Lords Sitting of 15 July 1952

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
Several Lords—Took the Oath.

OIL FROM PERSIA
2.36 p.m.
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, I beg to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether any American oil operators are involved in deals to procure oil claimed by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and to inquire what action the Government contemplate to convey to the United States the strong resentment which would be caused in this country by such proceedings.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING): My Lords, in spite of the reports which have been in circulation, no American oil operators have, so far as I am aware, been involved to any but a negligible extent in deals of this kind. I can assure the noble Lord that the United States Government are fully aware of our views on attempts to deal in this oil, and I have every reason to believe that they share them.
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, I am very glad to hear that, and I am grateful for a reply that gives complete satisfaction.

REFUGEES FROM IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES
2.37 p.m.
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, I beg to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the Consular Section of the Soviet Embassy is exerting, directly or indirectly, any pressure in any form on refugees in this country to induce or intimidate them to return to Soviet-controlled territory; and whether in such case Her Majesty's Government will notify the Soviet Embassy that such interference in our domestic affairs must definitely cease.]
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, Her Majesty's Government are aware that officials of the Soviet Embassy in London have endeavoured to induce refugees in this country to return to Soviet-controlled territory. They have also good reason to believe that to many refugees these approaches are unwelcome and that in some cases they have aroused anxiety or apprehension. These activities on the part of the Soviet Embassy are being carefully watched with a view to ascertaining whether methods amounting to direct intimidation or coercion are employed. If any such evidence were received, Her Majesty's Government would take a serious view of it. Meanwhile, I should like to take this opportunity to repeat and to emphasise that refugees are in no sense obliged to entertain such approaches, let alone yield to them, and they should report to the police any cases in which they consider that improper pressure is being exercised on them. Refugees resident in this country can rest assured that they have the full protection of our courts and that no foreign authority can by arbitrary action force them to leave this country against their will.
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, I am again grateful for an answer which seems to require no supplementary question. May I presume that the noble Marquess, in giving that reply, is aware of the fact that some of these unhappy people in this country live in a state of anxiety not only on their own account but also on behalf of their relatives behind the Iron Curtain?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Yes, my Lords, we are very well aware of that.
BRIGHTON CORPORATION (TROLLEY VEHICLES) PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL
DERBY CORPORATION (TROLLEY VEHICLES) PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL
PORTSMOUTH CORPORATION (TROLLEY VEHICLES) PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL
2.39 p.m.
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bills: Bills reported without amendment.

CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS (AMENDMENT) BILL
2.42 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Viscount Simon.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
[The EARL OF DROGHEDA in the Chair]
Clauses 1 to 4 agreed to.
Clause 5:
Amendment of Section 64 of principal Act
5.—(1) Where the parent or guardian of a child or young person proves to a juvenile court that he is unable to control that child or young person, any order of the court under section sixty-four of the principal Act that the child or young person be sent to an approved school shall not require the agreement of the local authority within whose area the child or young person is resident, and accordingly the proviso to the said section sixty-four is hereby repealed.
(2) Before dealing with an application under the said section sixty-four, the court shall cause to be sent—

(a) to the probation officer, or one of the probation officers, for the probation area in which the court sits; and

(b) to the local authority for the district in which the child or young person is resident,

