Lords Sitting of 1 November 1954

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers

  TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING BILL
  2.35 p.m.
  Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do resolve itself into Committee on the Bill.
  Moved, That the House do resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I do not know whether or not I am in order in saying a few words on this Motion, but perhaps I may have the indulgence of the House, as I think it may save some time if I say now what I have in mind and it will preclude the necessity of my saying it on the various Amendments to be moved. I should like to point out that the Bill which we are going to discuss is a very different Bill from the one originally introduced. From the Marshalled List of Amendments it appears that probably four out of every five clauses are being amended by the Government. I venture to say that there is hardly a single clause which will not have been amended at some time in the progress of the Bill since it was first introduced in another place. There are 161 Amendments on the Marshalled List, of which 119 are Government Amendments. I mention this point, not necessarily to make any complaint, because the Government are entitled to produce the best Bill they can, but as indicating the enormous complexity of the subject and the difficulty of drafting.
  There are two things that I should like to say on the difficulty of drafting. Some of us, without the assistance of the Parliamentary draftsmen, have tried our own hands at drafting Amendments. In view of the difficulties which the Parliamentary
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  draftsmen have themselves found in getting the right language, I hope that the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor will be tolerant of the Amendments that we have put down, and will not make capital of the fact that some of them are badly worded, as I am sure they are. In some cases we have put down Amendments, not because we expect them to be accepted in the form in which they have been put down (and this is what I feel is worth while saying at this stage, rather than on each Amendment) but in order to raise an issue, and perhaps in the end to get some compromise or agreement that the matter will be reconsidered before the next stage. For instance, in some cases where we have moved to delete a paragraph or a subsection, we realise that, strictly speaking, we ought to have put something in its place. We have not found it possible to do that: first, for the reason that I have already given; and also owing to lack of time, because we have had so little time in which to handle this matter.
  The only other thing I want to say—and I hope the noble and learned Viscount will not mind my saying it—is that I hope the fact that there are so many Government Amendments on the Marshalled List will not preclude those Amendments which are put forward by other noble Lords from being adequately and sympathetically considered, in so far as they are worthy of consideration. On the Second Reading I made the point as forcibly as I could that this Bill contained a large number of anomalies. The reply of the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, to that, as I understood it, was: "I agree that there are anomalies, but the Bill would have to be very much longer than it is if we tried to remove all the anomalies." I do not mind having a longer Bill if that is necessary to do justice and to be fair in respect of the people for whom we are legislating. I hope that the reason for refusing an Amendment will not be the difficulty of drafting, or the fact that the Bill may become even longer than it is. Having unburdened myself in that way, it will not be necessary for me to say this all over again in the case of each separate Amendment, and certainly not to apologise for the inadequacy of the language of some of the Amendments which we propose to move.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I hope your Lordships will bear with me if I say a word or two in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. The first thing I would say is that I am sure the whole House is grateful to him for what he has just said. With regard to the number of Amendments, there is, at any rate, the consolation that nobody can say that the Government are not recognising the importance, in their view, of your Lordships' House as a Revising Chamber. On the second point, I hasten to assure the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that this afternoon, and indeed, at every stage of the Bill, we shall look at the substance of his Amendments, and we shall not allow ourselves to be deflected, nor shall we take debating points as to the drafting. We appreciate the difficulty of every noble Lords who is in a private position and has not the advantage of the Parliamentary draftsmen, and I assure the noble Lord that he need have no fears on that point. With regard to the other point that he made, I can only assure him of this: that everything he says this afternoon, and every Amendment he moves, will be most carefully considered and regarded, and I hope that at the end of the day he will feel that sympathy was not lacking.
  On Question, Motion agreed to: House in Committee accordingly.
  [The EARL OF DROGHEDA in the Chair]
  Clause 1 [Payments by reference to established claims]:
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is a drafting Amendment, but as it is designed to rectify an obvious mistake may I just say one or two words upon it? The intention is that the modifications set out in the First Schedule to the Bill should affect all claims on the £300 million fund, whether or not the claims have already been determined. The calculations have, in fact, already been made and in many cases agreed with those concerned. The modifications in the basis of assessment for claims laid down in Part VI of the 1947 Act are necessary to remove inconsistencies and anomalies which experience has brought to light. With one exception they affect only a small handful of cases. The exception is paragraph 10 of the Schedule, which is designed, as noble Lords opposite will no doubt have realised, to implement an undertaking given in December, 1950, by the then
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  Chancellor of the Exchequer, that Rule 3 of the Rules specified in Section 2 of the Acquisition of Land Act, 1919, would be disregarded in assessing claims in respect of extension land held with industrial and commercial buildings. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 3, line 24, leave out from ("been") to ("that") in line 25 and insert ("if those provisions had at that time had effect in relation thereto,").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 2 [Claim holdings, their areas and values, and apportionment of values between parts of areas]:
  LORD MANCROFT: This is also a drafting Amendment. It has been represented that the words in the Bill which it is proposed to replace are inadequate as a description of the scope of the Second and Third Schedules. I will not weary the Committee by attempting to describe the Second and Third Schedules, with which you are doubtless familiar, but I submit that the new Amendment goes a long way to meet that difficulty. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 3, line 46, leave out from ("for") to end of line 2 in page 4 and insert ("treating the claim holding as divided into two or more claim holdings and extinguishing any of those holdings or reducing the value thereof").—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: This again is a drafting Amendment. Its object is to make clear beyond doubt that, for the purposes of Part I of the Bill, the value of a claim holding is its value after the operation of the Second and Third Schedules to which I have referred. As your Lordships know, these two Schedules refer to dates before the commencement of the Act although, of course, they are variable. I think this is a tidier way of dealing with the matter. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 6, line 14 at end insert—
  ("(5) References in this Part of this Act, other than in this section, to the value of a claim holding are references to the value of that holding immediately before the commencement of this Act.")—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 3 [Payment where development charge incurred by claim-holder or person from whom he derives title (Case A)]:
  LORD MANCROFT: This Amendment is designed to remove a slight anomaly—one of the anomalies to which the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, referred just now and to which I referred on Second Reading. The anomaly is in Clause 3. As subsection (1) stands, a holder of a claim holding is, by virtue of paragraph (b), entitled to a payment if he is the owner of an interest in any land covered by the holding and a development charge was incurred in respect of that land by a person from whom he derives title to that interest. The normal case will be where a previous owner of the freehold paid development charge and the present owner bought both land and claim from him. As the clause now stands, the latter would be entitled to a payment in the same way as the previous owner would have been. There may, however, be cases where the development charge was paid by a lessee, who subsequently surrendered his lease and assigned his claim to the freeholder. The Amendment provides that in such cases the freeholder will similarly be entitled to a payment under the clause. I think that is obviously equable, and I hope that the Committee will agree to it. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 6, line 44, at end insert ("or whose interest has subsequently become merged in that interest").—(Lord Mancroft.)
  LORD SILKIN: I do not rise for the purpose of objecting to this Amendment, but of expressing some surprise that it should have occurred to the Government only at this late stage in the Bill that this kind of case has to be provided for. I see that there are scattered through the Bill a considerable number of Amendments on this question of merger, and I wonder why this point, which seems an elementary one, was not thought of during the stages in another place and was not incorporated in the large number of drafting Amendments moved on the Report stage there. I do not know whether the noble Lord who moved this Amendment can tell me this, but it is a matter of great surprise to me: What would have happened if there had been no House of Lords?
  LORD MANCROFT: The noble Lord has taken the words right out of my
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  mouth. I cannot tell him why the point was not thought of before. Perhaps this is the first opportunity of putting the matter right. I cannot answer his question, but I can echo strongly his sentiments—how lucky we are to have the House of Lords to put it right!
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 3, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 4 agreed to.
  Clause 5 [Payment where land compulsorily acquired or sold at price wholly or partly excluding development value (Case B)]:
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after subsection (6), to insert:
  "(7) Where an interest in land is the subject of a compulsory acquisition or sale such as is mentioned in subsection (3) of this section and—

  (a) on or after the first day of July, nineteen hundred and forty-eight, but before the date of the compulsory acquisition or sale, another interest had become merged with that interest otherwise than by effluxion of time; and

  (b) the person entitled to the interest compulsorily acquired or sold was at the date of the compulsory acquisition or sale entitled to a claim holding or claim holdings which related to either or each of the merged interests,

  this section shall apply as if those interests had not merged but had been separately acquired from or sold by the person entitled to the interest acquired or sold; and the compensation payable in respect of the compulsory acquisition or, as the case may be, the sale price shall be treated as apportioned between those interests accordingly:
  Provided that nothing in this subsection shall prejudice the operation of the proviso to subsection (4) of the next following section."
  The noble and learned Viscount said: This is the first of a group of Amendments designed to allow for the possibility of a merger of interests having taken place between July 1, 1948, the date by reference to which claims on the £300 million fund were made, and the date of the transaction in respect of which payment should be made. For your Lordships' information, the other Amendments are on page 13, line 16, page 15, line 11, and page 17, line 10. Your Lordships will appreciate that entitlement to a payment under Clause 5 depends on the owner of a claim holding having sold the interest in land to which

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  the holding related for a consideration wholly or partly excluding development value. This essential condition cannot be satisfied where two interests existed on the appointed day but had merged prior to the transaction—for example as a result of the surrender of a lease—because the claim holding or holdings will relate to the interests which existed on the appointed day. In addition, the formula in subsection (4) for calculating the amount payable will not function properly.
  The Amendment seeks to overcome these difficulties by providing, in effect, that for the purposes of the clause the two interests shall be assumed to have continued to exist separately, though both in the ownership of the actual owner, and to have been separately sold by him at the time of the actual sale. The compensation or price notionally received for each interest is to be found by apportioning the compensation or price actually received between the two interests. If the erstwhile owner owns a claim holding in respect of both the original freehold and the leasehold, he will, of course, be able to claim in respect of both. I think Perhaps this Amendment does, belatedly, the noble Lords opposite might say, deal with a point which required to be dealt with, and I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 10, line 30, at end insert the said subsection.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is a drafting Amendment, but I think it would be convenient if I drew your Lordships' attention to the fact that cases where the consideration on a sale of land took the form wholly or in part of a rent-charge are covered by Clause 10 of the Bill, as proposed to be amended to-day, and should therefore be excluded from the present clause. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 10, line 45, at end insert—
  ("(9) Without prejudice to section ten of this Act, paragraph (b)) of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply in relation to a sale in consideration wholly or partly of a rentcharge").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 5, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 6 [Supplementary provisions relating to compulsory acquisitions and to sales]:
  LORD MANCROFT LORD MANCROFT moved, in the proviso to subsection (2), after "forty-eight" to insert:
  "and at the date of the sale the development specified in the certificate had not been completed."
  The noble Lord said: This Amendment and the next, which marches with it, are little more than drafting. The definition of "restricted value" in subsection (2) provides the norm, the common denominator, by which the payment made in respect of a private sale is to be assessed. Anything already received over and above the restricted value is, under Clause 5, subsection (4), to be deducted from the value of the claim holding in arriving at the sum payable. The purpose of the proviso to subsection (2) is to adapt these provisions to cases where part or the whole of the land sold was the subject of a certificate issued by the Minister, under Section 80 of the 1947 Act, when it was known, in the planner's charming jargon, as "dead-ripe land." The principal effect of such a certificate was that the development specified in it could be carried out free of development charge, and the corresponding development value was excluded from any claim on the £300 million fund. This development charge exemption was something for which the owner would quite properly have been paid by the purchaser, and it is therefore necessary to add the value of the exemption to the restricted value in order to arrive at the amount of the payment properly due.
  The value of the development charge exemption is obviously the amount of the development charge which, but for the exemption, would have been payable in respect of the development specified in the certificate; this is the basis on which the proviso is drafted. But if part of the development had been carried out before the sale, the value of the exemption would be limited to the amount of the charge which would have been payable in respect of the remainder of the development; the value of the completed development would be included in the restricted value. The purpose of the two Amendments to which

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  I have just referred is to modify the proviso in this sense. The whole definition of restricted value affects only private transactions: it does not apply to compulsory acquisition. I hope that this explains the Amendments. I beg to move the first Amendment.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 12, line 12, after ("forty-eight") insert the said words.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  LORD SILKIN: I do not know whether this is the best place in which to raise a point which I want to raise at some stage of the Bill. The noble Lord referred to land to which was attached a certificate under Section 80 of the 1947 Act, dead-ripe land. The question I wanted to ask was in what circumstances does the question of a claim holding arise? I have a note to raise the point on a later Amendment, but it will do just as well on this one. As I understand it, a person who held a dead-ripe certificate was exempt from development charge and normally made no claim. I think perhaps he could have made a claim if he had wanted to, but the whole purpose was that he had no claim if he made it. Therefore it is extremely unlikely, if not impossible, that anyone with a dead-ripe certificate would have an established claim. In those circumstances, assuming that his land had been compulsorily acquired, or that he sold it at a price less than the market value, he would, if he had made a claim, have been entitled to be compensated under Clause 5 of the Bill. But if he has not made a claim how does he get his compensation at all, and where is it provided in the Bill that the person who holds a certificate under Section 80 is entitled to be treated as if he had made a claim?
  LORD MANCROFT: We are not talking about compulsory acquisition here.
  LORD SILKIN: It does not matter, since Clause 5 deals both with compulsory acquisition and with cases where the land was sold at less than its true value. I have been looking at this Bill to see how it deals with the case of a person who has a "dead-ripe" certificate—I hope that I am making myself clear. He could not, in the nature of things have made a claim; therefore he has no established claim. But the whole of this Bill deals with people who have an established claim. How then does he get his com
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  pensation? I can elaborate the point, but it seems to me quite simple, and I should be grateful if the noble Lord, either now or in due course, could give me an answer. If he cannot do it now, he will have an opportunity on a later Amendment. Perhaps I can raise it then. The same point comes up again in a later Amendment.
  LORD MANCROFT: I am much obliged to the noble Lord. I have got his point; I can see what he is driving at. Would he allow me to look into it. I can deal with it better on a later Amendment.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 12, line 20, leave out from first ("of") to ("if") in line 21 and insert ("so much of that development as had not been completed if it had been completed and").—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  3.0 p.m.
  LORD MANCROFT LORD MANCROFT moved to add to subsection (4):
  ("Provided that where the whole or part of any liability or prospective liability which was or, as the case may be, would have been taken into account in calculating that restricted value had ceased to exist before the date of the compulsory acquisition or sale, the Board, or, as the case may be, the Lands Tribunal may, if they think it just and proper so to do, waive in whole or in part, as may appear to them appropriate, any reduction otherwise falling to be made under this subsection.")
  The noble Lord said: This Amendment, I am afraid, is rather technical in its character, as your Lordships will see, but I hope I can say without fear of contradiction that it is one with the object of which, at least, noble Lords opposite will not disagree. Subsection (4) is concerned with cases where the restricted value of land as found under Part VI of the 1947 Act was a minus quantity, or would have been a minus quantity if the land had been the subject of a separate claim. A minus restricted value would result whenever the value of the land restricted to its existing use was less than the rent or other charge to which it was subject. Perhaps I can best illustrate that rather paradoxical situation by attempting an example. Supposing an acre of building land worth, say, £1,000 was let on

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  a long lease at £40 a year. Restricted to agriculture, that land might be worth only £5 a year, in which case the lessee's interest would, on the restricted basis, be a liability to the tune of about £35 a year. Capitalised, that would give a minus restricted value of, say, £700
  One result of the acquisition of the lessee's interest was that he was freed from any further liability to pay the rent. That being so, he ought not to receive any part of his Part VI claim which resulted from the minus restricted value, because that minus value was the result of the now extinct liability. The subsection therefore provides for the amount of the minus to be subtracted from the claim. The erstwhile lessee will they be paid for the positive value of his interest and no more. So far, so good. This provision will not, however, function fairly if the liability which gave rise to the minus restricted value had disappeared, in whole or in part, before the acquisition of the land. Thus the lessee may have surrendered his lease, or the rent may have been reduced. The Amendment proposes to meet this possibility by giving the Central Land Board, and the Lands Tribunal, power to waive the reduction provided for in the subsection so far as appropriate. I cannot imagine that the cases in these circumstances are likely to be very numerous, and, of course, the circumstances may vary widely. I think your Lordships will agree, therefore, that a discretion as provided for here is probably the most economical solution. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 13, line 5, at end insert the said proviso.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Queston, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 6, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 7 [Payment where land disposed of by gift (Case C)]:
  LORD MANCROFT: This Amendment is similar in its object to the one which we have already discussed in connection with Clause 5. It is another one of these merger Amendments. The object is to ensure that a merger of interests which occurred between July 1, 1948, and the date when the gift of land was made shall not disqualify the holder of the relevant claim holding from receiving a payment. The reason why the provision is
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  so much less elaborate than the one which we have already discussed in Clause 5 is that payments on account of gifts are, for obvious reasons, not related to a price already received for the lard. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 13, line 16, after ("related") insert ("or another interest in which that interest had merged").—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: This Amendment is, I think, identical with that which your Lordships have already made to Clause 6 (4)—Amendment No. 9. The reason for it is the same. The gift freed the donor from any liability in respect of rent or other charge attaching to the land just as much as acquisition of the land would have done. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 13, line 43, at end insert:
  ("Provided that where the whole or part of any liability or prospective liability which was or, as the case may be, would have been taken into account in calculating that restricted value had ceased to exist before the date of the disposition in question, the Board or, as the case may be, the Lands Tribunal may, if they think it just and proper so to do, waive in whole or in part, as may appear to them appropriate, any reduction otherwise falling to be made under this subsection.")—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 7, as amended, agreed to.
  Clauses 8 and 9 agreed to.
  Clause 10 [Payments in cases analogous to Case B]:
  LORD MANCROFT: This is another of these merger Amendments. I think no new point arises. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 15, line 11, after ("related") insert ("or another interest in which that interest had merged").(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: Clause 10, as your Lordships realise, is concerned with a number of types of case broadly analogous to those covered, and which we have already discussed, by Clause 5. The second of these is where an interest in land was sold in consideration, not of a capital sum but of a rentcharge. This is a common practice, I think, in some parts of the country (I expect the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, is more familiar with

