Lords Sitting of 26 February 1953

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
The Lord Minster (M. Conyngham)—Took the Oath.
The Lord Croft—Took the Oath.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
3.5 p.m.
EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Swinton, I beg to move the Motion standing in his name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That Standing Order No. XXXIX be considered in order to its being dispensed with for the purpose of passing the Leasehold Property Act and Long Leases (Scotland) Act Extension Bill through its remain in; stages.—(Earl Fortescue.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.

MERCHANDISE MARKS BILL [H.L.]
3.7 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Mancroft.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
[The LORD MERTHYR in the Chair]
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved to insert as a new Clause 1:
Amendment of subsection (2) of section two of 50 & 51 Vict. c. 28
"1. Subsection (2) of section two of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, shall be amended by inserting after the word 'manufacture' the words 'or who at any time whether before or after a sale sends or delivers an invoice, account or statement in respect of'."
The noble Lord said: In moving the first of the Amendments standing in my
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name on the List of Amendments before your Lordships, perhaps, as a few weeks have passed since your Lordships considered this Bill on Second Reading, you will forgive me if I refresh your Lordships' memories, and incidentally my own, from the brilliant speech which the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, delivered on that occasion about the purpose of this Bill. In that delightfully concise manner in which the noble Lord always treats matters which he brings before your Lordships, the noble Lord said (OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 180, Col. 263):
"The first purpose is to attempt to widen the legal definition of the expression 'trade description' and, by so doing, to give greater protection to honest traders against those traders with fewer commercial scruples. The second purpose is to try to afford greater protection to the public generally and to the shopping public in particular."
That is the admirable purpose of this Bill and that is the purpose to which I address myself in moving the first of these Amendments.
The noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, has told your Lordships, quite rightly, that one of the developments since 1887, when the Merchandise Marks Act was first brought into operation to attempt to protect the honest trader and the public, is that the technique of deception has grown. It has grown so much that to-day the public are really martyrs of an insidious campaign of delusion. There are many ways in which this can be carried on. The noble Lord illustrated the point by giving descriptions of misleading advertisements. First, there is the advertisement which misleads by giving a false or misleading description. One of the things which this Bill seeks to do is to widen the scope of a "false trading description" to include a misleading description. The buyer can be misled by an advertisement or by a salesman by word of mouth. The first Amendment which I am moving is designed to extend that protection. In these days, packing notes, pro-forma invoices (when cash is wanted before delivery) and credit invoices (when cash is required after delivery) can all contain false descriptions.
Perhaps noble Lords may find this Amendment rather intricate, because this is a Bill to amend the previous Act; therefore the Amendment I am moving to the Bill before you is in terms amending the Act of 1887. This Amendment seeks to insert the words printed in the

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Order Paper in Section 2 (2) of the 1887 Act. That subsection says:
"Every person who sells or exposes for or has in his possession for sale or for any purposes of trade or manufacture"—
and I ask your Lordships to insert the words—
"or who at any time whether before or after a sale sends or delivers an invoice, account or statement in respect of"—
and then the subsection continues—
"any goods or things to which.…"
et cetera. I think this is a desirable Amendment because it will make the Section as watertight as possible. I think I have said enough to enable your Lordships to grasp what I am trying to do. I believe that this Amendment would benefit the Bill, and tighten it up. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 5, at the beginning, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)
LORD MANCROFT: The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has moved his Amendment quite clearly and very fairly. What he seeks to do is something with which nobody, in theory, could possibly quarrel. He seeks to catch a few more rogues, a few more dishonest traders. Half of his Amendment is perfectly all right; but, unfortunately, it seems to me that the other half takes the offence right outside the scope of this narrowly drawn measure. What the noble Lord is trying to do is to go far further in his attempt to catch rogues and vagabonds than this Bill is intended to go. The inclusion of a particular description in an invoice—and invoices and similar documents are what the noble Lord is particularly concerned with—at the time of, or immediately before or immediately after (that is, in the sense of being "contemporaneous with") sale but before the transaction is completed, has already been held to amount to the application of that description to the goods for the purpose of the 1887 Act. Therefore, that part of the Amendment—the "before," or contemporaneous part—is not really necessary: that rogue and vagabond is caught by the Act as it now stands. Perhaps I can explain that to the noble Lord more easily by giving him two or three examples of the type of offence which I think he has in mind.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: Could the noble Lord say where in the 1887 Act that is?
LORD MANCROFT: I am coming to that. First let me take the case of "after," which the noble Lord is principally worried about. A man, let us say, orders a pullover labelled "All wool"; it is cotton, but the subsequent invoice calls it "All wool." The false trade description was in the original label in that case, and that will be a sufficient basis for prosecution under the Act as it now stands. Section 5 of the Act of 1887 is, I think, the answer to the question the noble Lord raised. That is one case. The next case is this. A man orders a pullover not marked at all, saying: "I want that pullover." It is made of cotton, but the invoice describes it as being of all wool. The man got what he asked for, and there was no deception. Take the third case, the extreme case. A man chooses a pullover not bearing a label. The shopkeeper says to him: "It is all wool," and the subsequent invoice describes it as "All wool"—that is what the noble Lord has in mind—but it proves to be cotton. The false description was oral. An invoice merely furnishes confirmatory evidence. The purchaser has civil remedies for breach of contract or of warranty—indeed, actions on that line are quite common. An amendment to Section 5 in the Patents, &c. (International Convention) Act, 1938 (I am sorry this is so complicated but, as the noble Lords knows, it is mixed up with three or four different Acts) provides further that goods delivered in pursuance of a request made by reference to a trade description appearing in any sign, advertisement, invoice, wine list, business letter, business paper, or other commercial communication shall be deemed to be goods in connection with which the trade description is used. That catches in particular the mail order rogue, about whom I think the noble Lord is worried. Therefore, the trade description in an invoice is already deemed to be applied to goods ordered by reference to it.
But it is the word "after" in Lord Lucas's Amendment that produces an entirely new situation. If at the time of the sale, the purchaser got what he asked for and was not deceived, then a false description in a subsequent invoice has no

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relevance to any question of merchandise marks legislation, the main purpose of which is to prevent deception as to the description of goods bought and sold. If, at the time of the sale, the goods were orally misdescribed, the subsequent invoice might afford confirmatory evidence, but this, in effect, introduces a new offence of oral misdescription and it cannot in any sense amount to a merchandise mark. That is the point, and it is altogether too wide an innovation and takes the offence, in my submission, right outside the scope of this Bill. Oral statements are, as I say, outside the scope of the general body of legislation which is directed to the marking of merchandise. I am sorry I cannot recommend your Lordships to accept this Amendment. I respect entirely the object the noble Lord has in mind in putting it down, but it is not, in my submission, a proper offence to try to bring within the scope of this Bill, and, as I have already explained there are other civil law remedies. In my submission, it would be quite inappropriate in this measure, and it is with much regret that I cannot recommend your Lordships to accept the Amendment.
LORD SILKIN: I have been trying to follow what the noble Lord has said, and I think I have succeeded to a certain extent. I should like to take him back to the second example that he gave, when a person asks for, and gets, a pullover, and subsequently receives an invoice in which it is stated that the pullover is all wool but it is not.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD SIMONDS): Does the noble Lord mean a pullover in the sense of a pullover which he sees?
LORD SILKIN: Yes, take the case of a pullover he sees.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Without any description?
LORD SILKIN: Without any description and, if you like, without any representation. I believe that is what the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, had in mind—that there was no representation at the time of the sale. It may be that the purchaser believes it is wool, but let us assume that nothing is said at the time. Subsequently an invoice is sent, and on the invoice it is stated that it is wool, whereas in fact it is not. One of the
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purposes of this Amendment is to bring that kind of offence within the terms of the Act, and I would respectfully suggest that it does in fact amount to a false or misleading trade description, and that there is no reason at all why that kind of case should be excluded.
LORD SALTOUN: It seems to me that the noble Lord's Amendment is really an Amendment to the Sale of Goods Acts, and is rather inappropriate to this Bill.
LORD HAWKE: I do not know whether my question should be addressed to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, or my noble friend Lord Mancroft. As I read the Bill, it is an offence to have in one's possession misdescribed goods, and yet my noble friend opposite seeks to limit that further by making it an offence to invoice misdescribed goods. Surely the fact of possession is the far larger field and already embraces the smaller field which the noble Lord wants to bring in by this Amendment.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I think we had better start off on the principle that all questions should be addressed to the noble Lord in charge of the Bill, who happens to be learned in the law. He is supported by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor. I am not even a common lawyer, and so I do not want the disadvantages under which I suffer added to by noble Lords opposite. The noble Lord is quite wrong when he says that the Amendment is out of place, because it specifically refers to "sale." I have tried to understand the noble Lord, but I have not the trained legal mind of my noble friend Lord Silkin. I can only hope that any housewife who happens to read the noble Lord's little speech will now rest assured that the next time she goes and buys anything she will know exactly what she is doing. I tried to follow the noble Lord's argument. He dealt with a case before sale and after sale. But he did not, if I followed him correctly, deal with the incident of at the time of sale.
LORD MANCROFT: Yes, I did.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: What happens, then, if a false description is put down on a cash sale invoice at the time of purchase?
LORD MANCROFT: It is contemporaneous.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I cannot quite make out why it is that a documentary false statement, whether before, at the time of, or after sale, is held to come under two or three other Acts of Parliament, but a misleading advertisement or a misleading statement (according to the noble Lord's speech on Second Reading) is held to come within this Bill. That is what I cannot understand, because it appears to me that the noble Lord can ride off any Amendment by saying "Well, it comes under the Sale of Goods Act," or "it is a breach of warranty" or that it is something else. What I understood we were trying to do was to strengthen the 1877 Act so that the buying public could be safeguarded against a false or misleading description.
A misleading description can be given in three ways: by advertisement, by word of mouth or by being written on a document. I am sorry, but I cannot understand why, if the noble Lord will admit the case of an advertisement, and the case of word of mouth, he rejects the case when the description is put into writing. The Amendment reads:
"…whether before or after a sale sends or delivers an invoice, account or statement.…"
Therefore, it can be any one of three, and a statement could be a letter or something scribbled on a piece of paper. Your Lordships have now made up your minds that you are going to have an amusing afternoon, but as the noble Lord has told me that half my Amendment is good but that the other half is not, will he now tell me which half is good? Then, perhaps, I shall be willing to take away the other half.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Half is unnecessary, and half is bad.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: All I can say is that I hope the noble Lord's words will be clear to the housewife—the class of person for whom the noble Lord had great pity on Second Reading; I think he used the expression "the poor deluded female,"—who is the easy prey of these people he wants to get, and that she will be quite happy and content in her knowledge as to how she can prove that she has been swindled or had false representation made. With that assurance from the noble Lord, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
3.27 p.m.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved, immediately before Clause 1 to insert as a new clause:
Amendment of subsection (3) of section two of 50 & 51 Vict. c. 28.
".Subsection (3) of section two of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, shall be amended by inserting after paragraph (iii) the words 'and (iv) in any case, to refund to any person or persons who have purchased goods falsely described, the full purchase price thereof'."
The noble Lord said: This Amendment should be read in conjunction with the
last Amendment. The object is that if a person procures something that has been falsely described, and a case is successfully prosecuted, the Board of Trade should be authorised to refund to the purchaser the cost of those goods after it has been recovered from the person who has been proved guilty. With this Amendment, as with all the others, I am not tied to the wording—some of it is my own poor effort, but some has been drafted on the best legal advice that is open to me. The latter, I would say, is wholly good, and the former, very likely, wholly bad.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Which is which?
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: The noble and learned Lord wants to pay me a subtle compliment—I can see that. But this Amendment does not only seek to take care of the case of policing the Act. I shall come to that later. Of course it is the responsibility of somebody, and I shall seek later to place on the Board of Trade the responsibility of testing this Act. On quite a number of occasions test purchases will have to be made—whether by the method of agent provocateur or not I need not go into to-day. In some cases, where the Board of Trade instituted proceedings under this Act, in order to obtain evidence the Board's agent would have to make a test purchase or purchases. If the case was then taken to a court of summary jurisdiction it would be open to question whether or not the award of costs should include the cost of the purchase. If it did not, the taxpayer would pay, because those costs would come out of the Board of Trade Vote. On the other hand, if a public-spirited private individual, with money to burn, prosecutes his own case I maintain