a notification of the application and of the clay and hour when it is to be considered, and for the put poses of subsection (2) of section thirty-five of the principal Act (which relates to the making of investigations and the rendering of information to the court by a local authority) the notification shall be deemed to be a notification under the said section thirty-five.
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved to omit subsection (1). The noble Lord said: This is an Amendment with which many local
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authorities who take a deep interest in the welfare of the unruly or difficult child are concerned. It calls, I think, for just a few words of exposition. Under the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, a parent or guardian can bring a child before the juvenile court as being out of control, and can ask for an order that the child be sent to an approved school or put under a probation officer or some other fit person. A juvenile court can make that order if the parent assents. Under the existing law, which dates from 1908—this is not a new provision—an order committing the child to an approved school, which of course is the most severe form of order, as it removes the child entirely from the charge of its parents, is also subject to the assent of the local authority. The importance of that, from the point of view of the welfare of the child, is that all parents are not patient or judicious; and some parents might apply for an order for reference of a child to an approved school in a manner which might well be criticised by somebody who knew the circumstances of the family. Such a person, of course, would be the welfare officer of the local authority.
This power has been exercised, as the local authorities believe, with great advantage to the decision of difficult cases, by the local authority refusing its assent to an order until a further opportunity has been given the parent and the juvenile court to consider the case after, as it were, hearing the case for the child against the severity of an order committing him to an approved school. Local authorities feel strongly oh this matter and have expressed their great regret that they should be deprived by this subsection of this power of intervening in these cases, because they believe that their power has been exercised very much to the advantage of a just decision. I venture to ask the promoters of the Bill and Her Majesty's Government to give further consideration to this matter and to ascertain whether, possibly after further inquiries and the consideration of alternative measures, by omitting this subsection from the Bill, an opportunity may be given for preserving this valuable potentiality on behalf of the local authorities. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 8, leave out subsection —(Lord Kennet.)
VISCOUNT SIMON: I have communicated with the Home Office for the purpose of being the better informed about this rather technical matter and, of course, I have listened carefully to what my noble friend Lord Kennet has just said. I need not say that any further consideration which he feels might properly be given to the matter shall be given; but as for the moment I am acting as the promoter of the Bill, following the advice of the Home Department I cannot accept his Amendment. Allow me to point out briefly why. My noble friend said just now that the effect of the subsection was to deprive the local authorities of power to intervene in these cases. That is really not so. What the clause does is to remove the absolute power of the local authority to veto the sending of a child to an approved school. At the same time, in subsection (2) it provides that, before a juvenile court can deal with an application under this clause, the court must send the local authority for the district in which the young person is resident a notification of the application and of the date when it is going to be considered. The object of that requirement is to make sure that the local authority will put all its views and information before the juvenile court. Therefore, it is not the case that the local authority is being deprived of any power of intervention; but it is being deprived of the power of veto.
This power might have been a perfectly proper one for the local authority to exercise in times past, when juvenile courts were just beginning; and in some cases there was a financial reason why they might be disposed to do so, because in the old days the local authority would escape the burden which might follow from an order of the juvenile court. But since 1948, by Act of Parliament, the juvenile court has had power to place a child brought before the court under the care of the local authority, without the leave of the local authority at all; and as soon as the child is placed under the care of the local authority the financial burdens, whatever they may be, will follow. Therefore, I venture to think that, although the noble Lord's argument sounds attractive, it is really addressed to a past situation which no longer exists. The real question is: who is to be the body which is mainly responsible for deciding what is to be done in the case
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of a child who is beyond control and who has to be dealt with? I think experience has shown that the juvenile court is the body which ought to exercise that responsibility. But, of course, the juvenile court ought not to do it in a way which is opposed by the local authority, unless the local authority has the opportunity of pointing out the considerations which make them doubt whether such an order would be justified.
That, in brief, is the reason why I cannot accept the Amendment. It is the juvenile court, and not the local authority which is now constituted as the authority to decide on the treatment of the juvenile There is now no financial question involved, because the burden on the local authority, whatever it is, will fall on them one way or the other. From the advice which I have received from the Home Office—and I think it is right—it appears to me that this is a useful and convenient change in the law, and not at all a serious one. It is not one that tells the local authority that it must no longer intervene but one which says that the local authority no longer has a power of veto but can present to the court whatever considerations it feels should be born, in mind before the fate of the child is decided. I venture, most respectfully, to say to my noble friend that I cannot accept his Amendment as one which is intervening in the interests of the child The juvenile court are doing nothing except to decide things as best they can in the interests of the child, and it is right that the local authority should con tribute its own information and views which will be the effect of Clause 5 in it remains as it is at present. I am sure my noble friend will appreciate that I have considered this Amendment carefully, and not without a desire to understand the arguments put forward. I he sees fit to communicate with me at a later stage, I will certainly obtain from the Home Office any further information and advice that seems desirable, but I am afraid that I cannot now accept the Amendment.
LORD KENNET: I am obliged to my noble and learned friend for his offer o communication upon this subject. It may be some reassurance to the local authorities that there will be no discontinuation or cessation of the opportunity offered

