ADMIRAL SIR DUDLEY NORTH

HL Deb 26 July 1954 vol 189 cc50-119

5.8 p.m.

LORD WINSTER rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what were the circumstances in which Admiral Sir Dudley North was ordered to haul down his flag when Admiral Commanding the North Atlantic and the reasons why this officer has been denied the inquiry into his conduct which he has repeatedly requested; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in rising to move this Motion, it is perhaps right that I should say that I am doing it entirely upon my own initiative and have not been requested to raise this matter by Admiral North himself. I would say also that I feel it is my duty to raise the matter in the most impersonal way possible, and I hope that anything I may say will in no way be regarded as wounding by any- one to whom I have to refer. Admiral North, the subject of this Motion, had a career in the Navy of considerable distinction. He served as Director of the Operations Division at the Admiralty, and also at one time held the appointment of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet.

I have always understood that the appointment of Chief of Staff to a Commander-in-Chief is reserved for an officer of great promise, whom it is expected will go up to the top of the tree. But this officer was ordered to haul down his flag when Admiral Commanding the North Atlantic in 1940. No more grievous fate can befall a flag officer in war time; but it befell Admiral North, in circumstances which I will narrate. He was not employed again until he was given a shore job, after he had been placed on the Retired List. He has consistently been refused a trial or inquiry, the Admiralty, as I understand, taking up the position that they are not bound in law to grant an inquiry. I myself would feel—and I am sure your Lordships will agree—that very wide discretion must be given in war time to the heads of the Defence Services in deciding upon the fitness or unfitness of an officer for his appointment. It may be that their Lordships are not bound in law to grant an inquiry. I feel that circumstances alter cases, and that there should be some limit to the powers of the heads of the Defence Services to wreck an officer's career without giving him an inquiry. Circumstances alter cases, and in this case I feel that the rights and wrongs of it can be settled only by an inquiry, either by a court-martial, which I regard as a completely fair and unbiased tribunal, or some other form of impartial tribunal.

The Board, I understand, assert that they brought no charge against Admiral North which could be made the subject of a court-martial. They may be technically correct, but what the Board said was: Their Lordships cannot continue to retain full confidence in an officer who fails to act prudently in an emergency. I should say that in war time, except for cowardice in face of the enemy, it would be difficult to bring a more serious or wounding charge against a Flag Officer. Certainly failure to act prudently by a Naval officer is very different from the popular idea of how a Naval officer acts when faced with an emergency. I would regard it as a very wounding charge indeed, and it has been accompanied by little or no explanation of what the emergency was or of how imprudence was shown.

I feel that the seeds of this unhappy business were sown, prior to its occurence, at Oran and at Dakar. Admiral North had visited the French Admiral at Oran. He had received an assurance that French ships would not be surrendered either to Germany or to Italy, and he was not alone in being appalled by the decision to attack those French ships at Oran. Admiral Somerville was ordered to carry out the attack, and it is said of that decision: All the officers concerned were absolutely horrorstruck. Admiral Somerville, I am told, intended to protest, but before he could do so he was informed that the decision was an irrevocable decision of the War Cabinet. I know that war is a hard taskmaster, and very disagreeable and shocking things have to be done, but at the same time natural feelings were aroused by this particular affair. The attack was carried out, and 2,000 French officers and men were killed. The Government do not appreciate observations conflicting with a decision, however much that decision may have been criticised at the time and since, and Admiral North became unpopular. It may well be that exasperation with him about his views on that particular business, at a time, no doubt, when nerves were frayed and tension was high, became confused with lack of confidence in him. If lack of confidence was felt in Admiral North about his views on Oran, then confidence should also have been withdrawn from Admiral Somerville and Admiral Wells, who fully shared Admiral North's views.

After this came Dakar, which was, as it was bound to be, an ignominious failure. The Prime Minister had to explain this failure to the House of Commons where, no doubt, feeling ran a little high about it. He used these words to the House: The whole situation at Dakar was transformed in a most unfavourable manner by the arrival there of three French cruisers. … Neither the First Sea Lord nor the Cabinet were informed of the approach of these ships to the Straits of Gibraltar until too late to prevent them passing through. The House may rest assured that the mischievous arrival of these ships arose in no way from any infirmity of purpose on the part of the Government. Anyone listening in the House of Commons to that statement was bound to infer that there had been neglect at Gibraltar. It is not in my recollection that the Prime Minister told the House that the passage of these ships had been notified to us by the French, that information about it had been passed on to us by our Naval Attaché at Madrid, and that the Government had also had warning of the passage of these vessels from our Consul General at Tangier. That being so, I think there was something rather disingenuous in the statement that was made to the House of Commons. The inference that many Members must have drawn from it was that had the movement of these ships been known, their passage would have been prevented. If that were indeed so, it is most extraordinary that no orders were sent to that effect, since the orders in force with Admiral North permitted of their passage.

The Admiralty—and when I say "the Admiralty" I mean, of course, the Naval Staff and the responsible authorities—were informed by Admiral North of these ships in time to get Force "H" to sea and warn the French ships if they desired to do so. Surely, when Dakar was being planned the possibility of such intervention by French naval forces must have come to mind, and the Admiralty must have known that, by their own instructions, if French ships did erdeavour to pass the Straits en route for Dakar, Admiral North was bound to let them pass unless his instructions were amended. But no amending instructions were ever sent to him. There is no evidence to support the Prime Minister's statement that the failure at Dakar was due to the arrival of these ships. In fact, the French Naval Attaché at Madrid formally protested against that statement by the Prime Minister, because on the instruction of his Government he had officially informed our Naval Attaché of their movement.

It was indefensible to send this expedition without artillery, tanks or landing craft, and those were the reasons for the failure, and not the arrival of the French cruisers. Churchill's assumption"— writes a Frenchman in possession of the facts— that the arrival of the French cruisers at Dakar was a determining factor in the failure was fallacious. In fact, the Prime Minister really agreed to that, because when he came to write his history and referred to this affair he abandoned that line of defence entirely, but at the same time he failed to make any amends to Admiral North for having—I fear I must use the word—misrepresented him to the House of Commons. As so frequently happens in the history of military failures, the search for a scapegoat began, and Admiral North was elected. A well-known Admiral wrote to me: Churchill was responsible for the fiasco and made a scapegoat of North. I have seen a letter from another officer well acquainted with the facts, who said: If Dakar had not been a fiasco, North's actions would never have been reviewed.

That being the background, it brings us up to the facts of the passage of the French cruisers which brought about Admiral North's downfall. Now let us look at his instructions. I ask your Lordships to bear with me in this, because what I am going to say leads up, as I think, to an important point. On July 3, Admiral North informed the Admiralty that, failing other orders, he would attack any French ships trying to pass the Straits. There is no hint of irresolution about that. On the same date, as it happens, the Admiralty gave general instructions regarding the treatment of French ships. It said: All French ship; must be regarded as hostile. Be prepared to attack. But do not fire first shot. The next day, they amplified these instructions, saying: We may be at war with France shortly. Contact with equal or superior French naval forces should be avoided."— That statement is important, as will be seen later. They added: We want to get control of as many French ships as possible, but not to incur equivalent loss in so doing. An inferior French force should be stopped, by force if necessary, and told to go to British port. That was on July 4. On July 7, the Admiralty specifically told Admiral North that those orders applied to French ships trying to pass the Straits. On July 10, the Admiral suggested to the Admiralty that he should tell the French that no attack on French ships at Casablanca was contemplated. On July 12, came another signal to the Admiral: Further tension between ourselves and French navy very undesirable. It might lead to war. Our policy, therefore, has been reviewed. I am, of course, paraphrasing in reading this document, but I can assure your Lordships that it is an accurate paraphrase. No further action against French ships in French Colonial or North African ports. We reserve right take action against ships proceeding to enemy controlled ports. Inform French authorities of this policy. Be prepared for attack but do not fire first shot. May I call your Lordships' particular attention to that passage We reserve right take action against ships proceeding to enemy-controlled ports, which is important. On July 13, Admiral North received permission to inform the French in the sense of that signal.

On September 5, the British Naval Attaché at Madrid received a visit from the French Naval Attaché there who told him that Admiral Darlan had instructed him (the French Attaché) to maintain the closest touch with our Naval Attaché and added that French hopes rested in ourselves. The gist of all these messages and instructions was that the situation vis-à-vis the French was steadily improving and the Admiralty was progressively modifying its orders concerning the French ships. The gist was that it was essential to avoid incidents and to reduce tension; otherwise, there might be war. On September 9, our Consul General at Tangier informed the Foreign Office that French ships were likely to pass the Straits during the next seventy-two hours. At six o'clock in the evening of September 10 the Naval Attaché at Madrid informed the Admiralty and Admiral North of a message from the French Admiralty giving particulars of French ships which would pass the Straits on the 11th. Everything was completely open. There was nothing clandestine about this business.

We were officially informed by the French of what was in the wind. I should be most grateful if the noble Marquess who is going to be kind enough to reply could, in the course of his reply, mention at what time that message from the Naval Attaché was received in the Admiralty. It is not within my knowledge, and I think it is important to this matter. Admiral North received it at midnight on 10th-11th and I presume that the Admiralty had it earlier. Admiral North informed his Straits patrols so that if any Admiralty orders varying the standing instructions had arrived they could have been promptly obeyed. One of his destroyers, the "Hotspur," sighted the French ships at a quarter to five in the morning. They were burning navigation lights—I repeat. there was nothing clandestine about this movement. On receiving this sighting signal, Admiral North, in accordance with his instructions, ordered the "Hotspur" to take no action, and he informed the Admiralty that he had sent that signal to the "Hotspur." He told the Admiralty that he had ordered no action. He also told the Admiralty that he would shadow the ships by air and report their probable destination. Admiral Somerville, in command of Force "H," agreed with this signal, "No action," to the "Hotspur," but Admiral North and Admiral Somerville, in consultation, also agreed that Force "H" should come to one hour's notice for sea, in case the Admiralty sent new orders varying their old instructions. Admiral Somerville could have been at sea at 7.15 in the morning, had the Admiralty ordered him to go to sea. The French ships did not pass until 8.45, and the air reconnaissance which Admiral North had ordered showed that the French ships were going south and not north—that is to say, they were not going towards the enemy-controlled ports regarding which the Admiralty had reserved their rights.

Nothing came from the Admiralty and, again by agreement between the two Admirals, Force "H" reverted to two hours' notice. At 12.39 on the 11th, the Admiralty broke their long silence and ordered Force "H" to raise steam for full speed. Over an hour later, they told Admiral Somerville to go to sea, and after yet another hour Admiral Somerville was told what he was to do. When it was too late for him to do so, he was told to tell the French ships that there was no objection to their going to Casablanca but that they must not go to Dakar or to Bay ports. He was also told that, if it came to the point, the minimum of force was to be used.

It will be seen that it took the Admiralty, at a conservative estimate, at least fourteen and a half hours, after they had been told that French ships were moving, to give Admiral Somerville orders which were at variance with his standing instructions, although apparently the Admiralty wanted some action taken and had been told that "no action" was being taken. One would have thought that in those circumstances they would have moved rather more swiftly. And these Admiralty orders were not sent to Admiral Somerville until one day and sixteen hours—that is forty hours—after the Foreign Office had been warned of the movement by our Consul General in Tangier. At one period in this unhappy story Admiral North was told that he weakly—that was the word used—waited for instructions. Why should he ask for instructions when he already had instructions, and when the Admiralty had been informed of the circumstances of what was in progress? If these instructions were to be varied, as apparently the Admiralty wished them to be varied, why did the Admiralty "weakly" delay, hour after hour, sending amending instructions?

Admiral North is blamed for not giving orders contrary to his instructions to a Force which was not even under his command, orders which the Admiralty had failed to give to their own independently operated squadron. The Admiralty said that the fact that they operated Force "H"—these are the words—"does not affect the issue." What a monstrous statement! To say that the issue was not affected by the fact that they had failed to give new orders to their own Force; while by their silence they were leaving the two Admirals to believe that the old orders stood. Certainly Admiral North did not give orders, but he and Admiral Somerville, acting in concert, as they always did, brought Force "H" to one hour's notice. They had their end of the business ready had the Admiralty functioned.

So far as I know, the Admiralty have never attempted to reply to the simple question whether they consider reserving the right to take action in the case of French ships proceeding towards enemycontrolled ports constituted an executive order to Admiral North to engage the French on September 11 and so, as the Admiralty had said, possibly bring on a war with France—and to do this in the absence of specific orders, to do so contrary to his current instructions. My Lords, to suggest that Admiral North should have taken such a responsibility on his shoulders is simply fantastic. The Admiralty had reserved this right only in the case of ships making for enemy-controlled ports, and these ships were clearly not doing so.

The Admiralty charge was that Admiral North failed in an emergency to take all prudent precautions without waiting for Admiralty instructions. Was there ever such a case of the pot calling the kettle black? Who showed failure in an emergency—Admiral North or the Admiralty; the one acting on precise Admiralty instructions, or the Admiralty failing to give orders to fulfil their apparent wish to vary those instructions? Presumably, the Foreign Office told the Admiralty on September 9 of the impending move; the Admiralty certainly had the Naval Attaché's telegram on the 10th; they were told early on the 11th that Admiral North was taking no action. They had Admiral North's reports from air reconnaissance of the ships' position and course. My Lords, what is it thought that Admiral North should have done that he did not do? That would be a very difficult question to answer; but a very easy question to answer is to say what the Admiralty should have done in those circumstances.

I come now to another important point. Why was no action taken against Admiral Somerville, who, after all, commanded Force "H"? If Admiral Somerville were alive to-day he would fight like a tiger for Admiral North, in whose judgment he had the most implicit confidence. In a letter, Admiral Somerville said that he never remembered a case in which he was so absolutely certain that he, Admiral Somerville, was right. He was not in the habit of asking for instructions in cases where the authorities were in full possession of the facts. He saw no reason for going to sea. Here is an extract from a letter he wrote to the Admiralty: I discussed the situation with Admiral North. We were of opinion that in view of the ample warning your Lordships had received of the intended movement of these vessels, it was not desired to interfere or provoke any sort of incident. If the action taken is considered incorrect, I wish to accept full responsibility since I acted in the full belief that responsibility for any action taken by Force 'H' rested with me. I can only say, what a contrast!—an Admiral shouldering responsibility in the most frank manner possible, and the Admiralty trying to shift their responsibility on to other shoulders. If blame there was, why apportion it solely to Admiral North, who was not in command of Force "H"? One cannot really be surprised if people draw the conclusion that the Admiralty "had it in" for him, and that is why he was singled out in this way.

