NAVY ESTIMATES

HL Deb 27 March 1952 vol 175 cc1042-83

3.41 p.m.

Debate resumed.

LORD PAKENHAM

My Lords, when the late Administration gave way to the present one, many people were sorry about many things, but all who knew him were delighted that the right honourable gentleman, Mr. J. P. L. Thomas, should be selected as First Lord of the Admiralty. The months that have passed have confirmed that pleasure. At the same time, it was and is possible to regret that, among the Admiralty team of Ministers, no place should be found for a member of this House. That regret is increased after listening once again to an admirable discourse from the noble Lord, Lord Teynham. I hope he will accept that very sincere compliment. That does not, of course, mean that we do not rejoice to see the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, stepping up to the Government Despatch Box for his first major encounter. If I revealed the full depth, intimacy and antiquity of my friendship with the noble Earl, it might prejudice him in his progress towards the higher reaches of the Administration. I say only that I feel sure that he will hold the ring to-day as firmly and dexterously as he held my own wedding ring about twenty years ago, not many hundred yards from here. I know he is always happiest afloat, but I do not think he will remain at sea very long this afternoon.

VISCOUNT SWINTON

May we all assure the noble Lord, so that he should not cramp his style, that many Tories had the benefit of his tuition and advice when he was still one of us?

LORD PAKENHAM

I am grateful to the noble Viscount, but I often feel that, if he had received those benefits, he would be a still more fully-equipped Tory than he is at the present time: he would at least know the Socialist case, which I never think we are able to bring home to him with sufficient effect. It was an immense honour for me to occupy, even for a few months, the historic position of First Lord of the Admiralty, surely one of the most glorious offices that anyone in this country can hold. It was a deeply moving experience to preside over a Navy whose traditions had been preserved and, if possible, enhanced by my noble predecessor Lord Hall, so deeply loved throughout all the ranks of the Service, as I know very well. I believe the noble Viscount to-day, with his usual modesty, rather understated his long connection with the Navy and his work for that Service. He talked of eight and a half years, but I think it is really over twenty years since the noble Viscount began to work very hard indeed for the Royal Navy. Certainly, that is the way he is looked upon throughout the Navy itself. He was more than kind about me. Indeed, he has shown a generosity not only such as one would expect from him but such as I found throughout the Navy itself, from the highest to the lowest, from the great sailors—from perhaps. if I may so refer to him, the greatest sailor of the day, Lord Cunningham—to the humblest able seaman.

To-day I shall confine my remarks almost entirely to naval aviation. But first, I would say a few sentences on each of two other topics. I start with a word or two about the present position of the First Lord. These remarks, so far as I know, would apply equally as well to the other Service Ministers. I will not canvas this afternoon the merits or otherwise of the general system now prevailing in this field. It is a system that will no doubt eventually be judged by results. One feature of that system, as is well known, is the dual or, some might say, the triple allegiance of the Chiefs of Staff. They have a very difficult time of it in one respect, because they wear two, or one might say three, hats: they have an allegiance to their own Service Minister, to the Minister of Defence, and, it may be argued, to the Prime Minister.

Another feature of the system is the exclusion of the Service Ministers from the Cabinet, quite a new development of modern times. While to-day I am not arguing for or against the system, I would call attention to one danger which I am sure we are all at pains to ward off. I think we warded it off fairly successfully in our time, with the help of a lot of good will and a great deal of careful thought—I refer to the danger that the Service Ministers might be downgraded to the point where they were little better than Under-Secretaries. I say that with no disrespect to Under-Secretaries, if there are any present. I am speaking as an old Under-Secretary But there is the danger that the Service Ministers may become little better than Under-Secretaries with a kind of glorified ceremonial function, moving in an atmosphere of mock deference. I am glad to see one of the Service Ministers in this House, and if I might venture to give the present Service Ministers a word of advice I would offer them this one tip: if ever the Service Ministers hear that the Chiefs of Staff are being asked to the Cabinet, they must make absolutely certain that they are asked as well. I offer that advice free, gratis, and for nothing.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR (LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY)

I am much obliged to the noble Lord.

LORD PAKENHAM

I have no doubt that the good relations which existed in our time between all concerned will continue, but I make no apology for placing the matter publicly before the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Alexander, to whom on every personal ground our best wishes go out in his new and onerous duties.

Now one word about the overwhelmingly important subject of scientific research in the Navy. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Cherwell, has left us. because this is where he could be of great assistance. I suppose that anyone who lays clown the burden of the First Lord asks himself, at that time and later many times, the ultimate question: "How far have I handed over a Service adequate to its tasks if war suddenly came upon us?" In terms of personal quality, I believe that none of us need have any qualms; in terms of total physical material, it is possible to draw very comforting conclusions, certainly when you add to our resources those of our Allies. And yet if is struggle, the rivalry between our scientists and those, of our only possible opponents, continues unceasingly, almost as dramatically as it did during the last war, as Mr. Churchill has described so graphically. If we once lost that scientific lead, does anybody doubt—I am stile that none of the experts with us to-day doubt—sthat the position could he revolutionised to our disadvantage in the space of two or three years? It might be sooner.

My Lords, not only I but very much more competent judges repose great confidence in the quality of our naval scientists. Nevertheless, it is rather horrifying (I do not know whether the noble Earl has had time to look into this matter; perhaps he has hardly had sufficient time as yet), when one visits some of our research establishments, to observe how pitifully small in number are these high-powered scientific thinkers, on whose activities and mental processes to-day the very survival of our country might depend in war. While I. was at the Admiralty our scientific staff was not up to establishment, and in my view the establishment itself was too low. Various things were being done, but the problem of attracting the best scientists, against the competition of the universities and industry, was not an easy one.

In the light of those difficulties and against that background, I ask the noble Earl, to whom I have given some notice, categorically for these assurances: First, that the general cuts being imposed on the Civil Service will not apply to the scientific staff of the Navy. I refer only to the Navy, because that is our subject this afternoon; no doubt the need of the other Services is equally strong. I say at once, that I shall not be satisfied if I am told that the number of scientists now serving will not be reduced. If that answer is given, in my view it will be a highly unsatisfactory one, because the actual number of scientists the Navy is, or was until lately, below the establishment. I ask for an assurance, therefore, that the establishment itself will not be reduced. I ask further, that the noble Earl will place before the First Lord the suggestion that this same establishment shall actually be increased, and considerably increased. Finally, I ask whether we can be told to-day, or if not to-day very soon, what new steps are being taken to attract more scientists into the Navy. I should certainly hope that the noble Earl will obtain much assistance from the noble Lord, Lord Cherwell, in this matter. I can only say that if he finds the noble Lord, Lord Cherwell, a broken reed, my faith in human nature will be shattered—and most of my faith in science as well. So I leave the noble Earl to handle that matter.

I come now to natal aviation. None of us doubts its tremendous importance in the life of the Navy to-day. As the First Lord recently pointed out, it represents the main striking force of the Fleet. Again, as he pointed out in another place, its personnel account for about one-quarter of all those in the Navy. I am sure we shall all join in paying a tribute to our naval aviators for their splendid work in the Korean War. I should like at the outset, speaking with all the emphasis at my command, and from recent first-hand knowledge—and I am sure the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, will join me in this—to say that those at the very top of the Navy are determined to spare no effort to see that in this, as in all other respects, our Navy stands alone and supreme. That I think it is my duty to say, bearing in mind particularly the numbers of young men who are perhaps at this very moment wondering whether or not to embark on naval aviation, either for a short-service period or for the best part of a lifetime. But, my Lords, that certainly does not mean that I think that all has been done, or so far as I can judge is yet being done, to achieve the supremacy that I have mentioned.

I will say very little about aircraft, except to emphasise very strongly what the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, said just now. There is, of course no subject in which the naval airman himself is more interested than aircraft. Few of us would claim—I am sure that neither of my predecessors nor I myself, nor the present First Lord, would do so—that our naval airmen have hitherto had aircraft fully worthy of them. That defect is being partly remedied, too slowly I think for the liking of any of us. But I hope and believe that the present First Lord will give this matter, as have his predecessors, his personal attention, insistently and consistently throughout his term of office. To-day I am primarily concerned with the personal factor in naval aviation—the human factor. When the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, handed over to me last May, he pointed out to me, as did my new colleagues on the Board of Admiralty, that the shortage of pilots and observers was perhaps our outstanding deficiency in the Navy at that time. At a Press conference I held soon afterwards to inaugurate a new short-service scheme, I remember describing this shortage as "our principal headache." I understand from the First Lord's statement elsewhere, and from general information, that the position is now improving. But of course we still have a long way to go. I am sure that we on our side wish to do everything in our power to call the attention of young men to the great attractions, even admitting the hazards, of this life, and above all to the great service that they can perform to the Navy and the country by going in for it. I appreciate that the noble Earl may not be in a position to give us figures—they are not usually disclosed by the Admiralty in this connection: but we should all, I know, wish for at least a general indication as to how events are moving on this most vital of all recruiting fronts.