1053
to them of intervening and of being heard. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
VISCOUNT SIMON VISCOUNT SIMON moved, in paragraph (a) of subsection (2) to leave out all words from the beginning of the paragraph down to "in" and to insert:
(a) to a probation officer appointed for or assigned to the petty sessional division."
The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment and the next, although having a rasher elaborate appearance, are purely drafting Amendments, for the purpose of bringing the language of the clause strictly into line with that which has been used in the earlier Acts. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 18, leave out from beginning to ("in") in line 19, and insert the said paragraph.—(Viscount Simon.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
VISCOUNT SIMON: I beg to move the next. Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 27, at end insert—
"(3) The said section thirty-five shall have effect as if for the reference in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) thereof to the probation officer, or one of the probation officers, for the probation area in which the court or justices will sit there were substituted a reference to a probation officer appointed for or assigned to the petty sessional division in which the court or justices will sit.
(4) For the purposes of this section and of the proviso to subsection (2) of the said section thirty-five, the expression 'petty sessional division' means—

(a) in the case of any place deemed to be a petty sessional division under subsection (2) of section forty-five of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, that place;

(b) in any other case, a petty sessions area within the meaning of the Justices of the Peace Act, 1949."—(Viscount Simon.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 5, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 6 to 8 agreed to.
2.55 p.m.
LORD MERTHYR LORD MERTHYR moved, after Clause 8 to insert the following new clause:
". Section thirty-five of the principal Act shall be amended as follows:—

(a) by the omission from subsection (2) of the words 'home surroundings'; and

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(b) by the omission of the proviso to subsection (2); and

(c) by the insertion of the following new subsection:—

'(3) Investigations as to the home surroundings of the child or young person shall in all cases be made by a probation officer who shall present the report of such investigation to the court at such time as the court may direct."
The noble Lord said: Section 35 of the Act of 1933 lays down that when a child or young person is to be brought before the court, either to answer a criminal charge or as being in need of care or protection, two parties shall be informed before the trial takes place: first, the probation officer, and secondly, the local authority. The section goes on to lay down that in the case of the local authority it shall be mandatory that that authority shall furnish to the court a report of four things: the home surroundings, the school record, the health, and the character of the child. It further lays down that in respect of one of those four things—namely, the home surroundings—a different arrangement may be made by the justices, who may make an order that, instead of the local authority furnishing the report on the home surroundings, it may be done by the probation officer.
That proviso making it optional whether the report on the home surroundings is made by the probation officer or by the local authority was put into the Act, I suggest, because in the year 1933 there were not full-time probation officers all over the country; and if the Act had made it mandatory on the probation service to present these reports the duty could not have been carried out, because there simply were not the officers to do it. Times have changed since 1933, and now it can be said that the whole country is covered by a system of full-t tine probation officers. Therefore, I suggest that it would be an improvement if that which was optional in 1933 were made mandatory in 1953, and that in future the report in respect of the home surroundings (your Lordships will note that this Amendment deals only with home surroundings) should in all cases be furnished, not by the local authority, but by the probation officer. That is really the gist of this Amendment.
I should like to say a few words in support of that contention. It is most undesirable that a multiplicity of inquiries

