NAVY ESTIMATES

HL Deb 27 March 1952 vol 175 cc1024-38

2.37 p.m.

VISCOUNT HALL rose to call attention to the Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1952–1953 (Cmd. 8476), and the accompanying Estimates; and to move for Papers. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Pakenham for so readily agreeing to my opening this debate. He was the immediate predecessor of the present First Lord and he could have claimed that right. He served all too short a period as my successor as First Lord, and I much regret that the narrow swing of the political pendulum deprived him of a long and successful period in that attractive office. I know that he was settling down and was highly respected and popular with the naval and civilian branches of the Admiralty. I think we can regard his short stay as just an introduction to a much longer period next time, when I trust that his association with this fine Service will be as long and as pleasant as mine was. I am also happy in the knowledge that the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, is to reply to this debate. In these days we talk in terms of: "I knew your father." Or "I knew your grandfather." I have pleasant recollections of many conversations which I had with his distinguished father, not about politics so much as about coal. I found him most helpful and, indeed, very forthcoming on that subject.

This year's Estimates really represent a continuation in its entirety of the naval programme which was considered and approved by the Labour Government. My noble friend Lord Pakenham and myself, as predecessors of the present First Lord, could each have signed these Estimates, which indicate a complete continuity of naval policy and the carrying on of the Labour Government's policy in relation to this matter, including the very much criticised appointment of an American as Supreme Naval Commander, Atlantic. It must have been as pleasing to my noble friend as it was to me to know that, after what must have been the most careful examination of our naval preparedness by the Prime Minister, who was then Minister of Defence, and by the present First Lord, in the recent debates on Defence and the Navy Estimates there was little or no criticism of the naval programme or naval policy. Indeed, the First Lord during the course of his speech once graciously acknowledged that much of the criticism of naval policy in previous debates was unjustified. That is an indication of the inaccurate briefs which were supplied upon this and other political questions by the Central Office of the Conservative Party.

The purpose of the naval programme referred to is to build up our anti-mine and submarine forces, including naval aircraft; to modernise existing carriers, cruisers, submarines, destroyers, and frigates; and to enable us to make our contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, while maintaining an active fleet capable of supporting our policy throughout the world. To further that programme, the Estimates this year amount to no less a sum than £357,000,000, which of course includes the sum of £25,000,000 to be allotted during the year from the counterpart fund in the United States of America. The cost to the United Kingdom taxpayer will be £332,000,000—£53,000,000 more than last year. This is the highest-ever Navy Estimate in peace time, and an amount well above the total naval expenditure in the four years preceding 1939.

The First Lord, in his Estimate speech in another place, dealt freely with the progress made in building up the strength of the Fleet. He referred to the taking over of H.M.S. "Eagle" and also the two vessels of the "Daring" class. This will add much to the strength of the Fleet, for the "Eagle" is the newest and most powerful ship of its class in the world, while the "Darings" are very powerful destroyers indeed—they can be called small cruisers. In a recent visit which I made to one of the "Darings" I was very impressed with her appearance, her equipment and the confidence of the officers and the ship's company in the power of their ship. The First Lord gave much useful information about the "Eagle." There is no question about her quality. He suggested that it may soon be possible for visits by Members of Parliament to see this ship. I trust that some members of your Lordships' House will take advantage of this opportunity, should it present itself. I hope the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, will raise the matter with the First Lord. I hope that the progress of the other ships under construction—namely, the "Ark Royal," the four "Hermes," the remainder of the "Darings," the frigates and the many minesweepers which are on order—will be speedily accelerated, so that they may be completed soon.

