HL Deb 03 February 1953 vol 180 cc162-97

4.22 p.m.

Debate resumed.

LORD MORAN

My Lords, after the noble Viscount's statement, it would appear that further debate is irrelevant, but perhaps I might remind the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, that on former occasions, when he spoke of the independent members of this House who have no close Party affiliations, he said very flatteringly that they were the strength of this House and carried great weight. As I say, that was, of course, a very flattering way of speaking of our political innocence. At the same time, it encourages me to ask whether those Members were represented in the 1948 Conference and are to be represented in the Conference which is about to take place. It is natural, in the circumstances, that we should like to state our views, however unimportant, before possibly an agreed report comes back from the Conference.

It has been said, I think by John Stuart Mill, that On all great subjects much remains to be said. but I think it would tax the ingenuity of any noble Lord to say anything very fresh upon this subject of Life Peerages. It has been debated six times on six separate occasions in the last hundred years, on the grounds that Life Peers would strengthen and invigorate the House, would add weight to its deliberations and, in Lord Rosebery's phrase, "promote its efficiency." I trust this may be the sixth occasion on which your Lordships will require to be satisfied, before you change the composition of this House, that these benefits will in fact follow. The case put by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, appears to me to be based upon two arguments. The first implies, I think, that this House needs strengthening with a new kind of member, and that the Life Peerages would in fact strengthen it. The noble Viscount argued that there are a number of able and distinguished commoners who are reluctant to accept hereditary Peerages because they would be a burden to their descendants. Since there are, of course, no figures available, I can only state my impression, which is that if there were any, the numbers would not justify legislation.

When the noble Viscount talks of strengthening the House, or says that the House needs strengthening, I ask, is that well-founded? It was certainly true when Lord Russell first brought this proposal forward in 1869. Bat conditions then were totally different. It was a time when the Industrial Revolution had driven home its iron wedges into the fabric of society, when the incidence of power was shifting from the territorial aristocracy to the rising middle classes. It was a time of doubt and uncertainty and even of insecurity. Lord Russell may well have felt that the House of Lords, which was then predominantly a Chamber of hereditary Peers, was vulnerable. At any rate, he felt that it could be strengthened by attracting to it twenty, thirty, or even forty, commoners, business men of great ability, over several years. Lord Wensleydale was to be the first, and Lord Macaulay was to be one of the first.

But the conditions of to-day are very different. Whereas at that time one or, at most, two Peers were created in a year, in the five years from 1945 to 1949 seventy-five peers were created, an average of fifteen a year. Of the 857 members of your Lordships' House, 176 are Lords of first creation—that is to say, about one-fifth. Not only is that a substantial fraction, but it displays an activity out of proportion to its numbers. I have been through Hansard for the four Sessions 1947 to 1951. In those four Sessions, 318 noble Lords addressed the House, and 147 of that number were Lords of first creation. Not only is it clear that these Lords are playing a part—perhaps I might claim a substantial part—in maintaining the admittedly high level of debate, but I think it is true to say that they are an essential element of this House. It not true, as the noble Viscount said when he introduced this Motion (I quote his words), that the composition is as vulnerable as ever. Is it not true, on the contrary, that what he is trying to do has already been done: that there is in existence at the present time a Chamber which is speaking with great deliberation and with great influence upon the fabric at the present time? This point has been raised before, by the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, in the 1948 debate. But to bring conviction to the agnostic it should be documented.

The noble Viscount's second argument is that if Life Peerages were created they would gradually do away with the hereditary right to sit in this Chamber, and so, it may be said, put us right with the public. I do not lightly dismiss a consideration of that kind, for all government stands on opinion. But if it is right and proper that we should be conscious of the necessity of popular support, that does not mean that we must listen to every idle critic. There is a light-minded section of the Press and public who say that there is no necessity for a Second Chamber and no need for second thoughts. Why should they, when they have never in their lives had a thought of any kind? I address myself to serious critics of the hereditary principle. They begin by finding not so much a chink as a gap in our armour, a gap that was noticed more than eighty years ago by Bagehot. In his saber judgment he declared that the slack attendance of noble Lords would in time destroy your Lordships' House. An Assembly, he said—a revising Assembly especially—which does not assemble, which looks as if it does not care how it revises, is defective in a main political ingredient. It may be of use, but it will hardly convince the public that it is so. Nevertheless, there may be support for the proposal of Lord Salisbury, who in 1888 suggested that noble Lords who were not interested in the proceedings of this House or found it difficult to attend should be released from their obligation to attend.

The crux of the whole matter, however, is that the hereditary Peerage is conservative in temper and tends to walk through the same Lobby. Our sin is not so much that we are a hereditary Chamber as that we are predominantly of one Party. Life Peerages will not remedy that defect in any way. Governments come and Governments go; the Left succeeds the Right, and the Right the Left; and each in turn will create Peers in its own image, so that in ten years' time things may be much as they are now. It is something of a paradox that Life Peerages not only make things no better; they actually make them worse. Your Lordships are very sensitive to the disparity in numbers of the two great Parties in this House, and in consequence you have come to exercise an admirable restraint and self-discipline in the self-imposed task of not giving offence to another place. If you are going to alter the composition of this House, with the idea of putting things right politically, that restraint is likely to be loosened. Bagehot himself saw danger here. He said that if in a new House every member were chosen for his ability only, that Chamber would presently begin to think that ability was the only thing that counted and would begin to challenge the findings of another place.

For these reasons, if I am right in thinking that our main offence is that we are predominantly of one Party, I do not believe that Life Peerages are any remedy. What is the remedy? We can leave the House as it is or we can reform it. If we are to remodel the House, I would ask: Who is to do the remodelling? That is not an idle question. When Lord Rosebery brought up this matter of Life Peerages in 1888, Lord Wemyss rose in his place and moved an Amendment. He said this: It is not a safe thing to place the constitution of this House in the power of a committee; if any changes in the constitution of this House are to be made, they should be debated and made by the House itself. Lord Wemyss had in his mind a problem which is troubling me; and it is this. If you are going to have a remodelled House, you will get nowhere unless you devise a way of life which does not bring the House into conflict with the other place. Would it not help, in devising such a House, to call in the advice of those who have very slight political affiliations? I feel that there may be something in what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, said in 1948, though I would not go so far as to agree with his suggestion that the value of this House is in direct proportion to the lack of Party politics here. Any new Chamber, he said, that was going to work would have to be full of cross-Benches. He saw no other way in which the House could work. I am not suggesting that Party is not an essential part, but I think it is when we are non-political. when we are debating some high non-political issue, that we are most convincing.

Perhaps I may be allowed to go back for a moment to the report of the 1948 Conference and to remind your Lordships that the report recommends that The present right to attend and vote, based solely on heredity, should not by itself constitute a qualification for admission to a reformed Second Chamber. I interpret that to mean that this House, as it has been constituted, would cease to exist. As the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, once said, there are many noble Lords of considerable ability who would find themselves in the new Chamber; nevertheless it is still true to say that no single member of this House can be quite certain that he will be there. I think that that is true. But what is to take the place of the present Chamber? Perhaps I may be allowed to quote to your Lordships these words: Members of the Second Chamber should be styled 'Lords of Parliament' and would be appointed on grounds of personal distinction and public service. They might be drawn either from hereditary Peers or from commoners who had been created Life Peers. That might give you a better House of Lords or it might not, but it would certainly be a very different one. I think your Lordships will agree that the present House works, and works well. We are asked to exchange it for a House which may or may not work well. Is that altogether wise? In England we say of our Constitution that it works. If Burke were living at this hour what would he think when he heard that a Chamber had been hastily invented, as it were, overnight, to take the place of your Lordships' House which had grown up over the centuries?

