THE STATEMENT ON DEFENCE

HL Deb 18 March 1954 vol 186 cc526-54

5.14 p.m.

Debate resumed.

VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN

My Lords, this is a continuation of the same speech that I was making before the Royal Commission, and I trust it will not be thought I am committing a breach of the Rules of Order by addressing your Lordships twice. I was saying that we had in this White Paper a definite plan. I was going on to say that although the plan was a definite one, the problem was far from easy. I do not remember a single White Paper since the war which bristled more with almost insoluble problems and contained more dilemmas with sharper horns which the Minister of Defence had to do his best to overcome. It is quite plain that no one could have avoided all those dilemmas. In a number of cases, compromise has been made, and it is clear that in many cases one could take the view that the compromise might have been made differently. Equally, one can easily see the places where an improvement is overdue and has to be taken as a first priority matter next year—as, no doubt, the matter referred to by my noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye, air transport for troops. That stands out strongly as one of the matters urgently needing attention.

As I say, there are too many choices of evils to be comfortable, and too many compromises which are unavoidable. We have that compromise which was referred to by many noble Lords yesterday and the day before, of atomic weapons versus conventional weapons. That problem is worse now, because I think it is right to say that in the last twelve months a number of new weapons, particularly new Army weapons, have reached the stage where production can take place; in particular, it was possible to take that long overdue decision about the standardised rifle and standardised round. All that had to be faced. One cannot tell at the moment how far it is possible to rely solely on atomic weapons, if only for the reason that one cannot tell whether, in any future war, one will have the necessary concentrated targets—not of civilians, because that is plain—of forces which are necessary in order for the atomic weapons to do their work.

My noble and gallant friend Lord Tedder asked a question yesterday, which I am sure he was right to ask, as to whether we had gone far enough in making use of air power in dealing with small wars. I think it was Lord Tedder who instanced what happened after the first war in Iraq. Of course, there is no doubt that there is a great need to press on with those developments which will lead to quicker settlements of troubles like those in Kenya or Malaya in the interest of all concerned. Whether it is true to go on to argue from that that the Air Force should therefore take over more of the Army's duties, or else to say that the Army should be trained to use aircraft in some form, is another matter; and perhaps not a matter upon which we should go very far to-day. But the fact remains that there is a great deal to be done in that direction, and I for one have no doubt that that matter is being studied as a question of great urgency.

The noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, talked about the next dilemma. the need to expand the Royal Air Force—which is made clear in this White Paper—against the continuing demand for soldiers and sailors. There is another dilemma—the question of guided missiles and the future of Anti-Aircraft Command, a problem which is not only acute in itself but is giving rise to a good deal of hard thought among those people in the Territorial Army who are concerned for the future of the Territorial Anti-Aircraft Regiments. The earlier that problem can be settled, and guidance given, the happier will be the whole of the Territorial units and the Anti-Aircraft Command. There is another dilemma—the need for economy against the equal need to maintain our plan and provide for amenities for the men who are in the forces now. And so we go on. There is the readiness of the Territorial Army—a matter also referred to in the White Paper—which we must set against the strain which is being placed on the bona fide volunteer, who is so important.

The last of the dilemmas which I will mention this afternoon—but by no means the least—is this urgent need to create a strategic reserve, as opposed to the dispersion which is forced upon us. Although the Defence White Paper has not a map, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for War has perhaps gone one better than my noble and gallant friend, and produced an excellent map in the Memorandum accompanying the Army Estimates, which makes this problem quite clear. As I said, this problem is probably the deepest and the most urgent of all. After all, the number of troops, let alone the number of formations, which the Government have in this country, and at their free disposal, is very small indeed. It is so small that our continued dispositions would not make any sense at all were not it that we in this country are members of N.A.T.O. It is only the fact that we are members of N.A.T.O., the fact that A.N.Z.U.S. exists, although we are not members of it, and the fact that every step is being taken to press on with the formation of the European Defence Community that makes our position, with our forces dispersed all over the world, in any way tolerable or sensible. We cannot say that too often.

The noble Lord, Lord Layton, mentioned the same point just before the Royal Commission when he was talking about N.A.T.O. and Trieste. It is no use our thinking that those of our troops or air forces who are in Western Europe are free reserves, even if we assume, for the moment, that they are in the right places; because, whether or not that is so, they are there as part of our commitment to N.A.T.O., and they could not be taken away, certainly not at short notice, I imagine, unless N.A.T.O. consented to our reducing our contribution. Therefore, we shall never be right until we have our own strategic reserves at our own disposal, committed to no one and in a place where they are under our control. From that point of view I am quite sure it is greatly to our interest to push on with the formation of the E.D.C. When I say that, however, I am not suggesting that we should go any further than we have gone already in the direction of offering ourselves for full membership. On the other hand, I should take this view. So far as the substance goes, the genuine nature of the contribution we have offered and its permanence, we have done what is necessary. We have done, in substance, all that could have been required of us if we had offered to become full members. But we do not belong on the Continent. Therefore, although we should make our commitments as members of N.A.T.O., and put the troops in the places where they are wanted to fulfil the whole strategic plan, in my view we have gone quite far enough in the substance towards the E.D.C. I should be sorry to see us commit ourselves to anything further than that, because, unless I am wrong, it could be only in the nature of a gesture and would not mean any substantial alteration in our contribution. The fact of our strategic disposal and of all the sideshows that have been forced on us, sideshows which are just as dangerous in a cold war as in a hot war, throw up strongly the strain on our forces.

