HL Deb 19 November 1953 vol 184 cc408-36

3.22 p.m.

THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (LORD LLOYD) rose to move, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the National Service Act, 1948 (Duration) Order, 1953, be made in the form of the draft laid before the House on the 3rd instant. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name. The purpose of the peace-time National Service scheme was originally stated by the late Prime Minister in the debate on the Address in 1946, and it was as follows: First, to supplement the Regular component of the active Forces which had run down badly during and immediately after the 1939–45 war, in order that they could carry out their world-wide commitments; secondly, to build up large trained reserves which would be ready for operational use in an emergency, without the need for a lengthy period of training as was the case with the Auxiliary Forces in 1914 and 1939. These still continue, clearly, to be the two main objects of the National Service scheme, and it was to give effect to this purpose that the late Government introduced the National Service Act, 1948.

As your Lordships will be aware, under Section 61 of that Act the power to call up men for National Service was taken for a period of five years, and with your permission I shall have more to say on that particular point later. This power lapses on December 31, 1953, unless, with Parliamentary approval, a later date is substituted by Order in Council. I feel that it is probably unnecessary for me to dwell upon the serious results that would ensue if the provisions of the Act were not renewed in some form or another. I have only to remind your Lordships that National Servicemen represent some 37 per cent. of the total number of men in the Forces at the present time. Moreover, if the Order were not renewed, all National Servicemen would have left the Forces by the end of 1955, and the National Service reserves—which build up to a maximum, under the provisions of the 1948 Act, by mid-1954—would begin to decline from the end of 1955 and would practically cease to exist by mid-1959. The Draft Order therefore proposes the substitution of January 1, 1959, for January 1, 1954—in other words, we propose an extension of the scheme for another five years, which was the same period as was decided upon by the late Government in 1947.

Earlier this week, in another place, the Prime Minister paid tribute to the courage of the late Government in taking the decision—which was undoubtedly unpalatable to them: it is unpalatable to all of us—to institute compulsory service for a period of live years, and also to embark upon an immense rearmament programme, and he gave it as his opinion that these decisions have played a great part in preventing another major war. I do not imagine that any of your Lordships would dissent from what the Prime Minister has said—I certainly would not. Indeed, it is because we believe his statement to be profoundly true that we wish to continue this scheme for a further period of five years. It would appear, however, from a Motion recently moved in another place, by the Leader of the Opposition, that the Opposition are no longer entirely at one with us in this matter. The terms of that Motion, which, as I say, was moved by the Leader of the Opposition himself, were as follows (OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons. Vol. 520, No. 10, Col. 1407): That this House, whilst accepting the necessity for National Service in present circumstances, nevertheless considers that the time has now arrived when the period of Service should be determined by Parliament on affirmative resolution, and not less frequently than once a year. I feel, in view of that Motion, that I should endeavour to explain to your Lordships our views, both on the two-year period of service and on the question of annual review.

As most of your Lordships are aware, it was hoped after the war that as normal recruitment built up the Regular Forces, the necessity for using National Servicemen to supplement the Regular component of the active Forces would largely disappear. This, indeed, might have occurred, but the hope has been dashed by the continuance of the world-wide commitments of the Forces and by the current emergencies in Malaya, Korea, Kenya and elsewhere. I think it is true to say that it was the strain imposed by the need to maintain large Forces in Malaya and the Middle East, and the additional strain imposed by the war in Korea, that compelled the late Government in 1950 to increase the period of whole-time National Service from eighteen to twenty-four months; and I am bound to say that, so long as our commitments remain at their present level, it is difficult to see any prospects, now or in the immediate future, either of doing away with National Service or of reducing the period below two years.

Nor do I believe that the situation could be radically altered merely by making more economical use of our manpower, as has been suggested in some quarters. Of course, economy in the use of manpower is essential from every point of view: the cost in terms of money of National Service is in itself important. No less important is the problem of finding the men required with a minimum of disturbance to industry, and the minimum dislocation of agriculture and the export drive. Of course, the Government recognise fully the importance of all these considerations, and I can assure your Lordships that the question of economy in manpower is continuously in our minds. The Service Ministers, in particular are, I know, constantly looking for such economies and are always ready to investigate complaints of waste, and continual investigations and inquiries have taken place. Indeed, I believe that fifteen separate and full-scale inquiries have been held since the war. At the same time, care has been taken to ensure that experience from outside the Services was made available; and in several of these inquiries outside help, from business concerns and from trade unions, was called in.

I do not wish to weary your Lordships with too many details about the inquiries that have taken place. At the same time, I wish to try to convince the House, so far as I can, of the very real efforts that have been made, and are continuing to be made. In the case of the Navy, there is a Standing Committee which considers and makes recommendations concerning the schemes of complements of Her Majesty's ships and establishments. In addition, ad hoc Committees are appointed from time to time to investigate particular aspects of the manpower situation. During the last five years, five such inquiries have been held, including one relating, to the deployment of the Reserve Fleet, and economies resulting from such re-deployment are expected to release some 5,000 officers and ratings for duties elsewhere. In general, however, the economies achieved have not, perhaps, been so much in large individual savings as in a multiplicity of small savings in various fields. It is significant that none of these inquiries in the Navy has revealed that there has been anything seriously wrong with the use of manpower in that Service.