I am not going to deal very much with the question of new construction, but before I leave it I should like to ask a question concerning H.M.S. "Cumberland." The conversion of that ship for certain trials was completed almost a year ago. I am not sure whether those trials have taken place. They are of the greatest importance, because they deal with the advance models of some of the new types of equipment which will form a vital part in the programme of the re-equipment of the Fleet. Indeed, it can be said that the three "Tiger" class ships, work upon which has been suspended for some time, are awaiting some of the results of these trials, in order that work may be resumed upon them. We shall urgently require these ships, with others of that class, in the not too distant future, for some of the existing cruisers will require replacement shortly. I trust that the Board of Admiralty is now considering and preparing designs for the laying down of some of the cruiser programme which we my require in the course of the next few years.

It is disappointing to know that the heavy modernisation programme is being delayed owing to the scarcity of suitable labour, raw material and machine tools, particularly in view of the fact that the tempo must progressively increase. I ask whether it is not possible to place more work in the private shipbuilding yards, even at the sacrifice of some of the merchant shipbuilding. The warship builders some time ago promised to set aside slipways for naval purposes, if required. Last week I saw a report of a statement by the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, that the Admiralty proposes to build a naval shipyard in Belfast consisting of three slipways and employing 1,000 men. It seems strange that if labour is available at Belfast, that labour cannot be transferred to some of the yards where equipment and machinery exists, but where there is a shortage of men, to complete many of these very important conversions. It is satisfying to note that there is an increasing number of minesweepers with the Fleet and used for training, with larger numbers in reserve. We must build up other anti-mine forces, particularly the mine-watching service which is now being recruited, for I consider quick and accurate "spotting" of all mines which will fall around this coast in the event of war absolutely essential in order that they may be cleared as soon as possible. The menace of the mines is only just beginning to be recognised. In coastal waters they will be very dangerous; indeed this will be one of the main threats in the event of emergency.

It is not my intention to deal with the question of naval aviation. My noble friend Lord Pakenham will deal fully with that important branch of the Service. But I should like to warn the First Lord of the great difficulty in getting delivery of aircraft on anything like the promised date. In some cases it is not weeks or months but, indeed, years between the promised date and the actual date of delivery. It is almost impossible properly to plan this important service, and very discouraging to those who have to administer it, and particularly to the pilots who for long periods have to fly in obsolete aircraft for their training, owing to these delays. It will take all the persuasion and pressure of the naval authorities to speed up deliveries. I should like to ask whether all the Attackers—in connection with which there is a bad case of delay—have now been delivered. And it is important that the other newer aircraft, the G.R.17, the Sea Hawk and the Sea Venom should be coming along soon.

Of all the research projects in which the Royal Navy is engaged, one of the most important is that of ship propulsion. We are faced with the fast submarine, the fast corvette, the destroyer, the patrol boat, the cruiser, and so on. In fact, speed dominates sea movement almost as much as it dominates movement in the air, and there is no doubt that big things are now moving in every branch of research dealing with this matter The First Lord, in his Statement and speech, was, as could be expected, for obvious reasons very cautious in the matter of giving general information. But it is generally known that much research by the Admiralty and by engineering firms has resulted in the production of a new light-weight, high-powered diesel engine as well as gas-turbines suitable for very fast and comparatively small craft of the patrol boat size. The First Lord stated that a number of patrol boats, which will be fitted with this diesel engine, have been ordered. I understand that this diesel engine has been on test for some time and is at present undergoing sea trials; also that plans are being made for its large-scale production. If that is so, then there should be a slowing down of the building of craft of older design for the new diesel machinery and gas turbines to be installed in the new craft. These engines have the great advantage of providing more power for less weight and requiring fewer spares and less maintenance than the older type of engine. It is also known that a number of experimental gas-turbines of varying power are already being used at sea, and I am sure that the Board of Admiralty has this matter in mind.