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  them than I am)—I believe, in Manchester, Liverpool, Cardiff and places like that. There may be cases where the consideration was only partly in the form of a rentcharge, and also where only part of the land in which the vendor's interest subsisted was sold. The Amendment extends the clause to deal with these cases. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 15, line 25, leave out ("in consideration") and insert ("or of that interest in so far as it subsisted in particular land, where the consideration for the sale consisted wholly or partly").—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: This Amendment and the next two, Nos. 15 and 16, are, apart from the point we have just been discussing, of a purely drafting character. Their object is to rearrange the clause on a more logical basis. On that foundation, I am certain that it will meet with your lordships' approval. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 15, line 34, after ("affected") insert ("being damage in respect of which compensation fell, or if the sale had been a compulsory acquisition would have fallen, to be assessed in accordance with the provisions of Part V of the principal Act (which provides for compensation on the basis of existing use value) as applied by subsection (4) of section one hundred and nineteen of that Act").—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: This Amendment is consequential on No. 14. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 15, line 38, at end insert ("being damage in respect of which compensation fell to be assessed in accordance with section two of the Compensation (Defence) Act, 1939, as modified by section ten of the Requisitioned Land and War Works Act, 1948 (which limits the compensation to an amount calculated on the basis of existing use value)").—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: This again is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 16, line 1, leave out from beginning to end of line 25 and insert—
  ("(b) in the case of a sale falling within paragraph (b) of the last preceding subsection, to the capital value of the rentcharge or, as
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  the case may be, to the aggregate consideration represented by the price paid and the capital value of the rentcharge;
  (c) in the case of a compulsory acquisition falling within paragraph (c) of the last preceding subsection or in a case falling within paragraph (d) of that subsection, to the compensation paid or payable in respect of the damage referred to in that paragraph;
  (d) in the case of a sale falling within paragraph (c) of the last preceding subsection, to the sale price in so far as it represented compensation in respect of the damage referred to in that paragraph,").—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 10, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 11 [Residual payments in cases analogous to Cases A and B]:
  LORD MANCROFT: This Amendment is another in the series dealing with cases where there has been a merger of interests since July 1, 1948. No new point of principle arises. I beg to move accordingly.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 17, line 10, at end insert ("or another interest in which that interest had merged.")—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 11, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 12 [Payments not to exceed value of claim holding]:
  LORD MANCROFT: This Amendment also is not really much more than of a drafting character. The purpose of the clause is to ensure that, where two or more payments are due in respect of one claim holding, they are scaled down as may be necessary to ensure that in the aggregate they do not exceed the value of the holding. The clause is not, however, adequate to deal with cases where two or more payments fall to be made in respect of the same part, or of overlapping parts, of the land to which a holding relates, and the Amendment seeks to rectify this. It ensures, I hope, that the aggregate of the payments made under Part I of the Bill in respect of any land cannot exceed the fraction of the value of the claim holding appropriate to that land. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 18, line 43, leave out from beginning to end of clause and insert ("the authority determining the amount of any such payment shall apportion that amount between the different parts of the area of the claim holding in such manner as appears to that authority

  865
  proper, and if the aggregate of the portions of the principal amounts of the respective payments so apportioned to any part of the area of the claim holding would, apart from the provisions of this subsection, exceed the fraction of the value of the claim holding attaching to that part of the area thereof, those portions shall be reduced rateably so that the aggregate of them is equal to the said fraction, and the said principal amounts shall be treated as reduced accordingly.
  (2) Where two or more payments are payable in respect of the same claim holding by virtue of the last preceding section, the aggregate of the principal amounts of those payments shall not exceed the value of the claim holding or, where that value is treated as reduced in accordance with subsection (6) of the last preceding section, that value as so reduced.")—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 12, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 13 [Applications for payments under Part I]:
  3.10 p.m.
  LORD O'HAGAN LORD O'HAGAN moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "three" and insert "twelve." The noble Lord said: In rising to move this Amendment, may I say that I do not do so in opposition to the Bill before the Committee, but because I think it is important that full opportunities and sufficient time should be given for cases to be drawn up and submissions to be made after the inquiries and careful verifications that are obviously necessary in dealing with a matter of this sort. Three months is a very short time in view of the considerations that arise from this part of the Bill, and I would therefore venture to suggest that the period be extended to twelve months, as is mentioned in the Amendment standing in my name. I hope Her Majesty's Government will take this point into consideration. To a great many of us here, three months is a quite inadequate length of time for the preparation of cases. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 19, line 15, leave out ("three") and insert ("twelve").—(Lord O'Hagan.)
  LORD SILKIN: I should like to support the principle of this Amendment, although I think that even twelve months is inadequate. I personally do not understand why there need be any particular time limit at all. It is not so much the difficulty of preparing a claim—the claim has been agreed, and I imagine that in most cases, apart from cases where the character of the holding has changed, it
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  is just a matter of writing to the Central Land Board and notifying them of the claim. The difficulty is really with the inertia of the general public. Anybody who had anything to do with claims under the 1947 Act would know how lax the public is to respond to a request to put in claims, even when they know it is in their own interests that they should do so. The Committee may remember that in the case of the 1947 Act, Sir Malcolm Eve, who was then chairman of the Central Land Board, went round the country begging people to put in claims by a certain date, announcing it on the wireless and publicising it in every possible way; and in spite of that I understand that there will be complaint to-day that a number of people who were entitled to make a claim, did not make it. In those circumstances, whatever time is given, there will be people who will not make a claim, and I wonder whether it is really necessary to have a time limit at all. Most people will put in their claims as quickly as possible, but there will always be a residual number who will be lax—if you gave them twelve months they would still be out of time.
  With great respect to the noble Lord who moved the Amendment, I should have thought that the real solution would be to provide a time—twelve months if you like—but not to make failure to put in a claim within the twelve months an absolute bar as it is at the present time. The Committee will bear in mind that the people with whom we are dealing are people who have established claims. They have worked very hard to get that claim established, as anybody knows who has had to deal with district valuers and to satisfy them of a claim. These people have an established claim; they have suffered loss as a result of having had their land compulsorily acquired or having sold their land at below the market price. They are morally entitled to this compensation, and if, through some oversight on their part, they fail to make a claim, it seems to me quite wrong that they should be for ever barred. I should like to ask the noble and learned Viscount whether he would consider the possibility of accepting the Amendment, but not making it an absolute bar if the claim has not been put in. The Central Land Board should be given discretion, if there are reasons—not overwhelming reasons, but reasonably good

  867
  reasons—even after the period has expired, to allow the claim. I believe that there is a precedent for this in the case of the War Damage Commission. There, again, people were loth to put in claims within a certain period, but the Commission had the discretion to admit claims that were put in late. I think they did eventually have a time limit, but if there were really overwhelming reasons, they were enabled to permit claims even after the expiration of that final time limit. So I hope the noble and learned Viscount will give this point his sympathetic consideration.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I hope that what I have to say will convince my noble friend and meet the point of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. The reason for indicating in the Bill that the regulations may be expected to prescribe a fairly short period—not less than three months—for the submission of applications to the Central Land Board, is that until the Board have made some progress with their payments it is not possible for the Minister to get on with making compensation payments for planning restrictions. I should not like my noble friend to think for a moment that that is merely a matter of ministerial or administrative convenience. The reason is this: that on the structure of the Bill, the effect of Part I payments on the value of claim holdings has to be brought into account before payments can be made under Part V. The point I want to impress on my noble friend is that many of these Part V payments are due to people who have been waiting for several years for their money, and it is plainly incumbent on the Government to ensure that they are made as soon as possible. It is really for that reason, and having in mind the people I have mentioned, that I would ask my noble friend not to press the Amendment on this occasion.
  The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has raised a point on which I am glad to reassure the Committee. Although I hope and believe that the vast majority of persons entitled to payments under Part I will apply well within the three months, I believe, and so do those who have been advising me, that the Board have power to extend the period if there are circumstances which prevent an application. I shall not take up time now, but I will communicate with the noble Lord setting
  868
  out the point in detail. If, after we have communicated, he has still any doubt in the matter, then I shall be pleased to consider it at a later stage. But I am glad to be able to reassure him—and I am sure the Committee is impressed by the point he made—that in our belief it is met. I hope in those circumstances, bearing in mind the people who are affected, that my noble friend will not press his Amendment on this occasion.
  LORD O'HAGAN: I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for the reply he has given. I am afraid he has not persuaded me, and I do not think his remarks will have persuaded many people who study this matter very carefully. It is a thousand pities to have something in the Bill in such form as may prejudice the rights of those who are supposed to derive benefit from it and prevent others from having benefit. I will not press the Amendment to-day but I trust that further consideration will be given to this point, and that at a later stage some alleviation of the obvious difficulties will be effected. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  3.21 p.m.
  LORD AMHERST OF HACKNEY: This Amendment is self-explanatory. It will enable people having a claim under Clause 5 of this Bill (against the £300 million) to charge their proper legal and surveyors' expenses in establishing that claim. They are people who have a justified claim, either because they have had their land compulsorily acquired or have taken note of what the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, advised them at the time and sold their land near to existing use value. My argument is reinforced slightly by the speech made by the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor in moving Amendment No. 5, which showed that the position of a claimant under Clause 5 is not crystal clear and that he will be in need of some legal assistance; therefore, it is only fair that he should be helped. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 19, line 26, at end insert—
  ("(a) for enabling persons entitled to a payment by virtue of section five of this Act to be paid their legal and surveyors' charges for completing an application and supplying particulars and verification of evidence as may in any case be required by the Central Land

  869
  Board and for advising as to the restricted value of the interest."—(Lord Amherst of Hackney.)
  LORD SILKIN: I should like to support this Amendment but, as with the previous Amendment, I am a little surprised at the moderation of the noble Lord in moving it. This is a most difficult measure, one around which I would defy any layman to find his way. Anybody with a claim must get professional advice and assistance and incur fees. Admittedly Clause 5 cases stand out as possibly the strongest examples, but anyone with a claim would be ill-advised to try to negotiate with the Central Land Board without seeking some advice unless his claim is crystal clear—and there are very few like that. If the Government intends to accept the principle of payment of legal and other professional fees, the acceptance should be general; there may be discretion on the part of the Central Land Board to say in a particular case that it is not necessary, but it ought to be much wider than it is in the Amendment moved by the noble Lord.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am grateful to my noble friend for raising this point. I am also glad to hear what the noble Lord opposite has said. It may be useful, especially to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, if I ask your Lordships to consider the analogy with the position under the 1947 Act. The noble Lord opposite will remember that under that Act fees were paid where the claimant's valuer had provided information and expert knowledge of administrative assistance to the Board in assessing the amount of the claim. Again, the noble Lord will have in mind that reliance was placed on a statutory provision in Section 3, subsection (5), enabling administrative expenses incurred by the Board for the purposes of the Act with the approval of the Minister to be defrayed. The noble Lord will also remember that the provision contained the words:
  "Any administrative expenses incurred … shall, to such extent as may be sanctioned by the Treasury, be defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament."
  In this case we consider that, in general, the work of valuation in relation to claims has already been done, and there is not the same service rendered to those
  870
  administering the paying out of compensation as there was under the 1947 Act. But we recognise that there may well be cases (we hope they will be exceptional, but they may exist) where the expert knowledge of a claimant's surveyor or valuer does assist in the settlement of a claim. I do not know whether my noble friend appreciates that in Clause 63 (8) (c) of the Bill we have provided authority to pay the professional fees involved. That clause is in similar terms to the section of the 1947 Act to which I have referred.
  I would add one general word. Under the 1947 Act, as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, knows well, the course of administration resulted in the building up of a policy for paying fees in certain types of cases. He knows it was no insubstantial contribution that was made in that way. I am anxious that we should not make the position less flexible than it was under the 1947 Act. But in paying out public money one has to be careful, and there is scarcely anything more difficult in legislation than defining the types involved and defining them in advance. I would ask noble Lords to believe that often, if one tries to lay down with too much particularity and precision in a Bill, one prevents a common-sense application to certain cases for which it may be difficult—I frankly admit—to find precise justification in the Statute but which are yet well within the spirit of the words your Lordships have approved. I should like to have another look at this problem, in view of what both my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, have said, and in the consideration which I undertake to give it I shall be grateful if noble Lords will care to discuss it with me or my noble friend at any convenient time. It is difficult to give people the rights we desire them to have and at the same time not tie ourselves too much beyond the provision that already justifies such a payment. I would therefore ask my noble friend, on my assurance to consider the matter and my great readiness to discuss it with him, not to press his Amendment at this stage of the Bill but to let us examine it again on the Report stage.
  LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: Would the noble and learned Viscount say where provision is made in Clause 63?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Clause 63, paragraph 8 (c).
  LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: With respect to the noble and learned Viscount, that makes provision for payment out of moneys provided by Parliament
  "to such extent as may be sanctioned by the Treasury"
  of
  "any administrative expenses incurred for the purposes of this Act by the Central Land Board with the approval of the Minister."
  Where is the provision for the claimant?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Under the 1947 Act it was treated as an expense incurred for the purpose of the Central Land Board to pay professional charges to the claimant's advisers. That was what was done and, as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin knows, it was done to a considerable extent. That was why I put to your Lordships, in the guarded language anyone speaking from this Bench must use, that it is a pity sometimes to make your provisions more precise if they have been found to act very well and to deal with the problem when framed in the wider words. I am grateful to Lord Milner of Leeds for raising this point. The fact is that the words were drafted in that way to enable them to be used to a considerable extent. That is why I am reluctant to tie myself until we have considered this matter very carefully.
  LORD SILKIN: Before the noble Lord withdraws his Amendment, as I imagine he will do, I should like to say that, of course, I personally accept what the noble and learned Viscount has said. When he says that he will examine a thing, I know from long experience that he really will do so. It is no mere form of words with him. May I just put this point to him? I do not altogether accept his approach. I wonder whether he would look at the matter again. I think that the words in Clause 63 to which he has drawn attention do enable the Central Land Board to spend the money. I think they can do what he says. But his approach is that these expenses are permissible or justifiable if they help the Central Land Board in the course of their administration. The way I would rather put it—and I believe that the noble Lord who moved the Amendment would agree with this—is that this expense in practice has to be incurred by the citizen who has a claim, whether it helps the Central Land Board or not. He is really forced
  872
  by the intricacies of this Bill to get advice, and it seems only fair that he should be reimbursed in a proper case. If the noble and learned Viscount would look at it from that angle and not merely from the angle of whether or not it helps in the administration of the Central Land Board, then I shall be perfectly satisfied.
  LORD AMHERST OF HACKNEY: In view of the assurances which the noble and learned Viscount has given, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  3.33 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved to leave out all words after the first "Board" in paragraph (c) of subsection (2) down to the end of the subsection, and insert:
  "on determining any such application, to give notice of their findings to the applicant, and, if their findings include an apportionment, to give particulars of the apportionment to any other person entitled to an interest in land which it appears to the Board will be substantially affected by the apportionment."
  The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment brings the provisions of Clause 13 (2) into line with the similar provisions of Clause 28 (1). At present, Clause 13 (2) contains an additional requirement, under which the Central Land Board have to give notice to all concerned of any "proposed apportionment." Your Lordships are aware that "apportionment" is the process of breaking down a claim on the fund, to decide how much relates to a part of the original area of land. It has been found that this additional requirement might, as well as being unnecessary, considerably delay the settlement of claims for payment. In practice, the assessment of what is payable will be carried out by the district valuer in negotiation with those concerned. Your Lordships will see that if the present Clause 13 (2) (c) were preserved, it would be necessary to serve a fresh series of notices whenever the district valuer proposed to vary an apportionment in deference to the arguments put to him. That seems to us to be an unnecessary and a dilatory procedure, because all concerned will be able at a subsequent stage to dispute the district valuer's figures before the Lands Tribunal if they are dissatisfied. That is provided for in Clause 13 (3). Therefore, I suggest that this additional hurdle should be cleared away. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 19, line 33, leave out from ("Board") to end of line 46 and insert the said new words.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: Does the deletion of the words specified in the Amendment mean that there will be no provision for enabling such persons to make representations to the Board with respect to the apportionment? If the noble and learned Viscount's Amendment is carried, it would appear that there will not be any provision in the subsection for enabling persons to make representations. Is that intended?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: At that stage it is intended. Of course they will have both a previous and a subsequent opportunity to deal with it. This is only to cover the case where, as I said, minor amendment is made by the district valuer. It would seem unfortunate if he had to reopen the whole matter at that stage. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds. I will look into the point and if I find any difficulty I will inform your Lordships of it at a later stage.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 13, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 14 agreed to.
  Clause 15 [Effect of payments on claim holdings]:
  LORD MANCROFT: This Amendment is solely in the interests of the purity of language. It is purely drafting, and I think it irons out some of the awkwardness in the existing Bill. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 21, line 32, leave out from ("holding") to ("the") in line 33.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: The next Amendment is consequential on the last one. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 21, line 36, leave out from ("payment") to ("is") in line 37.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: This Amendment is consequential on the one preceding the one which the Committee has just agreed to. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 21, line 41, at end insert—
  ("Provided that if in the case of any claim holding a payment becomes payable under Case D, then, regardless of the amount of that payment, that holding shall for the purposes of the following Parts of this Act be deemed to have been extinguished immediately before the commencement of this Act").—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT LORD MANCROFT moved to leave out subsections (3) and (4) and to insert:
  "(3) Where one or more acts or events have occurred whereby in accordance with the provisions of this Part of this Act one or more payments become payable in respect of a claim holding (in this section referred to as 'the parent holding') and any such act or event did not extend to the whole of the area of the parent holding, then, both for the purposes of the preceding provisions of this section and for the purposes of the following Parts of this Act—

  (a) the parent holding shall be treated as having been divided immediately before the commencement of this Act into as many separate claim holdings, with such areas, as may be necessary to ensure that in the case of each holding either any such act or event as aforesaid extending to the area of that holding extended to the whole thereof or no such act or event extended to the area of that holding;

  (b) the value of each of the separate holdings respectively shall he taken to be that fraction of the value of the parent holding which then attached to the part of the area of the parent holding constituting the area of the separate holding;

  (c) the authority determining the amount of any such payment shall apportion that amount between the areas of the separate claim holdings to which the act or event in question extended in such manner as may appear to that authority proper, and the portion of that amount apportioned to the area of any separate claim holding shall be taken to be a payment payable under this Part of this Act in respect of that claim holding."