Let me now turn to the Army. In the Army a study of this problem is a continuing process. As a result of one of these examinations, the establishment of the War Office was reduced by 10 per cent.—that happened last year—and I do not consider that that is a bad performance, in view of the commitments of the Service. As your Lordships probably know, the Templer and Callander Committees of 1951 achieved considerable economies in headquarters and units at home and overseas, and in the distribution of military and civilian manpower. I do not wish to weary your Lordships with too many details, but you will probably be interested to know that a total of some 10,000 men were saved. It is also satisfactory to note—and I think the Secretary of State for War mentioned this in another place the other day—that Sir John Reid Young, the expert from Vickers Armstrong, after investigating the static administrative installations in this country, has given it as his opinion that no marked waste of manpower existed.

I turn briefly to the R.A.F., where again the establishments of all units are constantly under review by standing establishment committees. Between January, 1952, and May, 1953, about 7,000 posts were deleted from R.A.F. establishments. These savings included considerable reductions in Command and Group headquarters staff, the closing of a number of reserve centres and reductions in the training organisations, which were achieved by closing some schools and reorganising others. Again, in the last few months a working party has been reviewing establishments in the technical trades with the object, where possible, of replacing advanced tradesmen by skilled tradesmen. As a result of this review, it is expected that the number of such replacements will be of the order of 2,500 and will provide a valuable saving in highly skilled tradesmen. I have quoted only a few of the many examples which I could quote and I have done this, as I say, in an endeavour to show your Lordships that we are making a real effort to economise wherever we can. This effort will continue.

But, whatever success may attend these efforts, I think I should be misleading the House if I were to pretend that sufficient economies are likely to be made from this source to justify a reduction of the period of service. I am convinced that this can come about only through a reduction in our overseas commitments. Here I am bound to say that no diminution of these commitments seems probable, at any rate in the immediate future. It is true that fighting has ceased in Korea, but can we be certain that the situation will not worsen again? And, even if it does not get worse, it seems fairly clear that the Commonwealth will need to maintain a considerable force there for some time to come. Nor, again, does there seem to be any immediate prospect of reducing commitments in Malaya. To turn to the Middle East, whatever may be the outcome of the current negotiations with Egypt, it is certain that the Services will have to remain in some force in some part of the Middle East, unless British prestige is to be irreparably damaged. As your Lordships are aware, in point of fact in recent months additional commitments have had to be undertaken in East Africa and now, more recently, in the West Indies. Even when it does become possible to effect some reduction in our overseas commitments, the first priority—and I am sure this will be generally agreed—before any question of a reduction in numbers arises, must be to build up our strategic reserve. Noble Lords should not forget that at the present time we have no strategic reserve at home and, for the first time in the history of the British Army in peace time, 80 per cent. of its fighting units are overseas.

I hope noble Lords opposite will accept this estimate of our present position and of the immediate outlook for the future. I realise, nevertheless, that what I have said may not be regarded as a convincing argument against the proposal for an annual review of the situation. It may be contended that the situation is likely to improve, that our commitments will thereby be reduced and that in this way a diminution in the period of service will become possible. If that is the contention, then I am glad to accept it as a tribute to the conduct of affairs by the present Government; and certainly nobody hopes more fervently than we do that this prediction—if it is indeed made—will be realised. But, for all that, I cannot accept it as an argument in favour of an annual review.

After all, we are asking for no greater powers than those that were taken by the late Government in 1947 in circumstances which I think I can fairly say are certainly no better than they were then. If it is felt that an annual review is so desirable to-day, I put it to noble Lords, was it not equally desirable then? And, if the late Government took five years then, did they not have good reason for it? No doubt they did, and I suggest that their reasons then were very similar to the reasons which actuate us to-day. In the debate last April, the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, remarked that life would be happier and more secure for all nations if tensions could be lessened and their causes removed. He went on to say (OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 181, Col. 777)—and in my opinion his remarks are as true to-day as they were several months ago— But all that lies with the future—though we hope that important first steps will be taken in the near future. Nothing, however, has occurred yet—I repeat 'yet'—to lessen the need for adequate Western defence or to justify a slowing down or curtailment of Western defence preparations. We must keep hard realities clearly in mind. I agree with the noble Lord that we must, and, for that reason, I cannot agree with the words contained in the Motion of the Leader of the Opposition, "that the time has now arrived" to make such a change.

In our opinion, such a change at the present moment would lead to nothing but uncertainty, and uncertainty at a time when it is least desirable: uncertainty in the minds of the Service Departments who, to use the Prime Minister's words, would find it difficult to plan on a coherent and thrifty basis"; uncertainty in the minds of the young men who are likely to be affected and who would equally find it more difficult than ever to plan their future; and finally, and by far the most important, it would create uncertainty amongst our friends and allies. Nor do I feel that we should forget the possible effects of such a change in Soviet Russia. After all, if there has been any improvement in the international situation, may it not be because we have adopted a policy of "peace through strength," and might not such a change give precisely the impression that we do not want to give—namely, that we are weakening in our resolution?

May I remind the House, before I close, that the extension of the present scheme for a further period of five years does not mean either that the subject cannot be discussed or that we are necessarily committed to two years' service during the whole of the five years. Under Section 1 (2) of the 1948 Act the Government can shorten the period of whole-time service at any time by Order in Council, and should the situation improve we should not hesitate to propose such modifications in the system as were consistent with our obligations and our own security. Nor, I can assure noble Lords, are we on this side of the House anxious to retain National Service a day longer than is absolutely necessary. After all, there is no political popularity to be gained by National Service. Indeed, the very reverse is the case, because National Service does a good deal to put obstacles in the way of the means whereby political popularity is to be won—that is to say, in a general increase in the prosperity of the nation.

I conclude with this reflection: if we ask the nation to continue to make this sacrifice for another period, let us remember that in my father's time there was no National Service, and thousands of his generation died in the trenches between 1914 and 1918. In my earlier days there was no National Service, and thousands of my generation died between 1939 and 1945. If by now accepting this smaller sacrifice for a little longer, we can avoid having to make that much greater sacrifice at a later date, is not the sacrifice worth while? My Lords, I beg to move.

Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the National Service Act, 1948 (Duration) Order, 1953, be made in the form of the draft laid before Parliament.—(Lord Lloyd.)

3.42 p.m.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My Lords, the first fact to point out is that some measure of this kind was essential, because the statutory date of expiry of the Act of 1948 is in 1953. Therefore, the Houses of Parliament have to face the necessity for a decision. Moreover, there is no doubt at all, if one reads very carefully the debate in another place, as well as consults the opinions of one's own confreres, that there is a clear recognition, in Parliament and in the country, that National Service continues to be necessary for us to meet our commitments. However, listening to the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, I thought that at times he was rather inclined to prove too much, and that it would not help us, in our general task of keeping the views in the country at large, and in our Parties, on the right lines, if we were to overstress some of the arguments which he has used to-day. What we need above all else in regard to National Service is that we should not only carry it as we did originally but should maintain it for whatever period is necessary, with the full accord of the great majority of the nation. That is fundamental to the matter and fundamental to the maintenance of the force required to maintain even an uneasy peace.

This is a matter which has been raised previously by my colleagues and friends in another place, and it is not being raised for the first time. I did not always agree fully with all that Members of my political persuasion may have said from time to time, but in this House at the time I did say to the present Minister of Defence, the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Alexander, that I thought the time had come when we should consider what was the right thing to do in relation to the fact that our general economy is as vastly important to the maintenance of a sound defence as the particular sections of this or that part of a military programme. Therefore, in the course of a debate on defence last April, I urged that the time had come when there should be a review of the personnel question. I pointed out then that the expenditure in our military budget as a whole must be reckoned as about half on personnel and about half on necessary equipment, research and the like. If that is so, I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, that if, from time to time, the inquiries to which he has referred have resulted in the actual saving of a number of bodies and their maintenance—of, say, 10,000 in one case, and perhaps 7,000 in another—that is not at all without important financial result, because on the average every single person in the Forces costs us certainly not less than £1,000 a year on pay, allowances, maintenance, clothing, travelling, and the like. That is a formidable figure when one comes to consider the matter; and, therefore, if by an inquiry you have saved 10,000 men, you save £10 million—or you should do unless the Services divert the £10 million to some other military purpose. That also is a question which we need constantly to keep under review.

I am glad to know that those inquiries have been taking place, but when I was speaking on the matter last April I think I said to the Minister of Defence that I was quite content with the explanations as a whole which he had given in his introductory speech, but that I should be happier if from time to time a review could take place. I gathered that that was not out of general accord with what noble Lords would require. On the other hand, when it comes to putting into operation a piece of machinery for which I, more than any other person, was personally responsible—that is, the procedure for continuing by Order in Council the operation of the Statutes of 1947 and 1948—it is fundamental to be quite sure that the whole population will understand that there is nothing incongruous between that decision and the claim by the Leader of the Opposition earlier this week in another place, that a review should be held not less frequently than annually. I say that for this reason. When I considered the matter with the Chiefs of Staff at the time, I had no idea that we should substitute for actual legislation an Order in Council which would run for a considerable period.

As your Lordships know, the Leader of the Opposition said this week that it is apparently quite possible to deal with what are called periods of uncertainty by the procedure which we adopt in regard to the Army and Air Force (Annual) Bill. I think it is unreasonable to clamp down for five years by an Order in Council; anything that is to last for that length of time ought to be the subject of actual legislation. What I had in mind at the time we were drafting in 1947 and in 1948, was that the outlook was uncertain, but I do not entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, that it is at least as uncertain or more uncertain to-day. If we take notice of the comments of the Prime Minister, and of that rather criticised speech the other day of Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, they both seem to think, one in his original speech and the other by his subsequent explanation, that the outlook is not quite so bad as it was. So I do not quite agree with Lord Lloyd on that.

LORD LLOYD

May I just say that I think the Prime Minister surely meant that the outlook was not so bad as, say, in 1950. I am comparing the outlook today with that in 1947, which was the time when the original Act was passed.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

As one who, perhaps, had more responsibility than anyone else, except the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, for the policy then adopted, I must say that I should be very unhappy if I felt that all the efforts we have made as a nation since 1947, in order that we may have a chance of peace through strength, had not led to an improvement in the outlook. It would be a sad blow to the people of the nation if that were so, and would make them begin to think that this was not the way out.

I believe it is true to say that the procedure adopted by the military and political authorities of the day has definitely put into the foundations of our work for peace a solidity which would not otherwise have been there. That is why we continue to support the general policy of National Service for as long as it is required. What we had in mind was the general outlook at that time. In the first place, we felt that it would be very difficult to ask the nation, by Act of Parliament (not by Order in Council) to give us a longer period than five years. Secondly, we felt that it would be wise then to have in the hands of the Executive the power, by Order in Council, to extend National Service for not more than twelve months at a time. If the situation is so difficult that it has to be met by action, there is never any difficulty in renewing an Order in Council, if the Government wish to do it that way. So I listened very carefully to the noble Lord to-day, because I did not want to make a long speech. As I have said, it has seemed to me that he tried to prove too much, once he got into that realm and began to talk about this period. I felt that he was talking about the quinquennial period, and I say that it is a great mistake to attach that to an Order in Council.