Your Lordships may remember a story of Lytton Strachey's, of Gilbert Scott, the architect, who, when his hopes of building Government offices in Whitehall in the Gothic style were frustrated by the tiresome Lord Palmerston, found consolation in building the St. Pancras Hotel in a style of his own. Are we trying to rebuild this House in a style of our own? That would not be a very evolutionary process. Is there nothing in tradition, which is our way of passing on experience? Is there nothing in the regal force of custom? Burke said of our Constitution that it was a prescriptive Constitution, whose sole authority is that it has existed time out of mind.

Your King, your Lords, your Judges, your Juries, grand and little, all are prescriptive said Burke. All these (if I may summarise this argument) are ordained by custom. You cannot tamper with one without endangering all the others. Prescription is the most solid of all titles to government. I say so much because noble Lords have recently heard custom, which has the force of law, somewhat summarily dismissed, though it seems to some of us the cement without which the whole edifice could fall to pieces.

My Lords, we are in a most singular position. On the one hand, the need for a Second Chamber has never been more obvious. In the press and hurry of the time, the art of government tends to become more and more empirical. We are al ways discussing symptoms without being quite clear what is the disease. That is on the one hand. What of the other? The public are growing increasingly conscious that there is something, after all, in a Second Chamber, but it has not given its mind to whether in fact it has got the Second Chamber it needs. Mr. Asquith, in 1911, said that a Second Chamber should be free of partisanship and that it should conduct its proceedings with a fair mind and an even hand. Is that not exactly what this House has been doing during and since the war?

Again, the Conference in 1948 put on paper its idea that the Second Chamber should be one composed of men of mature judgment and experience, gained in many spheres of public life. Has that not already been achieved by the happy combination we have here of the hereditary element and Lords of new creation? Is it not maddening that though every noble Lord in this House knows that we have a House that works, the public does not know it: that we know that the composition of this House has been radically changed of recent years, but the public does not know it: that we know the limited nature of our powers? I am not one of those who believe that if the people of England choose to be possessed and rushed down a steep place into the sea, this Chamber is going to stop them. We know exactly what we can do.

Nevertheless, we need not be discouraged. It seems to me that things are changing and that time is on our side. There may come a time when we shall have carefully to remodel your Lordships' House, but I am convinced that that time has not come yet. During the last twelve years the influence of this House has plainly risen. Would it not be wise to let that go on? Then, when the day comes when more must be done, we shall find the public much more responsive, much more sympathetic and much more understanding of our concept of what a Second Chamber should be. Not that the public is oblivious to what the House of Lords has done in the last decade. It is true that, when the public see your Lordships' House doing what is perhaps better done in another place, they are not particularly impressed; but when they find your Lordships' House sitting as a Council of State, engaged in high argument on some august theme—it may be the fate of India or the future of broadcasting—they are plainly impressed; and then it is that the cumulative sagacity of our elder statesmen, each sentence wrought out of their experience hardly won in every walk of life in many lands, seems for a moment to transport us into regions of lasting wisdom. My Lords, cannot we leave well alone?

4.45 p.m.

THE EARL OF HALIFAX

My Lords, in the constructive and thoughtful speech to which the House has just listened there may be, I doubt not, observations which at the appropriate occasion would lead many of us into argument. However, I do not consider myself obliged to follow the noble Lord in detail at this moment, because, as I see it, the task of the House as the debate has developed has become somewhat more simple and straightforward than it was when we began the debate, Speaking for myself, I certainly feel that, however admirable might have been the speech that I had thought of asking your Lordships to listen to, I am not sure now that it would be entirely appropriate. Therefore your Lordships may console yourselves by feeling that what I shall say will certainly be more brief and possibly more directly to the point than what I had had in mind at an earlier stage to inflict upon your Lordships. Because, as I see it, the speech that was made a few moments ago by my noble friend who is leading the House has effected a complete transformation of the position, even from what it was when my noble friend Lord Simon moved his Motion an hour or two ago, If, indeed, my noble and learned friend Lord Simon entertains any wish to feel that he has earned a reward, I think he may well feel that his Motion has been amply justified by the occasion it has afforded to my noble friend Lord Swinton to put the House at this early stage in possession of the Government's thought and purposes on this great subject.

LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH

And action.

THE EARL OF HALIFAX

And the news that, as my noble friend intimated, if I heard him rightly, the invitations to the Conference on this great question were sent out on behalf of the Prime Minister to-day or yesterday—

VISCOUNT SWINTON

To-day.

THE EARL OF HALIFAX

—is an extremely satisfactory piece of information which my noble and learned friend, Lord Simon, has been instrumental in eliciting. The fact that this debate was imminent may not have been without its influence in the acceleration of such a decision.

The situation, therefore, moves into the shape that my noble and learned friend Lord Simon foresaw when he made his speech—namely, that if he had reason to expect an early assembly of such a Conference and action by the Government, he would be entirely ready to concur in the suspension of further proceedings on this Bill. As I suppose the situation that he foresaw has been brought into being, I presume that when this debate finishes we shall, by general agreement, see the matter adjourned. Incidentally, I was pleased to observe that my noble friend who leads the House saw a difference between his Amendment and the Amendment moved by the noble and learned Earl who leads the Opposition. I should have found it impossible to vote for the Amendment moved by the noble and learned Earl, but no difficulty in voting, as I should vote now if a vote were required, for the Amendment moved by Lord Swinton. But, from what has fallen from those who have taken part in the discussion, I presume there will be no need for noble Lords to register their vote in the Lobby. Therefore we must concentrate our hopes and prayers upon the success of the Conference, when it meets.

Watching the history of the last forty years, to which reference has so frequently been made, I conceive that never has agreement been so close as it was in 1948. I think the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, would wholly support me in that belief. I must honestly admit that I am one of those who feel that it was a disaster that the minor difference that the noble Viscount described should have become elevated into a point of principle, rendering agreement so elusive. I hope that this time we may be more fortunate. Incidentally, however, I did not understand the noble and learned Earl who speaks for the Labour Party, to pledge his Party, or to answer for his Party in any way, as to what their reply will be to this invitation, and I was surprised to hear the noble Viscount assume that the noble and learned Earl had answered affirmatively for his Party, I hope he may; but I was under the impression that he had saved his position in that matter not once or twice but many times.