  The noble Lord said: This is a slightly different point. The purpose of subsections (3) and (4) of this clause is to ensure that where a payment is made in respect of a claim holding on account of an act or event affecting only part of the area of that holding, it shall be debited against the fraction of the value of the holding appropriate to that part. Thus, if a claim holding relates to two plots and a development charge has been paid for building on one plot, with the result that a payment is made under Clause 3 of the Bill, that payment ought, obviously, to be debited against that part of the claim holding appropriate to the

  875
  land developed, and not against the claim holding as a whole. This is achieved by dividing the holding into two holdings, one relating to the land developed and the other to the remainder, and debiting the payment against the former. This is all right so far as it goes, but the present subsections are not adequate to cover cases where there have been separate payments relating to different but overlapping parts of the area of the claim holding. The revised wording remedies this defect, but, of course, the principle remains exactly the same. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 22, line 1, leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert the said new subsection.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 15, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 16 [Scope of Part II]:
  3.40 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after subsection (2), to insert:
  "(3) Where, on an application for planning permission for the carrying out of new development of land to which this section applies, a planning decision is made after the commencement of this Act whereby that permission is granted (whether unconditionally or not) and the Minister certifies that he is satisfied that particular buildings or works to which the application related were only included therein because the applicant had reason to believe that permission for the other development to which the application related would not have been granted except subject to a condition requiring the erection or construction of those buildings or works, then, for the purposes of this Part of this Act

  (a) the application shall be deemed to have included, in place of those buildings or works, such other development of the land on which the buildings or works were to be erected or constructed as might reasonably have been expected to have been included having regard to the other development to which the application related; and

  (b) the permission shall be deemed to have been granted for the other development to which the application related subject to the condition aforesaid."

  The noble and learned Viscount said: I very much hope that the purpose of this Amendment will commend itself to all your Lordships. Cases have come to light where intending developers, having ascertained that permission would not be granted to build unless a service road was provided, have included the service road in their applications for planning
  876
  permission. As the Bill stands, no compensation would be payable in these cases, because provision of the road was not required by a condition attached to the planning permission. The Amendment is in general terms, since the same thing may happen in other connections. Its effect is that if the Minister is satisfied that the service road, or some similar feature, was included in the application in anticipation of the planning authorities requirements, compensation will be payable in the same way as if it had been required by a condition attached to the permission. It is really an anticipated inevitable condition, and we think that there ought to be compensation in these circumstances. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 23, line 5, at end insert the said subsection.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD SILKIN: I think the noble and learned Viscount is right in saying that the principle of this Amendment will commend itself to the Committee, but I wonder whether he could explain how it will operate. A person makes application to the local planning authority, possibly on information, given privately or otherwise, that if he puts in an application in a certain form he will get permission. He puts in his application in the form suggested and gets permission. Obviously he has no case for appeal because he has been granted exactly what he asked for. How does the Minister get to know of such a case? Does the applicant go along at some later date and say that he has been granted permission for what he asked for, but was induced to ask for something more than he ought to have been asked to do? Virtually, he is appealing against a decision for which he asked.
  Does the noble and learned Viscount contemplate that, having got permission for what he asked for, an applicant will then go to the Minister and suggest that the Minister should step in? There is no machinery laid down for this, and it seems to create a most unsatisfactory relationship between the Minister and the local planning authority, because the only ground for intervening here is that the applicant was induced to make an application, say, to make a service road, but that in some sense it was improper. If

  877
  the Minister comes to the conclusion that he ought to grant relief, that is virtually a serious reflection on the local planning authority for having induced an applicant to put in an application which was improper or unfair or for more than should have done. Therefore, I should be grateful if the noble and learned Viscount would consider how this is going to operate in the normal way. Unless there is an appeal and the Minister gets to know of it, I imagine that the source of information would be the applicant, who has been granted exactly what he asked for. There is no time limit here. While one would certainly wish to remove any hardship that might arise, this way of doing it seems to be somewhat ill-considered and "half-baked," and in any case the machinery needs rather more explanation than the paragraphs in the Amendment.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am sorry that I have not taken the noble Lord with me into legislation, although he assures the Committee that he is with us in spirit. This is essentially a practical problem. It happens in planning, as in many other things, that development is considered a good development so long as an addition, such as the one I suggested, a service road giving access, is made. The person who is providing the development makes a service road and asks permission for the development, which he carries out. We think that is a case that ought to be dealt with, and I confess that the application for the certificate from the Minister, mentioned in the Amendment, did not seem to us a very difficult or serious matter as a matter of procedure. Far less did it appear to be anything that reflected either on the planning authority or the applicant. As it appeared to me, the planning authority would act with common sense in demanding access to the development and the applicant would also act with common sense in seeing that the access was there. In view of the great experience of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in matters of procedure, I am always prepared to look at them again, to see whether any improvement can be made, but I hope that your Lordships will accept this Amendment, because it seems to me that it merely gives what is fair and equitable to the applicant. I should be sorry if, when I come with open hands to provide something for the applicant, your Lordships should not
  878
  accept the gift and should treat me as if I were to be the more suspect when I bring gifts in my hands.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is a drafting Amendment. Your Lordships will remember how the Restriction of Ribbon Development Act was married to the Act of 1947, and that requires this Amendment to be made. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 23, line 16, at end insert ("or by virtue of any regulations made under paragraph 13 of the said Schedule (which relates to certain applications under the Restriction of Ribbon Development Act, 1935)").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  VISCOUNT RIDLEY VISCOUNT RIDLEY moved to add to the clause:
  "(5) Subsection (4) of section fourteen of the principal Act shall be amended to read as if for the words therein 'application the Local Planning Authority for permission' there were substituted the words 'a permission by a Local Planning Authority'."
  The noble Viscount said: This Amendment is an attempt to correct what seems to be a mistake in procedure. Under the present law, the Board of Trade have to supply an industrial development certificate for any factory or industrial building before application for planning permission can be made. That is the meaning of the reference in the Amendment to subsection (4) of Section 14 of the principal Act. I think that is an excellent provision, because the industrial development certificate has been a very useful procedure, but the result, under the Bill now before us, is that the owner of a piece of land who wants to build a factory on it must get a Board of Trade certificate before his application for planning permission becomes valid. And if the Board of Trade do not give him a certificate (though they may be quite right in any particular case), he cannot apply for planning permission, with the result that he cannot be refused planning permission, and therefore, can have no claim for compensation. The intention of this Amendment is to alter the words so that he can apply for planning permission and, having got it, can then get his industrial development certificate, if he is going on building; and if he does not get it, he can be in the category of those who have a refusal and have a right

  879
  to compensation. It may be that my reading of the present arrangement is incorrect and that it is unnecessary to put it right, but I hope that the noble and learned Viscount in charge of the Bill will appreciate that the intention is to put this particular category of people on the same footing as everybody else. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 23, line 28, at end insert the said subsection.—(Viscount Ridley.)
  LORD SILKIN: I am somewhat reassured by the speech of the noble Viscount in support of his Amendment, because I believe that the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor is going to say that among the 161 Amendments there is one which meets his point: that an owner who is not enabled to put up a factory, by virtue of his failure to obtain a Board of Trade certificate, will not be penalised. If that is the only purpose of the Amendment, then I imagine the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley will withdraw it if he is satisfied on that point. But on planning grounds, I am sure it is right that the Board of Trade certificate should come first.
  VISCOUNT RIDLEY: Yes.
  LORD SILKIN: If the noble Viscount agrees about that, then I have no more to say.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has in the most friendly way possible stolen my thunder. I was going to inform my noble friend that the new clause which I propose to move following Clause 58 deals with the point which he has advanced to your Lordships, and, I hope, deals with it adequately. As my noble friend and I are seeking the same objective, although by slightly different ways, I hope that he will not press this Amendment. If he will allow me, I will not go into some of the technical difficulties which his present Amendment presents, but may I assure my noble friend of this: that when we have discussed the new clause after Clause 58, if he is still in any difficulties, I shall be pleased to consider them, either publicly or privately. I hope that, when he has examined the new clause and heard it discussed in Committee, there will not be any difficulty in his mind.
  VISCOUNT RIDLEY: I am obliged to the noble and learned Viscount. While I have not yet had time to read the proposed new clause, I appreciate that the intention is to cover this point, and that is all I am after. I am happy to leave it until then, and beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause 16, as amended, agreed to.
  Clauses 17 and 18 agreed to.
  Clause 19:
  Right to compensation in respect of planning decisions
  (2) Where an interest in land has (whether before or after the commencement of this Act) been compulsorily acquired by, or sold to, a public authority possessing compulsory purchase powers, that authority, and any person deriving title from that authority under a disposition made by that authority on or at any time after the first day of July, nineteen hundred and forty-eight, shall not be entitled to compensation under this Part of this Act in respect of a planning decision made after the service of the notice to treat, or after the making of the contract of sale, as the case may be, by reason that the value of that interest, or of any interest created (whether immediately or derivatively) out of that interest, is depreciated by that decision.
  VISCOUNT GAGE VISCOUNT GAGE moved, in subsection (2), after "title" to insert "immediately". The noble Viscount said: This is a somewhat technical point and I think I can best illustrate it by an example. Some little time ago the education committee of my county council bought several acres of land from a nearby farmer for the purpose of establishing a playing field. Subsequently, the Ministry of Education altered their standard requirements governing the size of playing fields, and in conformity with that ruling the education committee to which I am referring decided that a smaller acreage was appropriate in this particular case. They thus found themselves saddled with superfluous land. I have quoted this case to show that it has happened, and I want to use it purely for the purpose of illustration. I now go on into the realm of supposition.
  Suppose that this superfluous land was an acre in extent, and suppose that it had on it an existing use value of, say, £50 and a claim value of another £50. The county council would, therefore, have originally paid £100 for that particular

  881
  acre. If they resold under existing law, presumably, they would have to sell at the full market value. But let us suppose that, moved by the kind of arguments advanced by my noble friend Lord Teviot last week, they so contrived matters that they sold his particular acre back to the original farmer, and also so contrived matters that that farmer paid for that land exactly what the county council had paid him—which is, in point of fact, considerably less than the market value. Now an ordinary person might perhaps assume that the status quo was thereby restored: the farmer would have his land back, the authority would have their money back, and everything would appear to be as it was before the land was originally acquired. But I doubt whether that is really the case.
  Let us suppose, further, that after a few years, owing to an increase in population, the authority again had to consider the expansion of the school, and suppose that they again came back to acquire the same acre of land from the same farmer. I believe that in such a case the district valuer would have to say that, under Clause 19, the farmer had derived his title from the statutory body, and that any claim on the land had automatically been extinguished. Therefore, the price on the second occasion, instead of being £100, would be £50. It seems to me hard that a man should have his claim extinguished in this somewhat complicated way, and there seems to be a good case for cutting out any reference to a person deriving title from a statutory authority. But if it is hard on the original owner, it is doubly hard on anyone who might in the intervening years have purchased that land without being aware of the complicated effect of this clause. It seems unreasonable that this skeleton in the cupboard could go on reappearing long after the original transaction had taken place. The effect of my Amendment would be, I believe, that the claim value in the case of any subsequent purchase would be restored to the land, which seems reasonable. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 26, line 1, after ("title") insert ("immediately").—(Viscount Gage.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: In approaching the problem which has been so attractively propounded by my noble friend, I think one ought to look first at
  882
  the primary purpose of subsection (2) of Clause 19, which is to secure that a public authority possessing compulsory purchase powers is not entitled to compensation under the Bill in respect of a planning decision made after the date of service of the notice to treat. I think your Lordships appreciate the reason for preventing a public authority from claiming compensation under the Bill—namely, that apart from Government Departments, who are not bound by the planning provisions, those affected will in most cases be either local authorities or statutory undertakers. Where these bodies are empowered to buy land compulsorily, it is solely for the purpose of their functions. An absurd position would result if a local authority, authorised to buy land for the purpose of, say, a public open space, were able, after acquiring it, to claim compensation on the ground that permission had been refused to cover the land with houses.
  So far, I think, the matter is quite clear. But the scope of the provision is not wide, for in the ordinary case, where the authority have acquired all interests in the land, the provisions of Part III of the Bill will result in the liquidation of any unexpended balance from which payment might have been made. But where, exceptionally, one or more interests in the land remain in private hands, the effect of the subsection will be that only those interests or their successors can claim on what is left of the balance. The disqualification extends in the clause, as drafted, as my noble friend has said, to persons deriving title from the public authority under a disposition made on or after July 1, 1948. The reason for that is that it would be unfair to allow such persons to participate in the share of unexpended balance which in equity should be attributed only to the interests which were not acquired by the public authority. I think the real answer to my noble friend's doubts is that those who derive title from the public authority can protect themselves by securing planning permission for any development which they have in mind before completing the transaction.
  My noble friend's Amendment seeks to confine the disqualification, so far as those deriving title are concerned, to those who derive title immediately from the public authority. He is afraid, if I may develop his own language, that the occasion may arise when someone looks

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  rather more deeply into the cupboard and finds a skeleton lurking in the back places of the title deeds. I appreciate my noble friend's point, but I doubt whether there is really any ground for distinguishing. The position which he put to your Lordships, that prospective purchasers, many years after land has come through the hands of a public authority, may find themselves in difficulty in discovering what their entitlement to compensation may be, is not, I think, a very real one, because the vendor should know. And I do not think the difficulty should be great because, as I have indicated, the facts will certainly emerge when the title is investigated. The main safeguard, as I have mentioned, is obviously that planning permission should be sought before completion takes place.
  I have considered this matter, and I appreciate my noble friend's desire to obviate any unfairness in the future. I do not think it is an unfairness that is likely to arise, and I would ask my noble friend not to press the Amendment. If there is any particular anxiety that he has in mind, again I shall be pleased to look at it, because I ask your Lordships to believe that I, most of all in your Lordships' House, am always reluctant to don the mantle of Elijah and try to prophesy what is going to happen—though I should be willing to admit that my noble friend is better at that than I am. If he feels that I have failed to pierce the veil of the future, I shall be glad to discuss with him any other examples he would care to put to me.
  VISCOUNT GAGE: I am obliged to my noble and learned friend. I do not think he has entirely filled me with confidence on every point, particularly on the precise points that I mentioned. Of course, we planning authorities have to deal with a variety of people. We have to deal, for example, with farmers; and farmers, unfortunately, are not always possessed of the technical knowledge which seems to be necessary when any matter of town planning comes up. I suggest that, if a farmer were offered his land back at the original price paid for it, he would think that a perfectly straight deal. I do not think he would necessarily consider the position which would arise in subsequent transactions. I suppose that if he sold his farm it is perfectly true, as the noble and learned Viscount has said,
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  that the purchaser would go into the question of title. I sometimes wonder whether an ordinary solicitor would have spotted that point. However, on the assurance that my noble and learned friend has given, that he will further consider what I have said, I am most willing to withdraw my Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is really a drafting Amendment. The subsection is otiose, in view of the fact that the definition of "interest in land" in Clause 68 precludes a mortgagee from claiming in respect of his own interest. Your Lordships will know that the position of mortgagees will be safeguarded by regulations to be made under Clause 65. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 26, line 38, leave out subsection (6).—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 19, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 20 [General provisions as to amount of compensation]:
  LORD MANCROFT: This Amendment is not a drafting Amendment so much as to transpose the clause. We propose, with the permission of the Committee, to move Clause 20 to after Clause 27. The reason for it is this. The rearrangement proposed by this and subsequent consequential Amendments will have the effect that the clauses dealing with title to a payment and the making and examination of a claim are brought together, leaving to the last those concerned with the assessment and the amount of compensation. I think the Committee will agree that this is a more logical order than the present order, and accordingly I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Transpose Clause 20 to after Clause 27.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 21:
  Compensation excluded in certain cases
  (2) Compensation under this Part of this Act shall not be payable in respect of the imposition, on the granting of permission to develop land, of any condition relating to—

  (a) the number or disposition of buildings on any land;

