HL Deb 18 June 1952 vol 177 cc323-43

5.10 p.m.

LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH rose to call attention to the Report on the Huntingdon train accident; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the object I had in putting this Motion upon the Order Paper was to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they did not think, in all the circumstances of the inspecting officer's report into the incident of the Huntingdon train accident, that the time had arrived when there should be some alteration in the law, or some other arrangement, in order to give the Minister of Transport or another responsible Minister some authority over fire precautions and fire accidents on trains—for which no one in Her Majesty's Government is responsible to-day. But before I come to that question, perhaps it would be helpful, in order that your Lordships may be able to consider what, in my view, is the very serious position arising, with the public interest seriously at stake, if I gave your Lordships a brief outline of this unfortunate accident at Huntingdon.

The train concerned was made up of articulated centre-corridor coaches. If any of your Lordships are in possession of the inspecting officer's report you can see a sketch on the first page. This particular coach had seating accommodation for 64 passengers; it was 73 feet long and had a narrow corridor, 2 feet wide, running up the middle. The only entrances and exits were via one single narrow door of 2 feet 1 inch width at either end of this corridor, into the vestibule. At about 4.30 p.m. on July 14, 1951, a passenger sitting in the rearmost seat of the twin-set (as I will call it for convenience sake) noticed a wisp of smoke. Perhaps I may be allowed to repeat that there were approximately 65 other passengers. This one noticed a wisp of smoke coming between the seat and the side of the coach. She called the attention of a passing pantry-boy who was going down the centre corridor of the coach, and he, in turn, informed the restaurant car conductor. The conductor informed the guard. The guard made an examination and came to the conclusion that the smoke was caused by a hot axle-box. He decided to throw a note out of a window as the train drew up at Huntingdon, about ten minutes travelling time away, asking for the train to be stopped at Peterborough, half-an-hour further on. He wrote the note in his compartment in the ninth coach, went to the restaurant car to search for a potato, to attach, I presume, as a weight so that he could throw the note out of the window; but he was unable to find a potato.

During this time the smoke in the second coach grew increasingly thick. It was here, of course, that the fire had been seen to start. One of the passengers, after making a further examination, decided to pull the communication chain. He was unable to find it: there was not one in the whole of that coach. After making a search he found it in the vestibule over one of the exterior doors—that is, outside the coach. He pulled it and at the same time asked a soldier standing in the vestibule to go to the guard's van and call the guard to come as soon as possible. By this time, approximately, twenty minutes had elapsed from the time the passenger noticed the smoke. When the guard again reached the seat of the fire a flame had already started to show. He went to the guard's van in front of the train—this was the first coach—applied the brake, took a fire extinguisher from the van, and returned to the fire.

In the meantime, the flames had increased, and, as the train came to a standstill, through the passenger's pulling the communication cord, they suddenly spread with great rapidity up the sides of the coach and into the roof. The guard tried to use the extinguisher, but it would not work. Immediately the flames broke out, all the passengers—about 65 of them—at once tried to escape; but the only available exit was through that one single door at the furthermost end of this long corridor, 73 feet long and 2 feet wide. The corridor in the middle was blocked and the people could not get out of their seats into the corridor. The gangway was choked, and there they were, trapped between the oncoming fire and the crush inside. They had no alternative but to try to escape by smashing the windows of the coach and jumping out on to the rail—a seven-foot drop.

Those are the brief and, I think, essential details of this unfortunate accident. This is the third serious passenger train fire in a little over two years. The others were at Penmanshiel, in which seven persons were injured, in June, 1949; and at Beattock in June, 1950, in which five passengers lost their lives. There was a similar type of fire to this at Westborough in 1941, in which six schoolboys were killed and seven injured. During the past three years the number of fires in passenger trains reported to the Ministry of Transport have averaged 121 a year. Some were small fires in gangways, but all were a potential source of very great danger.

