THE AIR ESTIMATES

HL Deb 26 May 1954 vol 187 cc943-1001

2.48 p.m.

LORD DOUGLAS OF KIRTLESIDE rose to call attention to the Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air to accompany the Air Estimates, 1954–55 (Cmd. 9076); and to move for Papers. The noble and gallant Lord said: My Lords, in rising to move the Motion which stands in my name on the Order Paper I cannot but reflect on the vast changes in aviation and in the strength and equipment of the Royal Air Force which have taken place since the day, nearly forty years ago, when I first joined the Royal Flying Corps. When I contrast the rude contraptions of canvas, wire and wood on which I first learned to fly, with the sleek, gleaming monsters in which one travels nowadays, I cannot help being impressed by the great progress which has been made in the design and construction of aircraft and in their operation. I suppose that in the last thirty or forty years there is no field of human endeavour in which greater strides have been made than in aviation—except, possibly, the wonders of radio and radar. All this has happened in the course of little more than a generation. One of the results of this rapid advance in technique in aviation is that one becomes quickly out of date. It is barely six years since I left active service with the Royal Air Force, yet even in that time immense strides in technical efficiency and complexity have been made. So that it is with a proper sense of diffidence that I propose to make some comments, and perhaps a few criticisms, on the Air Estimates, 1954–55.

In the field of defence I think it can be truly said that the R.A.F. has now grown into a position of pre-eminence. In the White Paper entitled Statement on Defence, 1954, which we discussed in this House some weeks ago, there occur such phrases as these: The primary deterrent remains, however, the atomic bomb … Again: The Air Force has the major deterrent rôle. And again: We intend as soon as possible to build up in the Royal Air Force a force of modern bombers capable of using the atomic weapon to the fullest effect. A strong and efficient force of medium bombers is of the greatest importance to us both for our own security and for the defence of Western Europe. These are very significant words. They point to the fact that our discussion of the Air Estimates this afternoon must have as its somewhat sinister background the atomic bomb, including the more recently developed hydrogen bomb.

I should like to spend a few minutes discussing this very important question, because I feel that we cannot sensibly talk about the Air Estimates without some understanding of the immense problem involved in the atomic bomb. I am one of those who firmly believe that the atomic bomb, and still more the hydrogen bomb, is a powerful deterrent to the outbreak of World War III. The results of using these weapons are so catastrophic and so horrible to contemplate that I do not believe that any nation would willingly start a war which would involve the use of these weapons. Therefore it is possible, in spite of what some people say, to regard the hydrogen bomb as fundamentally beneficent in its effect, since, if it can prevent the outbreak of World War III, it will have contributed much to the wellbeing of mankind.

It would be wrong, however, to claim too much for the hydrogen bomb, since, while we can hope that it may prove a strong deterrent to the outbreak of a major war, I doubt whether it can be regarded as a deterrent in the case of minor or local wars, such as we have recently experienced in Korea and are now suffer-in Indo-China. In this respect, I disagree with the statement made in the White Paper on Defence, which reads as follows: As the deterrent continues to grow, it should have an increasing effect upon the cold war by making less likely such adventures on the part of the Communist world as their aggression in Korea. I cannot see how the atomic bomb could act as a deterrent in wars of that nature. I do not believe that any sane person would contemplate using the atomic bomb in such circumstances, and so, for these minor and local wars, I think we must continue to rely on the conventional weapons.

There has been a considerable outcry amongst certain sections of the public advocating the abolition of the H-bomb, but in view of what I have said about the effect of the H-bomb as a deterrent to a major war, it is doubtful whether its abolition would be of advantage to the world unless it were accompanied also by a general disarmament in conventional weapons. The other day I read in The Times a report of a speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge, which I thought summed up the problem very well. He said: Any rational person considering the hydrogen bomb must say quite clearly that the use of such weapons must be stopped; but to say simply that you wilt abolish the hydrogen bomb alone seems to me utterly absurd, because if all the other weapons were left, the whole of free Europe would be at the instant mercy of the despotic Soviet forces. The abolition of war with any weapons is the only rational aim the scientists have left us. That seems to me to be sound sense. It has also been suggested—indeed, it was strongly advocated in the debate in another place on the Air Estimates—that we ought to give up the idea of possessing a strategic bomber force, and that we should leave this form of warfare to our friends the Americans. I do not share this view. On the contrary, I believe that this great country should do its share in providing what I regard as the greatest deterrent to World War III. We should not expect the Americans to "do our dirty work for us." As Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor said recently, in an interesting broadcast entitled "The Revolution in Strategy": The gold mine of knowledge and skill in the bomber trade—in technique, design and invention, and in aptitude and battle experience, that we in this country have—we must contribute to the common cause. The bomber is the primary agent of air mastery. If we want to remain a first-class Power, we cannot possibly leave to an ally, however staunch and loyal, the monopoly of this instrument of such decisive importance in these massive issues of war and peace. Indeed, our voice in world affairs and in the conduct of strategy, if unfortunately war should come, will depend, to some extent, perhaps to an appreciable extent, for its efficacy on the possession of an adequate air striking force.

As I have said, the White Paper on Defence says that we intend as soon as possible to build up a force of modern bombers capable of using the atomic weapon; that is, a powerful strategic bomber force. With that sentiment I am in full agreement. But there is singularly little mention of this intention in the Memorandum accompanying the Air Estimates. Indeed, all that is said on this subject in the Memorandum is: The re-equipment and expansion of Bomber Command will continue during the next twelve months period. That, surely, is a very pedestrian statement. No doubt, security considerations had something to do with the reticence of the Secretary of State on this subject, but I think we are entitled to ask him some questions, although I am sure we shall understand if he is unable to answer them all. One question I should like to ask him is: Why is it that we have under development three types of medium Vbombers—the Valiant, the Vulcan and the Victor? Undoubtedly, the size of the bomber force that this country can afford will be limited, and to have three different types of aircraft in that force will be, I suggest, both inefficient and wasteful.

I know what the difficulties are. It is difficult in the early stages of development to make up your mind which force to back, so that one tends to defer "backing one's fancy" as long as possible, with the result that in the end you find yourself committed to all three types. Indeed, that is precisely what happened before the last war in regard to the equipment of Bomber Command. I must confess that, by virtue of my appointment at that time, I must share some of the blame—if there be any blame—for what happened. In those days before the war we had three types of heavy bomber under development—the Stirling, the Halifax and the Manchester, which later became the Lancaster. We proceeded with the development of all three types until, as I have said, under the pressure of events it was decided to go ahead with the production of all three types. Looking back on that, I cannot help feeling that it was a mistake, and that we should have made up our minds at an earlier stage to produce one, or at the most two, of these three types of bombers. If, shortly after the outbreak of war, by a stroke of the magician's wand, we could have converted the production lines of the Stirling and the Halifax to producing Lancasters, everyone would have been delighted, and it would have been greatly to the advantage of Bomber Command. I hope, therefore, that, before it is to late, the Air Staff will make up their mind which of these three V-class bombers is the best, and concentrate production on that type, or, at the most, on two out of the three types.

I now want to turn to the question of fighter defence, and in particular the defence of this country against air attack. There seems to be a good deal of pessimism floating around on this topic, and it is even alleged that there is no defence against the modern bomber. This has led certain misguided people to say that Civil Defence is no good, and that we should do away with our Civil Defence organisation. It is a curious fact that in time of peace optimism is always on the side of the bomber attack, and the efficacy of air defence tends to be minimised. I remember that it was the same before the last war. A celebrated Prime Minister once said. "The bomber will always get through"—he was a Conservative Prime Minister. This, however, I have always regarded as a misleading half-truth. If a large number of bombers is sent over, it is fairly certain that a proportion will get through. But the question is: What proportion? It is up to us, for the sake of the people of this country, to ensure that that proportion will be as small as possible. Indeed, if the proportion of bombers shot down is high enough, the enemy's effort will quickly dwindle, apart from the effects on the morale of his air crews.

The main defence against bomber attack is still the pilot-manned fighter, and here at the present time the picture seems to be somewhat unsatisfactory. The majority of our fighter squadrons are still equipped with the obsolescent Meteor. We have two new and, I understand, very good fighters on the stocks, the Hunter and the Swift, but these are very slow in coming into the squadrons. Some Swifts have reached the squadrons, but I read in The Times the other day that these, for the time being, have been grounded. The Hunter, I understand, was due to come into the squadrons some months ago, but that again has been delayed for technical modifications. I suppose one can hardly blame the Secretary of State personally for this state of affairs, but it does seem to me that the aircraft industry and possibly the Ministry of Supply have let him down. I am glad, however, to hear that the new all-weather fighter, the Javelin, is making good progress, and I understand that twenty of these fighters have been ordered primarily for use as prototypes. This, I think, is a sound move, since in my experience we tend to order too few prototypes, with the result that the development of the type is held up for lack of sufficient aircraft for trial and testing, and for the trial installation of armament and other equipment.

There is one question in regard to fighters that I should like to ask the Secretary of State. We have at present two basic types of fighters—interceptor fighters, such as the Hunter and the Swift, and tactical fighters, such as the Venom, which is the new equipment for the Second Tactical Air Force. Obviously, as with the bombers, it would be better if we could have one type of fighter, if that were possible, though I am quite prepared to be told that it is impracticable. Is it thought that these two types of fighters will tend to diverge, or is it possible to look forward to using one type for both types of work? And what about the light fighter, about which we have seen a good deal of propaganda lately in the Press, particularly the aeronautical Press? Does the Secretary of State believe that there is a place in our armoury for the light fighter, and, if so, would it be used as an interceptor or as a tactical fighter, or for both purposes?

It is obvious that, in considering the problem of air defence, the question of guided missiles assumes tremendous importance, and I am glad to hear that good progress is being made with the air-to-air guided missile, and that our new types of fighters are capable of carrying these weapons. All I can say about that is, the sooner the better. The development of the ground-to-air guided missile is also obviously of great importance, since it hardly seems likely that ordinary anti-aircraft guns will be able to cope with fast bombers flying at 40,000 to 50,000 feet. Indeed, it looks to me as though we are going through a phase in which there is a gap between the speed of the bomber and the development of effective anti-bomber weapons. I think the bomber, for the time being, is a jump ahead. The sooner we can close that gap the better, and it seems to me that development of guided missiles of all types is the only answer.

Turning to Coastal Command, one notices in the Memorandum accompanying the Air Estimates that there is no mention of the development of the flying boat. I know we cannot afford everything, and questions of priorities come in, but I cannot help feeling that it is a mistake to have, to all intents and purposes, stopped the development of the flying boat. We found the flying boat extraordinarily useful in the past and, indeed, in the Memorandum accompanying the Estimates mention is made in two paragraphs of the useful work done by flying boats during the past year. Moreover, we have in this country a great fund of experience and skill in the design and construction of flying boats, which it would seem foolish to throw away. I notice that the Americans are still busy with the development of flying boats. I would therefore ask the Secretary of State to see whether in the next year's Estimates a sum of money, however small, could be set aside for the development of a successor to that great old aircraft, the Sunderland. No doubt it would not fall directly on his Vote—it would fall on the Vote of the Ministry of Supply—but it would be as a result of representations from him that such a sum of money would be included in next year's Estimates.

I should like to say a few words about Transport Command, but I am afraid that my comments might be rather "near the knuckle" since, as your Lordships are aware, by virtue of my present appointment, I am precluded from speaking on any controversial subject which touches upon civil aviation. I will therefore leave this question to other noble Lords to deal with. But I should like to say something about one subject which is very close to my heart, and that is the development of the helicopter. I can find no mention whatsoever of helicopters in the Memorandum on the Air Estimates, and I cannot avoid the impression that there is a marked indifference in the minds of the Air Staff to the development of this type of aircraft. In some ways this is natural. As I have said, money is limited and one cannot do everything one wishes to do, and, in the eyes of the Air Staff—I think rightly—bombers and fighters come first. But the helicopter is of importance to the Navy for antisubmarine duties, and the Army will undoubtedly require big helicopters to assist in its mobility. There is also the question of the civil application of helicopters. I am one of those who believe that in the next ten years all the shorter air routes up to 200 miles in this country and on the Continent will be flown by big multi-engined helicopters coming into the middle of cities.