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  (d) the use of any buildings or other land;

  or in respect of any condition subject to which permission is granted for the winning and working of minerals.
  (3) Compensation under this Part of this Act shall not be payable in respect of the refusal of permission to develop land, if the reason or one of the reasons stated for the refusal is that development of the kind proposed would be premature by reference to either or both of the following matters, that is to say—
  (a) the stages indicated, in the development plan for the area in which the land is situated, as the stages by which development is to be carried out;
  Provided that this subsection shall not apply if the planning decision refusing the permission is made on an application made more than ten years after the date of a previous planning decision whereby permission to develop the same land was refused for the same reason, or for reasons which included the same reason.
  (4) Compensation under this Part of this Act shall not be payable in respect of the refusal of permission to develop land, if the reason or one of the reasons stated for the refusal is that the land is unsuitable for the proposed development on account of its liability to flooding or to subsidence.
  (6) For the purposes of this section a planning decision, whereby permission to develop land is granted subject to a condition prohibiting development of a specified part of that land, shall be treated as a decision refusing the permission as respects that part of the land.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is a drafting Amendment, but I think I might profitably say one or two words to your Lordships. The form of words in the Bill was devised to attempt to avoid using the phrase "use of land," which is the subject of much misunderstanding. This has given rise to other difficulties, and I think it is worth emphasising that "use of land" as defined in the 1947 Act does not include the development of land by the carrying out of building or other operations. The exclusion is drafted to include development consisting in part of a change in the use of buildings or land and in part of operations, because in such a case it is often impracticable to divide the total depreciation between the two elements. I thought it right to put those points to your Lordships, and I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 28, line 3, leave out from ("which") to second ("or") in line 4 and insert ("consists of or includes the making of any material change in the use of any buildings or other land").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: Your Lordships will be aware that Part II, of which Clause 21 forms part, is really the most important part of this Bill, and I am bound to say I am a little surprised that there are not more of your Lordships here and that a greater interest is not taken in this matter. If I owned land—I do not—I should certainly feel very strongly about these particular clauses which purport to provide compensation for a refusal or the conditional grant of planning permission. It might perhaps be thought to be a little difficult for noble Lords on this side to make a plea in this matter, but we do not stand here for any confiscatory provisions. We think fair compensation should be paid after having regard to community interest and to the increased value of the land created by the community. But these provisions, if your Lordships will think of them for a moment amended as proposed by the noble and learned Viscount, would really appear to do away with all possibility of compensation of any kind except in the most rare cases.
  Under the Amendment moved by the noble and learned Viscount, Clause 21 will read:
  "Compensation under this Part of this Art shall not be payable in respect of the refusal of permission for any development which"—
  then I take in the noble and learned Viscount's words—
  "consists of or includes the making of any material change in the use of any buildings or other land."
  So that if there is a proposal to make any material change in the use of buildings or other land, then there is no compensation for the refusal of permission for that change. If any of your Lordships have a barn, for example, which you desire lo turn into two or three cottages, and that development is refused, there is no compensation. If you have a large house which you wish to turn into a block of flats and that development, for one reason or another, is refused, there is no compensation. I hope the noble and learned Viscount will correct me if I am wrong. If you have a house which some-one will purchase for the purposes of a club or an institution—a private nursing home or school—and permission is refused for any reason, then there is no compensation. So one might go on. If you have land which someone will purchase perhaps for a car park or for the

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  purposes of a nursery garden, to erect two or three greenhouses, and permission is refused, there is no compensation. If you have a piece of land, as I have known happen in the case of a Member of your Lordships' House, which it is desired to turn into a parking ground for motor vehicles, to obtain a little income from it, and permission is refused, then there is no compensation.
  That general provision which the noble and learned Viscount is now asking your Lordships to accept is added to and particularised in the later provisions of this clause, as to which my noble friends and I propose to move the Amendments in our names. I submit to your Lordships that this Amendment proposed by the noble and learned Viscount is a very serious one, and far too wide. These provisions, which purport to give compensation, whittle it down to such an extent that in hardly any case will any compensation be paid. As your Lordships know, you have first to have something which is described as a new development. Then (I am looking now at Clause 17) you have to have an unexpended balance of established development value available. Then Clause 18 has various provisions which are very difficult to follow but which would appear to deprive one of compensation if there is no balance of established development value available. Then we go to Clause 19, which would appear in the first subsection to provide that a person shall be entitled to compensation under the conditions set out in that subsection. If, however, you turn to the clause to which this particular Amendment relates, your Lordships will see that again compensation is whittled down.
  I should certainly have thought that your Lordships would feel strongly on the extremely wide provision which the noble and learned Viscount has just moved, and which, as I submit, would cover almost every contingency one could think of. Another contingency which occurs to me is this: suppose one of your Lordships had premises which it was thought convenient or possible to turn into a factory—that is not in the least inconceivable. If, for any reason, permission is refused, there is no compensation; there is only, I think I am right in saying, the existing use value of the land. I merely point out these facts. I do not think it is necessary for me to
  888
  argue them at any length, except to say that we on these Benches wish fair compensation to be paid in proper cases when the community interest and the community contribution to the buildings or the land have been fully taken into account. I should have thought your Lordships would feel sufficiently strongly on this Amendment possibly even to divide against it.
  VISCOUNT GAGE: I think we ought in some ways to be grateful to the noble Lord for what he has said, but I must point out that under the 1947 Act, although compensation was not excluded in these cases, very heavy development charge was imposed for this change of use. I remember my noble friend Lord Llewellin reducing the House almost to a state of hilarity by reading through a list of development charges for changed use which had been imposed. The noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, has covered a wide range in his speech. I do not propose to follow him in that general survey, but I must say there is one phrase in the Amendment which has been moved by the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor which I believe can be explained, but which nevertheless has given rise amongst quite expert people to some feelings of real alarm. It would appear at first sight that if there were a proposal to change the use of land from agricultural condition to developed condition by putting houses on it, that would be a change of use, and if permission were refused it would attract no compensation. But I cannot believe that that is so, because it would conflict with everything we have been told about this Bill and about the principles of the Bill by every official spokesman who has ever spoken on it. However, there it is. It has caused certain confusion, and I should be glad if an interpretation could be given that a change of use of land from agricultural to residential, let us say, is not a change of use which is contemplated in this clause.
  LORD HYLTON: Clause 21 is generally accepted as what is called the "good neighbourliness" clause. That being so, these changes of user can rightly take place only if they are more or less in line with the good neighbourliness of the area concerned. The noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, said that he thought that compensation should be paid on a planning refusal. I doubt if that is really sound,

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  for this reason: first, that the planning authority will not issue a refusal if tie development consists of any form of development which is reasonable in the district. If it is unreasonable, then we have always considered that permission ought to be refused. I think that that rather modifies the view which some of your Lordships may take as to the inclusion of the words in this Amendment.
  I, too, with my noble friend Lord Gage, hope that the noble and learned Viscount, when he replies, will put it beyond a shadow of doubt that the use of the words "or other land" will in no way affect the general conception of compensation under this Bill, which we have always understood to be that, if land was zoned for development and any development was then refused, compensation should be paid. That is the general principle, and we should be grateful to have a further assurance from the noble and learned Viscount that that is so.
  4.23 p.m.
  LORD SILKIN: This Amendment relates only to one specific aspect of the clause. If I may respectfully say so, the noble and learned Viscount was quite right in saying that in form it is only a drafting Amendment. The intention of the Amendment was in the original clause. I have two Amendments down to other parts of the clause which I can argue when we reach them. I do not propose to argue the general question of this clause at all, but merely the Amendment. I am not sure that noble Lords opposite realise what this clause does. It takes the case of a person who has an established claim and who is refused permission to develop. It says that in certain circumstances he is not to be paid out on his established claim in respect of that refusal. I want to deal at this stage only with the refusal in respect of a change of use.
  I will just say this to the noble Viscount, Lord Gage, who thought it necessary to refer to the noble Lord, Lard Llewellin, and his bringing the House into a state of hilarity; that I remember the occasion very well indeed. The noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, referred to fourteen cases, of which he gave particulars to the House. After the debate in the House, every one of those was examined and I am sorry to have to say that every one
  890
  was found inaccurate: there was a complete answer, so that the hilarity was rather misplaced. There might have been more hilarity, if we had been able to give the answers to the particular instances which he had cited, or if he had given notice that he proposed to raise them, so that they could have been dealt with. But I do not claim for a moment that the 1947 Act was perfect or that it could not have been improved. I gather that this Bill is for the purpose of improving it and it is no answer for the noble Viscount to stand up and say, "This is just as bad."
  Coming back now to the actual Amendment, it does say to a person who has an established claim, and who makes an application for permission to develop by change of user, that if he is refused permission to change the use, he is not to be paid out on his established claim. The point is this: that in many cases the established claim did relate to, and was because of, the possibility of a change of use. A person who was using his premises or his land for one particular purpose claimed that he could make better use of his premises it the land were developed more fully or used in a particular way. This clause arises only in those cases where he has proved this contention up to the hilt. He has had to satisfy the district valuer that the contention that he could make a better use of his land or buildings has been made out, and it is because of that that he has an established claim. Having got his established claim and having relied on being paid out, he finds that, in the particular circumstances in respect of which his claim has been established, he is not going to be paid out. My noble friend Lord Milner of Leeds gave a number of examples of change of user. It is exceedingly odd that there should not only be no criticism from the other side but that the noble Viscount, Lord Gage, should actually stand up and defend this provision. If he is satisfied, and if the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, is satisfied, far be it from me to criticise it, for they are much more in touch with landowners than I am; and, if they think this is fair dealing, I will leave it at that.
  VISCOUNT GAGE: May I say that I think the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, is slightly misrepresenting what I said. I did not say that. I expressed gratitude for one aspect of Lord Milner of Leeds'

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  contribution, but I did express some surprise that he should feel so much concerned for us, considering that, by a rather different route, we reached the same conclusions under the 1947 Act. We are discussing this matter rather generally. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said that he was going to discuss the particular aspects of this matter. We will listen to what he has to say before coming to any conclusion on this point.
  LORD SILKIN: I thank the noble Viscount. I do not make any debating points and I certainly do not want to misrepresent the noble Viscount. If he does not agree with what I said, and thinks this a fair provision, it is open to him to say so. I am now in some doubt as to whether he thinks it fair or not. I think it is unfair. I think it is unfair that a person who has an established claim should not be paid out on that claim when he has made his claim on the particular ground that his land is capable of more beneficial use. Having established this claim, and having been told that at a certain date he is going to be paid out, the Government now come along and, under this clause, say that he is not to be paid out in respect of a refusal to permit a change of use. I am not for the moment concerned about questions of neighbourliness or otherwise (I shall be dealing with that when I come to my Amendment), but I say that this is a promise which has been made to a number of people. Landowners are not all large; they may be small. There are small people who are involved in this as well as large people—probably more small people than large. I very much regret that Her Majesty's Government are departing from what I regard as the honourable course, and are now declining to pay compensation to which people are properly entitled, which they have been led to expect they are going to get, and which now they are not going to get.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do, very respectfully, ask the Committee to consider the problem which is involved in this Amendment. May I ask the Committee to do so, first, by considering the words which we seek to leave out. They are:
  "does not consist in the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations".
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  We are seeking to substitute
  "consists of or includes the making of any material change in the use of any buildings or other land."
  My submission to the Committee is that the words which I have suggested are preferable, for the reason that they refer back to the principal Act and pick up a definition which is included in that Act, in the Definition section, Section 119. As your Lordships will remember, I mentioned the definition in the opening remarks that I made in moving this Amendment, but I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, can have heard me clearly. I know how difficult it is to pick up a definition when it is stated over the House, so may I read it to the Committee at dictation speed. It is:
  "'Use', in relation to land, does not include the use of land by the carrying out of any building or other operations thereon."
  So, with the greatest respect to Lord Milner of Leeds, in the examples that he gave, with the intention of jovially making the flesh of the Committee creep, every one of the examples that included building or operations on land, as a number of them did, was irrelevant for the purpose to which the noble Lord spoke.
  We come back—and this is the only problem in the Amendment—to whether it is fair to express the question of change of user in a positive form, as we now suggest, which goes back to the original Act, or in the negative form in which it now appears in the clause. That is all that is contained in this Amendment. But I want to make it quite clear, in response to what my noble friends, Lord Gage and Lord Hylton have said, that in my view the fears which they announced are unfounded, and I believe that the lack of foundation is obvious when one considers the definition which I have just read. On this Amendment the broad question which Lord Silkin used as an illustration but does not wish to debate fully at this time—namely, whether change of user should be included or not—does not strictly arise, because it is excluded by both forms of words. I do want to say this, however—again I make only a passing reference to it because to do more would be wrong on this occasion: that in putting this Bill before your Lordships on Second Reading, I tried to

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  deal with the two principles which are inherent in this clause. The first is that of good neighbourliness—and a change of user may well have a considerable effect as far as that is concerned; and the second is that propounded by my right honourable friend the present Minister of Defence: that, with all the desire that he had to encourage development, there must always be a limit, which varies from case to case, where the private rights come into conflict with the general interest of the locality in which those rights are sought to be exercised.
  I do not want to be led aside, attractive though the byeway is, into discussing that general point, because that can be discussed again. I merely want to point out to the Committee that here the Amendment makes a very small change, that of substituting a positive form of Words for a negative form of words. I must say that the discussion reminded me of the old Latin tag, that the mountains were in labour and a little mouse was born, except that in this case the "mice" seemed to have performed a miraculous creation of mountains out of a very mouse-like Amendment. I hope the Committee will accept it because there are a number of other most important points which we have to discuss.
  LORD HYLTON: I thank the noble and learned Viscount for his help on this point. He has explained the definition in the 1947 Act of the use of land, and it does, I think, meet the point in his Amendment where it refers to the use of building land. I am not clear whether this Bill covers the definitions from the other Act. Are they incorporated in it? In this Bill there is no definition of the "use of land." I should not like to guess from the legal point of view whether it is implied that the definitions of the 1947 Act automatically come into this one. Although. I accept what the noble and learned Viscount has said, is there not a danger of the Act being misapplied in this respect? This Amendment has caused a great deal of what is known as "alarm and despondency," because at first sight it appears to remove any claim to compensation on refusal. I quite see that that is not intended, but I think a definition of the words "use of land" should be included somewhere.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My noble friend may take heart and grace in this way. It is certainly intended that that should apply, and I give him the firm undertaking that if there are doubts cast on that by any further examination of the Bill, I will see that it does include it. At the moment, I ask him to take it that the definition is adopted into this Act. As I say, if he has the slightest fears in the matter, I shall make quite sure that it is included before we part with the Bill.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  4.40 p.m.
  LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved, in subsection (2), to omit paragraph (a) The noble Lord said: I beg to move the next Amendment standing in my name. I regard this clause as one of the most important in the Bill. It deals with persons who have an established claim for compensation but who, for one reason or another, will not be paid compensation. One of the reasons is that which we have just discussed. I agree with the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor that the discussion was perhaps slightly irregular at that stage, but it would be quite appropriate to discuss it on the Motion that the clause stand part of the Bill. We have not yet disposed of the question whether it is right that refusal of change of user should not attract compensation from the established claim. This paragraph provides that, where permission has been granted to develop, no compensation shall be payable in respect of any condition relating to the number or disposition of buildings on any land.
  I cannot help referring to the general character of this clause in dealing with my Amendment. This has been described by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, as the "good neighbour" clause and the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor fell into the same trap. It is, of course, nothing of the kind. II; has nothing to do wit good neighbourliness. Restrictions may be imposed by a planning authority for many reasons which may have nothing to do with good neighbourliness, though I admit they may have. Permission may be refused or a condition may be imposed as to the number or disposition of buildings on land because it would be bad neighbourliness to allow a developer to build the

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  number of dwellings he is seeking to build or to arrange them in the way he seeks to arrange them. But he may be refused for a variety of other reasons; some of them may have a connection with something a local authority itself wants to do at some future time, or indeed it may be a way of avoiding payment of compensation. Some of us with practical experience have known cases where a planning authority, in order to avoid paying compensation, has, where a developer wanted to develop his land in the normal way by building ten or twelve houses to the acre, given permission for one house only to be built and thereby have avoided payment of compensation. That has nothing to do with good neighbourliness. It is grossly unfair, that a person with an established claim should lose his claim because a planning authority is perhaps using this provision either to deprive him of his claim or for some reasons which have nothing to do with good neighbourliness.
  I imagine the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, will have in his brief that this is one of the provisions contained in Section 19 of the 1932 Act. It is perfectly true that that Act contained certain provisions which were permissive and under which it was possible for a planning authority to ask the Minister to insert some of these conditions in a planning scheme. If the Minister so desired, he could insert the conditions in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) in a planning scheme and they became operative, but so far as I know very few such planning schemes came into operation. I do not know of one case where the Minister actually incorporated those conditions in a planning scheme. If there is a case I am not aware of it. Certainly there are no such cases in any scheme made by the London County Council or by any other authority, so far as I am aware. Although these provisions were incorporated in the 1932 Act (which has now been repealed) they were, in fact, never operated and at best were only optional.
  My Amendment is to leave out paragraph (a) relating to the number or disposition of buildings on any land. Its effect would be that any such condition imposed would not deprive a person of compensation. That may be going a little far. There may be cases where
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  such a condition is imposed on the around of good neighbourliness. Where a person is seeking to develop at too high a density it would be proper for a local authority to say, "No, you must not develop at that density; you must develop at a lower density." But there will be other cases where the question of good neighbourliness will not arise at all and where the condition is imposed on grounds completely divorced from good neighbourliness. It is right to distinguish between cases where there is refusal on the ground of good neighbourliness and those where refusal is on other grounds. It would be right that compensation should not be payable in respect of the imposition of a condition where good neighbourliness is involved, but in other cases is it not proper that a person should be given compensation out of his established claim to the extent that he suffers from not getting everything that he might properly be entitled to?
  I want here to lay down a doctrine with which I am sure noble Lords opposite will agree: that normally a person who is an owner of land is entitled, morally and otherwise, to do whatever he thinks proper on that land, so long as it does not conflict with the public interest and so long as it does not do damage to his neighbours. Certainly when I was Minister of Town and Country Planning it was my objective to deal with appeals on that principle. The sole criterion was: Will there be any injury to the public interest if this development is permitted? If the answer was "Yes," then it was right that it should not be permitted. If the answer was that no such injury resulted, it was permissible. I personally went further and said that if there was a doubt, then the owner should get the benefit of that doubt. If one accepts that principle—and I imagine noble Lords opposite will accept it—I suggest that wherever there is a condition imposed which goes beyond the limits of good neighbourliness, then an applicant should not be deprived of his compensation. If he is given permission for something substantially less than he asks, he should at least get recompensed to the extent that he suffers as a result of getting less than he is properly entitled to.
  There is no difficulty about evaluating that loss because in later clauses of the