But, my Lords, is there nothing more that can be done? Frankly, I think that there is a good deal: but it means going a little beneath the surface, and analysing the position rather carefully, in order to discover the right kind of remedy. Naturally, we ought to do everything possible to publicise the various short-service schemes and, it may be, to improve them as time goes on. I recognise the immense trouble that has been taken, and is being taken, by the Admiralty to work out the short-service schemes, and I am not holding myself out this afternoon as able to suggest improvements upon them. But I venture to suggest that the real core of the problem is the question of securing a better recruitment for naval aviation among Regular long-service officers. I know that an improvement is taking place, but I do not think anybody argues that there is the slightest ground for complacency. If we once get right the recruiting for air-crews among long-service officers, I have little doubt myself that the short-service recruitment will follow.

Those with much greater experience than myself will speak in this debate this afternoon, but I believe that the fundamental issue is the prestige, the status, of naval aviation within the Royal Navy as a whole. I remember that at this same Press Conference which I mentioned just now, I stated that the naval aviators were regarded by the Board of Admiralty as the corps élite of the Navy. That was, and I am sure is, the Board's intention. But speaking to naval aviators, particularly those in the junior ranks, later on, I gained the impression that these young men certainly did not feel that this was so in practice. They applied other words to it, and they did not feel that they were looked upon as the corps élite throughout the Navy. I do not think it is easy to secure this result—to give a sort of moral priority in the Navy to something that is represented by many sailors, who after all have joined the Navy to go to sea, as at best no more than one of a number of special jobs. If you talk to any young man at Dartmouth and say "I hope you are going in for naval aviation," he is inclined to say "Oh yes, they came round and tried to get me to go into that, but I have joined to go to sea." With the best will in the world at the top, you get that sort of answer from those at the bottom. It is a great problem, and can be tackled only gradually and along a whole lot of different lines, all converging to the same end.

I should like just to mention by name to-day, without developing them, a number of suggestions which were under discussion when I was at the Admiralty, and I should like to ask the noble Earl who is to reply what progress, if any, he can report. Having done so, I will say a few more words about a rather wider proposal in the same field. The questions which I will only mention by name to the noble Earl are these. First, can the noble Earl tell us anything about the proposal to introduce flying at Dartmouth? There are various local difficulties which always seemed to me to be a little bit pettifogging, but I must admit that they defeated me during my time in office. I hope they will not defeat the present First Lord of the Admiralty. Perhaps the noble. Earl can tell us something about that matter. My second question is: how far have the Admiralty got with the plan, which I believe has been approved by the Board, for giving junior officers during their sub-lieutenant's air course a chance of actually learning to fly—for example, with a flying club in the neighbourhood? There was a plan of that kind and I should like to know what is happening now.

Thirdly—and I think this is very important—is any progress being made with the idea of taking over from the R.A.F. that part of flying training which is actually being carried out for the Navy at Syreston? I never got to Syreston, I am ashamed to say. I was going there, but the General Election came along, and so my visit never took place. I gather, however, that Syreston is about as far from the sea as any place in these Islands. I would suggest not only that this training should be taken away, if convenient, from the R.A.F. but also that the training should be transferred to some place in the Portsmouth area.

I break off to say that I will not get involved in the subject of Coastal Command. I should like very much to discuss it with the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard, but I feel that if I started we should spend the rest of the afternoon upon it. I should be very much surprised if I agreed with the noble Viscount, but I will not say more than that at the moment. Like the noble Viscount, I stand for inter-Service co-operation at all costs—or, at any rate, at almost all costs. That would be my general attitude.

Now as to my fourth question. This is a rather technical matter, but again I am sure that the noble Earl will agree that we do want a guarantee of a minimum of at least one year's general service in every eight years' flying. We need that for a number of reasons—one reason being that after eight years' flying there is great danger of even the most willing pilot "cracking." I know that the Admiralty are tackling this matter, and perhaps the noble Earl can tell us whether any arrangements for some kind of a break after a number of years of flying are actually in force. Fifthly, there seems a general agreement that the status of a squadron commander ought to be raised; that he ought to be accorded the kind of respect which is now given to the captain of a destroyer or a submarine. Perhaps the noble Earl can tell us whether this is in fact, going forward, or whether any difficult problems of prestige arise. Personally, I feel that something ought to be done without delay.

Sixthly, would the noble Earl agree (again this is a rather technical point) that it is highly desirable that in this so-called "Air age" officers promoted to the rank of captain should at least have some knowledge of the air? Are the Admiralty prepared to view with favour a rule that, in future, before being eligible as a captain an officer must either have served in naval aviation as an aviator or at least have served as a commander or lieutenant-commander in a carrier or on an air station? In other words, are they prepared to make a rule that before an officer becomes a captain it is necessary for him to have had some practical experience of the air? My last, and my biggest point—though I shall not say much about it to-day—is this. Even if you regard aviation within the Navy as no more than another specialism—and I certainly do not—you will never, it seems to me, be able to give the air a fair chance, with all the good will in the world, if an officer has to complete all his other courses before starting his career as an aviator.

What I have said about flying at Dartmouth, or club flying during sub-lieutenant's courses, would help, of course, but it would leave the essential problem unaffected. If a young mart joins the Air Force, he starts to fly at seventeen or eighteen years of age, and if he goes in for short-service flying in the Navy he starts at about the same age. But if you look through a list of the various stages through which a cadet—that is, a potential long-service naval officer—has to pass before he can take up flying as a job, you will find that he cannot begin until he is about twenty-three; that is, about five years later than the young man in the Air Force or the short-service naval officer. I say that this is imposing a deplorable handicap. Apart from the technical argument that it would be considerably better for his flying if he could begin earlier, I submit that, if we really want more Regular long-service officers to fly—and we all admit we do—we must not leave flying last on the list, where it is now. It does not give flying a fair chance, as compared with the other options in the Royal Navy. I know that the Admiralty are going into this matter. It may be that nothing very definite can be said by the noble Earl to-day, but I earnestly believe that a change of the kind I have mentioned, a chance for the long-service officer to take up flying much earlier in the day, would not only have an immediate effect on recruitment but would have long-term consequences which would be immensely beneficial in a number of ways and would tend to raise the whole position and influence of naval aviation. And that, in turn, would serve the purpose which everyone in the Royal Navy has in common.

My Lords, in conclusion I would say that I came to the Admiralty—succeeding a wonderful gentleman—with the highest expectations of the spirit I should find in the Navy. Those expectations were more than fulfilled. The devotion to duty is unsurpassed, and perhaps unequalled, in this country or the world. The sense of the past lies all about you. But I do not know whether to marvel more at the inspiration drawn from an incomparable naval history or, contrariwise, the flexible, the ultra-modern, the scientific approach, the instinctively practical approach, to each new and sudden challenge or technical problem of the hour. Certainly, my few months at the Admiralty have given me, as I am sure they have all my much more distinguished predecessors, a permanent and profound interest in the success and happiness of our sailors. With all my heart, I wish them well.

4.10 p.m.

EARL HOWE

My Lords, I am sure the noble Earl and the House as a whole will welcome the wonderful tribute that has been paid to the Navy by the late First Lord of the Admiralty. The principal task of the Navy in war is to keep open trade routes. We all know that in this House—it is a platitude here—but I often wonder whether, outside this House and in the country generally, the man in the street realises how much he owes to the Navy and what his lot would be supposing the Navy failed in its task. We can all envisage the start of another war. It might, and probably would, consist of a concentrated attack on our trade routes by a large number of submarines. An American authority stated the other day that the only possible enemy to this country and the Western World, at sea—I refer, naturally, to Russia—has as many as three hundred submarines. That is a great many more than the Germans started the last war with. Those submarines might be expected to be at sea and in position on the trade routes long before a state of hostilities arose. Therefore it is obvious that the Navy must be ready to grapple with a very grave menace indeed.