The only other points I want to make are these. First, it is a great tribute to the common sense and intelligence of the British nation that they have, in the last five years, stood so firmly behind us in regard to National Service. In my view, it is a mistake for a lot of people who have little real knowledge of these matters to make pronouncements as to what are the feelings of the men in the Services. I do not know what is the practice of other noble Lords, but hardly a month—I might say hardly a week—goes by but what I take advantage of some opportunity, in railway trains, it may be, or elsewhere, to cross-question young recruits as to how they are getting on in their particular Service, whether they like it, whether they have anything to object to, and so on. I am bound to say that the vast majority of those young people to whom I have spoken are happy about things in general, On the other hand, it is essential in dealing with such great Services, as it is in all the three great Departments, that there should be as little ground for grumbling as possible. So I am glad to learn from the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, that these inquiries are continually being made. Particularly is it necessary to have inquiries as to whether there is any wasting of time. Waste of time is the worst possible thing that can happen in the life of a young soldier, sailor or airman at a period which would normally be devoted to his preparatory education for his future adult life. This, I think, is a matter which needs careful attention.

Another point about which I am concerned is this. Whilst in the Royal Air Force, for example, a great deal has been done in recruiting, from the ordinary ranks of the National Servicemen who are called up, officers for short-service commissions and the like, not nearly enough is being done to make a clear way for entry into commissioned rank in the Army and the Navy so as to ensure that there will be adequate provision of officers for the general strategic reserve which is being built up. We must remember that the strategic reserve is not merely a separate trained force which is to be held for any particular moment. It is the follow-up in a great plan which, by reinforcing the old volunteer Territorial Force with the National Reservists after their National Service training, will ensure that in case of emergency we shall have a very large trained force. But at the present time we are not getting established a proper channel into commissioned rank, and that applies especially to the Army. We are not getting the system we ought to have in order to build up, in addition to the general rank and file trained reserve, a proper reserve of officers, capable at short notice of taking over control and exercising leadership of this vast strategic body which will have been created by means of National Service. This is a matter which also needs very careful attention. And may I say that there ought to be no class distinction, whether implied or through default, in building up that reserve of officers for what, after all, is a citizens' Army. I think that is very important indeed.

With regard to the point about the part which the general economy of the country has to play in our ultimate build-up of defence, it has been made clear, in statements relating to the future prospects of our trade, industry and finance, that the maintenance of our present military budget is a matter of grave concern, not only because of its size but because of the changed circumstances which are bound to come as American aid becomes smaller. We have to weigh very carefully what contribution will be made by the rest of our Allies. We have to consider whether they are making the same sacrifices as we are in such matters as length of service and, in fact, whether their general military contribution is on the same scale as ours.

We have, too, our own general economic survival to consider. That is a matter which I do not propose to develop further at the moment, but it shows how vastly important it is to have an annual review. You can have a review of the Service Estimates, but often, as your Lordships know, that is a fait accompli. Every Service Minister knows that, very largely, he has to fight his battle with the Treasury before ever he goes to the House of Commons, and my sympathy is always with the Service Minister in that task. But we do need an annual review. And because of the fact that our industry and commerce will now be up against intense competition, often from Allies of ours who are not making the same rate of contribution as we are to the defence effort, the whole matter is one of very considerable importance. I agree with my noble and learned Leader that in all the circumstances there is no need for us to say anything further to-day. I told the Minister of Defence last April that I should be content if the Government would promise to go on looking at the matter from time to time. The more we consider the financial situation in relation to national defence, the more obvious does it become that it is necessary for Parliament to be given very strict control of the renewal of engagements of this kind. Therefore, I hope that what I have said will be enough to influence the Government not to quarrel with us about this matter, but to look at it specifically, and to weigh carefully the question whether the public would not be better encouraged to stand four-square behind this effort if they had the knowledge that there was to be a review by Parliament every year.

4.0 p.m.

LORD THURLOW

My Lords, as was to be expected, there has been a great deal of emphasis in your Lordships' House, and even more in another place, about economy in manpower in the Services. Therefore it may not come amiss if, as one of the few members of the Regular Services in the House who can occasionally speak to your Lordships, I should say a few words about the difficulties that face us in economising in manpower under present conditions, and something about what we are trying to do. I refer mainly, of course, to the Army, my own Service, and to the Infantry, my own arm, which nowadays is being called the "Foreign Legion" because there are so few infantry units in this country. I will give your Lordships four of the major factors which I think are militating against economy of manpower in the running of the Army to-day.

The first one, about which I need not say much, is our commitments all over the world. The difficulties experienced in administering all the little packets of troops we have in various parts of the world can be realised. In a few minutes I shall take up some of your Lordships' time with an analogy illustrating this fact. The second factor is that we have to use National Servicemen in jobs for which long training is necessary, and that is most uneconomical. I know that the R.A.F. at the moment have to face up to this problem and have to train certain classes of technicians for a whole year in order to use them for one year, and then they have to train some more. That sort of thing is forced on us if we cannot get the technicians as long-term Regular members of the Services. That is part of the price we have to pay in this technical age in which we are living. My third factor, one which I hope is not increasing, although there are already dangerous portents in the sky, is the lack of enough good Regular N.C.O.'s to make the best use of the National Servicemen by good training and supervision. I shall come back to that point later on. Last of all there is the factor of finance. We always get down to money in the end. The Services lack money to pay civilians to do many of the chores that we should much rather the soldiers, and particularly the National Servicemen, did not do.