I must point out another, as it seems to me, important fact. The Admiralty instructions were that, whatever the circumstances, a superior or equal French force was not to be engaged because we could not afford to incur even equivalent losses. Admiral Somerville's flagship, H.M.S. "Renown," had with her three or four old destroyers—and she, too, was an old battlecruiser. The French squadron consisted of three modern, fast cruisers, three modern, large destroyers, supported by large air forces at Casablanca. If the Admiralty, when planning Dakar, foresaw the possible movement of French ships which they might wish to prevent, they should have stationed an adequate force at Gibraltar, because I think it is quite clear that Admiral Somerville could not have engaged that French squadron without grave risk indeed of incurring equivalent losses.

Now let us turn to another side of the matter. The Governor of Gibraltar supported Admiral North and Admiral Somerville. He reported to the War Office as follows: I was convinced with the information and instructions the evident policy of His Majesty's Government was to avoid incidents with the French. I was in entire agreement with Admiral North and cannot conceive how, by any stretch of imagination, he can be convicted of failure to take prudent precautions. The impression created here is that Dakar was planned on inaccurate information, ending in fiasco, and Home authorities are endeavouring to pass the blame on to a local commander in no way responsible for that failure. Well, my Lords, if two Naval officers of recognised high ability, and an Army officer with a record which had placed him in a high appointment, all arrived at a conclusion misinterpreting the Government wishes, it is pretty clear that the Government had failed to issue instructions which made their wishes clear. There is, however, confirmatory evidence of this from headquarters. The Operational Staff of the Admiralty, on receiving news of the movement, considered that it was covered by current Admiralty instructions, so that no action was called for. The Admiralty had failed to make their wishes clear even to their own Operations Division.

Now let us look at the sequel. Dakar ended in failure on September 23. When he came to write his history of that affair, the Prime Minister carefully avoided mentioning that, in his account of the matter to the House of Commons, he blamed the failure, by implication, on Admiral North for letting the French ships pass. In his history he entirely abandons that line of defence, and blames the Director of Operations at the Admiralty and delay at the Foreign Office in deciphering a telegram which, if dealt with properly, would have given the War Cabinet timely notice of the passage of the French ships. No amends were made, however, to Admiral North. If these delays and oversights occurred, they were most unfortunate; but they constituted no reason for dismissing Admiral North. Why should he take the blame for the errors of others? After all, he was an Admiral; he was not a clairvoyant. He could not know what was going on in London.

Then, eighteen days after the news of the French ships had reached London, but only four days after Dakar had failed, and when there was an awkward, difficult explanation to be made to the House of Commons, the Admiralty suddenly asked Admiral North what he had done on receipt of the message from the Naval Attaché at Madrid. This is the comment by a very well-informed officer: Investigation had started with an obviously unpleasant intention at the Admiralty"— in other words, the search for the scapegoat was on. The question was obviously superfluous, because Admiral North had told the Admiralty all he had done. He had ordered no action; Force "H" had gone to one hour's notice. He told them the whole story. On October 2 Admiral North was asked why the "Renown" had not been sent to sea, since the French ships might have turned towards enemy ports. As noble Lords will remember, however, an air reconnaissance had been ordered which showed that they were not proceeding towards enemy ports. Why was Admiral North asked why the "Renown" had not gone to sea? Why was this question not addressed to Admiral Somerville who was in command of Force "H"?

Admiral North might well have asked, in reply, why—if the Admiralty had this in their minds—they had net sent the "Renown" to sea, since they operated her completely independently of him. However, he did reply that all his information showed that the French ships were going south, which was proved right. Tension with the French Navy had eased. The French ships had given notice of their movements. No attempt was made at concealment, and he pointed out that the movements of Force "H" had not been under his orders; that the Naval Attaché's message had been sent to the Admiralty direct and the Admiralty had had time to issue orders, and that the "Renown" had gone to one hour's notice in case such orders came. I should have thought that was a pretty conclusive reply which, even were it not agreed with, at least merited a certain amount of sifting and inquiry. But on October 15 the Admiralty told Admiral North that he would be relieved of his command, and all his requests for an inquiry have been brusquely refused. There were certain things about his interviews at the Admiralty on return home to which I should very much like to refer, but, as I said earlier, I do not wish at this stage to stir up any harsh feelings.

The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, in his reply to a Question put here by the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, was, in my view, misleading. Let me hasten to add that nobody in his senses would ever accuse the noble Marquess of being intentionally misleading—I most certainly do not. But the fact remains that his reply was misleading—and, indeed, lf am not surprised. If he will accept my sympathy, I sympathise with the noble Marquess because, as I pointed out on that occasion, this is such a complicated matter that, with great respect to my noble friend Lord Elibank, it is utterly impossible to deal with it by Question and Answer. I am therefore not at all surprised that the noble Marquess found some difficulty. However, his replies were misleading.

He said that Admiral North was not relieved for letting the French ships pass but for not acting prudently while they were passing. That really is a distinction with a difference. He said that there was no question of the Admiral being made a scapegoat for Dakar. I have quoted other views on that subject from very high authorities indeed, who have no doubt whatever about Admiral North being made the scapegoat. Why did the Prime Minister tell the House of Commons that the arrival of the French ships was the cause of the failure at Dakar? The noble Marquess said there was no inquiry because, whatever the verdict of an inquiry, it would not have affected the Admiralty's views. I have heard of a prisoner, on being found guilty, feeling that it did not affect his own view that he was innocent. In this claim that, whatever the verdict of an impartial inquiry, it would not have affected the Admiralty's view, the Admiralty was putting itself above the law.

Then the noble Marquess referred to the Official War History which had been quoted to him as largely, if not entirely, vindicating Admiral North; but he waved that aside, saying that the conclusions arrived at were only the conclusions of the author. The author was an officer of high intelligence, known for his impartiality and specially selected for this job. He was given access to all papers, and I imagine that a draft of what he wrote would be seen by the Admiralty. The noble Marquess has provided us with a new definition of history: history is history when the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, agrees with it; when he does not agree with it, it is merely an opinion. In other words, when the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, does not agree with history, then, as the late Mr. Henry Ford said, "History is hunk."

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY)

Is the noble Lord arguing that because a thing is in black and white, it is necessarily true or correct or accurate, or represents a true and balanced point? He would find many things in black and white that took a different view.

LORD WINSTER

I have not been in politics for about thirty years without knowing that what appears in black and white (especially in White Papers) is frequently highly misleading. What I am saying is that here is an officer specially selected to write the Official History. He was selected because of his intelligence and known impartiality, and was given access to all relevant papers; and no doubt secret papers were put at his disposal. When the noble Marquess, not agreeing with the Official History, says that it is merely an opinion, that is a new and, to my mind, very interesting definition of history. The noble Marquess also omitted to say that the Naval Attaché's message from Madrid was an official message conveyed from the French Authorities saying that the French ships were going to pass the Straits.

Again, the noble Marquess said that Admiral North took no action to get his ships into a state of readiness. Admiral North alerted his patrols in the Straits. Will the noble Marquess tell us what other ships Admiral North had under his command? We were told that Admiral North did not inform Admiral Somerville. But the two men were completely inseparable in this, as in all other matters affecting affairs at Gibraltar; they conferred and agreed on all that was being done. Why represent Admiral Somerville as the man of action and Admiral North as the laggard who did nothing? What steps was Admiral North to take with ships not under his command? All he could do was confer with Admiral Somerville, who was in command of Force "H"; and he did that. It is far more relevant to ask why the Admiralty were so dilatory in sending orders to the ships which they were operating indpendently.

The noble Marquess asked, is it to be supposed that an inquiry now could produce results not available at that time. My answer unhesitatingly is, Yes. Such an inquiry would review events in the light of later knowledge; and would do so impartially, and not under the shadow of a failure. After all, the Prime Minister altered his views. Presumably because he had later knowledge he altered his views very much between the time he made his statement to the House of Commons and the publication of his statement in his history of the war. The noble Marquess showed a miscomprehension of the relations existing between the two Admirals when he said that Admiral Somerville, wishing to put Force "H" back to two hours' notice, reported to Admiral North. That might indicate that Admiral North commanded Force "H." He did not. What is termed a "report" was only the normal co-operation which existed between the two men.

We were told that, supposing the Admiralty had sent a signal ordering immediate action, Admiral North's forces would not have been prepared for it. But again I must point out that they were not his forces. The forces available were Force "H," under the command of another Admiral, and they were ready at 7.15. If the Admiralty contemplated action, why did they do exactly and precisely nothing until the afternoon? Why did not they find out if all was ready for carrying out new instructions that were at variance with the instructions in force? In confirmation of what I have said about Force "H" not being under the orders of Admiral North. I quote these words from Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cork and Orrery, who was at Gibraltar—the noble Viscount smiles. It is very amusing indeed, this wreck of an officer's career.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

The noble Lord has no right to say that. I was making no comment upon it at all.

LORD WINSTER

I do not think this is an occasion for laughter, even about something else. I quote these words from what Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cork and Orrery who was at Gibraltar at the time said in your Lordships' House [OFFICIAL REPORT, V0l. 187 (No. 80), col. 1129]: Admiral Somerville considered himself as under the direct orders of the Admiralty and did not acknowledge that Admiral North was responsible for his squadron in any way… It was felt…in the squadron…and I saw a great many of the captains—that the Admiral had been unjustly treated. Speaking with reference to the deputation of Admirals of the Fleet who went to the Admiralty the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, said: there was a feeling in the mind of every one of us that one of our senior officers had not been justly treated. Our object was to obtain an inquiry. We were perfectly impartial as to the result. In my opinion, it is the Board of Admiralty, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence who are far more "in the dock" over this matter than Admiral North. If they felt that they had been let down by their Director of Operations or by the Foreign Office, they should have dealt with those delinquents and taken the responsibility for the mistake, not shuffled it off on to Admiral North. The Admiralty failed to make clear what it was they wanted. They specifically told Admiral North that his orders were to "lay off" French slips and to create no incident; and that order specifically applied to French ships passing the Straits.

I imagine that one story is good until another story is told. I do not want to come to a conclusion in my own mind until I have heard the reply to what I have stated. But I feel that on the facts I have narrated there is great room for feeling that Admiral North has sustained injustice under which he must have suffered abominably during the past fourteen years. How very bitterly it must have rankled! But he has some consolation to reflect upon; he has been largely vindicated by the Official Historian. I say without hesitation that many naval officers, perhaps a majority, feel that an injustice has been done to him. It is common knowledge that he enjoys the sympathy of some of the most senior officers of the Navy, who support him not as a matter wholly of sympathy but in their professional judgment on a professional matter. Let me quote some extracts from what I have seen written by some of the most senior officers in the Navy: No one can have any doubt about the injustice meted out to you. Shocked at the injustice of the Admiralty. Enraged by your treatment. Scandalously treated. I am still fuming over your interview with Pound. Such are some of the comments I have seen.

In addition to Naval opinion, I think that public opinion is very much on the Admiral's side. This is a country famed for its sense of justice, and although I fear that I have detained your Lordships at very great length I am sure you will not blame me for trying to put fully on record the facts on which I and many others—some of them better qualified to judge than myself—feel that a very great injustice has been perpetrated. I hope that those who share my opinion will keep together on this matter, and will keep the matter to the front until Admiral North is vindicated as long after he was broken as General Gough was vindicated. I beg to move for Papers.

5.56 p.m.

LORD TEYNHAM

My Lords, I have listened very carefully to the arguments of the noble Lord who has just sat down, and I must say that he has not convinced me that Admiral North's case should be reopened. I had the honour to command one of His Majesty's Ships in Force "H." and I remember many of the points which have been raised by the noble Lord to-day. I cannot help feeling that the question of a public inquiry or court martial is a matter of major principle. We all know the difficulties that prevail in time of war and that quick decisions must be made. In fact, Admiral North was not the only senior commander to be relieved of his post during the last war because he had lost the confidence of his superior officers. I entirely agree with the principle that justice not only should be done, but should be seen to be done, but I do suggest that this principle cannot be applied as between the Government and officers of the Services. It may well be that it can and that in fact it should be applied as between the Executive and the private citizen.

I think it is clear that Admiral North took every opportunity, both at the time and since, to put his point of view before the Admiralty. He was asked to explain, and did explain, and his explanation appears to have confirmed the Board of the day in their opinion that he was not the right man for the post he occupied. I suggest that perhaps Admiral North was more fortunate than others in having the reasons for a final loss of confidence explained to him, and I would say that there can be no obligation on the Board of Admiralty to give reasons for such decisions. I cannot help feeling that the Government must maintain its established right, certainly I would say in time of war, to relieve officers in whom they may have lost confidence, without obligation to hold a public inquiry, either at the time or perhaps even later. As we all know, flag officers in war have a very heavy burden of responsibility, and great qualities of judgment are demanded of them. In this particular case, I would say there is no reflection whatever on the honour of the officer concerned but merely that he was not the right man for the post. In view of the fact that two of the principal witnesses are no longer alive, I suggest that it would be a mistake to reopen any inquiry.

6.0 p.m.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Teynham who has just sat down has said that in his view an inquiry into the case of Admiral North is not necessary. I propose to endeavour to show your Lordships why an inquiry is not only necessary but most desirable. On June 15 in your Lordships' House I put a Question to Her Majesty's Government in relation to the case of Admiral Sir Dudley North. In the course of an interchange of supplementary questions and answers, I gave notice that I would revive the subject again in order that the main features of the case should be put on record in Hansard. With your Lordships' permission, I propose to review those features to-day.

