete and up-to-date register of unexpended balances of Part VI claims would really meet the case of prospective purchasers, they have endeavoured to think out something rather less ambitious which would yet serve a useful purpose. They have suggested that at least the following information should be made available as of right to all persons interested: first of all, the amount of each unexpended balance at a datum line drawn after Parts I and V of the Bill have taken effect; secondly, information as to the state of development as on July 1, 1948, of ail land carrying an unexpended balance, and, thirdly, the effect of all relevant apportionments. The Law Society Council are confident that if machinery could be set up for the prompt and efficient supply of that information, the profession, the public and prospective purchasers would be willing to pay reasonable search fees for obtaining it. Your Lordships will appreciate that Clause 48 draws a distinction between certificates of the Central Land Board given to ordinary inquirers, and certificates given when a notice to treat has been served with a view to compulsory acquisition. If your Lordships will look at subsection (2) you will see that upon a notice to treat it is laid down that a certificate will be issued showing the unexpended balance of established development value, if any, of any of that land immediately before the service of that notice. That is the information that is really required in the case of ordinary inquirers.

It is true that the first requirement I mentioned is satisfied to some extent by subsection (1) as at present drawn, but it is not at all clear as to what extent the second and third suggested requirements would be met. Although there is a provision in the Bill whereby additional information may be given by the Central Land Board, your Lordships will see that that is purely at their discretion and may presumably be omitted or refused altogether if the Central Land Board think fit. The Amendment I propose provides for the issue of the same type of certificate to ordinary inquirers as the clause at present proposes should be given to a public authority which has served a notice to treat, and I submit that it is not unreasonable that the provision should be made. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 56, line 11, leave out from ("land") to the end of line 27, and insert the said new words.—(Lord Milner of Leeds.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I am sorry that we cannot meet the noble Lord and the Law Society on this point, and I should like, if your Lordships will bear with me for a few moments, to put the difficulties that stand in the way. They can be summarised, broadly, by saying that to adopt the Amendment would set an impossible task, and that the information it would produce would, in many cases, be misleading. As the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, has pointed out, information is to be given under subsection (2) of the clause to public authorities which will tell them the amount of the unexpended balance when notice to treat is served. Our difficulty is that we feel that it is not possible to provide everyone with similar information which would be up to date at the time at which they might choose to ask for it. We hoped, and at one time it was thought, as the noble Lord said, that a register of unexpended balances could be established which would be open to search by anyone interested. And as Lord Milner of Leeds has already said, my right honourable friend, in introducing the clause, said that a register would obviously be ideal, but it was found on closer examination that an up-to-date register would entail a volume of work out of all proportion to the benefits to be derived. We have come to the conclusion, after examining this very carefully, that so also would an obligation on the Central Land Board to supply on request precise and up-to-date information about unexpended balances. Your Lordships will realise that a great deal of the land in respect of which a claim on the £300 million fund was established has already been developed, and a great deal more will be developed without any question arising about the amount of the appropriate balance. The balance attached to such land is largely a matter of academic interest because there is no risk of compensation becoming payable. Yet the Amendment would impose on the Board the obligation to supply the information.

On the other point, I should like your Lordships to realise that quite misleading inferences could be drawn from a certificate stating the amount of the balance at any particular time, because even if a question of compensation did arise the amount to be deducted against the balance, because of development already carried out, might be a quite different amount from the amount assessed at the time of the certificate. You have got to take into account the debit, as I have tried to explain. So as far as private people are concerned, the subsection provides for information of a rather more modest order to be supplied on request, as the noble Lord pointed out by referring to the subsection. We feel that from this information anyone concerned with buying or selling land will be able to make a quite sound assessment of the price which he ought to ask or offer, having regard to the compensation likely to be payable in the event of a planning restriction or compulsory acquisition. I want to assure the noble Lord that there is no desire to be difficult about this matter, but it is a question of placing the burden on the Board in proportion, as the noble Lord approached the matter, to the value of what would be given. In the next few days we will apply our minds again, and if we can find, shall we say, a one-eighth of the way house instead of a halfway house we will certainly do it. That is the difficulty, and I would ask the noble Lord not to press his Amendment at the moment and to convey from me to the Law Society our regrets that we have been unable to help in this matter.

LORD MILNER OF LEEDS

It is difficult to see why in this matter the local authority, with their vast resources and so forth, should have preference over the private individual. Having regard to the fact that the noble and learned Viscount is going to look into the matter again, I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 48 agreed to.

Clause 49 [Cancellation or reduction of liability for development charges]:

9.39 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved to leave out subsections (4) and (5) and insert: (4) Where, for the purposes of the Second Schedule to this Act, one or more development charges such as are mentioned in subsection (1) of this section are covered by a pledge of one or more claim holdings to the Central Land Board, and by virtue of the provisions of that Schedule one or more of those claim holdings are deemed to have been extinguished or reduced in value by reference to the unpaid balance of the charge or, as the case may be, the aggregate of the unpaid balances of the charges, as therein mentioned, a sum equal to, or to the aggregate of—

1. (a) the value of any such holding which is deemed to have been extinguished; and
2. (b) the amount of the reduction in the value of any such holding which is deemed to have been reduced in value but not extinguished,

shall be deducted from that balance or that aggregate of balances and—

1. (i) if that sum is equal to that balance or aggregate of balances, the charge or charges and any liability of any person in respect thereof shall be discharged;
2. (ii) if that sum is less than that balance or aggregate of balances, the charge or charges, or the balance or respective balances thereof remaining unpaid at the commencement of this Act, shall be reduced by an amount, or, as the case may be, shall be reduced rateably by an aggregate amount, equal to that sum:

Provided that where paragraph 2 of the Second Schedule to this Act applies, any development charge in connection with which the claim holding in question was pledged in accordance with the arrangements mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) of that paragraph and any liability of any person in respect thereof shall be discharged without regard to the treatment of the claim holding in question.

The noble and learned Viscount said: Subsection (4) of Clause 49, deals with cases where one or more claim holdings have been pledged to the Central Land Board as security for one or more development charges. Your Lordships will remember that the Second Schedule to the Bill provides far deducting the amount outstanding by way of development charge from the value of the appropriate claim holding, and Clause 49 (4) provides for the corresponding discharge of the development charge liability. It is proposed to make a number of Amendments in the Second Schedule in order to simplify the calculations required. The effect of these, if I may summarise them, will be that, where two or more development charges were incurred in respect of land in the area of the same claim holding, they are to be aggregated and the aggregate amount outstanding deducted from the holdings pledged. This change in the method of calculation employed in the Second Schedule makes necessary corresponding changes in Clause 49 (4) of the Bill, because it will no longer be possible to say that a deduction has been made from a claim holding in respect of a particular development charge, as distinct from the aggregate of outstanding charges. In the end, the changes are little more than drafting but I felt I ought to explain them to the House. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 58, line 29, leave out subsections (4) and (5) and insert the said new subsection.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 59, line 39, leave out ("subsections (2) and") and insert ("subsection").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 49, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 50:

Exchequer grants to local authorities

(4) The amount of any grant paid to a local authority in accordance with regulations made under this section—

1. (a) where that amount is calculated by reference to annual costs incurred or treated as incurred by the authority in respect of the borrowing of money to defray expenditure in respect of which the grant is made, or by reference to the excess of such annual costs over the receipts, or the annual value of receipts, mentioned in paragraph (b) of the last foregoing subsection, shall not exceed an amount equal to fifty per cent. of those costs, or of that excess, as the case may be;
1063
2. (b) in any other case, shall not exceed an amount equal to fifty per cent. of the amount of the expenditure in respect of which the grant is made.

9.42 p.m.

LORD LUKE had given notice of three Amendments, the first being, in subsection (4) (a), to leave out "fifty per cent." and insert "the specified percentage." The noble Lord said: With permission, I hope I may speak to all three Amendments, Nos. 113, 114 and 115, together. In bringing forward this Amendment to this part of Clause 50, I am well aware that this matter has been pretty fully discussed already in another place. I know also that I run the risk of a question of privilege. Nevertheless, I hope I may proceed with proposing these Amendments. I am quite unrepentant in attaching a great deal of importance to encouraging local authorities in every possible way in the provision of recreational facilities. It will not have escaped your Lordships' notice that there was a debate on an Adjournment Motion only recently in another place on the question of physical culture, and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education on that occasion said (OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 531 (No. 168), Col. 2277): The honourable gentleman asked me to state that the Government were interested in physical recreation. I have no difficulty in reassuring him on that point. Indeed, it is the duty of my right honourable friend, under Section 1 of the 1944 Act, to promote the education of the people, and that, under Section 53 of the 1944 Act, includes physical recreation.