Allied to it there will no doubt be a heavy air attack. Naval aviation is one of the principal features of the modern navy. Whether it is called naval aviation for the first time or not I do not know, but in another place the First Lord was at pains to explain that it would be called naval aviation, to distinguish it from a mere arm of the Service. Therefore, I presume we may take it that naval aviation will play a far more integral part in the operations of the Fleet than it ever has done up to now. Consequently, the first thing to notice is our carrier position. The Memorandum issued by the First Lord indicates roughly what our carrier strength may be, but it does not show that at least two of our biggest fleet carriers are, for all practical purposes, out of commission. In the case of the "Victorious," she is completely gutted, and the "Formidable" is probably going the same way. That leaves us with five fleet carriers of which only one, the "Eagle," is modern. The others saw war service and, for all one knows, may require to have a good deal done to them. We have light fleet carriers, but they are ships of inferior speed and on occasion would find it difficult to work with a modern fleet. Therefore, I am not at all happy about the strength of our Navy.

In days gone by, whenever we talked about the Navy, we knew that there were so many capital ships and that their armour consisted of 13.5, 14 or 15 inch guns, and all the rest. The only worth of the carriers we have today is the aircraft which they carry on board, and there is no statement in the First Lord's Memorandum to indicate whether these carriers have a full complement of aircraft available for them in emergency. In another place, either the First Lord or the Financial Secretary stated that great efforts w ere being made to provide the "Eagle" with her complement of aircraft, but she had not obtained them yet. So we come to the position where we have a first-class ship such as the "Eagle" with only an uncertain number of aircraft on board. That ship cannot be fully operational until she has all her aircraft on board, and the same thing applies to the rest of our carriers. I would ask the noble Earl whether he can tell us, without disclosing any untoward secrets, what is the state of preparedness of our carrier fleet. Have they the aircraft available for them, if not actually on board, then at airfields adjacent to them from which they car, easily be embarked?

Then we come to the types of aircraft. It was stated in another place that the Attacker is now relatively obsolete, as noble Lords who went down to the "Illustrious" last autumn will know, and that they should be replaced by others which are on the way. Mention has been made of the Sea Hawk and Vampire and of a third which is superior in performance to both of these. The Gannet, GR.17, was also mentioned. That is all very well, but I want to know how many machines are available, where they are and, if they are not available now, when we are going to get them. I do not want to know secrets, but to have an assurance from the noble Earl who is to speak on behalf of the Admiralty that there will be no undue delay. Under present conditions, with the R.A.F. moving every stone to try and get every possible aircraft into that Service, it may be very difficult for the Admiralty to obtain the aircraft they need. No mention is made in the Memorandum of the position regarding flying boats. I should like to ask the noble Earl whether flying boats are still counted on the strength of naval aviation and whether the Admiralty still require them.

We come to the pilot position, which has already been touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham. I do not know whether I am wrong about this, but, if I am, I shall be corrected. We require a superior pilot to get the most out of a modern jet aircraft, and not everybody who goes in for flying is capable of handling such machines. Are we really getting a sufficiency of pilots for naval aviation to fly these jet machines? It seems obvious that increasingly the Navy will have to go over to jet machines, and, if that is so, what about the pilots for them? Friends of mine have stated that it takes about six weeks for a pilot to learn to fly a jet machine and in the case of the R.A.F. a good many of those who make the attempt have not been able to make the grade. I do not know whether that is true, but I should like to be told a little more about the pilot position in naval aviation.

With regard to the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve air squadrons, could the noble Earl tell us, if not this afternoon, then in due course, whether they are equipped with the type of machines they will have to use in an emergency? In the case of the ordinary R.N.V.R. there has always been the tendency to give them out-of-date gear for training purposes and for them to work up on that basis. I do not think that worked so well as it could, though it has worked up to a point, and. I submit that if we are going to ask these young officers to fly different and much improved types of machine when we are really embarked on an emergency, they should be given for training the sort of machine they will eventually have to use.

As regards the ordinary officers of the Royal Navy I should like to ask, now that naval aviation appears to be becoming an integral part of the Service, whether it is going to be the policy of the Admiralty that all naval officers should have a certain amount of flying experience? I think that that is most important, because when an officer rises to higher command in the Navy he will not be so useful if he does not know anything about flying, as he would be if he had flying experience. I think that that is essential in order to get the best out of him. Therefore I should be glad if the noble Earl could tell us whether flying experience in the Navy is going to be insisted upon for all naval officers, and whether all branches of the Service will be eligible to go in for flying duties if they care to volunteer for them.

LORD STRABOLGI

Would the noble Earl expound that point? I am quite in agreement with him. Would he make that a qualification for a commission, as in our days we had to qualify in navigation, gunnery, and so on, before we received a commission?

EARL HOWE

I do not want to lay down any rule. I am really asking a question to try and get information. If naval aviation is to be an integrated part of the Service, I am very much in favour of the idea that all officers should undergo a course in naval aviation, even though they do not specialise in that particular branch.

I should now like to say a few words about Coastal Command. Here I may be treading on dangerous ground, but I am relieved to know that the noble Viscount is not in the Chamber at the moment to "eat me up." It is going to be as important in future as it has been in the past that Coastal Command should be closely integrated with the Navy. I believe that in another place the First Lord referred to Coastal Command as the maritime arm of the Royal Air Force. I should like to ask the noble Earl whether the Admiralty are completely satisfied as to the present position of Coastal Command and the Navy. I cannot help feeling that it puts a premium on lack of co-operation, if there is any lack of co-operation, which I do not expect for a moment. At the same time, it must make it difficult for either of these two Services, each of which has to perform practically the same job, working over the sea together, to develop its maximum efficiency. A further point, which would probably better he raised in the course of the Air Estimates debate at some future date, is as to how Coastal Command fits in with the new High Command of the naval spheres in the Atlantic. For example, are Coastal Command to be tied down to the 100 fathom line, or are they to be allowed to go over it? There are other questions, each of which may be quite complicated. I hope, too, that we shall be assured that Coastal Command are getting the aircraft they will require in order to work with the Navy, and in sufficient quantities.

I have said all I want to say about naval aviation, but there are one or two aspects of the Navy Estimates to which I desire to refer. I am a little anxious about our destroyer position. The memorandum on the Navy Estimates disclosed the fact that we have to-day 116 fleet destroyers and 174 frigates; and we are further told that seven of our destroyers are in Korea. There is a war in progress in Korea. These destroyers are no doubt worked very hard in action in difficult and dangerous waters and, as in the case of other wars, they are likely to get worn out. Therefore, we may take it, if we leave out those seven destroyers employed in the Far East, that we have 109 destroyers and 174 frigates. Those are the ships that will have to provide the convoy escorts and provide for all the services of the Fleet in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, or in any other part of the world where they may be required. Are the Admiralty sure that we have enough destroyers? We never have had enough destroyers we never shall have. But, with no further destroyer construction proceeding after the "Decoys" are completed, would it not be wise to go in for a further programme of destroyer construction? I know that these new frigates, as they are called—fleet destroyers specially converted to hunt down submarines—are being tested and tried out. But it seems to me that we should, without delay, lay down a fresh batch of fleet destroyers. Probably much the same holds good with regard to our frigates.

The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, referred to the question of guns for defence of the armed merchant ships. That is a most important point. If these guns are available, where are they? Are they available in various naval ports all over the world: or are they in this country? I do not want to know any secrets, but if the noble Earl can assure us that guns are available for armed merchant ships where they are needed, that would relieve some anxiety. There is a further point in relation to degaussing. There are various types of mines as your Lordships know: there is the magnetic mine, the acoustic mine and the hydrostatic mine. The magnetic mine, so far as ordinary merchant ships and naval warships are concerned, is dealt with by degaussing. It is a complicated business to fit degaussing on ordinary merchant ships. It had to be done in the last war in a hurry, and that is not the most efficient way of doing it. Can we be told whether anything has been done about degaussing merchant ships, or providing for their degaussing? That also involves the installation of degaussing ranges to measure all these ships to see how far they are protected. Is all that being borne in mind?

Reference has been made to the R.N.S.V.R. I am hoping that the Admiralty will do all they can to encourage the R.N.S.V.R. Some of the finest officers employed in the last war came from that Reserve. In peace time before the war they received no encouragement; one had to fight even for an opportunity for them to go to sea in a warship for a day's training. Now I see that the Admiralty are doing what they can in that regard. But what about the expenses these officers entail in training, such as messing and travelling expenses? Can the noble Earl tell us—perhaps not today—whether the Admiralty are going to make arrangements to refund travelling expenses to these officers when they go to sea? A further question to which I should like to refer is that of pensions to officers who have been killed or injured on service. This matter was raised in the other place. The position of some of these officers is really tragic. In the other place the case was quoted of a widow of a rear-admiral who had absolutely no private means whatever, according to the statement made there, being granted £120 a year pension. I would appeal to noble Lords opposite: How can you exist on £120 a year in these modern days? It is not right, and I am perfectly certain fiat every one of us knows that it is not right. It is a question which should be dealt with by all the Services acting as one, and I hope that the matter will receive attention.