On June 20, 1950, the noble Lord, Lord Clydesmuir, asked His Majesty's Government whether they could make any statement on fire precautions in railway carriages—having particularly in mind the Beattock accident. At that time I was on that side of the House and not on this side, and it fell to my responsibility, as the then Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport, to make a reply. My reply was to the effect that the inspecting officer holding the formal inquiry into the Beattock accident would, during the course of his investigations, consider the general question of fire precautions in railway carriages. On November 1, 1950, the noble Lord, Lord Clydesmuir, again asked if any further statement could be made. I, in turn, replied that the inspecting officer had carried out a most careful and extensive investigation in order that no possible circumstances should be overlooked which would in any way lead to the prevention of a repetition of these fires. On July 17, 1951, the noble Lord, Lord Clydesmuir, asked a further question regarding the Huntingdon fire (the one to which I am drawing your Lordships' attention now), and whether the recommendations of the Beattock report were being acted upon. I replied that all but three had been accepted and, in so far as time had permitted, were being implemented.

The three exceptions—and I mentioned these at the time—were these: first, that in regard to sleeping cars, an intermediate external door should be provided in the centre of the coach upon the corridor side; secondly, that in the new open centre corridor coaches (the ones in use at Huntingdon and to which I am referring), an external door should be fitted in the centre on both sides, in addition to the doors already provided; thirdly, that a standard fire fighting procedure should be introduced which would include the stopping of the train at the first sign of fire. Those were the three recommendations made by the inspecting officer. In a careful examination of this report there are three points that stand out, stark and clear. The first is that if the simple rule, that at the first sign of fire the train must be stopped, had been in operation, neither the deaths at Beattock nor the injuries at Huntingdon would have occurred. The second is that if there had been a sufficient number of doors or opening windows, the majority of the deaths and practically all the injuries would have been avoided in all the four fires to which I have referred. The third was that the dangerous and extremely rapid spread of flame inside the coaches in all these four fires would not have occurred if the interiors had not been covered with such highly combustible materials.

Taking the first of those three points, why was not this simple rule and recommendation put into force—that at the first sign of fire on a train the train should be stopped? Various excuses have been offered, among them that if you stop a train in a section there is a danger of collision. But suppose the train turns over in a section: what is going to be done about it then? What can be more important than that, in a highly combustible object like a train, at the first sign of fire the train should be stopped, as this one could have been stopped, not twenty minutes after the first sign of fire but, at the outside, two minutes from the time when the communication cord is pulled? In two minutes that train could have been stopped.

As regards these centre corridor coaches, holding sixty-five passengers and with only two exits, one at one end and one at the other, with doors 2 feet wide, no good reason was given to the inspecting officer by the Railway Executive why two centre doors could not have been fitted. As the inspecting officer points out, a sixty-four seater coach with these centre doors was the standard product of the Southern Railway. Your Lordships have only to read this report to see the weak and inept answers that were given. When we come to the third point, to the decoration of the inside of these coaches with highly combustible materials, the position is even more serious. After the Penmanshiel fire in 1949 the Railway Executive undertook to remedy the cellulose lacquer situation; but on this train on which this fire took place at Huntingdon coaches were being used which had not only inflammable interiors but also an inadequacy of communication chains, a lack of fire extin- guishers and, above all, a lack of sufficient exits.

While this report was being prepared, another fire occurred on March 14 of this year in a passenger train at Fordhouses, which is in the Midlands. The coach concerned, which was completely burnt out, fortunately without any injury to passengers as it happened to be practically in a station, was built in September, 1950, fifteen months after the Penmanshiel fire and three months after the Beattock fire. In spite of that, the compartments were found to be decorated with material containing nitrocellulose. When tested by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, the Fire Offices Committee and the Joint Fire Research Organisation, they fell into the lowest category, "Class 4—Surfaces of Rapid Flame Spread"; and yet the coach had previously been tested by the railway authorities and had been passed as safe.