That brings me for a moment to the other side of the White Paper, which deals with the men who form the Services. I want to say how glad I was to hear the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, and even at this late hour may I congratulate him very much on his maiden speech. I want to emphasise what he said and what he meant when he said, "Do not let us create an opinion hostile to service abroad." It is very easy to do that; it is easy to misplace our concern for those in the Services and to take the line that they ought not to be there. That is entirely wrong, and I am glad that it was not the line of my noble friend the Secretary of State for War. May I take this opportunity of welcoming very much the concessions which he announced in another place on the occasion of the Army Estimates. I am sure that they were on the right lines; I am sure they were the result of careful thought, and of a real, honest, economic study of exactly what the difficulties were and what the points were at which financial aid could help. I shall be disappointed if those concessions which he made do not show good results. But time will show we shall see. Of course, no amount of money will produce good results by itself. They can be produced only if the troops are in good heart. Any suggestion that you can buy the loyalty of the Services would be utterly wrong. What is suggested, as I see it, is that we meet the real needs, particularly of the married man with a family, and help him where the shoe pinches. Let him go overseas to do his job and not feel all the time that his wife and children are having a hard time. We should not allow that.

Of course, there is the point that my noble friend Lord Caldecote raised yesterday about the spirit of the regiments and the importance of going about our business, to whatever Service we belong, with a high heart. He said a certain amount about the esprit de corps of the Regular infantry, and about postings and so forth. I am afraid I could not go all the way with him. I am not going to enter into that now because the subject is a complicated one. It depends on a lot of calculations and one thing and another. It is not quite so simple as it might appear at first sight. It is also bound up with the fact that, compared with 1939 and even more with 1914, the proportion of infantry as against the proportion of other arms is much smaller than it was. I will say one thing and no more at the moment: that if in 1946 those in authority at the War Office had used the pruning knife as skilfully and perhaps as ruthlessly as did Lord Cardwell in Victorian times and Lord Haldane later, it might at the time have gone down very badly but in the, long run have been very useful.

What more is there that we can do to improve the realisation in the country of these defence problems, and to raise the reputation of the Services either as a career for Regulars or as a proper part-time occupation for the good citizen? A great deal has been said about that, but there is one thing that I do not believe has been said quite enough. We are not going far enough back in this propaganda. We leave it to the Service Departments to do what they can to propagate to the troops. All well and good. But do we look on the defence problems as proper subjects on which to educate the young people of this country? The answer is: "No, we do not." Take the Ministry of Education. For all the interest in defence that I have seen exhibited by the Ministry of Education, they might just as well be on another planet.

The time has come—and I put this very strongly—when this problem of defence has passed out of the realms of opinion. It is a fact; it is with us. From the speeches we have heard from noble Lords opposite, one would gather that these problems have passed out of the realms of controversy. Why, then, should it be thought wrong that these problems should not be put more fairly and squarely than they are before our young people? Why should it be thought that, because local authorities are perhaps out of touch with the needs prescribed in the White Paper, therefore it would be wrong to ask education to make its contribution to this vital problem? I put that strongly to my noble friends in front of me as a suggestion to be explored, because I feel—and one cannot say this too often—that the business of national defence is not a departmental affair. It is something which concerns the whole Government and therefore every Department of Government. No Department of Government, merely through the fact that it is primarily concerned with other things, can escape its responsibility for taking its share in the defence of the country.

May I turn for one moment to a rather narrower problem, that of the home defence field —the Territorial Army, the Home Guard and Civil Defence? I think they are dealt with in paragraph 39. My noble friend Lord Limerick spoke chiefly about the Territorial Army, and I am not going to repeat what he said. I want, however, to associate myself very strongly indeed with what Lord Limerick and also my noble friend Lord Clydesmuir, said about the Territorial Army bounty. Because I do not now repeat what they said, I do not want noble Lords to think that I am not in complete and strong sympathy with them. I want also to welcome the statement which was made in another place by my noble friend the Secretary of State for War, when he said that he had set up under the Under-Secretary of State a committee to inquire into the whole question of the administration of the Territorial Army. I think that those of us who have been concerned with the affairs of the Territorial Army will welcome that statement. We welcome it all the more because this inquiry is not to be one-sided, but is to be undertaken, as the Secretary of State said, in conjunction with the Territorial Army associations; and therefore all the wealth of their experience and good will, which is considerable, will, I know, be brought to bear on the problem, to help the War Office and the Air Ministry.

My noble friend Lord Jeffreys, whom again I shall not follow completely, talked about Civil Defence and the Home Guard, and the co-operation, or the lack of it, between the two. I do not think this is a question into which one should go too deeply in a debate like this or at a time of day like this. I would say that both Civil Defence and the Home Guard have suffered a good deal because they were both started off in a highly unco-ordinated fashion, long before anybody had been able to say exactly what were the plans for their operational employment and what they were wanted to do. Therefore, it was not surprising to me—and I fail to see why it should have been surprising to anybody else—that there was no immediate and enthusiastic response. But equally, from what I have seen, I am certain that once the people can be told what is the local plan, and exactly what is wanted of them, there will be a response, and nobody need be downhearted about the result of that response. That is one other thing that has got to be done, in regard not only to the Home Guard but, even more, to Civil Defence—again another subject.

I am glad that the Civil Defence paragraph still continues in the Defence White Paper. The reason why I am glad of that is that I think Civil Defence can be regarded only as an operation of war. Whether we like it or not, whether it is carried out by civilians or by people who are in the Forces, does not matter; it is one of the main operations of war described in the Defence White Paper. Once it is looked on as an operation of war, many of the administrative difficulties which have been made so much of elsewhere will blow away. Until it is looked on as an operation of war, you can be certain that those difficulties will continue to exist and will make trouble out of all proportion to their real importance.

My Lords, that brings me to the end of the points which I wish to make on this Defence Paper. May I go back for one moment to what I said at the start? Here we have a Defence White Paper containing more vital and thorny problems than I ever remember. We have a White Paper which does not present any satisfactory or definite solution to many of those problems. But what it does present is a serious and successful attempt to tackle those problems. It also offers us a good idea of what are the main problems to be tackled next year; and, in doing so, it gives us an idea of how perhaps, in our small way, we can support my noble and gallant friend in seeing that these further steps are carried out.

5.36 p.m.