Looking through the Navy Estimates, your Lordships will see that the cost of the Admiralty Office has gone up by very nearly £1,000,000. I do not know whether that represents increased responsibility, an increase in wages, or what. I hope that it does not mean a large addition to the Admiralty staff, and I trust that the noble Earl will be able to reassure us that every effort is being made to keep the Admiralty staff within hounds. There is another matter to which I should like to draw the noble Earl's attention. If your Lordships would look at page 116 of the Navy Estimates, you will see that the Admiralty are going in for motor transport in a big way. Your Lordships will see that motor transport vehicles, spares, repairs, tyres et cetera are referred to on that page. In 1951–52, the estimate was £1,200,000. This year it is £2,000,000—an increase in one year of £800,000. I do not know what the reason for that may be—whether we are going to have a mechanised formation in the Navy, or something of that sort. It may be to do with Marine commandos, but I think we ought to have an explanation why the Vote for motor transport has almost doubled in one year. I have said all I want to say and, in company with other noble Loris who have spoken, I should like to pay my humble tribute to that great Service, the Royal Navy, of which everyone who has belonged to a branch of it, however humble, is so proud.

4.33 p.m.

LORD WINSTER

My Lords, I feel that the essential pint to remember in any debate upon the Navy Estimates is that in spite of air power, the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb, there is no new weapon which has made sea power obsolete. Indeed, it never can be for this country, because the sea is our essential link with the Commonwealth. There is a further reason: our foreign policy is based upon support of the United Nations Charter, arid the United Nations Forces can be assembled only by sea. The responsibilities of the Navy remain unchanged and the fundamental principles of sea power also remain unchanged. Only the types of ships, strategy and tactics change: sea power does not. And if sea power cannot of itself win wars, sea power decides whether wars are won or lost.

I have noticed a great change coming over the character of these debates upon the Navy Estimates. There was a time when with a little study, the layman—and I include myself in that category—could quite well qualify himself to take part in discussion of the material side of the Navy Estimates. It was a question of whether you had, two, four or six battleships, so many cruisers, what gun those ships should be armed with, speed and armour and so on. It was a comparatively simple matter to argue those points out. But to-day these questions of matériel have become the province of the scientist, and the developments in the Navy now are on the technical side and are a highly scientific matter. Only someone who is an expert in technical and scientific affairs can effectively take part in discussions on developments in the modern Navy.

There is another thing which I have noticed in the course of years about these debates on Navy Estimates. When one comes to think of it, since 1918 we have witnessed the most striking changes in the composition of the Navy. In that comparatively short space of time, we have seen the battleship become, as I think, obsolete or, as I believe almost everyone would admit, obsolescent. In consequence of that, we have seen the destroyer, as we have known it, also become obsolescent, and it is now on its way out. This "Daring" class of destroyers we have heard mentioned to-day are not destroyers as we used to know them. They are a new type of light cruiser. We are never going to build another of those magnificent ships, the battle cruisers, which played such a wonderful rôle in the First World War. I do not think it is any exaggeration to say that, so far as the Navy is concerned, we are seeing the gun on its way out and in future it will be the directed missile that forms the armament of our ships. Those are changes which we have seen in this short space of years.

I have mentioned the battleship, and I have said that I regard it as obsolete. The noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, has had many questions addressed to him this afternoon, and now I will address one to him—but only one. It is the same question that Percy Scott was putting after World War I—namely, what is the use of the battleship? In the case of every other type of ship in the Navy, the function is perfectly clear and distinct. There is not the slightest difficulty in answering that question about any other type of ship. Will the noble Earl tell us what it is a battleship can do which cannot be done better by some other means? I may say that it will be no reply if we are told that battleships come in handy as floating dormitories or something of that nature, which I believe to be largely the case to-day. Let us have an answer to the question, which can be answered when it concerns any other type of ship: What is the function of the battleship in modern naval operations? If no real answer can be given to that, why not admit the fact and cut our losses in these ships, however grievous it may be to do so?

I should like to turn for a moment or two to the first commitment and responsibility of the Navy; that is, the protection of our merchant shipping. In that connection, I should like to refer to the (as I believe) very exaggerated accounts that we have received of the number of submarines in the possession of Russia. However many submarines or other individual ships Russia may possess, I think we should do well to remember that Russia is not a sea animal. We might recall the very wise words of Nelson, when he was discussing how to win battles at sea. His advice was: "Close with the Frenchman; outmanœuvre the Russian." In other words, he recognised the Frenchman as a seaman whom you have to fight, but he reckoned that the Russian admiral was not but was someone who could always be outmanœuvred without closing.

I believe that there have been very exaggerated stories of the number of Russian submarines available. Let us put the number at a very conservative figure of 350. That is a great reduction on the 1,000 or 1,200 about which we have sometimes heard, but we must remember that those submarines are very much more powerful than the sixty operational submarines which Germany possessed at the beginning of World War II. But let us also remember that in the first seven months of 1942, Germany sank over 3,000,000 tons of Allied shipping, and she did that in North American waters, where those sinkings mostly took place, with a loss of only about six U-boats. Had we learnt the lessons of the First World War I believe that the German U-boat campaign could have been brought to a dead stop in 1939. The last Navy Estimates showed sixty-one destroyers and frigates in commission. When we were told these figures we were given no information as to the number which were organised and distributed and trained as convoy escorts. and about how many were similarly organised for Fleet duties. Unless to-day we have the right number of escort ships for convoy we might again suffer crippling losses or the outbreak of war. The experience of the First World War showed clearly that our requirements for convoy work in another war would be about 200 escort vessels. During the first eighteen months or so of the Second World War, oily about fifty escort vessels were available. They were manned by untrained personnel, and probably the vast majority of the depth charges dropped by these escorts were dropped on imaginary targets. Radar and Asdic required very intensive training indeed. The results of such neglect would mean more appalling losses on the outbreak of war, threatening defeat, involving dreadful casualties among the officers of the merchant navy. Such losses hamper our overseas strategic plans, with a consequent prolongation of the war. Between 1918 and 1939 there was not a First Lord who admitted any weakness in these respects. The First Lord would come to the House and tell us everything was all for the best, with the best possible of all Boards: thinking, even if he omitted to say "With the best possible of all First Lords."

That, my Lords, is the situation, and I must say that it has been very welcome indeed to see in recent months a recognition by the Admiralty that protection of merchant shipping is to-day, in the absence of any Potential enemy surface fleets, top priority of the Admiralty commitments. It is satisfactory that that is admitted. But we still want more information as to how far the ships and equipment, and training are allied with that recognition. I want to do no more than touch upon Coastal Command: but it is below strength in aircraft and personnel. This is perturbing, because success against submarines depends on an adequate number of properly armed and properly trained aircraft being available and on their having had adequate training with escort ships and personnel of the Navy. Something was said about inter-Service co-operation. One noble Lord said he was all for inter-Service co-operation. That is another welcome development. Inter-Service co-operation, well understood and well practised, is all to the good; but we still have a few officers who are all for it only provided their Service gets its own way. But I think perhaps we are seeing the end of that.

I should like to say one word about the protection of shipping. I hope it. is recognised that, with the increased speed of submarines, protection of merchant shipping must depend upon speed in merchant shipping; and it must be borne in mind that speed is an expensive thing to build into merchant ships. It means building more speed than is required by these ships for their ordinary peace-time avocations. I should like to ask about the development of helicopters in the protection of merchant shipping. I believe that there have been successful exercises in that respect. I should also like to ask whether there is any anti-submarine committee in existence at the Admiralty, which would involve representation of the other Services. But let us bear in mind the lessons of the past. We have started too weak and we have had to hang on, suffering great losses, while we were building up. That is expensive, and it involves shipping losses which lengthen the war and increase its cost. You cannot possibly win a war now unless you can defeat the submarine.

I have some connection with the Association which looks after the interests of the officers of the merchant navy, and consequently I hear a great deal of what affects it. One thing we have been very glad to notice is the improved status of the Admiral Commanding Reserves. It was once the fact that that appointment was given to an Admiral on his way out of the Service: it was a closing appointment. Now a welcome change has taken place. The last officer to hold the appointment is now Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. The upgrading of the status of that office is most encouraging to the Reserves of the Navy. On the question of arming merchant ships I would say that I think there has been a great improvement. The officials responsible for the Association of which I have spoken have been taken into the confidence of the Admiralty and the Ministry of Transport, and they are satisfied with the arrangements which the Admiralty have in hand, and envisage, for the defence of our merchant shipping.