I hope not only that your Lordships will take note of that statement but also that we can take a certain amount of heart from the fact that Her Majesty's Government are again taking a little interest in physical recreation. Recreational facilities are always a sort of Cinderella among things that local authorities may provide. There is no fortunate magic wand or fairy godmother to assist them very much in their efforts. There is a very low priority for them in the scale of things, and the attitude, not unnaturally, I suppose, is, "We will do something about recreational facilities when everything else has been seen to." Therefore, I consider that any action which is calculated as a disincentive to local authorities is detrimental to progress; and I think, on a long-term view, if amenities are left out of scheming and planning there will be regrets established in this and in future generations. I consider that this part of Clause 50 is indeed a disincentive.

I should like to pay a very sincere tribute to the remarkable achievements that have been made throughout the country by voluntary effort and, indeed, by the local authorities in their efforts to establish well-ordered, well-developed, open spaces, in spite of the curtailment of Government assistance in another direction. The result of the provisions under the 1947 Act was that open spaces and allotments could be provided at low cost; the authority had only to pay the existing use value, and Government funds compensated the seller for the difference out of the compensation fund. In some cases a small development charge was payable by the local authorities. Under the present Bill local authorities who wish to provide open spaces either for themselves or by acquiring land on behalf of private clubs, are thus put back into the same sort of position as before the 1947 Act was passed—that is to say, they pay somewhere near the full market value instead of the existing use value.

Under this Bill and by this clause, grants of 50 per cent. may be made. I do not deny that this will help, but it does not come to the same thing as acquisition at existing use value and the payment of a reduced development charge. I should like to give the following example—this example was given in another place, but for the benefit of the Committee, if they will bear with me, I will repeat it. On the old basis the existing use value in this particular case was £950 and, with a development charge on the quarter rate of £395, the total came to £1,345. Under the new basis, the existing use value is £950; the admitted claim is £4,430, and the supplement is £630, making a total of £6,010, which, when the 50 per cent. grant is taken off, results in a total of £3,005, as against the old basis of £1,345. I think those figures are remarkable.

I dare say I shall be told that all the associations of local authorities have accepted the rate of 50 per cent. That is true; but I suggest that it is only because they were unable to obtain anything else by agreement. I shall also be told that some of the larger towns, particularly places dealing with bomb-damaged sites, will be better off under this Bill than before. That also is true. If a local authority wanted to provide an open space on the site of a bombed building, it did not help them that under the 1947 Act they had to pay only existing use value. There being a legal right to rebuild, the authority therefore bought at site value. This will still be the position, but the new 50 per cent. grant will be payable in every case. Previously, grants were payable only in certain cases, mainly of redevelopment areas.

The need for open spaces is not, however, the need of only a few big cities. Further, the preservation of existing playing fields from development is at least as important as providing new ones, and in this case the new Bill is unfavourable to all authorities, large and small. At this late hour, I apologise for wearying the Committee, but I feel that this is a matter of the greatest importance and I hope very much that the noble and learned Viscount may give favourable consideration to these Amendments, the first of which I now beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 61, line 28, leave out ("fifty per cent.") and insert ("the specified percentage").—(Lord Luke.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

It is impossible for anyone not to be moved by the words of my noble friend, because we are all in sympathy with the objectives which he has so much in his mind and in his heart, and he has put the case very attractively to us. We had, however, to consider the general position between the central Government and local authorities on the subject matter of this Bill, and the settlement about grant for which the Bill provides is one which, on the whole (I do not think my noble friend would question this), is likely to be to the advantage of local authorities. It is not possible in matters of this kind to work on two contrary principles for the sake of giving specific treatment either to one category of authority or to all authorities in respect of one category of land. The authorities have accepted the basic principle that in future they should have to pay for the development value as assessed in 1947 with all the advantages that that gives them. That this is not an illusory or debating point is surely made clear by all the speeches we have heard from noble Lords this afternoon on that same point from (if I may speak colloquially) "the other end of the gun." Having these advantages, they are then at liberty to use the land for any proper purpose, be it allotments or anything else; but no regard is paid, in fixing the price of land, to the particular use to which it is intended it should be put. That was a feature of the old development charge system which was founded on a different principle and there is no place for it in the future, either in connection with the price of land or in connection with grant.

It is quite true—and the noble Lord, with the frankness I would expect, admitted—that, knowing that the Government would not allow both these principles to operate side by side, the authorities signified that they preferred the system of paying on 1947 values and not on current market values. It is on that basis, and on their own assessment of the probabilities, that the Government have maintained that the settlement about grant will work to the general advantage of the authorities. I do not deny that there will be some authorities who will find the acquisition of particular sites for allotments, open spaces and possibly other things more expensive than might have been the case under other arrangements. But the main point is that the broad shape of the Government's arrangements will assist the authorities.

The second point on which the Government rely is that there is great virtue in having a flat rate system of grant which is applicable to acquisitions for all purposes in this Bill. That virtue extends a long way beyond mere administrative convenience, important though that is: it goes to the root of relationships between central and local government. I cannot imagine anyone in your Lordships' House disagreeing with the view that the general object of these relationships ought to be to encourage local enterprise, initiative and independence, but the greater the financial dependence of authorities on the Exchequer, the more difficult it is to achieve that object. We think that 50 per cent. represents a very fair sharing of the burden of providing amenities which are, after all, primarily of a local character; and bearing in mind the other burdens of the taxpayer it does not seem to Her Majesty's Government unreasonable that the ratepayer should be called upon to pay half. As my right honourable friend pointed out in another place, in Committee, the introduction of any kind of variable grant system, even for specified purposes, really means going back to the beginning and reopening negotiations with the authorities on a different basis. I do not think that at this stage that is what anyone really wants.

There is the other point that if difficulties are experienced by some of the poorer authorities, the fact will be reflected in their accounts on which the Exchequer equalisation grant is calculated. I do not attach much importance to that point, but I do attach importance to the general settlement, which has been accepted, and the freedom of action within that settlement which is given to local authorities. For these reasons while, as I say, I have every personal sympathy with my noble friend's view, and more than sympathy with the objectives behind that view—no one who has been Home Secretary could have any other feeling as to the importance of the work which is behind my noble friend's plea—I am afraid that it does not really fit in with the structure of the Bill or with the arrangements that have been made. Therefore, I cannot accept the Amendment.

LORD SILKIN

I am sure that most members of the Committee will feel bitterly disappointed at the speech to which we have just listened. I have associated myself with this Amendment because I should like the Committee to appreciate that both sides were in sympathy and in agreement with the case put forward by Lord Luke. The noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor has dealt with this matter as though it were a case of trying to get a little more grant on the part of the local authorities. We who support this Amendment are not looking at it primarily from the point of view of the local authorities. It is not that we think 50 per cent. is fair or unfair. We are prepared to accept that as a settlement. The angle from which we approach the matter is that we believe it to be essential, if we are to get playing fields, that every inducement and every encouragement should be given to local authorities to provide them. There is general agreement on this—at least, I have no reason to think that there was any disagreement on the part of any Party or any individual.

We provided this special inducement under the 1947 Act. Local authorities purchasing land for playing fields or land for allotments were able to buy it at existing use value and to pay a quarter of the normal development charge. That was a definite inducement which was held out to them. As the result of that, I believe that there was an accentuation in the process of the acquisition of playing fields. It is unfortunate that local authorities, with so many commitments on their hands, are inclined to put playing fields in a very low priority. Providing them is not particularly spectacular: it is much more spectacular to provide homes—though, of course, I am not suggesting that it is not most essential that they should do that. But unless some special inducement is held out to local authorities, whether in the form of that embodied in the Amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Luke, or in some other form, it is feared that the playing fields will simply not be acquired. That is why the special inducement was provided under the 1947 Act.

The noble and learned Viscount was right in saying that there is administrative convenience in arranging all the grants provided for planning purposes at 50 per cent. and not to have variable grants. But, of course, that does not settle the relationship between the Exchequer and local authorities. We still have all sorts of grants—education grant and housing grant—though on a different basis, and I see nothing illogical in providing a special grant at special rates for playing fields. Moreover, if playing fields can be associated with housing estates, they are regarded as part of the provision of housing and attract a housing grant. I think that is true, but the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, who is more familiar with these matters, will confirm it or otherwise. So that I am asking for nothing extraordinary or exceptional in seeking preferential treatment for playing fields.