LORD HADEN-GUEST

My Lords, I am glad to have the privilege of following the noble Viscount who has just sat down, and who has said a number of things about Civil Defence with which I entirely agree. The N.A.T.O. countries must, of course, be closely integrated in this field. I may perhaps mention that recently I paid a visit to France and had the opportunity of visiting N.A.T.O. headquarters. Whilst there, I came to the conclusion that there is still a good deal to be done in order to get the organisation, so to speak, working in a way which will give a magnificent opportunity for those with ideas and, if necessary, for those who try experiments.

We in the United Kingdom have an extremely good organisation for Civil Defence. I come across it very closely in my capacity as chairman of the National Medical Manpower Committee. At the present time, in Civil Defence we have people who are much more divided up, and much more elaborately— though not over-elaborately—organised, than any other country with which I am familiar. I am glad that that is so, because I believe that Civil Defence may be regarded as the fourth arm in any great war in the future. Necessarily it will be entirely separate from the question of attack by the forces of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, and will depend on a different strategy, different tactics, and altogether different circumstances. Although in France Civil Defence is being organised to a considerable extent at present, so far as I know, in this matter we take the lead in Europe—and I believe that I have information over the whole field. I am glad that we are taking the lead because I think that we know how to do it. At the present time, in this country, there is practically no group of doctors and those concerned with the medical services, which is not in one way or another allocated under certain conditions to duties in connection with Civil Defence in time of war. It is a remarkable fact that we have this quite elaborate plan in operation. I am quite sure that it is a plan which will work very well.

Civil Defence in Europe does not by any means work so freely and so fully as it does in this country, and I feel that we ought carefully to look into this question of Civil Defence in all the N.A.T.O. countries, in order to see that we are getting something which will enable the Services to have at their disposal an organisation which will cover the field of Civil Defence. It seems to me that the field of Civil Defence is going to be one of the four great fields of conflict if we are so unfortunate as to get into another war. There will be Civil Defence and the three Fighting Services. But Civil Defence will necessarily and inevitably, in many cases, be separated by long distances from the main services of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force, and will have, as it were, to proceed under its own steam. It seems to me that we have not yet sufficiently considered what requires to be done. We are, in fact considering in this country all the details of organisation in connection with. Civil Defence, but I think we shall need to have for the whole of Europe a Civil Defence organisation as good as the one which we arc building up for this country. Such an organisation, on a continental scale, will be a very important part of the general defence. Various speakers in this debate have referred to Civil Defence, but they have not made any very definite and specific statements on the subject. I feel that we should all realise that Civil Defence is the fourth arm of defence, and one of enormous importance. I know that I have said that twice already, but I have no hesitation in repeating it again, because I think it is exceedingly important.

Then, when one considers the vast amount of medical knowledge bearing on this matter of Civil Defence which is available, it becomes clear that it is essential to have a large organisation which will enable use to be made of that information. In this country, if we get into a new war there will be practically no group of doctors, or of those associated with the medical profession, who will not be, in some way or other, concerned with Civil Defence. I do not think that is the case by any means on the Continent of Europe as a whole. I think it ought to be, because if we have a war in which large-scale attacks by very destructive methods are made over a large area we must have a Civil Defence organisation which will adequately cover a large area. I do not believe that it is as impossible as some people seem to think to protect ourselves, through the medium of Civil Defence, against the weapons used in warfare directed from the air to bring sudden and widespread destruction. But I think it essential that we should be ready to do those things that are necessary, and I would make the point—it is the only point I am seeking to make—that we ought to see that the methods which we are using in this country are methods which can be used in other countries, because they must be used in other countries also. In the matter of Civil Defence, we should take the lead on our side of the fence. We should endeavour to bring a new light on to the subject of Civil Defence, because I believe that it will prove to be one of the most difficult problems of all for us to tackle.

5.44 p.m.

LORD NATHAN

My Lords, the debate of these past three days is of real national significance. Contributions have been made by many noble Lords possessing striking qualifications, either of experience or of study or of both. The debate was opened by the noble and gallant Earl, the Minister of Defence, in a speech, cool and clear, the breadth of vision and comprehensiveness of which were appreciated by all of us. Our discussion has been marked by a notable speech—his maiden speech in this House —by the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, whom we shall be eager to hear again. Inevitably, there have been differences of emphasis, differences here and there on points of judgment. But the importance and significance of this debate is that it gives once more the assurance, if an assurance were needed, that there is intrinsic harmony among noble Lords in all quarters of the House, all of whom aim at ensuring adequate defence and the national safety. That is the common aim of all of us. We have to ponder the problem before us in days of dramatic change, both in the means of warfare and in the circumstances of nations.

The Statement on Defence is a graphic document. It is also a document which, here and there, is oddly contradictory. Measured against the first needs of Modern warfare there are, clearly, perilous weaknesses. I should like to take just three illustrations—two at home, and one overseas in the battlefields. First and foremost, there is Civil Defence, to which reference was made by the noble Lord, Lord Jeffreys, yesterday, and by the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, and my noble friend Lord Haden-Guest, to-day. But I speak on Civil Defence at this moment in rather a different context. The White Paper forecasts the course of the atomic war, with its first mortal clash and the successive "broken-backed" period of struggle for survival and recovery. One would think that Civil Defence would be crucial and, perhaps, decisive in this period. Yet in the White Paper it takes only a very subordinate position. The argument seems to be that if the deterrent of "massive retaliation" does not work and so prevent the war, there is nothing much that we can do about it. That would not be good enough. The British people cannot be expected to spend £1,600 million a year on defence and remain defenceless, even though the first aim of the programme is to prevent attack from happening. There is the same contradiction in the programme in the strictly military and logistic sphere.