I should like next to say a word about the Reserve Fleet. There is a school of naval officers who contend that a sailor should go to sea and stay there. That represents a good spirit and a good principle. I believe that there are too few sailors going to sea for long enough, that there are too many ships in reserve, and too many officers and men in harbour and at shore depôts. Senior officers get few opportunities of exercising command at sea. Strategy and tactics must depend upon the squadrons constantly exercising and manœuvring at sea, entering harbours by day and by night in all weathers, and so on. There are too many ships in the Reserve and too few in the Active Fleet, and I think the Admiralty will do well to get more ships into the Active Fleet and give more officers and men a chance of the sea training on which so much depends.

We have heard a great deal to-day about naval aviation. There are many difficulties in this sphere. There are too many types, and there is still a shortage of pilots and officers. The Service was cold-shouldered at a most critical moment in its development. The Admiralty's policy has been unimaginative. Expert advice has been disregarded, and there was serious neglect. Look at the machines which the Fleet Air Arm, as it was then, had to fly during the last war. I have read a speech by the Chairman of the Hawker-Siddeley Group, made in January this year, in which he refers to the Hawker Sea Hawk, and said: This machine is the latest in the proud line of naval fighters. I should very much like to see the names of the "proud line" of naval fighters. Think what our naval airmen had to fly during the last war. But the Service at present shows inevitable signs of lack of continuity in policy. I noticed an interesting calculation the other day, that at the earliest it must be 1957 before there is a Captain of Dartmouth who has been "through the mill" as a pilot in naval aviation. When we shall get one on the Board I do not know, but certainly it will be a great advantage to naval aviation when there is an admiral on the Board who has been right through the whole business. Of course, the submarine service had to undergo the same difficulties and disabilities in its turn, when it was a new service.

LORD GIFFORD

May I interrupt the noble Lord for one moment? There happens to be on the Board now a member of my term who did go right "through the mill" in naval aviation.

LORD WINSTER

That is very good news. Nobody could be more delighted than myself. I thank the noble Lord for giving us welcome tidings. I have heard the suggestion made this afternoon that promotion in the Navy should be made only if the officer has had flying experience. I am all for reciprocity in these matters, and I think the Board would be very happy to agree when it is also a rule in the Royal Air Force that no officer is eligible for promotion until he has commanded a ship of some sort at sea. Let us have reciprocity in these matters. I do not think that that idea will commend itself very warmly to the existing generation of naval officers.

I notice that the noble and gallant Earl the Minister of Defence is in the Chamber. I should like to say something about standardisation of equipment, weapons and so forth, which is more peculiarly his sphere. I have recently seen some interesting information, to the effect that in America Admiral Fowler, a Munitions Board expert on standardisation, is at work at present compiling a single Federal supply catalogue. He has gone on record publicly that already "tremendous savings" have been effected by what he has done in that direction. He said that he has assembled a "chamber of horrors" exhibit of various prices and various standards used by the separate supply services of the three Armed Forces. He spoke very emphatically about "overlapping and duplication" in these matters between the three Services.

As an example of standardisation, he said that, in regard to certain internal combustion engines, it had been found that the spares carried by a destroyer for an auxiliary spare engine had been reduced from 1,187 to 60 different types. At this moment, too, in America there is before the American Minister of Defence a proposal from the Munitions Board of the Pentagon for centralised procurement of clothing and equipment for the three Services. It is said in this report, which I have seen, that each Service thought that it knew how to do the job better than anyone else. I think that is a feature of these matters with which we also in this country are all acquainted. I should like to ask the noble Earl who is to reply whether we are moving in that same direction, and are considering the possibility of drawing up what is called in America a single Federal supply catalogue. Are we moving in that direction at the present time? I am perfectly aware of the difficulties about standardisation, and that it is impossible to carry it out 100 per cent., but I think a great deal is possible. I wonder what is being done in that respect.

I had intended to say something about the organisation of the naval dockyards, which I believe to be archaic in their organisation, as a result of which they are costing the country an enormous amount of money in wasted time. They are also depriving the Fleet of the services which it ought to be receiving in full efficiency from the dockyards. On thinking it over, however, I have come to the conclusion that that is far too big a subject on which to touch in the course of a debate upon Navy Estimates. It opens up so many matters. Therefore, I propose to put down for a later date a Motion to call attention to the system of organisation prevailing in naval dockyards so that, if your Lordships so approve, we can have a debate dealing with that matter, and with that matter alone. I am quite convinced that it will supply as much matter for a debate as would a Motion directed solely to Coastal Command.

Now a word about America. I should like to say this straight away. I can think of no worse service which can be rendered to this country, and to the world, at the present moment than that represented by the anti-American biases and prejudices of certain Members of Parliament. They are doing the greatest possible disservice to the country and to the world. I hope that our American friends realize—and I am sure they do—that these people represent a negligible minority of public opinion in this country. But if these criticisms are to be made, may I trouble your Lordships with just one or two figures to show what America is doing at the present moment in the common defence of Western Europe? In 1951, the security expenditure in America was, 27 billion dollars. In 1952, it is 52½ billion dollars—a tremendous increase in that time. I think those figures give some measure of what America is doing. By June of last year, I believe the personnel of her Armed Forces was up to about 3,250,000 men. Now, while we are debating these Estimates of £350,000,000-odd (I think that is the figure), America has in hand a 2,000,000,000-dollar naval programme which is providing for 173 new ships, and for 291 ships to be modernised. We have heard something to-day about the active research which they are carrying out, not only into propulsion but into a great number of other naval problems. I do most sincerely hope that there is not merely an exchange of information with America in matters of research but that there is also a complete pooling of knowledge in these matters. I hope that is the case. Something was said about the shortage of scientists in this country. Of course, it has to be remembered that America can pay her scientists and technicians salaries that we cannot begin to look at. I wonder very much how that affects the situation.

The question of entry into the Navy has been touched upon this afternoon. There are difficulties about recruiting. The Navy cannot compete with the material advantages of civilian life—wages, conditions, home life and scales of pay. We have to try to make all those things compare as favourably as we can with civilian conditions, but we shall never be able to achieve complete equality. I feel we must not rely entirely upon material inducements, although at the same time in regard to publicity I would say, "Cut out some of the glamour which seems to be such a noticeable feature in some of the advertisements designed to attract recruits." I remember a ventriloquist who wore the uniform of a naval lieutenant and whose puppet was Sailor Boy Jim. He used to say to Sailor Boy Jim, "Whatever made you join the Navy?" The boy replied, "Well, the recruiting officer took me into his office and showed me a picture in colour of an admiral in full uniform—all gold braid. And underneath was written: 'This is what you are going to be.' It was only after I joined that I found he had kept his thumb over the word 'not'." So I would say, do not rely too much upon glamour; set out the advantages and the disadvantages of the Navy perfectly fairly and correctly. I think that is a more effective way of attracting recruits than what I have described as the glamour in these advertisements. But as we are dealing with entry into the Navy, I think the First Lord might look at the entry into the Admiralty building. I think it is getting rather unwieldy. I remember that during the Second World War we had more than fifty admirals in the Admiralty, as well as unspecified numbers holding shore appointments, some of them very small ones.

In conclusion I would say a word about construction. We have had reference this afternoon to the new aircraft carrier, "Eagle." She has not any aircraft on board at present, but we are told that she is a very fine ship. As she has cost £16,000,000, I think we are entitled to expect rather a decent ship; I do not think we ought to be told that it is a matter for congratulation that a £16,000,000 ship is really rather a fine ship. We have heard also about the "Tiger" class cruisers which are still in a state of suspended animation. Every year in these debates, when the question of the "Tiger" class cruisers comes up, I am reminded of the Poet Laureate who wrote an ode about the illness of an illustrious patient. He said: Along the electric wires a message came, 'He is not better; he is much the same'. Every year from successive First Lords we hear that the "Tiger" class cruisers are in the same state. In regard to construction, I should also like to ask whether it is not the case that perhaps too much modernisation and conversion is being attempted. I am not so keen on all this putting of new wine into old bottles. I really wonder whether we are not, perhaps under the guise of being able to put up an appearance of economy here and there, overdoing this business of modernisation and conversion, and I am inclined to be on the side of those who say that they would like to see more money put into new construction.