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  Bill, as the noble and learned Viscount will agree, the question of depreciation is dealt with. Depreciation in value is dealt with and fully defined, and this provision could quite well be made to apply to the depreciation in the value of a person's interest where he does not get what he is fully entitled to because of reasons other than good neighbourliness. So I suggest that these exceptions, (a), (b), (c) and (d), ought to be looked at again to see whether it might be so provided that a person should not lose the whole of his claim on account of a condition which might render it quite uneconomic for him to develop, and which amounted virtually to a refusal. If it were a refusal he would be entitled to get his established claim; but because it is not in the form of a refusal, and is in the form of a consent subject to an impossible condition, he loses the benefit of his established claim. I hope that the noble and learned Viscount will agree that there is justice in what I am putting forward; and, if he feels that there is, I am sure that he will do his best, whatever the drafting difficulties may be, at this late stage, to see that justice is done. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 28, line 11, leave out line ll.—(Lord Silkin.)
  VISCOUNT GAGE: The question of conditions attaching to planning consents is, I believe, an extremely complicated one. In recent years we have been informed that a number of conditions which we have quite commonly attached to consents are ultra vires. I think that the position is very wrong and that it ought to be tidied up. I should have thought that conditions affecting the placing of buildings, provided that they are reasonable—and I agree that they should be reasonable—are in accordance with one of the oldest principles of town planning. The noble Lord quoted the 1932 Act. I do not know whether the schemes were confirmed or not, but certainly they were operated as if they had been confirmed, and under the 1932 Act local authorities had every inducement to try to make this kind of condition, because, if compensation had to be paid they were the only people who could pay it. Under this Bill they have no such temptation. They will not pay compensation. I should have thought there would be far less temptation for them to impose ridiculous conditions like zoning many acres of land
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  at one house to the acre than there was under the 1932 Act. Personally, I would agree that if any of these things are abused it is very wrong, but I was not aware that there was much abuse, even under the 1932 Act. It may have been because of the action of the Minister on appeal. While I believe that this question of conditions attaching to town planning consent ought to be most carefully looked into, I should not have said, in the light of our experience, that this particular condition offers any great threat, though I agree that it might be abused.
  4.56 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I confess to feeling a certain amount of astonishment in hearing the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, press this Amendment so eloquently as he did to your Lordships this afternoon, when I remember the quite vehemently expressed desire of the Opposition in another place to extend the range of exclusions under this clause. But that is only one of those debating pleasantries to which the noble Lord and I are accustomed, and I am sure that he will take my remark in good part. If he will allow me to say so, I think that what he did propound this afternoon, and the principles which he enunciated, are well worthy of the consideration of the Committee. He enunciated his principle in words used by the Duke of Newcastle 150 years ago—with, I confess at once, some addition. He said that a man may do as he likes with his own, so long as it does not interfere with the public interest. I think the noble Lord will agree that there is not much difference between that and the principle which I tried to enunciate: that private interest must sometimes give way to public interest, and that an owner, though entitled to the reasonable use of his land, is not entitled to exploit it to the maximum where this would involve detriment to neighbours or to the community.
  I think that the new facet of that well-known principle which the noble Lord sought to develop was the distinction that he tried to draw between neighbourliness in particular and the, community in general. I think that the noble Lord will agree that the problem of how far a principle can or should be pushed in any particular circumstances is one of the most difficult for anyone engaged in political

  899
  life to deal with. Probably, every Party would subscribe to the principle, but I think it would be difficult to find two individuals of any Party who would agree as to its application in any circumstances. That is the extent of the problem, which we must consider. Therefore, it is relevant to consider the 1932 Town and Country Planning Act, because it would be very difficult, as a matter of practical politics, for even noble Lords in the Labour Party to turn back the clock twenty-two years without at any rate some surprise being occasioned by that being done. I always attach great weight to statements made by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, but I am told that, despite what he says, compensation was regularly excluded in respect of the zoning and density provisions of operative schemes. In fact, more than a hundred such schemes came into force. So one starts from that fact: that planning schemes under the 1932 Act commonly excluded compensation in respect of zoning provisions—that is, restrictions on the type and density of buildings, and on the use to which they were put.
  The Amendment before your Lordships would delete the subsection which precludes compensation for conditions relating to the density or disposition of buildings. I have already commented on the pressure in the other direction to which the Government were subjected in another place. I would ask your Lordships to look a little more closely at the resemblance to the Act of 1932. It must be noted that paragraphs (a) and (b) deal with the number, the place and the design of buildings that may be erected on the land, and the total effect is similar to that of paragraphs (a) to (c) of Section 19 (1) of the 1932 Act. The present words in paragraph (a) go a little wider, in that they make it possible to control the siting of building on the land, as well as their numbers and density, without giving rise to payment of compensation. That is the only difference that I can see.
  I would remind noble Lords opposite, and especially the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, who in one way is the archpriest of the Uthwatt heresy, that the inclusion of siting removes an evident anomaly to which the Uthwatt Committee drew attention, as he will remember when the matter is brought to his mind. Let us
  900
  consider whether we are really going too far in this direction. I say to your Lordships that the matters that are covered in paragraph (a), and indeed in paragraph (b) also, of this subsection are akin to those which are commonly regulated by by-laws, and, as such, are generally agreed to be properly controlled without compensation. I say, further, that control of the volume of building is necessary not only as a matter of design, to ensure adequate daylighting, but also from the broader social standpoint, to ensure that development does not outrun the capacity of roads and of educational and other services. I have listened carefully, and as sympathetically as I can, to what the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has said, but I find it impossible to distinguish these aspects of the matter from a due consideration of neighbourliness, and certainly from a due consideration of the interests of the community. I always find that arguments in which the traditional positions are reversed have a piquancy entirely their own, but I try to look at the matter fairly and to face up, as your Lordships have to face up, to that age-long problem and apply it to this present aspect. I say that to exclude this exclusion would be a retrograde step, with which I do not think any of your Lordships, on consideration, would be pleased to be associated.
  LORD SILKIN: One of the advantages of this House is that at times we can say what we really think, without being tied to Party dogmas. The noble and learned Viscount has made the traditional case and assumes that in every instance where a condition is made about the number or disposition of buildings on any land it is solely a matter of public interest and good neighbourliness. I agree with him that, in so far as a condition is imposed on those grounds, there should be no compensation. There we are at one. But I say that there are cases where such a condition is laid down which have nothing to do with good neighbourliness. The condition is not laid down on that ground at all and good neighbourliness would not be affected if the applicant got what he asked for. That would not affect the community one iota. The point I am really arguing is that in such applications, if the applicant can establish his case, and only if he can, he should not be deprived of his compensation.

  901
  He should get something in respect of the loss which he suffers as the result of this condition.
  However, I have put my case—I hope the noble and learned Viscount appreciates it—and I do not propose to press it beyond having made the point. If the noble and learned Viscount is satisfied that compensation should be wholly excluded in those cases, I imagine that his noble friends behind him will have more to say about it than we on this side. If they are satisfied, it is not for me to press them. May I say, in passing, that I was surprised to hear the noble and learned Viscount refer to the Uthwatt "heresy," because I thought he himself was a party to the Uthwatt. "heresy" not so very long ago? He may remember that the White Paper on Control of Land Use, which was issued by his own friends, accepted the Uthwatt "heresy" completely. I do not know when they ceased to accept the Uthwatt view and began to treat it as a heresy. I did not know that there had been any formal pronouncement, but perhaps the noble and learned Viscount is using his own new-found freedom in this House by departing from the accepted doctrine of his Own Party on Uthwatt. Whilst I do not think that I should withdraw my Amendment, I am not going to ask my friends to press it.
  On Question, Amendment negatived.
  5.9 p.m.
  LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved, in subsection (2), to omit paragraph (d). The noble Lord said: This is a similar Amendment, but we now get back to the discussion that we had on the noble and learned Viscount's earlier Amendment to this clause, on whether compensation should be excluded in respect of a condition about the use of buildings. I do not wish to elaborate this point because to a certain extent it follows on the discussion we have just had, but here again it seems to me that restrictions on the use of buildings can be imposed on the ground of good neighbourliness or on the ground of arbitrariness. A case came before me on appeal in which a woman living in a village had been refused permission to use her front room to sell packets of tea. The local authority fought this case most vehemently, as if the whole world were involved in the question of whether this woman could sell tea from her front
  902
  room. If that woman had an unexpended balance of an established claim, and had been granted some permission but had been refused permission to do this particular thing, she would have lost the benefit of her claim. I am sure that no question of neighbourliness was involved in that case.
  There are many other cases of that kind, where a change of use cannot be said to affect neighbourliness. Take the sort of case in London, of which there are many at the present time, where a condition is imposed as to the use of a large dwelling-house which, in practice, can no longer be used as a dwelling-house, but which can most suitably be used as offices. No question of good neighbourliness is involved; it cannot possibly hurt the community in any way that these obsolete residences should be used as offices. There is an established claim on the ground that the Central Land Board are satisfied that these houses have a development value. But if, in spite of that, the owners are refused permission to use the dwelling-house, or any part of it, as offices, then they cannot get the benefit of their established claim. That seems to me to be wrong, and to be going much further than was intended. Here again, I am not going to press this Amendment. I have put the case, and if the Government think they are right I will say no more about it. But I do feel it is an injustice, and that people who have an established claim ought to be paid out unless there are good reasons why they should not. It seems to me that the whole of this clause is directed to depriving people who have made out their case of the benefit of a claim. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 28, line 19, leave out line 19.—(Lord Silkin.)
  LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: In supporting my noble friend Lord Silkin, I would venture to put a point to the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, having now had the opportunity of looking at the definition of the word "use" in the 1947 Act. The matter is not free from doubt, and I offer my opinion with diffidence. The definition to which the noble and learned Viscount referred the Committee is to the effect that
  "'Use' in relation to lane does not include the use of land by the carrying out of any building or any other operations thereon."

  903
  As I understand it, if there is a change of user, and there are no building or other operations carried out on land, and permission is refused, no compensation will be paid. Therefore, if I am correct, the noble and learned Viscount was wrong in telling the Committee that all the instances I gave were covered by this definition.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Not all; a number of them.
  LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: The noble and learned Viscount said "all," I think. But take the case of a car park. I have a piece of land which I can let or sell if planning permission can be obtained for it to be used as a car park. There are no buildings to be erected thereon. In that case, if permission is refused, I get no compensation. That is one of the instances I gave. I am sure that the noble and learned Viscount will tender his apologies in that one respect, at any rate. I can think of others. I do not know whether this is an apt case (I must not go too far), but supposing that I desire to turn my piece of agricultural land into a cricket field, it may be that I should have to get planning permission. If I am refused, although there are no buildings to be erected, I get no compensation. I believe I am right there. My noble friend Lord Silkin reminds me that this is so—and this assumption applies to all these cases—even where I have an established claim, so to speak, on my own money in the hands of the Government.
  This Amendment moved by my noble friend is to delete
  "(d) the use of any buildings or other land; or."
  Under this paragraph no compensation is permitted if there is a change of user in regard to a building, which change of user does not come within the definition of the 1947 Act. So that there again, I submit to the noble and learned Viscount (he will correct me if I am wrong and, as he knows, I shall take no offence) if I have a house which I decide can conveniently be divided, without any building or other operations, into two or six flats, and permission is not given unless the Amendment of my noble friend is accepted there would be no compensation. Therefore, the matter
  904
  is not quite so simple as the noble and learned Viscount, in his kindly way, would lead us to think. In my view, the time will come when this Bill is in operation as an Act when there will be something like an outburst amongst landowners who have been refused compensation, notwithstanding that there has been a chance of user. As my noble friend has said, we on this side of the House are asking only for fair compensation, having regard to the community interest. Where the community have contributed to the increased value of land, then, under my noble friend's original Act, a charge would have been made in the one case, and that money utilised to compensate other cases. I submit that this is a proper Amendment and one which ought to be accepted by the Committee.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If I unguardedly used the word "all" and attacked every one of the examples of the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, I apologise, and I shall not indulge in a rhetorical dutch auction by speculating whether the word should have been "most" or "many." The noble Lord knows that the last thing in my mind is to do him any injustice, and I hope he will accept that assurance. However, I find it difficult to appreciate how noble Lords have been able to express such obviously genuine worry about this Amendment and its subject matter. Again, one cannot help going back to the Act of 1932, Section 19 (1) (g) of which provides that a planning scheme might exclude compensation in respect of any restrictions on the use of a building. If that was the position in 1932, it really is beyond practical politics in 1954 to say that compensation should be brought back. I agree that it is a courageous argument for noble Lords to advance, and I hope the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, will believe that I am being quite sincere when I say that I am the last person to admire dogmatism for its own sake. If your Lordships will allow me to say so, I have always thought there was a great deal of sense in the old saying that dogmatism was simply "puppyism" come to full growth. Therefore, I do not for a moment think any less of the noble Lord's arguments because he is freely finding his own political

  905
  path. But I do put that point to him: that when that was the provision in 1932, then it is difficult for any practical political thinker, or anyone who seeks to put his political thought into action, to turn back the clock.
  Of course, the noble Lord is entitled to say that it is only an argument on precedent; they may have been quite wrong in 1932.
  LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: If the noble and learned Viscount will permit me to interrupt, are not the conditions entirely different? There was no question of an established claim in 1932; now there is. The positions are not in the least analogous.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: With respect, I do not agree with the noble Lord, because the position in 1932 was that you were deciding what were the conditions on which there should be no compensation. You decided that one condition in which there should be no compensation was restriction on the use of a building. How you can expect compensation for restrictions on the use of a building to-day I do not see. I was going on to deal with the matter on the more general view, and not merely arguing on precedent. Again, I find it difficult to understand why this should not be excluded, because I cannot imagine anything that could change the nature of the neighbourhood more than the change of user in that way. Indeed, as noble Lords will remember, if they think of any neighbourhoods with which they are familiar and which have changed, in a great number of cases it has been a change of user that has brought about the change, which has affected people and which has driven people out; and, therefore, looking at it on the merits, as opposed to precedent, I find myself in the same position.
  LORD SILKIN: I hope the noble and learned Viscount will not mind my interrupting him. He is rather assuming that in all cases of refusal the imposition of a condition as to user is one which will affect the neighbourhood. It is a difficult argument. I agree that in a good many cases it does; and in cases where the neighbourhood is detrimentally affected, I agree that there should be no compensation. I should not like it to be thought that I was advocating compensation for people who want to do something which
  906
  is detrimental. My point is that there are cases where a condition as to user is imposed which cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as affecting the neighbourhood or interfering with anybody.
  I know that it is always dangerous to give examples, but there is a case which came to my knowledge of a person wishing to open a petrol station in an area where it was greatly needed. There was not another petrol station for two miles, and it would have done no harm to anybody. He was refused. If he had had an established claim, on the assumption that it did no harm to the neighbourhood surely he ought to have got his established claim. There was a case of a person who wanted to put a few caravans on a piece of land where nobody would have been a penny the worse off. They could not have been seen from the neighbourhood, and there would have been no interference with anybody. That is the sort of case I have in mind, and not the obvious case where there is interference with the amenities. I hope the noble and learned Viscount will not mind my making a rather lengthy intervention, but I want us to understand one another.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention, which has made his point quite clear. I think the answer to his point is this—let me deal with it in stages. As we are all clear now, the buildings or other operations on the land are excluded by the definition in the 1947 Act. Then, when we come to change of use of building, we find that there is a history and an ancestry in the Act of 1932—on the noble Lord's own argument a decline, a slope of degree in which it alters in a small way from the straight and narrow path at the top to the foot, where there is a serious declivity in the bad cases which the noble Lord has quoted. There one has to take the balance, noting that there are these bad cases, and that there are cases in which it may be to the detriment of the neighbourhood and the community. One has to decide which line one is going to take. I have tried to show that, both on historical grounds and on the grounds of looking at the problem, the safe and proper course is the exclusion which is contained in the Bill. So much for buildings.