Reference was made to the fact that all possible means of submarine propulsion were under investigation, including systems using nuclear energy and oxygen-bearing fuels. So much is happening, particularly in the field of atomic power research for propulsion and other forms of power utilisation, that most people are bewildered by it all. I remember that on a visit to the United States in the autumn of last year I saw much publicity given in the Press to matter from official naval productions, and it was particularly directed to what was called the gigantic atomic-powered submarine of the future, one of which, we were told, is now being built, while designs were being prepared for another. These submarines are credited with having an under-water speed of as high as thirty-five knots, which is a speed far in excess of that of the latest type of conventionally powered underwater craft. In addition to the speed advantage, it was revealed from different sources that a single charge of uranium in the nuclear thermal reactor of this atomic submarine would propel this type of vessel for tens of thousands of miles. The United States Navy have the utmost confidence that this type of submarine will be developed, and they regard it as what they call the true submarine. Their view is that up to the present most submarines have been a compromise between a craft capable of underseas operation and craft intended to operate on the surface in concert with conventional surface craft.

In this publication in the United States it is pointed out that the atomic-powered submarine will achieve virtual independence of air, a difficulty which besets the conventional submarine. The latter requires a great deal of air for operating the diesel system and must either be surfaced or take in air through the "Snort" It is asserted that the only restriction on the time the atomic submarine could remain completely sub-merged would be air for the crew and the crew's endurance in the restricted quarters; but special consideration is being given to the crew's comfort in designing these submarines. It should be pointed out that the cost of submarines of this kind is very high. It is expected that one will be completed sometime in 1954. It can be said that this important naval development is getting much and increasing attention in the United States and other countries, and it is also taking up a substantial share of the United States Navy's budget. Some United States Navy planners go so far as to say that, just as the carrier superseded the battleship, so might the dreadnought of the deep, the future submarine, become the capital ship of the future.

This activity in ship propulsion is not confined to submarines. It is reported that Admiral Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the United States Navy is now thinking about building a fleet carrier to be propelled with atomic energy. A new ship's design is required, but the principal problems, particularly those dealing with propulsion, have already been resolved in the research on the new submarine now under construction. When built, the carrier will probably have a higher speed than any other warship afloat, and will be able to make longer cruises without the need for refuelling. There is no doubt that the United states is passing from the research stage to the production stage in this new and revolutionary method of propulsion, and that the Americans will have this new type of ship in commission in a few years' time, with all that that may mean in peace and war. In my opinion, it is vitally necessary that in these developments the greatest possible cooperation should exist between the United States of America and ourselves. The Admiralty must be aware of these developments, and I should like to know whether they, too, are pressing forward with the development of this kind of ship.

There are two matters in the Estimates about which I desire to offer some criticism. Both concern man-power. The Estimates provide in Vote A for 153,000 men, against 143,000 last year. This increase of 10,000 is to be provided not by calling up additional recruits but by a continuation of the policy of retaining time-expired men for the full period of eighteen months, by recalling another 3,500 from the Royal Fleet Reserve, and by a small increase in the number of National Service men in the Royal Navy. It is pleasing to me to note that by the end of last year the inducements in the form of new pay and pension codes brought a substantial increase in re-engagements of the men whose time was expired—from 25 per cent., in 1950, to 40 per cent. at the present time, and it is expected that the target of 50 per cent. will soon be reached If that is so, with the number of new recruits provided under the Estimates, then there is bound to be art over-balance of senior ratings.

Last calendar year, fewer than 10,000 new recruits entered the Navy (the figure is actually about 9,500), whereas in 1948, there were 19,000, and in 1949, 16,000. In 1950, just before the trouble in Korea, Vote A provided for 143,000 men. Of that number 39,500 could be regarded as senior ratings—chief petty officers, petty officers and leading seamen. In the present Estimates, provision is made for an increase of 9,500 senior ratings, whereas other ratings—able seamen, ordinary seamen and boys—are to be fewer than they were two years ago by some 200. I am convinced that if the Admiralty depend for the maintenance of man-power on the retention of time-expired men and the calling up of reservists, without an intake of an increasing number of young recruits—and it takes a considerable time for their training—in the course of the next two or three years, when the time comes for the release of these men, there must inevitably be an under-balancing of the type of personnel which the Navy requires.