My Lords, I think in many ways we need have no anxiety about the state of the Navy, but sometimes I think, and have thought for some time, that what is very much wanted in the Navy is another reformer or two. There have not been any "root and branch" reformers in the Navy since the days of the present Prime Minister, when he was at the Admiralty, working with the First Sea Lord, Lord Fisher, and since the days, too, of Percy Scott. Those were the great reformers of the Navy. Since then many very distinguished naval officers have taken the office of First Sea Lord. They have kept the machine well oiled and ticking over, with a little improvement here and a little improvement there. One knows all that. But the real breath of new ideas and imagination which swept through the Admiralty and the Navy when the present Prime Minister and Lord Fisher were at the Admiralty, and when Percy Scott was developing modern gunnery in the Navy, has not been repeated since. Had we had more imagination and foresight I think many of the bitter lessons that we learned in the last war might have been avoided. So my naval prayer would be, not only for those in peril on the sea, but that we may get another reformer or two at the Admiralty. That the machinery is kept well oiled and ticking over is, I know your Lordships will agree, amply-proved by events in Korea and in the Suez Canal, where the Navy has shown that it has all the initiative, the enterprise and the ability of the Navy of old.

5.6 p.m.

LORD SELSDON

My Lords, the very few remarks I am going to make this afternoon will be devoted entirely to light coastal forces, small craft. I am rather interested to see in the First Lord's Statement, on page 5, a paragraph headed, "Commissioning Bases for Small Craft," which says: The maintenance in reserve of large numbers of wooden craft is a novel problem for the Royal Navy in peace time and these commissioning bases provide the most practicable and economical solution. I should not have thought that the maintenance of wooden craft was anything very novel to the Navy, either in peace time or in war time. Certainly during the war, at various coastal forces bases we did not find much trouble. At an interval of every three months or so, a boat was drawn out of the water and various fungi were scraped off. It was given a coat of anti-fouling composition and was put back into the water again. Turning over to page 7, one finds another paragraph with which I hope the noble Earl who is to reply will deal. That paragraph says: A number of fast patrol boats has been ordered incorporating a new design of diesel machinery, which for its power is the lightest unit so far designed. I hope that the noble Earl will say that a large number of these craft have been ordered. It is now nearly eight years since I commissioned the first diesel gunboat, which was very heavy, rather ponderous and not very reliable.

During the last war, the Germans had two types of diesel boat. There was the E-boat, which was a magnificent, very fast and far more reliable boat than anything we had; and they also had the R-boat. These craft can be a very great potential menace in the English Channel. The destroyers of to-day are far too costly and scarce to risk operating in confined spaces of water. There is imminent danger of air attack and of mines, and there is this constant danger of the lurking E-boat. I think the only time that a light cruiser ventured into the precincts, or near precincts, of the English Channel she was sunk, as was also a destroyer. The Germans used the E-boat in a very sensible manner: they used it for mine-laying. It would arrive quickly, drop its mines, and go off at a speed at which nothing ant we had could catch it. The only alternative was to get over to the other side of the Channel, wait for the boat, and try to catch it on its way back. The "Hunt" class destroyers which were used to escort convoys up "E-boat Alley" had not a hope of catching it. This mention of new fast patrol boats, therefore, really does give some considerable hope, and I trust that the noble Earl will be able to tell us that this new design of engine is superior to, or at any rate the equivalent of, the engine which I think the Germans had, and which I know the Russians have in their coastal force boats, of which, we are told, they have some 500 in the Baltic.

Coastal force warfare is a specialised warfare. It is a young man's job. Movement on the ships is difficult, and with a wind of anything over Force 4 it is very hard to fight your ship efficiently. Practically all the people who were in coastal forces at the end of World War II would, in the event of another war starring, be too old to serve again. These coastal force vessels at the end of the last war finished up with virtually as many departments as a destroyer. You had three officers, and a crew of perhaps twenty-two; and it was essential that all the men in the ship's company should be interchangeable. That was achieved only by constant practice and constant training. But—and this is most important—that constant training had to be done at sea. It is no good going through gun routine in a drill hall and pretending to fire your weapon. Things are totally different when you are on a moving boat, and totally different when you have to do the job at sea at night.

I remember one day early in 1941 when we had one of the first R.D.F. sets fitted. We were extremely pleased with what we called "this new gadget." We were assured that it was going to find the enemy for us, and, in fact, was going to find everything. We were also told that the radio mechanic was a first-class fellow. It turned out that he was making his first trip at sea. He was a first-class radio mechanic but he had never been to sea before. We said, "Switch on the set" but he replied: "There is a slight technical hitch." About five minutes later a voice came up the pipe—rather like a famous voice one hears at Epsom on Derby Day—saying, "I have got an echo, Sir." Sure enough, our radio mechanic had got an echo. We said to him "Where is it?" He replied: "I think about half a mile astern." We spent an hour and a quarter looking for that echo, and then we suddenly discovered that we were getting a "ping" on the last ship of the line—a friendly craft. That would not have happened if the fellow had had some sea time. I earnestly beg the noble Earl to see whether it would not be possible to let us have some of these coastal force craft for use for training purposes, instead of putting them into reserve where they are serving no useful purpose. It might well be possible to man them with skeleton crews and let them go round to various ports, so that people who want to join coastal forces may have the opportunity of getting some practical sea training upon them—firing the guns, working the various radar sets, learning how to operate the minesweeping gear, how to operate the minelaying gear, and receiving instruction in depth charges. This, I suggest, would be a far better way of employing the craft than allowing them to lie idle, which means that they need a fairly considerable maintenance staff to keep them in a proper state of fitness.

Before I sit down, there is another point that I should like to urge, and that is with regard to the diesel engine which we have been hearing about. I hope that there will be adequate facilities for training engine room personnel to handle this. At the beginning of the last war, one was apt to get anything in the way of a stoker—he might have been a butcher, and he might never have had anything to do with a petrol engine at all. The diesel engine is fairly robust, fairly simple and its maintenance is not difficult. Given time, it should be possible to have available for instructional purposes in the big towns where R.N.V.R. centres are established some of these new diesels. Finally, I think that if some of these new coastal force craft are made available there will be no lack of volunteers, and we shall certainly start off in another war with a nucleus of well-trained personnel. I think I am right in saying that at the end of the last war coastal force officers and ratings numbered altogether just under 19,000 men. And I think it speaks volumes for their high efficiency and training that on D-Day there was not one single coastal force craft out of action. I hope the Government will see their way to make it possible for this enthusiasm to be maintained.

5.16 p.m.

VISCOUNT CALDECOTE

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, has already called attention to the lack of scientific officers in the Navy, and Lord Winster has said that we could not possibly afford to pay our scientists the scales which they are paid in America. These are two rather conflicting statements—or perhaps not exactly conflicting, because they are closely connected. I would put Lord Winster's point in another way: can we afford not to pay our scientists adequately? The main subject of my remarks is going to be the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors. I must apologise for raising this matter again, because we have debated it several times before in your Lordships' House, but the question is so important and the Corps form such a vital link in the efficiency of the Navy that I do not think it is wasting time to discuss it again. The Corps must be efficient, otherwise all the good equipment, all the new engines, will serve no useful purpose. If I may adapt an old nursery rhyme I would say: Not all the gas turbines, Nor all the admirals benign, Can ever make up For a bungled design. The constructors are the co-ordinators in all the equipment of a ship. They design the hull and co-ordinate the building. They co-ordinate the installation of the various services, electrical, plumbing and engineering. They have to be first-class administrators in the dockyards and in the Admiralty, and they administer departments which are larger than many industrial units. The problem, of course, is to recruit, train and retain in the Service sufficient first-class engineers. How successfully has that been done in the past few years? How successfully has the problem been tackled and how far has it been solved? It has certainly not been solved, I suggest, and it has been tackled most half-heartedly. I do not want to quote a lot of figures, but I should like to give a few facts. Since 1946 the pay and conditions of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors have been under consideration; they have been under review, and some improvements, it is true, have been made. But they have all been too small and too late. What is the result? The Corps is undermanned and recruiting is insufficient to replace wastage.

The Eastham Committee recommended a strength of 300 fully-qualified constructors in the Corps. The present strength is 175 plus 20 temporaries. The mere presence of the temporaries shows that the Admiralty are not satisfied with the regular recruiting. There have been twelve recruits since 1949 and there have been twenty-one resignations. Entries from every source are drying up. In 1951, there was one entry from the universities, one from the dockyards and one from the private shipyards. Universities should provide one of the best sources of recruitment. Since 1936, when the university scheme began, there have been twenty-five university entries and fourteen resignations out of those twentyfive—that is, more than half. They were more or less fully trained and they have left because conditions are impossible. In man-power loss it is tragic, and on the economic side the loss of money involved in the training of these young men—I estimate it must cost at least £1,500 to train each one—is sheer folly.