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that he should be able to obtain a refund of the price of the article he has purchased before bringing that case. Perhaps the wording of this Amendment on close scrutiny, will tempt the noble Lord to say, "As the Amendment is worded, everyone in the country who has purchased an article similar to that proved to have been falsely described would be able to get money back." That is not what I want. What I want is that there should be a refund of the price of the actual article purchased for the purpose of proving the false description.
When he addressed your Lordships on Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, cited the instance of a bottle of whisky. Take the case of somebody who buys a bottle of whisky to prove a false description, whether he be an agent of the Board of Trade, or acting as agent provocateur or as a private individual. I maintain that, if the person who has falsely described the goods is convicted, that convicted person should be made to refund to the purchaser the cost of the goods and to take the goods back. I expect I have made clear to the noble Lord in charge of the Bill, and I hope also to other noble Lords, exactly what I am seeking to do. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 5, at the beginning insert the said new clause.—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, it is not the wording of the noble Lord's Amendment that worries me so much as the principles behind it, although I must confess that the wording, as it is at the moment, would have—and I expect the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, realised this—some fairly comic results. Certainly, as he has rightly forecast, in a prosecution such as he has envisaged, people who felt themselves aggrieved could technically, I suppose, queue up and ask for recompense, and technically, as the wording of the Amendment now stands, the man who is penalised could go up and down the chain of distribution collecting something for the kitty all the way, which again would provide some very comic results. I do not think that that is what the noble Lord intends should happen, but it is what, in fact, clearly would happen if his Amendment were to be incorporated in the Bill.
The real objection to this is, I am afraid, the same objection as I have
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already touched upon in regard to the previous Amendment—namely, that the noble Lord is confusing civil and criminal proceedings; and, though he may perfectly well turn round and tell me that that is an ultra-legalistic attitude to adopt, it is a very genuine and real one, because, although Lord Lucas's Amendment is framed as an additional penalty, its purpose really is to provide compensation to the deceived purchaser; and compensation is properly a matter for civil and not for criminal action. There is nothing in the Act of 1887 (the original Act) to limit the civil rights of those who have suffered loss through false trade description. Indeed, that Act enhances those rights by providing in Section 17 an implied warranty that a trade description applied to goods is not a false trade description. The proper place for the exercise of those rights surely is the civil courts and not the criminal courts where a prosecution would be brought. The purchaser would have little, if any, difficulty in recovering damages for breach of the implied warranty. Indeed, I should imagine there would never be any need for the action to be brought in the civil courts if the prosecution had been successful.
Therefore, I would suggest to your Lordships that this, again, is an attempt, and a praiseworthy attempt, to make things easier for the man who has been defrauded, but it is misconceived because it confuses civil and criminal action. It is my submission to your Lordships that a man thus deceived already has, under the principal Act, perfectly adequate protection and safeguards. I should have liked to accept this Amendment because I know the noble Lord has taken a lot of trouble over it, but I am afraid I cannot recommend to your Lordships that it should be accepted, as I think it would introduce certainly a wrong principle and a wrong system of procedure into the Bill.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: Would the noble Lord explain this point, for the sake of clarity, because this is causing various sections of people a lot of thought? If the Board of Trade take action under the Act and spend money in making test purchases, then the taxpayers' money has been at stake and there is no need for reimbursement because only the taxpayer is out of

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pocket. But if a private individual takes a case, he cannot get any redress for the cost to which he has been put in making that test purchase—and that cost may be very heavy—unless the court of summary jurisdiction takes into consideration the amount of expense to which the individual has had to put himself in order to make the test purchase. If, when the offender has been convicted, the court of summary jurisdiction does take into account that the individual prosecuting has had to spend, let us say, £10 or £15, as well as his solicitors' costs, then my point is made. But there is no obligation on the court to do that.
Many of these cases are brought by protection associations or fair trading associations who have to so to great expense in engaging barristers, because they cannot afford to have anything less than the best since they cannot afford to lose their case. If a protection association were to lose a case under the Merchandise Marks Act it might have serious repercussions upon the honest traders who provide the money to keep their trade clean by policing the Act for the Minister. Sometimes the costs are about £150, including the cost of test purchases; and sometimes the award of costs reaches the sum of £50, but it has been known to be only a few guineas. Now, how can one expect people to go on policing these things for the Government when on every case they bring they lose money? That is why I said I wanted this Amendment taken into consideration with the last Amendment on the Order Paper. If the noble Lord is going to give me my last Amendment, then in so far as the Board of Trade will authorise someone else to undertake a prosecution and will reimburse the cost, I do not mind, for then the cost of the procurement of the article on which the case is based would come within those costs. Then whether or not the court awarded the man only ten guineas costs would not matter, because if the costs were £150 the Board of Trade would pay. But when the poor individual does it on his own, or when it is done by a corporate body or a trade association and no costs are granted, I cannot see that that is fair. The noble Lord may say it is, and that the remedy lies in civil action and not in the criminal action.
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I put this final point to the noble Lord, Many trade associations have by-laws which have the protection of the Common Law. Trade associations can go to the courts and have their by-laws enforced. The British Motor Trade Association, which has troubled your Lordships with many cases in the past, is an instance in point. They go to the courts to uphold their by-laws. But this is a case of a private individual or a body of private individuals in an association going to the courts to do a job which the Government should do itself, and that is to police an Act of Parliament, not a by-law of an association. That is the difference as I see it. If the Board of Trade or any Government Department take this action it matters not: the taxpayer pays; but if private individuals or a body take it and get only small costs allowed them, they have to stand the bulk of the expense themselves.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (VISCOUNT SWINTON): My Lords, in order that I may make a statement similar to that which is being made in another place by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, I beg to move that the House do now resume.
Moved, That the House do now resume.—(Viscount Swinton.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and House resumed accordingly.

AMALGAMATION OF MINISTRIES
3.41 p.m.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords, with the permission of the House I will make a statement similar to that which has just been made by the Prime Minister in another place. It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government, to which my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer has devoted sustained personal attention, to make, as opportunity affords, such changes in the organisation of Government Departments as will simplify administration and reduce costs. As a result of a recent review, some changes are already contemplated and others are under examination. It is proposed to amalgamate the Ministry of Pensions with the Ministry of National Insurance, as regards the award and payment of war pensions and allowances.