An inevitable implication of the atomic attack and the "broken-backed" warfare sequel is that there will be destruction of ports. The question whether Britain can, in these circumstances, nourish herself and her Forces is a vital question. How is Britain to be nourished? There is no indication in the White Paper of plans to supply the people of this country and their defenders when the normal entrances are out of action. Yet clearly we must envisage a phase in which the only way to keep the country and the Forces going will be "across the beaches." It is imperative that plans should be laid to use, in this perilous event, the techniques so brilliantly used in the evacuation of Dunkirk and in the D-Day invasion of Europe. There is nothing about this in the White Paper, yet it means being ready with alternative ports, being ready with alternative entrances even though all available ports are destroyed. It means the employment of all the ingenuities of little ships and prefabrication. It means being ready with internal transport arrangements to distribute supplies for the people, the factories and the forces from scattered points. It means being ready to stockpile supplies of food, raw materials and oil sufficient in quantity and dispersed enough for safety, and capable of quick transport to the points of need. All this is absent from the Statement on Defence, yet these are the sinews of national safety. We have, as it were, to plan for improvisation.

Let me take my third illustration, for these illustrations apply not only to the defence of these islands; they apply no less overseas and in the main European battlefield. They apply to mobilisation; they apply to the deployment of the Army and Air Force. Under atomic attack, divisions cannot be concentrated again in the old sense. The first requirement for our safety is dispersal, and then speed into battle to the point of attack. This was brought cut very cogently by a recent remarkable lecture by General Pynam on armoured warfare. Correspondingly these new fighting techniques demand new supply techniques, with dumps scattered for safety but capable of being drawn upon and transported at the moment of need. The Statement on Defence says nothing of these obvious implications of its forecast of the atomic war for which we are to prepare.

I take, for instance, the case of the base at Antwerp, which needs to be looked at now in the light of atomic foresight. Here at Antwerp is a bold conception, admirably executed, a great British base in Belgium, a vast storehouse for the Army over the Rhine, whence supplies can flow to the point of need in peace or battle. It is worth, even on this view, the £7 or £8 million it cost to build and the £1 million or so it costs to keep it up. But is it so designed, and are its equipment and supplies so dispersed, that it can withstand the first atomic clash and play in the "broken-backed" period the part for which it was first planned? Antwerp, in essence, epitomises the problems we have to face. It would be reassuring to know, and I hope the Secretary of State when he replies will be able to tell us, that in the view of Her Majesty's Government Antwerp can, notwithstanding atomic attack, fulfil the purpose for which it was originally destined.

Now a fundamental contradiction in the White Paper, it seems to me, is between what is at great expense in men and money and what ought to be. The British Army, for instance, is not only overextended but divided into small packets, each being trained and equipped for different kinds of warfare. The divisions in Germany are, apparently, being trained in the tactics of atomic warfare. The divisions of police out in Kenya, Malaya and elsewhere are still being trained with obsolescent weapons, for something very like the last war rather than the next. The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, has referred to-day, arid the noble Earl, Lord Bathhurst, referred yesterday in an attractive speech, to the Territorial Army divisions. I remember that when commending to your Lordships the National Service Bill seven years ago I said, and now repeat, that those divisions are the linchpin of the ground forces of the Crown. But those Territorial Army divisions are, for the most part, not being given either the training or the equipment to fulfil their vital rôle of supplying the essential forces to flow into the battle-line within weeks of the first clash. This discrepancy runs through the White Paper, which forecasts, with great emphasis, the character of atomic war and propounds for this year at least, plans which in large measure have but little relevance to that forecast. This contradiction, I will grant you, is in some degree, inevitable in the transition from the old weapons to the new. It is an indication of the far-flung and diverse commitments which this country has contracted. But it carries a very special danger: that is, that a great part of the standing forces and the production for those forces is, in fact, irrelevant to the chief requirements of national defence in atomic war.

My Lords, the fact is that the strategy in the White Paper is a tremendous, even a dangerous, gamble. It takes for granted that national safety can be secured only by a threat of "massive retaliation." Yet the actual equipment and deployment of the forces proposed in the White Paper remains almost entirely irrelevant to that argument. It is laid down as a general principle that, for the purposes of atomic war, the Army is too large and the R.A.F. must be expanded, with the reinforcement of the latest weapons of war. Yet the figures in the immediate plans bear slight relation to this proposition. No answer is offered in the White Paper to a number of pretty decisive questions such as, What strategic reserve should this country have? Where should that strategic reserve, in conditions of atomic warfare, be located? Should it be in this country, where to move it might be greatly hazardous? Should it be in Cyprus, where it might be dangerously exposed or cut off? Or should it be scattered in safer pockets, to be brought together at the point of attack by swift modern means? Which is it?

Where is the strategic reserve to come from, with the present commitments, when the Army is in any case too large? The noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha—though I do not think the Minister of Defence would agree—suggests that we already have a strategic reserve in Germany. But that is surely wrong. The divisions in Germany are part of what we now think of as "the shield." They are not available, either there or elsewhere, for the purpose for which a strategic reserve is normally needed. They are already in situ and not available to be thrown in when danger threatens or victory offers. Where, in fact—I wonder whether we can be told by the Secretary of State to-night—is Britain's present frontier? Is it, as once it was said to be, the Rhine? Is it still farther east, so that the system of radar warning may, even at this stage of guided missiles and supersonic flight, give a chance for modern scientific defence to operate? Where is our frontier now?

There is every argument for the earliest possible examination of these various matters, both here at home and also by all the Allies and by all the countries of the Commonwealth who have these burdens to share. It is not enough to say, though it is true, that the Army is overlarge and over-extended. Its commitments must be examined with a view to seeing how they can be lightened or shared with others to allow for the creation of a proper strategic reserve, without which British strategy is hamstrung, and to permit a proper appraisal of the demand made by the Army upon manpower. I was sorry yesterday to hear the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, deny my noble friend and Leader the inquiry for which he asked. Yet surely it would be wise and well to examine the question of the two years' National Service. Is it not too expensive, in view of the calls on manpower for other purposes, for defence production and for production which is essential for exports and so for solvency? Ought we not to know by a dispassionate inquiry? Ought we not to have a view, voiced by those who have inquired expressly into the matter? The need is to marry the real requirements of the Army with the real requirements of the nation. Surely an inquiry is urgently needed, if for no other purpose than to discover how the Army's essential requirements can be met, while at the same time scaling down the man-hours at present demanded by the two years' National Service.