Those are the facts. I think that any impartial observer who reads that report must come to the conclusion that the Railway Executive have been culpably negligent—though I do not use the expression "Railway Executive" as the inspecting officer has. The Railway Executive are only an Executive under the Transport Commission. It is, in fact, the British Transport Commission who are responsible: at least, it is the British Transport Commission who are responsible to Her Majesty's Government. If I do not embarrass him by my question, I should like to ask the Secretary of State: Is this yet another case of the British Transport Commission not being master in their own house? Because, although the British Transport Commission may delegate the functional running of the railways to the Railway Executive, they cannot delegate their responsibilities to Her Majesty's Government, to the Minister or to the Secretary of State. This is a serious point to which I want to draw your Lordships' attention: that while in this country we are very careful about fire precautions in places of amusement and in factories, and the Home Office are very careful about fire precautions in buildings where there are accumulations of people no one, no Minister, is responsible for the safety precautions and the fire precautions on trains. That is strange. The first Acts of Parliament covering safety on railways were passed in 1840, when there was produced a Statute which set up the Railway Inspectorate.

Let me say that no one having any experience of the operation of railways could, on reading these reports, fail to be impressed by the ability and the impartiality of the inspectors in the Railway Inspectorate of this country. They hold completely the public confidence, as I think the Secretary of State will agree. They are the custodians of public safety. They were set up by Statute in 1840, and I suppose are almost in an independent position. They were then responsible to the Board of Trade, although since the formation of the Ministry of Transport they have been responsible to the Minister. But until to-day all the enactments, including the Railway Act of 1840, have dealt with safety on railways only in four specific regards: first, the block system of signalling; secondly, continuous braking on passenger trains; thirdly, the reporting of accidents on trains which involve personal injury; and lastly, the installation of communication cords. The only responsibility which the Minister of Transport has regarding the safety of passengers on railway trains is to see that there are sufficient communication cords on the trains. I suggest to the noble Lord the Secretary of State, from visual observation, that communication chains are rapidly disappearing from railway trains, as the inspector points out in his report. As that is the only responsibility which the Minister has at present, perhaps he might discharge it with a little more alacrity.

My Lords, those are the only matters over which Parliament and the Government, in their wisdom, have thought it necessary to have statutory authority. That is understandable, because in the years gone by successive Governments always took the view that it was the responsibility of the railways to run their trains safely; and if any particular Government had taken over responsibility for safety, they would have taken over a great many other responsibilities and liabilities, which, perhaps, would have been unfortunate. That attitude is quite understandable. I have no quarrel with it. The position to-day, however, is different. To-day, we have the British Transport Commission. We have only one owner of railways, and, in the last analysis, that is the Stare. I assume that the railways—in other words, either the Railway Executive or the British Transport Commission—accept liability in all cases. I cannot see any difference between the British Transport Commission accepting liability and the State accepting liability, so there is nothing in that, so the position is completely different from what it was in 1948.

Now may I make a suggestion to the noble Lord, Lord Leathers who, as Secretary of State, is primarily responsible for policy? I do not want to be dogmatic about method. All I want to be firm about is that something has got to be done. It should not be left to an inspecting officer to have to use such language as he had to use in this report, to shame the Railway Executive into doing their public duty. It should not be left there because, under present conditions and with highly inflammable materials being used, there is always this danger of fire in a railway train. My Lords, there is no greater danger than fire.

I am going to suggest to the noble Lord, that either Her Majesty's Government should think seriously of strengthening the Railway Acts or they should do something else. I am wondering whether Section 4 (1) of the Act of 1947 does not give the Minister sufficient powers to act. I will not read the section, but your Lordships may recall that it gives the Minister the right to give directions to the British Transport Commission on matters which, in his opinion, are of sufficient national importance to merit such action. That sounds all right. But one set of legal advisers, of which I have had experience, will give to one Government the advice that the heavens must nearly fall before, in their opinion, there is constituted something of sufficient national importance for the Minister to give a directive. Then the very next Government will interpret the point in quite a different way, and say, "Even if somebody wants to put the fares up a few pounds, that is of sufficient national importance for the Minister to give a directive."