The noble and learned Viscount has said that as a former Home Secretary he appreciates the need for playing fields and that he is very sympathetic with what is behind this Amendment, and I believe he is saying that quite sincerely. But sympathy is not sufficient. If we can do something to encourage local authorities to provide playing fields by regarding them in a preferential way, I think we shall be doing a great service to the community. Tidiness of administration and finance is all very well, but we should not make that our master: beyond that is what we want to use our administration to do, and I should regard this as one of the most important things we can do. Therefore, I hope the Government have not said the last word on this subject. I do not want to ask the noble and learned Viscount to add one more to the enormous list of undertakings to reconsider which he has given, and therefore I do not ask him for an undertaking—I do not know what my noble friend Lord Luke will do—but I express the hope that this will be considered. I regard this as a very important Amendment and hope that we shall hear more about it at a later stage of the Bill.

LORD O'HAGAN

I rise to say briefly how much I sympathise with the Amendment that has been moved and how thoroughly I endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has been saying with regard to the necessity and desirability for the Government to reconsider this matter. I earnestly hope—and I believe I represent a good many others, both inside and outside the House—that this question will receive most careful consideration with a view to meeting the case which has been so amply made out by the noble Lord, Lord Luke.

LORD HYLTON

I should like to support my noble friend Lord Luke. I do not believe his request for a revision of the amount of the grant from 50 per cent. is more than a request for a discretionary grant. We all recognise that the provision of playing fields is probably the greatest good that can be done for the youth of this country, and I believe that if in certain cases discretion were given to the Minister to make an increased grant, it would be public money well spent.

EARL BATHURST

I should like to support the Amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Luke, has moved. I think if the noble and learned Viscount could see fit to make some concession to the noble Lord, he would have overwhelming support throughout the country. When we think of the disasters that have happened in English sport—for example, to the football team which met the Dynamos in Russia—and other difficulties which sporting teams are facing now, we must agree that this could be some small measure of help which the Government might give to promoters of all forms of sport—possibly not only for playing fields, but for tennis, swimming, and so forth. Local authorities could thereby help sport organisers on a larger scale. I hope that the noble and learned Viscount will be able to make some concession.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My heart is getting more and more wrung, but despite what the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, has said, there is great difficulty, as all your Lordships know, in disturbing arrangements that have been come to, and I should be less than frank with your Lordships if I were to underestimate that difficulty. But, having said that—I like to be frank when I undertake to look at something—I say that we will look at this again, bearing in mind that point and those made by noble Lords. I do not want my noble friend Lord Luke to be misled in any way. I have indicated on one or two occasions when I thought there was great difficulty and that it was unlikely that anything would result. On the other hand, after what your Lordships have said, and especially after what the noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, said in the last speech in this "round," I shall certainly have another look at the matter in the way I have indicated.

LORD LUKE

I am grateful for that second speech of the noble and learned Viscount. I will not be misled by anything that he said, because I am afraid I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that this is sympathy without any backing whatsoever. If the Government feel that it is much too difficult to upset anything now, all I can say is this: that when things were being arranged, it is a pity that the Government put themselves into that great difficulty and did not give more consideration to this matter before it was too However, I will study the reply of the noble and learned Viscount, and if I have one small crumb from him indicating that he will also study the matter again, I am grateful. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 50 agreed to.

Clause 51 agreed to.

Clause 52:

Recovery of certain sums from acquiring authorities

52.—(1) Where under Part I of this Act a payment becomes payable by the Central Land Board in respect of the compulsory acquisition of an interest in land by, or the sale of such an interest to, a public authority possessing compulsory purchase powers (in this section referred to as "the acquiring authority"), the Board shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be entitled to recover the amount of the payment from the acquiring authority.

(2) The preceding subsection shall not apply if— (b) the interest was acquired, in pursuance of a notice to treat served, or a contract made, before the eighteenth day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-two, for the purposes of the development or redevelopment of any area as a whole; or (c) the interest was acquired, in pursuance of such a notice to treat or contract as is mentioned in the last preceding paragraph, for the purposes of the use of the land as a public open space, or as allotments:

Provided that paragraph (b) of this subsection shall not affect the application of the preceding subsection— (i) if the interest was acquired by a development corporation under the New Towns Act, 1946; or

10.8 p.m.

LORD LUKE moved, in subsection (2) (c), to leave out all words beginning "in pursuance" down to and including "paragraph." The noble Lord said: I do not know whether I shall have any better luck with the next two Amendments. At this late hour I shall deal with this matter quite briefly. Under this clause, any concessions to local authorities in cases where the use of land would have a low development value reflect the fact that, without those concessions, local authorities could not be expected to undertake such development on the scale which sound planning demands. Clause 52 recognises the fairness of this principle in so far as past transactions are concerned, but the principle is forgotten, very conveniently it would appear, for the future. This Amendment and that which follows are an effort to allow local authorities to continue to purchase on the old basis land for open spaces or allotments, and the Amendments would assist local authorities who had purchased open space prior to the coming into force of the new Act. Many authorities who had not actually entered into a contract by November 18, 1952, may have gone so far in the matter that they cannot draw back. It does not seem unreasonable, therefore, that they should be allowed to purchase on the old basis. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 63, line 20, leave out from ("acquired") to ("for") in line 22.—(Lord Luke.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The present Amendment really stands in the same position as the Amendments which we have just been discussing, and I am in the same difficulty about applying two contrary principles and also in upsetting the settlement with the local authorities which has been made and which, in our view, is a fair and consistent one. Therefore, I am afraid, if I may put it shortly—I am sure your Lordships will not misunderstand me—that I cannot adopt a different position on this Amendment from that which I have indicated to the House in the previous one. I am afraid that I must leave the matter in the same position as I have already indicated.

LORD LUKE

I rather feared that that was the reply I should receive, though I cannot quite see why the Government, having made a concession, cannot continue it. However, I see that I am getting no support for this Amendment and, therefore, I beg leave to withdraw it.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD SILKIN moved, in the provision to subsection (2), to leave out paragraph (i). The noble Lord said: This clause provides for the recovery by the Central Land Board of payments which they make to persons holding established claims. Subsection (2) provides that in certain circumstances the Central Land Board shall not be able to recover amounts that they pay out. One of those circumstances is set out in subsection (2) (b), where land was acquired, broadly speaking, for the purposes of the development or the re-development of any area as a whole. Then we go on to make exceptions, and one of the exceptions is if the interest was acquired by a development corporation under the New Towns Act, 1946. Obviously, if this proviso were not contained in the Bill, a new town would be in the same category as local authorities who buy land for the purposes of the development of re-development of an area as a whole. Indeed, the new town is the supreme example of an authority buying land for the purpose of the development or re-development as a whole, and the Government have thought fit in such cases to exempt such authorities from the payment which the Central Land Board can normally enforce.

I must confess that I do not understand why the development corporations of new towns should be put in a less favourable position. Indeed, the Government itself took my view in the first instance, because in the first print of the Bill (I do not know at what stage it was altered) the new towns were put in exactly the same category and were exempt from these payments. But this paragraph (i) has been inserted since the print of the first Bill, and I do not understand why, except on the basis, which I should not like to believe to be true, that there is an anti-new towns bias, and with a view to appearing to put new towns in a less favourable position from a financial point of view than the local authorities. I must admit that in the last resort a good deal of the money which new towns are paying comes from the Government, but there will come a time when the new towns will be taken over by the local authorities, and it is therefore material as to what their liabilities are and what their expenditure is. It does seem to me that, since it is contemplated that when the new towns have been substantially completed they should be taken over by the local authority, there is all the more reason why the new towns should be treated in exactly the same way as a local authority. I must confess that I am completely puzzled by this exception. I move the Amendment because I believe they ought to be exempted, but partly also in order to ascertain from the noble and learned Viscount why this paragraph has been put in at this relatively late stage of the Bill. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 63, line 26, leave out paragraph (i).—(Lord Silkin.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I willingly explain to the noble Lord why this provision appears. The part of the proviso which the Amendment proposes should be deleted was included in order to ensure that the accounts of new town corporations should bear as complete an indication as possible of the cost of their operations; and the need for that is clear from the words of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, himself, when he said that at the present time the new town corporations are receiving most of their money from the Government. Therefore, it is essential that there should be as complete an indication as possible of the cost of the operations. The corporations are, in this respect, in a different position from the generality of local authorities. The generality of local authorities, by virtue of paragraph (b) of the subsection, are relieved of the obligation to pay to the Central Land Board sums paid by the Central Land Board under the Bill to former owners of land which was acquired for purposes of the development or redevelopment of an area as a whole.

The authorities, in a great many cases, might reasonably have expected not to have to make any payment in respect of development value, but it was fully to be expected that the corporations of the new towns would in due time have had to make a payment to the Exchequer in lieu of a development charge, and the Government saw no reason for extending to the corporations the waiver of recovery for which the subsection provides. I am sorry that it even crossed the mind of the noble Lord that there was any anti-new towns feeling, because that is certainly not so. But it is most important—and I am sure that the noble Lord, who, in one sense, is the more than putative father of the new towns, would himself be anxious—that we should know exactly where they stand and that that picture should not be blurred by cross-entries of this kind. I hope that will satisfy him and that he will not press this point.