My Lords, this is the only reference that I want to make to the general problem. We have all become accustomed over these years to watch the action and inter-action of the double element of powers and of composition. It has become increasingly plain, I think, that those who were concerned to revise the composition of the House were frequently reluctant, and often, indeed, restrained from any action at all by their reluctance, to do anything through revision of composition that might possibly give the House greater power. On the other hand, those whose principal interest it was to see the House enjoy greater power were apt to be sharply divided on questions of composition. Therefore it was that those two questions, not easily separable, were yet uneasily linked together, producing a difficulty not infrequently like that of the elephant in the country pantomime, when the forelegs and the hindlegs do not always synchronise and go the same way at the same moment. It was no doubt that sense of impatience with the situation that led my noble and learned friend, Lord Simon (and I certainly do not find myself in disagreement with him), to feel that it was desirable and definitely useful to bring the House up to the point of considering, as a practical proposition, one definite piece of reform. As I say, the situation has moved beyond that now, and we may all hope that success will emerge.

One point I should particularly like to make. I think it is possible, although undesirable, for one Parliament to undo the work of its predecessor in the case of an ordinary domestic issue, whether it be the nationalisation of transport, steel or anything else. One Party can go on doing that, and no doubt the other Party can do it, too. It is undesirable, although it may be necessary. But I do not think it can be done with a constitution. That is why I thought particular importance attached to the remarks which fell from the noble and learned Earl who speaks for the Opposition, when he emphasised (and I was glad to hear my noble friend who leads for the Government emphasise also) the importance of securing agreement on this, the constitutional issue. I thought the noble and learned Earl spoke words of great wisdom when he said that he would sooner have the second best by agreement than an ideal scheme imposed on the other Party. I hope that on this question we may find ourselves moving to agreement, because the issues that hang on successor failure are great, far transcending the importance, the history and the work of this House by itself, important as that is; and I am sure that not one of your Lordships would wish to say a word at this moment to impede what may be the new possibility of a beneficent agreement.

4.55 p.m.

LORD KENSWOOD

My Lords, like the noble Earl who has just spoken, I find myself in the difficult position of having to remodel my speech, following the statements made by the noble and learned Earl who spoke for the Opposition and the noble Viscount who is the acting Leader of the House. There are, however, just one or two points that I should like to bring out. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, pointed out in his speech, with approval, that men and women who would become Life Peers should do so on account of their distinction or on account of public service, as they would be best able to contribute to the deliberations of this House. When, however, he goes on to say that these nominations should be made irrespective of family or of fortune, I begin to wonder whether his Bill is not even more meagre than it seemed to me at first. When it was first notified that this Bill was to come forward I felt that there were points in it which greatly commended themselves to me.

VISCOUNT SIMON

Would the noble Lord forgive me one moment? The reference to "without consideration of family and of fortune" was in the quotation from Mr. Walter Bagehot's book; it was not my own phrase. Perhaps I may be excused for pointing that out.

LORD KENSWOOD

I thank the noble and learned Viscount for the correction, but I took it for granted that that quotation was made with the noble and learned Viscount's approval. If that is the case, then surely the Bill comes under criticism, for this reason: that while today it is all very well to appoint people to this House, can we be sure that they will be able to attend? If the nominations are made irrespective of fortune, I am of opinion that many of the people we should like to see here would not be able to come because they are not in a position to give the time to this work. Therefore I have the feeling that the Bill, as it stands at present, would be largely abortive.

A further criticism I have to make is one which has already been touched upon. There are two aspects of the reform of this Chamber: one is function, the other is constitution. It seems to me that before we can say who should do the work, we must first be fairly certain as to what we want this House to do. The analogy is that of a machine. We do not devise a machine and then afterwards ask, "What work shall we give this machine to do"? We first of all think what work has to be done, and then create a machine to perform that work. Here again, in spite of everything that the noble and learned Viscount has said, I believe that there is at least a tacit assumption that the functions of this House should remain more or less as they are.

Now one final point on the Bill itself. I agree with the noble and learned Earl the Leader of the Opposition that, if we pass this Bill, the Conference, the appointment of which has been announced to-day, and which is to meet, I hope, very shortly, would inevitably find itself embarrassed by a decision of this House taken so very shortly before the meeting of the Conference. The question now arises, should we accept the noble and learned Earl's Amendment, or should we accept the Amendment of the Government? I think it would be more satisfactory to reject this Bill outright, and for this reason. There is a feeling—at least with me, and possibly with other people—that if the Conference were to start with a suspicion that it might fail, that would be a bad beginning. I think that everyone concerned should go into the Conference with complete confidence that it will succeed. If that is the case, it is bound to succeed. Therefore I hope that the noble and learned Viscount will see fit to withdraw this Bill.

5.2 p.m.

LORD TEYNHAM

My Lords, I feel that I can agree with a great deal that has been said by the noble Lord who has just sat down. However, I think it would be a mistake not to give this Bill a Second Reading, because if we were to throw out this Bill now it would indicate to the country at large that this House did not want any reform at all. I am sure that that would be a mistake. Nevertheless, with all due respect to the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, who has introduced this Bill, I cannot support it in its present form. I was glad to hear from him that the question of men and women Life Peers was a question for Committee, as was also that of numbers. I agree also with the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, that if we accepted this Bill to-day it might prejudice any reform which might be proposed in a Conference between the two political Parties. But I suggest that the noble Viscount was perhaps a little hard on the introducer of the Bill, because the kite-flying measure which the noble and learned Viscount has put before us to-day appears, in fact, to have woken up the Government, and we hear that invitations have already been sent out for a Conference. I suggest that the idea behind this Bill is a good one, but I should prefer to see the maximum number of Life Peers who may be created in one calendar year reduced from ten to five. I also suggest that it would be far better—for reasons which I will give in a few minutes—not only to limit the number of Life Peers who may be created under this Bill but also to provide that their nominations for submission to the Crown should be by a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses. Those of your Lordships who have studied the Report of the well-known Bryce Committee on reform of this Chamber will remember that this was the method put forward for the nomination of Life Peers, and I suggest that it would go a long way to prevent any kind of partisanship in nominations.

Now what must be the ultimate result of the proposals in this Bill, with the possibility of the nomination of ten Life Peers every calendar year? By the process of time, the Life Peers would outnumber what one might call the present working population of this House, which is certainly not a very large one. This result may be a good thing or it may be a bad thing, but what does history teach us in this respect? I think we should not forget that when the House of Lords was abolished in 1649 by Cromwell, and restored eight years later, a right of nominating Peers was retained by Cromwell himself; and, in fact, a very large number of Life Peers were so nominated, outnumbering the number of hereditary Peers. But what happened? In a very short time it was found that the nominated Peers had the disadvantage of being largely partisan and of doubtful benefit. So much so that after the new House had been in Session for only a fortnight it was found necessary to reassemble it on the old hereditary lines.

Of course, present-day conditions and circumstances are entirely different. But I suggest that we should beware of creating a large number of Life Peers, either by this method or by any other method which might tend to submerge the present working population of the House. If we did that, we should inevitably tend to make this Chamber overshadow the First Chamber. This House would be bound to become more assertive and critical, and eventually a rival to the First Chamber. If the country were seeking to establish an entirely new Constitution, a form a Senate might be an admirable thing. But to try to build up one, however limited, and interpose it on the present Constitution, would be doomed to failure. On the other hand, I suggest that there are certain reforms which could be undertaken which would not destroy the inherent advantages that exist in this House and which would, at the same time, meet some of the objections frequently levelled against it. I would mention one very great advantage of the present composition of this House—that is, that it is a good cross-section of the common man, because so many of us are not Field-Marshals or experts in any particular line.