Another point is that, fortunately—and this is not the case, by any means, with all types of aircraft—the civil and military requirements of helicopters broadly coincide, so that the development of one assists the other. There is no doubt that the development of the helicopter in this country is lagging and we are being outstripped by our friends the Americans. My impression is that there is not enough pressure or sense of urgency behind helicopter development. I gather from an answer to a Question put in another place that considerably more money will be spent on the development of the helicopter in the current year. This is all to the good hut, unfortunately, it is too late. We should have made our effort two, three or four years ago if we were going to keep pace with American development. I would urge that the development of the helicopter should be pressed on by all means and with all speed.

Now I should like to turn to the paragraphs in the Memorandum which deal with personnel. With most of what is said in those paragraphs I am in full agreement, but I cannot help sharing the Secretary of State's disappointment in the drop in the number of young men coming forward for training as pilots and navigators. I find it difficult to understand, since I have detected no signs of deterioration in the courage and enterprise of the youth of this country, and aviation still remains one of the most fascinating professions. Whatever the explanation, I agree with the steps that are being taken to remedy this state of affairs. The Cranwell scholarship scheme should certainly appeal to the right type of boy in considerable numbers. The increase in pay for the middle ranks of officer in the R.A.F. should also help, since it will improve the prospects in middle life of those entering the Service as pilots. But, most of all, I agree with the proposal to abolish the short-service commission and to substitute for it a twelve-year commission. Personally, with all due deference to my noble and, I may say, my real friend, the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard, who is present this afternoon, I have always thought that the short-service commission of four or five years duration was a mistake. It meant that in the old days we used to lose large numbers of officers who had just reached the most useful stage of their flying careers, and had to take on in their place, and train, young inexperienced men whom again we lost as soon as they became really proficient operational pilots.

I know the arguments that used to be advanced in favour of the short-service commission—there are quite a number—but I have always thought that they were outweighed by the disadvantages which I have mentioned. In pre-war days, aircraft were comparatively simple to fly and operate, compared with the highly complicated and very speedy modern types. It obviously takes several years—probably three or four—and great expense to train a young man to be a proficient operational pilot on a modern type of aircraft, and it would be madness to turn these pilots out of the Service just when they had reached a stage of real usefulness and experience. That is why I agree with the Secretary of State's decision to stop the training as pilots of the National Service entry. With this new type of 12-year commission, it will be possible for an officer to give eight or nine years of service as a fully experienced operational pilot, and this should be invaluable in raising the efficiency of the Air Force.

Turning to the question of reserves policy, I also agree with the Secretary of State's policy of maintaining a smaller aircrew reserve at a much higher standard of efficiency. It is in the first few months of a major war that it will be of supreme importance to have a highly-trained reserve of aircrew. It is readiness on the first day of war that counts. A man who requires, say, a year's further training before he is fit for operations may well never get into the war at all. Finally, a point in regard to the training of other rank reservists. I understand that there are 125,000 Class "H" reservists—that is, ex-National Service men—at the present time, and that these are liable to come up for training every year for three and a half years. My facts may not be completely accurate, but I believe that they are approximately correct. Out of these 125,000 Class "H" reservists, 30,000 have been earmarked to do training in Civil Defence. A further number, somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000, are going to be called up this year and attached to Regular units, where they will be trained by those units as their immediate reinforcement in war. This seems to me an excellent idea and one which ought to be extended. Indeed, it seems to me that there is no reason why it should not be extended to every unit at home in the R.A.F. It is surely of inestimable advantage for a reservist to know to what unit he is going on the outbreak of war, and to have done some training in time of peace with that unit. As I say, however, I understand that only some 10,000 or 20,000 reservists are coming up for this form of training this year, which means that some 70,000 or 80,000 Class "H" reservists will not be called up at all and will get no training. This, of course, is inequitable, and I think that all men should, if possible, be treated alike. Would it not be possible to arrange next year for the whole of the Class "H" reservists to be called up for training on the excellent scheme of attachment to front-line units which is set forth in the Secretary of State's Memorandum?

I have only one more thing to say and that is a general point—indeed, it is almost a platitude. It is an essential principle of air power that only the best is good enough—the best aircraft, the best armament, the best radio and radar. Quality is far more important than quantity, and this is even more true in the atomic era of to-day than it was in the past. I have no reason to believe that the Air Ministry are departing from this doctrine but I should like to hear from the lips of the Secretary of State, in the course of his remarks, some confirmation. I beg to move for Papers.

3.16 p.m.

VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD

My Lords, there is no Member of this House who is more entitled to move a Motion of this kind than the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside. He has held some of the highest commands in the Air Force, both in peace and in war, and I am sure that we have all listened with great interest to the many important points that he has raised in his speech this afternoon. I am going to confine my remarks to the second part of his speech, the half of his speech that dealt with personnel. I regard the personnel side of the question as perhaps the most important of all the questions covered in the Air Ministry White Paper. I am not sure whether we have all realised the gravity of the position: the fact that in the next five or ten years we may find the shortage of flying and technical personnel the dominating question in the Air Force. What is the present position? We are spending this year £500 million upon the Air Estimates. When I first introduced the Air Estimates I was criticised for being extravagant with Estimates of £11 million. We are now building machines some of which cost more than £500,000 each. We are developing every kind of technical and scientific appliance that makes my mind reel. I ask myself: are we, in the immediate years before us, going to have a sufficiency of skilled and technical officers and men who will be able to make full use of this gigantic machinery?

Let me draw your Lordships' attention to certain paragraphs in the Air Ministry's White Paper, for instance paragraph 32: Our problem is most difficult in the engineering trades. Men with the skill and experience which the Royal Air Force needs and produces are also in great demand for civilian industry…. Furthermore, the proportion of really experienced men in these advanced trades has been steadily decreasing for some time…. Then paragraph 33 says: No less serious is our need for more pilots and navigators. The figures for 1953 are, on the whole, disappointing; little more than half the pilots needed, and even a lower proportion of navigators, have joined the Service. I add two further points of my own. I am informed that the intake at Cranwell, the institution which I have always regarded as the key institution of the Air Force, is only one-half what it should be. I am also informed that industry is more and more absorbing the limited number of the kind of scientists that are needed for the new Air Force.

This is a serious matter, and I do not believe that it can be dealt with by palliatives or by a hand-to-mouth policy I believe that this Government, or any Government, must face the fact that in the modern world the conditions of em- ployment in the Services need to be fundamentally reviewed; the Government must behave in these new conditions as a progressive modern employer would behave in the ever-changing conditions of modern industry. I believe that, in spite of the palliative improvements that have been proposed this year, the Service Departments, as employers, are falling behind the constantly rising standard of employment in civil industry. To-day I propose to confine my speech to giving two examples where I think that the Air Ministry should take urgent action, if they are to make the Air Force sufficiently attractive to bring in the large numbers of officers and men that will be required for this gigantic machine.

I take, first of all, the case of educational facilities for the families of Air Force officers and men. I take, secondly, the case of life insurance against death or disablement by flying accidents. I begin with the question of educational facilities. I am told that the lack of educational facilities for large numbers of Air Force personnel is one of the outstanding grievances in the Force to-day. Let me explain to your Lordships what I mean by that. In a service like the Air Force there are constant moves from one station to another—that is almost inevitable in any service that is quickly developing. I have amongst my papers a case sent to me by a wife who says that she has had sixteen moves in ten years. Your Lordships will see at once how difficult it is for a family in conditions of that kind to arrange for the education of the children. Further than that, with these families constantly moving from one area to another, they are not regarded by many local authorities as resident for the purpose of special educational facilities.

There is a further difficulty when the families go abroad. To-day, the Air Force has many overseas stations—I imagine the Army has even more. There again, the only solution for providing regular and continuous education, particularly when the children reach secondary school age, is to find boarding accommodation for them in this country. Under the Education Act, 1944, it is assumed that the local authorities will find boarding accommodation for the children who cannot receive proper education in any other way. That is all very well in theory. In actual practice, I am informed that the local education authorities at present have in their own schools only 7,000 boarding places, and there are in the Air Force 13,000 officers' children and 120,000 children of the families of other ranks. In other words, so far as the local education authorities are concerned, there is nothing like the amount of boarding accommodation required to provide the continuous education of these families that are constantly moving.

When I come to the case of foreign service, the trouble is even greater. But I find a remarkable fact connected with the modern conditions of Government servants or officials upon foreign service. I find that the Civil Departments have far out-distanced the Service Departments in making provision for their overseas staff. I will give noble Lords one or two instances. What happened was this. The grievances became so acute amongst the overseas civil servants that the National Whitley Council conducted a detailed inquiry into the problem, with the result that they produced for these civil employees a scheme that has since been adopted by the Treasury. I will give the House the figures. Foreign service (that is to say, the Foreign Office) Branch A officers receive £150 per annum free of tax for each child at boarding school in the United Kingdom; Branch B officers, £100 per annum for each child at boarding school in the United Kingdom. In the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Trade Commissioner Service of the Board of Trade, officers of the Administrative class receive £150 per annum for each child at boarding school in the United Kingdom; other officers, £100 per annum for each child at boarding school in the United Kingdom. Thirdly—and this case is very interesting, because it concerns the civil side of the Air Ministry—men in all other departments, including the Works Department of the Air Ministry, receive £50 per annum in respect of the first child, and £75 in respect of each subsequent child at a boarding school in the United Kingdom, provided that the official is accompanied overseas by his wife. Why should the Service personnel be at a disadvantage? Either the local authorities should provide the accommodation under the 1944 Act, or grants should be given in appropriate cases to the families so that they can themselves find places for their children in boarding schools.

My Lords, I have elaborated this case because I am told that it is one of the burning questions in the Air Force to-day. There has been a whole series of inquiries into it by Government Departments in Whitehall; I am told that even the Imperial Staff College has investigated it. From another angle the Air League has taken a great deal of evidence from many directions, and all these various inquiries have reached the same conclusion —namely, that if the Air Force is to remain a Service that will attract a sufficient number of skilled personnel in the future action must be taken upon the kind of lines that I have suggested. Therefore, to-day I do not ask for another inquiry—there have been scores of inquiries upon this question and everybody has agreed that something ought to be done: I ask that something should be done, and I shall indeed be disappointed if, in the course of this year, or at the very latest in the next year's Estimates, this question is not faced with the gravity to which it is entitled.

Now I come to my second example, the need for life insurance for flying personnel in the Air Force. As things are, as noble Lords know, where there is a fatal accident the widow receives a payment that varies (I am giving general figures) from 23s. a week, in the case of a sergeant, and £130 a year, in the case of a flying officer, to something in the nature of £200 a year. I do not consider these sums are in any way sufficient. I am informed upon very good authority that the risk of fatal accidents is not deterring the brave young man: he will not be deterred by the risk of accident. But it is turning parents, and particularly schoolmasters, against the Air Force. I want to urge this afternoon that, in addition to these somewhat insignificant payments that are at present provided by the Air Ministry, there should be started a comprehensive scheme of life insurance, contributory it may be, and, if it is contributory, with sufficient Government aid to enable the young officer to pay the contributions. I am sure that such a scheme is quite practicable, and if it could be drawn up by the Air Ministry, the Treasury and the Life offices it would remove from the minds of those in We Air Force a cause of grave anxiety.