10.20 p.m.

LORD SILKIN

If it were merely a matter of bookkeeping I should not press the matter very hard. Even so, I still think that this puts the new towns on a worse basis than the local authorities. But it is rather more than a matter of bookkeeping, as I have indicated. There will come a day of reckoning. That day of reckoning may not be far ahead. Some of the new towns are proceeding very well indeed, and it will not be more than five or six years before it may be possible, in the case of the most advanced of them, to wind up the development corporation, as provided for in the New Towns Act. At that time, there will have to be financial arrangements as between the local authority and the new towns, or between the local authority and the Exchequer. Of course, it does put the local authority, who eventually will be acquiring the assets of the new towns, at a disadvantage as against their normal operations if they have to reimburse the Central Land Board in this way. I hope that I am making myself clear on this rather complicated subject. It is rather academic. I do not feel that I want to press this matter to-day. It is one about which I should like to think more, and possibly the noble and learned Viscount will do so too. The Government themselves have changed their view on it. I had not seen any adequate reason why they should have changed their view. As the Bill first stood, these new towns were put in the same category as the local authorities. So I think there is possibly a question here for reconsideration, although frankly I am not going to die at the last ditch over this, particularly in the circumstances. I hope that it can be looked at again but, without seeking any undertaking, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I think this is really drafting. Subsection (6) of the clause applies only to compulsory acquisitions. It is to be applied to sales by regulations made under subsection (8) (c). I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 64, line 37, leave out ("or sale").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is drafting. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 65, line 29, leave out from ("is") to end of line 32 and insert ("by virtue of subsection (4) of section fifty-seven of this Act to be treated as apportioned to the land in which the interest acquired or sold subsisted").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 52, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 53 agreed to.

Clause 54:

Special provisions relating to minerals

54.—(1) Development charges determined in respect of the winning and working of minerals shall cease to have effect in so far as they require the payment of any royalty or other sum in respect of minerals got after the commencement of this Act.

(5) The Mineral Development Charge Setoff Regulations, 1951, shall cease to have effect; but in respect of the winning and working of minerals to which those Regulations applied no development charge shall be payable or be deemed ever to have been payable.

10.25 p.m.

VISCOUNT RIDLEY moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "commencement of this Act" and insert "eighteenth day of November one thousand nine hundred and fifty-two." The noble Viscount said: This is one of these mineral arrangements which has given more trouble in various planning Bills than any other class of developments. The plan here is an attempt to put all people working minerals on the same footing, and these three Amendments which follow are all aimed at the same object. The arrangements for development charge on mineral owners varied under the various Parts of the 1947 Act and their regulations. Some developers paid a lump sum development charge; others—and I think these were mainly those who had rented the land which they were proposing to work and are now working—paid the development charge on a royalty basis. Those who made these arrangements after the 1947 Act are still paying and will, under this clause, go on paying until this Bill begins to operate. On the other hand, under the 1953 Act provisions were made whereby mineral workers who had not yet started need not pay development charges in the form of royalties at all; so that there are concurrently some people who pay the royalty charge up to November 18, 1952, and others who pay up to the coming into force of this Bill. The intention is that by changing these dates they should all be put on the same basis. As I see it, therefore, it is not asking for mineral workers anything that other classes of owners or developers do not get; it is an attempt to put them all on to the same footing. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 67, line 42, leave out ("commencement of this Act") and insert the said new words.—(Viscount Ridley.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is a subject of great complexity and I have done my best to master it. Having made that attempt, I have come to the conclusion that to accept this series of Amendments would be to treat the mineral operator more generously than the surface developer, without any justifiable reason that I cart see for doing so. I must ask the Committee to bear with me for just a few moments while I develop that point. The principle underlying the abolition of the development charge in the 1953 Act was that where a project—a large factory, perhaps, or a housing estate—had been begun before November 18, 1952, the whole of that project remained liable to development charge. That is the starting gate of this matter.

The Government (and Parliament agreed with the Government) rejected as impracticable the idea that the development charge should be turned off, like a tap, on the 18th November, 1952, but they also concluded that to apply this rule without modification in the field of mineral working would he unfair—it would involve some persons continuing to make development charge payments. This is the important point. It is really the point that my noble friend has to meet. That basic principle of continuing the development charge on projects existing at that time would have meant that those persons would continue to make development charge payments in respect of minerals into the 1970's. The Bill therefore proposes—and several people have thought that we have been overgenerous in this matter—that payments should cease when the Bill comes into operation. So it is substituting for a payment that would have gone on to the 1970's a payment that ceases when this Bill conies into operation.

My noble friend's Amendments seek to introduce in the field of mineral working a principle already rejected by Parliament in passing the 1953 Act, and so to put mineral workers a step ahead of everyone else. I have not been able to see why that would not be unfair to other developers, and for that reason alone the Amendments should be rejected. Of course, it could be argued (and the argument is used) that some mineral operators have secured an unfair advantage over their fellows because their development charges had not been determined when the Government's proposals were published, and so they were able to have them assessed for the period ending November 18, 1952, and escape liability beyond that date. But it has several times been pointed out to me in other aspects of this Bill that the fact that some mineral workers have got ahead of other mineral workers is a very poor reason for putting mineral workers as a whole a step ahead of other developers. Persons developing land by building did not have this right to demand that their development charge be assessed for a period chosen by themselves.

I am aware that my right honourable friend, in the Committee stage of the 1953 Act, promised to consider sympathetically the effect of Section 1 (2) of that Act on the mineral industry. Noble Lords will remember that Section 1 (2) of that Act provided that where a development charge was determined before November 18, 1952, or an application for a determination was received and any of the development was started before that date, the liability to pay the charge extended to all development covered by the determination or application except where the Central Land Board determined the charge for less development than that covered by the application. Mineral operators were faced with the prospect of paying development charge for years to come. Where the charge had been levied in the form of a royalty paid on the basis of the minerals as they were won, the operators have contracts with the Central Land Board which, as I have said, in some cases make them liable to pay charges up to the 1970's. As my noble friend is aware, in some contracts there are "break" clauses, enabling an operator to opt out of the contract at predetermined times; but even in these cases the first break is often not before 1955 or 1956.

It is often thought that when a Government suggest a time for the coming into operation of a Bill, they do so foe administrative convenience; but the only way in which that has influenced the decision of Her Majesty's Government is that they have selected that time instead of (as well they might have) the years of the "break" clause, which would, of course, have varied from 1955 to 1956. I am sorry I have to detain noble Lords, but I wanted my noble friend to know that not only had this matter been considered in official quarters but that I have considered it myself. I have come to the conclusion that mineral operators have not done too badly in getting the date which we have given them—the beginning of the Act. I hope my noble friend will not press for an even earlier date in these circumstances.

VISCOUNT RIDLEY

Having heard what the noble and learned Viscount has said, I do not want to press my Amendment at all. He has gone into great detail and I am grateful for the trouble he has taken in explaining the matter. I should have thought there were injustices between one or other of the same class of operators, but as the noble Viscount says there is a comparison here with other kinds of developers, it is not a matter I should wish to press, and I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

VISCOUNT RIDLEY moved to add to subsection (5): Provided that in relation to any development of minerals in respect of which planning permission has been granted after the coming into operation of the said Regulations and before the commencement of this Act, nothing in this subsection shall relieve the Central Land Board of the obligation of making under Regulation 19 of the said Regulations any such payment in respect of conditions as they would have been required to make if this subsection had not been enacted.

The noble Viscount said: This Amendment is intended to allow the Central Land Board to honour a bargain already made. The regulations for dealing with mineral developments are abolished by this clause but in some cases there persists—or there would persist until this Bill becomes law—an arrangement whereby, in cases in which the conditions imposed for development consent were unusually high, resulting in excessive expenditure by the mineral worker in arranging for the set-off as between development charge, on the one hand, and claim for loss of development value, on the other, account was taken of conditions, and it was arranged that adjustment should be made by the Central Land Board in order to help mineral workers in the conditions to which I have referred. It is thought, therefore, that that arrangement, being in the nature of a bargain between the landlord and the mineral workers, should be allowed to persist; and unless express permission is given in this Bill, Clause 54 (5) would abolish the regulations and would remove authority to implement this arrangement. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 68, line 23, at end insert the said proviso.—(Viscount Ridley.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Again, I am sure that my noble friend will agree with me that this is a matter of some technical difficulty, and I will try to explain as shortly as I can to your Lordships how it strikes me. The practical effect of this Amendment would be that in certain cases payments would be made in respect of conditions attached to a permission to work minerals, despite the fact that under Clauses 21 and 43 no compensation is payable for such conditions unless they limit the area to be worked. The payments to be made under Regulation 19 were conceived, as I think my noble friend has indicated, against the background of a development charge. When a charge was assessed for any development, surface or mineral alike, any onerous conditions had the effect of reducing the charge, and, consequently, it was only reasonable in dealing with these near-ripe mineral cases, where the Part VI claim was taken in settlement of the charge, to provide for payment to be made by the Central Land Board where the conditions were specially onerous. But the case for these payments vanished with the abolition of development charge.