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The new Ministry will be known as the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance. The medical treatment undertaken by the Ministry of Pensions (including the management of hospitals and the supply of artificial limbs, surgical appliances and invalid vehicles) will be transferred in England and Wales to the Ministry of Health, and in Scotland to the Department of Health for Scotland.
The greatest care will be taken to ensure that war pensioners and their dependants are not in any way adversely affected by these changes. An additional Parliamentary Secretary will be appointed to the new Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance to look after the pensions and allowances of war pensioners. The Central Advisory Committee on war pensions will continue to function. So far as medical treatment is concerned, such special facilities as war pensioners at present enjoy will be fully safeguarded and, in addition, the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland will be able to call on the facilities of the whole National Health Service to ensure that the necessary treatment of war pensioners is given by the hospital best able to provide it. Arrangements will be made, in consultation with the Government of Northern Ireland, to meet the requirements of war pensioners resident in Northern Ireland.
A second change which is proposed is the amalgamation of the Ministries of Transport and Civil Aviation. This change has been under consideration for some time, and the way to it was paved by the appointment of the same Minister for the two Departments. There will continue to be two Parliamentary Secretaries, one dealing with Transport matters and one with Civil Aviation. The new Ministry will be known as the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation. The necessary Addresses will be moved in both Houses, with a view to all these changes being effected by Order in Council in the course of this year.
The regional organisation of Government Departments is still under examination to see whether economies could be secured without detriment to the standard of service afforded by the various regional offices. It is hoped to make a definite announcement before long. Consideration is also being given to reducing the
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number of local offices throughout the country, including an extension of the practice whereby certain Government local offices undertake, on an agency basis, the work of other Government local offices.
3.45 p.m.
EARL JOWITT: My Lords, we take note of this statement and express our thanks to the noble Viscount for informing us of the statement that has been made in another place. I do not desire to say anything about it, except this. I always feel, when one Ministry is amalgamated with another and comes under the larger whole, that, instead of being represented by its own Minister, it is represented by an Under-Secretary; and, whether we like that or not, it does suffer a certain loss of prestige. I am a little apprehensive about the decision in regard to the Ministry of Civil Aviation. However, we will certainly look into this matter and, as I have said, I am most grateful to the noble Viscount for informing us of what is proposed.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords, I am obliged to the noble and learned Earl for what he has said. If it is desired, at some later date, to have discussions on this matter, of course there will be an opportunity when the necessary Addresses are presented. We are very sensible of the importance, as regards both Ministries, of maintaining fully the important services which they render. There are, of course, two sides to this question. I appreciate what the Leader of the Opposition has said. On the other hand, as an old Minister he knows that a multiplication of Ministries does not necessarily mean that the particular Minister of a particular Department gets more consideration than what I may call a composite Minister. Sometimes it may well be that a Minister who combines two or three offices carries more weight. We can go back to Haldane's principle, that it is better not to proliferate individual Ministries but rather to concentrate—provided (and certainly I can give this assurance absolutely as regards Civil Aviation, which has a colossal future) that neither the Minister concerned nor the Government as a whole will allow all the great potentialities of that Ministry to suffer in any respect.
LORD LLEWELLIN: My Lords, may I ask that when the Government are considering the question of this regional organisation they will bear in mind that before the war we got on very well without any of them? Nor did we have them for the first year of the war. They were brought into operation in order that, if the Central Government were cut off, there would be some representative of the Ministry in the region to carry on. I should like to know whether the Government will bear these facts in mind when they are considering and giving effect to these further amalgamations.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords, we will certainly bear those and all other facts in mind. There is a great deal to be done in the provinces, and there again there is more than one aspect of that position. We have for three days been discussing, among other things, the question of the decentralisation of transport with a view to getting more efficient service on the spot. I am all for maximum economy, but on the whole it has paid us to have local offices where quick decisions can be taken, to the great convenience of those in the local areas and, I think, without undue expenditure. I have also found in practice that I was able, with great profit, to devolve the whole of my regional organisation on to other local offices on an agency basis. Provided that you have one good agency in a particular place, it can act, just as commercial agencies do, for quite a number of Departments. Bearing in mind what the noble Lord has said, and what I have said, I hope that we shall achieve maximum economy and, at the same time, efficiency, and meet local convenience.
3.50 p.m.
LORD CHORLEY: My Lords, may I support what the noble Viscount has been saying? There is one very obvious exception to the case made by the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, and that is the Ministry of Labour, which did build up, in the years before the war, a most efficient divisional organisation in the regions. And, as a result, it was one of the most efficiently conducted and valuable Ministries during the war years. I think there can be no question at all that, by and large, regional organisation of Departments has paid "hands down." I hope that the Government will not go too far
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in their desire to economise by closing down these regional organisations.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: It is not a case of closing down regional organisations. Certainly, so far as the Ministry of Labour are concerned, I entirely agree; and we have no intention, as I understand it, of interfering with the regional organisation of that admirable Department. But in practice I have found that you may have one or two good local organisations which are fully occupied but which, at the same time, with all their local connections, can perfectly well also take on an agency service there for Ministries which have not nearly as much to do but which, nevertheless, have their local job to do in the provinces.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: Will the noble Viscount bear in mind how important it is that the amalgamation of the Ministry of Pensions with another Ministry should not be allowed to affect the claims for improvement in the rates of pensions which are now going forward?
VISCOUNT SWINTON: Certainly those claims will not be affected in any way. I am not making any commitment about it, but certainly the claims will not be prejudiced one way or the other.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: I am much obliged to the noble Viscount.

MERCHANDISE MARKS BILL [H.L.]
3.53 p.m.
House again in Committee.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: May I add one word? I think that the matter has been fully explored but the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, did make a special plea for favourable treatment to be meted out to trade protection associations, which undoubtedly perform a useful work. With great respect to the noble Lord, this is not a proper Amendment to give them that sort of relief. We are dealing with a penalty section which provides that:
"Every person guilty of an offence against this Act shall be liable (1) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment with or without hard labour, or to a fine…or to both imprisonment and fine; (2) on summary conviction, to imprisonment…"
and so on. The noble Lord proposes to add to that something in the nature of

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a penalty which is yet not a penalty: namely, that there shall be something in the nature of damages—compensation awarded to the person who has presumably been deceived.
I take it that it is intended to be a condition of that relief that the person so deceived should have successfully prosecuted. If that is so, surely there is no difference between a protection association, a trader who is a member of that association and any member of the public who has been deceived. If you are to award compensation to one, so you must to all; but it is unnecessary for all alike, for this reason: that they have their civil remedy. If they have been deceived, they can claim, under Section 17 of the principal Act, in the simplest possible way in a county court or, if the sum is sufficiently large, in the High Court, for damages for breach of warranty. I respectfully submit to your Lordships that it is quite a wrong principle to mix up the two things in a Bill of this kind—the civil remedy to the man who has been deceived and the criminal penalty for breach of a Statute which lays down what is an offence and what shall be the penalty for it. Therefore I could not advise your Lordships to accept an Amendment of this kind which would, in fact, be a grave departure from precedent.
LORD CHORLEY: I may be mistaken, but did I hear the noble and learned Lord say that it lays down the punishment of "hard labour"?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I hope not.
LORD CHORLEY: Because I understood that "hard labour" had been removed.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I hope I did not say anything of the kind.
LORD CHORLEY: I thought I caught the words "hard labour."
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Either my voice is flabby or the noble Lord begins to suffer from what so many of us suffer from.
LORD CHORLEY: I am glad to have the noble and learned Lord's assurance that "hard labour" is no longer a possible penalty to be administered under the Act.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for making the statement he has, which I think will be most helpful.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I hope your Lordships will forgive me. There is no doubt that the noble Lord's hearing is perfect and that I fell into error. I apologise to the noble Lord. I should have said "with or without a fine," but I said "with or without hard labour."
LORD CHORLEY: I am consoled.
LORD LLEWELLIN: I must say, if I may perhaps come in aid, that I think the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, was reading the terms of the Statute of 1887 which, of course, still has the words "with or without hard labour" in it. Although since then "hard labour" has been done away with, that fact does not appear in the Act of 1887. I think that is how this slight error in wording arose in this instance.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am much obliged to the noble Lord.
LORD CHORLEY: The noble Lord is undoubtedly right. I am sorry to have taken up your Lordships' time.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. What he has said will be very helpful to everybody concerned, and in view of his remarks I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 1:
Extension of definitions of "trade description" and "false trade description"
1.—(1) In section three of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887 (which, among other things, defines "trade description" as any description, statement, or other indication, direct or indirect, as to any of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e) of the definition), that definition shall be amended by inserting after paragraph (a)—
"(aa) as to the quality, fitness for purpose, strength, accuracy, performance or behaviour of any goods, or".
3.58 p.m.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved, in subsection (1) to omit the proposed new paragraph (aa) and insert:
"as to the strength, accuracy, fitness for purpose, performance or behaviour or other physically ascertainable and definable characteristic of any goods,".