I would ask the Admiralty to look into this matter again. At the present time, there are from 12,000 to 14,000 men (I have not accurate figures) now in the Royal Navy, who are either time-expired and serving the additional eighteen months or called up as Royal Fleet reservists, and there is no prospect of any reduction in this eighteen months' period, so far as the Admiralty are concerned, until towards the end of 1953. Noble Lords should understand that the Army and Royal Air Force are progressively releasing all Regulars retained so that they will be released at least by September, 1953, while the Royal Navy is still calling up reservists. The Army has released all Regular reservists called to the colours for the Korean emergency. I fully appreciate the difficulty of having complete uniformity within the Services and how dependent the Royal Navy is upon the senior man; but the men in the Navy will take some convincing that it is necessary for them to be retained when the other Services can release their men serving in like circumstances. I ask that the patience of these men and their families should not be tried too much.

There is a serious failing off in the boy entry. In 1950, the boy entry numbered 7,500, while the present Estimates provide for only 5,600. Before leaving the question of man-power, I should like to deal with the young officer entry. In his Estimates speech, the First Lord of the Admiralty pointed out that the number of cadets now coming forward is insufficient to meet requirements, and that a considerably larger entry has become imperative. This is a matter in which I took a great personal interest when I was at the Admiralty, and I can say that, apart from the scarcity of officers for naval aviation, which I understand is now easy, it was not reported to me that there was any shortage of executive or other officers. So I would ask the noble Earl who is to reply whether he can give some idea of the number of officer cadets now required and the urgency of obtaining them.

The First Lord announced that he proposed setting up a Working Party or an Inquiry to look into this matter, with a view to recommending ways and means of securing at once an appreciably higher yield from the existing competitions—that is to say, Dartmouth, special entry, and lower deck promotion—or of tapping some additional source of entry. I can offer no objection to that course, but I assume that before any other source of entry is considered the three existing sources will be fully examined; that consideration will be given by the Working Party or Inquiry on those lines; and that the Working Party or Inquiry will be composed of persons holding varying views in relation to the question of the Dartmouth cadet entry. I am sure that the First Lord would obtain much useful information if he himself could—as I did on several occasions—visit some of the larger ships, and particularly the training cruiser, and meet some of the officers in the wardroom and the gunroom. This is a most important matter. I agree that what is required is to obtain naval officers of the highest possible standard for the Royal Navy, and I trust that his Working Party or Inquiry will be the means of bringing about that end.

There is one other matter to which I want to refer, and I should like the noble Earl who is to reply for the Government to deal with this, because I am under a small cloud in relation to the three Medway towns. The noble Lord will be aware that in 1950, when I was First Lord, I decided on a reorganisation of the Royal Marines, which involved the closing down of the Chatham Division of the Corps. I met a deputation representing the three Medway towns to explain to them the reasons which influenced the Admiralty, and I stated that it was the intention to transfer to Chatham, in place of the Royal Marine Division, the Supply and the Secretarial Branch Training Establishment, known as H.M.S. "Ceres." The Admiralty have since decided that this move should not take place. I have no doubt that in reaching this decision the Admiralty have given due consideration to the undertaking which I gave on their behalf, and have satisfied themselves that the reasons for not transferring H.M.S. "Ceres" to Chatham are compelling. However, should like an assurance on this point.

It is gratifying to know that the joint exercises with the Navies of the Commonwealth and the North Atlantic Treaty countries were carried on successfully. In my view, they should now become a normal part of naval activity between the countries named, for they must lead not only to efficient but also to most friendly co-operation. The Royal Navy has well maintained its very high standard in all its many and varied activities in various parts of the world—that is to say, in Korea, Malaya, Persia and, indeed, in the Suez Canal. In all these activities it can rightly be said that the Navy was there. I have now severed my long association with the Admiralty, and can say that, so far as I know, nobody who has served in the Royal Navy can fail to have the greatest admiration and, indeed, affection for that great and wonderful Service. I am proud of what little I could do to assist that Service, and I shall always be grateful to all with I whom worked so closely for their kindly and friendly assistance. They made my eight-and-a-half years which I served with them at the Admiralty a very happy memory. I beg to move for Papers.