I do not speak without the book. I have been making inquiry into what happens with the American Air Force. I do not suggest that we can compete in many ways with the very high payments that are made by the Americans, but I do say that the American plan does provide a guide, even though we may not adopt the full details, for the kind of thing that not only should be done but could be done. In the case of the American Air Force, on death the next of kin of personnel (in our case it is only the widow) are paid a lump sum consisting of six months' pay and allowances. In addition—and this is the point I want to emphasise—every man, whatever his rank, is insured for a sum of 10,000 dollars on death. This is paid to the family at an annual rate of 2½ per cent., and amounts in the end of ten years to a gross total of 11,000 dollars.

There is a system of life insurance that is working well in the case of the greatest Air Force in the world. I am convinced that something of the same kind ought to be attempted here, and I ask the Secretary of State to take what I have said very seriously and—if I may make a concrete suggestion—to arrange for a meeting, not in the distant future but at once, with the Life offices, not to discuss round and round whether a plan of this kind is practicable—the American plan shows that it is—but to produce a concrete, definite plan of comprehensive insurance, preferably, in my view, contributory, but with sufficient Government aid to bring the contributions within reach of the Air Force personnel.

I have ventured to suggest to your Lordships two concrete ways in which we can improve the conditions of service in the Air Force. No doubt other noble Lords can add others. I have taken these two examples because I am informed they are the two most serious causes of anxiety of the kind in the Air Force to-day. I ask the noble Lord who is to reply to take very serious account of what I have said, for I feel sure that, unless we face these problems, and face them at once, we shall find, year by year, a shortage of Air Force personnel and all these millions and millions that we are spending upon new machines and all the rest will be, if not wasted, at any rate frustrated.

LORD WINSTER

May I ask the noble Viscount, before he sits down, whether he has any information about the premiums payable in the system of life insurance in the American Air Force. It would be most interesting to know something about that.

VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD

No I have not, but it is just the kind of question that the discussion I have envisaged ought to take into account.

3.39 p.m.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My Lords, I am grateful to the Secretary of State for Air for allowing me to speak early. This debate has been opened this afternoon in a most able manner by my noble and gallant friend Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, and I should like to express my thanks to him, both for the speech he has made and for the subject matter of his speech. I do not intend to trouble your Lordships with any detailed comment upon the important matters of strategy and equipment and the like which he has put before us to-day, but I shall listen with great interest to the reply from the Government Bench on the very important points which he has raised. I make only one point on the question of the Atomic and the H-bomb: whilst there is a great deal to be said for the noble Lord's point about not banning the bomb, I feel that there should be a continuous endeavour to get a convention in these matters which would be at least as effective as the pre-war conventions on other weapons which were regarded as unconventional. We cannot afford to do without our pressure for conventional Agreements, because they did, in fact, mean a relief to this country from what might have been a very serious position in regard to gas warfare.

With regard to the speech just made by the noble Viscount, Lord Temple-wood, who has such great experience in these matters, I am quite sure that we shall all consider with sympathy the two main points which he has put before us today. Life assurance is already the subject of some form of subsidy—tax relief is given on life assurance premiums —but I quite agree that more could be done in that direction, and I hope that the matter will be given attention. I trust, however, that in any subsequent scheme, it would not mean—what would seem to follow, if I understood the noble Viscount aright—that on the basis of a capital sum like the one he mentioned, namely, 10,000 dollars, there would be a distribution at the rate of only 2½ per cent. That would give a very small annual payment to the people concerned. But questions of this sort are, of course, a proper subject for inquiry, together with such matters as premiums assistance, actuarial possibilities and so on.

I should like to ask one or two questions with regard to certain paragraphs in the Secretary of State's Memorandum. First, however, I should like to congratulate him on the Memorandum as a whole. It has enabled me to see the general position quite clearly. The first point which I wish to raise relates to Paragraph 5. This is a matter that has always been of some concern, especially when one bears in mind what Lord Douglas of Kirtleside said about the development of a variety of 'planes in each category. It appears from Paragraph 5 that, because of a change in the defence programme, we have, as a result of cancellations, been faced with payments estimated for the last financial year at £13 million and for the coming year at £10 million. Taking into account what has already been spent in the last financial year, we get a round sum of, say, £17,500,000 for the two years. That is a very considerable sum of money to have to pay for cancellation of works. If this sort of thing is operating to anything like the same extent in the supply programmes of the other Service Departments, then it would be one of the supporting factors which I should bring forward on what I might call a more general occasion, in pressing for an inquiry into the general finances of this enormous programme which world circumstances have forced upon our country, and in stressing the need to exercise every possible economy.

Next, I turn to Paragraph 10 of the Secretary of State's Memorandum, and I would draw attention to the fact that it is there stated that: A new agreement has been concluded with the United States Government which provides for an extended programme of works services for the U.S.A.F. and for revised financial arrangements. Apparently under the agreement that was already in existence we were receiving about £16 million from the United States Air Force towards a total of £19 million which it cost us, in that particular year, to provide the facilities which that Air Force required for their bases in this country. Could we have, during the course of this debate, some information as to whether this new financial agreement is on the basis of a lower percentage of contribution from the United States, and also any other figures which the Secretary of State may have available and which he can give us?

I would turn now to Paragraph 18 of the Memorandum, which deals with Coastal Command's re-equipment and expansion. We are all glad—this applies especially to those who were interested in the general sea work of Coastal Command in the last war—to see that such re-equipment and expansion has been continued. I should like to stress, as my noble friend Lord Douglas of Kirtleside has done, that we should be told whether there is any intention now to develop the flying boat. Certainly circumstances in aviation matters have greatly changed during recent years. I am not speaking from technical knowledge as to how the flying boat stands in regard to these new developments—I should not dare to do so. On the other hand, in view of matters with which I was familiar, I can say that the flying boat proved of great value in our work over the sea in the last war. I should like to know whether the Secretary of State thinks there is any possible development of the flying boat which could be of assistance in that direction in the future. If the noble and gallant Lord can give us any information on that subject, I shall he grateful.

I should like to take the opportunity now of bringing forward a matter which has not yet been raised in the debate, and that is how much the House must appreciate the work done by the Air Force as shown by this Memorandum. I do not think there has been any year during the years which have passed since the war—leaving aside the year of the great Berlin Airlift—when we could say that there was a greater state of efficiency or better service given by the Air Force than in the last year. We should like to offer to all concerned our grateful thanks for the splendid manner in which they have been working. I also wish to stress, in case the Secretary of State does not do so—though I expect he will—the tribute which is implicit in Paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Memorandum to our friends in Canada and in Southern Rhodesia for their help to us in air training.

Now I come to Paragraph 32 which has already been dealt with by the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood. It draws attention to an exceedingly serious problem. It is, of course, easy to take up the statistical diagrams or charts which appear at the end of the Memorandum and point out that we are now spending a much greater sum upon actual re-equipment and armament, in percentage of the total, than we were a few years ago. With regard to personnel, it is to be noted that personnel now accounts for about 20 per cent. of the actual expenditure of over £500 million gross. Obviously the demand for skilled men in the engineering trades must have been growing in this period of extreme pressure for rearmament, but I make no point on that. On the other hand, I am sure that the great competition from the skilled trades in our home industry, in relation to the needs of the technical side of the R.A.F., is a very serious matter. I feel that every possible inducement that we can afford to offer from the financial point of view will have to be examined, and, if it is found feasible, made use of. Great inducements have already been offered in the last six or seven years to personnel.

I am sure that if we can get the young men into the technical side of the Air Force, they can be offered a great deal that is extraordinarily interesting. That they have to be well trained and efficient is a fact which can be well borne out by those who have travelled in Service 'planes for any great distances. I recall how, without very much notice, on one occasion I had to fly home on Service duty in a York aircraft, and when we got to Ngombo it became apparent that one of the inner engines of the 'plane's set of four had gone completely out of action. There was no other means of dealing with the situation but to put in a new engine. In the ordinary way putting in a new engine would not have been a great difficulty, but when it was found that the new engine was of an entirely different mark from the defective one, all the fittings for the new engine had to be improvised by the R.A.F. technical staff on the spot. That is an instance of how important it is that we should have well trained and technically efficient personnel. I am sure that the noble and gallant Lord has been on many of these journeys, which have the advantage of bringing one into contact with the personnel, to whom one can talk about the difficulties.

I wonder if the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, has considered whether we are offering as attractive long-period careers on the technical side of the R.A.F. as we ought to do. At a station I visited in the last few months before I left the Ministry of Defence, I talked with two warrant officers on the technical side. They had gone all through their training and were in charge of most important engineering operations, and although I regarded them as well-educated and cultured men, able to mix in a reasonably satisfactory manner with any class at all, for some reason or another they had never been able to get their commissions and had no hope of doing so. I asked that it should be done at the time, and again it seems to me that we should examine carefully how far those on the technical side of the R.A.F., and also of the Army and the Navy, are offered careers right up to commissioned rank. How far can those men who began in the early training schools such as Halton and Looking go in their careers?

I was interested the other day to meet a group captain from the Looking school. I met him socially and unofficially, but I should like to have the Secretary of State's permission to go down there and talk to some of the personnel about their difficulties and see whether I can do anything to help to secure a solution to their problems, which the Secretary of State has put clearly in this paragraph. I should like to do what I can to get this great problem settled. I should like to mention a matter already referred to briefly by my noble and gallant friend Lord Douglas of Kirtleside—namely, the training of National Servicemen. I was struck by Paragraph 36 on the mobilisation of reserves. I had hoped that we might have had further development by the offering of short commissions to National Servicemen, who would be embodied as reserve pilots in the Reserve Force and could be mobilised without much delay, but I do not wish to offer further comment on that.

I am concerned about the complaint that we are still slow in getting deliveries to units of aircraft of new types. When I remember the serious blocks in the flow of aircraft to the aircraft storage units in the period of great emergency from May till the end of June, 1940, until we got it loosened up a bit, I hope some attention will be given to the need to make as speedy as possible delivery from the factory to operational squadrons. I want to make one point in regard to works, but I will not labour it. With regard to the provision of new depôts for high explosives, it seems to me to be a sound thing to save expense where we already have isolations; but is the noble Lord satisfied that by further concentration he will still be able to meet the need for dispersal of these stocks, having regard to the danger of attack from the air? That is a point on which I should like an answer.

I was going to say something on Paragraph 44, but as I understand my noble friend Lord Lucan will be dealing with that later, I will leave that to him. I have refrained from making a long speech. I have not talked about strategy and have only put these questions to the noble and gallant Lord. I conclude by saying that we are all anxious to have the best and most efficient Air Force we can, but I remain continually anxious about the economy required in the spending of this huge sum. The noble and gallant Lord is in the course of answering a number of questions I have sent to him on the way in which certain financial matters are dealt with now, which questions arose out of the debate on the Defence White Paper, and I am grateful to him. I will not comment on that to-day but after I have considered the noble and gallant Lord's reply, perhaps I may be allowed to return to that upon a future occasion, with the noble Lord's permission? In the meantime, I would congratulate him on his Memorandum.

3.57 p.m.

LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY

My Lords, certainly no Minister could complain of the speeches which have been made so far in this debate. The speech of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, who had such a distinguished career in the Royal Air Force and who has had so much experience of air matters, was a model of moderation and informed criticism. The noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, had some extremely valuable suggestions to which I shall refer later on. He speaks as my distinguished predecessor, with an enormous experience. And I must thank the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, for his flattering reference to my Memorandum. I had hoped he was going to refer to the diagrams at the back. I will do my best to deal with his points.