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The noble Lord said: On this Amendment I feel on very safe ground because, in short, what this Amendment seeks to do is to remove from the new definition the word "quality." By the Bill it is proposed to insert in the Act of 1887 this paragraph (aa), containing the words:
"as to the quality, fitness for purpose, strength, accuracy, performance or behaviour of any goods, or".
Eminent lawyers (I cannot mention their names, for then I should be guilty of giving them an advertisement, and, if I did, that might come under the heading of a misleading description) who advise such bodies as the Trade Marks, Patents and Designs Federation, and those who advise that very eminent body, the British Standards Institution, inform me that they think it highly undesirable to have in a Statute the word "quality." The word is highly subjective and it is absolutely impossible to define it adequately in a court of law for the purpose for which it is here.
What is "quality"? As I say, it is a subjective term. A person advertises something of first-grade quality. What is it? Where is the comparison? "High quality," "best quality"—what is it? The thought that comes into my head is "jam." What is high-quality jam? I do not know. So it is suggested by these legal advisers that, if you are going to cover "quality," it must be in precise terms; and the precise terms are laid down in this Amendment, for which I take no credit whatever. It is far beyond my powers to have devised this Amendment. In fact, it is devised by eminent lawyers practising at the Bar in these particular subjects. Instead of the word "quality," these words appear in the Amendment:
"or other physically ascertainable and definable characteristic.…"
Reverting to the question of jam, if it were described as "full fruit standard" of quality that would be different. If you can detect one whole strawberry in the jam of to-day, that is a "physically ascertainable characteristic." I am notgoing to say anything more on this Amendment. It is something that these people have devised, and if the noble Lord has a good answer to it perhaps he will be good enough to give it. If he cannot accept this Amendment (I have no
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great hope of his doing so, because I do not suppose he will agree with the eminent lawyers), at least it will give those lawyers the reasons why the Government want to adhere to the word "quality," which they say it will be practically impossible to determine and interpret in the courts of summary jurisdiction. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 11 leave out from ("(aa)") to the second ("or") in line 12 and insert the said new words.—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)
4.3 pm.
LORD MANCROFT: Quite frankly, this is a difficult matter. The noble Lord started by criticising the word "quality"—and I think he is fully entitled to do so. Nobody would pretend that the word is perfect for the purposes of this Bill. One hears of such phrases as "Quality Street" and "a man of quality." Admittedly, this is a word which is open to a wide interpretation. The noble Lord asked me how I would define the quality of jam. Before he actually launched on his definition I assumed that he would describe it to us as "the jam we get to-morrow, but never to-day," but he has attempted a more accurate description. I can tell him that I spent a considerable time this morning trying to make up my mind whether the description "new laid eggs" would come within the Bill as it stands at the moment.
I am going to ask the Committee to accept the word "quality" and to reject the noble Lord's very carefully and skilfully drafted wording—for two reasons. The first, quite frankly, is that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, "quality" sets the whole tone for this Bill. That is one of the reasons why Her Majesty's Government are affectionately disposed towards the word, without stating categorically that it is perfect in any way, or, again, without stating categorically that they will not look at any other better wording that can possibly be produced. But for the reasons which I will now try to explain to the Committee, we do not think that the actual words, skilful though they are, which the noble Lord and his undoubtedly skilful advisers have put before the Committee in this Amendment, will be of much assistance.
The trouble lies in the definition of the noble Lord's words. "Quality" is admittedly a vague term; in any event, few

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trade descriptions relate solely to it: most of them fall more appropriately, I think, under one of the other headings in Clause 1 of the Bill as it now stands. The noble Lord's wording is this:
"or other physically ascertainable and definable characteristic of any goods."
Despite its superficial precision (if I may so describe it) this description is undesirable in itself and is not a good substitute for "quality." In any prosecution relating to false trade description, whether in respect of quality or any other characteristics which are described in the Act, it is necessary to prove what characteristic it is which is described. If it is quality, the evidence must be there to enable the prosecution to show what "quality" is in the particular case. Unless the facts are there to enable the prosecution to do this, not only can no conviction result but probably no prosecution could begin. For this reason, therefore, the vagueness of the word "quality" which the noble Lord has quite fairly referred to, is more apparent than real, in the sense that "physically ascertainable and definable" represents no more than a statement of what the prosecution has to do in any event to prove "quality."
Now let me, if I can, try to point out what I think is the inherent difficulty of the noble Lord's wording. His Amendment widens the range of characteristics in that what I might call the residuary characteristics are not described. If I have understood his argument aright, they can be any characteristics, provided they are ascertainable and definable That is going to bring within the ambit of the Act an entirely new range of goods. It it going to bring in colour, taste, smell, temperature and other things. Let me ask the noble Lord this question—I do so with a certain amount of anxiety, because I remember that once before I threw out a challenge to him in the matter of refreshment and we were both in serious trouble about it. Suppose that he goes to a coffee stall and asks for a "hot dog," and it is cold. Under his Amendment that would be a criminal offence. We are going to get into tremendous trouble over the question of colour—with paint and with ladies' clothes. He knows, probably, as well as I do the enormous range of colour that can be applied to materials for
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ladies' clothing. I am advised by this individual industry that adoption of this Amendment would lead to immense difficulties and confusion. We should also get into very great trouble in regard to the question of cosmetics. I remember this being mentioned in the course of the Second Reading. This Amendment would lead to enormous confusion, because the colour and smell of cosmetics is an "ascertainable characteristic within the meaning of his wording. The noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, is not in his place. It was he who raised the question of antiques. They also would come within the scope of the noble Lord's Amendment.
I presume that the underlying purpose of the Amendment is to ensure that goods falsely described as complying with a British standard, but not bearing the Institution's certification mark, are caught; but I should have thought that this was not a good means of achieving that object. I believe that the object is probably better achieved by the clause as it stands. British standards usually relate to characteristics already within the definition of trade description in the Act of 1887 or being brought within that definition by Clause 1 of this Bill. The extension by Clause 1 of the range of characteristics which can be the subject of "trade descriptions" for the purpose of the principal Act will tend to bring within the scope of the Merchandise Marks Acts most of the characteristics described in British Standards. This is a complicated matter. It is not a definitive matter, and I suppose there can be no final word on it other than that given by the courts—and of course that is not what this Bill sets out to encourage. I do not hold out "quality" as being the final and perfect word. I have given, to the best of my ability, the reasons why I think it is better than the ingenious wording which the noble Lord has laid before us this afternoon, and, therefore, unless I can hear put before me something which is better than the noble Lord's wording, I prefer the word "quality." I feel that it sets the whole tone of this Bill. It achieves what it sets out to achieve. It does not give rise to a vague number of possible offences such as, I suspect, the noble Lord's Amendment would do. On the whole, with confidence, I ask the Committee to prefer the word "quality" to the wording which

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the noble Lord has so persuasively put before us.
LORD OGMORE: I have listened with interest to the argument on this particular Amendment which has taken place between the two noble Lords on the Front Benches. Sitting here, it seems to me that one of the main bones of contention is as to whether the word "quality" is a proper word to have in a Bill of this kind. The Minister's argument seems to be that, although the word "quality" is a vague and not very desirable term in such a Bill, it should go in because it might refer to some particular class of goods which he wants to bring within the scope of the clause. Like many of your Lordships, I am both a legislator and a practitioner. At the moment, I am a legislator, wondering what I, as a practitioner, will have to do about this particular word. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, who has considerable experience of these matters, will appreciate that the Bill will have to be considered, immediately it is passed, by merchants, and by their legal advisers if necessary. I think that unless this word is defined in some way—I understand from my noble friend Lord Lucas that it is not defined—its insertion will mean that a heavy burden will be thrown on merchants and their legal advisers who may have to ascertain exactly what the word "quality" means. I would ask the noble Lord, if possible, if the word has not been defined, to have a definition clause inserted which will clear up this doubt to which the noble Lord has referred. Shakespeare, we know, has written about "the quality of mercy." Obviously, "mercy" is not within this Bill, but "quality" is. Could the noble Lord give us any help in the matter in order to relieve our anxieties?
LORD LLEWELLIN: I am not sure that I like the last two phrases of Lord Lucas's Amendment. I think that they would bring in more difficulties than would arise from leaving in the word "quality." I should like to ask the Minister this. A large number of highly respectable shops up and down the country are now advertising that they sell "best quality goods." I personally see nothing very offensive in that. But if by any chance, although they are very high-class goods indeed, it should be
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found that in some other shops still better goods are on sale, would that mean that the people running the shop which has advertised "Best quality goods" would have been guilty of a false description? They might have done it quite honestly not knowing that there were better goods somewhere else. It would seem that it is going to be very risky, if this word is left in, to say anything like that about the quality of any goods which are being sold.
LORD SALTOUN: I do not wish to take up much time in what to me is a perfectly delightful and most interesting discussion, but I should like to tell Lord Lucas that while "strawberry" may be a perfectly accurate and definable quality, to my knowledge "raspberry" may not; and it may not even be physically ascertainable. All that may be known about it is that it has no quality.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: Perhaps it may save time if I say that I think both Lord Llewellin and Lord Ogmore are quite right. I am not wedded to these words, as the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, knows. Would he agree to accept this Amendment, and then to amend it as he thinks it should be amended? Or, alternatively, will he accept the suggestion of Lord Ogmore and define "quality"?—because the noble Lord's point was precisely the argument which all the legal advisers who have advised me in this matter raised. They have said that it will lead to endless trouble if there is left in this Bill something which makes a trader guilty of using a false or misleading description if he does what Lord Llewellin has described. After all, lay benches of magistrates will have to adjudicate on these matters. If the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack disagrees with all the other arguments which I have used, I am sure he will at least agree with this: that an Act of Parliament should at least be intelligible. This Bill is not intelligible at the present time. It may bring untold income to barristers and solicitors, but that is not our purpose. I can imagine lawyers arguing over this matter for quite a long time. Will the noble Lord, therefore, accept this Amendment and alter it—even if he wishes to leave out altogether the word "quality"? I see no reason why the word "quality" should be left in, if it