To give your Lordships an idea of our difficulties, I should like to take the simple analogy of a business. I am going to ask you to consider the noble and gallant Earl, the Minister of Defence, as the general manager of a very large business, myself as the manager of a small branch and your Lordships as shareholders in the business. The first thing that happens is that the general manager asks me to take my branch out to Egypt and set it to work there. So we start packing up the branch, which takes a great deal of time and the work of a great many people, and the shareholders rightly complain that the branch is not doing any useful work towards carrying on the business while that move is taking place. When we get to Egypt and set up our branch there, the first thing that happens is that the senior clerks come to me and say that they have been separated from their wives; they want to go home and go to another job, because they don't like it there. Then I have to write to the general manager and say, "Please send me some more highly-skilled senior clerks." He is rather angry with me and asks why I cannot persuade the last lot to sign on for longer contracts. Grudgingly, he sends me half as many as I have asked for—and I am forced to promote the young novices to take the place of the experienced seniors who were there before. Consequently, the work of the branch suffers considerably.

The next thing that happens is that the branch is so unpopular in Egypt that nobody in that country will sell us food or work for us. Again I ask head office for more staff to find us food and generally look after our needs. But the general manager tells me that the shareholders want him to open a branch in British Guiana and another in Kenya. He cannot possibly send me any more staff and I must use my own men to do all our chores. I have to accept it that they cannot be doing their proper jobs. Possibly that is an incorrect analogy and your Lordships may see many faults in it, but I think it does illustrate what we are up against. If the branch I described were going to Kenya instead of Egypt, that would be the position I shall be faced with in February, when, presumably on the instructions of the subordinates of the general manager, I go to command a brigade in Kenya. That is the sort of problem we shall be faced with out there. The senior clerks of the firm are the long-term Regulars. If we are going to get the best value out of the National Servicemen and if we are going to do the job that lies before us out there, they are the people we need to retain.

We find even more difficulties when we get down to real life. For instance, in my branch in Kenya, I shall have three departments. One has just come from Korea; another, after being in Malaya, back to England, then out to the Middle East and back again to England, is now there. My third was in England and at very short notice was sent out with one suitcase to an emergency in the Canal Zone, and has been sent from there to Kenya. All three departments want to be given jobs in the central office at home, which, of course, at the moment, is not possible.

I think it all boils down to the importance of a good Regular Army if we are going to get the best out of our National Servicemen. The present instability is having a serious effect on getting men, particularly N.C.O.'s, to continue in the Service. Nowadays, men in the Services get married much earlier than they used to, and their wives and families have a big effect on whether they stay on or not. The wives like to settle down at one place where they get a home and have their husbands with them. If this is uncertain and the wife is convinced that her husband could get an equally good job in civilian life, where they could settle down on just as good pay or, if he is a technician, on considerably better pay, then she is going to throw the whole of her influence into getting him out of the Service and settling down where she can get a house and make a home. Even in what is called "Home Service" in Germany, the wives of officers and men, as your Lordships may have seen in the newspapers, find life much more expensive than in this country. That is one of the problems we have to face. Then there is the frightful problem of educating the soldiers' children. I have heard of one case which sounds too fantastic to believe—that of a boy aged nine who has already been to eleven schools, because his parents have moved round so much. Obviously, it is not going to be easy to persuade people in that sort of position to stay on in the Army and do this vital job.

I should like to say something on what we are doing in the Services to watch this problem of manpower economy. For eighteen unhappy months I was staff officer in the Middle East Command responsible for manpower economy. I had a staff of four officers and a large number of clerks, and we did nothing else the whole time, for very long hours, except review all the establishments in the Command, time after time, and inspect them time after time, and try to make cuts. That is going on in every Command, and your Lordships can be quite convinced that everything is being done to keep an eye on this problem. But, as I say, many of these economies are quite impossible to make in present conditions. Anything that can be done to achieve stability, so that we can keep our Regular Army contented and persuade a certain number of the men to stay on for longer than seven years—and mind you, my Lords, most of them are signing on as Regulars for only three years—will, I am sure, produce huge financial savings, and we shall get much more value out of a smaller number of National Servicemen.

4.11 p.m.

LORD WINSTER

My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, will allow me, I should like to congratulate him on the apt and racy analogy which he drew in the early part of his remarks. The job of an analogy is not to be correct in every detail but to convey abroad picture of the situation, and I am sure your Lordships will agree that the analogy of the noble Lord certainly did that. There are two or three things I should like to say on the subject. The first has not been said here to-day, and, in fact, I should not expect it ever to be said here, but it has been said in other places that the heads of the Defence Forces, the Chiefs of Staff, are men who, regardless of any other consideration, are always trying to grab the greatest number of men they possibly can for their particular Service. I do not believe that to be true; I do not believe that the Chiefs of Staff are such unreasonable men.

Further, while the Chiefs of Staff are not politically minded, in my opinion they are, for a variety of reasons, much more closely in touch with the politics of the country than they used to be at one time. They are just as well aware as anybody else of the two crying needs of the country at the present moment: first, the need for economy and for reduction of expenditure; and secondly, the fact that, if we are to survive, it will be by virtue of our export trade and by a great increase in our export trade—and on that ground they are perfectly aware of the need for economy in manpower. I am sure that in framing their requirements they have those two facts clearly in their minds, and are not actuated merely by a selfish desire to grab all the bodies that they can for their own particular Service. Having said that, I should like to say that the history of two wars now shows that this country would have been in a much happier position had many of the requirements of the Chiefs of Staff been met in the years before those wars broke out.

The second thing I should like to say is this—and it reinforces something said by the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd. He said, I think correctly, that a Government would be mad to keep on National Service longer than they needed to do. Clearly, no Government could possibly invite more sweeping disaster at a General Election than by keeping on National Service when the Opposition were able to make out that it was unnecessary. On the other hand, probably no Government could reap greater popularity than by sweeping away National Service altogether. Therefore, I think we may rely upon any Government, of any colour, to watch this matter most carefully, and not to keep National Service on a day longer than is necessary.