I feel sure that the noble Lord, Lord Leathers, will interpret the Act in the proper way. He may find that the Minister has power, under Section 4 (1) of the Transport Act, 1947, to see that proper precautions are taken. Whilst I am not going so far in this debate as to suggest that the Minister should saddle himself with the total responsibility for precautions on track and on everything else where the safety factor may arise, I feel that, when it comes to a question of fire precautions, and when a responsible inspecting officer has made common-sense recommendations, the Minister should give a directive that those recommendations must be carried out. If the noble Lord feels that that would be satisfactory as a temporary expedient while he is giving this matter further thought, I shall be more than satisfied. But I would ask him whether he will be good enough to consider at some appropriate time, before he, together with his colleagues, vacates office—which may be sooner than he thinks—whether it might not be preferable and in the public interest that the Railway Acts should be so altered as to give this statutory effect, so that it does not rest upon the interpretation of successive individual Ministers.

My Lords, I have finished. I hope that the seriousness of this matter has been brought home to Her Majesty's Government, and I hope that we can have confidence that the Railway Inspectorate, who have operated so well for the past 100 years, will have their painstaking efforts in this direction properly carried out when their recommendations are put forward. I beg to move for Papers.

5.39 p.m.

LORD SEMPILL

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has done well in drawing your Lordships' attention to the report on the Huntingdon train accident on July 14, 1951. It is quite obvious that your Lordships will want to know whether other accidents have resulted from a similar cause. The noble Lord has had something interesting to say about a number of those. In my view, there have been three other accidents which I suggest should be considered at the same time—and at least two of them have already been mentioned by the noble Lord. There was that at Penmanshiel in June, 1949, that at Beattock in June, 1950, and the third at Fordhouses in March, 1952. In two of these there was loss of life to passengers. All these four accidents were caused by fires resulting from the use of inflammable finishing materials, paints, lacquers and the like, used for interior decoration.

The Penmanshiel and Beattock accidents were inquired into—this has already been referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas—by one of the most experienced of inspectors, Colonel R. J. Walker, and I should like to take this opportunity of joining with the noble Lord and saying that to Colonel Wilson, the chief inspector, and his brother assessors, the travelling public owe a great debt of gratitude for their skill in analysis and clear-cut recommendations, which are quite often very critical of the administration. And these assessors have so often to sit by and see no action taken for the public safety along the lines of their recommendations. In the case of the two accidents to which I have referred, Colonel Walker made a number of specific recommendations for reducing the fire risk, fighting an outbreak of fire effectively, and facilitating escape from the train. Many of these recommendations were, I understand, not accepted by the Railway Executive, with the sad results of which your Lordships are well aware. I submit that events have shown that such refusal to act on the inspector's advice was given without sufficient reason—the result, disaster.

As a country, we are gummed-up in our daily lives with regulations, to which ever more are being added. But all too often important matters are left undone, with the result that lives are lost. Take, for example, the accident at Fordhouses in March, in which a coach was burned out. This coach was passed by the Executive as safe—I repeat the word "safe"—being, in fact, as the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has said, built after the fire accidents at Penmanshiel and Beattock. Following this accident of March, 1952, it was announced, by authority, that this coach had been decorated inside with dangerously inflammable materials. I really cannot select words to describe one's feelings in terms suited to the tradition and dignity of your Lordships' House. The promises of the Railway Executive to improve matters seem really of no value, and one can but imagine that they are handed out to keep those of anxious and inquiring mind quiet. This, surely, cannot be allowed to continue, since I submit to your Lordships that a fire in a train stands in a different category from other types of accidents, and your Lordships, I feel, have every right to insist on strong action against those who perpetuate the risk. If the Railway Executive are incapable or unable to initiate suitable tests to discover what effective non-inflammable materials are available for interior coach decoration, surely they could turn to the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and make use of that Department's very great knowledge. But, as Lord Lucas has pointed out, they apparently did not do so, since that Department reported so very unfavourably on the materials that were being used in the interior decoration of the coaches.