This debate is the end of the "defence season," and in a sense it is bound to be a discussion on policies already announced and debated. But the noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, with his experience, has been able to illumine the scene with fresh light and put matters into a new focus. What I say to-day will not be startlingly new, I fear, but perhaps it will be an amplification of Government policy as it relates to the Air Force. The noble Lord referred briefly to the hydrogen bomb. I do not find myself at all in disagreement with the general drift of his remarks. Indeed, the knowledge that weapons enormously more powerful than what we call, inaccurately, the atom bomb are available must have far-reaching effects on our thinking. In due course, this must be reflected in our plans.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

My Lords, I should like to ask a question to clear up this point. The noble Lord speaks with great authority, with supreme authority in this matter. Are we to understand the development of the hydrogen bomb as forming a settled matter of air policy?

LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY

I think the noble Viscount had better sit and listen to what I have to say. He is very keen on putting what I might call teasing questions out of the blue. I hasten to say that I do not enjoy supreme authority.

Mr. Cole, the Chairman of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee in the United States, made an important and informative speech in Chicago on February 17, and he referred to the results of the experiment at Eniwetok in November, 1952. Your Lordships may remember that that speech was incompletely reported here, and, rather curiously, I think, its importance was not reflected in the speeches made in another place on the Service Estimates or Defence debates. But greater interest has been expressed since. It is true that since then further tests have taken place. But essentially the position has not changed since the debate we had in this House from the 16th to the 18th March. As I said, the matter is being studied in all its complexities, and I do not propose to-day to add anything to what has been said in another place by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, who naturally bears the prime responsibility in these matters. All I would say is that the White Paper on Defence issued earlier this year did not underestimate in any way the impact of nuclear reaction on defence. Nothing which has been said or done since invalidates the trend of announced policy; in fact, that policy has been reinforced by further consideration.

We have announced this year our reserve flight policy, to which the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, drew attention. I should like to tell him that if, from experience gained, we find that it is advantageous to extend it, we shall certainly do so. But I ought to add, in fairness to the noble Lord, that the Royal Air Force will not call up men for National Service merely for the sake of symmetry. However, the needs of the Service are likely to compel a larger proportion to be called up than hitherto. Last year we called up 10,000 National Service reservists; this year we shall call up 17,000. It is a little difficult to talk about the year after that but, in accordance with the announced intention of the Government to train National Servicemen in peace time on Civil Defence duties during their part-time service, there is likely to be a larger number in that year. I must not anticipate legislation which is likely to be laid before this House, but I believe that there is general support for the plan as announced by the Government.

The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, and I have taken part in a good many debates on Defence in the past eight or nine years—I think he has taken part in even more than I have. I always remember in those debates—perhaps the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, will remember it, too—the insistence of the noble Viscount on the, importance of the state of readiness. As with training flights, so with aircrew. We must have, in these modern times, immediately available reserves in operational flying practice; and that means, in effect, a built-in reserve. That is really the reason why it is not possible to train a larger number of National Service pilots. The conditions of service nowadays must be such as to encourage aircrew to serve on and make a career in the Service. That is the reason for the recently announced direct entry scheme, by which, as the noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, has already pointed out, an officer comes into the Service for twelve years, though with an option to go out after eight years.

It is our intention that the majority of those, with the correct abilities and attainments, should serve on for a pensionable career, either in the general duties branch or in the other branches of the Service. They would have a good chance to reach the highest ranks of the Service. I should perhaps remind your Lordships that after twelve years' service an officer on this engagement, if he leaves, gets £3,000 tax-free; and if he leaves after eight years, he gets £1,500 tax-free. I am certain that with the trend towards faster and more complicated aircraft, and with the concurrent increase in cost per flying hour, eight years is the minimum period for which we ought to train a pilot. Other factors concurrently pull in the same direction. We do wish to encourage a large proportion of officers to serve on for pensionable careers, whether a full career or a limited career, as it is called.

I, for one, regret the end of the famous short-service commission, which was introduced in 1922 under the inspiration of the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard. Although I am not so well informed as the noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, who served for so long. I have always understood that that scheme brought into the Service many young men who would not otherwise have undertaken even a short career; and they broadened the basis of the Service, and provided an invaluable reserve at the beginning of the late war. If your Lordships will forgive me, I cannot refrain from a Latin tag: Tempora mutantur nos et mutamur in illis. We must keep up with the times and recognise that the state of readiness, and the state of training of the pilots in the Service, is highly important for our national defence.

VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD

I do not want to interrupt the noble and gallant Lord unnecessarily, but perhaps I might just say this. The short-service commission was one of the great proposals of the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard. It was absolutely necessary at the time, not only for getting officers into the Air Force but, equally important, for creating a reserve, when no reserve existed. I am prepared to judge by results. The part about which I am nervous is whether the new system is going to produce reserves.

LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY

I thank the noble Viscount for his intervention, which I hope I may characterise as qualified support for our proposals. It was with no criticism of the past that these changes were initiated. None of us can be certain about the future—indeed, it would be much more satisfactory, in some respects, if we could. We mean to make the scheme work, and we believe that it will.

The noble Viscount also referred to Cranwell. I entirely agree with him that it should be the centre of the training system of the general duties branch of the Royal Air Force. That is why we set up this pre-selection scheme, by which youths can be pre-selected whilst still at school, and remain at school, and come to Cranwell when they reach the appropriate age. So far, we have had 616 applications; 609 have been interviewed, and we have selected 47 young men. We judge that, so far, that is a satisfactory result. We must not count our chickens before they are hatched, but we are, so far, pleased with what has been achieved.

I have endeavoured to be frank with Parliament and the public in my Memorandum on the Air Estimates. It would certainly be wrong in any way to conceal our anxieties, particularly about aircrews, and we have made these changes. We believe that they will work, and when I have an opportunity I will certainly report to the House how things are going. In my belief it will always be a problem how to attract the right young men, because the standard must be so very high. The problem is not so much the lack of applicants as the lack of enough young men of the right qualities. Too many have to be rejected. It is perfectly true, as has already been said, that the new V-bombers and the new all-weather fighters will make even greater demands on the skill and experience of our aircrews. Skill, experience and a splendid morale are all plants which already flourish in the Royal Air Force, but they are, I agree, plants which need constant tending. This applies to ground crews as well as aircrews. To the general public the Air Force rather tends to mean pilots and aircrew, and it is difficult for the man in the street to realise that the Force is a unity built out of a large number of delicately articulated but all equally essential parts.

I had hoped (perhaps before the end of the debate I shall find that it was not a vain hope) that we might have had a little qualified praise for the new pay scheme which we introduced last February and which is designed to reward skill and long service. Perhaps that is one of the palliatives to which the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, referred. I cannot refrain from commenting that, to somebody who is out of office, the measures which the Government take often appear as palliatives, although they seem splendid to those who propose them. Here, again, it is too early to draw definite conclusions, and all I will say to-day is that there are grounds for restrained optimism. Naturally, men on the whole tend to delay their decision until towards the end of their current engagements. A promising indication has been the number of applications for aircraft apprentices, which has been the highest for nine years—the highest since the war. I recognise, and my colleagues in the Government recognise, that pay is only one of several factors which are important in fixing the conditions of service. Housing is also extremely important, and I think that this Government and its predecessor can jointly render a good report, because the housing scheme for the services was initiated under the administration of the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, when he was Minister of Defence. In the Air Force we have already built over 11,000 permanent quarters at home and abroad, and a further 3,000 are under construction. We hope to start another 2,500 quarters this year. That is going a long way towards the total Royal Air Force requirement, besides being a substantial contribution to the solution of the nation's housing problem.

Then there is the problem of what is compendiously called turbulence—that is, too frequent postings. That problem is not easy to resolve, and that has been especially true in the last three years or so, with an expanding Air Force and particularly in the conditions in which the Services find themselves in the post-war world. But great efforts are being made, and we look forward to a considerable improvement in this sphere over a wide field. The Government attach special importance to minimising separation, and the effects of separation, by every reasonable concession that can be made. The House will remember that certain cold war concessions have been announced within the last two months, and I should like to remind the House of some of the most important of these. First of all, there is leave at public expense to the United Kingdom for married men serving in the Canal Zone and Kenya without their families. Then there is a disturbance allowance for storage of furniture for families going overseas, and also a reduction of the qualifying period for families to join serving men overseas, entitling them to a free passage. Another concession is a free passage to enable children left behind at home to visit their parents overseas. I believe that these are important concessions, upon which the Government are entitled to at least a measure of credit.

The noble Viscount, Lord Templewood has made two persuasive points, and I certainly promise him that I will read his speech and bring it to the attention of the appropriate authorities, because he has made his points with such force. I am not in a position to say that the Government have already changed their policy, but I am aware—all Service Ministers must be—of the anxieties about education. I do not propose to say more about that to-day. On the question of insurance, I do not think it is unfair to say—and certainly this is no criticism of the noble Viscount's suggestion—that the effect of his scheme would be an increase in flying pay. It is a perfectly tenable belief that flying pay ought to be increased, and I will certainly re-examine his suggestion and look into the American scheme, which he outlined to-day, to see whether anything can be done. I fear that I must add a caveat, because it is easy to be generous until the time comes to pay the bill. All these proposals will cost money, and we had a hint from the noble Lord opposite that we must be exceedingly careful about the expenditure of national resources on defence.

VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD

I should like to remind the noble Lord that, if my memory is correct, flying pay is not given for risks—it is given for efficiency. It is quite different from a premium for insurance against death or accident.

LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY

I do not disagree with what the noble Viscount has said, but if he will read my words he will see that I said that that is what it would be in effect. I am not in any way trying to derogate from the value of his suggestion. I always notice that when noble Lords are speaking from the other side of the House in these debates—and it is natural that it should be so—they appear to be in favour of economy. We all have our own theories and suggestions, but if they were added up the Defence budget would be much larger than it is now. It is always a question of selection, and people's views on selection differ a great deal. I shall have something to say about that later on a different topic.

I have dwelt at some length on this question of personnel, because I entirely agree with noble Lords that it is a most serious and important problem which we have to face. Although we must admit the seriousness of it, we must not think that all is gloom. The Royal Air Force has been, and still is, splendidly served, especially by those who bear the responsibility for the maintenance and safety of its aircraft. The spirit and devotion to duty, of both officers and other ranks, in this field is beyond all praise, and the expansion in the number of hours flown and the high rates of serviceability are continual examples of their skill and determination.

It is very difficult to delineate in a verbal picture the intricate organisation of the Royal Air Force. There is no easily recounted pattern. Very few units have any standard or uniform establishment, and it is the same with equipment as with organisation. There are, I believe, something like a million or more different articles in the Royal Air Force equip-men vocabulary. The modern Air Force is rather like an ant-heap of activity: you can see it but it is almost impossible to describe. The process of re-equipment does not proceed by jerks; it is a continuous process. Sometimes you can mark a definite stage, such as the start of the re-equipment of Fighter Command with British swept-wing aircraft, but the process of modification of aircraft, weapons and instruments is a continual one. In fact, it is impossible at any one time to say when one stage is completed and another begun.

For instance, the control and reporting system of the United Kingdom, I think it is true to say—in fact, I am sure it is true to say—is the most highly developed control and reporting system in the world. It is a monument to industrial and constructional enterprise during the last three and a half years; and the process is not yet complete. It must be constantly modified and improved with the increasing heights and speeds of aircraft. Each change, either major or minor, begets a kind of chain reaction. If we have a new aircraft, it probably has a new fuel system, which requires new refuellers; that means better fuel storage, which means a better fuel supply to the station. In planning, it is the consequentials which precede in time the causal factor—usually the aircraft. The Americans, in their expressive phraseology, talk about long lead-in items, which is rather a mouthful, but I think it conveys what I mean. It is, in fact, the explanation of the cancellations to which I have referred at the beginning of my Memorandum. I could not say without notice that there have been any cancellations in the other two Services. The cycle of production with the Air Force is a long one and, therefore, if you have a change of policy, you are bound to get some cancellations. Regrettable as they were, I believe that they were necessary at the time. In fact, I think they have worked out rather smaller in number than we might have anticipated at one time. If the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, wants any more detailed information about that matter, I shall be delighted to let him have it. Perhaps he could raise it in the course of the debate.