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is going to cause all this trouble. Or will he, at the next stage of the Bill, insert a definition clause to define "quality," in order to help those who, as my noble friend Lord Ogmore said, will have to adjudicate on matters that will come before them arising out of the operation of this measure. When the noble Lord tempts me into other spheres, and asks me the question: Do I think that a man who serves me with a cold "hot dog," when he says that it is a hot "hot dog," should be liable to criminal proceedings?, I say that anyone who purports to sell me a hot meal and delivers to me a cold meal should be put in prison forthwith.
LORD MANCROFT: This has been a very interesting discussion. I think it is clear that there is no hard and fast rule or doctrine on either side. There are shades of opinion, and it is clear that there must obviously be give and take when subjects like this are discussed. If I may, I will at once answer the question which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, as to a shop selling goods which were described as of "best quality." That, I think, clearly comes into the category of a legitimate trade "puff," and should not render the shopkeeper liable to be penalised under the Bill when it becomes law. It is a matter which comes into the same category as the "Beer is Best" type of advertisements. If you should actually find something which is better than beer you would not be able to bring an action against the brewers. As regards the last request of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, I am afraid that I cannot accept the Amendment as it stands. But I will do this. Since he has put forward reasoned and reasonable arguments, I promise him that they shall be most carefully considered. His criticism of the word "quality" shall be most carefully looked at. If I can possibly do anything at a future stage of the Bill to assist the noble Lord, I will. The noble Lord will understand that in saying this I am not holding out any promise, because, as he realises, I am not entirely my own master in this matter, and I know that my right honourable friend the President of the Board of Trade attaches much importance to the actual word "quality," for it is the keynote of the whole Bill. As I have said, I will do my best to reconsider this matter; and, while I do not
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hold out any promise, I will see that the noble Lord's views are fully represented in the appropriate quarter. Having said that, I must add that I am afraid that I cannot accept the Amendment.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: On that assurance, for which I am very grateful, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.18 p.m.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved, to add to subsection (1):
"and by inserting after the word 'copyright' in paragraph (e) the words 'or being of a standard defined in a British standard'."
The noble Lord said: This Amendment is really put down with a view to getting an assurance such as the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, gave me when he was replying to my last Amendment. What we are trying to do in this country to-day—and I take it for granted that I shall have the agreement of the noble Lord in this—is to lift the standards of our manufactures. The British Standards Institution is doing great work in this connection. As I say, I put this Amendment down really to get from the noble Lord an assurance such as he has already given me, and if he will repeat it I shall be reasonably happy. I must apologise for a printer's error which has crept into the Amendment as it is printed; the small "s" should be a capital "S."
If the noble Lord will look at the 1887 Act, he will see that I am seeking to add the words in this Amendment to Section 3 (1) (e), which reads:
"as to any goods being the subject of an existing patent, privilege or copyright"—
and then follow the words in my Amendment. My contention is that a standard promulgated by a private body like the British Standards Institution should have the same protection as goods which are the subject of a patent, privilege or copyright. I do not think that is to ask for too much. The section as it stands protects an existing patent and privilege. We know of the acceptable and honoured privilege of a trader being able to say "Purveyor to Her Majesty"—a very old custom held in high esteem by all traders. A provision for the protection of standards laid down by a recognised standards institute in this country would adorn the noble Lord's Bill and not

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detract from it. Surely he can accept this Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 12, at end insert ("and by inserting after the word 'copyright' in paragraph (e) the words or being of a standard defined in a British standard'.")—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)
LORD GIFFORD: I should like to raise one point which I have mentioned to my noble friend Lord Mancroft. It is the question of whether this Bill will give greater protection against infringements of the Royal Warrant. I am a member of the Royal Warrant Holders Association and we are sometimes troubled by advertisements being published with colourful imitations of the Royal Arms. If the Royal Arms themselves are used in an unauthorised manner, that is easily dealt with; but we may have something like the Royal Arms with two unicorns being used and we find it difficult to deal with that. When remonstrated with, the advertiser will say, "These are not the Royal Arms. It is just a little crest that we thought looked pretty on our advertisements." It seems to me that this Bill may help us in some way, and I should be glad to have the noble Lord's opinion about it.
LORD MANCROFT: If I may, I will address myself first to my noble friend, Lord Gifford, who has raised the important question about the unauthorised use of the Royal Arms and its embarrassment to Royal Warrant holders. I have looked into this matter carefully and in my opinion his fears will be completely met by the combination of this Bill, the principal Act, which it seeks to amend, and section 61 of the Trade Marks Act, 1938. I think that ought to cover all the cases he has mentioned. May I now address myself to Lord Lucas's Amendment, the purpose of which, if I understand his argument correctly, is to ensure that goods falsely described as complying with the British standard, but not necessarily bearing the Institution's certification mark, are caught. I do not think his Amendment is a good way of achieving that object, which I believe is already achieved by the clause as it stands. British standards usually relate to characteristics within the definition of "trade description" in the Act of 1887, or which are being brought within that definition
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by Clause 1 of the Bill. The extension by Clause 1 of the range of characteristics which can be the subject of trade description for the purpose of the principal Act will tend to bring within the scope of the Acts, I imagine, most of the kinds of descriptions which relate to British standards. As the noble Lord hinted, this Amendment reinforces his previous Amendment attempting to delete the word "quality" from Clause 1 (1), because, if the word "quality" is retained, there is less strength in this Amendment.
There is one other matter which rather troubles me about this Amendment. The wording the noble Lord proposes is not quite suitable. Any standard produced in this country by anybody can be described as British. As the noble Lord knows quite well, a large number of firms, particularly the larger ones of high repute, produce standards of their own—and very high they are. Anybody who cared to publish a standard could claim the protection of this Amendment if the standard were used to describe goods. Apart from this point, "British standard" would require definition, either by specific mention of the British Standards Institution or by a form of words which pointed to them and to no other body. The Institution, of high repute though it is, is not an official body, and I am not sure that it is really desirable that they should receive recognition, either expressed or implied, in this way. I doubt whether this Amendment would redound to the ultimate benefit of the Institution—it might conceivably discourage the honest use of British standards. But that is a matter of opinion. I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising this important and interesting matter, but I can assure your Lordships that the danger he sees and the good he seeks to promote are already covered by and provided for in this Bill
On Question, Amendment negatived
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2 agreed to.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved, after Clause 2, to insert the following new clause:
Amendment of section ten of 16 & 17 Geo. 5. c. 53
".In paragraph (a) of the definition of 'Indication of origin' in subsection (1) of section ten of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1926, the word 'Commonwealth' shall be substituted for the word 'Empire.' "
The noble Lord said: This Amendment raises a technical point. In Section 10 of the Merchandise Marks Act of 1926 there is an obligation upon traders to indicate the place of origin of goods. Subsection (1) (a) says:
"In the case of goods manufactured or produced in any foreign country the word 'Foreign' and in the case of goods manufactured or produced in part of His Majesty's Dominions outside the United Kingdom the word 'Empire';"
The question has been raised whether in the circumstances of to-day that is a correct description. There have been cases of traders putting "British Empire" as a mark of origin on imported goods and they have been advised that they can put only the word "Empire." Then there is the question of whether, for instance, Australia as a country of origin is technically within the Empire. Should not the word "Empire" be removed and the word "Commonwealth" put in? This is a constitutional point upon which I am not going to express any opinion whatsoever. The point is raised as one of accuracy of definition and I will leave the matter to the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 2, insert the following new clause—
Amendment of section ten of 16&17 Geo. 5. c. 53
(".In paragraph (a) of the definition of 'Indication of origin' in subsection (1) of section ten of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1926, the word 'Commonwealth' shall be substituted for the word 'Empire.'")—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)
LORD MANCROFT: One day this matter will have to be cleared up—the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, is perfectly right—but I most sincerely and devoutly trust, not to-day. This is a far-sweeping constitutional matter which, I imagine, in a fuller House would have kept the constitutional experts at work for many hours, and a change of this importance really must not be founded upon some obscure section in the Merchandise Marks Act, 1926, which is not even the principal Act we are seeking to amend. I admit the force of the noble Lord's argument that we shall have to consider it, but, before we do so, an enormous amount of preparation will be required. Consultations far and wide will be necessary. The whole of the stamping,
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packing, merchandising and manufacturing of our opposite numbers overseas will have to be taken into consideration. We shall have to consult far and wide. Without in any way commenting on the use of the two words, "Commonwealth" and "Empire," save to say that the word "Empire" still appears in many respectable Acts of Parliament, and without prejudicing the noble Lord's right to raise the matter on an appropriate occasion, I should like to say, with great respect, that I do not think this is such an occasion.
LORD OGMORE: After listening to the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, I am not at all sure that his reply is quite satisfactory. After all, I should have thought that in a Bill dealing with merchandise marks an Amendment to a previous Merchandise Marks Act was appropriate. It may not have been the Act mainly concerned, but still it is a Merchandise Marks Act. The point of my noble friend's Amendment is this. Every day goods are coming in, manufactured in a part of Her Majesty's Dominions outside the United Kingdom. Those goods have to be stamped with this word "Empire." It is a purely factual matter: is that a correct description, or not? We have heard descriptions of Her Majesty's Dominions in recent years, in recent months and in recent weeks. In every one of those descriptions, whether by Her Majesty's Government or otherwise, the word "Commonwealth," and sometimes the words "Commonwealth and Empire", have been used. As I understand it, the practice in recent years in this country has been this. The word "Commonwealth" is used to denote the larger membership of the Commonwealth as a whole—the great Dominions, ourselves, and so on—and the word "Empire" has tended, in practice, I admit, and not by law, to be confined largely to the Colonial Empire, and does not, in practice, at all events, now apply to what used to be called the Great Dominions. We have, in fact, changed the title of the Empire Parliamentary Association to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association.
It would be interesting to know what, say, Mr. Nehru, or the Premier of Pakistan, would think of this point: whether they would consider it correct that the word "Empire" should from day to day still be marked on goods