Looking through some of the early numbers of The Times, published at the beginning of the last century when railway development was in its infancy and the general public had not accepted these juggernauts that prevented cows from giving milk and hens from laying eggs, I came across a short paragraph saying that the principal record of these new contraptions appeared to be a list of the killed and injured. With such an atmosphere, it was not surprising that this famous journal wrote of Queen Victoria's first ride in a railway train from Slough to Windsor: We are well aware of the bravery of the Queen on all occasions but we must insist with respect that these Royal railway excursions should for preference be wholly abandoned or but occasionally resorted to. I do not know what the actuarial calculations may be, but the outlook of the ordinary person is that it is increasingly dangerous to travel by train, and this is well to be understood as a result of the many serious accidents that have occurred. Your Lordships have debated accidents from fire hazard, but what about those resulting from mechanical defects? Quite recently, the chief inspecting officer, Colonel Wilson, reporting on the accident at Weedon, showed that this was due to bad fitting, lack of proper tools and lack of inspection. There was another accident more recently in which the points were switched by faulty assembly of the brake linkage on a locomotive that came adrift and derailed the entire train. Perhaps the Secretary of State, Lord Leathers, with his wide experience of these matters—to which I pay sincere tribute—can tell your Lordships what is being done in such cases and assure you that those who have failed—as they have—in their engineering duties have been posted to positions in which they can no longer endanger the lives of Her Majesty's subjects.

Yesterday the noble Lard, Lord Pakenham, spoke with feeling of the need to maintain the high and proud tone of service to the community that permeates the two governmentally-owned air transport Corporations. All he said was well spoken and points to the vital need of engendering a similar spirit in the first railway system in the world—to wit, our own. I long for the day when, looking at the finest sight in London to a Scot, "The Aberdonian" at Kings Cross on any morning, I can board her without having, as now, first to clean the windows (and I recommend to your Lordships "Windolene" as the best preparation for the purpose) so that I may admire the beautiful English scene on the way to the Border.

5.49 p.m.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF TRANSPORT, FUEL AND POWER (LORD LEATHERS)

My Lords, the subject of this Motion is one that does not come before this House very often. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, for having brought before the House this most important question, one which, of course, is of intense interest to everyone. Safety in transport is one of the problems which continually press on our attention; we are only too familiar with the continuing and tragic toll of fatalities on the road which daily occur throughout the country. It is fortunate, indeed, that the record of the railways in this respect is one of which we can all be proud, and it is precisely because of their good record that public attention is rightly aroused by such accidents as those which have been referred to to-day.

Perhaps, I may first recall briefly the history of the Railway Inspectorate of the Ministry of Transport, who, among their other duties, are much concerned with safety on the rails. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has already referred to the first Act of more than a hundred years ago. It was in 1840, only ten years after the opening of the Liverpool arid Manchester Railway, that the State found it advisable in the public interest to assume some measure of supervision over railway working, and an Act of Parliament was passed in that year authorising the President of the Board of Trade to appoint inspecting officers of railways; and the inspecting officers who have followed them are still in the same position. Their initial duties were to examine new railways and report on construction and certain equipment. For their part the companies were required to notify all accidents involving personal injuries.

In the early days of the railways speeds were not particularly high and, in spite of the primitive arrangements, travel by the new means of transport was comparatively safe. But as the railways extended and speeds increased, so also did injuries and fatalities. Thus, in 1871, a further Act provided for comprehensive orders specifying the types of accidents which were to be reported and legalising the holding of official accident inquiries and the setting up of more formal courts of inquiry into specially serious cases.

The powers of the Board of Trade passed, in 1919, to the Ministry of Transport, and it is a proof of the satisfactory development of safety in operation, as a result of the close co-operation which has always prevailed between the inspecting officers and the railways, that the Transport Act of 1947 effected no change in the duties of the inspectorate. The relations of the Royal Engineer officers by whom it is manned with the British Transport Commission and the Railway Executive to-day are the same as they were with the four main line railway companies before they were merged. Indeed, the history of safety on the railways is a record of close and cordial cooperation between the inspecting officers and those responsible for railway management. I might add that the work of the inspecting officers of railways covers a much wider field than the investigation of accidents. They also inspect and approve new railway works, they give much technical railway advice to the Minister and, perhaps rather oddly, they have certain responsibilities connected with the testing, construction and operation of trams and trolley buses. They have no powers of approval of the general design of rolling stock, except on Tube lines.