I am sure that my noble friend has in mind that Regulation 19 of the Mineral Development Charge Set-Off Regulations, 1951, which are repealed by subsection (5) of Clause 54, provided for payments to be made in respect of the cost of work necessary for complying with certain conditions attaching to a planning permission to work minerals. And the conditions were those which went beyond the mineral undertaker's obligations under his lease where the estimated cost of the additional work that was necessary exceeded one-tenth of the relevant development charge. Where the charge was assessed in respect of the working of non-near-ripe minerals, a reduction in the charge was made to take account of the cost of so-called "onerous conditions." A similar principle was therefore applied to near-ripe minerals, but as, under the near-ripe scheme, development charge was deemed to have been set-off against the Part VI claim, the regulations provided for a payment to be made by the Central Land Board in appropriate cases to represent a reduction in charge.

As I see it, my noble friend's Amendment would preserve the effect of Regulation 19 in respect of conditions attached to a planning permission issued between the coming into operation of the Set-Off Regulations and the date of the commencement of the Bill. It is argued that in many cases operators did not challenge conditions attached to permissions granted in this period because they knew that they would be paid for the cost of complying. But the chances of successful challenge do not seem to me adequate reason for providing now for special additional payments in all cases.

I do not know whether my noble friend has considered the fact that this concession is to be applied only to near-ripe minerals which have already been generously treated, inasmuch as, whilst in the development charge world charge was almost invariably greater than the relevant Part VI claim, the two were accepted as equivalent under the set-off regulations. I think that this may fairly be said to represent a reduction in development charge already, and any additional reduction would be indefensible by comparison with other minerals and surface development. I am sorry to put to your Lordships so technical a point, but it did not seem to me that the last point I was making, as to the action taken fairly representing a reduction, would be intelligible to anyone reading it unless I put forward the preliminary ground. Therefore, I have put it at some length, because I want my noble friend to understand that his point has been carefully considered. For these reasons, I am sorry that I cannot accept the Amendment.

VISCOUNT RIDLEY

The noble and learned Viscount has given me a great deal of detail, so much so that I cannot properly take it in; in addition to which, I have a train to catch. I shall take the opportunity of reading his very detailed and carefully worked out account of this when it appears in the OFFICIAL REPORT. Meantime, I can do nothing but beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 54 agreed to.

Clause 55 agreed to.

Clause 56 [Contributions to Ironstone Restoration Fund]:

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment enables the Minister to make orders, subject to annulment in either House, exempting certain ironstone land owned by charities from the liabilities imposed by the Mineral Workings Act. 1951, as amended by this clause, to contribute a full 2¼d. a ton to the Ironstone Restoration Fund. This is a procedural point and at this late hour I will not go into the reason for this rather curious arrangement. I do not think the Amendment will occasion your Lordships any discomfort. I beg to move

Amendment moved— Page 69, line 43, at end insert ("and the Minister may by order made by statutory instrument, which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament, direct that, as from the date of the order or such earlier date as may be specified in the order, this subsection shall not apply to such other ironstone as may be so specified, being ironstone an interest in which is held on the date of the order on charitable trusts or for charitable purposes.")—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

Subsection, (3) of this clause, the deletion of which is proposed, provides for a deduction to be made for the Ironstone Restoration Fund, to which I have just referred, from all compensation payments made in respect of ironstone under this Bill or any other enactment—for instance, the Mining Code. The Amendment is made in order to simplify the administration of the provisions of the Bill in relation to the Fund. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 70, line 23, leave out subsection (3).—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 56, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 57:

Recovery, on subsequent development, of payments under s. 59 of principal Act

(3) Section thirty of this Act shall have effect in relation to notices registered under this section as it has effect in relation to notices registered under section twenty-nine of this Act:

Provided that— (b) in the case of development of land initiated after the date of commencement of this Act but before the expiration of a period of one year commencing with that date, a notice registered under this section in respect of that land shall, irrespective of the date of registration, be treated for the purposes of the said section thirty as having been so registered before the development was initiated; and

LORD MANCROFT

Subsection (7) of Clause 52 provides for the recovery from public authorities of any payments made under Section 59 of the 1947 Act in respect of interests in land which they have acquired. An exception is to be made in the cases specified in subsections (2) and (3) of the clause. This Amendment is necessary to prevent that exception from being nullified by the provisions of the present clause, under which Section 59 payments are to be registered as local land charges and recoverable on development of the land. The effect of the Amendment is that these excepted payments will not be registered and thus will not be recoverable. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 71, line 13, at end insert ("or which would be so recoverable but for the provisions of paragraph (i) of the proviso to that subsection.")—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

This is a drafting Amendment. Subsection (9) of Clause 30 is not applicable in the present context. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 71, line 34, after ("Act") insert (", except subsection (9) thereof,").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

10.45 p.m.

LORD SILKIN moved, in subsection (3), to leave out paragraph (b). The noble Lord said: I beg to move the Amendment standing in the name of my noble friend Lord Ogmore, who asks me to apologise for not moving it himself. A moment ago the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, in moving the Amendment deleting a subsection said that it would simplify the administration of the Bill. I would suggest that the deletion of the paragraph as proposed by this Amendment would equally simplify administration. This is an Amendment to which the Law Society attach some importance. Put briefly, paragraph (b) provides that at any time within a year after the commencement of the Act there may be registered a notice which will affect the owner of the land. It will be a notice under which a certain sum of money is recoverable under earlier clauses. If such a notice is inserted, it is to be treated as if it had been inserted before any proposed development had been initiated. In other words, at any time within a year a notice that is put on the register is treated as if it had been put on a year before. I realise that in the next Amendment, the noble and learned Viscount, having appreciated that that would be a monstrous proposition, is to move to reduce the monstrosity to six months; but it still remains a monstrous proposition that a notice is put on affecting the property, and is then regarded as if it had been put on six months earlier. The iniquity of this is that in the meantime, even during the six months, transactions may have taken place.

The noble and learned Viscount has been talking about three months as a long time; and six months is certainly a long time. An innocent purchaser may have bought land and may have proceeded to develop it, and he then finds, perhaps after six months, that he becomes liable for the repayment of compensation which has been paid to a previous owner under Clause 59 of the Bill. That is really a grave injustice. I think it is a novel procedure in British law that a notice affecting land is made retrospective as if the notice had been put on six months or a year before. If there is such a precedent, I should be interested to know of it. I suggest to the noble and learned Viscount that this really cannot stand up to scrutiny and that something has got to be done about this paragraph. I move to delete the paragraph, but I do not think that this entirely meets the case. I hope that if the noble and learned Viscount cannot delete the paragraph he will, at any rate, do something to see that this iniquitous retrospective imposition is rectified. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 71, line 43, leave out paragraph (b).—(Lord Silkin.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The Government would not dissent from the proposition—and I certainly would not—that the registration of land charges which would have some measure of retrospective effect is far better avoided, but I want to put the special circumstances of the present case, because they do create a considerable difficulty, and it is difficult to see the way out. The clause provides that certain payments which have already been issued by the Central Land Board, under the special scheme dealing with development value in war-damaged property, shall be recovered by the Board if the land is developed, and the payments were made on the footing that if the land was developed then development charge would have to be paid. Now that development charge has gone it would be difficult to defend—indeed, it would be absurd—if the payments were left in the hands of people who are quite free to realise the development value in bricks and mortar.

That is the general position. Quite plainly, of course, people who have already started developing when the Bill conies into operation cannot readily be required to pay back the money they have received from the Central Land Board. But that is no reason why those who develop after the Bill is law should not be required to pay, notwithstanding that it may be a few months before all the payments made by the Board can, in fact, be registered as local land charges. The difficulty there is the simple one that registration cannot begin until the Bill gives statutory authority to do it. Now a word on the question of warning. The White Paper itself, which was published in November, 1952, gave warning of the Government's intentions, and it is not likely that any purchaser acting on prudent advice will buy or will have bought land in respect of which one of these recoverable payments has been made without knowing that if he develops it after the Bill comes into operation he will have to repay.

