HL Deb 02 December 1953 vol 184 cc911-20

5.30 p.m.

LORD MILVERTON rose to ask Her Majesty's Government, with reference to recently published communications between the leader of the Action Group Party of Western Nigeria and the Secretary of State for the Colonies concerning the future status of Lagos, whether Her Majesty's Government will make clear the meaning and scope of the third paragraph of the letter of the Chief Secretary of Nigeria, dated November 10, 1953, which was written under direction from the Secretary of State. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in rising to ask Her Majesty's Government the Question on the Order Paper, I think it is desirable, in order that the Question may be fully understood, to give some of the background before I quote the words whose meaning I am asking the noble Earl to elucidate. It is all connected with the recent decision on the status of Lagos. I shall quote from The Times of November 20. The leader of the Action Group on October 23 sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies putting what he called five challenges to him. I am concerned with only one of those challenges which reads as follows: I challenge you to deny that the people of the Western Region have the right of self-determination and are free to decide whether or not they will remain in the proposed Nigerian Federation.

The reply to that was conveyed to the leader of the Action Group through the Acting Chief Secretary of Nigeria, by direction from the Secretary of State, and it read as follows: The Secretary of State has directed that you should be informed that any attempt to secure alteration of that decision"— that is, the decision concerning the status of Lagos— by force will be resisted, and in this context I am to observe that any attempt to secure the secession of the Western Region from the Federation would be regarded as the use of force. It is true that the communication then went on to say: If, as Lord Munster has pointed out, the majority parties in Nigeria freely agree among themselves on some alternative solution regarding the status of Lagos, Her Majesty's Government will be willing to consider it on its merits and in the interests of Nigeria as a whole. Failing that, the decision made by Her Majesty's Government is final. My Lords, in passing, may I suggest that the impression that that statement may superficially make, of a rather fair and open mind in certain circumstances, is in fact not really the case, because what those words in that context would mean, and have meant to the people of the Western Region, is that the Secretary of State would in no way facilitate a conference between the Regions, particularly the West and the North, which might lead to a variation of the decision; and, in the circumstances of Nigeria, it is also fairly certain that no such conference with a view to reaching an agreement could take place save under the auspices or with the help of Government authority.

In order to understand that reply and the Question which I have asked, one has to ask to whom those very strong words were addressed. The answer is, to the leader of the Action Group. What is the Action Group? My Lords, the Action Group is the Government of the Western Region. I presume there will be no question about that, because this Group controls a majority of 57 to 19 in the Western House of Assembly. Recently, too, the same Group has swept the municipal elections in Lagos itself, where they have now 26 Members to 15 of the Opposition, together with nine traditional members of the Council who are all Action Group supporters; and that means that there is now on the Lagos Council an Action Group majority of 35 to 15. It is true, but I hope it will not be quoted by the noble Earl as an argument, that only 30 per cent. of the people on the electoral register of Lagos, voted in the last election. That 30 per cent. is a record total for elections in Lagos. I remember as far back as my time there the remarkable indifference of the people of Lagos to the so-called benefits of universal suffrage and the voting system. In any case, the last poll represented a bumper poll.

The question must arise in relation to this reply about secession: has any region the right to secede, and if so, when did they acquire it? Have any of them lost it, or has it never existed? One was led to understand that one of the ways in which the Northern Region acquired merit at the London conference in August was that they modified their former eight or nine-point programme which amounted to a refusal to enter Federation, and agreed to become members of a Federation. Whether or not that implies that they previously had the right to stay out of the Federation, or whether or not it implies that they or any other Region can still claim to go out of the Federation, which was a recommendation of that conference, I do not pretend to know. I hope that the noble Earl will elucidate this point. But certainly the impression left at the time was that Regions had to be persuaded and therefore had a right to stay out if they chose.