Basically, these are certain questions of quite crucial importance for the nation's future. What is the hypothesis, the appreciation of the situation, upon which the Government Defence plans are founded? Is it simply that the forces, British and Allied, can be made so strong that they will never be needed for a major war? Is not that too great a gamble? And if the gamble turns out wrong, will they not, inevitably and perilously, enter a war ill-equipped and ill-prepared? Again, are not the present commitments undertaken by the British forces, and especially by the Army, too large to permit of any real reason or prudence in planning? In order to make proper defence planning possible, is it not imperative to cut down these commitments in concert with our Allies—in the Middle East with all the Allies, and in South-East Asia, imperatively, with the Commonwealth countries? Is it not indispensable to share the burden and distribute the labour, if safety and strength are to be the result? Is it not indispensable to take the long-term view of the old and the new look of the forces in this transition, and to ask, as we must ask, whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer's problem can even begin to be solved when the country is committed to spending £1,600 million a year, within hailing distance of the whole proceeds of income tax, without even any proper provision for Civil Defence or for the material requirements of national safety and nourishment in time of danger, and without a sufficient regard to the new techniques of fighting and supply?

The noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, referred, as others have done, especially the noble Lord, Lord Layton, to-day, to the deterrence issue. The implications of the statement made on Tuesday by Mr. Dulles call for close and urgent examination. Clearly, we must have closer ties with the United States on the great decisions, whether made within or outside N.A.T.O. The British view of this is surely the Canadian view, as put by Mr. Lester Pearson the other day. It is the Commonwealth view; it is the European view. One cannot cast the die when all have to take the shock. Mr. Dulles now seems to be talking more agreeably to British ears than when he first announced the policy of "massive retaliation." The President, Admiral Radford (Chief of Combined Chiefs of Staff) and Mr. Dulles himself have since said, more acceptably, that the decision to "retaliate," cannot be "automatic"; that it must depend on the kind of conflict and the kind of issues at stake. But the weakness of "atomic deterrence" is that it is irrelevant to many kinds of conflict, unless, of course, the decision is to turn all into Armageddon and risk doing what Samson did. Deterrence may work, but it will work only if we are prepared for it not to work. Otherwise, it is not only a gamble, but a bluff; and perhaps, worst of all, it may be mere self-deception.

What I ask for again, therefore, is the appreciation of the situation on which this gamble is based. I will assert that it is based on hope: on the hope that war with modern weapons will be regarded by both sides as national suicide and therefore be ruled out, so that the weapons will not be used—on the hope, that is, that the deterrent will prevail. It is indeed a hope we all have, that the real fears of a world's self-destruction will bring their antidote. But this hope cannot be the basis of policy. To make it so is to take risks that are unpardonable. The day may still be very distant when the weapons paralyse themselves, and the peoples see it so. Nations do not yet abandon the resort to war, or the struggle for self-defence, because logic and calculation show them only defeat and destruction. Far from it. We did not do it in the summer of 1940. There was no question then, though every calculation pointed to the end, of "stopping short," or of "striking a compromise": we went on. And so it may still be for long years, with other peoples as well as our own. As George Orwell wrote: No bomb that ever burst Shatters the crystal spirit. So, while we seek above all to prevent war, we must be prepared to fight it. Will the policy of the White Paper give us the best chance? That is the question which the noble and gallant Lord the Secretary of State for Air has now to answer.

6.10 p.m.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR (LORD DE LISLE AND DUDLEY)

My Lords, I have now had the honour of being a Member of your Lordships' House for over eight years. In the course of those years we have had many debates upon Defence, but I cannot remember a longer debate than this, nor one which has aroused more interest or in which there have been better contributions. That is an indication, as other noble Lords have said, of the interest in this all-important topic. We have had many notable contributions, and, as ever, some most informative and useful ones from the Cross Benches. And, of course, the debate has been marked by a notable maiden speech from the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha. I should like to add my congratulations to those of others which the noble Lord has already most deservedly received. In a debate lasting three days there are bound to be a great many points raised, and if I stayed here until midnight I doubt whether I could deal adequately with them all. However, as I have been challenged by the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, I will attempt to answer this debate upon the Defence White Paper with what I hope your Lordships will agree is a connected argument, and I hope that in the course of that argument I may be able to deal with the points which have been raised.

I was brought up on the old saying that in your Lordships' House you could get the best opinion on any subject in the world, from the governing of a nation to the shoeing of a horse. The horse, alas! is out of date, and outmoded as a means of traction, and it is the problems created by the successors of the horse which have raised so many difficulties for our generation, because the problems with which we have to deal are essentially problems of movement in time and space —and, indeed, in thought. I think it is that feeling which has been underlying so many speeches that have been made during the course of this debate. If I may put it in colloquial terms, the question which has been asked is, can we afford to keep the old car running, and pay the deposit on a new one? Noble Lords opposite may not like the colour which we have painted the car; they may feel that there is too much room in the back, that the wings are the wrong shape, or that we ought to get rid of some of the impedimenta on the top. But it is our car; we both own it. They certainly have not in the course of this debate disowned their ownership of that car. They have every reason to be proud of it. After all, they started this great rearmament programme, and if it has had to be modified in several respects by Her Majesty's present advisers, because it was, as it were, going through the roof, we do not blame them, and I am sure they do not blame us.

They have every reason to be proud of being the joint authors of N.A.T.O. Many noble Lords, I am glad to say, have called attention to the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance in our present defensive plans. I have sometimes hitherto thought that we tend to ignore the achievement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation but certainly during this debate my noble friend Lord Bridgeman, and other noble Lords, have accorded to that Organisation the measure of support which it deserves. We forget, too, what an important event it was when, some two years ago, Turkey and Greece adhered to N.A.T.O., so that it now stretches from the North Cape to Mount Ararat. Although it leaves us with many important responsibilities in the Middle East, and does not relieve us of our burden, it does, at any rate, create new opportunities in that area. Again, in thinking of N.A.T.O., one must remember what General Gruenther has already announced and what the Prime Minister repeated in another place—namely, the fact that it is now strong enough to compel a potential aggressor to build up his forces before he can put himself into a posture of offence. It is a great contribution to the security of Europe and to the peace of the world.