That brings me to a further point—namely, the question of an annual review of the need. That, to my mind, at first sight is quite attractive; and I believe that such an annual review would certainly create a feeling of confidence among those who are subject to, or are about to become subject to, National Service. I feel it would reassure them to know that every year the matter was under review. But as against that I have to set the fact that certain members of N.A.T.O. are only too anxious for any excuse to drag their feet. I believe there really is a fear that the annual review might encourage those rather backward Member States of N.A.T.O. in that process. I am sure, also, that such sections as there are in America which are hostile to us—and I think they are far smaller than many people fear—might also seize upon the fact to indicate that, to some extent, we are weakening in our Defence preparations. Therefore, though I come to the conclusion with some reluctance, I feel that probably an annual review would be a mistake. As against that there is this fact to be remembered. The Annual Estimates of the three Services in themselves surely constitute a review of this sort, because in those Estimates the manpower has to be asked for and allocated for each Service; and, for reasons which I gave at the outset of my remarks, I do not believe the Chiefs of Staff are likely to demand more manpower than they can honestly justify. Far those reasons, I feel that the weight of the evidence is against the annual review.

The next point I should like to make is this. I thought the Leader of the Opposition in his speech on this subject in another place touched upon a matter of great importance—namely, the question of idleness amongst the men called up. I have heard a great many first-hand accounts, and they all indicate that there is a great deal of idleness, and that it is that idleness, far more than the fact of being called up to do National Service, which makes National Service unpopular among the young men who are doing it. I think the evidence is incontestable that there is a great deal of idleness. I should like to ask the noble and gallant Earl, the Minister of Defence, whether he is perfectly satisfied in his own mind on this point. Is he satisfied, on the reports that he receives, that this idleness does not exist? Is he satisfied that a system of inspection and review prevails which would bring such idleness to light and ultimately to his own notice? I am sure it would be a source of great satisfaction to many of us who are uneasy on this question of National Service if the noble and gallant Earl could assure us, of his own knowledge and from his own inquiries, that idleness does not prevail to an unwarranted extent—of course, there must be some idleness.

In conclusion, I wish to say that I am sure that to all of us National Service is an odious necessity. I am not going to say for a moment that I do not think the young men who are called up do not reap many benefits from their period of National Service; but neither am I going to say that. I believe that to be an excuse or a reason for instituting National Service, or for continuing it longer than is necessary. I am sure we all hope that events in this troubled world may die down in the not too distant future, so that we may be able to get rid of a system which I have called an odious necessity. I believe practically all of us regard it as an odious necessity and also as something which is quite alien to our idea of the good way of life.

4.21 p.m.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

My Lords, I do not propose to enter into the general debate, which has contained some aspects of a foreign affairs debate, because I want to concentrate on one special point. The issue seems to me to be this. There are those who dislike the idea of National Service conscription and who do not believe in it. I am one of them. Fifty years ago, Lord Roberts had a great campaign in this country for conscription. The Liberals resisted it; many Conservatives and others were in favour of it. On the other hand, some people think that National Service is necessary at the moment, and with that we agree. I thought that the Prime Minister's speech in another place was convincing on that point, but that the action of my Leaders in another place and here was quite right. The point is, can we make the scheme flexible? Listening to the debate to-day, I have not heard a single speech from noble Lords, except from my noble friend Lord Winster, which indicated that they wanted to make it flexible. The whole speech of the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, was to the effect that we had all these commitments and must have the men to fulfil them. I understand that five years hence—which is the period of this Order—he will still want 80,000 men in the Canal Zone. If he does not want 80,000 men, why not reduce the number? He gave us no hope. He simply said that in the Middle East—perhaps the Canal Zone was too precise—we should need them. The whole burden of his speech was that in five years we shall still be in the same need of national strength.

LORD LLOYD

I do not want to interrupt the noble Viscount, but he has completely misinterpreted what I said. I said nothing of the kind. I said that at the present moment, and in the immediate future, it did not appear that there was likely to be a reduction of our commitments. Further than the immediate future it is difficult to tell. I never mentioned what should be done in five years time. I went on to say that it would be possible at any time during the next five years, if circumstances permitted, for the Government to reduce the period of National Service, or even abolish it, by Order in Council. I cannot let the noble Viscount "get away" with that.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

The noble Lord will accept from me that I have no desire to misrepresent what he said. The noble Lord is asking for five years—he has refused a Motion to make it an annual Order in Council—and I interpret that to mean that he believes that for the period of five years the troops will be needed. Supposing the present amelioration of the international situation continues, who is to control the period of National Service? That is the point I wish to make. Under the proposal of the Leader of the Opposition in another place, this would have been done by an annual Order in Council—that is to say, each year the Government would have to come to Parliament, and Parliament would decide. Here it is decided by a five-years Order in Council. Now suppose that some other Government is elected which desires to curtail the period of five years, justifiably doing so in the light of the international situation. It can do so in another place because it has its majority there—it is the Government. But if it has to proceed on the basis of a five-year Order in Council it has to present another Order in Council to your Lordships' House. What is going to happen if—as we undoubtedly all feel is likely to be the case—the Labour Party has a swingeing majority at the next Election, whenever it takes place? The new Government will be completely hamstrung by these proceedings, because we shall have given this House power to decide whether or not the five-year period should continue.

If I am right—I have read the Act—the first Act said nothing about laying an Order in Council. The second Act said that the Order in Council was to be laid, and it is laid under the special provisions of the precedential procedure. That does not affect the fact that the Order has to be approved by both Houses. The point to which I invite the noble and gallant Earl to reply is this. By this Motion to-day we are handing over to the House of Lords the power to say whether at a future date any Government that so wishes can curtail the period of National Service. I have not the least hesitation in saying that that is quite a wrong thing to do. I will not go into the general consideration of these matters, because it is something for which this House is in no way responsible, but the growth of legislation by Statutory Orders is steadily improving the strength of this House, to the detriment of the strength of the House of Commons.