Another point with regard to that reply about whose meaning I have asked for an elucidation is that if it was merely a statement that a resort to force by the Action Group would be met with force, surely it was hardly necessary to state it with such forceful ambiguity; that would be the normal reaction of a Government to a challenge to its authority. But undoubtedly it might mean that any meeting held in the Western Region at which secession from the Federation was argued and advocated would be treated as the use of force. If so, the letter which appeared in The Times of November 26 is very relevant. It was from two of the Action Group leaders under Mr. Awolowo, who was present in London at the time, and in it they pointed out that their leader was well known for his moderation and for his determination to use nothing but constitutional means. But, they said: Mr. Lyttelton's letter implies that even an attempt to achieve our ends constitutionally will be regarded as force. Such an idea comes ill from a Minister of a country which permits not only Irish Nationalists, Scottish Nationalists and Welsh Nationalists, but even Communists, to stand for election to Parliament, and allows them to do all in their power to influence the electorate. I think that reinforces the request I have made for elucidation of the meaning.

In conclusion, I underline it still further by quoting the last paragraph of the report which has now been published, written by Mr. Perry, the Canadian expert who was called in to make a report on the financial and administrative arrangements in the capitals of federal countries. May I say, in passing, that had it been possible to publish that report before the conference in August, I feel confident that anyone reading it would say it world very considerably have influenced the decisions reached at that conference. In his final paragraph Mr. Perry, referring to the different forms, of federal capital, says: In both Washington and Ottawa it would appear that the success of existing arrangements is due to the existence of a friendly and co-operative understanding between the central and local governments, with constant informal discussion of joint problems as they arise or can be anticipated. How very precisely that applies to the position in Nigeria ! And without that good will, prospects of federation—we all want them to be good, and we want federation to succeed—cannot but be jeopardised by a forceful reply of this nature, if it means what it can be read to mean and what the people in Nigeria fear it does mean.

5.40 p.m.

LORD OGMORE

My Lords, I beg to support the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, in the inquiry which he has made, and strongly made, of the Government. I assume that rarely has any communication gone out to what is, after all, the Government Party in a part of the British Commonwealth in such terms as those from a Secretary of State. No one could complain to-day of the amount of attention that the British public has, perforce, to pay to Colonial affairs. Unfortunately, as your Lordships have noted previously, we pay much attention to them, in Parliament and in public, only when they have become acute, when there is trouble, have always hoped that Parliament and the British public would pay some attention to Colonial affairs before a situation became acute. The noble Lord, Lord Milverton, wisely, has brought this matter to the attention of your Lordships before the situation has become acute. I hope that, as the result of his Question, the situation will not become acute, because, if it does, Her Majesty's Government will have another very difficult situation on their hands. I should have thought that already they had quite enough—no doubt they think so too.

The situation, as Lord Milverton has explained, has been caused by this extraordinarily maladroit letter that has been sent by the Secretary of State to the Action Group; and, as Lord Milverton has already said, either the letter meant that if the Action Group resisted the cession of their part of Nigeria by force he would meet that force by force, which was unnecessary, Or, if it did not mean that, it threatened these people, who are a Government, with force if they took action which was perfectly constitutional. That was Lord Milverton's point, and a perfectly good one. It is a point upon which your Lordships are entitled to an answer. I would say that the Government in Nigeria can choose the way in which they are going. At the present moment, in the Western Region, there is a Government of constitutional persons of moderate views. They are Nationalists, in the sense that many of your Lordships are English, Welsh or Scottish Nationalists; that is to say, they love their country and hope to handle their own affairs within the broader scope of the British Commonwealth. They are not in any form revolutionaries, still less Communists. That is as I understand it. If the Government so direct their affairs in Nigeria that these people, the present Government of the Western Region, are forced out of office, what is going to take their place? If the British Government are no longer going to deal with moderate opinion, they will have to deal with very inflamed opinion indeed. It is, I suggest, an act of wise statesmanship to try in every way possible, to meet the quite legitimate desires of the moderate opinion in the Western Region, as represented by Mr. Awolowo and his Ministers.

I would ask for a reply from the Government on one particular point, in addition to the explanation which the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, has requested. It is this. On the last occasion on which we debated Nigeria—a month ago, or something of that kind—the noble Earl, Lord Munster, made a statement which is quoted in the letter to which Lord Milverton has referred. He said in effect: if the majority parties in Nigeria freely agreed among themselves on some alternative solution regarding the status of Lagos, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be willing to consider it on its merits and in the interests of Nigeria as a whole. I have been in touch with opinion in Nigeria. Two gentlemen referred to by Lord Milverton have been to see me, and we have had discussions on this whole point. They are, of course, Ministers in Nigeria. I understand that the statement of the noble Earl, Lord Munster, did a lot of good. It made a very good impression indeed. I was glad to hear that, and I would ask the noble Earl whether he could go a little further to consolidate that good impression which he made, but which, unfortunately, was so soon dissipated by the Secretary of State's maladroit letter.