These changes in fact, as I submit, cast their shadows before them. Sometimes those shadows seem to us unduly prolonged, and I share the disappointment already expressed that we have not more new swept-wing day fighters in the Service. The delays have been not so much production delays—production has gone well; they have arisen from unexpected development troubles. I am not saying this in any spirit of criticism—it is easy to be wise after the event—but these development delays do emphasise the importance of the original order for prototypes, especially where a big technical advance is contemplated. Trials conducted contemporaneously are much quicker than trials conducted in series.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, referred to the twenty pre-production aircraft. I think he was slightly in error. He referred to the Javelin. It is not the Javelin but a new supersonic aircraft which is being produced for the R.A.F., as a result of the lessons we have learnt. We must be candid about these things. It is better to take action when you have learnt your lessons, and these twenty pre-production aircraft and five prototypes should enable us to carry out con-temporaneous development trials. But, impatient though we must be—and I certainly share the impatience—we must not underestimate what has already been achieved. We now have the most highly developed control and reporting system in the world; we also have the densest pattern of equipped modern airfields. That is the result of the great rearmament programme initiated by the late Government. We also have the world's most highly developed air defence system. We can all wish that it were better; we all intend to make it better. But we must not underestimate what has been achieved. It is impossible to state when this was achieved, because it is a matter of patient accumulation of improvements, and this process is still going on. In this present financial year we shall see a very important expansion and re-equipment of our all-weather fighter force, not yet with the Javelin but with later marks of the Meteor and the new Venom night-fighter. It is worth noting that not only is the Meteor night-fighter the first modern jet two-seater night-fighter—and there are still only two other types—but I am told that it is still the most effective that exists. I have that on good authority.

Then we come to the new V-bombers which are casting their shadows before them. Those shadows are, in effect, the physical preparation of airfields, handling equipment and any further important meteorological studies which are made necessary with increased heights and speeds. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, asked: Why three types? We naturally listened with great respect and interest to what he said. I am at the disadvantage that the noble Lord was serving in the R.A.F. in the days of the Stirling, the Halifax and the Manchester, and I have no knowledge at all of these things. I think it might be said, in answer to his argument, that the Stirling and the Manchester were not selected for full-scale production, and the Lancaster and Halifax were. It should not be assumed that the premise and the conclusion were necessarily inevitable. We might well have lost, rather than gained, by not having three types. At any rate, that is the view of the present Government, and there must have been something of that in mind with the late Administration when the orders were given.

I ought to explain that the Valiant represented the first stage of the V-bombers; the crescent-wing Victor and the delta-wing Vulcan are later stages of the long-range medium bomber. Therefore, we are not dealing with three types. It would not be possible to get down to one; two would be required, anyhow. And I, for one, looking round and pondering on these things, having noticed that the unexpectedly unpleasant can happen, believe that a premature decision and a wrong choice might well be disastrous. It is worth remembering that these are not three completely new aircraft. It is true that the engines and airframes are different, but the equipments are standard, so there is no need to test three new sets of equipment. I am glad that in his remarks, despite some qualified criticism of this policy, the noble Lord approved our policy for long-range bombers. It certainly was not intended to be left out. I hope he will not attach any significance to it, but if he read the Estimates and the White Paper together, as I have no doubt he did, he will have seen that they conjointly expressed the Government's policy. He will read in the opening paragraph that we have made financial provision for the introduction of the Valiant aircraft during this current year. I am not going to commit myself to any definite prophecy. But there it is; the money has been provided.

Of course, we in this present Administration do not claim any special proprietorship for this operation; it was initiated under the late Government. We should not have any V-bombers if the operational requirement had not been written when the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, was Secretary of State; and we should not have had them at all, if the right honourable gentleman, Mr. Henderson, had not ordered them when he was Secretary of State two years later. Without these important formative stages, we could not look ahead and make substantial provision during the current year.

My Lords, finance is always the rock on which we ground. Most of us attending here have a common enthusiasm for the air, and the inspiring history of the last thirty or forty years shows that fact usually out-rivals imagination, and that noble Lords speaking here or on other occasions are not likely to be least practical when they are most imaginative. It is only the Government spokesman who is tied to the ungrateful earth by the invisible and inelastic band of finance. He cannot spring winged into the stratosphere, although he knows that the field for innovation and experiment is immense. He knows that if you harness enough scientific and industrial skill and enough resources, there appears to be an illimitable set of choices. Yet limits there must be. I do not say this in an attempt to forestall criticism or, indeed, to scorn advice. I think it is in the nature of things that there is a wide, yawning gulf fixed between those who are compelled to select and those whose ideas need not be so confined.

I must remind the House that the Air Estimates have to be fitted into the general scheme of defence expenditure. I have noticed that everybody has his individual or private theories as to how we can economise here and there and save tens or hundreds of millions; but in fact we have not much room for manœuvring to meet the present political and economic conditions, and the process of selection must be both ruthless and painful. I must remind those who will bear responsibility for these things that in 1950 expenditure on defence was £780 million, and last year it was just under £1,640 million. Those are formidable figures, and everything has to be considered in that context.

I have already spoken at some length, and if it is convenient to the House I will say a few words at the end to try to answer any points that arise. I recognise that I have not yet answered some points which the noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, has already raised; but I propose to hold my hand until the end of the debate on one or two matters and to answer them more compendiously in replying to the speeches of other noble Lords. All I want to say now is that, in the context of those very large figures of expenditure, we ought to take a great deal of pride that the nation has been able to shoulder this burden, at the same time staging a great economic recovery; and although criticisms are levelled at the Government's policy in detail, I think that broadly we are agreed. I think it has been of great assistance to our place in the world, and has helped us to make our views felt in the councils of the free world that we can carry out this policy free from rancorous or Party differences.

4.35 p.m.

LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE

My Lords, I am sure we are all grateful to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, for giving us an opportunity to focus our attention upon the Royal Air Force in a rather more detailed way than is possible in a general Defence debate. The Secretary of State for Air said that he had no complaint about the speeches already made in this debate. He also said that he was going to say nothing startlingly new. My Lords, equally, we can have no complaint about the fulfilment of that particular undertaking on his part, because, if I may say so in an all-friendly spirit, it was a most interesting speech—what I would call an interesting exploration of the already known.

I had hoped that there would be a more positive reply to the interesting proposals made by my noble friend Lord Templewood as regards education and insurance. Those proposals seemed to fall with startling suddenness upon the Air Ministry. From the reply of the Secretary of State, it seemed that the proposals of help as regards education for officers' children were something new. From the Secretary of State's reception of the proposals about an insurance scheme, it seemed that suddenly he had been told of a new scheme—new to him—which was operating in the American Air Force. We all know that that scheme has been operating for a long time in the American Air Force, and I hope we may get something more positive, if not to-day, in the near future, than a promise to read the speech of my noble friend, Lord Temple-wood, and to examine carefully the proposals therein.

I am sure the House is grateful for, and listened with great interest to, the speech of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside. I would make only one comment in warm support of what the Secretary of State for Air said about the remarks of Lord Douglas in regard to the three types of bombers. The Secretary of State said that he was not at that time concerned with these matters. It so happens that at that time I was, and I think the Air Ministry are wise in not coming to any premature decision as regards the type of Vulcan, Valiant or Victor. If my memory serves me aright, it was in the remarkably fruitful administration at the Air Ministry of my noble friend Lord Swinton that the large bomber policy was adopted. He and his colleagues on the Air Council laid the foundation of the large bomber policy by giving orders for three types—the Manchester, the Halifax and the Stirling.

I went to the Air Ministry as Under-Secretary in 1938; I was there in 1939 and during the war. Had I been a betting man, and had some of my colleagues on the Air Council been betting folk, I think at that time we should have put our money on the Stirling as being the most likely aircraft to be adopted in large quantities and to render the best service to Bomber Command as a heavy bomber. Probably we should have put the Halifax second, and the Manchester, which was a two-engined large bomber, third. In the event, the Stirling, which was produced first and on which our main hopes rested, was a fine aircraft, but it was surpassed in utility by the Halifax; and the Manchester, as a two-engined aircraft, failed completely. That remarkable, man Sir Roy Dobson, the designer in A. V. Roe & Company, Limited, who was responsible for the Manchester, took a Manchester wing, took out the two engines and put in four Rolls-Royce engines, and overnight virtually made it into the Lancaster, which became the premier bomber of our bomber forces. I recount that to your Lordships only to show the wisdom of going on with three types and not making your choice too soon, but waiting until you are absolutely sure; because what may appear to be the most promising may, by various technical circumstances, become the most unsuitable, and the one that is the least efficient may in due course become the most efficient and most fruitful in effort.

My Lords, I wish to speak to your Lordships for only a short time and on one subject. The noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, said that it was no good having an Air Force if we are unable to man it. That is indeed true. But equally I submit to you it is no good having an Army or an Air Force if we are unable to transport them in accord with the needs of modern mobile warfare. So I make no apology at all for returning to a subject which I dealt with in a Defence debate last March, as regards the pathetic size of our Transport Command to-day. I think one need have no hesitation in saying that the Royal Air Force could satisfy neither its own operational transport needs nor the Army's transport needs if war broke out suddenly on the Continent.

In the Defence debate I raised this question of Transport Command and I gave certain figures, and in that debate I asked the Secretary of State to correct me if my figures were very far wrong. I was unable to be here on the third day of the debate so, quite naturally, he replied to those who were present; but I should be grateful if to-day we could revert to that question and he would tell me whether the figures, of which I will remind your Lordships in a moment, are very far wrong. I said at that time that I understood the strength of Transport Command fleet to be some 40 rather old Hastings aircraft, of which perhaps 25 might be serviceable at any one time nine squadrons of Valetta aircraft numbering some 56, of which some 30 might be serviceable at any one time; there are 20 wonderful new Beverley transports on order but it will be some time before they come into service; and the new type of large long-range transport is at present undecided, or it was a few months ago, which means that it will be four or five years before such transport aircraft can come into the squadrons.

In his reply on that particular point, the Secretary of State, with profound truth I think, said that out of a limited sum any major proposal for additional expenditure must necessarily be a subtraction from the rest of the expenditure on defence, and he thought I underestimated the contribution which civil aviation resources could make in time of emergency or in time of war. I wonder whether the Secretary of State would deal with this question in his reply: how can military requirements be adequately satisfied out of civil aviation resources if civil aviation aircraft are not designed, from the beginning, as regards doors, floors, general strength and cubic capacity, for the carrying of goods and supplies? How can those civil aircraft go into the field of operations and be reckoned as suitable? Secondly, surely the main civil aircraft of British Overseas Airways Corporation and British European Airways are likely to be required to keep open the civil communications of the world, as indeed we found was the case in the last war. At the beginning of the last war, in the quick action which was required, sometimes things were done which, looking back, we see were not always wise. We took certain British Overseas Airways flying boats and sent them to Norway, as the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, may remember. They proved quite unsuitable, and we lost them, and thus our civil fleet was deprived of resources which would have been very valuable afterwards. It was a mistake, and I believe we shall make the same sort of mistake again if we rely on, or comfort ourselves with, the thought that our civil airfleets in the main will not be required for keeping open the vital civil communications throughout the world in time of war.

Incidentally, I can remember three or four years ago an announcement in another place and in this House that the transport problem of the Royal Air Force as regards Transport Command was going to be much helped by a new scheme for Auxiliary Air Force transport squadrons, based upon various civil operating firms. I would ask the Secretary of State what has happened to that scheme. Is it going ahead—I have heard nothing about it—or did it just die? If it died for some reason, then one wonders why it was ever born if that particular reason was operating at the time of its conception. One feels that somewhere the planners must have gone wrong if the plan has not come to fruition. The Secretary of State suggested in the debate that I was wrong in wanting Transport Command to do all the transport work and that we should look to this civil aviation fleet. I do not want Transport Command to do all the work. All I want is an ability for Transport Command to be able to do what is expected of it for the Royal Air Force, for the Army and for the Navy.