It is perhaps true to say that the most complete and detailed reform which has ever been devised was that produced by the Bryce Committee—to which I have already referred—in the year 1917, which envisaged a large number of Life Peers in addition to a proportion of hereditary Peers. Why was this plan never proceeded with, and why was it allowed to drop by all Parties? I think the words of an historian—none other than Harold Nicolson—give the answer. He said: These recommendations were not carried out because it was felt that no Second Chamber, however carefully devised, would prove either as vulnerable, and therefore as unassertive, as a hereditary chamber, or more honourable, experienced and intelligent than the existing House of Lords. I cannot help feeling that these reasons against a radical reform of the House of Lords largely hold good to-day. The two main reproaches which are sometimes levelled against this House are, first, that there is always a large and permanent Conservative majority; and, second, that Members sit by hereditary right. I am sure the Party opposite will agree that while their Government were in power recently, the Conservative majority in this House was not used at all unfairly. And I suggest that, to that extent, the magnitude of the reproach on this score has been lessened, though no doubt the fear remains that the so-called "backwoodsmen" might appear on the scene.

I am certainly not one of those who rule out any reform of this Chamber. In fact, I would say that an internal reform is badly needed—a reform which could well be devised to meet the case of the "backwoodsmen" and, at the same time, improve the attendance of the House, I suggest that some 200 Peers should be elected by Members of this House to sit and vote during the period of each Parliament. They should be elected on the same lines as those on which the Scottish Peers are elected, and might be known as Peers of Parliament. The method of election might well be left to a Joint Standing Committee of all Parties of this House with a proviso that all Peers who have taken their seats and who are not Peers of Parliament should have the right to attend and speak in debates but not to vote on legislation. I should also like to see a further proviso, that Peers of Parliament who do not attend a minimum of, say, 25 per cent. of the Sittings in each Session, should forfeit their right of voting on legislation for the next Session. As your Lordships are aware, we have something similar in connection with our railway fares from home.

It is interesting to recall that powers to deal with absent Peers were taken in 1820. A Resolution was then passed in your Lordships' House: That no Lord do absent himself, on pain of incurring a fine of £100 for each day's absence, pending the first three days of such proceeding, and thereafter £50 for each day's absence, and in default of paying the fine he should be taken into custody. I have examined the Journals of the House, but I can find nothing to say that this Resolution has been rescinded. Moreover, if we examine the Journals of the House we find that during the 18th Century the Lord Chancellor was frequently engaged in writing letters to noble Lords, exhorting them to attend to their business. I would mention one more point. If payment is at any time to be made the rule, I hope that it will be made for attendances—say, five guineas a time—and not by an annual salary. I would suggest, however, that Peers of Parliament would be in a different position from what I might call the "Petrol Peers" made not long ago, because if Peers of Parliament did not attend the Sittings properly, no doubt they would not be re-elected for the next Parliament.

I submit that the reform of the House on the lines that I have suggested would to some extent lessen the hereditary right to sit and vote in the House, and would go a long way to meet objections to the present sole and unfettered rights. I see no reason why Peers who did not wish to be elected Peers of Parliament should not have the right to be candidates for the other place. Perhaps that would meet the wishes of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who sits behind me here to-day. I am sure that we shall make a great blunder if we endeavour to carry reform much beyond the suggestions I have outlined. I was much struck by the remarks made by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, who I regret has not been able to be in his place to-day. What did the noble Viscount say during the debate on the Parliament Bill in 1948? The noble Viscount said: There is a case for leaving the matter alone—why not leave it alone? Is it really necessary that it should be altered at all? You can have something that is too symmetrical. I must say that I am inclined to agree with the noble Viscount to a certain extent, but I feel that an internal reform of the Chamber, something on the lines I have suggested, is long overdue. I submit that the Bill which is before us to-day, when amended, might well be complementary to this reform. This Bill would undoubtedly be the means of bringing into the House a number of outstanding men in the professional and business worlds who would be a welcome addition to our debates. But I hope the noble Viscount will not press his Bill to-day.

5.14 p.m.

VISCOUNT HAILSHAM

My Lords, when I have the temerity to speak in your Lordships' House, I try to come with a fairly definite idea of what I want to say. That has certain advantages, if one is at a loss, but it also has a disadvantage. Events in your Lordships' House sometimes follow one another with such kaleidoscopic rapidity that one's original intentions become inapposite. That has been the situation this afternoon. What started with the Second Reading of a Bill to promote Life Peerages up to the number of ten has changed miraculously, first into a debate as to the means by which the Bill can be killed without revealing the real motives underlying the action of either Party Front Bench—a most interesting and revealing discussion—and then into a somewhat academic debate on the general subject of the reform of the House of Lords. I should like to offer, with great diffidence, something to both parts of this debate.

I fully share the views of the two Front Benches that, ideally speaking, a reform of the House of Lords should take place after an all-Party Conference, whether agreement is arrived at in the course of that Conference or whether it is not arrived at, as I should personally expect to be the case. For that reason, and since the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, who leads the Government this afternoon, has announced that invitations to such a Conference have now been issued, I must say it would be difficult not to proffer to the noble and learned Viscount, who proposed the Second Reading, the advice that the Second Reading should be, at any rate, postponed until the Conference has taken place. But, at the same time, I would say now that as between the alternative sponsored by the Government, of adjourning the debate, and the alternative of rejecting the Bill, sponsored by the Opposition. I should prefer the adjourning of the debate rather than the rejecting of the Bill, if only for the reason indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, who has just preceded me, that the rejection of the Bill, for whatever reason and however reasoned the argument, would be interpreted by the public at large as a rejection out of hand of the proposition underlying the Bill. And as the noble Earl, Lord Jowitt, was careful to make it plain that he did not reject the principle underlying the Bill, I think it would be a great pity if the Bill were rejected, even on a reasoned Amendment. Therefore, upon the purely practical problem with which we are faced, I myself feel that the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, should take the alternative offered by the Government of adjourning the debate after a suitable discussion in order to enable the Conference to take place.

I must say that I thought some of the criticisms of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, by the two Front Benches, were both a little less than gracious and less than funny. The noble Viscount who leads the Government, speaking, as he always does, with all the enthusiasm and vigour of an extinct volcano in violent eruption seems to consider that criticism was to be levelled at the noble and learned Viscount because for forty-two years he did nothing about this problem. On the lips of noble Lords opposite that argument is inapposite enough, but on the lips of the noble Viscount, who for nearly twenty-five years of his distinguished career has been amongst the leaders of the Party which has corralled Lord Simon into its own counsels, it is less than gracious. The noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, was himself a member of those Governments which in successive Administrations used to urge out of doors the urgency of the reform of the Second Chamber but made themselves responsible when in office for the very policy of non-feasance which they condemned. I thought it was rather less than funny for the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, to level this argument against his noble friend. For my part, I, who played no part in any of those Administrations, feel that the arguments are entirely sound in so far as they are criticisms of successive Administrations in which both noble Viscounts played such distinguished parts but in so far as they are designed as reasons for continuing delay on the part of the present Administration, I consider that they are a little less than convincing. When they are produced by an Opposition belonging to a Party which for years stood for the abolition of the House of Lords, as a reason for continued delay in its reform, I am still less convinced of the cogency or sincerity of these considerations.