The counter-proposals which the West have put forward are contained in a document which the noble Earl, Lord Munster, knows very well, a document headed "Lagos belongs to the West." I would ask Lord Munster whether he would arrange, either through the Secretary of State or the Governor, or both, for a meeting of the heads of the three Regions to take place in Nigeria before the January conference, so that these alternative suggestions, which are alternative to the present proposals with reference to Lagos, could be considered by the leaders of the three Regions. If he does that, it will entirely meet the views of the leaders of the Western Region, who at the moment—only at the moment—wish for nothing more than to discuss their alternative proposals with the leaders of the other two Regions. They hope at such a conference to persuade the leaders of the other two Regions that their counter-proposals would in every way safeguard the other Regions with reference to the position of Lagos, and that there is no need for the drastic solution that has been proposed—namely, to cut off Lagos from the West and to make it a Federal enclave. If Lord Munster could give an assurance that he would be prepared to arrange this meeting, I am sure that it would have a good effect in the Western Region, and that it could do nothing but good in the other Regions as a whole.

5.50 p.m.

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (THE EARL OF MUNSTER)

My Lords, I am glad to have this opportunity of clearing up what appears to be a misunderstanding. The noble Lord, Lord Milverton, who is asking this Question referred to paragraph 2 of a letter dated November 9, addressed to Mr. Awolowo by the Acting Chief Secretary of Nigeria at my right honourable's friend's direction. That is the same paragraph which appears as paragraph 3 in the circular which has been sent to many noble Lords in this House by a Mr. Pickering.

Although Her Majesty's Government firmly believe that it is in the interests of the peoples of Nigeria that the unity of the country should be preserved, they would, of course, not regard as the use of force an attempt on the part of the Action Group to get the right of regional self-determination, or secession, written into the Constitution, or otherwise recognised, if that attempt were pursued by constitutional means. When directing the reply to Mr. Awolowo my right honourable friend had in mind certain statements which had been made by the Action Group leaders, which implied that they would attempt to get the decision of Her Majesty's Government on Lagos altered by force, and would use the secession of the Western Region (for which there is no provision in the Nigerian Constitution), or the threat thereof, as part of a campaign intended to compel Her Majesty's Government to alter their decision. It was in this context that my right honourable friend wished, and still wishes, the Action Group clearly to understand that any such attempt would be resisted. I think all noble Lords will agree that it is always dangerous to let threats, or implied threats, of force or unconstitutional action go unchallenged. I cannot help thinking your Lordships will agree that my right honourable friend was wise to issue this word of warning. I hope that I have made clear to the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, and to the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, the reasons which prompted my right honourable friend to send that letter.

The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, raised the further question of whether the Action Group could be assisted in calling together a conference to discuss the future of Lagos, to see whether some kind of agreement could be reached. On that point I should like to say that my right honourable friend is not, and has never been, pro- or anti- any political Party, as such, in Nigeria, provided, of course, that they pursue their ends by constitutional means. In this matter my right honourable friend and Her Majesty's Government try at all times to be completely and wholly objective, and we are glad and anxious to work with any, and indeed all, Parties in Nigeria who approach the difficult problems of that country in a spirit of reasonableness and moderation, and who are prepared, where necessary, to subordinate purely sectional interests to the wider interests of Nigeria as a whole.

Your Lordships know that in the matter of Lagos feelings have run high, but we have no doubt at all that the decision which we reached was right in itself, and we believe that it still has the support of an overwhelming majority of Nigerians in the country. At the same time, as has already been made abundantly clear, and as was impressed upon the House again by the noble Lord opposite, if the majority Parties in the three Regions of Nigeria were freely to agree amongst themselves on some alternative solution, then Her Majesty's Government would be willing to consider it on its merits and in the interests of Nigeria as a whole. But the initiative of any action in this respect must lie with the Action Group. Failing that, I can only repeat that the present decision of Her Majesty's Government must be regarded as final. Should some compromise solution of a feasible and acceptable kind not prove possible, however, then Her Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the Action Group, and indeed the other Parties in the country, will come to the reconvened conference early next year with renewed determination to sink sectional differences, and will address themselves again to the tasks before them in a manner worthy of their country and in the best interests of the Commonwealth. Of course, there must be toleration for minorities; and, equally important, there must be respect for lawfully constituted authorities. The Nigerian people need have no fear that Her Majesty's Government will fail them, but it is our earnest prayer that the Nigerian statesmen themselves will not fail their own people.