It was originally supposed that it would be about a year before the work of registration could be done, but the Board now think they will manage it in about six months. It is therefore possible to reduce to six months, as the Government Amendment proposes, the period during which the commencement of development may bring about a recovery payment, notwithstanding that a charge was not registered at the time when development begins. If this matter could be tidied, I should be only too delighted to do it. I do not think any iniquity is being perpetrated on anyone, but I do not like this method of going about things. If, in the meantime, the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, or the Law Society, or anyone else, can make any suggestion for further improving the provision, I shall be prepared to consider it, but, as I said, in this case the real trouble is the simple one, that registration cannot begin until the Bill gives statutory authority to do it. I do not see how I can abandon the position.

LORD SILKIN

The noble and learned Viscount has explained why this provision is in the Bill, but I do not think he has justified it. It is impossible to justify a provision of this kind: putting on a charge to-day, and then saying that it must be deemed to have been put on a year ago. I understand the position of the person who has received his money and who is still in possession of the land and then wants to develop it. I do not think he needs taking care of. But I am concerned about the innocent purchaser. How is he to know that his predecessor has received a sum of money by way of compensation? He would not necessarily know, and if he asks he may not get an answer. Amidst all the complexities of this Bill, would it occur to most people? Anybody might trip up and not ask the question. I feel that this matter requires much more consideration. The noble and learned Viscount says that if I can suggest anything, or the Law Society, he will consider it. Fortunately for me, I am not drafting this Bill. Her Majesty's Government have a very able staff of Parliamentary draftsmen whose job it is to do that. I am not competent to do it. My proposal is to delete the offending paragraph. However, I take it that the noble and learned Viscount will himself apply his mind to this problem, and on that assumption I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment is tabled in pursuance of an undertaking given by the Minister to consider whether the period during which registration of a Section 59 payment should have retrospective effect could not be reduced. We have discussed this point. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, will indicate whether I can leave the moving of this Amendment in that short form, as we have discussed it on the last Amendment. Unless he desires me to go on, I will move the Amendment without further comment.

Amendment moved— Page 71, line 45, leave out ("one year") and insert ("six months").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

LORD SILKIN

Of the two evils I would rather have six months than twelve months.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD HYLTON moved to add to subsection (5): All claims put forward under the scheme in relation to all classes of interest described in section fifty-nine, to be treated as claims under section fifty-eight, notwithstanding that they are not in respect of 'qualified interests' under the scheme.

The noble Lord said: I beg to move the Amendment in my name. I wish to put forward this point because I understand that injustice has been caused through a confusion arising under the principal Act regarding the application of Sections 58 and 59. Section 59 as drawn in the principal Act appears to be the right section under which to apply for payment for war damaged land. When the regulations governing the sections were issued it was found that Section 59 was not the right section, but by that time it was too late to put in a claim under Section 58. This matter has given rise to considerable financial loss, and I put down my Amendment in the hope that the Government will be in a generous mood, and will be prepared, if not to accept this Amendment at least to take some action to put this matter right. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 72, line 23, at end insert the said words.—(Lord Hylton.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I sympathise with my noble friend's heart, but I think he would sympathise with my mind if I tried to legislate in order to cover particular difficulties and mistakes. I am not going to refer, as my noble friend has not done so, either to the regulations or to the mistakes, but I can say this: that the Amendment is, in substance, an attempt to allow the making of late claims on behalf of a particular group of persons who failed to make a claim. I say no more than that. The position arose in this way. The cases in question relate to war-damaged land which would have qualified for a cost of works payment under the War Damage Act had the owners been permitted to rebuild. It was known when the 1947 Act came into force that the local authority proposed to acquire the land and they have since done so. Under Section 53 of the 1947 Act the price which the owner of a war-damaged property qualifying for a cost of works payment receives from the acquiring authority represents the value which that property would have for its existing use if all the damage had been made good. He has therefore no further right to any war damage payment, and the payment under the War Damage Act is converted into a value payment which goes to the acquiring authority. The purpose of Section 59 was to enable payments to be made to supplement value payments under the War Damage Act in cases where the amount of the value payment had been depressed because of the presence of development value in the damaged land. I am sure that examples occur to your Lordships.

That was the purpose of Section 59. The provisions of Section 59 are wide enough to cover converted value payments, and the scheme as made does cover cases where a cost of works payment was converted, at the owner's wish, into a value payment. The scheme does not cover converted value payments arising from compulsory acquisition, and there was no reason why the owners of these properties should have expected to benefit under it. As has already been seen, the converted value payment belongs to the acquiring authority. So long as the properties remained with the original owners they qualified for a cost of works payment. At no stage had those owners any interest in the value payment, and it was hardly likely that they would benefit under a scheme designed to supplement value payments. Unfortunately they jumped to the conclusion that because the Section 59 scheme could, however inappropriately, cover these converted value payments, it would do so, and they failed even to make a precautionary claim on the £300 million fund. Failure to claim in good time is always regrettable, but I hope that this explanation, which I have gone into in detail, of the basis without going into facts or locality, will convince the Committee that the case for aiding this category of "non-claimants" is neither stronger nor weaker than that for aiding "non-claimants" in general, a case which this House has observed. I am sorry not to be able to help my noble friend, especially in view of all the assistance that he has given to this House on the Bill, but I could not manage to stretch the Bill so far.

LORD HYLTON

I regret to hear what the noble and learned Viscount says, because these people have been put in a most difficult position. As I understand it, the difficulty is that the regulations governing the clause under which application was to be made were produced at such a late date that it was too late for them to change Clause 58. However, I cannot press the matter any further. There are people suffering great loss from the circumstances of the case. I hope that some way will be found of giving them some redress.

EARL BATHURST

I should like to support the noble Lord, Lord Hylton. This is a most complicated case, about which I know the noble and learned Viscount has the full facts. It has been brought forward to your Lordships' House by an association which represents many hundreds, in fact thousands, of landowners or property owners, most of whom own just a few cottages, largely in the North Country.

Some of the people who are affected by this particular case are very hard hit indeed. In fact, one is an almost disastrous case comparable to that of Mr. Pilgrim, about which we have heard. Unfortunately (or fortunately, I suppose, for him), this man has not taken the same method of publicising the injustices which may occur through the complications of such measures as this Bill, the principal Act and all the rigmarole that goes with it.

The mistake, if indeed it is a mistake, has arisen. Whether or not it is a justifiable mistake, nevertheless it has arisen, and with a firm who are of the highest repute. If that can happen in this particular case, what more may happen in cases where somebody has not been able to take advantage of those who are supposed to know the ins and outs of such regulations? I beg Her Majesty's Government to endeavour to make some form of concession to alleviate such cases as this. It is apparently possible to change from Section 58 to Section 59. It would seem just in this particular case, which is only a small case in terms of cash but a most vital one in terms of hardship and welfare to those people concerned, that Her Majesty's Government should consider making it possible to change these cases to be studied under Section 59 back to Section 58. I strongly support the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, in this matter.

On Question, Amendment negatived.

Clause 57, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 58 agreed to.

11.6 p.m.

LORD MANCROFT moved, after Clause 58 to insert the following new clause:

Applications for permission for industrial development

".—(1) Where, after the commencement of this Act, an application is made to a local planning authority for permission to develop land by the erection thereon of an industrial building, being an application which would, apart from this section, be of no effect by virtue of subsection (4) of section fourteen of the principal Act (which provides that certain applications for such permission shall be of no effect unless it is certified by the Board of Trade that the development in question can be carried out consistently with the proper distribution of industry), the local planning authority shall consider whether, if the requirements of the said subsection (4) had been satisfied, they would nevertheless have refused the permission sought by the application either as respects the whole or as respects part of the land to which the application relates; and if they are of opinion that they would so have refused that permission, they shall serve on the applicant a notice in writing to that effect.

(2) Where a notice has been served under the preceding subsection as respects the whole or part of any land, the provisions of this Act and of sections nineteen and twenty of the principal Act, and, where by virtue of the preceding provisions of this subsection a direction has been given under subsection (3) of section twenty-six of this Act, the other provisions of the principal Act, shall have effect as respects that land or that part thereof as if the application had been of effect and permission had been refused.

The noble Lord said: The purpose of this new clause has already been mentioned by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor in connection with the Amendment moved by the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, to Clause 16—that is Amendment No. 28. The effect of the clause is that, though the provisions of Section 14 (4) of the 1947 Act will remain unaltered, an owner of land will be able to obtain what is, for compensation purposes, the equivalent of a refusal of planning permission. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— After Clause 58, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clauses 59 to 61 agreed to.

Clause 62 [Dissolution of Central Land Board]:

LORD MANCROFT

Both the Amendments to Clause 62 are either drafting or consequential. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 76, line 43, leave out ("the date of the making of") and insert ("such date as may be specified in").