Both the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, and the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, in glorious unison, turned and rent the unfortunate Viscount below the gangway because he ventured to bring forward his proposals now, when the Government had so manifestly and sincerely promised to call a Conference, to which up to this afternoon no invitations had been issued. That is really a little too much to expect Back Benchers on either side to swallow. After all, it is not the beginning of all our political careers, humble though we may be. We are quite sure that those invitations would not have been issued this afternoon had it not beer for the initiative of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon. However much the two Front Benches may try to explain that Lord Simon's intervention was very inapposite, because they were always intending to do it on February 3 anyhow, I remain certain that we ought to be grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for having intervened in this particular way. Each Front Bench is completely convinced of the sincerity of the other. I frankly confess that I am not convinced of the sincerity of either. They are neither of them sincere.

I have studied this question with great interest, personally and publicly, for twenty years. Most people in any way interested in public life have at one time or another, with a great degree of frankness and cynicism, made known their own views to me, although it would be wrong for me to betray any of the confidences I have received. I can make only this confession to your Lordships. I am quite convinced that the Labour Party will, if they can, preserve the present situation, because they wish the composition of your Lordships' House to be vulnerable in the light of public opinion, and not as good as it ought to be, in order, in fact, to prevent your Lordships from discharging the responsibility which rests upon you by law. I am equally convinced that there are many members of the Conservative Party who will go on playing with House of Lords reform as a kind of facade—a kind of ritual dance, as Lord Samuel suggested—in order to prevent anything ultimately from being done. Indeed, it is less than twenty-four hours since a prominent member of the Government discreetly informed me that he was not going to have any change made if he could possibly help it.

So much for the sincerity of the two Front Benches: the Labour Party designing to retain an anomaly in order to abuse it when it has nothing better to say for itself, and the Conservative Party designing to enter into a ritual dance for the purpose of avoiding a necessary reform. I hope that the marriage which is proposed in a Conference between these two entirely insincere parties will prove fruitful and produce a child of which the noble and learned Earl opposite will not desire to wring the dirty neck. I hope sincerely that the pressure of public opinion on this matter may drive both political Parties into a certain measure of decency, which so far I do not think they have shown.

Having said that, I should, with respect, like to indicate why, and to what extent, I favour the proposals put forward by my noble and learned friend Lord Simon. As he rightly pointed out, forty-two years have passed since we were told that this problem brooked no delay, I do not think we need complain too much of that, because two facts have gradually emerged during those forty-two years. The first is that the House of Lords as a practical institution works extremely well, although it may be open to every kind of theoretical objection; and the second is that the actual details of reform are a great deal more difficult than was originally thought. To begin with, I think it is fairly clear—I speak in the presence of the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, and he will correct me if I am wrong—that when Mr. Asquith originally thought that the problem brooked no delay, and permitted the preamble to the Parliament Act, 1911, to contain a phrase to the effect that it was designed to substitute for the present House of Lords a Second Chamber appointed on a popular basis, he envisaged some kind of assembly which would draw its authority either from ex-officio membership, or from election. Forty-two years' discussion has, I think, convinced us that that proposal will not do in any form. There are two good reasons why that should be so. The first was defined as long ago as 1857 by Walter Bagehot, when he pointed out that the existence in the British Constitution of two Houses of co-equal authority would lead inevitably to deadlock; that the Second Chamber must always defer to the popularly elected Chamber, and a proposal to have two popularly elected Chambers, each of equal authority, would never pass the House of Commons, and, if it did, ought to be killed by the House of Lords. Therefore, that will not do.

Moreover, there is another reason which applies to proposals of a wider kind. The Parliament of this country was not created: it grew. It has always consisted of King, Lords and Commons. Much of its authority depends on its mystique, which could never be recaptured were we to substitute for the Parliament which has grown a Parliament which was manifestly made by the temporary membership of two Houses. If we are going, to reform the House of Lords, then it follows that we must not substitute another Chamber of any kind at all. It has got to be, at the end, something which men will call, and think of as, the House of Lords. It would be fatally easy to abolish the House of Lords. But to reform it, it is necessary to maintain a continuity and mystique which will command the respect which your Lordships undoubtedly do command, despite defects in the principle of composition.

Therefore, at the end of forty-two years' discussion there are only three broad possibilities for the reform of the House of Lords. One is to leave it alone. There are many people who, in practice, are working to that end, but nobody has ventured to say so in public. The second possibility is to abolish it altogether. That, in my view, would be a very serious and great mistake. The third possibility is to follow, more or less, the general lines of agreement between the Parties in 1948; and that, for the reasons I want to give, quite shortly, is the alternative which I favour. I have not disregarded the powerful plea put in by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, in the speech immediately preceding mine, for another type of assembly. In his case, what he would favour would be an assembly in which the hereditary principle was modified by the principle of election, much as the Scottish Peers now elect their representatives to this House. In my view, with respect, that is another proposal which, although superficially attractive, is not likely in the end to satisfy public opinion.

If it be true, as I believe and as I shall try to show, that the hereditary principle, as such, is something of which public opinion does not fundamentally approve (although we are assured that every Englishman loves a Lord, I am bound to say that since I have been a member of your Lordships' House I have found certain exceptions to the rule) it will, on the whole, be more and not less offensive if what is done in future is to concentrate or distil the hereditary element in this House in such a way that the hereditary principle elects its most effective members always to attend. There is something to be said for the backwoodsman. I sometimes think that I am something of a backwoodsman myself, owing to professional engagements. There is much to be said for the noble Lord who comes to the House when he feels that his public duty demands it, and not simply when he wants to bore his fellow Peers. But there is nothing to be said, at least in my belief, for a House composed, rather like the House of Commons, of those who are compelled by conscience to attend because they have been elected by their fellow representative Peers, to represent nothing except the hereditary principle—a principle which is, at any rate in my view, vicious, at least in the eyes of the public. That is the reason why, with all respect, I do not concur in the view of the noble Lord, Lord Teynham.

Nor, in fact, would it do, as a great many people also ingeniously suggest, to have a number of ex-officio Peers. It is all very well for Her Majesty, on the advice of her Ministers, to summon the Chairman of the Trades Union Congress and make him a Peer, either for life or with the right of succession, as the case may be. But for ex-officio Peers to be created, one would do two things which are wholly alien to the nature of our Constitution. In the first place, we should place important and controversial political functions in the hands of people who do not wish to accept them. In the second place, we should produce exactly the same evil as an elected House of Lords—we should set up a body which would have the moral right to challenge the House of Commons, a principle which is intrinsically vicious in a Constitution like our own. For those reasons, I do not think that will do.