I turn now to the subject of fires in passenger trains, to which a great deal of attention has been given in recent years by the railways themselves and by the inspecting officers. It may be of assistance to your Lordships if I briefly outline the background of this matter. Over the past quarter of a century railway carriage design in this country has undergone a radical change. The old type of carriage, with its many external doors, is gradually giving way to the more modern type with doors at each end, which is more comfortable for long distance travel. At the same time new decorative materials have come into vogue and have been extensively used in railway coaches on account of their superior finish. These changes and improvements, however, have brought with them new dangers. A reduction in the number of exits clearly limits the means of escape, and many of the new materials which would otherwise be suitable for interior decoration are highly inflammable. A fire in a railway carriage must always give rise to a potentially dangerous situation, as the design of the carriage and the speed at which the train is travelling both provide ideal conditions for the rapid spread, not only of flames, but of asphyxiating smoke and fumes.

A considerable amount of expert knowledge on this subject has been accumulated as a result of four fires which have unfortunately occurred in passenger trains in the last three years. These accidents have already been referred to and I will not give details of them, except to say that they all resulted in five deaths and thirty injuries. All these accidents were characterised by certain common features—the very rapid spread of flames and the even greater rapidity with which thick black smoke and fumes filled the coach in which the fire started and spread along the corridors of others. So overpowering were the fumes that passengers felt themselves liable to be overcome in a few seconds, and the sensation of imminent collapse increased the alarm of the passengers and made orderly escape more difficult.

Three conclusions clearly emerge from all these fires. First, that too great importance cannot be attached to the use for interior decoration of materials of low combustibility; secondly, that the need for additional means of exit in case of emergency has been amply demonstrated; and thirdly, that there should be a standard procedure laid down for deal- ing with fires in passenger trains and that members of train crews should be thoroughly familiar with this procedure and able to operate it quickly and intelligently.

So far as concerns the first of these conclusions—namely, that regarding the use in passenger compartments of inflammable materials—energetic action has been taken by the Railway Executive. Of the 25,000 corridor coaches in Great Britain, nearly 24,000 have been examined, and those found to contain inflammable surfaces are being dealt with as rapidly as possible and a great deal of them have already been dealt with. In general, no highly inflammable interior finish will be used in any new coaches and I think we may fairly regard the progress made as satisfactory. As regards the second and third conclusions—namely, additional means of exit and a standard procedure for fire fighting in trains—noble Lords who have read the reports of the inspecting officers on the four accidents to which I have referred, and in particular that on the Huntingdon accident, will have observed that there have been certain differences of view between the Railway Executive and the inspecting officers. It is right and proper for me to emphasise that these divergences of opinion are worthy of full examination. It has always to be realised that it would be possible in theory to go on multiplying almost indefinitely the safeguards against fire or any other avoidable risk. In practice a reasonable balance must be kept between the risk of fire and the difficulties and expense of the measures required to combat it. It is not always an easy balance to strike.

The Minister of Transport and I have had full discussions with members of the British Transport Commission and with the Chairman of the Railway Executive on the whole question of fire precautions to be taken in passenger trains. In particular, we discussed the two questions on which there has been some difference of view—namely, the provision of additional exits in sleeping compartments and in centre corridor coaches, and fire fighting procedure. I am very glad to be able to tell your Lordships that, following these discussions, the British Transport Commission have informed me that they have considered the matter further, and in order to maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the safety of British Railways they have reached conclusions which appear to me, and will I think appear to your Lordships, to be satisfactory in principle.

So far as sleeping cars are concerned, a centre door on the corridor side will be provided on all new sleeping cars so as to afford an additional means of exit in an emergency. All sleeping cars to be built in the future will be of steel construction and the only inflammable elements in the berths will be bedding and carpets. In addition, the window opening in each sleeping compartment will provide an emergency means of exit, and with the proposed new door in the centre of the coaches the protection given to passengers in sleeping cars should give the highest practicable degree of safety in the event of fire.