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coming from their countries. I suggest that it does not matter What we think about it, whether we have any sentimental attraction to the word "Empire," or not, the point is, is it still an accurate description? If it is not an accurate description, in fact and in law, then I suggest that this is an appropriate occasion, while the Bill is going through its legislative process, for the Government to make this quite simple amendment—an amendment of one word in the subsection and one word in the proviso of Section 10 of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1926.
LORD LLEWELLIN: It seems to me that although it may mean just the amendment of one word, it would mean also the alteration of a great number of stampings, dies, and things of that sort throughout the Commonwealth and Empire. The die used for marking these goods now bears the short, simple word "Empire." Whether that is completely accurate or not I do not know, but it has the advantage of being a shorter word than "Commonwealth." Surely this change could not be made on the spur of the moment, without giving traders and others overseas an opportunity of saying what complications it might involve for them in the way of changing all their methods of marking and stamping their goods. I believe the correct description now is "Commonwealth and Empire"; and eventually, if we have to do something about it—and it is only so that everybody may know what is the place of origin—it might be more appropriate to put "C. and E." on the goods, indicating that they come from the British Commonwealth and Empire. It would, after all, follow the line so often taken by the sergeant-major in the case of a new recruit. He asks: "What is your religion?" and if the recruit has not any particular religion "C. of E." is at once put down. I certainly do not think this is an Amendment that we should make, because by doing so we should cause everybody dealing in these goods to alter their dies, and other things, at very short notice.
LORD MATHERS: Is not the matter that should concern us the question of accuracy? What is the accurate description? I quite agree that to take a chance
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in a small Bill of this kind and make what is a considerable alteration is perhaps to go too far. Yet I feel we should have an assurance from the Government that this matter will be considered, and that an accurate description will be applied at the earliest possible moment.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am always glad when the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, gets up, because I expect him to say, in better words than mine, just what I wish to say, and he always does. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, will not press this Amendment. It is, in fact, a practical matter. I do not think we could attend to this change in our law until after consultation with the Commonwealth Governments, who are obviously vitally concerned. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Mathers, that the matter will have our consideration—in fact, I believe an inquiry has just begun in regard to certain matters arising between the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries upon representations from other quarters. If I may say so, I entirely concur with what fell from the noble Lord, Lord Mathers, that it would not be appropriate to make an alteration as far reaching as this one in this Bill. I would ask the noble Lord not to press the Amendment.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I can assure the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, that I have not the slightest intention of pressing this Amendment, but I thought it would do no harm to bring the matter up, because this description will have to be altered at some time. I accept fully what the noble and learned Lord has said. Obviously a change like this cannot be brought in on a side wind it will have to be done after proper consultation with members of the Commonwealth. I think the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, has put forward the worst of all reasons in saying that we cannot make the alteration because somebody would have to alter a die. Why do we ever amend a Bill, when we know that we must get another one printed? I have never heard such a ridiculous suggestion, and that coming from a lawyer who, I suppose, has one eye on alterations in the law and new Acts being printed every day. I am grateful to the Lord Chancellor, but I wonder whether he would venture to be a little more helpful on this line. Suppose goods were marked

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"Commonwealth and Empire": does he consider that that would be a breach of the Act? Does he think that that would be acceptable? Or have all the members of the Commonwealth, whether they like it or not, got to mark their goods with the word "Empire" until we have been able, after consultation, to make an alteration? If that is so, I think the consultations had better start as early as may be.
LORD LLEWELLIN: Before we leave this Amendment, I should like to inform the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, that I have not practised in the law for twenty years, or something like that time, and I am certainly not looking at these matters from any personal point of view. The only way in which I ever come into the law nowadays is when, from time to time, I sit on the Bench and wonder how one is to administer Acts of Parliament, especially those that have been altered by snap Amendments in either House of Parliament.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: Of course, I knew that. If the noble Lord had been in practice I should not have made the comment. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.41 p.m.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved, after Clause 2, to insert the following new clause:
Makers' names to be marked on certain classes of goods
".Where the President of the Board of Trade is satisfied that it is in the public interest that the names of the makers shall be marked on certain goods, he shall make an order specifying the classes of goods to be marked in such manner; and it shall be an offence for any of the goods specified in such order to be sold or held for sale or for any purpose of trade or manufacture unless they bear the names of the makers."
The noble Lord said: This Amendment is again put down with the object of eliciting an expression of view from the noble Lord opposite, because I realise the many difficulties in this. But, as I said on moving one of the previous Amendments, something has to be done to bring before the notice of the buying public the need to beware of unbranded or unmarked articles. I think the noble Lord will agree with me that that is what we are trying to overcome. False
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description, misleading description, and all those evils which this Bill is seeking to amend, come from the unmarked or unbranded article, and from the sellers of the article on which the manufacturer or the seller has not the courage to put his name. A thing without a name is always sold as being "just as good." I am seeking only to make it permissive for the President of the Board of Trade, on a limited range of goods, to say, after consultation, that they must be marked.
There is considerable difficulty in this matter because of the multiplicity of manufacturers. The case I can give immediately is one with which I have had a great deal of experience, and that is the motor car. Anybody who thinks that a Morris motor car is made by Morris, or that an Austin motor car is made by Austin, is, of course, entirely wrong, because it is made by fifty, sixty, or seventy manufacturers. I suppose that in any mass-produced car to-day about 60 or 70 per cent. of the components are manufactured outside the factory of the maker whose name is on the motor car. Therefore, so long as there is a name on an article—whether it is a brand name, or whether it is a manufacturer's name—it is some guarantee of quality. It may not be a very good guarantee, but at least it prevents the buyer from being, if I may use the expression, "had" twice. He may be 'had" the first time, but if he is ever "had" by buying the same goods with the same name a second time, with it is his own fault. I would warn the public, especially to-day, to confine their buying to goods that have a branded name on them. They will at least get some guarantee of quality, and if there is anything wrong with those goods the man who puts his name upon them is generally jealous of his reputation and will make some redress if anything goes wrong. Let us bear this in mind. In the world of commerce to-day there are far more honest men than dishonest men engaged in trade, and my reason for putting down this Amendment is to uphold the reputation of the honest trader, who will put his name on what he wants to sell. I know that the noble Lord is not going to accept this Amendment. It is far too progressive for the present Government to accept. They would rather go along on the present lines of conservatism with a small "c." But I have ventilated the matter. I know that the noble Lord agrees

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with me; I think we all agree. But, of course, it is a difficult task, and Governments do not like difficult tasks. Perhaps one day we shall have a Government who will really go out and protect the British public—but that again, like the one raised on the last Amendment, is a very big issue, and one which cannot be brought in on a side wind upon an Amendment like this. I beg to move.
Amedment moved—
After Clause 2 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)
LORD MANCROFT: The noble Lord made quite an attractive argument until he got to his peroration. He then produced several excellent reasons for rejecting this Amendment which I had intended to relegate to only a minor position. He says that this Tory Government is not progressive enough to accept this Amendment. Just consider what this Amendment does. It is superficially attractive that the President of the Board of Trade should nominate those who must place their name, mark or brand on their product. How can an honest manufacturer be ashamed of putting his name upon his products? Only a rogue or a vagabond is reluctant to put his name upon his products. We are not a sufficiently progressive Government to accept this Amendment! What I would say is that we on this side of the House do not believe in regimentation, and this, if ever I saw one, is a superb example of Socialist regimentation. The Government are asked to give the President of the Board of Trade powers in certain cases which he may never wish to exercise. That is not progress, as a Conservative Government sees it, if the noble Lord will forgive my saying so. How are we to enforce this?—an enormous number of enforcement officers; more and more rules and regulations, to see who has infringed the Act which the noble Lord, Lord Lucas supports; to see how it was being infringed; and where and why. That is not progress, as we on this side of the House understand it.
I was not going to reject the Amendment solely on those two grounds of regimentation and the difficulty of enforcement, but reject it I am afraid I am going to ask the House to do. Before I do so, may I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, for the fact that we have not so far seen fit or been able to
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accept any of his Amendments? When I addressed your Lordships on Second Reading I asked that there should be put before the House any improvements that any noble Lord could think of. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has genuinely sought to improve the Bill, and I should have liked to accept anything which I thought would improve the Bill. I ask him sincerely to believe that it is in no sense the division between us which has caused us to be so unfavourably disposed towards all his attempts to improve the Bill, but his failure to convince us that they were improvements.
Surely, this is the trouble. If you compulsorily force manufacturers to mark everything, there will be no distinction in the housewife's mind—the housewife to whom the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has so sympathetically referred this afternoon—as to what is good and what is not. Everything will be branded. It will mean reducing the retailer to a purely automatic status. He is merely the man who handles 100 percent. branded goods. His reputation, his professional integrity, his knowledge and skill will be entirely wasted. He is merely purveying branded goods. Surely the noble Lord practically answered his own argument when he referred to his Austin and his Morris car. Whose name do you put on these goods—the manufacturers? Take a piece of material or cloth or a shirt. You have the buyers, the weavers, the processors, the finishers, the maker-up, the retailer—there are plenty of fields from which to choose. I think it is well to bear this in mind. Merely because a man does not mark his goods does not mean that they are shoddy. Some of the finest and most luxurious types of goods are unmarked. I am told that very high class ladies' clothes do not bear any mark. Equally, the fact that a brand of goods is marked does not necessarily mean that the goods are not shoddy. There have been cases where manufacturers of shoddy goods have changed their name, or the name of the firm or the trade mark, half a dozen times in a year, and have gone on deceiving the public with the same rubbish. Of course, it is desirable to catch such men if we can, but I am afraid that the old rule of caveat emptor must occasionally raise it head. We cannot always go on preserving fools against their folly. All we can do is to preserve them against something which they could