Therefore, we are driven back on proposals rather similar to those which are contained in the Bill and which are also similar—as my noble friend Lord Simon pointed out in his Second Reading speech—to those which were supported by the 1948 Conference. I will come back to that, as I believe it is the only way to a satisfactory reform of the House of Lords. "But why not leave it alone?", as I think the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, said in a former debate. Well, I think very serious disadvantages would be attended by doing nothing, although I am quite aware that there are powerful, if subterranean, influences in both Parties designing to leave it alone as long as they possibly can, which is why I am grateful to my noble and learned friend for having introduced this Bill.

I believe that your Lordships' House is doing invaluable work at the present time, but I also think it is largely prevented from carrying out its work, or hampered in its work, precisely because, of the principle upon which its composition is based. The public do not give, moral support to the, hereditary principle, (or so I believe) and for that reason, even with our present powers—and I want to say a word about powers in a moment—I believe that the work of the House of Lords is largely hampered by the suspicion which the public holds of the hereditary principle. If exactly the same noble Lords and right reverend Prelates met together and discussed in exactly the same terms the legislation which they do at the moment, I believe they would carry a far greater degree of public influence and prestige behind them if the public knew that they were there for what they are and not for what their fathers were. I believe that the reason which the public has in view there is basically perfectly sound. I have never been a critic of hereditary Second Chambers as such. There was a tine. I believe, when the hereditary principle did a great deal of good in our Constitution. That was the time when the danger was that the Crown could easily corrupt the Commons—and it did—and that the commercial principle, easily discernible in those times and easily represented in any metropolis in an age when transport and other services were less easily obtained, might become excessively predominant. The possession by members of your Lordships' House of great landed estates and hereditary titles largely counter-balanced those two dangers. It was not easy to corrupt the House of Lords. They were too numerous and they were too rich; and both those things were very valuable in those days. But death duties have put an end to all that.

It may well be that there was a day when the possession of a great landed estate, passed down from father to son, ought to have conferred the right to a seat in Parliament. But even if every Englishman loves a Lord, no Englishman has ever loved a poor Lord. Indeed, as long ago as the reign of Edward IV this House, and, indeed, Parliament, passed an Act depriving the then Duke of Bedford of his Peerage precisely because he was too poor. There are many people who think this decision ought never to have been reversed. But however that may be, it has always been supposed that the one argument, if any, for the hereditary principle was maintainable only so long as the Peers were rich. They now no longer are, and I myself feel that the hereditary principle is no longer appropriate to the present day.

As a matter of fact, I feel convinced that there are a number of men in public life—I think I may say without offence that I know there are a number of men in public life—who have been inhibited from accepting Peerages for themselves because of the serious disability which the title would impose upon their potential heir. That is no criticism of your Lordships' House. Your Lordships' functions are now well ascertained and the subject of almost general agreement. It is not easy—and I say this with all diffidence—for a young man who has his living, to make, to come at 2.30 in the afternoon simply because he is his father's heir, and for no better reason, to attend your Lordships' debates, knowing all the time that he must never press his views to a Division if they are in contrast to the views of the majority in another place; that his ultimate responsibility runs solely in the imposition of delay, or the insertion of minor Amendments in Bills, or the taking part in debates which have about the same influence in public affairs as a leading article in The Times. These are legitimate and proper functions and they are, by almost universal consent, the functions of a Second Chamber. Nevertheless to impose upon such a young man, with his living to make in a profession or business, or in trade, the obligation to perform these functions, is something about which a father might well feel doubts if he were offered a Peerage; and it is within my knowledge that some fathers have felt doubts to an extent which led them to decline an offer when an approach was made.

I think, therefore, that there are serious disadvantages in maintaining the present situation. I can sum them up in a single sentence by saying this, which I think I can say without causing offence to either Party. Both Houses of Parliament have entrusted to your Lordships' House certain important and, at times, controversial political functions. It is morally wrong for members of any Party, on either side, to permit those who are charged with such functions to carry on, in the knowledge that they will be hampered from discharging them by the presence in the composition of that Chamber of a principle which will rob them of public authority if for any reason they take a controversial line. I believe that the House of Lords, even without greater legal powers, would play a much more vigorous part in the life of Parliament if it were not for the fact that public opinion did not support the principle upon which it was based.

That leads me to say one more word on the subject of powers. I share the view of the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, when he appears to have told—because he told us this afternoon he had—the Conference in 1948 that the difference of three months which separated the Parties was not perhaps so deep a difference of principle as the protagonists supposed. This House has never exercised its legal powers to the full, even under the Parliament Act, except in one or two isolated instances, when it was overridden. What it has done has been to express a strong opinion about matters, some of which have had to be sent back to the House of Commons and some of which were not required to be sent back. But if this House exercised its legal powers, even in the mutilated form of the Parliament Act of 1949, it could make government impossible, and it could render double-Chamber legislation impossible. Unless I am mistaken, we have the right to stop, by simple Resolution, every act of delegated legislation which the Government desire; and no one doubts that if we exercised that indubitable legal right we should bring about a constitutional crisis of the first magnitude. But we do not do it; we do not need to do it; and we should be wrong if we tried to do it.

The point I am leading up to is that the actual legal power of the House of Lords is a relatively minor power so long as the House appreciates its true constitutional function. If it does not appreciate its true constitutional function, it does not matter what powers are given to the House: they are all too big and will all lead to a constitutional crisis. The reason I say that is that I am convinced—and I speak here to the members of my own Party and others—that, if we want to see a House of Lords sufficiently vigorous to be able to act as a trustee of the Constitution in an unlikely event—an event which may never happen, and which we hope will never happen: it was mentioned by the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel—then the thing which we have to be sure of is not that we have adequate legal powers but that we have adequate moral authority; and I think we can get adequate moral authority by a reform of the kind which is now before the House and which will be before the Conference if and when it takes place

I should like to make one last observation on this part of the subject. I should very much deprecate an attempt to put a legal maximum on the numbers of this House. I feel that there are too many Lords of Parliament. I do not think 857, if that be the correct number, is a suitable number. Nevertheless, to put a legal maximum on the number would be to deprive the Government of the day of a most important political safeguard. I know that I am now treading on ground which has been fought over many times—even to-day people can be barely reasonably courteous towards each other in discussing it. I was born after the controversies of 1911—or, rather, I was born before then, but it was not until later that I became interested in them. For this reason, perhaps, I do not feel quite so strongly about them. Nevertheless, I always thought that Bagehot was right in saying that the power of the Crown to create Peerages in such a way as at least to influence the House of Lords if it shows itself oblivious in its duty to the Constitution—that is, to defer to the Commons—is a valuable right which ought to be preserved by both Parties. And any House of Lords of the future is going to be a House of Lords in which one Party does not always have the advantage. It is, in a sense, an embarrassment for a Conservative to speak in this House, because one is always in a majority.

In a sense, the Second Chamber is bound to assist the Conservative Party—and there always will be a Conservative Party—in this country so long it retains Parliamentary democracy. A Second Chamber is bound to help a Conservative Party because its object is to make people think again sometimes; and that is not altogether a bad thing. There are other elements—plenty of them—in our Constitution which always favour the Radical Party—as Conservatives think, unfairly. There is the fact that it is impossible to reverse the trend of legislation, and therefore a mistake, once made, can almost never be repealed. I speak without reference to current controversies, which will be very much in the minds of noble Lords, and in the hope that no one will take advantage of my frankness. But whatever may be said about the Transport Bill and other great Bills, those are the elements which enter in to help the Radicals. The game of politics may not be a ritual dance, but it is rather like a game of picquet, in which two sides hold major and minor hands. That, of course, is why Conservatives have to be more intelligent than Socialists.