1055
should be sought from the homes of children before trial. Some inquiries are inevitable and necessary, but there is a good deal of evidence that parents have been very much embarrassed, and even distressed, by so many inquiries having to be made—by the local authority, by the probation service, by the police, and possibly by others. Therefore, the suggestion I make is that, while the local authority should continue to make the reports on the other three subjects—namely, school record, health and character (they are best fitted to do that)—the report on the home surroundings should be exclusively that of the probation officer, because for that, unlike the other three, it is necessary for a visit to be paid to the home. If this Amendment were carried, I believe that the Bill would be improved to that extent. There would be a clear distinction between the duties of these two different authorities. All the Amendment does is to make universal what could have been done before by the order of the justices. That discretion of the justices has not been universally applied—I expect there are some justices who do not even know of it. I feel sure that the Bill could be improved on those lines if this Amendment were accepted. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 8, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Merthyr.)
VISCOUNT SIMON: I have considered carefully the suggestion which my noble friend makes in this Amendment, and I have consulted the Home Office about it. The noble Lord is quite right when he indicates that in the majority of cases these investigations as to home surroundings are made by probation officers. But he feels that the law would be improved if we were now to change the Bill and make it a requirement that inquiries as to home surroundings should always be made by the probation officer, and that local authorities should be relieved of this branch of duty in all cases. It would have the effect of making things very tidy, but I am told—and I should myself judge—that it is unwise to lay down so absolute a rule as that. I doubt very much whether, if the local authority were relieved of inquiring into home surroundings in all cases, it would thereby reduce the number of visits to the home, because the section itself says that the local authority
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shall provide the court with information not only as to home surroundings but also as to the school record, health, and character of the child. I can imagine a case where, in order to ascertain either the health or the character of the child, it would be natural and desirable to make an inquiry at the home where the child is living. I agree entirely that the multiplicity of official callers is to be discouraged; we ought, so far as possible, to canalise this service and get the appropriate person to do it on behalf of all concerned.
The experience of the Home Office is that there are cases in which it is better to leave the local authorities to make the inquiries, and, indeed, I strongly suspect that there may be local authorities who would object if we legislated that they should not be allowed to do it. From that point of view, this Amendment is in slight contrast to the Amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Kennet, who wanted to increase the powers of the local authorities; this is one which would reduce their powers and duties. I believe that it will be found that it is better to leave the court with an option. The juvenile court now has an option with regard to inquiries into home surroundings—whether they shall be made by the local authority or by the probation officer—and it really is a question, as I am assured, of what is the best thing to do in each locality. By this time the decision about that can surely be left as a matter of discretion in the hands of the justices. As I have said, in most cases probation officers do make the inquiries. There are some where the arrangement is that the local authority staff do it; and the justices are grateful to them for doing so, and find that they do it very well. There is no reason for bringing these arrangements to an end when they work well, or to lay down a fixed rule that in all cases it shall be done in one way and that in no case is it to be done in another way. I hope that my noble friend will recognise this, when he looks into the point closely. If he desires to bring any further particulars about it to the attention of those concerned with the Bill, or to the Home Office itself, I know that they will be only too glad to hear from him. I hope that at this stage the House will agree that we should not make this Amendment.
LORD MERTHYR: I should like to say that the argument which the noble and learned Viscount used against the Amendment, in which he said that the local authority ought to be able to inquire into the health and character of the child, is surely an argument against, amongst other things, the proviso which is already in the original Act. If that be a weighty and sound argument, then I suggest that it is an argument against the law as it now stands. I should also like to make this observation. As I understand it, there is nothing in this Amendment which would prevent the local authority from making these inquiries. The noble Viscount said that they ought to be allowed to do it, and I agree. What I am suggesting is that they ought not to be made to do it.
VISCOUNT SIMON: May I interpose to observe that my noble friend's Amendment includes these words:
"Investigations as to the home surroundings of the child or young person shall in all cases be made by a probation officer…."
Surely he is not suggesting that the local authority should do it as well?
LORD MERTHYR: There is nothing to say that they may not do it as well. If they want to go to the home to investigate the health and character of the child, then they can do it as well if this Amendment is passed. Finally, the noble Viscount suggested that the present system was working well. It is just because I have at least some evidence to show that it is not working well that I have produced this Amendment. The evidence I have is that it is causing irritation and distress in some homes, as I have said before, that so many different investigations have to be made by so many different officers. It is for that very reason that I am moving this Amendment. However, the noble Viscount says that he cannot at present accept it. I certainly do not wish to divide the House, but in seeking to withdraw this Amendment I should like to take advantage of his offer of further
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discussion. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
Schedule [Consequential amendments of enactments]:
VISCOUNT SIMON: I beg to move the next Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 5, line 18, at end insert—
("3. In section thirty-five—

(a) in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) for the words `the probation officer, or one of the probation officers, fir the probation area' there shall be substituted the words 'a probation officer appointed for or assigned to the petty sessional division';

(b) at the end there stall be added the following new subsection—

"(3) In this section, the expression 'petty sessional division' means—

(a) in the case of any place deemed to be a petty sessional division under subsection (2) of section forty-five of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, that place;

(b) in any other case, a petty sessions area within the meaning of the Justices of the Peace Act, 1949 ").—(viscount Simon.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.
VISCOUNT SIMON: This is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 5, line 34, leave out from beginning to ("in") in line 35 and insert—
("(a) to a probation officer appointed for or assigned to the petty sessional division"). —(Viscount Simon.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
VISCOUNT SIMON: This is a further consequential Amendment. I beg, to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 5, line 41, at end insert—
("In this subsection, the expression 'petty sessional division' has the same meaning as in section thirty-five of this Act").—(Viscount Simon.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
House resumed.