After the First World War my noble and gallant friend Lord Trenchard was Chief of Air Staff. There were constant attacks upon the Royal Air Force and proposals that the Service should be broken up, that the Royal Air Force should be abolished and part should go back to the Navy and part go back to the Army. Separatist movements start from discontent in other Services, and I would urge upon the Secretary of State this point: a separatist movement on behalf of the Army for the provision of its own air transport or a separatist movement on behalf of the Navy for the provision of its own naval air transport will be the responsibility of the Air Ministry if they neglect the needs of their own Service and of the other two Services. It is no secret that at the present time neither the Army nor the Navy is satisfied with the transport facilities which are provided by the Royal Air Force. It is only because I am devoted to and love passionately—as does the Secretary of State—the Royal Air Force, that I raise this question and make the earnest plea to him that we should look to the provision of the neces- sary facilities which are expected of the Royal Air Force by the other two Services.

No doubt the answer to my point will be the plea of limited resources and priority for combat aircraft. But an unbalanced force, caught short of transport, is in a false position, even though it has a sufficiency of combat aircraft. I submit it might be better to have a few less combat aircraft if, by the provision of adequate transport aircraft from the resources so saved, you can improve the mobility of such combat aircraft as you have and improve the mobility of the Army and the Navy. There is a natural reluctance on the part of the Secretary of State and the Air Staff to direct money and effort away from combat aircraft and towards transport aircraft, but I would urge a re-examination of the needs, obligations and resources of military air transport, which has to go right up to the back, as it were, of the fighting line. In regard to the last Estimates I suggested there might be a pool of money, so that the provision of transport facilities should not fall entirely on the Air Force Estimates. The Navy and Army might each contribute something from their Estimates towards a general fund for the provision of transport. If the Secretary of State tells me in his reply that the air transport needs of the Royal Air Force, of the Army and of the Navy can be met and the essential war requirements provided by civil aviation, I accept that, I congratulate him upon his efficiency and I regret any criticism I have made to-day. But if, on the other hand, the Secretary of State cannot tell us that we have that sufficiency, or shall have that sufficiency, I submit we are right to go on drawing attention to the deficiency until it is remedied by those responsible.

4.50 p.m.

THE EARL OF LUCAN

My Lords, I am sure that we have all been greatly interested by the speech made by the noble Lord who has just sat down, speaking with all the experience he has of the Royal Air Force and of air operations generally. And what he had to say is, in fact, relevant to one of the points which I wish to make to your Lordships. That arises out of the paragraph in the Memorandum headed "Air Movements." That paragraph, No. 44, deserves a good deal of study. We learn from it, first of all, that 90 per cent. of all troop movements to the Middle East were in the past year carried out by air. I suppose that statement includes Army trooping as well as Royal Air Force and Naval trooping. Therefore, it is worth looking to see what the tendencies of air movements in the Army are. We find from the Army Estimates that the expenditure on the air movement of freight, personnel and stores by the Army has risen in a most startling way from £1.2 million in 1952–53 to £4.7 million in the current Estimates. That is a large sum of money to spend on air movements. These movements are carried out by various agencies listed in the Estimates—Transport Command, civil air lines or civil aircraft, chartered. But we see from the Air Estimates that Transport Command appears to be undertaking a smaller share of Service trooping than it did, because the appropriation in aid for Transport Command services to other Government Departments has come down quite considerably in the last year. So that reinforces very strongly Lord Balfour of Inchrye's point that Transport Command has not the aircraft and resources that it ought to have.

I am not qualified to go into the technical questions of the types of aircraft required for different rôles, but I notice that in another place a year ago the Minister mentioned the new types of aircraft that Transport Command were to get—the Beverley and another type, which he said was mainly for the operational rôle and not designed for the steady run of air trooping. That, one would say, is probably correct, in that Transport Command's rôole in a war would take it into forward areas, and it would have to carry out airborne operations in conditions for which ordinary passenger aircraft, designed for passenger-carrying, would not be suitable. Nevertheless, I cannot help thinking that these new types of aircraft to go into Transport Command could be used for the normal air trooping in peace time, to the great benefit of the Command, of the personnel of the Command, of the aircrews of the Command, and also to the benefit of the other Services and of the finances of the Service Departments. For, after all, the fares of personnel carried it Transport Command aircraft are merely the subject of a paper transaction between one Government Department and another.

Reinforcing that point, we read in the Air Estimates that there is expected to be an increase in the movement of freight—that is R.A.F. freight—by civil aircraft. So I hope that the Secretary of State will be able to reassure the noble Lord and me about the future of Transport Command. I have said that I have no technical qualifications; I have had no connection with Transport Command, except as a passenger. But, unfortunately, there is another aspect of this air trooping, and that is a political one. Though no one would wish to introduce politics into a Service debate, the question of these air movements is a matter in which, unfortunately, politics are affecting the Services. Civil aircraft, we read in the Estimates, are used, and they are said to be "chartered at competitive rates." I take leave to doubt how really competitive those rates are. The form of competition is one that is not unknown in a free enterprise economy; it is a highly restricted form of competition, with some of the dangerous competitors excluded by the rules of the game. And in this case we know that the civil corporations, B.O.A.C. and B.E.A., have been excluded from the right to tender for trooping contracts for the Services.

That exclusion has been attacked and defended in another place. It has been defended chiefly on the ground that we need a national reserve of transport aircraft in case of war. But that defence seems to me to be quite irrelevant because there will be aircraft in reserve whether they are operated by the civil lines or by the Corporations. Incidentally, it is no longer a question of protecting the small, enterprising, civilian operator, because, bit by bit, that field is being taken over by big business—by the big shipping firms. No one—certainly none of my friends—wishes to abolish private civil aviation firms. They undoubtedly have a rôle to play. But I see no reason why they should not enter the field on the same terms as the Corporations. I see no reason why they should be sheltered from competition, and why the finances of the Service Departments should be denied the benefits of true competition. We know that the corporations are the main instruments of the Government's civil aviation policy; we know that they have unrivalled operating experience all over the world. They have great resources, they have very fine aircraft, and they have a safety record that is second to none in the world. Moreover, they are faced with the fiercest competition from the national airlines of foreign countries. Surely Her Majesty's Government should see that these corporations have every opportunity to operate economically and carry out the service for which they are fitted.

Let me remind your Lordships that in the winter season in the northern hemisphere there is not much air passenger movement, so that there is a good deal of spare capacity available. Service trooping is no longer, as it was in the old days, concentrated into the winter months. Now, with National Service, men have to be transported to and from overseas stations at all times of the year. Although there may be trooping in the summer, there is also trooping in the winter; and the Corporations could well employ some of their aircraft and crews in trooping operations. All we ask is that they should be given the opportunity of tendering on equal terms with other firms. It is difficult not to use rather strong words to describe the present policy of the Government. To call it doctrinaire would not be unjust; nor to say that it is cutting off the nose to spite the face. The prejudice against public enterprise by the Party in power is responsible, I think, for this latest development.

May I now leave the more controversial side of this and say a word about personnel? I should not attempt to discuss matters with which my noble and gallant friend Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, with his great experience, has dealt, but for the fact that I can claim some knowledge of this subject, because for a number of years I was lent, with other Army officers, to the R.A.F. to establish the ground defence organisation in that Service. That was in the dark days of the war, when the present Prime Minister decided that the threats to our airfields were such that special measures were required. That was the inception of what later became the R.A.F. Regiment. There are several questions I should like to ask the noble Lord the Secretary of State, because in his Memorandum there is not one word about the training of personnel other than technical training and aircrew training. There is no mention of ground personnel, of how they are armed, equipped and trained, and what is to be their rôle. One of the lessons of the war was that every man in the Fighting Service must be armed, trained in the use of weapons, and organised and prepared to use them, in emergency, in defence of himself and his station. I should like to ask whether that is still the policy in the Air Ministry and, if so, what is being done to implement it. What is the state of training of officers and airmen generally in ground combat duties? What is their equipment and how is station defence organised?

Another lesson from the war was that the R.A.F. should undertake the defence of its own stations against low-flying attack and against limited ground attack. It was to implement that that the R.A.F. Regiment was formed. There is no word in the Memorandum about that Regiment. It is a branch of the R.A.F. of which I think the Service is proud. It built up fine traditions during the war. We should like to know whether it is still responsible for the defence of Air Force installations at home and abroad; whether its personnel and equipment are the best that can be obtained—whether, for instance, it has light anti-aircraft weapons capable of dealing with modern air attacks; whether units are up to establishment, and whether the noble Lord is satisfied with the state of affairs? I know that in our overseas territories a number of locally enlisted units are used—the Aden Levies, the Iraq Levies and the R.A.F. Regiment, Malaya—but at the same time there are a large number of Regulars and, we believe, Auxiliary Air Force units and reserves training in this country for employment in the event of war, either here or on the Continent or overseas. I think we are entitled to ask these questions. The Secretary of State owes it to this branch of the R.A.F. to make some recognition of its existence and of its services.

There is another point, allied to the last one, which I should like to mention—that is, the question of how airmen are employed during their service. Whether they are National Servicemen, Regulars or Reservists, whatever their trade, what about their day-to-day employment on their stations? In the last year or two it has been disquieting to read in the Press, every now and then, of some instance of an airman who is alleged to have been employed in some grossly unsuitable or wasteful way, of some instance where a reservist who has been called up is employed in some entirely non-military and domestic employment and who, not unnaturally, has become dissatisfied. I have no confirmation of any of these complaints, but I submit that the mere fact that they appear in the papers means that there is a situation which is worth looking into.

I expect that many noble Lords can recall stories which they have heard from friends and relations of young men in the Services who have been grossly misemployed on work that has no relation to training for war or training in their trades. I think the noble Lord the Secretary of State must have in mind that there is something there that needs looking into. We know that it is extremely difficult to organise a large number of men of different trades, of different lengths of service and different skills. I should be sorry to be a station commander in the Royal Air Force and have to organise the training of several thousand men so that they were more usefully employed. But there is no doubt that it has got to be done, or the Service will achieve unpopularity and will have more difficulty in attracting men to its ranks. I very much hope that the noble and gallant Lord will be able to tell us that he has this matter in mind and that he is impressing on commanders in the Service that it is something they cannot afford to neglect.

5.11 p.m.

VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN

My Lords, I should like to follow the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, in congratulating my noble and gallant friend, Lord De L'Isle and Dudley, on the White Paper and also—the noble Viscount could not do so when he spoke—on the well-balanced speech which he made in support of this well-balanced White Paper. It is, I feel, much easier for a Secretary of State to produce a well-balanced White Paper and to make a well-balanced speech in support of it than it is for other noble Lords to produce a well-balanced debate. The White Paper deals with many subjects which it is almost impossible to debate, because they depend so much on technical matters which, in any case, cannot be debated; on financial limitations, which are almost equally difficult to debate, and on the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government. But there are two lines of thought which I feel have emerged in to-day's debate. One is the point that the policy in the development of the Royal Air Force has been continuous as between the two Governments which the country has had since 1945. In fact, that must be so, because the plans for developing the Royal Air Force, whether they are plans for equipment or plans for personnel, are a much longer-term policy than the five years which is the life of a Parliament. It is quite right to say that the results which are being shown by my noble and gallant friend to-day could not have been there had there not been continuity of policy since the end of the war.