3.15 p.m.

LORD TEYNHAM

My Lords, I am sure that all noble Lords on this side of the House fully appreciate the great contribution made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, and the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, in the build-up of the Fleet after the heavy and, perhaps I might say, somewhat unnecessary run-down of Her Majesty's Fleet after the war years. Perhaps the noble Viscount's judgment of my past criticisms will be tempered by the fact that there have been few, if any, Boards of the Admiralty who have not benefited by a little prodding at the right time, in the past I have sometimes criticised the apparent lack of information contained in the Memorandum which always accompanies the Estimates, but I am sure noble Lords opposite will agree with me to-day that the present Paper is a model of information. As the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, said, the Naval Estimates have been fully discussed in another place. There are, however, certain aspects which I suggest have been rather glossed over, but which are of very great importance. They should certainly be emphasised in this House and should bear the scrutiny of the distinguished Admirals who adorn the Benches of your Lordships' House.

The noble Viscount, Lord Hall, mentioned the question of man-power in the Fleet. I think the Vote A in 1949 was for something like 154,000, and I believe that it is for more or less the same figure to-day. In the interval there was a plan to reduce it to 127,000. Then we had the Korean trouble, and it has been difficult for the Navy to plan ahead on manpower. No doubt the noble Earl who is to reply for Her Majesty's Government will deal with that point more fully. I should also like to refer to another type of man-power. If your Lordships will turn to page 6 of the Memorandum, paragraph 1, you will see that it reads: The stage has now been reached where considerable increase of man-power on naval work in the shipbuilding yards will be necessary to maintain progress. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will be able to give some indication as to how this man-power is to be increased, because unless it is increased quickly further delay will occur. I do not intend to enlarge on this matter to-day, but perhaps the noble Earl who is to reply may tell us that the Government have in mind certain priorities for this labour problem.

I am sure that all your Lordships are glad to know that almost all ships of the Reserve Fleet have had at least one refit since the war, and that considerable modernisation has taken place in a vast number of them. We are now, of course, as regards the Fleet, in a very different position from that before the war. We now have a very small Active Fleet and a much larger Reserve Fleet. Modernisation of the Reserve Fleet is no doubt of the utmost importance, but I cannot help feeling that it might be better to concentrate a little more on new construction. It is true that this takes more time and money, and no doubt a balance must be struck. But old ships cannot, in the long run, be made as efficient as a modern up-to-date vessel. I also feel that consideration might be given to the spending of more money on the Active Fleet rather than on the Reserve Fleet, because unless we have sufficient numbers of ships afloat on the Active list we cannot give proper sea-going training to our officers who are commanding those vessels. If we had to commission a large proportion of the Reserve Fleet to-day, we might have some difficulty in finding experienced officers, who have had sufficient training afloat in modern warfare, to command those ships. In the last war, if an officer was away from command afloat for only six months he was out of date in antisubmarine warfare.

I regret to see that no provision has been made for further work on the three cruisers which have been laid down since 1945. The noble Viscount also mentioned that he thought it was high time that we had a cruiser programme. I had hoped that at least one ship might have been included in the Estimates, so that we should soon have a really first-class up-to-date cruiser. I know that financial reasons must again be advanced for this delay, and that our old cruisers are being modernised. But this is not the same thing as having a modern ship which embodies all the lessons in layout and construction we learned in the last war.

I am sure that all your Lordships would wish to pay tribute to the wonderful co-operation which has been going on with the Commonwealth Naval Forces in Korea. The Australian carrier "H.M.A.S. Sydney" has been doing turn and turn about with "H.M.S. Glory," and the latter was re-fitted and her air crews rested in Australia. There is no doubt that our destroyers in Korea have had a very hard time indeed, and I hope that it may soon be possible, with the new "Daring" destroyers coming forward, to give them more relief. Last but not least. I am sure that your Lordships would like to congratulate the Royal Navy on its excellent work carried out in the Canal Zone under very difficult conditions.