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not reasonably have found out for themselves.
I do not think that the clause which the noble Lord seeks to have included in the Bill would achieve that. I think it would place great hardship on good and decent manufacturers. It would raise considerable difficulty in the matter of imported goods. It would be no use marking them, even if it were possible so to do, or there would be invidious comparisons between home-produced articles and imported goods; and it would do nothing, so far as I can see, to achieve the noble Lord's perfectly laudable object, of protecting the consumer and enhancing the reputation of the genuine and bona fide manufacturers. On the face of it, it looks an attractive argument, but I think that, if your Lordships look at it carefully, you will see that the provision suggested is one that is not possible of enforcement without an immense amount of trouble. It savours a little too much of regimentation, for my liking, at least, and it is one which I think (and this is the most powerful argument of the three which I wish to adduce) is practicably not workable. I hope that the noble Lord will not press his argument.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, before the noble Lord Lord Lucas, rises to reply, I should like to ask him whether he has not seen that those general stores which provide the widest range of unbranded goods are invariably the most crowded at all hours of the day.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I have the greatest admiration for the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, when he sticks to the rôle of lawyer. His adroitness on this Bill has been really engaging, and I envy him, as a craftsman in perhaps a different sphere from mine, that adroitness. When becomes to talk about trade he is not quite on such certain ground. I do not know whether what he has said is written into his brief, but I can tell the noble Lord that we are fast moving, with the consent and at the wish of the general public, into a world of branded goods. Soon we shall buy joints of meat pre-packed, cellophane wrapped and branded. We shall buy every mortal thing that the ordinary household needs with a brand on it. It is one of the evils that we have to face, because, while branding is, and will
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always remain, the greatest guarantee that the ordinary purchaser has in buying the ordinary article, it brings one of the greatest evils in its train—that is, the fixed and maintained price. But that is another subject, which must be dealt with in another way.
However, when the noble Lord says that this Amendment means regimentation I maintain that it is not regimentation to enable the lower classes of this country to buy branded goods and to get value for the small amount of money they have. It is all very well to talk about high-class dresses which are branded, but you must remember also the ordinary housewife of this country, who goes out shopping with her purse in her hand and wants to buy, say, a tin of cocoa. And she has the baby in the pram—also with a brand, quite likely, because, after all, the noble Lord has the brand of his father upon him.
LORD MANCROFT: I hope so.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: So do I. So the noble Lord himself is a branded article, and he has been regimented. You see, one of the things which we have in order to safeguard the public is a guarantee, of quality. I do not intend to pursue this subject. I am sorry that the noble Lord has put up such weak arguments for the rejection of this Amendment. My Amendment was drawn so widely that it could have been accepted, but I am not going to press the matter. I will, however, give the noble Lord in a moment or two the chance of a deathbed repentance.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 3 agreed to.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved, after Clause 3, to insert the following new clause:
Proceedings before court of summary jurisdiction
"The Board of Trade may in any case which appears to them to be of general interest to the community or to a section of the community take proceedings before a court of summary jurisdiction and may defray wholly or in part any costs or expenses incurred by any person or body of persons who may take such proceedings with the approval in writing of the Board of Trade."
The noble Lord said: This is the valedictory Amendment. I am sorry the noble Lord read the funeral rites before

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the end. I knew he had made up his mind not to accept any of these Amendments.
LORD MANCROFT: I carefully said "as yet."
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I did not hear the "as yet," but this is the noble Lord's chance to make a death-bed repentance. This is the one Amendment which I feel the noble Lord will accept, because all it does is to give the Board of Trade, when it appears to them to be of general interest to the community or to a section of the community, power to take proceedings before a court of summary jurisdiction or to defray wholly or in part any costs or expenses incurred by any person or body of persons who may take such proceedings with the approval in writing of the Board of Trade. I think that is a very sensible Amendment and it is one which I see no reason why the noble Lord cannot accept. The Board of Trade record of prosecutions under the 1887 Act does not show a high score. The noble Lord has come to your Lordships' House with Amendments to the Act to put teeth into the Act. Is it any good putting teeth into the Act unless the noble Lord is prepared to see it implemented?
I am not going to waste your Lordships' time any longer on this point, because your Lordships have other business to transact this afternoon, but if the noble Lord wants a precedent for such a suggestion as this he has only to refer to Sections 9 and 4 of the 1926 Act by which local authorities are empowered to pay for prosecutions and to take proceedings in all cases; and in such cases presumably the expense comes out of the rates. If the noble Lord will turn to Section 9, subsection (1) of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1926, he will see that any expenses incurred by the local authority under that section:
"shall be defrayed in the same manner as expenses incurred by the authority in executing the provisions of the said Acts."
Under Section 4, committees may be set up which can be paid for out of public funds.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Does Section 9 go beyond the local authority?
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: No. I said that that was a pity. This is a
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perfectly reasonable Amendment. The President of the Board of Trade need not give permission for proceedings, but if he does he can defray the expense, partly or wholly. I cannot see that there can be any reply to that. If the noble Lord says that there is no power to spend money, I would remind him that there is power to spend money under the previous Merchandise Marks Acts. After all, this is a Bill to consolidate or amend them all. I will not take up your Lordships' time further except to ask the noble Lord to accept this Amendment. I am not tied to the wording. This is the last chance; he will not have another one. I am not sure that he will be anxious to seize it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 3 insert said new clause.—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)
LORD MANCROFT: I am afraid I am not on my deathbed and I am quite unrepentant. This Amendment arises out of the twitting which the noble Lord gave us on Second Reading about the Board of Trade's activities in prosecuting under these various Merchandise Marks Acts. The noble Lord asked me during the course of the Second Reading debate whether I had any idea how many prosecutions the Board of Trade had initiated in the history of the Acts. I told him that offhand I had no idea but I imagined it must be under one hundred: I understand that the noble Lord and I were not at one over that, but my figures were roughly correct. The figure has worked out at an average of about two a year. I thought that was quite high enough, but the noble Lord clearly thinks it is nothing like high enough. He thinks the Board of Trade should be much more active over this matter. I do not think they should, and for this reason. I think the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has a completely wrong conception of the function of Government Departments in prosecutions. This new Bill, when it is an Act amending the previous ones, is there for all to use, including the Board of Trade. It is to the advantage of other, people professionally connected with this subject to use it.
That is so in the case of many other Acts, where the prosecution is frequently and deliberately left to private persons. For example, there is the Dentists Act, 1921, there is the Children's and Young

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Persons Act, 1933, under which the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children bring a large number of prosecutions. There is the Protection of Animal Act, 1911, under which the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals bring a large number of prosecutions. There is the Dramatic and Musical Performers Protection Act, 1925, under which the Performing Rights Society bring a large number of prosecutions. There is the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, and there is the Penicillin Act. I have picked out only two or three, but there are many Acts which empower a private body, a professional body or a private person to carry out prosecutions for the purpose for which the Act was originally passed.
That does not mean, of course, that the Board of Trade should not carry out prosecutions itself when it is a large matter of public policy and where the alleged offence is not necessarily confined to one person or to the interests of one body. Indeed, the Government prosecute in matters like taxation cases and National Insurance cases, where administration and the necessary information, much of it confidential, is concentrated in a Government Department. Under this Act, the Board of Trade will prosecute where it is in the national interest that it should do so. Outside bodies will prosecute in their own interests. Individual persons will, if they see so fit, prosecute in their own interests. There is no need that I can see for the Board of Trade to delegate its powers, and no reason whatever why public money should be spent to defray the costs of private prosecutions as the noble Lord suggests. I am sorry but I am still off my deathbed; I am still unrepentant.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: This is the last Amendment, and unless the noble Lord can think of a suitable Amendment that he and I can discuss for the previous Amendment on the term "quality," this will be the last chance your Lordships will have of amending the Bill—unless, of course, it comes back.
LORD MANCROFT: There is the Third Reading. The noble Lord can move to amend on Third Reading, if he wishes to.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I am not a betting mart, but I should not risk much money on my chance of amending the Bill.
LORD MANCROFT:That is a different matter.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I sincerely congratulate the noble Lord on the performance he has put up. He has convinced your Lordships, himself and everybody else, except me, that an Act of Parliament passed in 1887 requires only two minor Amendments to fit it to the commercial conditions of 1953. I think that is a feat of which he should be proud. He and I are old antagonists. He and I have been on each side of this House. I have learnt many lessons from him, and I hope he has also learnt from me. I hope that his performance in defending the Government on this occasion has had some link with the past when I used to defend it, I hope, as successfully.
I am going to withdraw this Amendment. I trust we shall be able to do something on the Amendment which we shall discuss later on. Again, I hope that the housewife, the defrauded person, will study carefully what the noble Lord has said: that all she has to do is to wander through about six Acts or any other Act she likes and, if she cares to spend her life's savings in pursuing this matter in various courts under various Statutes, she may eventually be reimbursed for being defrauded by the misleading description of articles under the Merchandise Marks Act. With those words, I desire to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
Bill reported without Amendment.
House resumed.