My noble friend Lord Swinton has already discussed this problem of the relationship of the prime deterrent, and the relationship of the Allies in N.A.T.O. But surely, it must be of importance that so long as there is an interval between the time when we first see the build-up and the time we expect the actual attack, then diplomacy can get to work. And do not let us divide this deterrent arbitrarily into packets: they are all part of the same thing, the defence of the Western World, and of freedom. The threat of the American strategic air power, soon to be aided by our own, and the positions taken up in Western Europe by the Armies and Air Forces under the Supreme Allied Commander, are all one part of a great scheme to preserve the peace of the world. The advantages to be gained from that Alliance cannot be bought on the cheap. It is very expensive, we admit. But I submit to your Lordships that we shall not make that Alliance enduring—and, after all, that is what we want—if we start fidgeting about and thinking how we can cut down our defence here and our contribution there. Nothing will bring the wolf back to the door more quickly than the smell of excuses cooking in the pot—excuses to relax our efforts.

Again I do not want to trench upon the ground covered by my noble friend Lord Swinton, but since the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, raised again to-day the question of an examination, I feel that I must say from this aspect: How would it look to our Allies if we did that? What would they say about the Government of the United Kingdom if it could not carry out investigations itself and form its own opinion, take decisions, and announce policy? They would smell the cooking in the pot soon enough; and first one and then another would find an excuse for lessening their contributions, thus weakening the Alliance. In a concise, compendious and expressive phrase, the Prime Minister referred to the "long haul." It is the policy of the long haul which will bring us salvation; and the long haul means carrying the burden on our back for some time, alas! Paragraph 6 of the White Paper says that the North Atlantic Treaty Council last December decided at its meeting that so far as political and economic considerations allowed they would maintain their present defence efforts. That, in a word, is the policy of Her Majesty's Government. My noble friend Lord Swinton stated to the House yesterday, quite explicitly, that of course we have regard to our economic posit ion, and that ultimately it is the balance of payments which must affect our capabilities to contribute in this field. But it is our intention to maintain, so far as political and economic considerations allow, our present effort to support our Allies in our defensive arrangements.

In the last debate we had on this subject, speaking from this Box, I felt bound to say that the amount we could expend on defence was not the sum of all the requirements to meet all the threats which we ought to meet That is my answer, in a word, to the noble Lord, Lord Nathan. In his closing words, he adjured us to remember the burden upon economy. He told us that we were spending the whole yield from income tax on defence. I could not cost his proposals as he went along, but I should have thought they would add two or three hundred millions to our Defence bill. All this talk about harbours and civil defence, and about protecting Antwerp from the atom bomb and so on, mean additions to our existing expenditure. And if we were to do it on the scale which I thought the noble Lord intended, we should add millions, possibly hundreds of millions of pounds—unless the noble Lord has some particular section of the field where he wants us to cut down our expenditure. If he has, I wish he would tell us.

So much for the general outline of our defensive plans. Now let us consider one or two aspects in rather greater detail. We had some notable contributions from senior officers of the Services. We had a speech from Admiral Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope; we had another speech from the noble Lord, Lord Tedder; and we had a short but, as usual, effective contribution from the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, I listened with great attention to the speech of the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope. I wish that he had been here this evening, because I should have told him that, while I would hesitate, from modesty, to teach the alphabet of military knowledge to Lord Cunningham—particularly to a man of his name and initials—and while I agree with him in his desire to increase our air power, I could not agree with him in the way he recommended it. He said, in other words, that we must make ourselves impregnable from air attack. The comedian Will Rogers was supposed to have said to an American Admiral, "Admiral, I can solve this submarine problem for you. All you have to do is to raise the Atlantic to boiling point, and then it will be too hot to hold them." The Admiral said, "I should think it would be, but how are we to raise the Atlantic to boiling point?" Rogers' reply was, "Admiral, I have the ideas; you work out the details." I say that to Lord Cunningham. He has had the idea, and has asked us to work out the details. We have worked out the details, and it cannot be done. We cannot in any foreseeable way make ourselves impregnable from the air.

I thought the noble Viscount had at the back of his mind the idea that we ought to boil down the expenditure on the bomber force and put it into Fighter Command. But in an age of nuclear fission, surely that is unrealistic. It must be so. To prepare for a long war, to cover yourself up like a tortoise, and let the enemy "cut and come again," at the time and place he chooses, is surely unrealistic. Anyway, lint is the view of Her Majesty's Government, and that is why we are proposing, as is stated in the White Paper, to build up a long-range, strategic bomber force. That strategic bomber force is, or will be, a powerful part of the deterrent, but it is also an integral part of the defence of these Islands. If we cannot reduce the scale of attack at source, then we believe that it will become unmanageable in the present context. It is not that we do not believe that we must have a highly proficient, highly organised, capable fighter defence force, but we must balance one against the other. You cannot abandon the power to hit back at the sources of attack just because you hope you might perhaps be able to make up a 99 per cent. impregnable fighter defence system.

I maintain that the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government is a realistic policy. It is not a policy, as in some circles it is fashionable to say, which exhibits a folie de grandeur. Surely no critic of our Government has so far said that we must spend all our money on fighters, and that we should be perfectly happy to hand Civil Defence over to our American Allies, even if they would take it on. Nobody in this country would be entitled to do that. Why should we be prepared to hand over perhaps the more vital ingredient of our defences to an Ally, and do nothing about it ourselves? At any rate, that is not the position of Her Majesty's Government. Moreover, British science, British industry, and the skill, courage and experience of the Royal Air Force have a great deal to contribute in this field. The more powerful the weapon that is carried, the more powerful the vehicle and all that goes with it. The fact that we do not believe in the possibility of having a 100 per cent. effective defence system does not mean that we do not believe the system is of no value. We have already built up a formidable system and one which any enemy would think twice about before attacking.