  907
  Now one comes to the use of land—cutting out, as I have said, by the definition, building or other operations upon it. There again, I think the noble Lord would agree that it is relevant to take into account the immensely greater importance which all Parties in 1954 attach to the proper use of agricultural land. It is one of the remarkable political phenomena of our time that, whereas in almost every other stage in British political history there has been controversy between town and country on this point, to-day there is almost unanimity. I admit that the noble Lord makes quite a good point when he says, "You can find examples one way or the other." That is the fair way of stating it, as one would expect from the noble Lord. But when one has done that, one comes to this over-riding consideration of the importance of the use of land which I mentioned a moment or two ago. Therefore, whilst I have tried—I hope the noble Lord will believe that I have tried—to follow and appreciate his point of view, I am afraid that it would be impossible to accept this Amendment.
  5.30 p.m.
  LORD OGMORE: I have listened with keen interest and all due attention to the noble and learned Viscount who has just spoken, but I cannot feel that he has answered the point put by my noble friend. In the jungle through which at the present moment we are hacking our way, most of us somewhat blindly, I am afraid (at least, speaking for myself that is the case), I felt there was a shaft of light in my noble friend's Amendment. He instanced the case of the woman who wanted to sell packets of tea in the front room of her house and was prevented from doing so by the local authority. I have no doubt that there are many other small village people like this who to-day cannot set the country aflame because they never get past the local planning authority. We all know, those of us who know London at all, that there are vast areas in the London suburbs which still have the shadows of the Victorian era lying upon them, huge houses with restricted covenants, houses which, unless the local authority will act to allow them to have change of user, are left derelict, or at least occupied by persons who cannot occupy them in the way in which they should be occupied.
  908
  As my noble friend has said, we do not for one moment support the suggestion that there should be any lack of neighbourliness. What lack of neighbourliness is there in a woman selling packets of tea in the front room of her house? I remember that in a village near my home when I was a boy they used to sell almost anything in the front room of a house, which was occupied by a shop. I well remember the extraordinary mixture of smells as one went in through the front door—the bulls' eyes, combining happily with the linseed oil, sugar, bacon and so on. Yet look at the enormous mountain the noble and learned Viscount is making over this small village molehill. If there is any objection by the local authority, if that objection is sustained, even though the woman who wants to sell tea has an admitted claim she will get no compensation whatever. What is the answer of the Government—the Government which, we are told, believes in democracy, in the owner-occupier and in every householder owning his own house? Presumably they believe that, within reason, the householder should also be able to use the house, because it is not much use his occupying a house if he cannot use it in the way in which he wants to use it. What is the answer of the noble and learned Viscount? First of all, he has a sort of Bourbon defence. This was done in 1932, says the noble Viscount, and because it was done in 1932, and has been done ever since, we must not change it. Of course, as my noble friend Lord Silkin has pointed out, conditions have entirely changed since 1932. Planning and the restrictions on property were nothing like so stringent in those days as they are to-day. The whole circumstances of the use of property have changed since then. The noble and learned Viscount made a great point of this fact; he put it first and he spoke at some length on it.
  Then there was the second argument, which was rather short compared with the first, and that was the merits of the case. I must admit that whereas I got a very clear picture from the noble Viscount on the first ground— the Bourbon argument—no doubt through my own error and lack of understanding I did not acquire any clear account on the second. I did not understand very well what the merits were in such a case as I have mentioned, the woman who

  909
  wanted to sell packets of tea in the front room of her house. Your Lordships may say (I do not think you will, because on this point I am sure that a great many of your Lordships on the other side agree with me) that we should not worry in Parliament about the woman who wants to sell tea; that we should not worry about London suburbs where people cannot use these vast white elephants because of the need to obtain planning permission; that we should lay down one clear line and stick to it; and that it makes no difference that there are small injustices to some people—they are no concern of ours. I am sure that this House ought not to take that point of view. This House ought to say what my noble friend Lord Silkin, with his vast experience, has suggested we should say; namely, that if the owners of the premises can show that there is no lack of neighbourliness, and that they ought to be allowed to use the building or the land in the way they desire, then if they are prevented from doing so and have an established claim, there should be compensation. I do not pretend to be any sort of expert on that matter, but I should have thought that my noble friend's argument was unassailable. After all, as the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, so rightly pointed out, these are cases where there has been an admitted claim; these are cases where it is in a way their own money which is being withheld from the owners. I am quite sure that your Lordships will not like to pass on from this Amendment unless we have some very much better defence of the Government position than we have had up to now.
  LORD AMHERST OF HACKNEY: The noble Lord who has just spoken seems to take a pretty poor view of local planning authorities. His whole case was that really ridiculous restrictions, such as stopping the old lady from selling packets of cigarettes, were to be imposed by local planning authorities. Surely if those particular cases did arise and, in fact, the authority were acting unreasonably, then the person aggrieved would have a perfectly good right of appeal against those restrictions and the whole thing would come out into the open. I think the noble Lord is making a mountain out of a molehill. The other matter he mentioned was these old houses. There again, planning permission for change of
  910
  use might be refused, and he mentioned that in many cases they of course had restricted covenants. I think that in most cases the lease which has restricted covenants would, in fact, be barred from coming under this at all; it would not have any claim on the £300 million, because there would be unlikely to be much development value in the lease.
  VISCOUNT GAGE: I confess that I feel somewhat confused at the present juncture, but, from what I have heard in this debate, it seems to me that the argument about the admitted claim is a little difficult to refute. It is a little difficult to understand how, if someone put in and got agreed an admitted claim for redevelopment of a building, it could ever be substantiated that refusal of consent to a change of use does not carry compensation with it. These matters are extremely complicated, but I should not feel entirely happy about this particular point without further investigation. I do not know whether the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor is prepared to give it any further consideration.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am always prepared to give a matter further consideration, and I shall. On the other hand, ever since I have been a Minister I have always tried not to mislead the House by appearing to hold out hopes which I do not think have any firm foundation. Therefore, in answer to my noble friend, I am prepared to consider it. I shall read again everything that I have heard to-day, but it would be disingenuous of me to pretend that there was a great hope of alteration. If I may leave it in that way, which is I think the frankest way in which to treat the Committee, I hope the Committee will pass on, because we have a great deal to discuss. But let me make it plain that I do not grudge a moment which has been spent on these Amendments.
  5.41 p.m.
  LORD SILKIN: I can assure the noble and learned Viscount that there is no intention on the part of myself and my noble friends to hold up the business of the Committee, but we feel that these are important matters. We want to be quite sure that the point of view that we put forward is properly appreciated. Once that is done, we will not labour matters at all. The noble and learned Viscount need have no fear that this Bill will not

  911
  pass at some time to-morrow night. But, before passing on, I would make it clear once more—I am not sure that it is properly appreciated by the Committee—that what we are speaking about is people who have established claims in respect of the possible use of their premises. It is that type of person, the person who has a house but has established a claim on the ground that that house is capable of further development. Then, that having been established, this clause says: "If you are refused permission to use the premises in the way in which it was contemplated when your claim was admitted—no compensation."
  The point has been made that there have been many cases where it would be right to refuse permission on the ground of amenity. I am conceding that in those cases it would be right to refuse compensation. The noble and learned Viscount has conceded also, in his usual fair way, that there are cases where the public interest would not be affected. I say that in those cases compensation ought to be paid, or at any rate there ought to be some payment made, in respect of the depreciation in value of the premises by reason of the refusal. That is the issue between us, simply in those cases where the public interest is not involved. The noble and learned Viscount has promised to consider it. I have not very high hopes—I quite understand that the chances are that the answer will still be in the negative—but he has promised to consider it, and no doubt it may be possible to inform us of the result of the consideration so that, if we desire to return to the attack at the next stage, we can do so.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Certainly.
  LORD SILKIN: On that understanding, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  VISCOUNT RIDLEY VISCOUNT RIDLEY moved to add to subsection (2):
  "being a condition such as is commonly incorporated for the lessor's benefit in a lease of land for mineral working."
  The noble Viscount said: This is a matter of more conditions. There is no doubt whatever that the operations referred to in these two lines in the Amendment—the working of minerals—are such that any prudent planning committee would impose conditions. There is no doubt
  912
  that there must be conditions. The idea behind this Amendment is to try to make things easier and simpler to understand. It is quite true that if these conditions are what one might call not reasonable ones, and they go too far, there is always an appeal to the Minister. While we all know that there are local authorities who are sometimes not entirely rational in all their proceedings, it apparently is not considered to be right—I think it never has been thought to be right—to put a paragraph into a Bill like this with such wording as "reasonable conditions." It is always assumed that whoever makes the conditions is reasonable.
  This rather exemplifies to me what the noble Viscount, Lord Gage, said about the difficulties experienced by planning committees in regard to the conditions which they may or may not attach to consents of various kinds, and the conditions which they should wisely attach. There is a lot to be said for putting them expressly in a list. Of course, in connection with the particular problem which we are discussing, the conditions which qualify for lack of compensation above are put in the list, but they are not put in for the people who are concerned with the extraction of gravel, sand and other minerals. There are many minerals which come under this heading. I regret as much as anybody does the necessity for removing such enormous quantities of minerals of all kinds and of spoiling such a vast area of country in doing so, but I fear that we must have out these minerals such as gravel, sand and clay, for bricks, cement and so on. We must get them.
  My proposal is that, instead of the wording of the Bill which says that there should be no compensation in respect of conditions subject to which permission is granted, we should have something describing such conditions as being those which are usually found in a mineral lease. I think that that would cover all the points which it is necessary to consider in respect of conditions which a local authority would wish to impose on planning grounds. The fact that unreasonable conditions are imposed from time to time in this respect is, I think, well known. I will not particularise them now, but all of us who have been concerned with planning, planning committees and so on, will realise that it is essential to impose conditions for levelling and restoring the surface and

  913
  generally treating the temporary buildings in a reasonable and sensible way. That is the sort of conditions which nobody would expect to qualify for a planning refusal. Therefore, they would not affect the proposal that compensation should not be paid. I think this is a much easier point than the very wide question raised in the last two Amendments, and I hope it will be considered. It is a point which can easily be met. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—.
  Page 28, line 24, at end insert the said words.—(Viscount Ridley.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I hope that my noble friend will not press the Amendment which is on the Order Paper to-day. I said earlier in this debate, in answer to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, before the House moved into Committee, that I would not be technical but would try to answer the substance of the Amendments and not rely for rejecting them on difficulties or defects of expression. But I am bound to point out to my noble friend that there are dfficulties in the form in which this Amendment is placed before the House which I think reflect the difficulties of the subject. It would be difficult for a Minister to decide what conditions are "commonly incorporated in a lease" and whether such conditions are "for the lessor's benefit" or not. I would ask my noble friend to consider whether the proposal might not have results which would certainly be unexpected and might be inequitable, because not all sections of the mineral industry have, in the past, customarily undertaken such matters as the preservation of surrounding amenities by the proper location of unsightly plant and the correct disposal of waste materials, nor have they always provided for the restoration of the land after opencast working. This Amendment, therefore, would enable any section of the industry with a poor record in such matters to benefit by obtaining compensation for the cost of work, whilst those operators who have customarily undertaken restoration at their own expense would be debarred from getting such payments.
  I find the matter very difficult when considering the general point, with the ordinary conditions that are imposed. As I think the noble Viscount himself said, the most common conditions are the location and screening from view of
  914
  plant, the disposal of waste material and the order of working; and secondly, restoration, which may take the form of filling the excavation where materials are available, or in other cases the grading and replacement of the topsoil, together with the removal of the plant when the working is finished. I think most people would grant that reasonable steps of this nature should be taken to minimise both the offence caused by the process of working and the permanent damage to the land worked and to the surrounding areas. If one tries to face up to the question, "Should that be at the public expense" (which is really what the Amendment suggests), "or at the expense of the person who does the work, as part of the expense of doing the work?" I must say that, up to date, I think that the expense should be that of the person who does the work, and that is what I should recommend to the Committee. If, after considering what I have put to the Committee to-day, my noble friend has any further points which he would like to put to me, I shall be glad to hear them. At the moment, however, I regret that I cannot recommend this Amendment to the Committee, and I hope he will not press it.
  VISCOUNT RIDLEY: I do not by any means insist on the words which I have put down, but I should like to correct or at least refer to one of the points made by the noble and learned Viscount. He said it was a question of who should pay for reasonable restoration. I do not intend this Amendment to mean that. Normally any person operating for minerals should pay for the restoration of normal amenity. My Amendment is to protect the mineral worker from conditions imposed or intended to be imposed by a local authority which may go further than that—which may put upon him the responsibility for matters much wider than what we now consider to be the normal treatment of land in this connection. It has become a standard practice amongst planning authorities at any rate to insist on the conditions to which I referred earlier, but it is in regard to cases where they go beyond that that I had hoped to get some protection for those who are affected. I am sorry that the noble and learned Viscount does not hold out much hope of doing something about it. Of course, these words

  915
  may well be subject to a great deal of criticism. I should have liked to put in "other reasonable conditions," but if I had the noble and learned Viscount would have told me that that would not have been possible. In the circumstances, therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  5.54 p.m.
  LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved, in subsection (3), to leave out paragraph (a). The noble Lord said: I beg to move the next Amendment standing in my name. I appreciate that Amendment No. 37 changes the wording of the paragraph that I am seeking to delete. I think the next Amendment is better drafted than the one in the clause as it now stands, but my objection to it remains the same and anything that I may say in support of my Amendment will apply equally to Amendment No. 37. The paragraph that I seek to delete provides that no compensation is to be payable— here again want to emphasise that we are speaking of cases where there is an established claim—if there is a refusal on the ground that the proposed development is premature because of the order of priority indicated in the development plan of the area in which the land is situated. My objection to this amended provision is that it is far too sweeping. I concede at once that in some cases development might be premature; but I hope the noble and learned Viscount will also concede that there will be many cases where it would not be premature at all, even though the order of priority indicated in the development plan shows that the proposed development is to take place at a later period.
  Let me give an example that will perhaps make the matter more clear to the Committee. It may well be that a development plan provides that redevelopment should take place in certain areas of a town in turn. Area 1 will be dealt with in the next five years; area 2 will be dealt with in the succeeding five years. An applicant comes along in area 2 and because he has an established claim it is conceded that development is proper in respect of his land. He wants to develop that land in anticipation of the redevelopment of area 2. Supposing he is prepared to do it in such a
  916
  way as not to conflict with the scheme of redevelopment, what possible objection can there be to his doing so? Suppose he wants to build a factory in area 2 which it is not proposed to redevelop for five or ten years, and that he wants to build it in that part of area 2 which is zoned for factory development. Can there be any possible objection? Yet he may be refused on the ground that this development is premature, as it would be under the terms of the amended paragraph; and he would not be entitled to his compensation.
  The noble and learned Viscount cannot plead the 1932 Act on this matter: he has got to deal with it on its merits; and he has got to explain not that there will be cases where it would be wrong to permit development but why a person should be deprived of his compensation when this particular development would be quite proper, even though in the order of priority in the development plan the redevelopment of the area might come rather later.
  I want to give the noble and learned Viscount all the hypothetical cases that he can think of. It may be that the local planning authority cannot make up its mind as to whether it is proposed to put a road through the particular site upon which the developer wants to put a factory. I think it might be quite legitimate for the local authority to say in such a case, "Until we can get round to it this particular development will be premature." But supposing there is no question of a road going through or anything else which would interfere with the proposed development, and supposing that it is proposed to carry out this development in an area where this type of development would be quite legitimate, then, merely because in the order of priority it is not proposed to tackle this area as a whole at that stage the applicant loses his compensation, or at any rate has to wait ten years before he can apply again. That seems most unfair.
  One of the justifications for this Bill, we are told, is that the 1947 Act was supposed to have held up development. Is this not a shocking case of holding up development in cases where to do so may be quite unnecessary? I hope the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor will look at this point again, not with a view to cutting out such a provision altogether but in order to ensure that

  917
  it does not go too wide and so prevents quite proper and legitimate development which can do no harm to the community, which will not interfere with the develop-of an area but which will, indeed, be in harmony with it. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 28, line 31, leave out paragraph (a).—(Lord Silkin.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I wonder whether it would be to the convenience of your Lordships if we discussed with this Amendment, Amendment No. 38, standing in the name of my noble friends, as to the number of years. The two Amendments seem to hang together. I do not want the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, to be deprived of the opportunity of expressing his opinion on No. 38.
  LORD SILKIN: I think we can have a wide discussion here; the question of five or ten years is relatively less important than the clause itself.
  LORD AMHERST OF HACKNEY: The Amendment which stands in my name is on a much more limited point: how long, in the case of premature development, a prospective developer has to wait for the money to which he is entitled by his claim under the 1947 Act. The Bill says ten years; I propose that it should be five years. I will not discuss whether or not it is reasonable to refuse the development, on the ground that it is premature, but will deal with the shorter point of time. After all, these claims were already established six years ago and anybody refused development, even if my Amendment is accepted (which means that they will be able to apply again in five years' time), must still wait a total of eleven years from the time the claim was first admitted. Under the Bill as it stands, it may well be sixteen years from the time of admission of development value in that land before the owner can get paid compensation for the refusal of development. Even in a period of ten years the value of that claim tends to halve, which again is an injustice. The five-year period, particularly if the claim is refused under paragraph (a), would allow the authority to review the proposed planning again at the five-yearly planning review. The authority would then be able to come to a decision on whether or not to grant permission and should not again have any "get out" on the ground
  918
  of premature development. I hope, therefore, that the noble and learned Viscount will consider my Amendment sympathetically.
  LORD HYLTON: I wish to support my noble friend Lord Amherst of Hackney on this very limited point. I have ascertained the effect of using deferred tables, as valuers do, over a period of ten years. Taking a capital sum of £1,000 as the agreed loss of development value, that is, compensation, the tables show a reduction in the value of a claim in that period to £640. This is a serious point, because in the original valuation by the Government valuer, when the loss of development value was originally assessed and agreed, the tables had already been brought into operation in establishing the original claim. Therefore, the claim-holder is now suffering through his claim being twice deferred. Even if his claim is deferred for five years, the tables show that in that period his claim, taking it again at £1,000, is reduced to £800. Even on the limited Amendment of my noble friend Lord Amherst of Hackney, the claim-holder loses on a five-year deferment £200 and on a ten-year deferment, £360. On those figures it is extremely difficult to justify any deferment at all, because of the way these mathematical calculations operate.
  Under paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of Clause 21, any amount of deferment can be brought into operation because it deals with
  "any existing deficiency in the provision of water supplies or sewerage services …"
  That provision, of course, can be used as an argument for almost infinite deferment by a local authority if it does not wish to supply these services. In some circumstances ten years may well be the minimum amount of time. I would urge the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor to explain how this deferment period of ten years will not cause very considerable financial hardship and loss to those who have an established claim or to the claim-holder.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I hope that when I have finished noble Lords will consider it has been profitable for me to intervene at this stage. I was impressed but not convinced by the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin because there was one lacuna in the argument which I