What is the cause of this unhappy state? Your Lordships will not want me to go into details—they have been argued time and again in public and in private. The late Government seemed determined to ignore all the advice from the best qualified sources. They ignored advice from the Royal Corps itself, from admirals like the noble Viscount, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cunningham, whom I am glad to see back with us to-day, from the shipbuilders and from the independent committee which they themselves set up. They preferred to take the advice of those who knew least about the problems involved. We have a new First Lord and I know he is intensely interested in this problem. I sincerely hope there will now be a different atmosphere.

The reason for the troubles in the past can be briefly and obviously stated. The conditions of service have been quite inadequate to attract the right type and number of recruits. What has been done? There have been some recent increases in pay, which has been some improvement, but I suggest that the whole basis has been wrong. I understand that what is being done is to bring constructors up to the level of the scientific Civil Service, but in fact they are still slightly below. For example, a university entrant at twenty-two receives £330 a year. A first-rate man from a university can obtain at least £500 to £600 in industry straight away. At twenty-five, the constructor is to get £425. After four years' training he gets £550 on a scale rising to £800. After ten years he goes on the scale £950 to £1,375. These are, broadly, similar rates to the scientific Civil Service, but there is longer training, fewer jobs and fewer opportunities. The prospects are considerably worse than the prospects in the administrative grades where a man goes in as an assistant principal. I would ask the noble Earl why that is so. Past Governments have paid lip service to the value of technologists, yet they pay them worse than the far less highly trained administrative officers.

The responsibilities of the Corps grow with every new weapon and every new complication put into Her Majesty's ships. If the Corps is going to provide the, ships the Navy must have, they cannot afford to fail to get the best men available. Noble Lords may have read in The Times of the problems that have to be met in the construction of welded ships. That is an example of the sort of trouble that can occur if there is insufficient men to tackle the problems of new types of construction. I would mention the tragic disaster of the "Affray." Not for a moment do I suggest that we know the cause of that disaster: I understand that insufficient information is available. But I want to bring it to your Lordships' attention to show the type of responsibility that the constructors have to face. The designs the constructors make have to be perfect, particularly for submarines. Men's lives depend on whether design and the method of construction are correct. If we go on as we are at the moment, I am afraid that the Corps will gradually run down, there will be fewer and fewer recruits, and those in it will be harder and harder worked; and in these circumstances the Navy cannot possibly get the service it should have. I implore the First Lord to act now to stop this situation getting any worse. Do not let him wait another three years to see how recent increases of pay are going to affect recruiting. If recruiting goes down in that time, it will be another four years from then before he can start to put the situation right. I implore him to take immediate and effective action.

I should like to mention briefly one or two other points. I believe the new scheme for training officers for the electrical branch is excellent, but it seems that they are not getting sufficiently large numbers of the high standard of recruit which is required in that branch. I wonder whether the publicity in the schools has been sufficient? Do headmasters know what a fine training and a fine career is being provided for these electrical branch officers? I hope the noble Earl can give us some assurance on that point. In the Memorandum that accompanied the Navy Estimates it is recognised how long it takes to build modern ships, even small ones. I wonder if the noble Earl can tell us whether the nine frigates have actually been laid down. I hope we shall hear that more frigates are going to be laid down during the year. There is no reference to it in the Memorandum. Last year the Memorandum stated that the limitation to the number of frigates that could be ordered was machinery. Modern high speed ships need very complicated machinery, which requires a long time to build. I understand it is necessary to order machinery a year before the ship is laid down, if her completion is not to be held up. Has that point been attended to and machinery ordered for the ships that are going to be laid down towards the end of this year and during next year? These frigates are going to be our first line of defence against a serious submarine attack in the event of a future war. It is vital that nothing should hold up that production. I was glad to see reference to the new Royal yacht. I am sure everyone is pleased that Her Majesty will be able to go to sea in her own yacht and visit the Fleet as in the old days.

Finally, I should like to pay tribute to the work of the Navy, in peace and in the war in Korea. We are proud of what they are doing. I admire their work in the Suez Canal Zone and in Persia, under unpleasant conditions, in helping the Army, and what they did in Jamaica after the hurricane. In storm and in emergency the Navy is still there and we are proud of it. It is up to every one of us to see that the Navy gets the equipment and the men it must have to carry on its great work.

5.30 p.m.

LORD STRABOLGI

My Lords, one of the pleasures of reaching a certain age of maturity is that one can have the satisfaction of welcoming the younger Peers in your Lordships' House and, as I have on this occasion, of appreciating their contributions to our debates. The last two speakers, Lord Selsdon and Lord Caldecote, are the sons of very distinguished fathers with whom I had the privilege of serving in another place and in your Lordships' House, and they are worthily carrying on the tradition of their sires. If I may address myself to the numerous Whips on the Government Front Bench, I hope that all encouragement will be given to the younger Peers on that side of the House to contribute to our debates.

I particularly welcome what the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, has said about the naval constructors, because the truth is that warship construction is undergoing a complete revolution. My noble friend Lord Hall, in his very weighty speech, referred to the coming into use of nuclear energy as a means of proplusion. That is a revolution in itself. Furthermore, I believe that I am not far out in saying that the best scientific and professional opinion inclines to the view that within a few years the air missile in its various forms, rockets and so on, will altogether replace the old-fashioned, conventional naval artillery. That is another complete revolution. In these circumstances, I feel that a strong case can be made for giving every attention to strengthening the constructor corps, as mentioned by the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote; and also, as has been mentioned by several noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Hall, to the strengthening of the scientific branch of the Royal Navy.

I am disturbed, like my old colleague opposite, the noble Earl, Lord Howe—and I also detected some signs of uneasiness in the speeches of both my noble friends who have held the great office of First Lord of the Admiralty—at the rate of reconstruction and expansion of the Royal Navy. My noble friend Lord Hall mentioned the cruiser position and the delays in completing cruisers already on the stocks. I think I am right in saying that we have on the Navy List 170 destroyers—this figure was also mentioned by the noble Earl, Lord Howe. Given the effective life of a destroyer as ten years—and even if she does not wear out in ten years, the advance in naval technique is such that she will be rendered obsolescent—then we ought to be replacing our destroyer flotillas at the rate of 10 per cent. a year, which means that we should build or lay down not six destroyers, but seventeen each year. The same applies to frigates, of which we have 165 on the Navy List. Given the effective life of a frigate as ten years, we should have sixteen in course of construction or begun each year, instead of nine. In those three vital arms, cruisers, destroyers and frigates, I maintain—and I think from his remarks that here I have the support of my noble friend Lord Hall—that we are not building enough.

What is the reason for that? The immediate reason, as given by the First Lord in another place, is not on this occasion the Treasury, who are usually the "villains of the piece," but, to quote his words: .… lack of man-power on naval work in the shipbuilding yards. But in the speech introducing the Estimates in another place the First Lord of the Admiralty went a good deal further. If I may quote him, he said: To keep up the rate of progress for which we had hoped we obviously ought to have sufficient labour, raw materials, machine tools and manufacturing capacity available. There are shortages in all these categories. Later on, the First Lord said: I think I should stress that we are particularly short of labour on naval work in the shipyards, which are, of course, fully engaged on merchant building, and that if construction of Her Majesty's Ships is not to suffer we shall need considerably more men to work on them. Therefore, there is a shortage of labour, materials, machine tools and manufacturing capacity generally. Why is that? One reason for the shortage of labour is the housing situation. Owing to the bad housing situation in this country labour is immobile. This difficulty is being felt not only in the Royal dockyards and shipbuilding yards generally, but also by the aircraft manufacturing industry, which again has a direct bearing, not only on the Royal Air Force but also on the Royal Navy. There, is, therefore, a serious shortage of labour for the necessary construction of our first line of defence.

The Royal Navy, with its co-ordinated air arm, is our first line of defence, and we must never forget it. I do not think we ever forget it in your Lordships' House, but I agree with what was said by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, that people outside are apt to forget it unless they are continually reminded. We can have the most wonderful Continental army, equipped with all the tanks, which are taking the raw materials, machine tools and labour which ought to go to ship construction; we can have the most wonderful land army, again taking the materials, machine tools and labour which ought to be going to ship construction, and the most wonderful mechanised forces. But if our sea routes are cut, and our supplies are interrupted at sea, we starve—and that in a very short time. There is no doubt about it. Furthermore, we cannot carry on our ordinary activities in war time, because this marvellous Continental army we are building up cannot be transported: it is helpless unless we have command of the seas. I shall have to repeat what I have ventured to put before your Lordships before—namely, that our whole strategical conception is out of gear, and that the maladjustment is very far reaching.