Of course, we come back again to the question of the car—to-day's car, next year's model, or the one after that? In air defence it is just the same. We should like now to have a fighter defence system which we know we are going to have in four, five or six years' time. Of course, it is much more effective to have a completely flexible force which we can operate by day and night and in all weathers, because then we can provide the same degree of defence at proportionately less expense than one composed of day fighters and night fighters. But the right kind of aircraft, and all that goes with it, the ground control and the fully effective air-to-air guided weapon, can be introduced only in stages. We have the Javelin coming along. We are developing the necessary radar and other electronic devices and, of course, the most suitable guided weapons. But we cannot hope that all this will spring like Minerva fully armed from the head of Jove. There must be several stages along this road. For instance, we cannot abandon the cannon until we have a fully developed and flexible air-to-air weapon. One day that will entirely oust the cannon, and I think it may be of interest to your Lordships to know that we are developing more than one kind of guided weapon. In the horrible new logistic jargon, these have to be "phased in" with the new generation of fighters with which we are just beginning to equip the Royal Air Force. Some fighters will carry both the cannon and the guided weapon, and some will carry only cannon. The new cannon which our new fighters have will give them the most powerful armament of any fighter in service to-day. Of course, the weapon to be carried depends on the role which the fighter has to perform, and upon its structure and performance.

I will not weary your Lordships with too much detail, but this is an excellent example of the way development and production must go hand in hand. It is simply not true to life to suppose that it is possible to put off into the distance the production of new weapons. It is impossible, in practice, to separate operational weapons and research and development. I think it is fair to state, because it is relevant to the context of the White Paper, that the public ought to know that never since the end of the war have we had a really well-equipped, up-to-date Air Force. First of all, we had to soldier along with Spitfires and Tempests, and then with Vampires and Meteors. We have never, until now, been able to start to rebuild a long-range bomber force. If I illustrate the extent to which the power of the Air Force fell, it is not to apportion blame—I know the difficulties—but only to illustrate the long road which we have to travel if we are to increase our power. It is a long road, and particularly so with an air force. I am not taking credit for the present Government: as has been said before, the seeds were sown by the last Government. The fact is that in 1948 the front line strength had fallen—it has been announced already in another place—to under 1,000 aircraft. As manpower has been mentioned, quite rightly, from the opposite Benches, I think it relevant to say that those 1,000 aircraft took no fewer than 176 trained men per aircraft to maintain. As I said, the Service had begun to climb to its present position before the present Government took office. In fact, the front line now is not only larger, but much more powerful. We have re-equipped both Coastal and Transport Commands in the meantime, and several valuable types of aircraft have come into service already.

But it has been achieved—and I ask your Lordships to give proper weight to this—with a great proportionate economy in the manpower bill. The Prime Minister in another place declared in, I think, 1952, in a debate on economic matters, that the Royal Air Force target was one front-line aircraft to ninety-five trained men. To-day, we have got very near to this: it is one to ninety-six. I want to emphasise that this question of economy in manpower is receiving the constant attention of Her Majesty's Government, and particularly the Service Ministers. I do not take particular credit for my Department. I know the other two Service Departments are pursuing the same line with the greatest possible vigour. But it is not true to say, as might be implied from some of the speeches from noble Lords opposite, that Her Majesty's Government do not know the problem, are incompetent to deal with it and have not got down to it.

I come now to the matter of the two years' National Service, to which the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, referred. Again, I do not want to weary the House with details arid figures, but I think in that context the argument advanced by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for War in moving the Estimates is worth repeating. To reduce the period of National Service to eighteen months would reduce the strength of the Army in 1957 by 50,000 men, and, of course, there would be quite a considerable loss of men who would not, in those circumstances, take on a three-year Regular engagement. He estimated that: figure at 15,000 men. Taken in conjunction with other factors, such as the extra call-up in 1952, leading to a larger run-down, it would bring down our Army in that year to 340,000 men, 100,000 fewer than it is now. As for the Royal Air Force, your Lordships have only to remember that if we reduced it by 33⅓ per cent. we should need to have the number of men under training increased by at least that amount and we should be compelled to have proportionately larger training cadres. Thus, instead of economising we should be spending, certainly on the Royal Air Force, more money in that way. I beg noble Lords opposite not to mislead themselves or the public in this way. We keep on examining the problem. No Government wishes to keep men out of industry; of course they do not. But every responsible Government—and I include the noble Lords opposite—faced with this problem has come to this conclusion.

There have been some extremely important contributions to this debate, such as the one from my noble friend Lord Limerick. No one in this House speaks with greater authority or more persuasively upon the Territorial and Auxiliary Forces. I know that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for War has paid great attention—because he has read he speech of the noble Earl—to what he said about the Territorial bounty. He and his colleagues on the Army Council are, at this time, considering this whole question. Although the noble Earl, I know, appreciates that to say that a question is "under review" has rather a monotonous ring, he knows as well as anyone how these matters have to be handled. He knows that they will have deep attention from my right honourable friend.

Then there was an interesting contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, who sent me his apologies for not being able to be present to-day. He spoke with vigour, as is his wont, upon Transport Command. As I said on a previous occasion, out of a limited sum any major proposal for additional expenditure must necessarily be a subtraction from the rest of the expenditure on defence. This question of Transport Command is no exception. I do not yield anything to the noble Lord in my enthusiasm for increasing the air transport potential of this country, but I think he underestimates the part played by what he called—and I entirely agree—the merchant marine of the air. I do not believe that in the long run it would be either economic for the R.A.F. or a good thing for the country if in Transport Command we tried to do all the jobs. There are some things which must be done by military aircraft but, in the main, it is in the national interest, irrespective of the means—I will not go into that because it is a political question—to maximise the civil air transport potential. Air trooping and other tasks carried out by the civil firms are an important factor in maintaining and possibly increasing the transport potential.