Page 77, line 8, at end insert— ("(4) On the dissolution of the Central Land Board by an Order in Council under this section, sections two and three of the principal Act (which relate to that Board) shall cease to have effect.")—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 62, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 63 agreed to.

Clause 64 [General provisions as to calculation of value]:

LORD MANCROFT

This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 79, line 39, at end insert— ("(2) Where, for the purposes of any of the provisions of this Act, a value falls to be calculated by reference to the duration of a tenancy, and by reason of any option or other contractual right with respect to the determination, renewal or continuance of the tenancy, the date of expiration of the tenancy is not ascertainable with certainty, that date shall be taken to be such as appears reasonable and probable having regard to the interests of the party by whom the option is exercisable or in whose favour the right operates and to any other material considerations subsisting at the time when the calculation of the value falls to be made."—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 64, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 65 (Provisions as to mortgages, settlements, ecclesiastical property, &c.]:

LORD MANCROFT

The regulations to be made under Clause 65 will provide for diverting to the mortgagee any compensation due in respect of depreciation in the value of the mortgagor's interest caused by planning restrictions, if the mortgage was entered into before July 1, 1948, or after the Bill comes into operation. In cases where the mortgage extends only to part of the land in which the mortgagor's interest subsists it seems right that the amount diverted should be limited to that part of the total compensation which relates to the mortgaged land. The clause as drafted would not permit regulations to be made in this sense. The Amendment which I now move gives the necessary powers.

Amendment moved— Page 80, line 1, leave out from ("compensation") to ("thereof") and insert ("or any part thereof is to be paid and as to the application of any such payment or compensation or any part").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

Clause 65 already empowers the making of regulations to divert compensation due to the owner of an interest subject to a rentcharge to the owner of that rentcharge. This Amendment is necessary to provide for consequential reduction in the amount of the rentcharge and for reference of any disputes to the Lands Tribunal. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 80, line 10, at end insert— ("and any such regulations may, in a case where any payment or compensation, or any part thereof, is by virtue of those regulations to be paid to the owner of a rentcharge, apply all or any of the provisions of section twenty-five of the War Damage Act, 1943 (which relates to the rights of owners of rentcharges as to payments for war damage), subject to such adaptations and modifications as may be prescribed by the regulations and may provide for disputes arising under the regulations so far as they relate to rentcharges to be referred to the Lands Tribunal for determination by that Tribunal").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

This is a drafting Amendment. The revised version makes explicit reference to the relevant provisions. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 80, line 23, leave out from ("the") to end of line 27 and insert ("payment of any sum recoverable under section thirty, forty-one, forty-six or fifty-seven of this Act").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 65, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 66 agreed to.

Clause 67 [Provisions as to regulations]:

LORD MANCROFT

This is a drafting Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 81, line 26, leave out lines 26 to 28—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 68:

Interpretation

"valuable consideration" does not include marriage or a nominal consideration;

LORD MANCROFT

This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 82 line 11, at end insert— ("'compensation on the basis of existing use' means compensation with respect to the assessment of which the following provisions apply, that is to say, the provisions of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, as modified by sections fifty-one, fifty-three and fifty-four of the principal Act, not being compensation calculated on the basis of equivalent reinstatement or on the basis of prevailing use and excluding any compensation for disturbance or for severance or injurious affection;").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

This definition is required, in particular, in connection with the amended Clause 32 of the new Schedule which goes with it. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 83, line 17, at end insert— ("'rentcharge' includes any annual sum charged on land, not being rent incident to a reversion;").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

11.12 p.m.

LORD MILNER OF LEEDS moved, in the definition of "valuable consideration," to omit "or a nominal consideration." The noble Lord said: My noble friend Lord Rathcreedan wishes me to apologise for the fact that he has been compelled to leave the Committee, and I now beg to move the Amendment standing in his name. This again is an Amendment to which the Law Society attach some little importance. They are not happy about the definition of "valuable consideration." Does it include "nominal consideration"? The latter term, so far as I am aware, has no definite meaning in law, and it appears to the Law Society that this definition does more harm than good. It throws doubt on what is meant by the term "valuable consideration," which is an expression well known to the law and is otherwise quite clear. This Amendment proposes as the definition "'Valuable consideration' does not include marriage." I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 83, line 35, leave out from ("marriage") to end of line 36.—(Lord Milner of Leeds.)

LORD MANCROFT

If the noble Lord's Amendment is accepted, surely it will look a little odd, apart from the meaning in the draft, to have a mere statement that "'valuable consideration' does not include marriage." It may need further explanation in the definition clause of the Bill. I admit that the words "or a nominal consideration" do not greatly add to the content of the definition, but it is felt wiser to avoid possible doubt by keeping them in. The point was discussed at great length on Committee stage in another place, and both sides then agreed that a definition of "valuable consideration" was necessary and ought in terms to exclude nominal consideration. It is not a very important point and there is not very much between the two forms, but I should prefer to see the wording left as it now is. If the Law Society feel very strongly about the matter I will look at it again, but I have been carefully through the debates in another place and I have listened to what the noble Lord has said, in abbreviated form, today, and I am not convinced that his Amendment will improve the definition.

LORD MILNER OF LEEDS

Would the noble Lord be good enough to give me a definition of "nominal consideration"?

LORD MANCROFT

That I could not do, as the noble Lord well knows. Nobody could be expected to tackle that; there is not time for it. We will bear that difficulty in mind. I think the definition as it now stands is liable to cause less confusion than it would be if the words which the noble Lord wants taken out were in fact removed.

LORD MILNER OF LEEDS

Do I understand that the noble Lord will have another look at this? It seems absurd to include "nominal consideration" when the noble Lord cannot give me any definition of that term. "Valuable consideration" one can get a definition of. I remember it from my student days. There was something about a canary and a tomtit—I forget the precise definition. But it does seem absurd to include in an interpretation clause that the term "valuable consideration" does not include marriage or a nominal consideration. It is obvious that it does not include a nominal consideration, and there is no necessity to mention "nominal consideration" because no one can give a definition of it. I should have thought that the Government would be well advised to accept the Amendment.

LORD MANCROFT

It is not merely "nominal consideration" it is "a nominal consideration." I have told the noble Lord that I cannot give him a definition: it is like an elephant—it is difficult to define, but you know it when you see it. "Nominal consideration" can be very difficult in a variety of circumstances. There are some considerations which may be big in figures but still merely nominal. Because of the uncertainty, I think it is as well to keep the wording as it is, thereby showing what the draftsman has in mind.

LORD SILKIN

I should have thought that in the circumstances the Amendment is necessary, but apparently the noble Lord thinks it unnecessary. It sounds rather odd to say that "'valuable consideration' does not include marriage or a nominal consideration." The noble Lord's view seems to be that the words add nothing but do no harm.

LORD MANCROFT

I think they help.

LORD SILKIN

I thought the noble Lord said they do no harm. But if they have no legal significance I wonder whether it is necessary to have a definition of "valuable consideration". It is a term which is well understood in legal language; it has been the subject of many judicial decisions. When you talk about "valuable considerations" you know where you are. I agree there is a point with regard to marriage, but cannot that be inserted in one of the clauses dealing with "valuable consideration"? I suggest that this point is worth looking at and that, rather than have words which do not mean a thing, but which, according to the Law Society, will create difficulties, it would be better to leave out these words. Of course, I know that if we were to content ourselves with discussions in another place there would be no need for us to be sitting here at 11.15 p.m. Your Lordships may nevertheless think that, even after the discussions in another place, we can still improve the Bill. I think this is a case in which we can improve it.

LORD MANCROFT

I should not dream of suggesting that merely because the matter has been discussed in another place we should not discuss it here, even at seventeen minutes past eleven. Of course, I will look at it again to see what the difficulty is as the Law Society sees it. Having looked at the Report of the debate in another place, having listened to the noble Lords who have spoken, and having had a little experience of construing "nominal" and "valuable consideration" I am still not convinced, but I will see whether the draftsmen cannot reconsider it again.

LORD MILNER OF LEEDS

I am obliged to the noble Lord, and on that understanding I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD MANCROFT

The next Amendment is drafting. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 85, line 10, leave out ("the making of a contract") and insert ("an option are references to an option in writing or attested as aforesaid; and references to the making of a contract or to the grant of an option").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

The next Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 85, line 13, leave out lines 13 and 14.—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 68, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 69 agreed to.