The Question which I asked the Government was whether in connection with the recently published Official History of the War at Sea they would state the reasons why Admiral North was relieved of his command subsequent to the passage of the French cruiser squadron through the Straits of Gibraltar on September 11, 1940, and was later placed on the Retired List, and why his request for a court martial or court of inquiry to investigate his case was refused. I further asked whether the Government would now afford Admiral North an opportunity of publicly clearing his name of an unjust stigma before a tribunal appointed by the Admiralty. I quote the reply given to me by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, on behalf of the Government, because it is necessary to an adequate understanding of the position that confronts us to-day in regard to this matter, and with which I propose to deal this afternoon. The noble Marquess said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 187 (No. 80), col. 1121–2]: In view of the wording of the noble Viscount's Question, I should make it clear that Admiral North was not relieved on the grounds that he allowed the French ships to pass through the Straits, nor is there any question of him having been made a scapegoat for Dakar. He was relieved because the Admiralty had lost confidence in him. There is no doubt whatever that he had forfeited the confidence of the First Lord and of the First Sea Lord of the day. The noble Viscount will also be aware that the Official History reveals that the confidence of Ministers in Admiral North had already been shaken at an earlier date. Admiral North's request for a court-martial or a board of inquiry was refused because, whatever report might have been made by such a tribunal, this could not then have affected the Admiralty's loss of confidence. That remains true. I must also stress very strongly that it would be contrary, to all established practice—a practice which has been especially preserved by Parliament—that the Service Ministers should be unable to relieve senior officers in whom they have lost confidence without setting up an inquiry, either at the time or later. In connection with this last statement in the noble Marquess's reply, because it also has a bearing on the comments on the statement which I propose to make at a later stage, I will quote certain observations made on June 15 by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. The noble Viscount, when saying that he was the First Lord of the Admiralty at the time and that he fully agreed with the answers given by the noble Marquess, went on [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 187, (No. 80), col. 1124]: The Admiralty came at that time to a final conclusion on their jack of confidence in the officer in that particular appointment. There should not be a new precedent established regarding a change of officer in those circumstances; and if an inquiry of this sort were now to be granted I do not know how many more requests of a similar kind the Government might receive. And at a later stage of the interchange of questions and answers, the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, asked the noble Marquess [Col. 1130]: Is the noble Marquess aware that probably the greatest amount of loss of confidence occurred prior to this particular incident, and that those who still live and who shared the responsibility are certainly not afraid of any challenge to the decision then made? But they are very jealous, in the interests of our country, if ever—which God forbid!—it should be at war again, of creating a precedent in this case which would be exceedingly dangerous. All that I would stress at the moment, in relation to the noble Viscount's statement which I have quoted, is his obvious anxiety, in what he considers to be the country's interests, quite rightly not to create what he calls, a "dangerous precedent." I suggest to the noble Viscount, with great respect, that the precedents are by no means in his favour. But to that subject I will return later.

And now I will come to the reasons given by the Admiralty to Admiral North for relieving him of his command as Admiral Commanding North Atlantic. The reason given in a letter dated October 15, 1940, was: Their Lordships cannot retain full confidence in an officer who fails in an emergency to take all prudent precautions without waiting for Admiralty instructions. That was the definite offence with which Admiral North was charged. That was the definite reason, according to the Admiralty—a reason which related to incidents in the early hours of the morning of September 11—why he was relieved of his command. There was nothing in the Admiralty letter which had any bearing on, or was related to, the statement of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, that the confidence of Ministers in Admiral North had already been shaken at an earlier date, or to the statements of the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, that the Admiralty came at that time to a final conclusion on their lack of confidence in Admiral North and that probably the greatest amount of loss of confidence occurred prior to this particular incident. I submit that it is prejudicial to the case of Admiral North in the public eye to introduce at this stage into the definite charge against him a charge of prior loss of confidence, without stating the exact nature of that charge, which in any event had nothing whatever to do with the case. It is a vague charge of this nature, shrouded in mystery—but leaving the impression on Parliament and on the public that Admiral North had previously failed in his naval duties—which would be examined and cleared up at the court of inquiry for which I am asking today. It has been suggested in some quarters that this alleged prior loss of confidence was related to the attitude of Admiral North towards the operations at Oran on July 3. If that indeed be so—although I repeat that it had nothing whatever to do with the case—then why, it may be asked, was Admiral North singled out for the displeasure of the First Lord and the Board of Admiralty from amongst other high ranking naval officers whose attitude towards the Oran operations was similar to that of Admiral North? In the British Navy, writes the Official Historian on this point, strong feelings were aroused and all three Flag Officers concerned in carrying out the Cabinet's orders—Admirals Cunningham. Somerville and North—viewed them with horror and incredulity, and did what they could, with so little time allowed, to postpone the issue. Certain questions in this connection would be cleared up if a court of inquiry were held, and I will pose some of the questions which might be put. Was it because Admiral North had expressed "horror and incredulity" at the Oran operations that the alleged prior loss of confidence in him took place? And, if so, did the Board of Admiralty at any time express a loss of confidence in Admirals Cunningham and Somerville? If not, why not? Further, were there reasons unrelated to Oran for the alleged prior loss of confidence in Admiral North? If so, what were they? And on what grounds, and in what circumstances, were these unexplained and unsubstantiated charges of prior loss of confidence brought in to cloud the issue of the definite charge made against Admiral North by the Admiralty—namely, that he failed in an emergency to take all prudent precautions without waiting for Admiralty instructions?

Now I propose to endeavour to prove that in the light of all the circumstances, Admiral North did not fail to take all prudent precautions in the early hours of the morning of September 11, 1940, and to show that an inquiry into the whole subject is necessary and desirable in the interests of justice. In the first place, it is important to remember that on July 10 Admiral North had himself sent a signal to the Admiralty in which he asked for some clarification of the very confused situation vis-á-vis the French Fleet. The French attitude at that time was so uncertain that he felt considerable anxiety regarding the safety of the large and lightly escorted convoys and many unescorted ships which were passing close to Casablanca. On July 12 and 13 he received signals from the Admiralty in reply to his, the general trend of which evinced a strong desire on the part of the Government to avoid any incidents with the French which might lead to open war. These considerations remained unaltered, and were, of course, present to his mind when the crisis arose on September 11.

An important confirmatory testimony to the correctitude of Admiral North's reading of the Admiralty's messages is to be found in a passage in the Memorandum to the First Lord of the Admiralty of five Admirals of the Fleet, who went on a deputation to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. J. P. L. Thomas, M.P., in May, 1953, to ask him to hold a naval inquiry into the case of Admiral North, which request the First Lord refused. The Admirals of the Fleet were Lord Chatfield, O.M., First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, 1933–38; The Earl of Cork and Orrery, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet, 1933–35, and Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, 1937–39; Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, O.M., K.T., Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, 1939–42, First Sea Lord, 1943–46; Sir John H.D. Cunningham, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, 1943–46, First Sea Lord, 1946–48; and Sir Algernon U. Willis, G.C.B., Flag Officer Commanding Force "H," Mediterranean, 1943, Second Sea Lord, 1944–46, and Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, 1948–50, a most impressive and formidable body of naval opinion and experience of the highest rank.

The passage—which has a considerable bearing on the subject—is as follows: From the papers we have carefully studied, it appears that Admiral North, A.C.N.A., was given in July, 1940, some indefinite instructions which were bound to place him in a difficult position should the eventuality, for which the instructions were meant to provide, come to pass. He was also definitely told that French ships were not to be interfered with unless proceeding to enemy ports and that they were in inferior strength. Although the political situation changed in the next two months. Admiral North's instructions remained unchanged. He was not officially informed of the changes in the Anglo-French political atmosphere; nor was he informed of the Dakar plans, though he probably had some knowledge of them from unofficial sources. As a result, he and his command had a different political mentality from the Admiralty when the crisis arose. Whose fault was it, I may ask, that when the crisis arose Admiral North had a different political mentality? It was not the fault of Admiral North. He had done his best by his signal of July 10 to elicit from the Admiralty the Government's views on the situation, but after their messages of July 12 and 13 he was left completely in the dark on the subject. Clearly, the fault lay with the Admiralty, a fact which I suggest would be established were a court of inquiry to be held.

I now come, my Lords, to the vital hours in which the affair which I am discussing to-day had its origin—namely, the first seven to eight hours of the morning of September 11, 1940, the hours out of which arose the charge against Admiral North that he did not take all prudent precautions in an emergency. If I tread on ground already trodden by the noble Lord, Lord Winster, I hope that I may be forgiven for doing so, because I desire to submit for your Lordships' consideration the picture, as I see it, of events as a whole, and not in disjointed bits and pieces. In the drama which was enacted that September night on the Rock of Gibraltar, at a time when the battle in the skies over Britain was on the way to its victorious close—a drama of which the aftermath contained tragedy and, in my submission, grave injustice for Admiral North—the central figures were Admiral Sir Dudley North, Admiral Commanding North Atlantic, Vice-Admiral (later Admiral of the Fleet) Sir James Somerville, Flag Officer Commanding Force "H," and the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Gibraltar. General Sir Clive Liddell, Adjutant General to the Forces, 1937–39. Force "H," which comprised the "Renown, "Hood," "Valiant," and other ships, and eleven destroyers, was described by the Admiralty as a "detached squadron" under Admiral Somerville's command, and there was never the slightest doubt in Admiral Somerville's mind that Force "H" was intended to be an independent command, and that he was directly responsible to, and under the orders of, the Admiralty, and not under the orders of Admiral North, the Flag Officer, North Atlantic.

All these three officers, Admirals North, Somerville and the Governor—and I lay particular stress on this point—had all along been, and still were, in close touch with each other, either personally or through their respective staffs. Admiral North, in his official residence, "The Mount," and Admiral Somerville in his flagship, the "Renown," were connected by private telephone to the office of Admiral North's Chief of Staff in "The Tower," and could talk direct to each other, and never hesitated to ring each other up at all hours of the night—and frequently did so—and Admiral North was in constant telephone communication with his Chief of Staff at all hours of the twenty-four, as was his Chief of Staff with Admiral Somerville's staff. Moreover, between Admiral North and the Governor there was also the closest liaison. Hardly twenty-four hours passed at that lime without their meeting or talking on the telephone to each other.

At 12.8 a.m. on September 11 the following signal was received from the Naval Attaché, Madrid: French Admiralty's to me begins—Please advise the Naval Authorities Gibraltar departure from Toulon September 9 three cruisers type George Leygues and three French Cruisers La Fantasque Class will pass Straits A.M. September 11th. In reply to a supplementary question by me on June 15, the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. said: In spite of this message, Admiral North took no action to get his ships into a state of readiness, although he must have known that the time was short and that he might at any moment receive instructions from the Admiralty which involved immediate action. Nor did he inform Admiral Somerville, in command of Force 'H.,' of the receipt of the signal till 8 a.m. on the 11th—eight hours after he had received it and when the French ships were already entering the Straits. In fact, Admiral Somerville did receive independent information of the approach of the French ships, at 5.10 a.m., and, very properly, put the 'Renown' under one hour's notice for steam. But this was not due to any action taken by Admiral North. These facts were the final cause of the Admiralty's loss of confidence in him. Those are the happenings as stated by the noble Marquess, the alleged happenings on which Admiral North was found guilty without a trial, dismissed the Service and his career as a full Admiral terminated.

LORD TEYNHAM

If I may interrupt the noble Viscount, I think he is incorrect in saying that Admiral North was dismissed the Service. He was not dismissed in any way, but was given another appointment.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

I will deal with that point later on. He was given another appointment as a Rear Admiral; subsequently he was placed on half pay. However, as I say, I will deal with that matter later on.

I propose to submit to your Lordships an outline of the happenings as I conceive them to be. The Naval Attaché, Madrid, 12.8 a.m. signal was decoded by about 12.30 a.m., and was shown to Admiral North's Chief of Staff and telephoned direct to Admiral North about the same time. The first thing that Admiral North asked his flag lieutenant was: "Have the Admiralty got that?" "Yes, sir," he replied, "it is directed to them, and they should have got it just as soon as we did or possibly sooner." We now know that the duty captain at the Admiralty failed to appreciate the urgency of the message and dealt with it as one of ordinary everyday business and not urgently, and in consequence it went through in the ordinary way with the First Sea Lord's telegrams. We also know that for his negligence in the matter the duty captain was dismissed from his post. But was this breakdown in the Admiralty machinery at a vital moment—of which, of course, Admirals North and Somerville knew nothing—given any or adequate consideration when the Admiralty arrived at the decision to dismiss Admiral North from the Service? I submit to your Lordships that that is a very pertinent question which would be cleared up in the course of the inquiry for which I am asking today. The next thing that Admiral North did—

LORD PAKENHAM

My Lords, as someone who is playing no part in the debate, may I interrupt the noble Viscount? He keeps returning to this suggestion that Admiral North was dismissed. Surely he was corrected on that point, and would it not be better to accept the correction?

VISCOUNT ELIANK

What correction does the noble Lord wish to insert?

LORD PAKENHAM

It is not for me to correct the noble Viscount, but simply to suggest that that particular statement should be withdrawn from his future remarks.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

Very well. Let us see the difference between being dismissed the Service and placed on the Retired List. What is the difference? I cannot see any difference.

LORD AILWYN

Dismissal from his command.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

Relieved of his command.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

I will give the noble Marquess anything he likes.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

All we are asking for is the facts. The noble Viscount has given the facts wrongly.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

If that is the only wrong fact which the noble Marquess can find in the statement which I am submitting to your Lordships to-day, I shall be very pleased. I am quite willing to give it to the noble Marquess that he was dismissed his command and subsequently placed on the Retired List. I hope that will satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Teynham. I withdraw everything that I said with regard to Admiral North's being dismissed as a result of this. He was dismissed from his command and placed on the Retired List. Perhaps if I had not been a landlubber I should have got it right. The next thing that Admiral North did after receiving the Madrid message was to discuss the situation with his Chief of Staff, and as a result of this discussion he sent a signal, despatched at 2.15 a.m.—as early as the very heavy volume of signal traffic would allow—to all ships on patrol in the area, including the destroyer "Hotspur," which was hunting a submarine, to report the French ships immediately if sighted.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

What time was this?

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

At 2.15 a.m., which was as early as the very heavy volume of signal traffic would allow. The message came in at about 12. At 5.12 a.m. a signal was received from "Hotspur" that she had sighted six unknown ships and at 5.37 a.m.—these signals are on record; the noble Marquess has them—a further signal was received from "Hotspur" that she was shadowing them. At 5.55 a.m. after a talk with his Chief of Staff—their talks with each other had been continuing throughout the night—Admiral North signalled "Hotspur" to cease shadowing. In the meantime, after the receipt of "Hotspur's" sighting signal at 5.12 a.m., Admiral North had a telephone discussion on the whole matter with Admiral Somerville, and it was as a result of that discussion that Admiral Somerville brought his Force "H" to one hour's notice for steam, which gave ample time to proceed to sea and to intercept the French ships if orders to do so had been received from the Admiralty—the Admiralty, be it remembered, who operated "H" Force independently, having, to the best of Admirals North's and Somerville's knowledge, received Naval Attaché Madrid's message as soon as or possibly sooner than it had been received at Gibraltar. Let another vital point be remembered and emphasised in this connection. On June 15 I asked the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, the question: "Is it now suggested that Admiral North ought to have gone into action against the French cruiser squadron?" "I never said or suggested such a thing," replied the noble Marquess. So that disposes of any responsibility on the part of Admiral North on that point.

The statement that Admiral Somerville acted on his own in bringing the "Renown" to one hour's notice for steam, implying that Admiral North knew nothing about it, is not in accordance with the facts and it is fantastically absurd to anyone—and there were many—who saw them working together. They were the greatest friends. They worked in the closest liaison, and they discussed anything and everything together, either by personal contact or by telephone, at any hour of the day or night. At 6.17 a.m. Admiral North signalled the Admiralty that "Hotspur" had sighted the lights of six ships, probably warships, steering west at high speed, and that he had directed "Hotspur" to cease shadowing. Immediately after Admiral North's Chief of Staff had ordered the cease shadowing signal to be made, Admiral Somerville rang him up and expressed great satisfaction at what he had done in the matter. The continued silence of the Admiralty, coupled with the knowledge possessed by Admirals North and Somerville that the Consul General at Tangier had telegraphed the Foreign Office on September 9 that a French squadron might pass through the Straits during the following 72 hours, confirmed Admirals North's and Somerville's original conviction that the Admiralty did not intend to place any obstacle in the way of the passage of the French squadron; and as the squadron passed Europa Point at 8.45 a.m. they signalled their names, and—the ships being all personally known to the Royal Navy at Gibraltar—Admiral North signalled "Bon voyage" to them.

Admiral North had kept the Governor informed of all that had transpired, and the Governor agreed with all the Admiral's actions and said that it seemed that the French Navy was at last coming to its senses. This mental attitude of the Governor's was shared by all responsible officers on the Rock, who felt it to be a confirmation of what they had been led to believe by art important message from the British Naval Attaché, Madrid, 6.42 p.m., of September 5 (relative to the improved attitude of the French Naval Attaché and of Admiral Darlan) and who also felt that it was quite possible that these cruisers might be getting away from German influence.

I emphasise as an important feature of the case that nothing at all had come to Admirals North and Somerville and the Governor from the Admiralty which was warranted to place any other complexion on the Naval Attaché, Madrid's, September 5 message, and that nothing at all had been received by them from he Admiralty to inject into the prevailing atmosphere on the Rock any sense of a sudden unexpected happening. It was not until 12.39 p.m. on the 11th that the Admiralty broke its silence and ordered Force "H" to sea in an unsuccessful pursuit of the French. Then the attack on Dakar failed.

On September 27—that is, sixteen days after the passage of the French squadron and four days after the failure of the Dakar expedition—the Admiralty signalled Admiral North asking him what time Naval Attaché Madrid's 18.09 message of September 10 was received and what action was taken on it. To this, Admiral North replied that it was received at 00.08 on the 11th and passed to forces at sea at 02.15; also, that "Hotspur's" sighting report was received at 05.12 and passed to Admiralty in his 06.17 immediate; and that "Hotspur" and ships on patrol had been ordered to take no action beyond reporting. On October 2, the Admiralty called for a report in writing from Admiral North, which he despatched to them on October 6. On October 7, Admiral Sir James Somerville, Commander of "H" Force—or Force "H," whichever the noble Lords prefer to call it—off his own bat wrote to the Admiralty giving his reasons for not intercepting the French squadron. He said that he had discussed the situation fully with Admiral North at the time, and he went on: Rightly or wrongly, we were both of the opinion that in view of what appeared to be the ample warning their Lordships had received of the intended movement and notification of the presence of these vessel approaching the Straits, it was not desired to interfere with this movement or to provoke any sort of incident. If, however, the action taken is considered to have been incorrect, I wish to accept full responsibility, since at the time in question I acted in the full belief that responsibility for any action taken by Farce 'H' rested with me. And in a letter to Admiral North, written shortly before his death a few years ago, Admiral Somerville said: I can recall no situation during the war when I had so little doubt that we were doing the right thing. We may be blamed for not requesting instructions, but I personally never do this unless I am in doubt as to what action I should take. In this case I had no doubt at all, and as my views were shared by both you and the Governor. I felt quite positive that we were acting in accordance with the wishes of the Government in allowing these ships to pass. On October 8, in another place, the Prime Minister said: The whole situation at Dakar was transformed in a most unfavourable manner by the arrival there of three French cruisers and three destroyers. A little later on in his speech, the Prime Minister said: By a series of accidents, and some errors which have been made the subject of disciplinary action or are now subject to formal inquiry, neither the First Sea Lord nor the Cabinet was informed of the approach of these ships to the Straits of Gibraltar until it was too late to stop them passing through. Orders were instantly given to stop them at Casablanca or, if that failed, to prevent them entering Dakar. Further on in his speech, the Prime Minister said: The House may rest assured—indeed, it is the only point I am seeking to make to-day—that the mischievous arrival of these ships, and the men they carried, at Dakar arose in no way from any infirmity on the part of the Government; it was one of those mischances which often arise in war, and especially in war at sea. The broadcast of the Prime Minister's statement came through to Gibraltar, and I shall be surprised to learn that any responsible officer on the Rock ever imagined for a single moment that the responsibility for "one of those mischances which often arise in war" would, or could, in all the circumstances, be laid at Admiral North's door, or that, in connection with the passage of the French ships through the Straits, he would be drawn into the net of responsibility for a political decision outside the confines of naval warfare, and would be charged with a serious professional offence, convicted without any sort of inquiry or trial of a formal nature, and be summarily dismissed the Service or placed on the Retired List—I have altered the words to "placed on the Retired List"—and his career as a full Admiral terminated. But that is what happened.

On October 15 Admiral North was notified by the Admiralty that he would be relieved of his command at the earliest opportunity, on the grounds which I have already stated to the House—namely, that their Lordships could not retain full confidence in an officer who failed in an emergency to take all prudent precautions without waiting for Admiralty instructions. Admiral North made an immediate signal of protest, and followed up the protest on October 27 with a report supplementary to his report to the Admiralty of October 6. On October 28, the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Gibraltar, General Sir Clive Liddell, moved into action, and off his own bat sent a very strongly-worded cable to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in which he said that he had been in the closest touch with Admiral North both before and during the incident in question, and that there had been a continual interchange of information between them. He then gave his reasons why he was in entire agreement with Admiral North's actions and said—and I ask particular attention to these words—that he could not conceive how, by any stretch of imagination, Admiral North could be convicted of failure to take prudent precautions.

On November 21, Admiral North asked that he might have an opportunity of vindicating himself before whatever board or tribunal the Admiralty saw fit to appoint. This request was refused by the Admiralty on December 4, as were further requests during the same month, and at the end of the year Admiral North was relieved of his command and he returned to England. On several occasions during 1941, in interviews at the Admiralty with the First Lord and the First Sea Lord, and in writing, Admiral North renewed his requests for a court martial or an inquiry into the circumstances in which he had been ordered to haul down his flag as Admiral Commanding North Atlantic, but these requests were all refused. Early in 1942, he was placed on the Retired List, and though, subsequently, in 1943, he accepted employment as Rear-Admiral in charge of the Great Yarmouth Command—and I hope that that satisfies the noble Lord, Lord Teynham—the Admiralty continued to refuse his requests to be allowed to vindicate before a Court of Inquiry his actions at Gibraltar.

After the war terminated in 1946, Admiral Sir William James, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, 1939–42, and Chief of Naval Information, 1943–44, in his Portsmouth Letters expressed the opinion that Admiral North had been the victim of a great injustice. In October, 1948, Rear-Admiral H. G. Thursfield, Naval Correspondent of The Times, 1936–52, and Editor of Brassey's Naval Annual, wrote an impressive article in the National- Review in which he related the principal circumstances and happenings at Gibraltar from July to September, 1940, and said that it was now time that the stigma which had lain for eight years on the reputation of Admiral North, a gallant and deserving naval officer, should be removed. Further steps were taken by Admiral North in his efforts to obtain a Court of Inquiry to consider his case and to clear his name, and those steps led in the event to the deputation to the First Lord of the Admiralty in May, 1953, of five Admirals of the Fleet, who submitted to him a considered and very moderately worded memorandum, requesting that an Inquiry should be set up. Notwithstanding, as I have already said, the great weight and experience behind this deputation, the First Lord, Mr. J.P.L. Thomas, M.P., turned down their request. Amongst the reasons given for not granting an Inquiry, one was, the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, said on June 15, that senior officers at the Admiralty who were in full cognisance of the facts, had unfortunately died—I wonder if I might have the attention of the noble Marquess?

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I am sorry; my mind wandered for the moment.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

I am not going to say on that what I might say. Amongst the reasons given for not granting an Inquiry, the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, said on June 15 that one was that senior officers at the Admiralty who were in full cognisance of the facts had unfortunately died, there is no chance of getting their evidence, and he could not therefore feel that an Inquiry would do anything for Admiral North's reputation, one way or another.

I desire to make a few comments on that statement. The first one is that although some senior officers at the Admiralty have unfortunately died, and there is no chance of hearing their evidence, the noble Marquess would appear inadvertently to have overlooked the fact that there is still alive, I am delighted to say, and with us in the House to-day, one of the most important witnesses of all—namely, the Cabinet Minister who authorised the signing of the papers which dismissed Admiral North from the Service and upon which he was placed on retired pay, the then First Lord of the Admiralty, the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. The noble Viscount must assuredly be fully informed of all the principal things that arose in discussion or in writing at the Admiralty in relation to the "North case" during those days in September and October, 1940, when vital decisions affecting the career of the Admiral Commanding North Atlantic, were being considered and taken. Everyone, I imagine, would agree that the noble Viscount's evidence would be of outstanding importance, and as he has told us in this House that he is not afraid of his decision being challenged—a fact which I for one, Lever doubted—he would, I feel sure, welcome the opportunity of giving his evidence if a court-martial or a Court of Inquiry were set up.

The second comment I desire to make is that if the noble Marquess's argument be a sound one, then little advantage could be attached to any inquiry into the past if some of the principal persons originally concerned were no longer in the land of the living, even though some of the persons were still alive and the papers relating to the subject were still in existence—and, further, that the bulk of historical research into events and persons of bygone days(of which I have done a great deal in the past)would be of little value. The third comment I should like to make on the statement of the noble Marquess is that it is my submission—a submission which I am endeavouring to establish on firm ground, to-day, as did the noble Lord, Lord Winster—that not only were the senior officers of the Admiralty to whom the noble Marquess referred not in full cog- nisance of the facts, but that—having regard to the nature of some of the answers given to me by the noble Marquess on June 15—the Government are not even yet in full cognisance of all the facts. That is one of the essential reasons why I, and others, are asking for a Court of Inquiry to be set up, in order that all the features connected with the case may be submitted to independent review and consideration.

Now, my Lords, I come for a few moments to the question of precedents, which has been turned by those who have opposed an inquiry into one of the most important features of this case and which must therefore be examined, if not at undue length, at any rate with reasonable care. The first thing I have to say is that I have never suggested, and no one to my knowledge has ever suggested—and this has reference to one of the answers given to me by the noble Marquess which I quoted at the commencement of my speech—that the Admiralty should not be entitled to relieve an officer of his command. My contention is that, in fairness to that officer and in accordance with Naval tradition and precedent, the Admiralty should be prepared and willing to take the necessary steps, especially in such a weightily disputed case as this one, publicly to justify their reasons for having done so. As the noble Lord, Lord Ailwyn, so truly said in your Lordships' House on July 15, "Justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done."

The noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, said on June 15 that to grant an inquiry in this case would be to create an exceedingly dangerous precedent. Is that so? Would it be creating a precedent? I have been refreshing my memory on this subject, and what do I find? I find that, far from creating a precedent, it would be a distinct departure from precedent if an inquiry into Admiral North's case were not granted. A study of Naval history shows clearly that in the eighteenth century—during the first eight decades of which Britain was almost continuously at war at sea—it was the established practice to allow Naval officers who were charged with offences connected with their Naval duties the opportunity to vindicate themselves before a court-martial. No one at that period, in the Royal Navy, at the Admiralty, in Parliament, or amongst the public, would have dreamed for a single moment of suggesting that accused officers should not be granted courts-martial, or that to grant a court-martial would be creating a dangerous precedent and would lead to many more requests of a similar kind. The motto of the Admiralty and of the public of those days, was that, "Justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done."

Take, for instance, the celebrated case of Admiral Byng, which revolved round the action which took place on May 20,1755, off Port Mahon, Minorca. Admiral Byng was replaced by Admiral Hawke and sent home, and was automatically accorded a court-martial before which he was able to state his case, a case which excited tremendous interest and controversy in and out of Parliament. Byng himself had previously been a member of the courts-martial on Admirals Richard Lestock and Thomas Mathews which sat in 1746 and 1747 in connection with incidents arising out of the action off Toulon on February 10 to 13,1743. It is highly interesting to remember in this connection that there was some delay in the setting up of the Lestock court-martial, as a consequence of which delay the House of Commons moved into action and passed an Address to the King praying that an official inquiry might be held. In that respect it was performing what Mr. Edward F. Iwi pointed out in The Times of June 24 to be the primary and proper function of Parliament under the Bill of Rights, 1688—namely, to redress grievances created by the Executive, instead of abandoning its obligations to Ministers.

Then, take the famous and very interesting court-martial on Admiral Augustus Keppel, a court-martial which, be it particularly noted, was ordered by the Admiralty itself. It will be observed that so entrenched was the practice in those days of granting courts-martial to Naval officers charged with offences while in performance of their duties that the thought of dismissing Admiral Keppel without a trial—as was done in the case of Admiral North in 1940 by the then Board of Admiralty—never for a moment entered the heads of the Board of Admiralty in Admiral Keppel's day. The court sat for five weeks early in 1779, and after examining and considering a great mass of technical evidence it pronounced the charge preferred against Admiral Keppel by the Admiralty to be Malicious and ill-founded; that Admiral Keppel had behaved as became a judicious, brave and experienced officer; and that the court unanimously and honourably acquitted him.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, I hesitate to interrupt the interesting reading of the noble Viscount. I am in a position of considerable embarrassment because I myself am taking part in this debate, and it falls to me to answer the noble Viscount and others who share his views. But I think there is a very strong feeling all over the House that the noble Viscount has perhaps ranged rather wider than the ordinary practice of the House with regard to read speeches. Perhaps I might remind the noble Viscount of the Resolution of the House which was passed on June 17, 1936, namely: It has been declared to be alien to the custom of the House and injurious to the traditional conduct of its debates that speeches should be read. That Resolution has always been very widely interpreted in this House. It is well known, I think, to all of us that there are certain noble Lords who find great difficulty in speaking without extremely copious notes, and a concession is always made in this way. The last thing I wish to do is to prevent the noble Viscount from putting his case as fully and as properly as he feels necessary, but the noble Viscount has now been reading steadily to your Lordships for nearly three-quarters of an hour. I think that is going a little too far.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

Naturally I take what the noble Marquess says in the right spirit: but what I was trying to do was to help your Lordships in the delivery of my speech. I desire to put the whole case for Admiral North, as I see it. I was, in fact, following what happens from the two Front Benches every day. The Ministers from the Government Front Bench, and the Leaders and noble Lords from these Benches consistently read their speeches—

EARL JOWITT

May I interrupt for a moment? So far as I am concerned, that is wholly inaccurate—I do not. Having listened to the noble Viscount with great interest, and very largely in sympathy, I would say, most respectfully, that if we have written speeches read it absolutely kills debates. The cut and thrust of debate mast go if speeches are prepared beforehand. I think that is all that the noble Marquess means to say, and if that is so, I respectfully agree.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

It is true that read speeches are more common from the Box than from other parts of the House, because a special exception has always been made with those who have to make declarations of Government policy and who, therefore, have to be extremely accurate in what they say. I think that is recognised here as a normal concession.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

It is not usually my custom to read my speech. I very seldom do—in fact I do not think I have ever before transgressed in this way. It was solely with the object of getting through what I have to say as quickly as possible that I have done so. However, I will proceed with my speech but will not deliver it in the same way that I have been doing, although of course it may take a little longer. As I was saying, in Admiral Keppel's case the court sat for five weeks, and after examining a great mass of technical evidence pronounced the charge preferred against Admiral Keppel by the Admiralty to be "malicious and ill-founded." Admiral Keppel, quite rightly, became the hero of the hour.

The Lords of the Admiralty, on the other hand, were neither regarded nor treated as heroes, which was not astonishing. In those eighteenth century days many unpleasant things, about both the living and the dead, could be openly said or expressed in print. The Board of Admiralty, which had been found guilty in the public eye of preferring "malicious and ill-founded" charges against Admiral Keppel, suffered severely at the hands of the lampooners and pamphleteers. Times have changed, and lampooners, and pamphleteers are no longer with us—some might say unfortunately. They did in those days perform occasionally a very useful part in protecting the liberty of the subject. They are no longer with us, unfortunately, to act as thorns in the flesh of the unrighteous.

In seeking to establish my point I have singled out just a few of the better known cases of courts-martial in the eighteenth century, but the records show numerous others, none of them dissimilar in reasons for their origin to the court-martial or court of inquiry which I submit ought to be held in the case of Admiral North. The practice followed by Hawke, Howe, St. Vincent, Nelson and the Admiralty in the golden age of our Naval supremacy was to give an officer who thought he had been unjustly treated an opportunity of re-establishing himself before a court-martial. What our great sea captains counted as a fair, just and quite usual procedure in the eighteenth century is now, in some quarters, described as exceedingly dangerous in the twentieth century. Dangerous to whom or to what? In the light of the facts which I have just given to your Lord-ships I am completely at a loss to conceive where the alleged danger lies. It is also quite clear and highly significant that this alleged danger has escaped the experienced eyes of the five Admirals of the Fleet who have asked for an inquiry.

There is every reason why it should have escaped their eyes because they were all serving officers in the Royal Navy in the First World War, when the motto of the First Lord of the Admiralty was still—as in the eighteenth century—that "Justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done." Let us see what transpired only four decades ago—in this century—in the case of Rear-Admiral Sir Ernest Troubridge, in connection with the escape, in August, 1914, of the Germans cruisers, "Goeben" and "Breslau," into the Dardanelles, a German move which, it was suggested, was the decisive factor in causing the Turks to throw in their lot with the Central Powers. Admiral Troubridge commanded the cruiser squadron in the Fleet of which Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne was Commander-in-Chief. Milne gave an explanation of his action to the Admiralty and was exonerated. Admiral Troubridge, however, was summoned home for a court-martial (just as Admiral North might have been summoned home for a court-martial) and appeared before the court charged that: from negligence or default, he did on 7 August forbear to chase H.I.G.M.'s 'Goeben.' being an enemy then flying. The court decided that the charge had not been proved and Troubridge was "fully and honourably acquitted."

My Lords, I will leave this question of precedents, and leave it to all fair-minded and impartial persons to decide whether or not, in the light of the precedents I have quoted, Admiral North is entitled to the inquiry for which he has repeatedly asked. In this House on June 15 the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, used the phrase that there has never at any moment been the faintest suggestion against Admiral North's honour. What then is honour? What meaning does the word have? If the professional reputation of an Admiral, who in time of war was relieved of his command, is at stake, and at the same time it is said that he has sustained no reflection on his honour, then I suggest the distinction is one which multitudes of people will utterly fail to grasp or appreciate. If an inquiry is not granted which would give Admiral North an opportunity of clearing his name—or if his name is not cleared to his satisfaction in some other way—then, in its passage down the dusty corridors of history, the noble Marquess's well-intentioned phrase will assuredly be stripped from its context, and in a short space of time will have gone with the wind; and there will be left to the gaze of prosperity that serious charge of professional misconduct of which Admiral North was found guilty without a trial.

In the Memorandum which they presented to the First Lord of the Admiralty in May, 1953, the five Admirals of the Fleet gave their reasons for asking for an inquiry in a case, "where," as they said, "the Admiralty machinery broke down," and ended with these words: If we may say so with respect, we believe an inquiry by the present Board would reflect highly and would be greatly valued in the Service. To this request from these distinguished and high-ranking officers I would again add my plea—namely, that Her Majesty's Government reconsider their attitude and now give to Admiral North the opportunity of publicly vindicating himself before an appropriate tribunal, an action on the part of the Government which, I submit, would be in keeping with Naval tradition and precedent, and with the spirit of fair play and justice which has animated the British people and the Royal Navy for centuries past.

6.50 p.m.

LORD AILWYN

My Lords, I shall be very brief. You have listened to a detailed and comprehensive narrative of events leading up to this debate this afternoon. I shall confine my few remarks to what I conceive to be the broad general principles involved in this unhappy case. It must be a matter of regret to all your Lordships that this affair has entered the arena of political argument and debate. It was with the express intention of avoiding this lamentable situation that the five Admirals of the Fleet, as we know, went to see the First Lord of the Admiralty, last year. And it is profoundly distressing, particularly to some of us who have spent the best years of our lives in the Navy, that the considered opinions and the urgent representations of a deputation of that distinction should have been rejected out of hand by the political head of the Admiralty, with the result that we see to-day, tossed into the arena of Parliamentary controversy, a subject that with good will, vision and imagination could have been handled, and should have been handled, with dignity and restraint—far removed from the popular clamour that has now been aroused. It is difficult to conceive of a case more grossly mishandled. It is a deplorable situation and, I submit, reflects little credit on those in whose hands should have lain the primary duty of ensuring that justice was seen to be done.

Voices have been raised suggesting that the matter should be allowed to drop. That seems to me to be a strange idea of justice. Pusillanimous advice of that sort does little credit to those who give it. We all know how justice can miscarry. The outstanding case in my lifetime that comes easiest to mind is the Dreyfus case. The French General Staff at that time refused to admit that a mistake had been made, and it required a man of the courage and calibre of Emile Zola, and the genius power of his pen in that famous article J'accuse, to get that wretched man back from the horrors of Devil's Island and, at long last, twelve years from the time of his first arrest, to secure his complete rehabilitation. We do not want the North case to degenerate into a cause célébre of that nature. But that is what is in danger of occurring, as a result of Her Majesty's Government's attitude. As a leader in The Times said a week or two ago: Nothing said in either House of Parliament by the official apologists has checked the increasingly anxious suspicion of laymen that an individual has been unfairly treated. The noble Marquess the Leader of the House, in reply to an intervention of mine on June 15, referred to the fact that at the present time—I am sorry, but there is bound to be a little repetition in these matters—nearly all the chief actors in this event are, unhappily, dead. He went on to say: Is it really to be supposed that an inquiry now could conceivably produce results which were not attainable at that time?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 187 (No. 80), col. 1125.] With great respect—yes. I venture to think, it could. But what is infinitely more important than what I think, and what is far more significant, is that the five Admirals of the Fleet clearly thought so, and so expressed themselves in their memorandum. I am inclined to think that an inquiry now, held by unprejudiced and unbiased minds, in a calm and unruffled atmosphere, far removed from the heat and stress of war, not labouring under a feeling of frustration and disappointment caused by an unsuccessful operation of war, and with all the relevant documents before them for calm and dispassionate consideration, might well produce results which were not attainable or, at least let roe say, were not attained, at that former time.

Moreover, not only would a high ranking officer, labouring under a deep grievance and sense of injustice, be given, at long last, the opportunity of stating his case, in accordance with the hitherto accepted custom of the Service, but the holding of such an inquiry would finally put an end to speculations and suspicions and reassure the country at large. The, noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, told your Lordships on June 15 that he and those survivors who shared with him responsibility at the Admiralty at that time are certainly not afraid of any challenge to the decision then made, to which that same Times leader replied: then let the challenge be met. But the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander, said something else. He feared that an inquiry in this case would create a precedent which would be "exceedingly dangerous." My Lords, the more I ponder over that statement, the more shocked—and I say this with great respect to a former First Lord of the Admiralty, who was well liked in the Service during his long tenure of office—I feel. "Exceedingly dangerous"—to whom? Not to the country, for the demand for an inquiry is growing day by day. Not to the Navy, for the Admirals of the Fleet say that the refusal to grant a court martial in accordance with Service custom, or another form of inquiry, is not understood in the Service. Dangerous, to whom? Not to Sir Dudley North himself, clearly, for he has not ceased to demand an inquiry all through these fourteen years. There is only one other direction in which an inquiry might be dangerous—and your Lordships will no doubt form your own judgment as to what that direction is.

But let me say to the noble Viscount, and to Her Majesty's Government, that I see a very definite danger in withholding an inquiry. While Admiralty action of removal in a case of loss of confidence is perfectly legitimate, the reasons for that loss of confidence should be capable of public statement—and failure to do so may lead to suspicion that high officers are pawns, whose careers are at the mercy of Ministerial caprice. A well known constitutional lawyer has written contending that it is the proper function of Parliament to redress grievances created by the Executive, and he urges that a Joint Committee of Lords and Commons should be constituted to give Admiral North justice. Without being rash enough to enter into the realm of anything so abstruse to the layman as Constitutional Law, it may well be that some such action would be of the essence of democratic government. Unwittingly, I am sure unwillingly, but nevertheless surely, Her Majesty's Government are sowing seeds of distrust and suspicion. I beg them to take heed lest those seeds germinate, and tares spring up and choke those good crops which they have grown and husbanded with such care over the last two or three years.

7.0 p.m.

LORD FRASER OF NORTH CAPE

My Lords, I know a little bit about this case as I was a member of the Board of Admiralty at the time, though not connected with operations. I should like to say a few words on both sides of this case, as the Admiralty is blamed and Admiral North is blamed. If we take the Admiralty's case first—I will not go into all the details of times and so forth—your Lordships have heard that Admiral North received a signal at midnight, and that day he was content to shadow. Now the Admiralty instructions were that there was to be nothing done to the French fleet at the North African Colonial ports, but they reserved the right not to let it go to the Bay of Biscay. The whole point was that if the French fleet had passed the Straits of Gibraltar, unless the British Fleet had been sent to sea in advance of them and deployed to westward so as to intercept them if they went north, there was nothing to stop the French fleet from going to the north ports in the Bay of Biscay. When Admiral North was asked for a reason, he said he was waiting for Admiralty instructions. The First Sea Lord said to me that any officer who waited for Admiralty instructions before taking the initiative was not fit to be in command of an important place like Gibraltar. Those were his words. The question of the command of Force "H" has nothing whatever to do with the situation, because it is the custom in the Navy for the senior officer present to take charge in an emergency and use any ships which are available to him—that is his job. That is the position from the Admiralty point of view.

Now may I put Admiral North's position, because when one views a situation from the other end it often looks very different, and I have experience of both ends? From Admiral North's point of view, at midnight he knew that the situation against the French fleet had obviously evaporated. There was no possibility of any further action and it seemed clear to him that the French fleet would not leave Toulon and go up to the German-controlled ports at that time when the rest of the French fleet was interned at Alexandria. That seemed most unlikely to him. Secondly, three independent authorities—Admiral North, Admiral Somerville and the Admiralty staff—did not think there was any question of urgency. The third point is that he did not know of the Dakar operation. The fourth point is that the Admiralty subsequently changed their instructions to prevent the French fleet from going to Dakar. On those grounds, I think there was grave room for misunderstanding on Admiral North's part in that particular episode. There is no question about that, when we look at the position as he saw it at that time.

What is the solution of this very difficult problem? I think it is this. In the first place, we must recognise that the Admiralty have the prerogative of relieving an officer of his command wherever and whenever they please. We must have that settled, because the First Sea Lord is responsible for recommending the appointment of officers in command. On the result of his choice the lives of officers and men depend, so he must have just as much freedom to relieve an officer in command if he thinks he has a better qualified officer to take his place. There is no question about that. The classic example was at the beginning of the First World War, when, on one day's notice, Admiral Jellicoe was sent up to relieve Admiral Callaghan in charge of the Home Fleet. Admiral Callaghan had brought it to a great state of efficiency and he was well liked, but the Admiralty thought that Admiral Jellicoe was a younger man and more fitted to command the Fleet in war. There was no inquiry. Admiral Callaghan was very hurt, but he did not make an inquiry of it. In the same way the First Sea Lord can be relieved without inquiry if the Government lose confidence in him. A case of that sort was the case of Prince Louis of Battenberg. He had no inquiry. I think he resigned, but he resigned because the Government had lost confidence in him. That principle must be upheld. That is the position on the side of the Admiralty.

On Admiral North's side, the First Sea Lord was changing him on the whole period of his command and this was one episode. On this question of misunderstanding, about 300 A.D. the Emperor Maurice made a very sound edict, that if a soldier disobeyed the orders of a superior he was to suffer punishment, but if he disobeyed through misunderstanding his instructions, then his superior should be punished. To my mind, in this episode Admiral North had sufficient grounds for misunderstanding. I think the Admiralty's right to relieve Admiral North was absolutely justified, and I think, secondly, that Admiral North should be relieved of personal blame for this particular incident on the ground of misunderstanding. It is interesting to remember that when the British Government went to France to try to persuade the French Government to go to North Africa—they failed, of course—Admiral Darlan's last words to the First Sea Lord were, "The French fleet will never fall into German hands." And he kept his promise.

7.17 p.m.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My Lords, I am sure your Lordships all appreciate the short and excellent speech just made by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape. Although I do not quite agree with all that he said at the end of his speech, is will save me from saying a good deal of what I should otherwise have had to say. I am glad that, not only as a member of the Board of Admiralty in 1940 but as a distinguished Commander-in-Chief at sea, and afterwards as a very able First Sea Lord, he has addressed your Lordships; and I think that after his speech we shall have no more question about the right of the Admiralty to follow the procedure which he has outlined with such clearness to your Lordships.

I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Ailwyn, that I have no complaint to make about his speech; his references to me I accept just as he put them. The danger I saw in deviating from the practice of not holding an inquiry into a case in which lack of confidence was expressed in an officer and no specific charge of misdemeanour was made, was not in the sense in which the noble Lord put it, but because of my own personal experience right through the war while in charge of the political administration of the Admiralty. In the difficult and dangerous situations which then arose, it would often have brought great danger to the nation if we had had to take time to hold inquiries, or if we had been prevented from making changes because of the possibility of such inquiries. Therefore, I repeat what I said the other day, that if we had made a precedent of that nature in the case of Admiral North many other officers might have demanded inquiries about other changes in the other Services. I could quote from both the other Services names of men who would have had substantial, if not stronger, cases for inquiries than that asked for by noble Lords who have taken part in this debate.

It is true that the decision with regard to Admiral North which was arrived at in October, 1940, was in the nature of a final decision on matters which had occurred throughout his command; and I am bound to say, frankly, that his handling of the matter in relation to the French Fleet at Dakar gave great dissatisfaction to the Board of Admiralty, and great dissatisfaction to the Executive Government. For the Executive Government at that time were up against a situation such as no Government in the history of this country had been faced with. It is well to remember their situation in coming to their decision, which has been criticised by Naval officers of different rank and standing in the past. We had just successfully come through the terrific operation at Dunkirk. Our Fleet had been greatly weakened. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, had had to give up a large part of his ship to the operations in the northern territories. It was at a time when France came out of the war, and Italy came in. We had a most dangerous situation to face in the Mediterranean, with every prospect that the French Fleet might fall into enemy hands.

It is sometimes claimed that this, that or the other great leading officer disagreed with the Government's policy at that time with regard to the treatment of the French. But a distinguished member of your Lordships' House, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope, in his book The Sailor's Odyssey, perhaps put it more aptly than anyone else. At the top of chapter 21, he says this: At the end of June, 1940, the question of the French squadron at Alexandria had to be settled. Though I had no doubt of the good faith of Vice-Admiral Godfroy, it was impossible for the British fleet in Alexandria to go to sea for operations against the enemy leaving behind in harbour fully efficient units of the French Navy. Immediately we were out of sight they might sail for Beyrout, or even go back to France, where there was no assurance that they would not fall into German or Italian hands and be used against us. Although thereafter the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope, criticised some of the methods which the Government proposed in order to deal with the situation, there was the danger perfectly expressed. In June, 1940, faced with all these difficulties the Board of Admiralty, so far from wishing to oppress in any way their former friends and colleagues in the French Navy, took every possible action to prevent such a thing arising, so long as we could have a safe arrangement as to the future disposal of the French Fleet. I flew to Bordeaux with the late Sir Dudley Pound and saw Admiral Darlan in June, 1940. I received an assurance from him then as to the situation. But what were the Government to do about it?

I am putting this case, because, after all, Admiral North's attitude over Oran has to be considered in relation to this matter, and we must state what was the view of the Government of the day with regard to the general treatment of the French Fleet. What happened after we had got our promise from Admiral Darlan? Sir Ronald Campbell, the Ambassador, was in the Bordeaux Embassy, in one room of a hotel; and he stayed there, on the instructions of the Government, trying to get information as to the terms of the armistice. Finally, the only information we got was through a wireless leak. The Official Historian, who is so much backed to-day in this House against the expression used by the noble Marquess on the previous occasion, nearly falls over backwards in trying to prove the case for the French, and for those who specially sympathise with the French. Yet it is quite clear that French ships were to be sailed to a Metropolitan French port, there to be disarmed and partly immobilised. The Government had to face the situation that that powerful Fleet might fall into the hands of the enemy at any moment.

We did not stop our efforts there at trying to come to an understanding, because, before we gave Admiral Somerville his instructions, we at the Admiralty got permission from the Government to delay a little longer. I personally sent a signal to Admiral Darlan, and Sir Dudley Pound sent a separate signal as between one sailor and another. We know that it was delivered. It was specially delivered through our Naval Attaché at Bordeaux. We never received an answer. On top of that, we devised five alternatives before the challenge was to be given to the French that they must sink their Fleet. We know now that we were forced into the action taken at Oran because the French Admiral Gensoul had sent only the one alternative to his Government, an ultimatum to sink his ships in six hours. None of the other alternatives was put. In the circumstances, the attitude of the Vichy French Government to such a signal as that is not to be wondered at.

It is always assumed that the Executive Government of 1940 were not taking proper steps to deal with this matter. On the contrary. But what was the attitude of Admiral North? The attitude of Admiral North was that he was absolutely opposed, in any circumstances, to the use of force. I personally saw Admiral Sir James Somerville, who is included in the Admirals described as having been incredulous and horrified at the instructions. His family were old friends of mine, and his revered and respected father had been chairman of the finance committee of the Somerset County Council, of which I was a servant for over twenty years. I saw him before he went out on the mission, after he had discussed the whole situation with the Naval Staff. He understood clearly the position and what had to be done. He said to me in my room at the Admiralty: "I quite recognise that, however repugnant this job may seem, the Government know it has got to be done, in the interests of the safety of the nation."

What happened when he got to Gibraltar? Immediately there was the opinion expressed, which Admiral North reported to us in his own words the day after the Battle of Oran, that he was absolutely opposed to the use of force. There was then a Staff meeting on the ship, and there was again a consensus of voices; and Admiral Sir James Somerville, because of this pressure upon him, sent a separate signal to the Admiralty at that time asking whether he would be allowed to do just what Admiral North had suggested: that after he had offered the alternatives—all the alternatives—to the French Commander-in-Chief, if then they did not ensure that the French Fleet was not likely to be used against us, he should still be allowed to withdraw Force "H" and take no action.

We in the Government had known from the beginning—and every member of the Government who was connected with the defence of the country takes responsibility for it—that, if necessary, we should have to run the risk of a battle. All those risks had been considered. Admiral North's attitude at that time was, therefore, one which gave rise to great dissatisfaction. But, so fair minded was the First Sea Lord of the day, Sir Dudley Pound, that—although the Board of Admiralty sent a very sharp reproof indeed to Admiral North (and I fully approved), in reply to which he sent his apology for his attitude at that time, with an assurance that he would not take that kind of line in future—when the question of relieving him from his appointment was then considered, because we felt we could not have sufficient confidence in him, it was Sir Dudley Pound who said—on the lines put just now by the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape—that we ought to see what happened a little later on and decide whether that course was necessary.

So much has been said already by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape with regard to the subsequent happenings, that I will cut my remarks short, although I could make them quite long. The one point upon which the lack of confidence in Admiral North was continued was the fact that in the signal of July 12 there was no ambiguity. In his general reply to us at the Board of Admiralty he did not plead ambiguity. In fact, he said that Force "H" was regarded in some respects as independent. He said "I have never ordered Force 'H' to sea. It has always been ordered to sea either by the Board of Admiralty or Admiral Somerville." "But," he said, "I should not have hesitated to order it to sea if I had thought it desirable." There was no question of ambiguity at all in his reading of the signal. That signal of July 12 had never been altered. The one thing to which I think the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape, is entitled to draw attention on the other side of it is the confused situation which was created as a result of failure to take the proper action, not only by the Admiral on the spot but by the senior officer of foreign operations at that time at the Admiralty, for which he was relieved of his post.

I have given as much time to this matter as I should. Your Lordships have been so patient, aid I could say a great deal more. I repeat what I said before, that in the interests of the country, and in the light of what we were up against in 1940, to suggest now that we were trying to fix something upon Admiral North because we did not ask him for an explanation about the happenings of September 11 until after September 23 is really too thin to be accepted. As a matter of fact, we had been passing through the Battle of Britain as well as the new attacks of the Focke-Wulfe on the coasts We were "up to our neck" in the new spate of submarine warfare, made more difficult by the addition of the Italian submarine fleet, and, of course, the operation "Menace" itself was on. The Admiralty said at the time, quite rightly, that they did not regard the matter as so urgent, within hours, that they should ask about it until they had got rid of all these much more urgent questions; and I thoroughly concurred with that view at the time.

I am sorry that this matter has been brought into the arena of public and political debate. I have seen a lot of things written about the war that ought not to have been written. I have heard a lot of things said about the war and its operations which ought not to have been said. Ever since 1945, when the war ended, I have refrained from either writing or speaking about the operational derails that I know. I would only say that I am exceedingly sorry that this question of Admiral North has been brought into this arena, and with so little fruitfulness to the nation. The noble Lord, Lord Ailwyn, said that there is a widespread opinion about this matter in the country. Do not believe it. If there had been, believe me, I should have heard about it.

LORD AILWYN

Does the noble Viscount read the newspapers?

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

Yes, I read the newspapers; but newspapers do not always contain writings which represent the total of public opinion. When I have been in trouble—and I have been in trouble politically many times in the past—I have had a pretty heavy postbag from a widespread section of the public. But I have had no letters on this subject. I do not think the case can be argued on that ground. I am terribly sorry that this matter has been brought into this arena. Admiral North, whom I liked, and whom I have known in other spheres, being a member of the Brotherhood of Trinity House, has many good qualities; but I stand by the decision taken as to whether we should have maintained confidence in him for this particular position of F.O.C.N.A. as we called it—Flag Officer Commanding North Atlantic. I have no hesitation in saying that the judgment by his peers at the Admiralty was right, and that there was no case for an inquiry. I hope that the Government, who have taken a sound and a sane line upon this matter after all these years, will stick to their position.

LORD FRASER OF NORTH CAPE

The noble Viscount said that the senior officer of the Staff at the Admiralty was punished for not bringing the signal to the First Sea Lord. My point about that is this. The fact that three separate independent authorities did not think there was a matter of urgency, rather indicates that there was something wrong with the orders at the time. That was my point about it. It is not the fact that he had to be punished, but the fact that three people independently were misled, which rather indicates that the orders were not sufficiently clear.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

I quite appreciate the argument put by my noble and gallant friend. At any rate, I think it is quite clear, certainly from my reading of the report that Admiral North made, that he never complained of ambiguity. In fact, inter alia, he made such statements as indicated that they were not ambiguous. After all, he never asked for any clarification of the signal of July 12—which would be the signal operative for his action on the date of September 11—after he received it. It is true, as the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, said, that he had asked for a clarification of the position after the signal of July 7, which he asked for on July 10. But he was so clear about what he thought was his duty that he never asked for clarification.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

He did not go on asking for clarification. He asked on July 10, and he got his reply. He could not go on and on.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

All we required him to do was to act upon that signal when the emergency arose. I entirely support the view expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape, which was according to the decision of the Board of Admiralty at the time: that whatever failures took place elsewhere, the senior officer on the spot should have taken the necessary action so to dispose of his forces as to be able to deal with the ships as they came westward.

7.38 p.m.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, at the end of this long and interesting debate, it falls to me to say a few words on behalf of Her Majesty's Government. First, I would say that I feel sure that we all appreciate the worthiness of the motives which have led the noble Lord, Lord Winster, to raise this subject again, and the other noble Lords who have supported him to speak on the side which he represents. At the same time, I hope they will understand if I say that I think it in many ways regrettable that they should have brought this matter again into public debate. Not that the Admiralty, for whom I principally speak to-day, have anything to conceal. Indeed, I think that the speeches that were made this afternoon by the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape, and the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander, of Hillsborough, with their great authority and knowledge of the facts, have added valuable information which tends to give general support to the action which was taken by the Board of Admiralty in 1940. But personally, I should greatly have preferred—and I think here I speak for others of your Lordships— that this sad episode in past history should not have been raked up and brought again before the public. It seems to me, if I may say so with real deference, that it is not to the interests of either Sir Dudley North himself or anyone else that these matters should be constantly the subject of the sort of discussion which we have had this afternoon. It can only cause pain, and I do not believe it can do much good.

I would remind noble Lords once more of the salient facts of this case. I shall do it briefly and as uncontroversially as possible. As I see it, they are these. As a result of more than one incident, which culminated in certain events connected with the passage of French ships through the Straits of Gibraltar in September, 1940, Admiral North was relieved by the Lords of the Admiralty of his post of Flag Officer Commanding the North Atlantic Station, since he had ceased to command the confidence of their Lordships. Sir Dudley North himself felt, and others who have supported his cause (and I am not criticising them that they should hold this view) have felt, that he was harshly treated. They have at various intervals pressed for an inquiry into his conduct during the events in question.

This demand, as your Lordships know, has lately been renewed by five Admirals of the Fleet. I am sorry that most of them are not here this afternoon; we should have valued their opinions. At any rate, that demand was renewed, and it has been reiterated this evening by the noble Lord, Lord Winster, and others. The demand for an inquiry, as we all know, was rejected at the time by the First Lord of the day (who I think was the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough) and it is still rejected by the present First Lord. I do not propose this evening to go into all those details which we have heard so full exposed in this extremely tangled story. I gave your Lordships as full an account as I could only a week or two ago, and most of it has been reviewed to-day. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, criticised me in one respect, I think, for casting doubts upon the omniscience of official historians. In answer to him I will not give views of my own but I should like to quote their own note at the beginning of the History. They say: The a authors of the military histories have been given full access to official documents. They and the editor are alone responsible for the statements made and the views expressed. I would accept that, except that I would add that that does not mean that we need always accept the views which they express. For instance, I have had an oportunity of looking at the facts, which I have done with some care, and I came to a different conclusion. But there are certain aspects which are still, I gather, causing anxiety among some noble Lords and, as the noble Lord, Lord Ailwyn, said, in wider circles. I understand that there are others who share the same view. Therefore I think I must say something more this evening in view of what has been said on these topics so fully by the noble Lord, Lord Winster, and others.

I gather that, first, it is suggested that the Admiralty instructions on which Admiral North was expected to act were not clear; that they left open serious doubts as to what, if any, action he should take in the event of an impending clash with the French fleet. This has been dealt with fully by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, and there is not much that I can add to what he has said. It is evident that the particular relevant signal—that is to say, the signal which gave a new slant on earlier signals—is that which was sent on July 12. That signal made it clear that, though no action was to be taken against ships in French Colonial ports, the right must be reserved to take action in regard to French warships proceeding to enemy-controlled ports. It is now suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Winster, by the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, and by others, that those instructions were ambiguous. I would make only one comment on that. As the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, has just said, Admiral North clearly did not think so at the time—that is to say, he asked for no further clarification. Moreover, in the light of the signal of July 12, which I have just read to your Lordships, I think he surely must have appreciated that if ships were going or might have been going to enemy controlled ports, he might be required intervene. And yet, on the night of September 11th-12th, 1940, he himself took no action—and I think that is common ground—to prepare any ships—

VISCOUNT EUBANK

The noble Mar-guess means the night of the 10th-11th.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I beg the noble Viscount's pardon—the night of 10th-11th—to prepare any ships when he received the signal from the Naval Attaché at Madrid, although this signal specifically said that the destination of the ships was unknown.

This brings me to the second point which is urged in favour of Sir Dudley North. It is suggested, and I think it has been suggested by several speakers this afternoon, that there was no obligation on him to take any steps to prepare any ships unless he received definite instructions from the Admiralty. The Naval Attaché's signal, it was argued, was sent nor only to Gibraltar but also to the Admiralty, which is perfectly true. If the Admiralty had wished him to act, they should have told him so. That was the main burden of the argument that the noble Lord, Lord Winster, put up. Here, if I may go over this ground yet once again, but as shortly as I can, I suggest that the time factor becomes extremely important.

LORD WINSTER

Hear, hear!

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

The message which was received by Sir Dudley North, the message from the Naval Attacheé at Madrid, was received at eight minutes past midnight—I think that is the exact time—yet he took no action at that time to see that any forces were put in a state of preparation to carry out any instructions which he might receive from the Admiralty—and those might have come at any moment. Whatever were the facts in London, he had no reason to suppose that those instructions might not come. But he did not even tell Admiral Somerville, in charge of Force "H." The noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, referred to a message which he said was sent out at 2.15 a.m. alerting ships. What I say about that message is that it is rather an obscure story. I find it difficult to get to the bottom of it. At any rate, no copy was sent to the Admiralty and, what is much more important than that, no copy was sent to Admiral Somerville, who was the one person who should have received it.

The first that Admiral Somerville learned was at 5.10, a report from the "Hotspur" which said that she had sighted some French vessels. That was Admiral Somerville's own information: that is the first he heard and, as we all know, he put "Renown," rightly, at one hour's steaming notice. I would remind the House of this in view of certain things that have been said. Even one hour's notice—I speak as a layman in these matters, but I have consulted those who know much better than I do—is not the same thing in a situation of this kind as a state when a ship is ready to move at once. In this connection I would add this. Admiral Somerville himself, I understand, explained to the Admiralty a week after the event that he felt that at 5.12 a.m., when he received the "Hotspur" signal, it was too late to put "Renown" to the westward without the risk of incident. The Admiralty replied to his letter—that is the letter which I think the noble Lord, Lord Winster, read out in the House. When they replied, they pointed out that he had not had the vital information in time; and Admiral Somerville never at any time contradicted that. Indeed, I understand—this is information which comes at a later date—that he did consider whether to order "Renown" to sea, but, among other reasons, decided against it because he thought that she could not make sufficient ground to the west before the French ships would arrive. So the argument, that because they were put on one hour's notice, that was all that was necessary, is, I think, if I may put it as mildly as I can, a rather doubtful argument.

In any case, whatever Admiral Somerville did, Admiral North, who had received the message as far back as eight minutes after midnight, took no initiative. He could have told Admiral Somerville long before 5.12, but he never did so; indeed, he definitely decided, as he afterwards I believe explained to the Admiralty, that no action should be taken to interfere. That decision, I submit, in the position in which he was placed, should not have been taken. Indeed, what he did was to take the rather odd course of sending a message of "Bon voyage" to the French ships, although at that time he did not know where they were going. At that time nobody could have known where they were going; until they were through the Straits no one could tell whether they were going to turn north or south, and then it would have been too late to intervene in any case.

If I am told by the noble Lord, Lord Winster, that Admiral North did not inform Admiral Somerville because he did not regard Admiral Somerville as being under his command, I would reply that when the ships were already through the Straits and the question arose of Force "H" reverting to two hours' notice, Admiral North then approved a request from Admiral Somerville that this should be done. It was not a formal matter; it was definitely an approval that he gave. There, again, I think we must assume that he did regard himself as the senior officer. Of course, this decision not to prepare any ships to take action until it was requested, above all led the Lords of the Admiralty finally to lose confidence in the Admiral's judgment. The fact that in the Admiralty also, as Lord Winster said, there was an unhappy delay, did not, in the view of the Board of Admiralty, excuse Admiral North for his inaction. As the noble Lord said to us this afternoon, it is perfectly true that there were errors also in London—deplorable errors for which the officer in question was immediately punished; but, as the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, admitted in his speech, Admiral North could not have known of those errors, and, so far as he knew, orders might have arrived at any moment; and he had already decided that no action should be taken.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

The Chiefs of Staff had been in communication with each other right through the night.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I am saying merely that Admiral North had decided to take no action although it was possible, so far as he knew, that at any moment some instructions might come from the Admiralty. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, asked most pertinently why Admiral Somerville was not also relieved of his command—at least, I understood him to ask that. He quoted, I think, some letters which Admiral Somerville had written to the Admiralty, in which he took the full responsibility for Admiral North, and it was greatly to his credit that he should have done so. Of course, the Board of Admiralty had these letters, but—the noble Viscount will correct me if I am wrong—they had at that time no other reason to lose confidence in Admiral Somerville, who, as I understand it, had an unblemished record; indeed, it is true to say that, even on this occasion, as I have already pointed out, it was he who put "Renown" on one hour's notice.

On the other hand, in the case of Admiral North, as we have been told just now, this was not the first occasion upon which their Lordships' confidence had been shaken. Further, I think it is clear beyond peradventure to anybody who has studied this question, whatever view they take about the responsibility or non-responsibility of Admiral North, that the Board of the day—that is to say, the First Sea Lord and the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, who occupied the position of First Lord—felt they could not endorse the attitude of an officer who took the line that, because there had been time for the Admiralty to give him orders and they did not do so, therefore he had nothing to do. After that, Admiral North's letter clearly gave the impression of an officer awaiting orders instead of wishing to take the initiative.

My Lords, we have had this afternoon the inestimable advantage on this particular point of learning from the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape, what the First Sea Lord of the day said to him. He was at that time, I think, a member of the Board of Admiralty, and we know now, for certain, exactly what was the view of Sir Dudley Pound. I took down the noble Lord's words rather rapidly, and perhaps he will correct me if I have got them wrong. Sir Dudley Pound took the view that any officer who waited for instructions before taking action was not worthy to occupy the important position of Flag Officer, Gibraltar, in the times which then existed.

LORD FRASER OF NORTH CAPE

Before taking initiative.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

With that amendment. Clearly, that was the view that led to the final loss of confidence by the Board of Admiralty in Admiral North. My Lords, had it been possible I should have preferred not to refer to this. I do not think it can be anything but painful to Admiral North to hear what was being said by his brother admirals at that time. But noble Lords have really left us no option, and it better, now that we have reached this point, that the whole story should come out. If, however, I am asked why, in that case, no action was taken for a fortnight to relieve Admiral North of his command, the answer as I understand it, after reading the papers and listening to the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, is that the reason for the delay was that the naval staff were so fully preoccupied with the preparations for the Dakar operation that they had no time at the moment for anything else; and though it was clear to them from the day—that is to say the night of September 10–11—that Admiral North had not taken all the prudent precautions he should, his position was regarded by them as not of comparable urgency to the other great matters with which they were concerned. What in fact happened appears to be that, in the view of the Board of Admiralty of the day, Admiral North's explanation disclosed an attitude so passive and a judgment so defective that they felt they could not retain him where he was. It was not that he had been guilty of some appalling dereliction of duty; it was merely that the incident of Oran followed by the incident of September 10–11 gave them the feeling that they could not any longer defer action with regard to him.

I have spoken of the Oran incident. I do not think it is necessary for me to say any more about that, after what the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough has told us. What I think is clear is that, after the operation was over, the Lords of the Admiralty received a communication from Admiral North in which he spoke very strongly against the steps which had been taken, not on grounds merely of naval policy but of general policy—about the conduct of the war and so on. That, of course, goes rather outside the scope which one would expect to be covered by an ordinary serving officer. It might have been right for him to have made wider comments before the operation, because then it was a question of letting the Board of Admiralty know exactly what the full picture was; but once the operation was over, once the Government's decision had been taken, then it was not a matter properly with which an individual Flag Officer should concern himself. That, at least, as I understand it, was the view of the Admiralty, and his letter was a serious shock to them; but not sufficient, as I understand the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, to say, to justify them in removing him. When, however, it was followed up by the further incident on September 10–11 to which I have already referred, they had no further doubt.

Their decision implied—and I would say this again, in spite of what has been said this afternoon—no personal criticism of Admiral North's courage and patriotism. Of course, that is beyond reproach; it always has been beyond reproach and, so far as I know, no shadow has ever been cast against it. But he no longer had the confidence of the Board in his judgment, and they felt bound not to leave him where he was. Can anyone doubt that, feeling as they did, they had any option but to act as they did? Could they possibly have been justified on any count if they had left a man in whom they had lost confidence—however old and valued a comrade he might be—in a vital key position, at a most desperate moment, in a war in which we were fighting for our lives? Had they done that, and had the Admiral, through some defect of judgment, been guilty of some disastrous result, they would have been heavily and rightly blamed.

The truth is that war is a very brutal business, and in conditions such as those that prevailed in 1940 decisions of this kind, however unpleasant they might be, sometimes have to be taken. That is why I say to the noble Lord, Lord Winster, that ever since the days of the Lord High Admiral of England, the Admiralty have always claimed the right—and Parliament has always supported them in it—to take such action as they think proper, without inquiry. Is it really to be suggested now that this age-old rule should be altered and discarded in this particular case, and an inquiry granted after fourteen years, when practically all the main witnesses are dead? Admiral Pound, the First Sea Lord, is dead. Admiral Phillips, the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, is dead. And Admiral Somerville is dead, too. In the absence of these vital witnesses, what real value can such an inquiry have? In any case, what would he its raison d'être?

I must emphasise most strongly to your Lordships' House that Admiral North was not relieved on the grounds that he had allowed the French ships to pass through the Straits. Nor is there any ground whatever for regarding him as a scapegoat for Dakar. The crux of this matter—and the point which seems still to be overlooked—is that the Admiralty had lost confidence in him. September, 1940, was not, indeed, the first occasion on which confidence in him had been shaken—that is clear from the Official History—but it was the climax by which the confidence of the Admiralty was finally destroyed. It is not, I would remind the House, the confidence of the First Sea Lord and the Board of Admiralty of to-day with which we are concerned this afternoon: that does not come into it at all. It is a matter of the confidence of the Board of Admiralty of 1940. The First Sea Lord of that day, a man whom many noble Lords will remember—a very just and famous man who died a number of years ago—and the First Lord of that day, now the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, both expressed the view that confidence in Admiral North could no longer be retained. Of that there can be no shadow of doubt.

The noble Lord, Lord Winster (I hope that I did not misunderstand him), seemed at one period in his speech to hint that he felt the object of the Admiralty in the whole affair was to shuffle off responsibility from themselves on to Admiral North. I was amazed to hear him, as I understood, say that. I think no noble Lord can make that suggestion about a man such as Admiral Sir Dudley Pound. I, and many noble Lords, knew Sir Dudley, and I should have thought anyone who knew him would know that he was incapable of any such action. I would entirely repudiate any such suggestion. In spite of what the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, has said, it is my view that no inquiry of any kind could now affect the confidence of a 1940 Board of Admiralty. That, together with the fact that most of the principal characters involved are now dead, makes it manifestly absurd to suggest that to-day, fourteen years after the event, the whole case should be reopened. Indeed, that would not even fulfil the object of the five Admirals of the Fleet for, ironical though it may seem, their object, as they have said several times, is to avoid publicity; and that object certainly would not be achieved.

Every war, my Lords, has produced situations in which Supreme Commanders have had to judge whether their subordinates deserved their continued confidence. Historians may dispute the wisdom of their decisions, but withdrawal of confidence is a fact about which there can be no dispute. It is not for the present Board of Admiralty either to justify or to condemn the views on confidence held by their predecessors fourteen years ago. It has, of course, fallen to Her Majesty's Government to ascertain the facts. That they have tried to do; but, having established beyond doubt that Admiral North was relieved because he had forfeited the confidence of the Board of his day, I must say firmly and finally that Her Majesty's Government cannot and will not be a party to any further action which would in any way impinge upon the right of those upon whom, after all, our very survival depends, to judge for themselves in a moment of national danger the degree of confidence which they have in individual officers and to relieve, without further explanation, officers in whom that confidence can no longer be retained. That view I submit with confidence to your Lordships' House.

8.7 p.m.

LORD CHORLEY

My Lords, it is an unpopular thing to do to rise at this hour of the night and make a speech—even a short one—but I feel it my duty to say certain things. I have no personal interest whatever in this matter and have taken no part in the controversy. I entered your Lordships' House with no particular interest in it and no intention of taking part. Having listened to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Winister, and much of the speech by the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, I had actually left the Chamber when I began to feel that those noble Lords had made out a case calling for a really effective reply, from the Government. I returned to hear from the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, and the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, what that case was, because it seemed to me that a prima facie case had been made out by the noble Lords who opened this discussion, that a wrong had been done to Admiral North. Having listened to the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, and the noble Marquess opposite, I am not at all satisfied that they have made a satisfactory case in answer. The noble Viscount, I thought, made a most unconvincing reply, and the noble Marquess's answer, largely a technical one, has in fact convinced me that there is an absolutely unanswerable case for an inquiry. The noble Marquess can be right only if one assumes that everything done at the Admiralty was correct and that a First Lord can never make a mistake; but that is the whole question in this controversy.

It is most upsetting to see how the exercise of power appears to dim the justice of those who exercise it. I feel that more particularly as the result of this debate. I feel it particularly disturbing that the Prime Minister, whose magnanimity is one of the finest personal traits in that great man's character, should have failed, on this occasion, to show that magnanimity. I recall the magnificent book he wrote in order to prove that his great ancestor, the Duke of Marlborough, who had been traduced in history books for two hundred years, was not guilty of the crime which had been fixed upon him, in the betrayal of Tollemache at the attack on Brest. Here, on a rather lower level, but when the honour of a distinguished Admiral is equally at stake, this same magnanimity is not forthcoming. I hope that there may yet be a change of mind.

I think that the noble Marquess has tried to put up a bogy and knock it down, in the sense that he has tried to make out that those taking Admiral North's part are necessarily trying to make a case that the Admiralty must be deprived of their power; that the Executive must be deprived of their power, in the circumstances and stress of a great war, to remove an Admiral or a General, or anyone else from executive command. So far as I have heard after listening to the whole of this debate, that case has not been made by anyone who has spoken this afternoon. Not only must the Executive have the right but it is their duty, if they think it necessary, to deprive an executive commanding officer of his command in the stress of war. But the very fact that that right and duty exist makes it equally necessary, as a matter of justice, that afterwards, when the crisis is over, there should be the possibility of an inquest into what has happened. That, surely, is all that is being asked for on this occasion.

Unless men in this sort of position can feel that although, at a crisis, they may be deprived, and properly deprived, of their commands, afterwards, when the crisis is over, there will be a chance to receive an impartial investigation into the justice of the decision and have an impartial investigation made, and if necessary acknowledgement of mistake equally made, I cannot really see how you can expect people to bear the burden and heat of command in the way they have to do in these terrible times of crisis. Therefore, though I do not expect that there is any chance that the Government will alter their decision—unfortunately, when Governments have once taken up an attitude in respect of anything, however wrong they may prove to be, they never, in my experience, alter their decisions—I still beg that on this occasion they will think again, and provide for the possibility of justice being done in the case of this distinguished Admiral.

8.14 p.m.

LORD PAKENHAM

My Lords, I know that everyone wishes to end this debate, but since the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, has exercised what might be called the right of a juryman to offer opinions on the submissions which have been made, perhaps I also may be allowed to offer my opinion. It is really with no sort of official background in this particular connection that I do so—certainly not as one who has been First Lord of the Admiralty, as I had the honour to be for a few months. All along, in this business I have had a great deal of sympathy with Admiral North. At times I have almost regarded myself as a professional champion of the underdog, which also inclines me to place myself on his side. But I must say that I should not have spoken unless Lord Chorley had spoken. Having sat through the whole debate and not having intended to speak, I feel that I must give my vote, with full conviction, if it is not an impertinence to do so, in favour of the case as stated by the noble Marquess and the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough.

Of course I have paid very deep attention to the speech of Lord Fraser of North Cape, and I was greatly struck by something which Lord Fraser said on behalf of Admiral North. I understood him to say that he felt that there was no personal failure here. I am bound to say that after hearing what everyone has said I cannot go beyond the argument that the Admiralty had lost confidence in this officer and were entitled to relieve him of his command. I cannot regard that as the equivalent of any sort of conviction of a criminal nature. It must rest with the executive authorities whether they relieve an officer of his command or whether they do not. I cannot see that even if all the officers concerned were alive at this time, fourteen years later, we should arrive at a different opinion— even if it were in the interests of the country to do so—as to whether we thought that that decision was right or was wrong. We must leave it with those concerned. I am very glad that these strong statements have been made on all sides completely exonerating Admiral North of any kind of charge reflecting on his personal honour.

8.16 p.m.

LORD WINSTER

My Lords, I feel that your Lordships were most indulgent, to me, in view of the fact that I made what I fear was a very long speech. I will try to show my gratitude by not speaking at length on this occasion. But I am sure it will be realised that if I do not reply to the many points which have been made it is not that I am letting them go by default. I reserve my right to study the debate and to make my views known in whatever way I can about many things that have been said with which I disagree and which I do not think formed an answer to the arguments which I put forward.

I need say hardly anything, I feel, about the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Teynham. He dutifully gave a blank cheque to the Admiralty on this occasion. One thing I feel I must say, however, is this. Many statements have been made to the effect that an inquiry would do no good because several of the officers involved in this matter are now dead. I cannot agree with that statement because, having tried to study the matter very carefully, I think this is a case where the papers—the signals, the letters and the papers generally—speak for themselves; it is not a matter of the opinions of the actors in this business. I think that an inquiry could quite well arrive at a decision on the strength of the papers, and when I am told that all the officers at the Admiralty at the time who were fully acquainted with the facts did not think there was a case for inquiry, I am bound to point out—as has been agreed this afternoon—that it was some of those officers themselves who were in default, and they were really giving judgment on a case in which they were themselves to some extent the defendants.

I completely agree with Lord Ailwyn, who thinks it is distressing that this matter has had to be ventilated here this afternoon. My opinion is that Admiral North has exhausted every means open to him of avoiding this matter being raised in public, but that, feeling strongly, as he does, that he has suffered an injustice, he is entitled to have his case stated; and it has been stated today. I repeat that he has done everything in his power—he has really behaved very chivalrously in this matter—to avoid a discussion. I have heard something about "washing dirty linen in public." Of course there are two schools of thought about dirty linen. There are those who say: "Wash it in public," and there are those who say "Wear it in private." I have always belonged to the former school. I think that, in the long run, what matters is getting dirty linen washed clean; and if I pursue this matter it will not be out of personal regard for Admiral North but because I believe that an injustice has been done to an officer which has had a bad effect in Naval circles.

I think, if he will allow me to say so, that the speech of the noble and gallant Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Fraser of North Cape, has made this debate well worth while. With all respect to others who have taken part, that has been the speech of the debate. Perhaps I may flatter myself a little by saying that, if that speech is analysed, it will be found that the noble and gallant Lord is very much in agreement with myself. I began my speech by saying that I completely agreed that the heads of the Defence Services in war time must be allowed to exercise their responsibility in removing officers in command. I stand by that. My only point was that circumstances do alter cases, and there is so much evidence in this case to show that an injustice was done to Admiral North that I think that there is a case for an inquiry. I understood the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape, to bear me out to that extent by saying that the Admiral had got a side, and quite a strong side, to his case and that he had partly suffered because of a failure to give him absolutely clear instructions; that he was the victim of a misunderstanding for which he was not entirely responsible. I hope the noble and gallant Lord will wish to be completely—

LORD FRASER OF NORTH CAPE

My Lords, my real point was that Admiral North is completely unjustified in protesting at being relieved, of his command, because that decision rests with the Admiralty, but that for that particular episode the position was such that we may absolve him from personal blame. There is no question of justice not being done in relieving him of his command. But in that particular episode there was enough misunderstanding to allow us graciously to absolve him from blame.

LORD WINSTER

I think the position is that the noble and gallant Lord and I are much in agreement. I have never contradicted the right of the Admiralty to relieve officers if they feel that they must do so. May I be allowed to say that Admiral North will find great satisfaction and comfort when he reads the remarks of the noble and gallant Lord?

May I say one thing about the remarks of the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough? I wish at once to apologise to him for having, in a speech in which I was very anxious not to raise the temperature, had a little "brush" with him. I am sure he will appreciate, however, that I was speaking under a little stress in trying to make a complicated and difficult case. I happened to turn round and saw him looking me full in the face and laughing.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

May I say that it was my fault?

LORD WINSTER

This is a matter between the noble Viscount and myself. I rather hastily jumped to the conclusion that the noble Viscount was laughing at something I said. I know now that that was not the case, and I hope he will accept my apology. There are one or two things in his speech upon which I must touch. He said that there was no time during the war for inquiries. But the Admiralty did hold inquiries. They sent the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Cork and Orrey, out to Gibraltar to hold one inquiry, and if they could find time to hold one inquiry they could have found time for another. In his speech the noble Viscount raised entirely new matter which had been barely referred to in the debate and had not been raised very much in connection with Admiral North. In this matter of Oran, what was it that Admiral North did that aroused the Admiralty and made the Admiralty feel no confidence in him? We are only told that he expressed some doubt about the wisdom of the action taken at Oran; but unless one had all the details of what Admiral North said, it is impossible to pronounce a judgment upon that matter. I should say that an Admiral holding a high command has a perfect right to represent to his superiors the local circumstances and feelings about a proposed action.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My Lords, may I take that point? As a matter of fact, as the noble Marquess has said, it would be perfectly right for a senior naval officer to give his views about a situation before an operation ordered by the Executive had taken place. Admiral North had previously, in fact, sent one short telegram—I am speaking from memory—in which he had given his opinion that, if action were taken, then the French Fleet would fight, and fully in the light of that previous advice the decision of the Government was taken in the matter. But for him then to come back, after the operation was over, with the kind of expression he used as to what had happened and why it had happened, according to his view, we regarded as being a very bad thing indeed for naval officers; and we had to tell him that we thought there was a dangerous lack of appreciation of the spirit in which we intended to fight the war.

LORD WINSTER

I should need to see the papers, of course, before I could express an opinion about that. When the Government had come to what must have been a most painful and difficult decision and were working under a certain amount of tension. I can imagine that the mildest expression of contrary opinion, however properly expressed, might have given rise to great annoyance. My own belief is that that probably represents what occurred. But the noble Viscount went further and devoted much of his speech to justification of the Government's decision in regard to the action at Oran. That is not what is at issue today. In regard to Admiral North, the noble Viscount brought forward matter on which I certainly do not feel competent to reply and which came to me as a surprise. The noble Viscount made a vigorous defence of his own actions and of his own administration. Naturally he felt it necessary to vindicate everything he did; but again I would say that this matter can be decided only by an impartial inquiry and not by the ipse dixit of men who have a great interest in defending the action taken.

I should like to express my thanks to the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, for his full and most helpful reply. We shall not agree about the History, I can see: the fact is that there is no finality about any history. I think we all have to be on our guard against dismissing as merely the opinion of the author statements in histories with which we do not agree. We should give credit to the author sometimes for having tried very hard to arrive at a just and impartial decision. I did not say that I thought the Admiralty instructions were not clear. On the contrary, I said emphatically that I thought they were so precise that, in the absence of instructions amending them, they left Admiral North no alternative but to proceed on them. I cannot argue that point now, but I must make it. In the whole of my speech I did not charge the Admiralty with giving ambiguous instructions. My charge was that they failed to give instructions to replace very precise instructions which they had already issued.

In regard to Force "H," I cannot accept the view that Admiral North had command of Force "H." I think the noble Marquess does not quite appreciate the way in which Admiral Somerville and Admiral North worked together as one man.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

Hear, hear!

LORD WINSTER

The point is that Force "H" was never operated by Admiral North. It was under the command of Admiral Somerville, who received his orders direct from the Admiralty and directed Force "H." I do not think that perhaps the noble Marquess took fully into account the extent to which that fact must have operated in Admiral North's mind.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, I say this only because the noble Lord has addressed me: it is not really for me to discuss it in the presence of the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. My impression was that Admiral North was regarded as the senior officer, and although various instructions were received from the Admiralty by Admiral Somerville, at the same time Admiral North would have been broadly regarded as the senior officer. In any case, even if it were an independent command, one would have expected him to pass on the signal received at midnight to Admiral Somerville.

LORD WINSTER

I am not sure how far that point is covered by the fact that the two Admirals worked together. Perhaps a formal signal was not passed, but they were simply "Box and Cox" in these matters, But the fact that remains is this: that here again we come to a fault on the part of the Admiralty, who must have known the way that Admiral North and Admiral Somerville were working together, but who never at any time laid down a chain of command as between the two men. Your sailing orders usually say that you will go somewhere and place yourself under the orders of so and so. This loose arrangement, in which no chain of command was establihsed, was allowed by the Admiralty to continue, and I have no doubt that that contributed to some of the mistakes made.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

That does not accord with the statement I made just now: that in the course of his reply Admiral North said that, while he had not sent them to sea previously, he would not have hesitated to do so if he had thought it desirable. In other words, he thought that he had the power to send them to sea.

LORD WINSTER

I think that Admiral North was on such terms with Admiral Somerville that that situation could hardly have arisen. We know what confidence Admiral Somerville had in Admiral North, and how willing he was to take the responsibility in these matters, if he felt the need to exist. I conclude on that remark by saying that I feel full weight must be paid to the views of the noble and gallant Earl, Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Cork and Orrery, who has said quite clearly that Admiral North never regarded himself as empowered to give orders to Admiral Somerville; and so far as I know, he never did so.

I should like to express my gratitude to all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate. I think it has had this result: that at long last, after fourteen years, Admiral North has had his case publicly stated in detail. It is now for the public and all concerned to make up their minds whether or not they think the case that an injustice has been committed and an inquiry should be held is made out. At any rate, that satisfaction does remain to Admiral North: that his case has been fully and clearly stated in public. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.