4.26 p.m.

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE (EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS)

My Lords, first I should like to thank all those noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, which has been both interesting and valuable. We have heard the views of noble Lords who know a great deal about the subject, and I, for one, welcome the opportunity which this afternoon's debate has given me of hearing their opinions and suggestions, of which I shall certainly take note. Your Lordships know the purpose of peace-time National Service which has been summarised by my noble friend Lord Lloyd as, first, to supplement the Regular component of the active Forces and, secondly, to build up trained reserves.

There are no fresh arguments why National Service is necessary at the present time, because the old arguments still hold good, and the reasons why the late Government brought in National Service remain the same to-day as they were then. In fact, the reasons are even stronger to-day than they were in 1948. I would ask your Lordships to consider Korea. It is perfectly true that the fighting there has stopped, but our defence commitment has not yet finished. Furthermore, only recently the present Government had to send the best part of two brigades to Kenya and an additional battalion to the West Indies. Your Lordships will also remember that in March, 1952, we sent another armoured division to Germany to reinforce our strength on the Continent and to help our N.A.T.O. friends. When we consider that National Servicemen represent 52 per cent. of the total male strength of the Army and 37 per cent. of the whole strength of the Fighting Forces, we can well imagine what would happen if that source of manpower was not available to us. Your Lordships will forgive me if I speak more about the Army than I do about the other two Services. I speak more about the Army because they are by far the biggest users of manpower.

As regards this question of manpower, I have heard it suggested that units could be reduced in numbers and still be able to do their job equally well. Unfortunately, that is not the case. In the old days, when I joined the Army, which was just before the First World War, an infantry battalion consisted almost entirely of riflemen. If it was reduced in numbers by, say, 100 out of its establishment of 1,000, its fighting strength was weakened by only one-tenth. To-day, owing to the advance in military science and the introduction of new and more complicated weapons, every man in a fighting unit is pretty well a specialist and he goes to make up a team. I put this to your Lordships for your consideration: what would happen to the Arsenal football team if it were reduced by one-tenth? That would make the problem a little difficult, so I will take an even lesser fraction and say reduced by one-eleventh, by eliminating the goalkeeper or one of the full backs or any member of the team you like. It would be weakened by far more than one-eleventh of its actual strength in manpower—its whole structure as a co-ordinated unit would be gravely weakened, if not wrecked. I have also been asked, "Why not reduce a platoon from three sections to two, or a battalion by one company, thereby making quite a large saving in manpower?" The same argument applies. The composition of a unit, whether it be a battalion or a platoon, is not just a happy guess; it is an organisation which has been evolved over many years of war experience to give the maximum fighting efficiency with a minimum of numbers.

Now, there is one practical way which could help to solve our manpower problem, and that is to maintain fewer formations; but, of course, such a solution is not possible so long as we are burdened with world-wide commitments as we are to-day. At the present time we have obligations to our Allies and responsibilities as a world Power which account for the whole of our Regular formations being outside this country. There is no strategic reserve in England at all. From a military point of view this is highly unsatisfactory. In my opinion it is most necessary that as soon as we possibly can we should remedy this situation and re-deploy our fighting strength by re-grouping forces, which will not only serve as a deterrent against aggression but, if war should come, could be thrown into the balance in those early stages which may very well prove decisive. It is most unsound that our fighting strength should be dispersed in every corner of the world as it now is. But if and when we are able to achieve this desirable state of affairs of having set up a mobile central strategic reserve, a great deal of careful planning will be needed; and those who make the plans in the Service Departments will find it very difficult to make their plans unless they are able to count on the necessary manpower for a reasonable period of years. It is with this in mind that the Government do no more than ask Parliament to continue the National Service Acts for five years ahead.

As your Lordships know, the original Act covered five years and provided for its extension, if necessary, by Order in Council. And this five-year provision was made at a time when the international situation which governed our commitments, was certainly no more complicated than it is at the present time. I think there is a misunderstanding about this five-year period. It does not mean that we are committed to a two-year call-up for another five years. All it means is that a person who has to plan—such as the Minister of Labour, who has to produce the required men—can proceed to lay his plans for the next five years. It does not mean that once the Order in Council has been passed we are committed to two years' National Service for the next five years. As your Lordships have heard, the Government of the day can reduce the two-year period at any time if they feel it can be done safely—as I feel sure any responsible Government would do. Nobody likes National Service; as Lord Winster said, it is alien to our way of life, and it is the first time in history that we have ever had compulsory service in peace time. As soon as we can get rid of it we will; but at the moment we cannot, and it is very unfortunate.

It is, I think, some consolation to know that National Service cannot be increased without legislation but can be reduced merely by an Order in Council. That is a very different thing from saying that in each successive year the period of National Service is to be subject to specific Parliamentary debate and that until Parliamentary decision has been reached no period can be regarded as fixed. I am sure that would be a mistake. So many reasons have already been given for this view that I feel rather shy about recapitulating them. But it would, I am sure, occasion a spate of rumours and the horrible things that follow rumours. It would upset the young man about to be called up, it would be upsetting to his family, and it would make things difficult for his employer. No man would know, until Parliament fixed the period of call-up, how long he would have to serve. My own son is doing National Service at this moment and I think he is quite content that his period is two years because he knows where he is and can plan accordingly. I do not know whether he is having a lazy life, as I understand some boys are said to have. Indeed, he complains that he has too much to do—but personally, I do not mind that.