  919
  waited in vain for him to fill. The noble Lord's argument was about an extremely silly decision of the planning authority. He asked, what about a case where the local authority will not give permission, although there is no harm in the proposed development, because they have said "We are going to develop in the following order, first one place and then another, then a third"? I say to the noble Lord that the answer to that question is that the owner appeals to the Minister against what is, ex hypothesi, a silly decision. I do not think that one can really deal with this matter on the basis of an argument that decisions are going to be silly. If they are not going to be silly, what is going to be the basis of the decision that the local authority makes? Of course, apart from paragraph (b) (which I am not putting against the noble Lord, because that is a separate matter relating to the question of water supply or sewerage services), the basis must be that the development would be premature, in the light of the development plan, for some good reason.
  I suppose the sort of reason which might affect the planning authority would be the view that sporadic development all round an expanding town is wasteful not only of agricultural land but also in the demands it makes on all types of public services. That might be the reason for the planning authority to stand by their development plan. And that is why the subsection provides that the owners concerned are not to be entitled to compensation because they are made to wait their turn. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Silkin will not think that I am merely being aggravating, but I would remind him—for it is so unusual for him, with his experience, even momentarily to forget one of these many complicated provisions—that temporary restrictions against development could be excluded from compensation under Section 19, (1)(d) of the 1932 Act. So I am, therefore, in the position of having some historical support for the argument which I am putting forward. There is, moreover, a strictly practical explanation underlying the provision. That is, that it would be inconvenient and frustrating for all concerned if compensation were paid on a refusal of permission only to be recovered after a short interval when development could be permitted. That is a point we have to remember. If
  920
  the period of time during which compensation is withheld is too short, plainly there will be a considerable increase in the number of payments and recoveries of compensation, which I think would be unfortunate.
  I come now to the other point which has been urged by my noble friends Lord Amherst of Hackney and Lord Hylton. As they appreciate, and as all your Lordships appreciate, it is very difficult to determine the correct period. In another place we were urged that the period should be as long as fifteen years. To-day my noble friends are proposing that it should be five. I think, taking into account the view which is implicit in Lord Silkin's argument—although I cannot accept it—that it would be right to shorten the period. I want, in these matters, to try to express, when it is possible and practicable, the collective view of the Committee. So, as I say, I think one ought to try to shorten this period. What I suggest to my noble friends is that if they will to-day withdraw their Amendment to make the period five years, then, on the Report stage, I will put down an Amendment shortening the period to seven years. I hope that that will suit your Lordships. I am sorry that I cannot go further to meet Lord Silkin, but I have tried to meet what I feel is the general spirit of the Committee on this matter.
  LORD SILKIN: The noble and learned Viscount has done exactly what I hoped he would not do. He has produced a case where a planning authority is perfectly right. I conceded that in advance. I conceded that there will be many cases in which it would be right to make this decision, and that compensation should be deferred. Then I came to cases where it is not right. I tried to give an example, and the noble and learned Viscount says that my example is silly. He says that if a local authority acts in that way they would probably be upset by the Minister. With great respect, I have seen decisions of this kind. I have had five years' experience in this connection, and I am quite accustomed to seeing decisions made by planning authorities which are quite inexplicable—and which are not always upset on appeal to the Minister. Local authorities do go wrong. Of course if they never do, or if everything is put

  921
  right in the end, the position of which we have been speaking will not arise and the noble and learned Viscount can be quite happy that any injustice will be put right. But I am dealing with cases where injustice is not put right. I am dealing with cases in which refusal to permit development is quite improper—cases in which development can be allowed but somehow is not allowed by the authority and is not allowed on appeal. I should have thought that in this instance, just as in the cases of the other two Amendments I have moved, some provision ought to be made for dealing with cases of that kind, recognising, as I have said, that in cases where it is proper that permission should be deferred the compensation should be deferred. I hope that the noble and learned Viscount will have this matter looked at again. I think that the provision which he is going to move in the next Amendment is too wide. I think that if he looked at the matter again he could find a form of words which probably would meet my case, and would ensure that only in cases where it is wrong that permission should be given to develop will compensation be deferred.
  LORD HYLTON: I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for suggesting a period of seven years instead of ten. That is a small advance. But your Lordships will have observed that the noble and learned Viscount did not base it on any question of equity; he based this reduction in the period of years on administrative convenience. The noble and learned Viscount said that because many claims, or some claims, might have to be paid over on the one hand and then repaid, it would be tiresome—
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I wonder whether my noble friend will allow me to interrupt. I should not like him to be under any misapprehension. That was really part of the argument against abandoning this position. With regard to this period of years, my suggestion is, in a sense, an averaging of all the suggestions made in this Committee, and of all the different points of view that have been put before us. I have tried to find a fair average. I wanted to tell my
  922
  noble friend that, because I should not like him to think that I was confining my remarks to the other point. I am sorry to have interrupted.
  LORD HYLTON: I am obliged to the noble and learned Viscount for putting it so clearly. But to my mind it does not affect the validity of the argument which I am trying to put before your Lordships. So far as I can see at the present time, this really is the sole basis on which an average line is drawn between a number of different periods of years. It is not based on the fact that the claim-holder is out of pocket at the present time and, under the Government's proposals, will be more out of pocket by the use of deferred payment. I am no valuer, but if the valuers' deferred tables are correct, I do not see why the claim-holder should be further out of pocket owing to the provisions of Clause 21. Though I am grateful to the Government for reducing this period to seven years, I must reserve my position and maybe put down a reduced number of years on a further stage of the Bill.
  On Question, Whether the said paragraph (a) shall be deleted?
  THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD O'HAGAN): I think the Contents have it.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If I may raise the point, it is clear that the paragraph is not deleted.
  LORD SILKIN: Its deletion would give the noble and learned Viscount an opportunity of looking at it again before the Report stage.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I should have thought that if the voices had been collected on the noble Lord's Amendment, it would have been negatived, but I do not wish to divide the House. I only want to get the position clear.
  On Question, Amendment negatived.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 28, line 31, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
  ("(a) the order of priority, if any, indicated in the development plan for the area in which

  923
  the land is situated for development in that area;").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD AMHERST OF HACKNEY LORD AMHERST OF HACKNEY had given notice of his intention to move in subsection (3) to leave out "ten" and insert "five."
  The noble Lord said: I have already spoken on this point. I should like to thank the noble and learned Viscount for going some way to meet us, and I shall not move this Amendment.
  VISCOUNT RIDLEY VISCOUNT RIDLEY moved to omit subsection (4). The noble Viscount said: I put down this Amendment because I wished to know why subsection (4) is inserted here. I should have thought that if land were not suitable for development on account of flooding or subsidence, it would not have attracted a very large claim under Part VI, so there would be no point in having it mentioned in this part of the Bill. However, if it was thought to be land which had some development value, in spite of some risk of flooding or subsidence, surely there would be no reason why it should not be left in the same category as any other land with development value. I am wondering whether there may not be some other meaning in this clause. I wonder whether it could not be taken to read that the land is unsuitable on account of its liability to flooding or subsidence by actions which are to be taken later—I am thinking of subsidence due to operations of the National Coal Board, for instance. I do not want to go into great length on the difficulties in connection with that, but I would ask if there is any such reason for it. It seems to me that if the subsection means what it says, it should not be there at all. Perhaps the noble and learned Viscount will tell us what is intended. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 28, line 43, leave out subsection (4).—(Viscount Ridley.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR:The purpose and effect of this Amendment is that it would enable compensation to be claimed where planning permission was refused on the ground that the land was unsuitable for such development because of its existing liability to flooding or subsidence. Again, this provision follows the precedent of the 1932 Act in which
  924
  Section 19 (1) (e) provides that compensation could be excluded in respect of restriction on building where such development by reason of the situation or nature of the land would be likely to involve danger or injury to health. The Government and Parliament of that day took the view that the fact that the foolhardy or unscrupulous might purchase land for development was no reason for paying compensation if permission was refused. I think that argument deserves equal consideration to-day.
  There is another aspect of the problem which I think my noble friend had in mind and which I think your Lordships ought to have in mind—that is, it may well be feared that the provision is inserted and might be used for the purpose of saving the Exchequer money by the attaching of such reasons to a refusal of permission which is really and fundamentally based on totally different grounds. I hope that that is not a ground of fear. I want to assure my noble friend that my right honourable friend the Minister will watch very carefully to ensure that the provision is used only for the purpose for which it is intended, following the lines on which it was inserted and used in the 1932 Act. Again, if my noble friend has any further worries on the point, I shall be pleased to discuss them with him and to consider the matter, but I feel that we should be on safer ground to follow the 1932 Act in this regard.
  VISCOUNT RIDLEY: I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for the information on the second point to which I referred. However, on the main point, are we not back on the same kind of thing as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, were concerned with earlier? The fact is that this is land which has been given a development value and has an admitted claim. If it was not so liable to flooding when the claim was admitted on it in 1947, has it not as much right to be paid for as any other land? I cannot get over that point. The longer we go on this clause, the more inclined I am to follow the Amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and others. This case, particularly, seems to me such a simple one. It is not a question of what is good neighbourliness, what is good planning and what is good manners, but

  925
  a question of fact: did the land or did it not have a development value in 1947? I would submit that the conditions in the 1932 Act are inappropriate, because there was no such thing as an admitted claim in 1932—it had never been heard of. Here, either it was liable to flooding or subsidence in 1947, or it was not, and according to that it was valued. What is the justification for treating this land differently from any other? I cannot feel convinced that this is the right answer.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: As I say, I will willingly have a look at it and consider the point which the noble Viscount has made. On the other hand, I hope he will consider mine, and that we might deal with the matter again on the next stage of the Bill.
  On Question, Amendment negatived.
  VISCOUNT RIDLEY VISCOUNT RIDLEY moved, in subsection (6), to leave out "prohibiting" and insert "either prohibiting or which in effect prohibits." The noble Viscount said: This Amendment is not a difficult one of principle on the admitted claims, or otherwise, but is an endeavour merely to amplify things a little. Subsection (6), which is really a definition one, says:
  "For the purposes of this section a planning decision, whereby permission to develop land is granted subject to a condition prohibiting development. …"
  I should have thought that it would be better if, as I suggest in my Amendment, the words were,
  "either prohibiting or which in effect prohibits."
  One can well imagine a condition which, on the face of it, allows development to happen, but in fact is so costly and so large a condition in relation to the work required to be done that it could prevent the proposed development. Following from that, the land referred to would come within the category of Clause 21. It is really a simple matter, and I do not think I need say more than that. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 29, line 8, leave out ("prohibiting") and insert the said new words.—(Viscount Ridley.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I must confess that there has been a certain amount of speculation in my mind as to what was the real purpose and intention of this Amendment. I found it
  926
  difficult to get an accurate view of what my noble friend had in mind. Therefore, I welcome the chance of considering it further after hearing what he has had to say to-day. I assume that the primary purpose of the Amendment is to provide for the type of condition which, if attached to a permission to develop, would make the development so costly and uneconomic that the permission could not be acted upon. It seemed to me hardly conceivable that such conditions would be imposed, but, even so, I believe that the solution to the problem lies not in the proposed Amendment, which it would be difficult to work, but in good administration by the planning authorities and in exercise of the right of appeal against unreasonable conditions.
  However, there is a slightly different type of condition which I know has received some consideration, and which I should like to mention, because undoubtedly those interested will have had it in mind when they saw the Amendment of my noble friend; that is, a condition which, without prohibiting, development in a specified part of the land, has the effect of sterilising some of the land for the purpose of such development. Such conditions are rare, and my right honourable friend the Minister is aware of only one example. A condition has been imposed stipulating that mineral working should take place in such a way that support is left for the site of a proposed highway. Such so-called "highway corridor" conditions are imposed as infrequently as possible, and are drawn in a form designed to minimise the sterilisation of minerals by a strict demarcation of the line up to which working may take place. I thought that that might be one of the forms of condition which my noble friend had in mind.
  It is difficult to see how an alternative form of condition could be devised which did not have this or some other defect. As I told your Lordships, that is an isolated example, and I should not have thought by itself a sufficient reason for the widening of subsection (6) in the way suggested, because that would admit compensation and dispute about the effect of conditions over a much wider range of possible situations. I hope that in this

  927
  case my noble friend will agree not to press the Amendment, because I should like to consider it once again, having heard his exposition and knowing more clearly what is in his mind. I will consider this, and I shall be glad to give him the decision of Her Majesty's Government on it when we come to the Report stage.
  VISCOUNT RIDLEY: I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount. He referred to one of the points I have in mind. I thought it was a simple one, and that it could be incorporated. However, in view of what the noble and learned Viscount has said, I am pleased to withdraw the Amendment, in the hope that he may be able to tell us something on the point at a later stage.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  6.39 p.m.
  LORD HYLTON LORD HYLTON moved, after subsection (6) to insert:
  "(7) Nothing in this section shall derogate from the operation of any enactment whereby provision is made for the payment of compensation in respect of minerals left unworked for the purpose of affording support for the sewers, water mains or other works of any local authority or statutory undertaker."
  The noble Lord said: This is quite a simple Amendment in a somewhat difficult Bill and it is really self-explanatory. It suggests that where minerals are left unworked for the purpose of affording support for the sewers, water mains or other works of any local authority or statutory undertaker, then nothing in this clause shall derogate from the operation of any enactment whereby provision is made for the payment of compensation. That seems a fair suggestion, because it means that the mineral operator is leaving his own minerals to support these sewers, water mains, and so on, on his property. In that case, I should have thought it was fair to make a provision that nothing should prevent his getting a reasonable compensation for such minerals. I do not think I need say anything else. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 29, line 10, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Hylton.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I can assure my noble friend that this Amendment is unnecessary, and that the position which he seeks to safeguard is
  928
  already well safeguarded and defended. I do not think there is any doubt about the matter at all. The other enactments which my noble friend's Amendment mentions are presumably those collectively referred to as the Mining Code, which makes provision for compensation at full market value for minerals which are sterilised at the direction of a statutory undertaker, or similar body having powers of compulsory purchase, which owns the surface of the land and which considers that the working of minerals beneath will injure its undertaking. But there can be no overlapping of these provisions with the provisions of Clause 21, and no derogation of rights under those enactments. If a planning permission stipulates that a developer may not work a certain part of the area of application, then he will be able to claim compensation under Clause 21 (6). No question of Mining Code compensation in respect of such sterilised land can arise—this is a point which I think is most important for my noble friend—as the developer has no planning permission to work it and, therefore, can constitute no danger to the undertaking. If, on the other hand, planning permission has been granted for an area, and an appropriate authority sterilises part of that area under the Mining Code provisions, then the right to compensation under the Code is unaffected. In other words, those for whom my noble friend is concerned have it both ways, and I think he can be completely reassured.
  LORD HYLTON: I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount. It shows the complexity of the Bill that it could already have been covered in some other portion. I regret wasting the time of the Committee with such a small point, and I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause 21, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 22:
  No compensation if certain other development permitted
  22.—(1) Compensation under this Part of this Act shall not be payable in respect of a planning decision whereby permission is refused for the development of land if, not-withstanding that refusal, there is available with respect to that land planning permission for development to which this section applies:
  Provided that where such permission is available with respect to part only of the land, this section shall have effect only in so far as the interest subsists in that part.
  (2) Where a claim for compensation under this Part of this Act is made in respect of an interest in any land, planning permission for development to which this section applies shall be taken for the purposes of this section to be available with respect to that land or a part thereof if, immediately before the Minister gives notice of his findings in respect of that claim, there is in force with respect to that land or part a grant of, or an undertaking by the Minister to grant, planning permission for some such development, subject to no conditions other than such as are mentioned in subsection (2) of the last preceding section.
  (3) This section applies to any development of a residential, commercial or industrial character, being development which consists wholly or mainly of the construction of houses, flats, shop or office premises, or industrial buildings (including warehouses), or any combination thereof.
  6.44 p.m.
  LORD WISE LORD WISE moved, in subsection (1) after "applies" to insert:
  "and the value of the land is not depreciated as the result of such decision:"
  The noble Lord said: Perhaps the noble and learned Viscount will be able to meet us in what we are proposing in this Amendment. I am encouraged in this by the fact that on Second Reading of this Bill he mentioned this particular clause and suggested that at a later stage it could be discussed more fully. In many ways it seems to me that this clause has a measure of unfairness in it, and particularly in regard to the first subsection. Noble Lords will observe that it says:
  "Compensation … shall not be payable in respect of a planning decision whereby permission is refused for the development of land …"
  That permission may be refused in regard to the whole of the land which is required for development, or it may be refused in part. In that subsection there is at the moment no basis upon which the planning authority or the Minister can come to a fair decision as between claim-holders. For instance, an owner of one plot of land or one area of land may receive planning permission, but on an adjoining plot or area the owner may be refused. In that refusal, the planning authority may suggest to him alternative schemes of development. Those alternatives may not be in the least what the owner of the land desires. They may be outside his province of development; they may depreciate the property, and they may be futile or according to the whims of the local authority or even of the Minister himself. For that reason, there is a great hardship and, may be, a
  930
  considerable loss imposed on the claim-holder.
  The Amendment which we propose is that some basis should be arrived at to limit, if necessary, the actions of the planning authority or, at any rate, to suggest to them that they should be reasonable in their desires and should not in any shape or form create a hardship with one owner against possibly an adjoining owner. The Amendment which is proposed is that these words should be added at the end of line 17:
  "and the value of the land is not depreciated as the result of such decision."
  I can readily understand that the noble and learned Viscount may find difficulty in arriving at what is depreciation or the value of that depreciation. If that is the case, the wording can be altered. I noticed that in another place the Minister was toying with the words, "reasonably remunerative development." That may be a solution. But at any rate what we seek to do is this, and I know that it will find favour on both sides of the Committee: we seek to exercise the law fairly as between adjoining owners or, at any rate, between individuals. The subsection as it stands does not appear to me to bring about that desired effect and I hope, therefore, that even if the Amendment which I propose cannot be accepted, the noble and learned Viscount will give us an assurance that between now and a later stage this particular subsection will be looked at in order to put the matter right and proper as between claims-holders. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 29, line 17 after ("applies") insert the said words.—(Lord Wise.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: As the noble Lord who moved this Amendment has indicated, there are drafting difficulties about it, and, as he guessed, it is not in a form which can be accepted. As I said earlier in this debate, however, I want to consider the substance of these points. I have assumed that the object of this Amendment, and also of the proposed deletion of subsection (3), is to widen the range of the permission the grant of which will bar compensation, but at the same time to ensure that compensation is excluded only where the permission given would be not less valuable than the permission refused. That is the sort of idea that I have assumed is behind