The Minister of Defence has graced our proceedings for most of the time this afternoon, but I am sorry that he is absent at the moment, because I particularly want to make a remark about his position as Minister of Defence, and also about his great career as a famous soldier. I have the greatest admiration for the military achievements of the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Alexander, and I am quite sure that as Minister of Defence he will hold the scales evenly. But we do not want the scales held evenly today: we want the scales tipped down in favour of our sea defences, including, of course, the appropriate air arm for the Fleet. For that reason, I regret that a Field-Marshal of such eminence in his profession has been chosen as Minister of Defence by Her Majesty. In my view, great pressure will be required in Parliament (I hope that it will come front the Press, and from the public, too, when they are roused) to see that the Royal Navy gets a large share of the scarce raw materials, equipment and man-power. At the present moment we are depending very largely on our Allies in N.A.T.O., or, if you like, in the United Nations, for our sea defence. But that is a false position in which to be. We cannot permanently maintain that position if we are not to betray the trust that we as Members of Parliament hold for the people of this country.

One or two noble Lords have said that the only enemy is; Russia. That may be so at the moment. But I, in my lifetime—and so have most of your Lordships—have seen our enemies and Allies changing sides every few years. One cannot foretell the future. No one in your Lordships' House can be certain to-day that the United States may not go isolationist again. There are isolationist tendencies growing up in the United States, and if there is a severe trade recession I believe that this feeling will be strengthened. It would be very rash to suggest that the United States will not again go isolationist, as they have every right to do if they wish: they have every right to withdraw from the United Nations, and from their Alliances, as they did after the First World War. In that event, we must rely, first, on our own strength at sea.

While Allies change into enemies, and vice versa, with bewildering rapidity in this extraordinary world in which we live to-day, the building up of our sea power is, and must be, a slow process. The training of the officers alone is a long process. The maintenance of traditions, and the welding of those traditions to the new techniques and new weapons, is also a slow process. You can build up armies comparatively quickly; you can even, as we saw in the last two world wars, expand air forces comparatively quickly But you cannot expand navies above a certain rate of increase. For that reason I feel that we are attempting too much for our economy and available money resources. We are trying to do to-day what we have never tried to do in the past: we are trying to maintain a great Continental army on the scale of the nations with great land frontiers and large populations.

We never tried to do that in the past. We always relied upon the highly trained but comparatively small professional army. Instead of that, we are now embarking on a great mass army on the scale of the Continental nations, and we are having at the same time to provide extremely expensive warships, and the very complicated and powerful aircraft which go with them, to cope with the same problems of sea defence as have always existed in the past. Our ancestors were not all fools. They realised in the past that in peace time we could not be as strong as the great Continental Powers in land armies and, at the same time, be a great naval Power. Make no mistake about this. Unless we are a great naval Power—that means to say a Power which maintains communications with the Commonwealth and safeguards the transport of its troops and, above all, keeps open these trade arteries for the transport of supplies—we shall be in the most vulnerable position and, in certain eventualities, completely doomed. Therefore I say that we must as soon as possible re-examine our whole grand strategy, and we must realise that all the marching regiments, all the mechanised divisions, all the brigades of tanks and all the great masses of land artillery, will not save us if we are not strong enough at sea to safeguard our vital communications.

5.43 p.m.

THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD

My Lords, it is customary on these occasions to say that we have had a very useful and interesting debate. Those tributes are sometimes mendacious and frequently conventional, but on this occasion I believe them to be profoundly true. This is, of course, just as it should be, because we have amongst us many authorities on naval matters, including the two last First Lords of the Admiralty. I take this opportunity to thank the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, for the scrupulously fair manner in which he opened the debate. I should like to thank also the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, for his arresting speech and for the intimate revelations he made about our past life. I have listened as carefully as I can to the speeches and I have been glad to note that no really serious criticism of the Royal Navy or its administration has emerged to-day. But I must warn noble Lords at once that I shall not be able, in the tour d'horizon which I am going to make, to answer all the questions which have been raised, because that would take far too long. However, I will make it my business to see that any unanswered questions will be fully dealt with, and any noble Lords whom I fail to satisfy I will acquaint privately and in detail.

My right honourable friend the First Lord of the Admiralty has recently explained, both in his Statement Explanatory of the Navy Estimates and in the course of the debate on the Navy Estimates in another place, the policy which we are following and the objectives which we hope to achieve. Broadly speaking, my right honourable friend said that our aim remains that of contributing to the maximum extent which is consistent with the economic situation to the defences of the free world and to the deterrence of any possible aggression. The main features of this programme are the buildup of our anti-mine and anti-submarine forces, including naval aircraft, and the modernisation of existing carriers, cruisers, submarines, destroyers and frigates, to enable us to make our contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which everyone feels to be necessary, while maintaining an active fleet capable of supporting our policy throughout the world.

That the Royal Navy, and. I include in that term the Royal Marines, has been able, despite the impact of the rearmament and expansion programme, to meet all the calls which have been made upon it during the past year, has been amply demonstrated by its activities in the Far East, the Persian Gulf and the Canal Zone, by the various very impressive exercises which it has carried cut with the N.A.T.O. Powers, and by the manner in which it has handled its other normal tasks. I should like to pay tribute to all concerned for the high standard of efficiency which has been maintained at all times. It is particularly gratifying that in the sphere of naval aviation, ships' companies, technical personnel and air crews have combined to produce remarkable results. The feats performed by naval aviation in the Far East have been outstanding and have been the subject of tribute by my right honourable friend in another place, who also stressed a point which I particularly wish to stress myself, for the benefit of both the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, and the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham. He said that every naval officer now recognises that naval aviation is the main striking power of the Fleet. Let there be no doubt, I implore, in noble Lords' minds of the fact that naval aviation will be given the attention, encouragement and equipment which it deserves and which it must have.

Perhaps the biggest single menace which the Royal Navy will have to meet in the future is the under-water menace, both mine and submarine. That is why very grew emphasis has been placed on increasing our minesweeping forces and our anti-submarine forces. In fact, the bulk of the new construction programme is directed towards that menace. Again, while the modernisation programme includes work on carriers and cruisers, the main effort is directed to converting fleet destroyers to fast anti-submarine frigates to supplement the new construction programme.

I should now like to deal with as many of the points which have been raised today as the patience of the House will permit. The noble Viscount, Lord Hall, I will not say criticised, but commented upon, the man-power situation in the Navy and, so far as I understood his criticisms, he wishes to know why it is necessary for the Navy to retain men beyond the terms of their engagements and to recall the reservists when the other two Services are dispensing with these expedients. The noble Viscount has also referred to the ratio of senior ratings to junior ratings in the Royal Navy, suggesting, I think, that top heaviness has resulted. The question has also been raised whether these two situations could be avoided if recruiting were stepped up. These are very serious charges, and they demand a careful reply.

I would say that, excluding retained and recalled personnel, the present strength is round about 130,000 and will rise to a maximum of 139,000 during the financial year 1952–53. With the addition of retained men and recalled reservists the maximum strength during the year will be 153,000. This will be maintained only for a short period, because the numbers of men who complete engagements will be diminishing, owing to the great reduction in Regular recruitment during the war years, and there will be an insufficient number of Royal Fleet Reservists left in certain categories. The strength of the Navy will thus drop to 149,000. Without retained men and recalled reservists the Navy would therefore be weakened by about 10,000 to 14,000 officers and men, depending upon the year selected. This reduction in strength, my Lords, distributed between seagoing ships and snore establishments, would be unacceptable in the present state of international tension. Some idea of the reduction in naval strength that would result can be seen from the following typical peace-time complements of some of H.M. Ships: aircraft carriers, 900 to 1,200: cruisers, 500 to 700; destroyers, 200 to 300.

The growth in numbers of chief petty officers, petty officers, and leading ratings, to which the noble Viscount referred, is almost entirely due to the retention of time-expired men and the recall of reservists. The retentions and recalls were essential to enable the Navy to meet its additional commitments arising from increased preparedness. The noble Viscount, Lord Hall, will not have forgotten that immediately prior to Korea there was a shortage of senior ratings, mainly because of the stopping of Regular recruiting during the war.

5.58 p.m.

EARL FORTFSCUE

My Lords, the Royal Commission is due to take place at six o'clock. I beg to move that we adjourn for that purpose.

House adjourned during pleasure.

House resumed.