Therefore I ask noble Lords opposite, when they enter this Conference, to enter into the attempt which I am sure both Parties will honestly make to see that in this House both Parties will be honestly and fairly represented. But I ask them at the same time not, to block any proposal for reform simply on the ground that in some circumstances Conservatives may gain a trick and that in no circumstances whatever are they prepared to see a reformed House of Lords discharge its full constitutional function, All know that they will have to work very hard in their own Party for that appeal to have any effect whatsoever on some of those inside them. I apologise for having detained your Lordships for so long. I should like to, reiterate my gratitude to the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, for having introduced this subject at this most timely moment and having precipitated the issue by the Government of the invitations to a Conference which I hope most sincerely will be conscientiously accepted.

5.47 p.m.

THE EARL OF MANSFIELD

My Lords, some twenty years ago, when I was a member of another place, the late Lord Salisbury did me and another fairly young Member the honour of asking us to join an unofficial committee that he had set up of something over a dozen senior Members of your Lordships' House to consider the question of House of Lords Reform. The Committee met on a good many occasions, and eventually arrived at no very definite decision on the powers; but as a result of the deliberations and the vast amount of historical and other material laid before us. I became convinced that no alteration in the powers or composition of your Lordships' House, other than in minor details, was feasible, necessary or desirable. Nothing that has taken place since then has in any way shaken that conviction.

On the question of powers, let me make clear at once that I entirely agree with all those speakers this afternoon who have stressed the danger of a clash between the Houses, should this House ever be given, or at least use, the powers which would enable it seriously to curtail the wishes of the Commons. For myself, I should not like to see us enjoy any greater powers than we do at present, save the restoration of the previous period of two years' delay. But when it comes to the question of the hereditary principle, my belief is that the country as a whole accepts that principle. If for forty-two years nothing has been done about a question which was then said to brook no delay, what is the reason? I think the answer is quite obvious. It is that the question, so burning in 1911, is now purely an academic one. In 1911, the fires of controversy were blazing high and bright. To-day, those fires are not even embers. Their very ashes have been dispersed by the winds of subsequent history, and to suggest that any considerable proportion of the people of this country to-day are wildly excited about the iniquity, so-called, of the hereditary system in your Lordships' House is, I think, to take a view which it would be extremely difficult to substantiate.

Indeed, I know of only one enthusiastic and persistent defamer of your Lordships' House, both as an institution and in regard to individual members, and that is a Member of this House who never ceases to take the opportunity of squirting venom through the daily periodicals which he owns and controls. But, with this quite unimportant exception, your Lordships' House is, I maintain, regarded with admiration, and indeed reverence, by a very large section of our population, and not a very appreciable number would wish to see a radical change in its composition. It is for that reason that my quarrel with the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, is that he has stirred up both Front Benches from their, to me, entirely convenient and appropriate torpor. I wish that he had left well alone. But, so far as his own Bill is concerned, since the matter has been raised, I could wish that the Bill were given a Second Reading, because I feel that in some respects the composition and certain functions of your Lordships' House might with advantage be amended in minor detail.

In spite of the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Moran, I feel that there is something to be said for the creation of Life Peerages. I would agree also with the criticism that ten new Life Peerages in any one year would tend to be too many. In regard to the question of the admission of women, that I think is a point that might well be left until later. The noble and learned Viscount said that voting had now become a ladylike occupation. One might be forgiven for wondering whether sitting in another place could equally be considered a ladylike occupation. In fact, from various episodes that took place when I was there, and others which have occurred since, it might possibly be considered hardly a gentleman-like occupation—but I imagine that it would be unwise to pursue that topic further. But there is one way in which improvement could be made: the creation of a limited number of Life Peerages every year.

Another possible improvement would be to enable Ministers, by invitation, to address the House of which they are not members, to answer Questions there. I brought forward a Motion on this point in your Lordships' House some time before the war, but received, I regret to say, very little support, though no one, at least in my opinion, was able to put forward very cogent arguments against it. Also, I should like to see that, when anyone succeeded to a Peerage, he (or, if necessary, she) should have the chance of electing whether he should take up that Peerage or leave himself free, so that it might be legal for him to stand for election to another place. These small points are ones which I think could well be introduced by the piecemeal legislation which has been commented upon so adversely, and, to my mind, unfairly to-day. The whole history of our Constitution has been that of evolution and not revolution. The one revolution we have had was a ghastly failure, and the country took pains to put the situation right and to forget it as quickly as possible. To alter the composition of your Lordships' House in the drastic ways that have been suggested would be, to my mind, a revolution in every respect out of keeping with our history and our traditions.

The best advocate for the hereditary system this afternoon has been the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who unwittingly blew his own case to smithereens when he pointed out that your Lordships' House, as at present constituted, had never made use of the still fairly extensive powers which it possesses under the 1911 Parliament Act. That is a tribute to the good sense and moderation of the hereditary element in your Lordships' House. Were that element to be replaced by persons more in the nature of, we will say, professional legislators—I will not say "professional politicians"—then I think it quite unlikely that they would exercise anything like the same restraint. Furthermore, no member of the Party opposite would claim that the action of your Lordships' House as a whole was in any way improper when their lamentable Government was in office from 1945 onwards. Then, if ever, was the opportunity, and indeed the justification, for "backwoodsmen" to descend in swarms to prevent the passage of legislation for which, in a number of cases, there was no mandate. But where were such "backwoodsmen"? Sound the clarion, fill the fife! Where were the men from the Norfolk fens? Where were the fur-clad men from the Welsh mountains? Did strange, kilted figures, mouthing Gaelic epithets, appear from North of the Border? No; nothing of that sort happened. Your Lordships' House has always accepted what was obviously the will of the people, and legislation was permitted to go through which was obviously entirely uncongenial to the great majority of them. But I repeat, I very much doubt whether, in a House which did not contain such a large hereditary element, such moderation would have been observed.

There is another point in regard to the possible limitation of the numbers which I think should be borne in mind and which has not been raised, so far as I can remember, this afternoon. That is that one of the weaknesses of nearly every Chamber of a senatorial character is the excessive age of the majority of the people composing it. In making this remark. I fully recognise that the first three excellent speeches this afternoon were made by noble Lords whose average age was, I think, closer to eighty than to seventy; but I do not think that anyone would claim that such noble Lords or their like would be found in large numbers, even in this House, let alone in any other legislative assembly. If we had the ordinary type of Senate, in which the only representatives there are persons who have already distinguished themselves in various walks of life, it is obvious that it would mean raising very sharply indeed the average age of such an assembly. In your Lordships' House, there are at the present time, and always have been since I have had the privilege of being a member of it, a considerable number of young men, some of them very young men; and I think it will be agreed that a number of those have amply proved themselves worthy of membership. Again, the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, truly said that some members who might sit by right in your Lordships' House but might be considered as not worthy of doing so never appear here. Can any noble Lord remember being present at, or even hearing of, any scene in your Lordships' House caused by some young Peer who did not know his place? I do not think so, and that in itself is an added justification for having young men present.