LORD OGMORE

My Lords, before the noble Earl sits down may I ask whether, if the Action Group send a request to the Governor for the calling of such a meeting as I have proposed, the Governor will take the necessary steps to call a meeting of the leaders of the three Regions?

THE EARL OF MUNSTER

My Lords, I hardly think that the Secretary of State would interfere at all in this matter; nor would he be prepared, I think, to give the Governor any instructions that he should convene a meeting for that purpose. As I said in the course of my reply, the first initiative in the whole of this question must obviously come from the Action Group. If they make an effort to call together the other Parties, let us see what will happen; but I feel perfectly certain that my noble friend would not be prepared to give any instruction to the Governor in that particular direction.

LORD MILVERTON

My Lords, arising out of that, may I ask whether the Secretary of State would be prepared to give the Governor a free hand if he is asked by the leaders of the Action Group to arrange such a meeting? Will he be given a free hand to do what he thinks is best in the interests of Nigeria?

THE EARL OF MUNSTER

My Lords, I think I can answer the noble Lord at once. Of course, the Secretary of State will be prepared to give the Governor a free hand in this particular line, but I do not think he would be prepared to direct the Governor.

5.58 p.m.

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

My Lords, perhaps I may be allowed to make two brief comments on what has been said. In the first place, I would ask the noble Earl to consider whether it is a satisfactory way of conducting our relations with political leaders in the Colonies to exchange strongly worded letters which are subsequently published in the Press. I cannot help feeling that when differences exist, as they very often do, it is better not to advertise them too widely. In a case of this kind, in the first instance, might a reply not have been given to Mr. Awolowo verbally and privately by the Acting Chief Secretary in Lagos? The second comment I should like to make is this. As the noble Earl is aware, the conference on the future Constitution in Nigeria will meet again in Lagos next year. I hope he will listen to the appeal that has been made by the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, and my noble friend, that the Government should make every effort to encourage Nigerian political Parties to come together to reach an agreed settlement about the future of Lagos, because that seems to be the essential, indispensable thing if the new Constitution of Nigeria is to work. The reason, above all, why I regret this matter is that up to now it has made the chance of agreement between the parties more difficult. I very much hope that Her Majesty's Government will do everything possible between now and January to encourage the parties to come together in a frame of mind in which both sides will be willing to make some compromise in order that there may be a settlement about the future status of Lagos in a Federal Nigeria.

THE EARL OF MUNSTER

My Lords, I would not disagree with the noble Earl's last remarks for one moment. I certainly hope that some agreement will be reached amongst all parties to the discussions, and I am sure that that is the view of my right honourable friend and of Her Majesty's Government. I do not want to prolong this debate longer than is necessary, but I should like to remind the noble Earl of the remarks of Mr. Awolowo, in which he used the threat of force.

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

My Lords, surely there is no threat of force in Mr. Awolowo's letter—none at all. The threats were made in Nigeria by other persons.

THE EARL OF MUNSTER

My Lords, the noble Earl must have forgotten what Mr. Awolowo said when he was addressing a very large crowd of people. These are his words: 'We are hopeful the decision to separate Lagos from the Western Region will be reversed. But if it is not reversed, Lagos will have to be separated on our dead bodies'. The report of the speech contined: 'Lagos must remain in the Western Region and not one inch of Lagos Island should be taken away from the West.' If Lagos was separated from the Western Region, the West would secede from Nigeria and the people of the Region would not be bound by any law enacted by the Nigeria Parliament. 'If any law is passed,' Mr. Awolowo was reported as saying, 'We will defy it'. Here was a very obvious statement that trouble was brewing, or certainly that Mr. Awolowo was prepared to use force if the decision on Lagos was not reversed. I have no apology to make on behalf of my right honourable friend. I think he was absolutely right in pointing out to Mr. Awolowo what was said in the letter.