The question is whether we should have the five years' period reviewed every year. I think the real answer lies in what Lord Winster said. He gave the right answer to the whole thing. We must consider the effect it is going to have on our friends and Allies, whom we are trying to persuade to follow our example and have a longer period of National Service and brace themselves for the long and steady pull which may last for a considerable time. At the present time of world tension we must be careful that no steps we take can be interpreted as being a weakening of our determination to seek "peace through strength." As the Prime Minister said in another place last Monday (OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 520 (No. 10), Col. 1417): …surely we could not choose a worse moment to suggest a change of policy… more especially, as he said, as he was hoping to go to the Conference in Bermuda in a few days' time.

Now I should like to say something about the second reason for peace-time National Service, and that is to build up trained reserves. The present strength of the National Service Reserves is some 400,000. By the middle of 1954 the peak strength will be of the order of 500,000 and will remain at about that figure as long as the National Service scheme is in operation. Although this may sound very satisfactory, in fact it is not, because it is considerably below the mobilisation requirements of the Services. Therefore, as was said in the Defence White Paper last March, the National Service Reserve will have to be supplemented by large numbers of other reservists, both Regular and volunteer, such as the "Z" and "G"reservists—the men who served during the last war and up till the end of 1948.

Finally, I should like to say a word or two about economies in manpower, because this is an important thing which we have very much in mind. It is most desirable that there should be every possible economy in manpower, and I can assure noble Lords that the Services are fully aware of that fact. It is satisfactory to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, said on this subject, because he has had much personal experience of it, but I would not for a moment say that it is all as satisfactory as it might be. It is a difficult problem, because we are dealing with highly complicated organisations, between them employing nearly a million men, and it is not easy to strike the correct balance between efficiency and economy.

For example, a large training unit may be hard pressed for sufficient instructors during a peak period; then at other times they may have too many instructors on the strength who have not full-time employment. It is inherent in the whole set-up of such fluid organisations as fighting forces that there is at certain periods an apparent wastage of manpower. Fighting men have no ambition to peel potatoes. How right they are! But if there is no one else to do the job—as is often the case—what are you going to do about it, if you want to eat potatoes? Speaking as an Irishman, I do not like my potatoes peeled, but others do, hence the problem of the military potato peeler—though, to be serious, potato-peeling is now done almost entirely by mechanical means. Again, men of one trade are often dependent for their work upon another. For instance, in the Royal Air Force the ground crews have less work to do when those who fly the aircraft are not flying. No one, I think, would suggest that the members of a fire brigade are wasting their time if there happen to be no fires for them to put out. As your Lordships have heard, fifteen separate and full-scale inquiries have been held since the war into the use of manpower by the Forces, and in several of these inquiries outside help from business firms and trade unions was called in to advise on how and where economies could be made. I can assure your Lordships that the results have proved most useful.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

May I intervene for a moment, with regard to the waste of time in their actual occupations? As I indicated, I have frequently talked to men in trains simply because I want to do all I can to encourage them. Only on Sunday, I spoke to a young Air Force recruit. I asked him how he liked the Air Force. He said, "I like it very much." I asked, "What do you want to do?", and he replied, "I think I should like to be a drill instructor." When I asked him, "What is your occupation?", he answered, "I am on the mechanical side, the motor side." I then asked him, "Why do you not get something new?", and he said. "I cannot. We are not allowed to, because we cannot do the course in two years' training." Cannot something be done to see that those men who go in for two years get work in the Forces which interests them, even though they are in for only two years?

EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS

I agree that there is a great deal in what the noble Viscount has said. In the Fighting Forces, with such huge numbers, of course there are such cases. It is not so easy as it looks. Often a man who is a highly skilled mechanic will not want to go on with his mechanical work when he joins the Army, or one of the other Services: he wants something new, a new life to take up; otherwise he looks upon it as a kind of "busman's holiday." However, if I can have full particulars of any cases which come to the attention of noble Lords, I promise that they shall be looked into. I will pass them on to my Service colleagues to see that those things are put right, whenever that is possible.

Perhaps I may mention just this. I have seen—and no doubt your Lordships also have seen—reports in certain newspapers that the Cabinet have decided upon a full inquiry into the problem of manpower in the Services. The inference is drawn that one result of such an inquiry might well be a reduction in the period of Colour service of National Servicemen or in the numbers called up under the National Service Act. There is no authority for these statements. As I have stated, these problems are constantly under review by the Service Departments, and are a continuing preoccupation of myself, the Minister of Labour and the Service Ministers. Personally, I would not advise on having further official inquiries just at this moment, as has been suggested. I think we shall get better value in this field by making the Services themselves responsible for carrying out their own inquiries and their probes into "teeth versus tail"; and, what is most important, making those commanders who use manpower responsible for seeing that they are not wasting it.

We of the Fighting Services welcome Parliamentary debate on all these matters connected with defence because it shows that our people are interested in, and alive to, the work and activities of the Fighting Forces. This interest is of great assistance to us in bringing forward new ideas and constructive thought in matters which are of vital concern to us all. We have only one aim, and that is to serve our country in the field of defence to the best of our ability.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

If I may remind the noble and gallant Earl, he has overlooked answering a question which I ventured to address to him. Could he see his way to answer it? The question I asked was this: Is it a fact that it would be impossible to reduce the period of five years in the future, whatever Government may be in power, without the consent of this House? That was the question.

EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS

I understand that that is true.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

It is not possible?

EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS

It is necessary to get the consent of both Houses.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

That is the answer.

On Question, Motion agreed to: the said Address to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

House adjourned during pleasure.

House resumed.