As regards additional doors in open centre-corridor coaches, the principal objection taken by the Railway Executive was that the addition of these doors would have a material effect on the seating capacity of the coach if reasonable standards of comfort and convenience were to be maintained for the long journeys run by express trains. The Executive have now agreed to fit emergency centre doors on new coaches of this type. Details of the arrangements will be discussed between the inspecting officers and the Executive.

Turning now to the organisation of train crews so that they are ready and prepared to deal with the menace we are concerned with this afternoon, your Lordships must remember that the crew of most passenger trains, apart from the footplate men, amounts only to a guard. Because of this fact, coupled with the constant changes in duties which each individual man has to undertake, it is difficult to evolve a settled fire drill as this is ordinarily understood. Arrangements have been made however for the regional fire officers and their fire inspectors throughout each Region to instruct all trainmen—drivers, firemen, guards, travelling ticket collectors, dining and sleeping car staff—in the operation of portable fire extinguishers. A pamphlet on this subject is being compiled and will be issued shortly to all train staff. Furthermore, an instruction has been issued by the Railway and Hotels Executives to each member of the stall who is employed on the trains de- tailing the action to be taken if any man becomes aware of a fire on a moving train.

In addition, the existing rule in the Rule Book is being amended and amplified to include the purport of the latest instruction and to emphasise the importance of the most prompt action being taken to deal effectively with a fire on a moving train. Your Lordships will appreciate that the advantage of doing this is that every member of the staff is in possession of a copy of the Rule Book and, on appointment to any of the grades of the train staff, he will be examined in the rule dealing with train fires in common with all other safety and general rules applicable to his grading. I feel sure that the action which has already been taken, and the proposed inclusion in the Rule Book of this amplified rule, is a considerable step forward in the Railway Executive's precautionary arrangements. I am sure your Lordships will share my own personal satisfaction at the outcome of these discussions. It all illustrates the desire of the British Transport Commission and of the Railway Executive to take every action open to them to maintain and improve the very high standards of safety which have characterised railway operation for so many years.

The question has been asked whether the Government have power, in the last resort, to intervene directly in order to enforce the inspectors' recommendations. I think myself that the statement I have just made shows that there is no necessity for such action. I mean by that, of course, that the Railway Executive and the British Transport Commission have responded. I do not know why it was that they did not respond earlier, but it was not my affair then. I would assure your Lordships that it took me no more than half an hour to secure complete agreement with them on this occasion. Moreover, it is the view of the Minister of Transport and myself that great value attaches to the voluntary co-operation between the railways and the inspecting officers. This is the basis on which the inspecting officers' recommendations are carried out and we should be reluctant to interfere with the present satisfactory arrangements. Experience over many years suggests that this voluntary basis does secure the most satisfactory results and best achieves the proper balance between the claims of safety and other considerations to which I have referred.

However, looking at the matter in a more theoretical light, I agree that the Government could not in the last resort accept the position that they have no powers at all in this matter. The extent to which the Minister could invoke the powers of direction conferred on him by Section 4 of the Transport Act, 1947, so as to ensure that any particular safety recommendation was carried out, would have to depend largely on the nature of the recommendation. But on any matter affecting safety which was of a genera] character and affecting the national interest, I have no doubt that the Minister's powers could properly be exercised. We think that these powers are sufficient to safeguard the public interests, and we have put them into operation, as the noble Lord will know.

Let me, in conclusion, try to put our discussion this afternoon into its proper perspective. It is understandable and right that public concern should be aroused when an accident involving death or injury occurs on our railways. Indeed, it is because serious accidents are so rare that they inevitably attract so much attention when they do occur. The record and general standard of safety on our railways is unsurpassed anywhere in the world. Statistics are notoriously dangerous weapons to use in debate, and I will not weary your Lordships with many. But it may be enough if I say that over the last three years figures of fatal casualties to passengers in train accidents—that is by all causes, not just by fires—represented approximately one death for every 95,000,000 passenger journeys. It is really worth recording in terms of that kind. This is a record of which the railways can justly be proud, and it should always be remembered that the exceptionally high standard is maintained in spite of difficulties caused by shortages of manpower and materials which have beset the railways since the end of the war. The fact that these high standards have been maintained is the best proof possible of the vital importance which those responsible for railway operation attach to this aspect of their work.