  931
  the Amendment. Apart from the drafting point, of course it would be contrary to the Government's intention to exclude compensation automatically owing to the grant of permission of a kind falling outside the description in subsection (3).
  It has been broadly agreed throughout the progress of the Bill that residential, commercial or industrial development is of a reasonably remunerative character, and that if development of any of these kinds is permitted there is no occasion to consider compensation for refusal of permission to carry out development of other kinds. This does not mean that compensation is automatically payable where something is permitted which is not within subsection (3). Compensation, in that event, is to be based on the depreciation sustained, and any permission which has been or is granted will be brought into the reckoning, and will operate to reduce the depreciation. We have not been able to adopt the intention that automatic exclusion shall operate only where the alternative permission given would be no less valuable than the one refused, because we are always brought up against the general principle which I enunciated—and which, indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Silkin enunciated in slightly different and probably better words—that an owner, although entitled to the reasonable use of his land, is not entitled to exploit it to the maximum where this would involve detriment to his neighbours or to the community. These are the difficulties that I feel, and in these circumstances I should like to consider this point again. I will consider what the noble Lord, Lord Wise, has said, and perhaps it would be possible for us to have a discussion between the two sides. Having therefore broken the ground of the problem and seen the difficulties which face each side, I suggest that we do not decide it at the moment, but that we come back to it at Report stage.
  LORD WISE: While thanking the noble and learned Viscount for receiving the matter in the way he has, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  LORD HYLTON LORD HYLTON moved, in subsection (2), after "Minister," where that word occurs a second time, to insert, "or the local planning authority." The noble Lord said: This is a small Amendment
  932
  but I believe it to be important to this part of the Bill. This clause, which is of great difficulty and complexity to understand, on the whole gives the impression that where planning permission for some such development is going to be given it can be given only by the Minister, and it is thought that in many cases this permission, or in some cases lesser planning permission, might well be given by the local planning authority. The reason for that is that if all these matters are to be referred to the Minister, the Minister will be overwhelmed with applications from all the planning authorities in the country. There are over sixty administrative counties, not counting any of the county boroughs, and it means, in our view, that, because of the great number, the Minister will not be able to deal with a great many of the applications for some such other development. That, of course, is a supposition, and no doubt the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, would be able to tell the House whether such a supposition is likely to be correct or not. Those of us who have had experience of these matters only in local government circles do not know what congestion might arise if this clause were to pass in its present form. I do not think I need to say anything further at this moment. I beg to move the Amendment.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 29, line 28, after ("Minister") insert ("or the local planning authority").—(Lord Hylton.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I feel, after the speech of my noble friend and having regard to his great experience in these matters, that this raises a difficult point, but I should like to put before him the views which we have formed about it, so that he will understand how the difficulties appear to us. Broadly, the point is whether it would be right and convenient that local planning authorities should be given the power, which they do not at present possess, to give undertakings to grant planning permission. These, in the context of the present clause, could have the effect of excluding compensation.
  As your Lordships know, it has been argued that for them to have this power would make for speedy and convenient administration, since certain cases, in which the authorities found it possible

  933
  to give undertakings, need never come before the Minister or need never be considered in detail by him. On the other hand, the Minister (and I must confess I see the force of his view) thinks that this would mean an unnecessary and, indeed, unfortunate interference with the existing arrangements under the Act of 1947, which enable authorities to deal formally only with applications which come before them and on which their decisions are subject to appeal to the Minister. If the Amendment were made, a series of further Amendments would be required to provide for rights of appeal. Quite apart from this consideration, I think it would be wrong that planning authorities should add to their existing burdens the task of considering in detail, on their own initiative, whether they ought to give an undertaking to grant permission for some development which has not been sought.
  Responsibility for the payment of compensation rests with the Minister, and although he will obviously require the assistance of local planning authorities in deciding whether or not to give an undertaking when the need appears to him to arise, and he will expect authorities to indicate to him, in forwarding claims for compensation, whether they would be prepared to grant permission for other development, he would consider it unfortunate if authorities felt bound, as they would under the Amendment, to consider whenever they turned down an application whether they ought to supplement their decision with an undertaking. I feel, and my right honourable friend feels strongly, that that would inevitably slow down, instead of speed up, the administration of planning.
  I have tried to put shortly but accurately the doubts that the Minister has over this change in procedure, but, as I say, I am struck, as I am sure the whole House is, by the fact that it comes from my noble friend with his great experience in this field. Therefore, again I put to him the suggestion that we might both avail ourselves of the advantage open to us of considering the arguments which we have respectively advanced and have another talk and another look at this on Report stage. If that commends itself to my noble friend—I am sure he realises the spirit in which I am advancing it—it may shorten our proceedings this evening.
  7.1 p.m.
  VISCOUNT RIDLEY: I feel surprised to hear my noble and learned friend say that it is thought that this would slow down the procedure of planning. I remember quite often, when we have been considering planning applications, our saying amongst ourselves in committee: "It would be all right if he would ask to do something else there, but what the particular applicant wants will not do." I should have thought it would fit in very well in practice for there to be power to make suggestions on what would be the right use of the land in question. As planning authorities, we have never had the power to do that. I have often wanted it and I think others have, too. From the point of view of slowing up planning, I do not think it would do the damage that has been suggested.
  There is this to be remembered: that, while the Minister is responsible for the payment of compensation and must have the power to decide whether the act requiring compensation is appropriate, he is not responsible for not paying compensation. To leave a provision of this sort within the sphere of a local authority would not at all hamper the Minister in carrying out his responsibility. I hope something can be done about this matter because not only would it be of benefit to the planning authorities, but also it would help quite a number of people who are genuinely in doubt as to what they should do with their land. This clause is meant to catch people who, as it were, are "trying it on," but there are people who have genuine proposals for the use of land and who would genuinely benefit from suggestions as to how the land might be used. If you ask almost any planning officer in the country about this, you will find that, when he is approached by somebody for planning permission, he will nearly always say informally, in conversation, to such an applicant, "That land ought to be used for so and so." Developed from that, a useful procedure could be established in that way.
  LORD SILKIN: I am all in favour of local planning authorities being helpful to applicants. I think there are cases where they are not as helpful as they might be. They ought to be approachable. It ought to be possible for applicants to come

  935
  along and talk over unofficially with the planning authority what is possible and what is not. I believe that in a large number of cases that is already done. Where it is not done, we should always advocate that it should be. But this Amendment goes much further than that. It empowers the local planning authorities to give undertakings as to what will be permitted, and I am inclined to agree with the noble and learned Viscount that that might very well slow up the administration of planning.
  Who gives the undertaking? Is it the planning officer? He is not in a position to give an undertaking. I have known cases where a planning officer has said, "If you do so and so, that will be perfectly all right and I will recommend it." and, on the strength of that, an application has been made; but the committee has turned down the planning officer. Therefore he is not in a position to give an undertaking. Who is? Is it the planning authority? Is it feasible for a planning authority to have an application in front of them and to give an undertaking that, if some other application not before them is put before them, they will agree to it? I have great doubts as to whether that is practicable or whether it would be helpful. If we could incorporate a statutory obligation on planning authorities to be helpful and to give advice freely to applicants, I should be all for it, but I think the noble Lord is going a little far in providing for their being in a position to give an undertaking that they will grant an application which has not yet been put before them. However, the noble and learned Viscount is going to consider it. I wish him joy. I shall be greatly interested to see the outcome of this consideration.
  LORD HYLTON: I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for agreeing to look into this matter. As the House will see, it is a matter of some complexity of which I imagine only few noble Lords here this afternoon have practical experience. But I am much encouraged by the support that my noble friend, Lord Ridley, gave me. He gave me an almost unqualified blessing. On the other hand, the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, thought it was going rather too far. Therefore, in the circumstances I think it would be wise for me at this stage to withdraw this Amendment. I will consult
  936
  those who know more about it than I do myself and perhaps put down something at a later stage. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  LORD WISE: In view of the arrangements which we have come to in regard to Amendment No. 42, Amendment No. 44 will not be moved.
  Clause 22 agreed to.
  Clause 23 [Measure of depreciation for assessing compensation]:
  LORD MANCROFT: Earlier on this afternoon, my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor introduced an Amendment and told your Lordships that it was purely a drafting Amendment. Your Lordships then discussed it for three-quarters of an hour. It is, therefore, with some trepidation that I announce that this Amendment also is a purely drafting Amendment. It is obvious that the assessment of depreciation should take account of all previous decisions which have given rise to compensation, whether that compensation was payable under Part II or Part V of the Bill. It is to bring that into effect that this Amendment is designed. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 30, line 15, after ("Part") insert ("or Part V").—(Lord Mancroft.)
  LORD SILKIN: I hope we shall not discuss this for three-quarters of an hour, but surely this is more than a drafting Amendment. The noble Lord really should not introduce this as a drafting Amendment when it is intended to bring a large part of this Bill into the operation of Clause 23, which the clause does not at present cover. There is no objection to that. I will support the noble Lord in the Amendment, but it is not drafting.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: I am now very frightened of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, because, if I say that something is drafting I shall be taken to task, while if I try to pretend that it is not drafting, I shall be accused of wasting his time. I merely say here that it appears that the words that we wish to leave out are unnecessary. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, will agree with me there. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 30, line 28, leave out from ("refused") to end of line 29.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  LORD SILKIN: They are unnecessary.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: I am given to understand that this also is drafting. Accordingly, I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 30, line 31, at end insert ("applied for").—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: This Amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 46. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 30, line 34, leave out lines 34 and 35.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 23, as amended, agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: Amendment No. 49 is consequential on Amendment No. 31. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Transpose Clause 23, as amended, to after Clause 27.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 24 [Supplementary provisions as to calculation of depreciation]:
  LORD MANCROFT: This also is a drafting Amendment, designed to make the subsection intelligible without reference to Clause 26 (1). I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 30, line 38, leave out from ("Act") to end of line 43 and insert ("in addition to any previous decision, account shall be taken of any further grant of, and of any undertaking to grant, planning permission, being a grant or undertaking in force immediately before").—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 24, as amended, agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: This is a consequential transpositional Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Transpose Clause 24, as amended, to after Clause 27.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 25 [General provisions as to claims for compensation]:
  LORD MANCROFT: Amendment No. 52 is also drafting. It seems desirable that owners of other interests should be notified of the making of a claim if the
  938
  claimant refuses to accept a Minister's contention that his claim fails at the outset. I think that is reasonable. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 32, line 14, leave out ("in any other case") and insert ("unless the claim is withdrawn").—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 25, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 26 agreed to.
  Clause 27 [Supplementary provisions as to review of planning decisions]:
  7.15 p.m.
  LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved to omit subsection (1). The noble Lord said: I move this Amendment in order to elicit an explanation from the noble and learned Viscount. Clause 26 provides for the possibility of the Minister reviewing the decision of the local planning authority where he thinks that the decision is wrong, even though there is no appeal, and he can give a direction. Clause 27 (1) provides that, before giving a direction, he shall afford an opportunity for the authority or the person affected to appear before him. The point of my Amendment is that there is no machinery in the Bill, and no obligation on the Minister, to inform the person affected that he proposes to review the decision or to issue a direction. I wonder how the person who is entitled to be heard gets to know. This may be a small point, or it may be something which it is not necessary to incorporate in legislation, but I should have thought it would be necessary to provide, where the Minister is contemplating issuing a direction or reviewing a decision, that he should notify the person affected; and then, if that person wants to be heard, he should be entitled to be heard. The Bill assumes that somehow a person affected gets to know; it assumes that the Minister has somehow got to know the decision; it assumes that the person affected gets to know that the Minister is intending to issue a direction, and then it says that this person is entitled to be heard. Strictly speaking, I suppose that I should have set out tie machinery that I suggest should be provided for informing the person affected, but that would be a different piece of drafting which, in the circumstances, I thought it more appropriate for the official draftsman to undertake. My purpose in moving the Amendment is to

  939
  point out what seems to be, in the words of the noble and learned Viscount, a lacuna in this provision. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 33, line 27, leave out subsection (1).—(Lord Silkin.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I confess that we were a little at a loss to know the purpose of this Amendment. Now that I realise that it is put down in this form, as an exploratory Amendment, in order to get the procedure more clearly set out, the parts of the argument that I have prepared as to the desirability for a hearing and with which I had hoped to fascinate the Committee, now fall by the board. I realise that the noble Lord approves of there being a hearing but would like to have more definite steps indicated as to how the hearing could be obtained. I confess that I thought that it would arise simply from correspondence between the parties, it becoming clear in the Department that this was a case where a hearing was necessary to do justice to either of the parties. In view of the noble Lord's remarks, I should like to have another look at the matter, and when I have done so I will communicate with him upon it.
  LORD SILKIN: In view of that assurance, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  LORD MILNER OF LEEDS LORD MILNER OF LEEDS moved, after subsection (1) to insert:
  "(2) Where, by virtue of the last preceding subsection, both the local planning authority who gave a planning decision and a person who made, and has not since withdrawn, a claim in respect of that decision (in this subsection called "the parties") are to be heard by a person appointed by the Minister the following provisions shall apply:

  (a) if the Minister sends any written communication to either party with regard to the subject-matter of the hearing he shall at the same time send a copy of his communication to the other party;

  (b) if either party submits to the Minister any written communication with regard to the subject-matter of the hearing the Minister shall, as soon as may be, send a copy of that communication to the other party;

  (c) the parties shall be heard on the same occasion and each of them shall be permitted to comment on the written or oral evidence of the other."

  The noble Lord said: The Committee will remember that Clause 27 (1) provided
  940
  that before giving a direction under Clause 26 the Minister should allow the local planning authority or the claimant to be heard by a person appointed by the Minister for the purpose. The Committee will remember that Clause 26 is concerned with the Minister's review of planning decisions where compensation has been claimed in respect of those decisions under Part II of the Bill. The present Clause 27 is better than the corresponding clause of the Bill as originally introduced, because under that clause notice was to be given to the applicant only where the proposed direction of the Minister was to have the effect of substituting for a decision refusing permission a decision granting it subject to conditions; whereas notice was to have been given to the local planning authority in all cases.
  It would, however, appear that this clause is still defective, because it does not provide that where both the local planning authority and the applicant wish to be heard in respect of the proposed direction under Clause 26 they must be heard at the same time, and must be given the same information and the same opportunity to express their views. It may be (perhaps the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor will tell us) that it is intended in such cases that the planning authority and the applicant should be heard at the same time. If so, surely that should be made clear. This particular Amendment provides, therefore, that:
  "Where … both the local planning authority who gave a planning decision and a person who made, and has not since withdrawn, a claim in respect of that decision … are to be heard by a person appointed by the Minister. …"
  and then follow the provisions (a), (b) and (c)—namely:

  "(a) if the Minister sends any written communication to either party with regard to the subject-matter of the hearing he shall at the same time send a copy of his communication to the other party;

  (b) if either party submits to the Minister any written communication with regard to the subject-matter of the hearing the Minister shall, as soon as may be, send a copy of that communication to the other party;

  (c) the parties shall be heard on the same occasion and each of them shall be permitted to comment on the written or oral evidence of the other."

  941
  I could have wished to insert a provision that there should be legal representation and cross-examination, but perhaps that is too much to ask. Clearly, it is only right and fair that communications from or to either side should be provided by the Minister to the other side, and that the parties should be heard on the same occasion and should have the same opportunity of comment.
  I mentioned on Second Reading the case of an inquiry by a person appointed by the Minister involving a town planning authority, where, after the inquiry had been completed, the local council sent an argumentative letter to the Minister. The Minister, quite properly, supplied a copy of the letter to the other side and it was possible to reply to some extent; but it was thought that the council's letter had some effect on the inspector's mind and hence on the Minister's mind. Some of the representations were not strictly accurate. Had the writer or the representative of the council been subject to cross-examination that would have been made clear—or so it is thought, rightly or wrongly. Whether or not the letter did, in fact, influence the inspector or the Minister, there is a feeling of grievance. It is a possibility which would be removed in the future if Her Majesty's Government accepted this Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 33, line 33, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Milner of Leeds.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I realise the motives which animate the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, in putting forward this Amendment. I also realise that he has tried, in framing it, to put on paper as shortly as can be what we lawyers call the rules of natural justice. I should like to have another look at this point. I should like, again, to put bluntly to your Lordships' House a case very familiar to everyone who has held Ministerial office. Something has been considered; a Minister has done his best; he has applied his mind to it; the parties have stated their views, and he has given his decision. Then somehow, often in a way not unknown to those of us who have sat in another place an attempt is made to reopen the matter. In those circumstances (I am predicating, a case where nothing new is put up, and
  942
  it is merely an attempt to start up what has already been placed before the Minister) there is something to be said for the Minister's being entitled simply to, send a communication back and say "I have given my best attention to this matter and I cannot possibly reopen it." If the noble Lord will give me time to consider this point further, I shall be grateful, and your Lordships' House can then consider it at Report stage.
  LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: On that understanding, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause 27 agreed to.
  Clause 28 agreed to.
  Clause 29 [Apportionment and registration of compensation]:
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The present wording of subsection (4) has been criticised on the grounds that it might be taken as implying that the notice to be registered in the Register of Local Land Charges could not he given once payment of compensation had been made. That is not so, and this Amendment is designed to clarify that point. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 35, line 33, leave out ("is") and insert ("has become").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 29 agreed to.
  Clause 30 [Recovery of compensation on subsequent development]:
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is another small point which has given rise to some doubt. The present wording of subsection (4) appears defective so far as it concerns cases where remission of compensation is confined to part of an area on which the original payment is made. In such circumstances the compensation registered against the land not affected should remain recoverable. As the subsection stands only the sum remitted would remain on the register and it is to correct that point that this Amendment is put down. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 37, line 27, after ("compensation") insert ("in so far as it is attributable to that land").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 30, as amended, agreed to.
  House resumed.

OVERSEAS RESOURCES DEVELOP MENT BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.

BANK OF SCOTLAND ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and (pursuant to the Private Legislature Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1936) deemed to have been read 2a and reported from the Committee.
House adjourned at twenty-eight minutes past seven o'clock.