THERAPEUTIC SUBSTANCES (PREVENTION OF MISUSE) BILL [H.L.]
5.8 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Earl of Onslow.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
[The LORD TERRINGTON in the Chair]
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2:
Power to relax restrictions imposed by Penicillin Act, 1947
(2) The power of making regulations under this section shall be exercisable by the Minister of Health, the Secretary of State and the Minister of Health and Local Government for Northern Ireland, jointly, after consultation with the Medical Research Council and, in the case of regulations appearing to those Ministers' to concern agricultural matters, with the Agricultural Research Council.
LORD WEBB-JOHNSON LORD WEBB-JOHNSON moved to add to subsection (2):
"and the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons."
The noble Lord said: I have put down this Amendment for two reasons. In the first place, I think it is desirable that there should be some provision to ensure that the health of livestock is considered, as well as the health of the community; and, secondly, because there was a little confusion during the debate on the Second Reading of the Bill in that the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, gave an assurance that there would be consultation with the Royal Veterinary College and that he understood that the veterinary surgeons would be called in on all agricultural matters of importance. The noble Earl was led into error by my noble friend Lord Amulree, who referred to the Royal Veterinary College. The institution to which he should have referred was the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons. That is the body which is the ruling body of the profession and which sets the standards of professional education. It is, therefore, the
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body to which I refer in my Amendment, hoping that there will be either an acceptance of the Amendment or an assurance that they will be consulted on agricultural matters. I have nothing to add, except to emphasise once more that the Royal Veterinary College of London is just one of the veterinary schools of the country.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 24, after ("Council") insert ("and the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons").—(Lord Webb-Johnson.)
LORD HADEN-GUEST: I should just like to say that I think the wording of the Bill as it stands covers the point that my noble friend Lord Webb-Johnson wishes to have covered. The Bill sets up machinery for making regulations. Clause 2 (2) which we are now considering says:
"The power of making regulations…shall be exercisable by the Minister of Health, the Secretary of State and the Minister of Health and Local Government for Northern Ireland, jointly, after consultation"—
and these are the words I wish to emphasise—
"with the Medical Research Council and, in the case of regulations appearing to those Ministers to concern agricultural matters, with the Agricultural Research Council."
I think that in that way it will be possible, to obtain through the Agricultural Research Council and the Medical Research Council, with the Royal Veterinary College, as clearly and as amply as necessary, all the information to which Lord Webb-Johnson refers.
There is another reason for not adding to the constitution of this body to which I have just referred. If one other body, which has not such a wide range as the Agricultural Research Council, is admitted, it almost certainly opens the door, as it were, and invites people to suggest that there should also be other representatives of other bodies. And I think that that would be undesirable. I sincerely believe that the organisation proposed in the Bill is one which will cover all the necessities of the case and will enable the veterinary research authorities, through the Agricultural Research Council, in concert with the Medical Research Council, fully to present any points which are necessary from the standpoint of animal health.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: First of all, through the noble Lord, Lord Webb-Johnson, perhaps I may apologise to the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, for giving them an improper title in my remarks on the Second Reading of this Bill. I had no intention of any discourtesy to them; it was merely my ignorance as a layman. I am afraid that I cannot accept the noble Lord's Amendment, largely for the reasons suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Haden-Guest—that we have already included these two bodies, the Medical Research Council and the Agricultural Research Council, both Committees of the Privy Council, and it would be unwise to widen the scope in this way. But I can give the noble Lord this assurance: that before any regulations are made, either under Clause 1 or Clause 2 of this Bill, my right honourable friend will have consultations with his colleague, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, who in turn also undertakes to consult the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons on veterinary interest as a whole before any recommendations by him are made to his colleague, the Minister of Health. I hope that this will satisfy the noble Lord, and that he will not press his Amendment.
LORD WEBB-JOHNSON: I am much obliged to the noble Earl for this declaration, which is so explicit that I can only accept it with gratitude and ask leave to withdraw my Amendment. I have had a little knowledge of assurances of this sort in the past, though not quite so explicit. When you quote the assurance to the Department concerned, and claim that the assurance has been given, then you are asked like Shylock, "Was it nominated in the Bond?" Was it in the Bill? In this case I am happy to receive the assurance, and I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
Bill reported without amendment.

LEASEHOLD PROPERTY ACT AND LONG LEASES (SCOTLAND) ACT EXTENSION BILL [H.L.]
5.15 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
[The LORD TERRINGTON in the Chair]
Clause 1 [Extension of 14&15 Geo. V. c. 38]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after subsection (2) to insert:
"(3) Notwithstanding anything in section eleven of the said Act of 1951, where apart from that section the expiring tenancy—

(a) would come to end by notice to quit given by the landlord, and

(b) would so come to an end on or after the twenty-third day of June, nineteen hundred and fifty-three.

an application under Part II of the said Act of 1951 shall not be treated as out of time if made not later than one month after the commencement of this Act.
In this subsection the expression 'the expiring tenancy' has the same meaning as in Part II of the said Act of 1951."
The noble and learned Lord said: The Amendment which stands in my name is necessary to make good the hiatus which the ingenuity of a correspondent discovered. I have furnished the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, with a note of the reasons why the Amendment is necessary and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has had, the advantage of seeing that note and will be able to follow me, for this is an extremely difficult and complicated matter, and not at all easy to follow at first blush. I will state it as shortly as I can.
The difficulty arises in connection with shop tenancies, which come under Part II of the Act of 1951, which the Bill now before the House seeks to amend. As Part II of the 1951 Act now stands, a shop tenant who has received notice to quit can apply for renewal if two conditions are fulfilled. The first, which I will call condition A, is to be found in Section 10 (1) of the Act, and it is that the notice must be one which will expire on or before June 23, 1953. The second condition, condition B, is to be found in Section 11 (1) (b)—that the application for renewal must be made within a month of receiving the notice to quit. The Bill which extends the 1951 Act from June 24, 1953, to Christmas, 1954, operates on the first condition I have mentioned, that which arises under Section 10 (1) of the

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Bill. It operates by substituting December 24, 1954, for June 24, 1953. But, as introduced, it says nothing about what I have called condition B, that the application for renewal must be made within a month of receiving the notice to quit. As the Bill stands, therefore, this would deprive of his chance of renewal any tenant whose notice to quit has been received a month or more before the Bill becomes law but will not expire until after June 23, 1953. For before Royal Assent he cannot apply, because he does not fulfil condition A as it now stands; and after Royal Assent he will not be able to fulfil condition B.
It is a very difficult matter to follow, but I can assure the Committee, having given it the best consideration I can, that it does appear that there is a gap, and that gap we propose to fill by introducing the words which appear in the Amendment standing in my name. Perhaps I may read them to your Lordships.
"(3) Notwithstanding anything in section eleven of the said Act of 1951, where apart from that section the expiring tenancy"—
which is defined—

"(a) would come to an end by notice to quit given by the landlord, and

(b) would so come to an end on or after the twenty-third day of June, nineteen hundred and fifty-three,

an application under Part II of the said Act of 1951 shall not be treated as out of time if made not later than one month after the commencement of this Act."
Then the same definition of "the expiring tenancy" appears. So the tenant, in any case, will get his month. I think that will be satisfactory to him and to everyone concerned, and, I hope, satisfactory also to your Lordships. I beg to move.
Amendment moved.
Page 2, line 10, at end insert:
("(3) Notwithstanding anything in section eleven of the said Act of 1951, where apart from that section the expiring tenancy—

(a) would come to an end by notice to quit given by the landlord, and

(b) would so come to an end on or after the twenty-third day of June, nineteen hundred and fifty-three,

an application under Part II of the said Act of 1951 shall not be treated as out of time if made not later than one month after the commencement of this Act."
In this subsection the expression 'the expiring tenancy' has the same meaning as in Part II of the said Act of 1951.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD SILKIN: I had not, in fact, had the advantage of being able to study this matter, but the explanation which the noble and learned Lord has given is, as usual, so clear that he has made a very complicated matter perfectly plain, to me at any rate. As I understand it, under the Bill as it stands there would, in certain circumstances, be tenants who would not get a full month's opportunity of giving notice; and this Amendment gives them rather more than a month in certain circumstances.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Sometimes.
LORD SILKIN: That is, of course, quite acceptable to us on this side of the House, and we are very glad that this Amendment has been brought forward.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
House resumed.
Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been dispensed with (pursuant to Resolution), the Amendment reported.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, in moving, That the Bill be read a third time I have it in command from Her Majesty to signify to the House that Her Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Leasehold Property Act and Long Leases (Scotland) Act Extension Bill, has been pleased to place at the disposal of Parliament the interests of the Crown in so far as they are affected by the said Bill. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—[The Lord Chancellor.]
On Question, Bill read 3a, and passed and sent to the Commons.

MANCHESTER CORPORATION (ADVERTISEMENTS) BILL [H.L.]
Committed: The Committee to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.

SOUTH ESSEX WATER BILL [H.L.]
Committed.
House adjourned at twenty-five minutes past five o'clock.