HEATING APPLIANCES (FIREGUARDS) BILL
3.9 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, the object of this short Bill which I wish to present to your Lordships is to cut down a number of accidents which can normally be prevented. In the first place, we should realise that during the year 1951, more than 500 people died as a result of burns and scalds which they suffered in their own homes. The bulk of these deaths were due to the fact that the person's clothing caught fire, chiefly as a result of contact with gas or electric fires. It is quite probable that the figures are even larger than those I have given, because the figures one obtains from the Registrar-General have not been broken down sufficiently to enable a finer analysis to be made. The majority of these fatalities—about 50 per cent. or 60 per cent.—occur among older people, whereas about 15 per cent. occur among young children. The reason why more of the old people died from burns is that the prognosis is generally better in the case of young persons than in the old.
One could go a little further. A large number of people have to attend hospital as in-patients and out-patients suffering from burns which are not necessarily going to prove fatal. I cannot give an exact figure, but I believe that the number who go to hospital as in-patients is between 15,000 and 20,000, whereas the number of those who go as out-patients is something in the neighbourhood of 50,000. This means that about 70,000 people, all told, suffer from this kind of accident every year. Many of those who go into hospital have to stay for a long time. The average is about forty to fifty days but it may be very much longer than that—up to a year, perhaps. These people may not die, but they may suffer from deformity which will probably persist throughout their lives. One of the people who have done much good work in this sphere is Dr. Colebrook, at the Birmingham Accident Hospital. He has told me stories and showed me photographs which were not pleasant to hear or contemplate.
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The gas fires and electric fires which are probably the cause of a large number of these accidents are not fixed in a wall but are mobile: one can take them into different rooms. People, therefore, may not be sure where they are and do no get used to the fire being in one particular place. Another difficulty is that eves when they are not mobile, even when they are fixed to a wall, they may no be standing on a normal fireplace of hearth. In one recent case on a housing estate it was found that there was no proper protection and no obvious mantel piece or fireplace to be avoided. There was, in short, nothing to show where the fire was. Moreover, the height of these fires is such that anyone wearing a dressing-gown or a frock is liable to catch it against the fire. There is a further difficulty. Young children an sometimes fascinated by the bright colour, and they have been known not only to brush the elements with their frocks but also to try, as curious children will, to touch or grasp the bright element. And, of course, if they do, they get their fingers badly burned; or their frock may take fire, with the result that they are permanently deformed. A further cause of these accidents is that a person may reach over the fire, if there is a mantelpiece above it, perhaps to adjust something, or to look into a mirror. In a moment, a woman's frock may be a mass of flames. It is very easy for a person to be burned to death in this way, for clothing ignites very quickly.
The main point of this Bill is to prohibit the sale of gas, electric or oil fires which are not fitted with a proper guard. I believe that there are certain powers under the Children Act of 1908 which make it possible for proceedings to be instituted against persons held to be responsible for such an accident. But the fact that a child has been killed is regarded as sufficient punishment for parents alleged to be responsible, and the authorities are very loth indeed in such cases to institute proceedings under that Act. If I may briefly run over the points of the Bill, your Lordships will observe that the first clause prohibits the sale of gas, electric or oil-burning fires which are not fitted with a proper guard, or a guard which does not comply with certain standards prescribed by the regulations. The second clause gives local authorities power to inspect fires which are exposed for