My noble friend Lord Teynham put forward the suggestion which I myself had intended to make. It is one which should be very carefully borne in mind if there is any serious question of the curtailment of the number in your Lordships' House. I refer to the proposal, which I think should be insisted upon if reform ever takes place, of allowing all existing members of your Lordships' House to speak, if not to vote. This House contains such an enormous wealth of experience, much of it undoubtedly concentrated in those who might be described as "backwoodsmen," many of whom, often for reasons beyond their control, do not come frequently to your Lordships' House but who have this wonderful experience which, on the right occasion, they come and impart to your Lordships. Few of them would have any chance of being elected or nominated to the type of Second Chamber that many people seem to envisage.

Although it has been mentioned more than once, I do not think sufficient attention has been paid this afternoon to the fact that it is not as a voting Chamber but as a debating Chamber that your Lordships' House plays its principal function. Our Divisions are not very numerous, but I am glad to say our debates, of a very high level, take place fairly frequently. If we are going to cut out these "backwoodsmen" and all these young men we are going to alter radically, and to my mind lamentably, the whole character of your Lordships' House. Anything which would prevent any of the present or future hereditary Peers from being able at least to voice their opinion is something which should be strongly condemned. It is not the vote that matters; it is the expression of free opinion, and the fact that in the great majority of cases here Peers speak with complete freedom of thought and of interest. If your Lordships will permit one personal experience, a short time ago I was approached by a railway man acquaintance of mine whom I knew to be a strong Socialist. He asked me for advice about a certain matter. I gave it to him, I believe with satisfactory results, and then asked him why he had not approached his own Member of Parliament. His reply was, "I came to you because I knew I should get a straight answer. You do not have to think about votes." That, my Lords, goes a long way to reinforce my contention that quite apart from politics, even the hereditary Peer still possesses the respect of the people of this country. They know that your Lordships' House is an independent body, not dependent upon votes and therefore able to discuss matters at a very high level.

It is for that reason that I have always regretted that the Conservative Party made any mention in their election manifesto of reform of the House of Lords. It is for that reason that I regret that the noble and learned Viscount has, if I may use such a term, stirred them up to activity in this way, because it is obvious, as has already been said, that now the noble and learned Viscount has produced his legislative bantling this afternoon, both Front Benches are determined to slaughter it, one by direct infanticide, the other by just permitting it to die. The suggestion contained in the Bill for Life Peerages would, I believe, as I have said, be a good thing, in addition to the various small emendations that I have suggested; but when both Front Benches are agreed upon this policy of infanticide, simply in order that they may go forward to a Conference designed to bring about some radical alteration in your Lordships' House, then I say to them, A plague o' both your houses! Why cannot you leave well alone?

6.5 p.m.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH

My Lords, I intervene to say only a few words in this debate. While certainly no expert on Constitutional reform, I have developed some interest in the matter that we have been discussing this afternoon by reason of my having spoken at various meetings on subjects connected with Parliament, which have, of course, inevitably touched on House of Lords reform. I must say that I have been rather surprised to find considerable agreement and enthusiasm amongst the various audiences that I have spoken to, that there should be some strengthening, if not of the powers, at any rate of the composition of your Lordships' House. Therefore, I welcome this Bill as a start towards settling this problem, even if, as some noble Lords have said, it may be rather inopportune. At any rate, it does seem to have brought an all-Party Conference nearer, and if that is the only function that it has served I think it is an extremely useful one.

After all, the reform of this House is an idea to which all Parties have paid lip service for forty-two years, but somehow or other have always found some plausible excuse to put it off until another day. It occurs to me that now there is no friction between this House and another place this might well be a good time for such a Conference, and I hope that any such talks will be entered into, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Kenswood, said this afternoon, in such a spirit that the talks will not fail, but will succeed. I think I am right in saying that the last all-Party Conference, in 1948, could hardly have been held at a worse time. The Government of the day had just introduced a Bill which necessarily led to friction between the two Houses, and Party controversy was running high. Even so, it was remarkable how nearly general agreement was reached, even in those circumstances.

I hope that there will not be any lack of trying on the part of the Government and of the Liberal Party. I do not think there will be. As to the attitude of the Socialist Party, it seems to me, to say the least, to be rather doubtful. They seem to speak with two voices on this subject—as, indeed, they do on some others. Certainly they have moved a considerable way from the view that I think was once expressed by the late Mr. Clynes: that the House of Lords cannot be mended, only ended. Now perhaps noble Lords opposite do not wish to end the House of Lords. I am sure that a number of noble Lords opposite do not wish that; but neither do they seem at all eager to mend it. Certainly nothing they did during the years that they were in office helped very much. As some noble Lords have said, a section of the Party opposite, at any rate, does not want an effective Second Chamber—and by "effective," I mean effective in the sense of exercising a check against totalitarian trends which may be displayed by a Party of the Left or the Right who enjoy a temporary, and perhaps unrepresentative, majority in another place. That, as I see it, is the vital function of this House.

It seems to me, therefore, that if the Labour Party do not enter the Conference it can only be because they want this House to be so weak in composition and in power that it is, as I think the noble Marquess the Leader of the House once put it, only useful to throw brickbats at on Saturday afternoons. It would mean that they are prepared to tolerate only a House of Lords which, as Mr. Bevan once said he hoped, would eventually become no more than an ancient monument and would gradually wither and crumble away. I believe it is vital that this should not occur and I think most noble Lords opposite are in agreement with me on that point. Already the powers of this House are down to somewhere near vanishing point. Yet, even so, any full use of those small powers which this House now wields would almost certainly be followed by a demand for liquidation. I think this is a very grave and urgent matter. And when we consider that we have an unwritten Constitution with wholly inadequate safeguards for preventing a Party in another place from going some distance towards a form of a dictatorship, I think we must feel that the sooner something is done the better.

I personally believe it is more important to concentrate on strengthening the composition of the House than on any increase in the powers. I believe that a Second Chamber with a substantial number of its Members appointed on individual merits and not necessarily attached to any political Party, even if equipped only with the powers which the House at the moment has, would nevertheless prove to be a Chamber considerably greater in the esteem and confidence of the public than the present House, which is almost entirely hereditary in composition. Finally, I should like briefly to mention the position of the younger Members with regard to any changes that may take place in the composition of the House. I hope it will still be possible for those who may wish to do so to have the chance of membership in any reformed House. At the same time, I think it should be recognised that there may well exist a considerable number of Peers, particularly younger Peers, who may wish to lead a more active political life than is possible in present circumstances. I hope, therefore, that the Government and all other Parties entering into the Conference will consider the position of younger Peers who may wish to stand for another place and who find their present inability to do so embarrassing. I sincerely trust that something fruitful will come of this all-Party Conference.

6.12 p.m.

LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH

My Lords, I beg to move that this debate be now adjourned.

Moved, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Lord Balfour of Burleigh.)

On Question, Motion agreed to, and debate adjourned accordingly.

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