The other point which has gone through this debate—and perhaps it is an even more important line of thought—is this. We are now paying the price which we must pay if we are to be a first-class power, in that we have Service Estimates of an unprecedentedly large size. At the same time, there are the financial limitations which everybody has talked about. The lesson to be learned is that if we are to work within financial limitations, as we must, it is a sheer waste to spend money on anything but the best, whether in the matter of equipment or of the officers and airmen in the Royal Air Force. It is because of that, 1 am sure, that my noble and gallant friend said a good deal of what he has said in White Paper about equipment and personnel; and that is why we have had to bring to an end the system of short-service commissions. Although there are points of criticism, I think it would be wrong if we did not go away from this debate feeling that the personnel of the Royal Air Force are going from strength to strength. As one who lives in a county where there are four or five Royal Air Force stations, I am much struck by the way that the Royal Air Force is getting its roots into the country. Its traditions are developing, and developing without any prejudice to that forward-looking attitude which every member of the Royal Air Force must have. Its relations with the local authorities are developing. Quite apart from that, we are coming now to the time when the Royal Air Force is being led by Cranwell-trained officers, and that is a matter which ought not to be passed by, because it is a notable milestone in the history of the Royal Air Force.

There are one or two points which have not been touched on to-day and which affect the relationship between the Royal Air Force and particularly the Army. One is the question of the guided missile. It is easy to mention the guided missile, but I appreciate that it is hard to say anything constructive about it, because I imagine the fact to be that the guided missile, like every other piece of equipment in the Royal Air Force to-day, is in a rapid state of development; therefore, no final conclusions can be arrived at at this time. Meanwhile, however, there is the position of the Anti-Aircraft Command in the Army, and particularly the Teritorial anti-aircraft regiments. They are not having an easy time, with their future so obscure; but I imagine they are performing a most valuable service in doing what they are doing now. We must have no gaps in our anti-aircraft defence, and the fact that changes may occur in future really has nothing to do with the need to maintain anti-aircraft defence with the present personnel and the present equipment, until the time comes for a change to be made.

The other problem is that of the helicopter. There, again, it is probably easier to talk than to come to any conclusion. But we are clearly on the verge of great developments in this sphere, and we may have come to the time—as we did in a like manner in earlier days when we dealt with motor transport, with signals and wireless—when we must realise that because a piece of equipment happens to go into the air is not necessarily a justification for its being handled by no one bat the Royal Air Force. In saying that, I want to make it clear that I am dealing only with the use of aircraft as something ancillary to an Army function; I am not dealing with the function of the Royal Air Force in having Bomber Command, Fighter Command or Transport Command. Here I should like to come back to a point made by my noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye. If it is the function of the Royal Air Force—or, perhaps more accurately stated, the function of the Air Ministry—to maintain Transport Command, then what I said earlier is equally as true of Transport Command as it is of any other function of the Royal Air Force.

The question of the personnel of the Royal Air Force has been touched on by many noble Lords to-day. It is a difficult problem. It is certainly not easy for local education authorities, as I well know, to help the Royal Air Force in dealing with the children who are in the local authority areas as a result of the presence there of the Royal Air Force. That applies not only to the children of Royal Air Force personnel, but to the children of civilians who congregate round R.A.F. camps. The local authorities are doing their best, but they, too, have long-term development plans which cannot be brought to fruition in a hurry. I agree that it would be wrong to suppose that any local authority would be able to deal with the problem of finding places in boarding schools for all the children of R.A.F. personnel who want them. Later on, that may well be done, but not at the present time.

I want to revert for a moment to the question of getting pilots and technicians of high quality, which I am sure is most important. In this connection, nobody so far has mentioned the importance of the Air Training Corps or the Combined Cadet Force in schools. The Air Training Corps, as many of us know, went through several difficult periods, largely, I think, as a result of Air Ministry policy in former times not having been entirely clear and, I may say, not entirely straightforward towards the Air Training Corps. Another important factor which should not be lost sight of in regard to the Royal Air Force or, indeed, in regard to the other two Services, is the great extension of secondary education which is coming about rapidly as the result of Mr. Butler's Education Act, 1944. One of the results of that Act is that a much larger proportion of the young people of this country are now being educated in secondary schools. Furthermore, the boys who are now being educated in these new secondary schools are the type of boys who are wanted as technicians for the Services, and particularly for the Royal Air Force.

Are we doing enough in those new secondary schools? Are we close enough to the local authorities who control the new secondary schools to see that the advantages of the Services, and particularly of the Royal Air Force, as a career are put before those boys? One of the best ways of doing it is, of course, to have close by an A.T.C. contingent or a Combined Cadet Force contingent with a Royal Air Force wing. I do not think that enough is being done in that direction. It is one of the things which are easy to do and not nearly so difficult as are the solutions to many of the problems which have been mentioned this afternoon. I welcome the proposal to train R.A.F. Reservists in Civil Defence. I welcome it even more from the Civil Defence angle than I do from the Royal Air Force angle. But that is another story, and I should be out of order if I went on with it now.

I should like to come back to something which the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, said about the need to look after the airmen in the Air Force who are doing the uninteresting jobs. Those are the people who, as often as not, turn up in Royal Air Force uniform in magistrates courts throughout the country. They are not the brightest specimens that the recruiting officers can find, and, therefore, they want more careful looking after, if they are to come back into civilian life as a credit to the Service in which they have served and be useful members of society; otherwise they will simply bring the Service into disrepute and come out of it having learned bad habits and lost the habit of working. I would put this point in a slightly different way from that in which the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, put it, although I agree with him in a great part of what he said. We must have these people. Someone has to wash up the crockery and someone has to mow the lawn, and it is no good putting high-grade technicians on those jobs. What I think is not always done, but what must be done with those people, is to see that they are made to do a full day's work—to work hard and, when they finish, to play hard. The criticism I have is not so much that they have to do these jobs, but much more that they are not made to do a full day's work at them. That again is a matter which is, I think, relatively easy to remedy.

But do not let us suppose that, because there are these matters which ought to be put right—and they are certainly matters which ought to be put right—they are major things compared with the remarkable development of the Air Force in regard to both equipment and personnel which has taken place in the last few years. I should like to finish as I began, by saying that I am sure my noble and gallant friend and those under him in the Royal Air Force are to be congratulated warmly on the progress revealed by the White Paper; progress in a year's work in times which have been difficult strategically, operationally and financially.

5.2.6 p.m.

LORD WINSTER

My Lords, I had not intended to take part in this debate, and do so only because of one or two matters which have crept into it. Reference has been made to the flying-boat and to the helicopter. When I was Minister of Civil Aviation. I was strongly impressed by the arguments brought to my notice in support of both those types, and I did all that I could to foster their development. It has been a great disappointment to me to see the fate which has overtaken the flying-boat, but I am glad to think that there are many people, knowledgeable and versed in these matters, who still support the idea of the flying-boat, and will continue to do so. I hope that that firm which did such good pioneering work in developing the Princess class, and those concerned in that firm, may yet see the fruits of their labours and find that we have a place in both our civil and our military aviation for the flying-boat.

As regards the helicopter, there again I did what I could to develop that type, but development seems to have lagged a bit. However, I am delighted to see that a former Minister of Aircraft Production is lending his weight to the task of popularising the helicopter and pushing it forward. I was interested to hear that, during the somewhat prolonged festivities which have attended the celebration of Lord Beaverbrook's birthday this week, the helicopter has played its part in bringing guests to the feast. I cannot help thinking that, with such a powerful protagonist as Lord Beaver-brook behind the helicopter, we shall see good progress made with the development of that type.

The noble Earl, Lord Lucan, much to my interest, spoke on the matter of trooping and the exclusion of B.O.A.C. from taking part in that important and lucrative business. In the Civil Aviation Act which I had the honour of piloting through your Lordships' House, I saw to it that provision was made for the private firms to have a due part and share in civil aviation. I was glad that that was done, and since then I have supported the private firms in their legitimate spheres of activities and shall continue to do so. But this exclusion of B.O.A.C. from trooping work requires a careful statement and explanation from the appropriate Minister. Sir Miles Thomas, the Chairman of B.O.A.C., has shown himself able, by a judicious blend of the practices of private industry inside a nationalised concern, to operate his Corporation at a profit. I think that is a remarkable achievement, for which Sir Miles Thomas deserves warm commendation. But it seems to me to be a little hard to expect Sir Miles Thomas to continue to operate at a profit, or to increase his profits, if he is excluded—unless there are the strongest reasons why that should be the case—from what I have called a lucrative sphere of civil aviation. It is on that account that I say I think we should have, on some appropriate occasion, a full and careful justification of the Government's policy in this respect.

There are only two other things I wish to say. The subject of the hydrogen bomb has also made its way into this debate. Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, said that we should all do our utmost to try to get a convention on the hydrogen bomb—I presume banning the hydrogen bomb. With that hope and aspiration, of course, every one of us will agree. But I would venture to utter a word of caution. To get certain countries into such a convention would, I imagine, present some difficulties; but supposing that we did, on paper, get all the countries possessing the hydrogen bomb, or countries to which the hydrogen bomb in the event of war would no doubt be passed by an ally which had the hydrogen bomb, to sign such a convention, it would be necessary to ask what would be the value of some of the signatures to such a convention. During the last war, we saw Germany violate, in a most barbarous fashion, several conventions on military warfare to which Germany was a signatory. Remembering that, one would need to consider carefully what the signatures to such a convention would be worth.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

May I ask the noble Lord a question? It is an interesting point. It is understood that the policy of the Government is to get an understanding to abolish this horror. Now I understand from my noble friend that any understanding, even if signed and delivered, is of no value, and that therefore we must face the future with a competitive arms race in hydrogen bombs.

LORD WINSTER

I think there is great force in the point which the noble Viscount has put to your Lordships. It was the point I was endeavouring to make, not so clearly and forcibly. I repeat, if you get the signatures of certain countries to such a convention, you must, as a matter of duty to your own country, consider carefully what such signatures would be worth.

That leads me to refer to an earlier intervention of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, in this matter during the speech of the Secretary of State, when I understood the noble Viscount to ask whether it was the case that the Air Staff is committed to the development of the hydrogen bomb. I can offer no opinion about that. Quite clearly, if the Air Staff were engaged in such development, it would be under the direction of higher policy. But I venture to say this: surely the Staff of any one of the three Fighting Services must certainly be considering very carefully matters affecting a weapon of which a potential enemy is in possession. I should regard it as a grave dereliction of the duty of the Staff of any of the three Services if they were not giving careful consideration to these matters and were not also considering the possibility of having to go ahead to counter a weapon in the possession of a potential enemy.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

My noble friend overlooks a point. Of course, an airman like the distinguished Lord who introduced this Motion is bound to consider this from a professional point of view, but this House has a duty to the country. It has a duty to say whether, blindfolded, we are to go into this business. Here we are, in the House of Lords, and there is not a word from the Bishops or anyone. Never has the matter been discussed, and now we find that we have drifted into a position where everybody knows that we are engaged for the future in a hopeless arms race with the hydrogen bomb.

LORD WINSTER

I think the noble Viscount, with whom I should very much regret to have any difference of opinion about anything, has opened up maters far wider than I have, and far wider than the matters which have been referred to in this debate. Of course this House, should it come to this point about the hydrogen bomb, will have full opportunity of discussing the matter. To imagine that, in any consideration of this matter, we are going blindfolded into it is, in my opinion, most misleading, in the grave and anxious deliberations which must attend upon this question of the hydrogen bomb. To imagine that people are going ahead blindfold about it is a complete illusion. As regards the noble Viscount's remark that the Bishops have not uttered one word about this question of the hydrogen bomb, I have seen statement after statement by the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York and by other Bishops—

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

The noble Lord must not misunderstand what I said. Of course, Convocation has discussed this matter. What I am saying, and what I repeat, is this: that the House of Lords has now consented to formalise the production of the hydrogen bomb without any proper formal consent. Naturally, the Lords Spiritual would play a most important part.