6.6 p.m.

LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH

My Lords, I must stand in a unique position this afternoon in being the mover of a Motion on this side of your Lordships' House in this Parliament who has obtained everything he has asked for. Surely, history has been made. I am deeply grateful to the noble Lord for what he has said, and for the assurance that he has given. I am sure that we are all appreciative of the action which he so swiftly took in this matter when the Motion was placed upon the Order Paper. The noble Lord says that it took him only half an hour to get agreement. That I can well understand. So far as that half-hour was concerned, my sympathies would be with the Railway Executive. I should not think it was necessary for any formal directive to be given after the noble Lord had talked to them for half an hour.

If the noble Lord will forgive me, there are just one or two things that I should like to say. First of all, I join with him absolutely in paying tribute to the safety of British Railways. As the noble Lord said, that is something of which we can be justly proud. But that is all the more reason why we should be so careful about the future. When the noble Lord says that the relations between the Railway Inspectorate and British Railways are the same as they have always been, I hope he will not mind if I join issue with him. If they were, it would not have been necessary for the inspecting officer to write such a report as he had to write upon the Huntingdon fire; and it would not have been necessary for him to argue. arid to receive rebuffs which no intelligent set of men should ever have offered him, for twelve months before that report was made.

I agree with the noble Lord's careful use of language in matters such as this. I can use stronger language now that I am on this side of the House than I could when I occupied a position on the Government Front Bench. The noble Lord said—I think I got the figure right—that, of all the coaches which are suspect, 24,000 have been examined up to date. By whom have they been examined? I have no faith whatsoever in the examination of these coaches by the Railway Executive. It was they who examined, and passed as safe, the coach which caused the fire at Fordhouses, when the technical inspection said that it was the lowest grade of fire-spreading material. If that is the standard of their inspection, then I repeat that I have no faith in it whatsoever. I would ask the noble Lord to look into that particular matter again.

I listened with great care to what the noble Lord had to say about the fire drill. However, he did not use one word that I wanted him to use—perhaps he thought it was unnecessary owing to the inspector's report. He will recollect that the inspecting officer said that in the standard fire drill the train must be stopped, but that there were other drills to be done. I understand from the Huntingdon report that, on being pressed, the Railway Executive accepted the recommendation that the train should be stopped in case of fire. It was on the other part of the drill about which there was some difference. I now take it that the drill which has been wholly accepted, and which will be put into the Rule Book, is that the responsible official on the train must stop that train at the first sign of fire.

LORD LEATHERS

To make it quite clear, may I say that the noble Lord has recited the drill in the right terms? It is just that.

LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH

I am deeply grateful, because I think that will allay the last vestige of public suspicion. When the noble Lord; aid that he did not think there was any necessity for the Minister to give directions, it took him so long to say it that I was convinced that he knew it was necessary after all, and that is what he intends to do. I agree that there are always differences of opinion between technicians and experts. What I want the noble Lord to understand is that the public have great confidence in the inspecting officers. Adequate fire precautions must exist. There must be a sufficiency of exits via doors and windows and things like that, because there is no terror in life so bad as the terror of knowing that you run the risk of being burnt to death. If you visualise this coach, with sixty-five people in it, the flames tearing up it and forcing them back, you can imagine panic and a dreadful prospect facing them. I hope the noble Lord will see that the recommendations of the Inspectorate are properly honoured, and that he will not hesitate to give directions. Before the noble Lord passes from his office and some weaker mortal takes his place, will he consider the alteration of the Railway Acts, to put all he has said this afternoon on a proper basis? I again thank the noble Lord very much for his most helpful reply, and I hope the result will be that we have seen the last of these fires on British Railways. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.