Clause 70 [Minor and consequential amendments, and repeals]:

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment adds Sections 54 and 89 of the 1947 Act to the provisions in relation to which the Third Schedule of that Act is to have effect in its unamended form. Both sections relate to requisitioned land and their effect, so far as material, is that for the purpose of finding the existing use value and the restricted value of an interest in such land, references in the Third Schedule to the appointed day should be construed as references to the beginning of the period of requisition. It would be wrong for this transposition of date to be affected by the Amendments being made in the Schedule. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 86, line 23, leave out from first ("of") to end of line 26 and insert ("the following provisions of that Act, that is to say section fifty-four (which relates to the assessment of compensation for the compulsory acquisition of requisitioned land), section sixty-one (which relates to the ascertainment of development values), section sixty-nine (which relates to development charges) and subsection (1) of section eighty-nine (which relates to the calculation of the development value of requisitioned land).")—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 70, as amended, agreed to.

Remaining clause agreed to.

First Schedule [Modifications of provisions of principal Act as to development value]:

LORD MANCROFT

Paragraph 4 of the Schedule is concerned to remedy anomalies arising from the fact that the compulsory purchase provisions of the Act came into operation almost a year before the appointed date. Claims on the £300 million fund were assessed by a reference to the state of the land on the appointed day, and if the acquiring authority had constructed buildings or carried out works before that date, a false assessment of the development value in the erstwhile owner's interest would result. Provisions were inserted in Section 91 of the 1947 Act to meet this difficulty, but they provide for only some of the cases and it has been found necessary to extend them by paragraph 4 of the Schedule. As at present drafted, that paragraph was confined to cases where services have been provided and buildings begun but not completed. It has now been discovered that in some cases houses were completed before the appointed day, and the paragraph has to be extended to cover that point. That is the purpose of the Amendment, which I now beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 88, line 45, leave out ("begun but not completed") and insert ("carried out").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment is little more than drafting. The present wording implies that the work of redetermination cannot be done until an occasion for payment arises. The Amendment puts that right. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 90, line 49, leave out from ("shall") to ("be") in line 50.—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

First Schedule agreed to.

Second Schedule [Claims pledged to Central Land Board as security for development charges]:

LORD MANCROFT moved in Paragraph 1 to insert after subparagraph (1)— ("(2) All pledges of claim holdings to the Central Land Board made by the same person, whether or not made at the same time, other than any pledge to which sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 of this Schedule applies, shall for the purposes of this Schedule be treated collectively as a single pledge made at the time when the last of those pledges was made. (3) Where a development charge covered by a pledge to the Central Land Board was determined in respect of land which constitutes the whole or part of the area of a claim holding not comprised in the pledge, being a holding of which the holder is the person who would, apart from the pledge, be liable to pay the unpaid balance of the development charge, then, for the purposes of this Schedule, that claim holding shall be deemed to be comprised in the pledge.")

The noble Lord said: This Amendment has two purposes. Both of them are important in connection with what was known as the builders' near-ripe scheme. As noble Lords may recall, this was an arrangement under which builders were promised that certain of their claims on the £300 million fund would be met in full, and were allowed to pledge them to the Central Land Board and then use them as a kind of credit against which development charges could be debited. The proposed new subparagraph is intended to simplify the application of the Schedule to cases coming under this scheme. It happens with the builders' near-ripe scheme, as with ordinary banking accounts, that the paying-in, or in this case the pledging, was not done all at one and the same time, any more than the process of drawing out or debiting. It was a running account. It will be much easier, however, to apply the Schedule in this sort of case if the Central Land Board can proceed as if all the pledging of claims by any one person had been done at one and the same time. That is what the Amendment seeks to effect.

The new subparagraph is designed to meet a point which can be most easily explained by a simple example. Suppose a builder owns two fields—Blackacre and Whiteacre. The claim for Blackacre is pledged to the Board under this near-ripe scheme, and then Whiteacre is developed and the development charge debited against the claim on Blackacre. The result is that Whiteacre, which has been built on and is never likely for that reason to be the subject of a compensation payment, will have a substantial unexpended balance, while Blackacre, which is bare land, will have little or none. Obviously it would be much better for all concerned if the claim on Whiteacre could be used to meet the development charge, so that Blackacre, the undeveloped land, could have an unexpended balance. That is what this subparagraph does. It deems the claim on Whiteacre to have been pledged as well as that on Blackacre—assuming, of course, that the same man still owns it—and then the remainder of the schedule will ensure that the claim on Whiteacre, the land that was developed, is used up before that on Blackacre is touched. I think your Lordships will agree that that is an ingenious and satisfactory solution of a rather difficult problem. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 91, line 28, at end insert the said subparagraphs.—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

The next Amendment is drafting. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 92, line 25, leave out from ("where") to ("and") in line 26 and insert ("a pledge to the Central Land Board comprised one or more claim holdings").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

11.26 p.m.

LORD MANCROFT moved to leave out paragraphs 4 and 5 and insert: ("4. Where a pledge to the Central Land Board comprised only a single claim holding with an area of which every part either consisted of, or formed part of, the land in respect of which some development charge covered by the pledge was determined, and the last preceding paragraph does not apply, the unpaid balance of the development charge covered by the pledge, or, if more than one, the aggregate of the unpaid balances of all the development charges covered by the pledge, shall be deducted from the value of the holding, and the value of that holding shall be deemed to have been reduced accordingly as from the time of the pledge.

5.—(1) The provisions of this paragraph shall have effect in the case of a pledge of one or more claim holdings to the Central Land Board to which neither of the two last preceding paragraphs applies.

(2) Any claim holding comprised in the pledge with an area of which every part either consisted of, or formed part of, the land in respect of which some development charge covered by the pledge was determined shall he allocated to the development charge in question or, if more than one, to those development charges collectively.

(3) Any claim holding comprised in the pledge with an area part of which did, and part of which did not, consist of, or form part of, such land as aforesaid shall be treated as if, at the time of the pledge, the claim holding (in this sub-paragraph referred to as 'the parent holding') had been divided into two separate claim holdings, that is to say—

1. (a) a claim holding with an area consisting of so much of the area of the parent holding as consisted of, or formed part of, such land as aforesaid and with a value equal to that fraction of the value of the parent holding which then attached to that part of the area of the parent holding; and
2. (b) a claim holding with an area consisting of the residue of the area of the parent holding and with a value equal to that fraction of the value of the parent holding which then attached to the residue of the area of the parent holding,

and the claim holding referred to in head (a) of this sub-paragraph shall be allocated to the development charge in question, or, if more than one, to those development charges collectively.

(4) Paragraph 3 or 4 of this Schedule shall then apply in relation to each claim holding, if any, allocated in accordance with the last two preceding sub-paragraphs to any development charge, or to any development charges collectively, as if the pledge had comprised only that claim holding and had covered only that development charge or those development charges.

(5) If after the application of the preceding provisions of this paragraph there remains outstanding any claim holding not allocated in accordance with those provisions, or any claim holding so allocated which has been reduced in value but not extinguished, an amount equal to the aggregate of—

1. (a) the unpaid balance of any development charge covered by the pledge to which no claim holding was allocated as aforesaid; and
2. (b) the amount, if any, by which the value of any claim holding allocated as aforesaid which is deemed to have been extinguished falls short of the unpaid balance of the development charge, or the aggregate of the unpaid balances of the development charges, to which it was so allocated,

shall be deducted from the value of the claim holding so remaining outstanding, or, if more than one, shall be deducted rateably from the respective values of those claim holdings, and the value of any such holding shall be deemed to have been reduced accordingly as from the time of the pledge.")

The noble Lord said: This Amendment is connected with the Amendment already made to Clause 49 (4), Amendment No. 111. Paragraphs (4) and (5) of the Schedule are, as your Lordships will possibly have noticed, somewhat complicated, even in their proposed new dress, but the underlying principle is perfectly simple. It is, in fact, the principle which emerges from the example which I ventured to give your Lordships on the last Amendment but one. It is roughly that when a development charge or charges are being met in this way by deduction from one or more claim holding, so far as possible each charge shall be deducted from each claim holding or part of a claim holding appropriate to the land developed. This is achieved in the Schedule by a process of allocation; to each development charge is allocated the claim holding related to the claim developed.

Where only part of the area of a holding was developed, the holding is to be split into two so as to produce a separate holding for the area developed and then that holding is allocated to the development charge. When each development charge has been met so far as possible from its allocated holding, anything still outstanding is to be recovered by a proportionate deduction from all the remaining holdings. That is as the Schedule stands. It has, however, been found to involve a good deal of unnecessary work where a whole succession of development charges has been incurred in respect of land in the area of the same holding. It could, for instance, mean a separate calculation in respect of each house in a road. This can be avoided, without sacrificing the underlying principle, by aggregating all the charges in respect of land in the same holding area and then doing one sum in respect of the aggregate of those charges. That is the sense of this Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 92, line 33, leave out paragraphs 4 and 5 and insert the said new paragraphs.—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Second Schedule, as amended, agreed to.

Third and Fourth Schedules agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

The next Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— After the Fourth Schedule, insert the following new Schedule: