HL Deb 08 July 1954 vol 188 cc613-47

House again in Committee.

LORD SILKEN moved, in subsection (1) of Clause 30 to omit paragraph (h). The noble Lord said: I beg to move this Amendment. When we adjourned we were discussing the grounds upon which a landlord may oppose the granting of a new lease. Eight grounds are set out in Clause 30, which gives the landlord a great many opportunities of defeating the purposes of the Bill. I have dealt with two of those grounds by way of Amendment, without very much good fortune. The last of the grounds is if: the landlord intends to occupy the holding for the purposes, or partly for the purposes, of a business to be carried on by him therein, or as his residence.

I feel there is some difficulty about this matter, and I want to be perfectly frank and to explain the difficulty as I see it. I can imagine cases in which there may be very good grounds for a landlord to get possession because he wants the premises for his own occupation. But I can equally well imagine grounds which are quite wrong, and I want to take as an illustration a ground which I imagine will be quite a common one in cases in which the tenant has been in occupation for a number of years of business premises, has built up a goodwill, has established a valuable connection—perhaps from nothing—has managed to earn a livelihood, and then the landlord says: "I want possession of this place because I want to carry on business here." And indeed he does, because he will be carrying on exactly the same business as heretofore and taking advantage of the goodwill which the tenant has built up. That will be, I will not say a common case, but one which will occur fairly frequently. There are, unfortunately, a good many landlords who may be tempted by the possibility of taking over goodwill and running a business, and even more who will be tempted by the possibility of taking over the goodwill and then disposing of it at a very good price.

If one looks at the economics of a business of this kind it may be found that a person has been in occupation for, say, twelve or fourteen years, has built up a goodwill, and is earning, perhaps, £1,500 a year in respect of the business on the premises. Goodwill of that kind may be worth £3,000—that is, two years' purchase. The landlord can get possession by representing that he wants the premises for his own occupation. His liability for compensation will be, in the case I have mentioned, one years rateable value, if under 14 years—possibly £150 or £200 or something that is quite insignificant as compared with the value of the goodwill. He gets possession in this way and then disposes of the goodwill which he has done nothing to create and which has been built up by his tenant. That is the other side of the picture.

I can understand the case where the landlord genuinely requires possession, not to carry on the business of his tenant but to carry on his own business. The noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, gave a number of examples where the landlord may genuinely require possession, and I do not wish to interfere with such cases, but only with those in which the landlord requires possession only to enter into Naboth's vineyard. The question is: how can we distinguish between the two types of case? How can we deny the tenant the right of renewal in one ease but give it to him in the other? I recognise that my Amendment goes too far in one direction and I believe that the provision of the Bill goes too far in the other. I put it to the noble and learned Lord: is it not possible to devise a new paragraph (h) which will protect the tenant against improper expropriation of his goodwill, but which nevertheless will give the landlord the right to take possession where he genuinely requires it for purposes other than merely capturing the tenant's goodwill? I have put the position frankly and fairly. I do not want to push this matter too far and I think the noble Lords opposite agree with me that this is a problem. Can we not sit down and see whether we cannot thresh out something which will achieve as nearly as possible the kind of result I have in mind? I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 17, leave out paragraph (h).—(Lord Silkin.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Nothing could have been fairer or more candid than the way in which the noble Lord moved this Amendment, and I will be equally candid with him and tell him that I can imagine cases in which the landlord might seek to make an improper use of this subsection. But I would ask him to remember this: we have gone a long way to meet the case which he envisages, for we have, by subsection (2) of this clause, provided that the landlord shall not be entitled to oppose an application by the tenant for a renewal of his tenancy on the ground to which we have been referring if the landlord's interest was created within five years of the termination date. That eliminates the rascal—in this case, the man who we are afraid will purchase the reversion and then make use of the goodwill which has been created by the tenant for the purpose of carrying on his own business. I think that goes a very long way, but, of course, I recognise that there may be a rare case in which abuse is possible under this clause. I frankly do not see my way so to define the provision as to meet the case, but I am sure of this—and I think the noble Lord recognised it—that it is impossible generally to exclude the landlord who genuinely wants to obtain possession of his own premises.

For instance, it is no uncommon thing for a factory owner to plan ahead. He builds perhaps larger premises than he requires, knowing or hoping that in time, with the expansion of his business, he will require the whole. In the meantime, he lets part of his premises. Is he to be hampered for ever in his development by the fact that he has so acted? I think it would be wrong to impose that sort of restriction upon a forward-looking landlord. For that reason I can see no way—and we have tried to do this—of protecting the rare case where a landlord seeks to abuse his position under paragraph (h). After all, though we start fundamentally at different ends, I think the noble Lord will concede that this Bill does make a great improvement in the position of the tenant. The whole of Part II effects a great improvement in the tenant's lot; and while there may be still some tenants in respect of whom a landlord does not act as a good landlord should, I do not see my way to provide for every particular case. You merely get into a welter of refinement and confusion. You have to take the thing on fairly broad lines.

Here we have inserted a proviso which imposes a qualification—not, I think, too difficult a refinement—which will go a long way to meet the sort of case the noble Lord has in mind. I do not see my way either to accept this Amendment or to suggest an alternative which would carry out his object. I will say this at once. If he can think of any provision which will meet with the bad case without also involving the good one, I will sympathetically consider it on Report. I have not been able to think of one myself, nor have those assisting me, but that does not mean that the noble Lord will not be able to do so. If he does, we will sympathetically consider it. But an extension of the whole of the subsection, or anything like it, I do not think would be fair, and I am sorry I cannot accept the Amendment.

LORD OGMORE

Anyone who has listened to the speeches on this Amendment will be bound to agree that there is a good deal of force in the speeches of both noble Lords. I think we all recognise that we do not want to penalise unduly the honest landlord; and, on the other hand, we do not want to enable the landlord to seize the goodwill of the tenant without paying for it or by paying only a very small amount for it. That would be quite unjustifiable. That is the dilemma the Committee is in and I really do not think the Government should say: "There is a dilemma here; we recognise there is a dilemma. It is a difficult problem but if you can think of the answer you can bring it up on Report stage. But we are not going to do anything about it; it is up to you." That seems to me, roughly—differently though the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack put it—to be the attitude of the Government: "It is up to you to think of a better move." I think it is up to the Government to try themselves to see that they give equity and justice to Her Majesty's subjects.

One suggestion I would make is this. It might be possible to have a much higher measure of compensation. There is very small compensation now, as the noble Lord Lord Silkin, pointed out. In fact, it is derisory in many cases. While listening to the noble and learned Lord, it suddenly occurred to me that that is a possible way, though I do not think it is the best way. I think the united brains of the Government and the Departments that they have available to them, and the Law Officers and the Parliamentary draftsmen, should be able to deal with this problem, which is going, I think, to be a very real one. It is going to cause a great deal of dissatisfaction in the cases in which tenants are turned out by landlords who, as my noble friend has suggested, obtain premises under this Act, pay a small amount for compensation and then re-let them or even sell them at a great profit. I do not think one can contemplate with any satisfaction a circumstance of that sort arising.

There is some truth in what the Government have said in regard to Part I. It is true that, as regards an occupying tenant, under Part I he is in a better position than he has been before. However, that does not help the unfortunate people for whom I have been speaking—namely, the non-occupying tenants, who are put in a much worse position than they were in before. So far as the sub-tenants are concerned, they are in a better position, and to that extent the case of the Government is a justifiable one. But here the position is different, and I think it will be found in some cases that the tenant will not be in as good a position as he was under the 1927 Act. It is possible that if he were enabled to obtain the compensation he could have got under that Act—which he no longer is—he would have been better off than he will be under this Bill. We shall have to see how it will work out, but I can contemplate that to be the fact. In all the circumstances, I ask the Government to look at this again to see whether they cannot obtain some more equitable arrangement than they have under this subsection.

8.47 p.m.

LORD SILKIN

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for the way in which he has addressed himself to the case that I made on this Amendment. I suppose we are bound to agree to disagree about the extent to which this is likely to arise. I do not put it forward as a matter which is likely to be a daily occurrence, but I think it is likely to happen more frequently than he seems to believe. I realise that Part I of the Bill will be a great boon to tenants if they can get a renewal of tenancy, but to set out eight different sets of circumstances in which a tenancy can be refused is a considerable obstacle; and it may well turn out that the benefits we are holding out to tenants under this Bill will be almost as illusory as those we held out to tenants under the 1927 Act. But let me accept the statement of the noble and learned Lord as being an admission that there is a possibility of this evil taking place in a certain number of cases—he thinks very few, I think not quite so few. Ought we not to try to meet such a case? I agree with my noble friend Lord Ogmore that the onus should not be entirely on the Opposition. If it is recognised that this is an evil, then it is for the Government to see whether this evil can be met.

We on this side are perfectly prepared to discuss the matter and to make suggestions. I will make one straight away; I do not know whether it will stand up to examination, but it is something we might discuss. Would it not be possible, in a case where it is established that the landlord has really stepped in and taken advantage of the goodwill of a tenant, that he should pay compensation for the loss sustained by the tenant? I am sure that the ingenuity of the Parliamentary draftsman would be equal to finding words to enable a tenant to obtain that remedy. It may be that that is not adequate, or that it would not work, but I feel that my suggestion is worth further examination than has been given to the matter so far. Therefore, while admitting that it would not be right to press this Amendment to its logical conclusion—because I am asking for more than I think I ought to get, and the noble and learned Lord will be "getting away with" more than he ought to "get away with" if I withdraw—nevertheless, I do ask leave to withdraw the Amendment, and I hope that the matter will be reconsidered.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Let me say at once, and I say it sincerely, that we welcome any suggestion the noble Lord makes. If there is any good to be got out of further thinking we will think further, and we shall be glad to meet the noble Lord.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 30 agreed to.

Clauses 31 to 33 agreed to.

Clause 34 [Rent under new tenancy]:

LORD SILKIN had given notice of an Amendment, after paragraph (a) to insert: (b) any effect on rent of the scarcity of similar holdings in the locality of the holding") The noble Lord said: This Amendment is similar in principle to one that I moved in Part I of the Bill. The noble and learned Lord was not able to accept that Amendment and I apprehend that he will be equally unlikely to accept this one. I could only repeat the arguments I put forward on that occasion, but that I do not propose to do. Therefore, without prejudice to further consideration of this matter, I will not move this Amendment.

Clause 34 agreed to.

Clauses 35 and 36 agreed to.

Clause 37 [Compensation where order for new tenancy precluded on certain grounds]:

LORD SILKIN had given notice of an Amendment, in subsection (2) (a), to leave out "rateable" and insert "rental." The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 22, 23 and 24 stand together. Since I put down these Amendments certain suggestions have been made to me which I should like to submit in the form of an alternative Amendment. I have not put it down, and therefore I think it would be preferable that we should not spend any time in discussing the Amendments printed. I propose to put down at a later stage an alternative form of Amendment. It may be possible that I can put before the noble and learned Lord the proposals that I have in mind so that he can consider them.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I should be grateful.

Clause 37 agreed to.

Clause 38:

Restriction on agreements excluding provisions of Part II

(2) If at the date on which the tenant under a tenancy to which this Part of this Act applies is to quit the holding the holding or any part thereof has been occupied for the period of five years immediately preceding that date for the purposes of the carrying on of the tenant's business (whether by the tenant or by any other person), any agreement (whether contained in the instrument creating the tenancy or not and whether made before or after the termination of that tenancy) which purports to exclude or reduce compensation under the last foregoing section shall to that extent be void, so however that this subsection shall not affect any agreement as to the amount of any such compensation which is made after the right to compensation has accrued.

(3) In a case not falling within the last foregoing subsection the right to compensation conferred by the last foregoing section may be excluded or modified by agreement between the landlord and the tenant.

8.54 p.m.

LORD SILKIN moved to leave out subsection (2). The noble Lord said: This Amendment goes with Amendment No. 27. They can be discussed together, if the Committee will give leave. The point of these Amendments is to take out of Clause 38 the provision which enables parties to contract out of the provisions of compensation if the tenancy is for a term of five years or less. I see no reason why this differentiation should be made. I can understand the Government coming to the conclusion that, in spite of the provisions of this Bill, it should be possible for the parties to contract out. I should not have supported that view—I think it wrong; but it is a possible line of thought. What I do not understand is why parties cannot contract out, as regards compensation, if the tenancy is for more than five years, but can if it is for less than five years. I see nothing sacred in this term of five years, and I see no principle underlying it.

What we are really doing is giving landlords every possible inducement to grant tenancies for not more than five years. To-day, business premises are frequently taken on a term of seven, fourteen and twenty-one years. I can well imagine that a good many landlords will stop doing that and will in future grant them for a lesser term and insist upon a provision that the compensation provisions in this Act shall not apply. I ask the noble and learned Lord whether he attaches any great importance to a provision which enables the parties to contract out in those circumstances. Would it not be better not to give the landlord the opportunity of insisting upon the omission of the compensation clauses from every agreement, thereby rendering so nugatory the good provisions of this Bill? It is for that reason that I have put down this Amendment. I hope the noble and learned Lord will agree that there is a considerable weight in the point that I am making.

Amendment moved— Page 30, line 19, leave out subsection (2).—(Lord Silkin.)

LORD MANCROFT

The effect of these two Amendments is to leave out all the provisions about contracting out of compensation. The result would be that contracting out would be permissible without limit. At present, contracting out ceases to be valid when the tenant's business has been carried on in the premises for five years. When I first looked at these two Amendments I thought it would be the intention of the noble Lord to prohibit contracting out altogether, because that was the way in which his mind seemed to be working in the course of his Second Reading speech. The distinction it is sought to make here is a fairly plain and a very just one. Contracting out of compensation is intended for the case where both parties enter into the tenancy in the knowledge that it is to be temporary because the landlord will shortly require possession. If contracting out were not allowed, the result, I should have thought, would be one of great rigidity. The tenant would not benefit because the landlord, knowing that he would shortly require possession on a ground giving rise to compensation, obviously would insist on a higher rent. The five-year limit, to which we have been referring, is an important safeguard. I would draw the attention of the Committee to that safeguard. It ensures that if, contrary to expectation, the tenancy proves not to be temporary, the tenant is entitled to compensation, despite the contracting out provision in the agreement.

The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, made again a few minutes ago a point which he made on Second Reading. He suggested that one result of the contracting out provision would be to make landlords refuse to grant leases for more than five years. I do not think that that result is very likely, and for this reason. The test is not the length of the lease, surely, but the length of time for which the business is carried on in the premises. At the end of the first five years the landlord cannot prevent the tenant from staying on unless he can establish one of the grounds for possession. If he can do this, then he is justified in limiting the lease to five years. If he cannot, there is no point in his limiting the lease to five years, because the tenant can remain longer and thereby qualify for compensation. I see what is at the back of the noble Lord's mind; I think he has misdirected his mind on this point. It is a real and necessary distinction that we make. The safeguards provided by the Bill, to which I have attempted to draw the Committee's attention, are valuable ones and ones which should allay suspicion in the noble Lord's mind. I hope he will give it reconsideration, because I can assure him that in our opinion his Amendment is an unsatisfactory one.

LORD SILKIN

In the light of what the noble Lord has just said, I am quite prepared to reconsider it.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I believe the noble Lord has missed a point for once.

LORD SILKIN

I am perfectly prepared to admit it is possible. I will certainly look at the matter again. Of course, if the noble Lord is right he will hear no more about it. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

9.1 p.m.

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment is a drafting Amendment. It is quite uncontentious. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 30, line 19, leave out from beginning to ("any") in line 24, and insert— ("(2) Where—

  1. (a) during the whole of the five years immediately preceding the date on which the tenant under a tenancy to which this Part of this Act applies is to quit the holding, premises being or comprised in the holding have been occupied for the purposes of a business carried on by the occupier or for those and other purposes, and
  2. (b) if during those five years there was a change in the occupier of the premises, the person who was the occupier immediately after the change Has the successor to the business carried on by the person who was the occupier immediately before the change,")—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

This also is a drafting Amendment. Not only is it uncontentious, but it involves some distinction in the definition of the word "landlord," and I am quite certain that at this stage in the evening the Committee would not wish me to launch on any explanation of that, uncontentious as it is. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 30, line 34, leave out ("between the landlord and the tenant").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 38, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 39 and 40 agreed to.

9.3 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment seeks to incorporate a somewhat long clause which is, I think, quite non-contentious. In a word, it seeks to apply Part II of the Bill to cases where either the tenant's interest or the landlord's interest in business premises is held on trust. That sums up the whole thing. In order to achieve it some very elaborate provisions are necessary which I shall be glad to explain if any noble Lords wish it. But I believe the Committee will take it from me that it is wholly non-controversial and, although elaborate, is I think free from ambiguity. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— After Clause 40, insert the following new clause:

Trusts

"41.—(1) Where a tenancy is held on trust, occupation by all or any of the beneficiaries under the trust, and the carrying on of a business by all or any of the beneficiaries, shall be treated for the purposes of section twenty-three of this Act as equivalent to occupation or the carrying on of a business by the tenant; and in relation to a tenancy to which this Part of this Act applies by virtue of the foregoing provisions of this subsection—

  1. (a) references (however expressed) in this Part of this Act and in the Ninth Schedule to this Act to the business of, or to carrying on of business, use, occupation or enjoyment by, the tenant shall be construed as including references to the business of, or to carrying on of business, use, occupation or enjoyment by, the beneficiaries or beneficiary;
  2. (b) the reference in paragraph (d) of section thirty-four of this Act to the tenant shall be construed as including the beneficiaries or beneficiary; and
  3. (c) a change in the persons of the trustees shall not be treated as a change in the person of the tenant.

(2) Where the landlord's interest is held on trust the references in paragraph (h) of subsection (1) of section thirty of this Act to the landlord shall be construed as including references to the beneficiaries under the trust or any of them; but, except in the case of a trust arising under a will or on the intestacy of any person, the reference in subsection (2) of that section to the creation of the interest therein mentioned shall be construed as including the creation of the trust."—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 41:

Groups of companies

(2) Where a tenancy is held by a member of a group and the property comprised in the tenancy is or includes premises which are occupied by another member of the group and are so occupied for the purposes of a business carried on by that other member or for those and other purposes, the tenancy shall be one to which this Part of this Act applies, and in relation to such a tenancy—

  1. (a) references (however expressed) in this Part of this Act of or to use occupation or enjoyment by the tenant shall be construed as including references to the business of or to use occupation or enjoyment by the said other member; and
  2. (b) the reference in paragraph (d) of section thirty-four of this Act to the tenant shall be construed as including the said other member.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in subsection (2) to leave out all words after "group" (where that word first occurs) to the commencement of paragraph (a) and insert: occupation by another member of the group, and the carrying on of a business by another member of the group, shall be treated for the purposes of section twenty-three of this Act as equivalent to occupation or the carrying on of a business by the member of the group holding the tenancy; and in relation to a tenancy to which this Part of this Act applies by virtue of the foregoing provisions of this subsection—

The noble and learned Lord said: This Amendment is substantially a drafting Amendment, dealing with a rather troublesome clause concerned with a group of companies, and it is required because of certain changes made in another place in Clause 23, in particular the commencement of the present subsection (4) of Clause 23. As I say, it is a clause which deals with groups of companies, and at present it provides that a tenancy is within Part II if it is vested in one member of a group of companies, although occupied for business purposes by another member of the group. The result of Clause 23 (4) is that occupation for business purposes is no longer in all cases enough to bring the tenancy into Part II. This subsection includes certain cases where the business use is in breach of the covenant. The Amendment makes the necessary changes in the wording of Clause 21. Again, this is difficult to follow without a much longer exposition, which I shall be glad to give if any noble Lord wishes it, but at this late hour I do not think it is necessary to give it. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 32, line 38, leave out from ("group") to end of line 44 and insert the said new words.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR had given notice of two Amendments in subsection (2), the first being to leave out "and", at the end of paragraph (a), and the second to add to the subsection: and (c) an assignment of the tenancy from one member of the group to another shall not be treated as a change in the person of the tenant. The noble and learned Lord said: These Amendments again are quite uncontroversial and non-contentious. The first Amendment is preliminary to the second, and the second corrects a small defect in Clause 41. The explanation is a somewhat long one but I think I ought to give it to you. The object of Clause 41 is to put a group of companies as a whole in the same position as a single company. The clause as it stands just fails to achieve this object, in one respect. Clause 26, confers the right on the tenant of business premises to take the initiative in having his tenancy replaced by a new tenancy. That right is confined to the tenant under a tenancy which was granted for a term exceeding one year. Where such a tenancy comes to an end after the Bill has become law it will automatically be continued under Part II, and the tenant's right to make a request for a new tenancy is preserved by subsection (1) of Clause 26. Where, however, a tenancy was granted for a term of years certain and the term expires before the coming into operation of the Bill, the law implies that if the tenant retains possession and the landlord accepts rent, then a new tenancy from year to year is thereby created. That is an adoption of law familiar no doubt to some of your Lordships, but not to all. Such a new tenancy would not be within the terms of Clause 26 (1) and therefore would not give rise to a right to request a new tenancy under Part II but for Paragraph 4 of the Ninth Schedule, which secures that a tenant who holds over after a fixed-term tenancy comes to an end shall have the right conferred by Clause 26, irrespective of whether the first term came to an end before or after the corning into operation of the Bill. I cannot hope that your Lordships will have been able to follow that explanation, but I do not know how to put a complicated and elaborate provision more simply, and I hope your Lordships will accept that it does achieve the object we have in mind. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 33, line 4, leave out ("and").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

LORD SILKIN

I think I understood everything that the noble and learned Lord read out, but what I did not understand, and wish he would explain, is its relevance to this Amendment. This Amendment, I think, says that an assignment of the tenancy from one member of the group to another shall not be treated as a change in the person of the tenant. I thought he was explaining that where a tenant was holding over and, under Clause 26, had lost his right to a new tenancy, he should get some kind of relief where he was holding over in respect of a lease which expired before the commencement of the Act. It may be that all this is relevant to this question of an assignment of tenancy from one member of a group to another, but I did not quite follow that.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I ought to have read a little more from my brief. I apologise. The noble Lord has "caught me out"—I did not turn over the page. It is as well to be frank on these occasions, and I will now read out the passage which will make the matter clear to the noble Lord. The notion of the tenant holding over is expressed in sub-paragraph (c) of Paragraph 4 in the Ninth Schedule as a requirement that the tenant under the current tenancy must be the same as (or a successor in business to) the tenant under the fixed-term tenancy—your Lordships will see that we are now getting somewhere. It is at this point that a group of companies requires special treatment. If, for instance, after the expiry of the fixed term, and before the passing of the Bill, a new subsidiary was formed for the purpose of holding all the land belonging to the group, arid the tenancy was then assigned to that new subsidiary, the requirement that the tenant must be the same would not be fulfilled unless the change of tenant were ignored. The same would apply if the fixed-term tenancy was vested in the subsidiary and the subsidiary was for some reason dissolved after the expiry of the term. By ignoring the change of tenant in such cases the Amendment secures the benefit of Paragraph 4 of the Ninth Schedule to a group of companies. I hope that that explanation is clear to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin.

LORD SILKIN

The noble and learned Lord has certainly provided the missing link.

EARL JOWITT

I remember—if I may be allowed to reminisce for a moment—that when I was Lord Chancellor, on an occasion such as this I read out a completely inappropriate piece of paper in dealing with an Amendment. Your Lordships were very much impressed by what I read out and gave me the Amendment. A few minutes afterwards, I came to the Amendment to which the piece of paper was appropriate. I was in a great difficulty whether I should read the same paper again or go back to the earlier one which I had missed. I decided to read the same one again. I did so and it went very well. No one knew that there was anything the matter and I got my Amendment.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I beg to move the next Amendment.

Amendment moved—

Page 33, line 7, at end insert ("and (c) an assignment of the tenancy from one member of the group to another shall not be treated as a change in the person of the tenant.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 41, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 42:

Tenancies excluded from Part II

42.—(1) This Part of this Act does not apply—

  1. (a) to a tenancy of an agricultural holding;
  2. (b) to a tenancy created by a mining lease;
  3. (c) to a tenancy where the property comprised therein is let under a letting to which the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, applies, or would apply but for subsection (7) of section twelve of that Act; or
  4. (d) to a tenancy of premises licensed for the sale of intoxicating liquor for consumption on the premises, other than premises where—
    5. 628
    1. (i) the excise licence for the time being in force is a licence the duty in respect of which is the reduced duty payable under paragraph 3, 5, 6, 10, 11 or 12 of the Fourth Schedule to the Customs and Excise Act, 1952, or a licence granted on the provisional payment of reduced duty with a view to subsequent adjustment to the, duty payable under the said paragraph 3 or the said paragraph 6; or
    2. (ii) the Commissioners of Customs and Excise certify that no application under any of the said paragraphs has been made in respect of the period for which the excise licence for the time being in force was granted, but that if such an application had been made such a licence as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (i) of this paragraph could properly have been granted.

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment and the next one go together, and I am happy to find for my own safety and security that they are printed on one piece of paper. They are really no more than drafting Amendments. It is a small point. What is involved is the necessity to make this provision in the Bill complementary to a similar provision in the Rent Acts. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 33, line 18, leave out from ("the") to end of line 19 and insert ("restrictions on the obtaining of possession by the landlord imposed by section three of the Rent and Mortgage Restrictions (Amendment) Act, 1933 apply in relation to the tenant,)."—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 33, line 21, leave out ("that Act") and insert ("the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920;").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD OGMORE moved, in subsection (1), to omit all words beginning with "or", in paragraph (c), down to the end of the subsection. The noble Lord said: This Amendment has been put down by my noble friend, Lord Silkin, really to obtain from the Government the explanation for the inclusion of paragraph (d) of Clause 42 (1) in the Bill. As your Lordships may remember, I raised this matter on Second Reading and then said that I hoped that at some stage the Government would explain why they have included the provision regarding licensed premises in this clause. The position is that under paragraph (d) the greatest number of licensed premises are excluded from the benefits of the Act. They share this fate, dismal or otherwise, with agricultural holdings, mining leases and certain premises to which the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, applies.

However, there are types of licensed premises to which the Bill applies. They are to be found, though not easily to be found, in the exceptions to paragraph (d). I have gone through the Fourth Schedule to the Customs and Excise Act, 1952, and find they are premises like seasonal hotels, residential hotels which have licences to supply wines to guests but have no licence to supply the ordinary passing trade, restaurant cars, buffets on railway stations, and so on. These come under the provisions of the Bill, but the broad generality of hotels, inns and public-houses do not. I want to know why the Government exclude hotels other than those I have mentioned from the Bill. They are very different from agricultural holdings, mining leases and small premises to which the Rent Restrictions Acts apply. I can understand the argument which may be adduced by the Government, that the compensation provisions of the Licensing Act already apply to hotels, inns and public-houses. That is true, of course. If an inn loses its licence, there are provisions for compensation; and an inn which may have its licence removed because of a fault on the part of the manager, which is very easy to make under the Licensing Act, is often insured against loss of licence. But I cannot see how that really affects the need for the premises themselves, apart from the licence, to come within the purview of this Bill. It seems to be quite a different thing from an agricultural holding, which is a business amply covered by legislation. In this case the fabric, the building, needs protection under the Bill, even though the licence comes under special provisions of the licensing Statutes. Though we do not propose to press this Amendment, for the benefit of those who have to construe the Bill—and from what we have seen already it is not going to be an easy matter—a little enlightenment on this clause might be very welcome. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 33, line 21, leave out from ("Act") to end of line 40.—(Lord Ogmore.)

LORD MANCROFT

The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, has put the point very fairly. He raised this matter on Second Reading and I intended to try to give him some sort of reply then, but time was against us and we had to hurry on. So I will try to explain this valid and important point now as shortly as I can. As the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, states, the present situation is that licensed restaurants and hotels are in Part II but the ordinary public-house is outside it. The reason for the exclusion of the ordinary public-house is that in the view of the Government it is most important, if the licensing laws are to be properly administered, that there should not be any impairment of the control exercised by the licensing justices. This means not only that it should be possible to get rid of a tenant to whom the justices have stated they are not prepared to grant or renew a licence, but that the landlord should have reasonable latitude, without waiting for that point to be reached, to get rid of a tenant if he conducts the business in such a way as to give reason to suspect that the police would object to the renewal of his licence.

The alternative to exclusion would be to leave public-houses in Part II and then give the landlord the right to take possession on these grounds under Clause 36. This would not, I think, be satisfactory, because it would divide between the county court, and in exceptional cases the High Court, and the licensing justices the jurisdiction which I think the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, would agree is much better left in the hands of those who best understand the subject and the locality—that is, the licensing justices. The exclusion of public-houses from this part of the Bill is the result solely of the Government's concern for the proper control of all licensed premises and is in no way the consequence of pressure of any sort at all. The position of the public-houses which I have described under this Bill is in point of fact precisely the same as under the Labour Party's temporary Act of 1951—that is, the Leasehold Property (Temporary Provisions) Act. The reasons which led to the exclusion of public-houses from the temporary Act were exactly the same as I have described. They were accepted as valid by the Government of which the noble Lord was then a member and apply with greater force to permanent legislation. The device adopted in Clause 42 (1), (d), for excluding public-houses is taken from that temporary Act. I think that is a satisfactory conclusion to a difficult problem, and I hope it will satisfy the noble Lord.

LORD OGMORE

I see the difficulty of the Government in this matter. Of course the licensing justices might be very much prejudiced if all hotels and inns came within the purview of this Bill when it becomes an Act. Possibly on the whole the Government have done rightly in this matter. I think it is perhaps a good thing, at all events with certain classes of property. The way in which they have been divided is that where the licence is the main business the matter is left to the magistrates; where the licence is what might be called the secondary or ancillary business of the hotel, then the hotel comes under the provisions of this Bill. You cannot get absolute justice in this world, and I think that in a rough and ready way that is probably the best method of dealing with this matter. My noble friends and I do not intend to press this Amendment and I beg to withdraw it.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 42, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 43 to 51 agreed to.

Clause 52 [Jurisdiction of county court is where lessor refuses licence or consent]:

LORD MANCROFT

This is purely a drafting Amendment, and a minor one at that. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 38, line 29, leave out ("refuses") and insert ("withholds").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 52, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 53 agreed to.

Clause 54 [Compensation for possession obtained by misrepresentation]:

9.25 p.m.

LORD SILKIN moved, after subsection (1) to insert: (2) Where under Part 1 of this Act an order is made for possession of the property comprised in a tenancy on the ground contained in section 12 (1) (a), or under Part II of this Act the Court refuses an order for the grant of a new tenancy on the ground contained in section 30 (1) (g), then without prejudice to the rights of the tenant under the xlast preceding subsection, if it appears to the Court after the expiration of two years from the date of such order or refusal that no effective step has been taken by the landlord to carry out the demolition or reconstruction of the premises, the Court may order the landlord to pay to the tenant such sum as appears sufficient as compensation for damage or loss sustained by the tenant as the result of the order or refusal.

The noble Lord said: This is an attempt to deal with the problem arising where a landlord gets possession of premises or, through his instrumentality, a tenant is refused a statutory tenancy because the landlord satisfies the court that it is his intention to carry out redevelopment of the premises. This matter gave a good deal of trouble in another place, and a considerable time was devoted to the case where a landlord obtains possession by a representation which is either false or misleading, where he conceals material facts, or where he either never had any serious intention of redeveloping, or finds afterwards that, having got possession of the property which he desired to redevelop, it now suits him better not to do so.

The Government have made an attempt to deal with the case of a landlord who, by misrepresentation or the concealment of facts, induces the court to make an order favourable to himself. In such a case the court may order the landlord to pay to the tenant compensation in respect of damage or loss which the tenant has sustained. In my view, however, this does not go far enough. It is often difficult to establish that a landlord has obtained an order by misrepresentation or the concealment of facts. The landlord may have gone through all the motions that he is required to under the Bill, of applying for planning consent, of preparing plans, getting by-law consent, and all the consents necessary; and then, having got possession, he may desire to do nothing at all. He has not really misrepresented, nor has he concealed, material facts—or at any rate it may be difficult for a tenant to establish that he has done so. What I suggest in this Amendment is that where, after three years, the landlord has taken no effective step to carry out the redevelopment on the strength of which he obtained possession, he should be liable for damages in the same way as if he were found guilty of misrepresentation of the concealment of material facts. I think at the end of two years one could definitely say whether or not he was going on with the redevelopment.

In some cases, it will be found that the landlord has made no attempt to redevelop at all, but has re-let or sold the premises. At any rate, it will frequently be possible to establish that not only has no effective step been taken, but that no effective step is going to be taken, because the landlord has put it outside his control to take such step. In that case, surely the tenant who has suffered damage ought to be entitled to recover from the landlord such damage as he can establish that he has sustained. In fact, this Amendment is really carrying a stage further—but not a long stage further—what I think it was the intention of the Home Secretary to achieve, namely, not to let a landlord recover possession on the ground that he was going to redevelop, and then for him not to redevelop. This Amendment is the best that I can frame for achieving that end. It may well be that the noble and learned Lord can find better words for achieving it, but I hope he will agree with me that we do want to give the tenant a right to recover damages in the circumstances which are contemplated in this Amendment. For those reasons, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 39, line 36, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Silkin.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Nothing could be clearer than the purpose of the noble Lord and the language by which he seeks to give effect to it. But I approach this matter from a somewhat different angle. One of the grounds upon which the landlord is entitled to recover possession is that he may redevelop his land. If he makes use of that provision of the Act improperly—making misrepresentations in order to secure the order of the court—then he is guilty of art offence, and it is quite right that he should be punished for it. But it is something quite different if, having the intention to redevelop, through no fault of his own he is precluded from carrying it out. It may be because of his insolvency; it may be because he cannot obtain finance owing to a change in economic circumstances; it may be he has gone bankrupt, or it may be that he is dead. In those circumstances, surely it is wrong. The tenant has suffered no greater loss because the landlord has been unable to develop.

The purpose of putting this provision in the Bill is that it may act as a deterrent, and a man shall not by misrepresentation secure an advantage which he would not otherwise get. It will not operate as a deterrent if he has a genuine intention but is precluded by economic circumstances from carrying out that intention. We do not think it is right in those circumstances that he should be called upon to pay compensation for something that arises through no fault of his own at all. As I say, we approach this from a somewhat different angle. The purpose of this clause is to prevent the landlord from making an improper use of the earlier provision of the Bill, and if he makes a misrepresentation he must suffer for it. But he really ought not to be made to suffer a further misfortune, because maybe he has already suffered a misfortune in the circumstances which have made it impossible for him to carry out his intention. I hope the noble Lord will see the wisdom of that.

There is something wider still, as it appears to me. Really the noble Lord is putting upon a man who is presumed to be innocent until he is guilty the burden of proving his innocence. Here we put the burden, and I think rightly, upon the tenant to prove that the landlord has been guilty of an offence and made a grave misrepresentation to the court. A man ought not to have put upon him the burden of proving his own innocence, and that is what is involved by and large in the Amendment which the noble Lord is seeking to put forward. Moreover, he is going further. He is really making the man pay even though he is innocent. I do not think that is a fair extension of the provision which we have put into the Bill. It is an extension but, with great respect to the noble Lord, I do not think it is a fair extension and I could not advise Her Majesty's Government to accept it.

EARL JOWITT

I see the force of the Lord Chancellor's point. On the other hand, there may be a case where a man simply changes his mind. There is no alteration in circumstances; he has not gone bankrupt or insolvent, or anything of that sort. He thought to himself, when he was before the court, that he was going to develop, and he has changed his mind. He now thinks he is not going to develop. I realise at once that there is a vast distinction between that and the case of a man who is telling lies to the court—because, after all, the state of his intention, as a distinguished judge once said, is as much a matter of fact as is the state of his digestion, and it is terribly difficult for the court to say what the position is. It is difficult to say whether a man was perfectly honest when he was before the court and did intend to develop, as he said he did, or whether he never intended to develop at all and that the facts are that, without any change in circumstances at all, he never has developed. I realise the logical distinction between the two—they are poles apart; I admit that at once. It is difficult for the courts to tell which is the truth.

Would the Lord Chancellor consider a clause—I am not attempting to draft it at the moment—on these lines. Suppose that where the clause says … the court may order the landlord. … we put … the court may order the landlord in the absence of special circumstances or in the absence of some excuse"— or something of that sort. Because I quite agree it would be unfair to make this order if there had been some real change in circumstances such as the Lord Chancellor suggested. But if the circumstances remained exactly the same and the gentleman changed his mind, then I think there is a case to consider whether or not it would not be fair to say that he should pay compensation. The facts are then that he got the tenant out, asserting that he wanted to develop. Two years have passed and he has not developed, and the liability of the landlord to pay compensation depends now, as this Bill is drafted, upon the question, which is difficult to determine, as to whether or not his change of intention was a genuine subsequent change of intention or whether he said he was going to develop but really never meant to develop at all.

I suggest that the Lord Chancellor might consider whether it is possible to frame some form of words to guard against the sort of case which he has in mind where there have been subsequent circumstances which make it impossible for the man to do what he genuinely anticipated he would do at the time: in that case he ought to be protected. If, on the other hand, the circumstances remained the same and the landlord, having got possession of the premises on the ground that he intended to develop, says: "I have thought it over and have changed my mind," I should have thought there might well be a case for considering whether it would not be right to give the tenant some compensation. It would be difficulty to find a form of words on the spur of the moment—I could not attempt to do it now—but there is an obvious distinction there, and it may be that, if the Lord Chancellor looked at it, he would be able to find a form of words which would meet such a case.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

There is one aspect of the case which the noble and learned Earl has ignored. It will not be a matter of course to satisfy the court under Clause 13 of the Bill that the landlord desires to resume possession in order to redevelop. If the noble and learned Earl will remember, the landlord has to satisfy the court that he has made such preparations (including the obtaining, or if that is not reasonably practicable in the circumstances preparations relating to the obtaining, of any requisite permission or consent, whether from any authority whose permission or consent is required under any enactment or from the owner of any property) for proceeding with the re-development as are reasonable in the circumstances. … He may, of course. There is a possibility that a man may change his mind; but, if he has made up his mind to develop and has gone through all these motions, making preparations which will satisfy the court that he intends to develop, it is very unlikely that he will then change his mind unless there are such compelling circumstances as I have mentioned. I think the case is a very unlikely one, and I repeat what I said before: refinement upon refinement, complication upon complication, may be good for the legal profession, but they do not, I think, help the body politic. One is bound to legislate on comparatively broad lines. There are, goodness knows, enough refinements in this Bill already, and therefore I do not think it desirable or wise to try to incorporate further qualifications in this provision. I understand that the noble Lord is not going to press this Amendment. If anything can be thought of which would meet the sort of case he had in mind, I should be happy to consider it. But I would utter this word of warning—and I am sure the noble and learned Earl opposite will appreciate what I am saying—one does get into endless difficulties by trying to provide for every case. I think, as a matter of comment (if I may make one on a Bill which in so many respects so admirable), that as there are complications in it already, it is not possible to do justice in each individual case.

LORD SILKIN

Of course, there is a good deal of force in what the noble and learned Lord has said, and one does not want to make this Bill more complicated than necessary. On the other hand, where one cart point to manifest injustices, we ought to make an attempt to deal with them. In my view, these injustices almost invariably occur on the one side and not on the other. Of course, we can simplify this matter very much if we allow the landlord always to have the benefit of the doubt. Cannot we for once give the tenant the benefit of the doubt? However, having said that, and the noble and learned Lord having very fairly kept the door open just a little bit—although it may be difficult to push one's way through—I will accept that and, in the circumstances, withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 54 agreed to.

Clause 55 agreed to.

Clause 56 [Modification on grounds of public interest of rights under Part II]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This and the following Amendment are drafting Amendments to meet points which were raised by the Dock and Harbour Authorities Association. They are, if not purely drafting Amendments, so little more that probably it will not be necessary for me to discuss them with the Committee. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 41, line 2, leave out from ("that") to ("for") in line 3, and insert ("it is requisite").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I beg to move this consequential Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 41, line 5, after ("corporation") insert ("that the use or occupation of the property or a part thereof should be changed by a specified date,").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

9.45 p.m.

LORD SILKIN moved, after subsection (3) to insert: (4) Where the interest of the landlord or any superior landlord in the property comprised in any tenancy belongs to the National Trust, and the Minister of Works certifies that it is requisite, for the purpose of securing that the properly will as from a specified date be used or occupied in a manner better suited to the nature thereof, that the use or occupation of the property should be changed, paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1) of this section shall apply as they apply where a certificate is given under that subsection.

The noble Lord said: In another place, representations were made to the Home Secretary on behalf of the National Trust. As I understand it, the position is that the National Trust have the ownership of a considerable number of buildings, which generally they are anxious to retain for residential purposes. It has sometimes been difficult, by reason of the nature of these premises, for the Trust to ensure that they are occupied for the purposes which they wish to secure, and they have let them for business purposes, or purposes other than residential. The purpose of this Amendment is to enable them, if they have the opportunity of letting the premises for residential purposes at the expiration of their tenancy, to get possession if they satisfy the Minister of Works who issues the certificate. Strong representations were made to the Home Secretary on behalf of the National Trust, and he promised in another place that an appropriate Amendment in this place would be acceptable. I believe that the Amendment I am putting forward is acceptable and fully carries out the undertaking of the Home Secretary. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 42, line 7, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Silkin.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is an admirable Amendment which I have great pleasure in commending to the Committee.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD SILKIN

This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 42, line 11, at end insert ("and in the last foregoing subsection the expression 'National Trust' means the National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty.").—(Lord Silkin.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD SILKIN moved to add to the clause: (5) Where a Minister or Board in charge of a Government department has certified under this section the landlord shall serve upon the tenant a copy of such certificate and if within one month from the date of such service the tenant gives notice to the Minister or Board as the case may be that he objects to such certificate then the Minister or Board shall arrange for the tenant to be heard by a person appointed by the Minister or Board and shall consider the report of such person and make a determination. Pending such determination the provisions of section 63 of this Act shall apply with the necessary modifications.

The noble Lord said: I beg to move the next Amendment standing in my name. This is an Amendment to Clause 56, which enables the landlord, where that is a Government Department, to obtain possession of premises after obtaining from the appropriate Minister a certificate that it is within the public interest that the tenancy shall not be renewed. The purpose of my Amendment is to secure that the tenant shall have the opportunity of making representations if such a certificate is issued. My proposal is that where a Minister issues a certificate a copy should be sent to the tenant, who should then have the right to make representations to the Minister and to be heard, either by way of a public inquiry or by way of a private hearing, by somebody on behalf of the Minister, in the same way as if he were objecting to an order made by a Minister in other circumstances.

In that way the tenant would have an opportunity of having his case put to the Minister as to whether his claims for renewal of the tenancy were capable of overriding the public interest—and, indeed, of making representations, if necessary, that the public interest did not require that the tenancy should not be renewed. It is, in short, in the interests of fair play and of providing the tenant with an opportunity of stating his case and raising an objection that I am moving this Amendment. If it is not accepted the tenant will be obliged to accept without question the statement of the Minister, and will have no opportunity of raising any point on it. He will have no assurance that his point of view has been taken into consideration, and it is possible that injustices may be done. It is certain that tenants will feel a sense of injustice if such an order is made, if certificates are issued without a tenant having the slightest chance of raising any point on the certificate. Whilst I do not regard this Amendment as being the last word in procedure. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will see his way to provide some opportunity for the tenant to be heard in these cases.

Amendment moved— Page 42, line 11, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Silkin.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The history of this clause has been rather curious, because in another place my right honourable friend was very much pressed, as he had been outside the House by deputations, not further to delay the taking of possession by the Department or local authority that required the premises, by requiring a certificate of the Minister, but (particularly by the local authorities) to allow the local authorities to give a certificate which would be sufficient to show that they did require possession in their own interests. And from both sides of the House he was pressed by those representing local authorities not to grant this appeal, as it were, to the Minister to give his certificate but to leave the giving of the certificate in the hands of local authorities. That pressure came from both sides. My right honourable friend resisted that pressure. He said that the certificate should be given by the Minister responsible to Parliament. He thought that that was right; but undoubtedly it must be recognised that that did, at least in the case of the local authorities, interpose some delay.

My right honourable friend was able to some extent to satisfy those who spoke for the local authorities by saying that he would use his best endeavours to see that that procedure was speeded up and that delay was as short as possible. As we all know, if we are to go a step further and the Minister is to institute the sort of inquiry—whether a public inquiry or a private hearing—which is entailed where there is a compulsory purchase order, there may be a very considerable further delay. After all, these certificates are given by the Department for and in respect of its own property, or in respect of local authority property, that they want it for their own purposes. No one knows except themselves whether they do or whether they do not. I suggest that if the certificate is given by the Minister who is responsible, that ought to be sufficient. Of course, I know the sort of arguments that can be used, particularly at this time. I can see that the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, is thinking very much the same thing as I am. I venture to think it would be difficult for me to make this concession in view of the representations that have been made, particularly by local authorities. I do not know whether the noble Lord wishes to press this Amendment. I hope that, closely connected as he is with local authorities, he will appreciate their point of view in the matter. I will, if the noble Lord wishes, have a further word with my right honourable friend about it, but I do not think from what he said, he having met the local authorities so far and resisted them so far, that he would be prepared to change his mind about it. The matter is nicely balanced, but on the whole I think it is better that the clause should stand as it is, without further amendment.

LORD SILKIN

I did not gather that the noble and learned Lord was resisting this Amendment with great enthusiasm.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I say it is nicely balanced.

LORD SILKIN

So far as I know, this is the only case in the whole of the Bill where a decision is made without a tenant being heard or having the opportunity of being heard. He loses his rights at the instance of a Minister, who may know nothing of the circumstances—at the request, if you like, of a local authority who may be in a great hurry and whose case may have little merit. And apparently the main reason is that it might be urgent. I cannot conceive circumstances in which it would be so urgent as to justify the depriving of a tenant of an opportunity to make representations. May I say, with respect to the local authorities, that my long association with them has taught me that sometimes they can be unreasonable. I do not wish to pass this Amendment, but I am not really satisfied with the explanation. I feel that the balance should be on the side of giving the tenant an opportunity to have his say.

Nobody knows better than the noble and learned Lord that the administration of justice is not speedy. One of the justifications for the slowness of our procedure is that we try to do justice between the parties and give every party the fullest opportunity of stating his case and of knowing what the other side is going to say. It is because of that that we are slow, and speedy justice is not always justice. In this case, it is proposed to deprive the tenants of justice altogether. I think this point should be looked at again. While I withdraw my Amendment, because I have no alternative, I ask the noble and learned Lord to have another word with his right honourable friend to see whether something cannot be done to give the tenant the satisfaction of putting his case.

EARL JOWITT

I should like to add my plea, if I may. I do not pretend to have followed the details of this Bill, but what I have heard just now is to me a little disquieting, and I dare say a little disquieting to noble Lords on the other side. I understand that a citizen may be deprived of his rights without having a chance for his representations to be heard by anybody. If I have it right (and I am not sure that I have) I think, particularly in the face of some of the experience we have all had recently, that we should take steps about this matter. It is far better that we should be a little slow in our administration than that we should take from anybody anything which he thinks he has without giving him the right to be heard. I believe that that will find an echo just as warmly on the other side of the House as on this. I may be butting in and may have quite misunderstood the point, but, if I am right, and a man may be in some way prejudiced without having the right to be heard, I would ask the noble and learned Lord—he has already said he would do so—to look at the point again in conjunction with the right honourable gentleman the Home Secretary, who, I am sure, is the last person in the world to encourage that sort of thing, and see whether it would not be better, even at the cost of some little time, to see that such a thing does not happen.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I repeat what I have said before. It is not a question of anybody being deprived of his rights. The question is: what rights shall be given to him? Having said that, I repeat what I said before—that I will have another word with my right honourable friend. But I am a little apprehensive. I shall get into terrible trouble with the local authorities.