I should like to turn for a few minutes to the training of officers at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, which has been mentioned by the noble Viscount this afternoon. I am afraid that it is unfortunately true that we have not been obtaining either sufficient numbers of entries for the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, or, in fact, entries of a high enough standard. At present, as your Lordships are aware, the cadets enter the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, either at the age of sixteen years or as special entry cadets at the age of eighteen. At the time the change in entry was made by the late Government, when they decided to do away with the thirteen-and-a-half year entry, I ventured to point out to the noble Viscount that it might fail for various reasons. I would say that many of these reasons are now becoming more clear. I would mention only one to-day, and that is that the really successful boy at a secondary school has a great deal of pressure put upon him by his teachers to go on to the university, rather than join the Services. For that reason, we do not always get the best material. Of course, civil life to-day holds greater chances for the boy with brains and ambition than it did some years ago. I understand that an Inquiry is to take place on the whole matter of entry. Personally, I cannot help feeling that the best system would be to retain the sixteen-year-old entry, together with the special entry, and bring back the thirteen-and-a-half year entry. We should then have a further source of supply of young officers and catch them young before they are diverted into other spheres of activity. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that unless we have this very young entry we shall miss some of the best brains that may be available to us.

It is perhaps well to remember that the naval training system has never been static. It evolves with the Navy, together with the general trend of national education. We have certainly gone a long way since the days of the King's Cadets, who were called "King's Letter Boys," who were the equivalent cadet entries of the seventeenth century. I understand that there is a certain feeling in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve that it is almost impossible for an officer to become qualified with a watch-keeping certificate because he does not receive long enough training to obtain that certificate. I believe that it was mentioned in another place that consideration was being given to some kind of intermediate certificate, and perhaps the noble Earl who is to reply may be able to give us a little more information on that point. Then again, there appear to be few opportunities for the members of the Royal Naval Volunteer Supplementary Reserve to have much training afloat, and in some cases, when provision has been made, there has not been very much demand for it. I would say that one of the difficulties is that practically no financial provision is provided for these officers, and they get no messing allowance whatever. I hope that something may be done in that direction.

I now turn to another point which I think is of great importance, and that is the provision of guns and weapons for our merchant ships, because, in the event of another war, we shall certainly not have the time to build up a stockpile as we were able to do in the last war. I know that merchant ships coming forward for refit are being strengthened for guns, but I should like to have an assurance that all the necessary stockpiling is going on in order to put these weapons in these ships. I also think that many of your Lordships would like to have a more complete picture of the actual set-up of the Supreme Commander of the Atlantic, and his ancillary commands with their headquarters, and of how they are to work. The arrangement appears to be a very complicated one, and I hope that we shall not become entangled in too many sub-divisions, so that by the time the squadron or ship concerned receives an order the enemy may have either attacked or fled.

There is another aspect of naval organisation which I do not feel is having the attention it should have at the present time. We may have to visualise the possibility of provision for large-scale port working over the beaches at the very outset of a new war, and failure to provide this organisation might well mean the starvation of this country at an early stage. There is no doubt that atomic attack might well stifle a great number of our large ports and make them practically unworkable. We might be driven to discharging cargo over the beaches. It should be remembered in that connection that beach discharge entails the provision of a large number of small merchant ships, so that the cargoes in the bigger ships can be transferred to the little ones in order that discharge may take place in the shallow water areas. I have no doubt that Her Majesty's Government have all these matters under consideration, but I think your Lordships would like to know that energetic steps are being taken to build up an organisation for port working over the beaches. There is no doubt that the Navy is in good trim and a very effective fighting force. The noble Viscount who set down this Motion has undoubtedly contributed largely to this efficiency. I should say that the Navy has not yet reached that perfect state in which all First Lords would like to see it, but I think we are on the right road.