LORD WINSTER

It would be inopportune and not the wish of your Lordships that I should say anything to prolong this animated exchange of opinions between the noble Viscount and myself. I will end with this comment. It is true that I have not been able to attend this House quite so regularly as I should have liked in the past few weeks, but it has not come to my notice that your Lordships' House has formalised or regularised the development and production of the hydrogen bomb. If your Lordships' House has passed a decision to that effect, I must apologise for having overlooked it.

5.37 p.m.

LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY

My Lords, let me say at once that I am certainly not going to interpose my vile body between the exchanges of two former colleagues on those two Benches opposite.

LORD WINSTER

I hope we are still colleagues.

LORD DE LISLE AND DUDLEY

I am not talking about the present state of the Parties.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Friends.

LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY

Friends, undoubtedly. I apologise for speaking again. I do so, I hope, with the permission of the House, but I thought it would be convenient if I did my best to answer briefly some of the points which have been raised. The noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, told me that he could not be in his place, but I should like to say, in case he reads the Report of this debate in Hansard tomorrow, a word about the financial arrangements with the United States. It is estimated that the capital expendiure in U.S.A.F. requirements in this country—I think it has been announced already to Parliament—will be of the order of £125 million. The contribution of Her Majesty's Government will be limited to £22½ million. All the costs of maintenance and of minor works services, with one exception, will be borne by the United States Government. This represents some improvement on the original arrangements which were made under the late Administration. I felt that I should like your Lordships to know that.

Then I should like to say a word to the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, on the question of ground defence. I should like to leave the question of aircraft to the last few minutes of my speech. The fact that we have not made our Memorandum completely comprehensive does not mean that we do not highly value the Royal Air Force Regiment and the work that it does in many parts of the world. It plays an important and significant part in the training of the R.A.F. in ground tactics and ground duties. It remains the policy of the Air Council that all units of the R.A.F. must be prepared for local defence, and all officers and airmen are trained in the use of a personal weapon of some kind.

If I may just illustrate the interest shown, for instance, in small arms, which are, after all, the foundation of all minor tactics, the Royal Air Force has won the inter-Service revolver competition on nine successive occasions, ending last year; it won the United Services rifle match in 1948, 1952, and 1953; it has won another important challenge cup on seven successive occasions; and in 1946 and 1947 the King's Prize was won by an airman. That is an illustration of what interest is paid to this aspect, and of what success is achieved. I was fortunate to witness an exercise in Germany, not last year but the summer before, in which the whole of the station took part in local defence. I do not say that there were not occasional grumbles by those in charge of maintenance, because the exercise took the airmen away from that activity; nevertheless, they were taken away and they took part in a tactical exercise.

On another personal problem, both Lord Lucan and Lord Bridgeman referred to the employment of airmen. I do not think any of the Service Ministers could lay his hand on his heart and say, conscientiously, that he knew of no misemployment. There is bound to be some misemployment in forces where there are something like 800,000 men and women in uniform. But that that should be limited and reduced to the minimum is the constant effort of all commanders-in-chief. It is obvious that, for the maintenance of morale and for the maintenance of the system of National Service, for recruitment and for re-engagement, it is vital that airmen should not be misemployed or be forced to lounge away their time. Like the noble Lord, I sometimes read complaints in the newspapers, but I am bound to say that this sort of complaint does not figure very largely in one's post-bag—and after all that is at least a measure of the feeling. I am certain that we should hear, either directly or from Members of Parliament, if there were any large-scale feeling about this matter, and I believe that it has improved enormously in the last four or five years. May I add that I listened with great interest to the remarks of the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, about the A.T.C. and the Junior Cadet Corps in the schools. I am grateful to him for what he said. I shall read it again and ponder upon it.

I now come to the important points made by several noble Lords, about various types of equipment. Perhaps I ought to interpolate here that, when we come to the question of Transport Com- mand, I do not intend to enter into a political debate with the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, about the national air corporations and charter companies. I feel that that would be much more suitably discussed on a Motion on civil aviation and civil aviation policy. Of course, it is open to any noble Lord to put down a Motion about that—as a matter of fact, I do not think we have had one for two years. The noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, with his accustomed pertinacity and determination, charm and debating skill, has returned to this question of Transport Command. With his accustomed felicity of phrase and command of tactics he has endeavoured to put me on the horns of a dilemma. I know that he intended to be helpful, and I took all his remarks in that spirit; but I could not put my hand on my heart and say that we have all the transport, either military or civil, that we should like. I will not admit that.

In considering this question of transport aircraft, whether they are conventional planes or helicopters, we must look at the system under which the Government military machine plans. Individual Services do not make their plans without reference to the major or overall plan, which is formulated as Government policy on the advice of the Chiefs of Staff. Of course, our plans are not always the plans we should like to make in a perfect world. For instance, the noble and gallant Earl, the Minister of Defence, would like to have a strategic reserve in this country, and we should be glad if we could so arrange our affairs. But the fact remains that in allocating our resources on defence and on the priorities—whether they are in regard to carrier aircraft, bombers, or fighters, or Transport Command—consideration must be given to the major plan.

I am at one with the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, on the utility and necessity of mobility, not only in the air but for the ground forces and, where appropriate, for the Navy as well. But I think he overestimates the difficulties that exist in placing at least considerable reliance on civil aviation in war. First, in making our plans and keeping them up to date, we make allowance for those aircraft which will be required to maintain our world-wide, civil airline routes. We know which aircraft are unsuitable, technically, for military purposes. I do not deny that routes will have to be maintained. But in making our plans we estimate and try to equate probable needs with available aircraft; and when we have made allowances for maintaining civilian routes in war conditions, we are left with a surplus which can go to meet military needs. It may be that they are not all suitable—in fact, the majority of them are not—for specialised military or tactical operations. But I submit that, when making plans for air movements in conditions like these, the Government would be neglecting the public interest if they did not take account of surpluses. It would be far more uneconomic to have an inflated Transport Command, although no doubt we should all like it, and not to take account of this other part of the national resources.

One other thing I should like to say to the noble Lord—I hope it will be some comfort to him—is that our plans for re-equipment of the long-range squadrons of Transport Command have now crystallised. I will not say more than this for the moment, but we hope to be able to announce details in the fairly near future in regard to what new types we ought to go for, the probable dates and so on. There is another point I should like to make in this field. I am not going to deny or confirm the figures the noble Lord gave, because I think that would be much too simple—we should have people bobbing up every day of the week asking us to confirm or deny the strength of Bomber Command and so on. An immense amount of work is done by Transport Command to-day. I know the noble Lord does not forget it, but it is sometimes forgotten how a large aircraft, even a Hastings, goes a long way in a short time. An enormous amount of work is done from a comparatively small source, and it is the sort of work which can be done in no other way.

Then we come to the question of the Beverley. Here again, I am not confirming any figures. But the Air Force has fitted its plans into the major strategic plans in this field. The Beverley is primarily an aircraft for the movement of airborne troops and military stores. I am afraid that I cannot admit that the Royal Air Force has not done its duty by the general defence scheme in this field. It is the same with helicopters. I share the enthusiasm for the helicopter and regret that—which is a fact—we have been outstripped by the United States in that field. We are certainly a long way behind in several directions as regards vertical take-off aircraft, although the United States are not ahead in every direction. But when one thinks of the immense burden which was thrown on the aircraft industry by the rearmament programme of 1950–51, is it surprising that there were not enough resources in research and development for everything? The United States is a very rich nation indeed. I believe there are over 3,000 helicopters in the United States Army alone. It is a vast number. Vast sums of money must have been poured into research and development; and, being a highly efficient and technically skilled nation, they get results. I believe we shall gain a great deal if we build on their experience, coming perhaps rather late into the field, although I would remind the House that there is in existence the Bristol 173, which has been flying for two years and has been under development far longer.

Do not let us be deluded by enthusiasm for all those things, those rotors that go whirling round and a machine that flies up and down; it is still an aircraft and, under United States development, it is getting more like an aircraft than ever. In fact, as noble Lords may have heard, they have the "convertiplane" which goes up and down like a helicopter and flies like an aeroplane, so that the types of machine get much more alike, and I foresee that the time will come when, with much more efficient mechanism, all aeroplanes will become vertical take-off aircraft. We must get into that field, I entirely agree, and the rise in expenditure announced by my right honourable friend the Minister of Supply in another place shows that we are getting into it. I should like to take issue with the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside. I do not think it is by any means certain that military and civilian requirements will be the same. The military requirement on the whole is for maximum lift and weight, whereas I understand speed is a very important feature of civil flying. So, although the principle may be there, the types may not be interchangeable.

Finally, we must remember—and I think it is wise for those enthusiasts who think helicopters may become flying "fifteen cwts."—that flying is extremely expensive and helicopters are the most expensive type of aircraft per lb. weight you can build, because they are highly complicated. Without very great diversion of resources I cannot see in the near future that we can have a vast number of helicopters moving about in the air. But I agree that they are an important military machine, and in places like Malaya and for what might be called cold-war policing tasks, they are very important indeed. I ought once again, however, to explain that these decisions are not the decisions of the Air Ministry. Very wisely, advice on what research and development should be carried out is given by a centralised committee composed of scientists, representatives of the Services and, as and when appropriate, the Ministry of Civil Aviation, and they have to equate, evaluate and weigh one thing against another, whether we want to develop a jet engine at great expense or a helicopter. I say that by way not of excuse but of explanation of how the thing works.

The same point applies in regard to the flying-boat. I am bound to say that during the speeches I have heard to-day I have always noticed eyes light up when reference was made to a flying-boat. It has what I might call its devotees. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, referred, quite properly, to the utility of the flying-boat and to the fact that in my Estimates Memorandum I mentioned that it had been engaged on two useful tasks during the last financial year. And it is perfectly true that we were delighted that we had flying-boats available for both the Greenland expedition and important rescue work. But if you were writing operational requirements you would not write them for those tasks. We have not the money to spend on keeping a thing alive if it has not got a purpose for which we can put our hand on our heart and say we must have it. I do not say the devotees are wrong and that because they cannot move entirely by the light of reason their faith is misplaced. There are possibilities in the flying-boat and that is why it has been kept going by one or two firms and in the research and development organisation. All I can say is that in the Air Force, where we consider these things and make plans for maritime reconnaissance aircraft and other matters, we must look primarily to military use; and at the moment we do not see that the land-plane cannot do what is claimed for the seaplane, and do it more economically.

We come at last to the light fighter, and here again finance must play its part. It is perfectly true that N.A.T.O. Air Commanders are faced with a problem rather different from the problem of the defence, let us say, of the United Kingdom, and they are giving this matter, as I know from personal contact, a great deal of thought and study. Particularly they are thinking about the type which might operate in a ground attack rôle with much less complicated equipment than the very expensive interceptor fighters, and which would be capable of using less elaborate airfields. All I can say at this stage is that the Royal Air Force is associated with these studies, so that the matter is alive and is being investigated; but once again I must point out that finance must play its part in these decisions as well. I apologise for speaking again. I hope that I have met most of the points made during the debate, and I thank noble Lords for their eloquent and important contributions, all of which I shall ponder and study at my leisure.

5.55 p.m.

LORD DOUGLAS OF KIRTLESIDE

My Lords, we have had a most useful and interesting debate, one which has ranged over a very wide field, from the atom bomb to revolvers in the hands of the Royal Air Force Regiment, and I should like to thank the Secretary of State for the conscientious way in which he has dealt with the various points raised. I thought he was a little specious on the subject of helicopters, and I should greatly like to have a private argument with him some time. However, I will not weary your Lordships with controversy on some of the points that he made. I should just like to have the last word on the question of the H-bomb. According to my way of thinking, both the noble Lords who argued this subject were also slightly "off the beam." Of course we should all like to see the H-bomb banned, but in my opinion it would be foolish to do that except as part of a general scheme of disarmament. That is really the point. With those remarks I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.