LORD SILKIN

I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 56, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 57:

Termination on special grounds of tenancies to which Part II applies

(3) Where the landlord's interest in the property comprised in any tenancy is held by statutory undertakers, nothing in this Act shall invalidate an agreement to the effect— (a) that where the Minister or Board in charge of a Government department certifies that possession of the property comprised in the tenancy is urgently required for carrying out repairs (whether on that property or elsewhere) which are needed for the proper operation of the landlord's undertaking, the tenancy may be terminated by notice to quit given by the landlord of such length as may be specified in the agreement, if the notice contains a copy of the certificate; and

10.0 p.m.

LORD MACPHERSON OF DRUMOCHTER moved, in subsection (3) (a), after "undertaking" to insert: or for carrying out an alteration to or development of that undertaking. The noble Lord said: I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name, and in doing so I will declare my interest, being a member of the Port of London Authority. This Amendment sets out the purposes for which the Minister may give a certificate under Clause 57 (3), so that a decision may be obtained by a port authority at less than six months' notice for carrying out necessary or urgent alterations or development of the port undertaking. Port and harbour authorities in the United Kingdom have an exceptionally heavy programme ahead of them in the years to come, in order to make good the war damage and to overtake arrears of capital development of the harbours which are necessary in order to equip their undertaking to meet the modern requirements of the shipping industry. We therefore envisage many occasions and many different circumstances in which recourse will have to be made to Clauses 56 and 57 of this Bill.

As the Bill stands now, the only purposes for which the authority can obtain a decision under short notice are those specifically laid down. There are three named: for the purpose of effecting repairs, in the interests of national security, or (thanks to the Amendment to Clause 56 moved by the Lord Chancellor this evening and accepted by the Committee) a change in the use or occupation of the property. We can, however, foresee many other reasons why it will be necessary, in the interests of port and harbour development, to make application to the Minister to act at short notice. One example is the case in which we wish to have a building pulled down so that the necessary development can take place. But under none of these heads have we authority to apply to the Minister for a certificate to do work of that nature. I am sure the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor is just as anxious as anyone else to see that under proper safeguards there is no unnecessary restriction on the development work of the ports and harbours of this country, and I therefore trust he will give the Amendment favourable consideration.

Amendment moved— Page 43, line 19, after ("undertaking") insert ("or for carrying out alteration to or development of that undertaking.").—(Lord Macpherson of Drumochter.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment has been very clearly explained by the noble Lord. He is quite right in saying that I have no wish whatever to stand in the way of the proper development of statutory undertakings. The difficulty I feel is this. In the ordinary way, the six months' notice is given to the tenant, and here (although I know the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, will look at me with suspicion) I am anxious that justice should be done to the tenant. If six months is the usual notice that tenants should have, an exception should not be made in favour of a statutory undertaking unless there is some compelling reason. We have recognised a compelling reason where some form of repairs is necessary, but where what is intended is "alteration to or development of" the undertaking it is difficult to be convinced that six months' notice could not well be given. It is difficult to suppose that any alteration or development will not be sufficiently foreseen to give six months' notice to the tenant, who will be unduly prejudiced if he has less than six months' notice.

I must therefore say this to the noble Lord. As he knows this matter has been considered departmentally. Unless some more cogent reason than has yet emerged can be advanced for giving to statutory undertakings a special privilege which is not given to ordinary landlords, I find it impossible to concede the Amendment for which he asks. We do not think it right, in the absence, as I say, of compelling evidence, that such an exception should be made. I hope that if the noble Lord has any further evidence which he can give he will put it before the Department, although I have no doubt that this has already been put forward with all the force that they can command, by the powerful body which he represents. The proposal having been considered and rejected, I think it unlikely that the position will be reconsidered. At present I can only say that, regretfully, I must refuse the Amendment, and I ask your Lordships not to support the noble Lord.

LORD MACPHERSON OF DRUMOCHTER

At this late hour I do not wish to quarrel with either the Department or the noble and learned Lord, although in the opinion of my friends in the port and harbour industry there will be occasions when the six months will be a hardship. However, in view of what has been said, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 57 agreed to.

Clauses 58 to 61 agreed to.

Clause 62:

Jurisdiction of court for purposes of Parts I and II and of Part I of Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927.

(6) Where in any such proceedings an assessor is summoned by a judge under the said subsection (1),— (c) the remuneration of the assessor shall be defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament.

LORD MANCROFT moved, in subsection (6) (c), after "assessor" to insert: shall be at such rate as may be determined by the Lord Chancellor with the approval of the Treasury and. The noble Lord said: This Amendment concerns something quite different—namely, the payment of assessors whom, as your Lordships will remember, the county court judge can summon at various stages in the proceedings contemplated under this Bill. The Bill as it stands says merely that the assessors are to be paid out of public funds, but it does not say expressly who is to settle the rate of payment. The result will be that the County Court Act, 1934, will apply, and this provides for the remuneration of assessors to be "at such rate as may be prescribed," and the Act goes on to define "prescribed" as meaning prescribed by County Court Rules. The position, therefore, is that the rate of payment is to be settled by the County Court Rules Committee. That is all right where the cost of the assessors is borne by the parties to the proceedings. As, however, in proceedings under this Bill the assessor is to be paid from public funds, it seems right to the Government that the rate of payment ought to be settled by a Minister, with the consent of the Treasury. This seems both reasonable and proper, and I hope that your Lordships will accept the Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 47, line 4, after ("assessor") insert the said words.—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 62, as amended, agreed to.

Remaining clauses agreed to.

First Schedule [Supplementary Provisions as to Payments for Accrued Tenant's Repairs]:

LORD MANCROFT

This Amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 9. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 54, line 11, leave out ("such greater number of instalments") and insert ("instalments of such smaller amounts").—(Lord Mancroft.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

First Schedule, as amended, agreed to.

Second to Fourth Schedules agreed to.

Fifth Schedule [Provisions for purposes of Part I where Immediate Landlord is not the Freeholder]:

10.10 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is a somewhat long Amendment, but I can state the effect in a few words. It is simply a procedural Amendment to enable the tenant to apply in proceedings after they have started. It is an Amendment to paragraph 9, which provides relief for the occupying tenant where a superior landlord enforces a right of forfeiture for breach of covenant against the immediate landlord. The tenant is obviously interested in that, and this will enable him to apply after the proceedings have started. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—