I hope other noble Lords will forgive me if I do not at this time, after this lengthy debate, do more than thank them for their contributions. We had a most eloquent, informed and useful speech yesterday from the noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, who spoke from detailed firsthand knowledge of command of an armoured car regiment. We appreciate his contribution, and my right honourable friend will read, mark and pay great attention to what he said. It was a useful and informed contribution. If I say that, it is not because I do not wish equally to praise other contributions. This has been a debate mainly on policy, grand policy, and it is right that in this House we should debate it and ponder upon it. I confess I liked the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Layton. I always do. But I particularly liked his phrase about the White Paper taking the public and treating them not as children, but as adults. That is exactly what my noble and gallant friend the Minister of Defence has attempted to do. The fact that the White Paper cannot answer all the questions and that it poses problems which it honestly says it cannot answer, does not mean that Her Majesty's Government have not gone into this matter with great care, anxious thought and due deliberation, and framed their policy on it. Of course, there are dilemmas. There is the dilemma of the old car and the deposit on the new one; but we cannot escape from the dilemma any more than we can escape from our commitments.

I have referred to N.A.T.O. No noble Lord has ever advanced a reason, and I hope he never will, why we should in any way retract from our commitments to N.A.T.O. and the rest of the world. Do noble Lords challenge our need as well as our right to exercise British power in places like Kenya and Malaya? Should we reduce our forces in Malaya? Could we then offer effective resistance to Communist rebellion? And the same with Kenya. Does any noble Lord sitting in any part of this House say that we should not, exercising all the power we can, stamp out that horrible, savage, regressive rebellion? The fact is that we are most deeply committed, morally as well as militarily and politically, in those parts of the world where the consequences of our withdrawal would be most dangerous to the peace of the world and if we tried to abdicate, as is advanced in certain circles, I believe that the British people would learn, with regret, how much power Great Britain does in fact exercise in the world and for peace. It is rather like experiments we used to carry out in the laboratories at school, when we used to try to measure a given volume of air. We took a vessel with air in it and weighed it, and then we evacuated the air and again weighed the vessel; the difference, of course, was the weight of the air. We do not want to make a vacuum in the world in order to weigh how much power Great Britain has; we must estimate it beforehand. Surely those who take a responsible view of our commitments must address themselves to this question: how better could our forces be disposed to achieve equal effectiveness at less expense?

My Lords, we have had notable contributions and suggestions from the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and from Lord Tedder. I know that my noble and gallant friend Lord Alexander of Tunis will consider, as he always does, suggestions coming from such informed quarters. But I do appeal to noble Lords in all parts of the House not to speak loosely upon the subject of our commitments. We have a responsibility to our fellow-citizens in this country and the Commonwealth, and we have a responsibility to the world. We certainly have a responsibility to remember the burden on our economy, about which the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, has spoken. We have an example of what may happen if a commitment is prematurely laid down—I refer to Korea. Every noble Lord will remember what happened there. Every noble Lord will know how much blood, how much treasure and how much anxiety was expended in retrieving that commitment; and every noble Lord will remember the terrible and almost disastrous effects on our economy of the Korean adventure. It is not a matter merely of adding up an account where all the factors are known, but if we regarded our responsibilities as no higher than those of an accountant, it would indeed he folly to reduce our defence bill only to face a far higher one later on.

I welcome the tone of moderation and responsibility which has informed the speeches in all parts of your Lordships' House. I welcome the general, if qualified, support which has come from noble Lords opposite. Of course, we must have the policy examined, debated, threshed out and argued about—that is the function of Parliament. But I do once again appeal to all those who have influence upon public opinion in this country not to try to take an easy way out of this terrible, but not hopeless, situation in which the world finds itself to-day. I appeal particularly, if I may say so, to politicians of all classes. I cannot resist reading, because it pleases me very much, a letter from Mr. Gladstone to John Morley, which is apropos of politicians of all Parties arid of all times. The letter reads: Human nature is the most complex thing in the known creation; and politicians, I have long ago concluded, represent far away the most complex form of human nature. They are not more dishonest than other people; but they are of all the least single-minded. Politicians, soldiers, professional men, bishops, have all, in this world, to be single-minded. We must bend our backs. stretch our sinews, and persevere.

Most of us have lived at least through two world wars. Who can say who bears the responsibility for them? Who can say who bears the responsibility for the fact that we live in an age of nuclear fission? We live in the consequences of all those things. We cannot avoid them by mental gymnastics, and if we are to assure the peace of the world in this generation surely it must depend firmly upon the moral stimulus, strength and determination of the Western Allies, but, above all, upon the British people.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

Before the noble and gallant Lord sits down, although we have all appreciated his speech, may I refer to two questions, out of many we asked him, which he apparently feels he cannot answer. To these two questions I should like an answer. First of all, are all the extra alleviations of Servicemen's conditions which have been announced only in the last few days, included in the present Estimates?

LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY

No.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

Are they all to be the subject of Supplementary Estimates? Possibly my second point ought to be directed to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, but I wanted to know specifically what is the present basis of dealing with profits assessed on both development and productive work, and the general expanding productive programme, where one cannot deal by tender. Those are two important questions.

LORD DIE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY

My Lords, that is quite true. May I take the second question first? I have no wish to avoid the question. I did my best to inform myself, and I have certainly looked up the speech I made in this House in the debate on Civil Aviation. I do not think I cart answer that question compendiously. I would much rather the noble Lord put down an unstarred Question upon that matter. I should like to deal with it fully, because it is difficult. I do not think I can deal with it within the ambit of this debate. I should be very happy to inform myself, through my right honourable friend the Minister of Supply, and to answer that Question in detail arid, if I may say so, at leisure. In regard to the question of pay, and what one might call alleviation measures, those are not included in the Estimates presented to Parliament; but I think I can assure the noble Viscount that they should net add to the total expenditure of the Services. Because of difficulties of virement between Voles they will certainly require Supplementary Estimates, but they should not increase the total expenditure, in which case the Services will have provided the money from their Estimates.

On Question, Motion agreed to.