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sale, and also to apply certain tests which are prescribed by the regulations. The third clause provides the penalty for people who offend and the fourth clause gives power to local authorities to prosecute. The fifth and sixth clauses are the most important, because they give the Secretary of State powers to make regulations laying down the standards of the guards to be employed. The last clause gives the various definitions.
The Bill does not apply to fires at present installed in houses, and so on, so there is no question of people having their fires inspected. Moreover, time would be required for manufacturers and shopkeepers to dispose of stocks which they already hold. It has been said that the guard will make the fire much more expensive, but in fact it will not add materially to the cost of the fire; nor will it reduce the fire's efficiency. The expenditure of materials would not be great. The Bill has the support of a very large number of manufacturers of fires. There was a Committee on the British Standards Institution on which I had the privilege to sit. That Committee sat for four years, and eventually worked out a standard—Standard 1670: 1951. This is a small but important Bill, and I trust that your Lordships will give it a Second Reading.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Amulree.)
3.18 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords. I rise on behalf of my noble friends on this side of the House merely to give a warm welcome to this Bill. In view of the number of items on the Order Paper to-day I do not propose to inflict a speech on your Lordships. I will say only that this Bill has our very warm support.
3.19 p.m.
LORD WEBB-JOHNSON: My Lords, I do not want to labour any point in connection with this Bill, which is obviously receiving support from all sides of the House, but I should like to take the opportunity of paying a tribute to the patient and devoted service and researches of Dr. Colebrook. He has received his reward in the number of lives that his researches and services have saved, not only in respect of puerperal fever but in this field of burns. But the saving of lives has only further emphasised
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the importance of providing against the dangers of these heating appliances; for those who to-day survive degrees of burns which in the old days were fatal are sufferers from terrible pain, often involving long-continued treatment, and in the end, great disfigurement and deformity.
There is one point which I should like to emphasise—namely, that these electrical gas and oil-burning appliances are not a big cause of burns in children and old people particularly. The ordinary open fire remains, as Dr. Colebrook has vividly said, the outstanding hazard of the English home. But I believe that, when this Bill becomes law, as it promises to do, it will prove a stimulus to further research in making articles of clothing flame-proof, and that that will contribute something towards resolving the major danger from the open fire. I believe that it will also lead to the manufacture of an easily attachable guard to existing apparatus. I hope that these results will be realised.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, this is a Bill the purpose of which is wholly laudable, arid Her Majesty's Government are grateful to those who have produced it and submitted it to your Lordships' House. I suppose that all of us have at some moment, possibly at a good many moments, been subject to a shock of apprehension at seeing either ourselves or somebody else in the room obviously within dangerous proximity to an unguarded fire. Although the promoters of the Bill would not contend that the passage of this Bill will remove all risk of such accidents happening, at the same time it does seem reasonable to expect that it will, to a considerable and valuable extent, reduce those risks. From that point of view, Her Majesty's Government welcome the Bill. It may perhaps be an encouragement to the noble Lord who introduced it in your Lordships' House to say that if, as appears reasonably possible horn the course of proceedings this afternoon, the Bill does pass into law, every effort will be made to issue the regulations, after consultation with the authorities concerned, with the minimum of delay.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

COCKFIGHTING BILL
3.22 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, I must apologise for rising a second time to move the Second Reading of a Bill which is rather like a Bill that I brought about two years ago to your Lordships' House but which did not have the luck to get on the Statute Book. I hope this one may have better fortune. I should like to recapitulate briefly a few facts about cockfighting. Cockfighting was made illegal in the year 1853, but a good deal of evidence has accumulated in the past hundred years that a certain number of cockfights—or, as they are called, "mains"—have been held in various parts of the country. It is very difficult to track them down because naturally great precautions are taken by the promoters to hold them in secret. Generally the day and place where they are to be held are kept secret until the day of the "main." The place where it is to occur is very well guarded, while the birds are conveyed in cars, milk floats or covered vans; and, if they are stopped, the people concerned say they are taking the birds to show. However, several successful prosecutions have taken place in recent years, notably between 1927 and 1938, when there were about a dozen prosecutions, which ranged over a large part of the country—Lancashire, Derbyshire, Yorkshire, Hampshire and Cumberland. They were not confined to any one place.
The point of this Bill is to make it simpler, in a way, to enforce the existing law by making it illegal to rear and keep birds for cockfighting. The rearing of birds for cockfighting involves four separate operations: first, the taking away of the comb or wattle of the cockerel; secondly, cutting the wing feathers short; thirdly, cutting the tail feathers; and, fourthly, taking off the natural spurs from the bird's legs. In order that a person shall not get into trouble if these things are done to meet ordinary natural requirements, the Bill does not cover a bird which has only had its comb or wattle taken off and/or its wing feathers clipped. By reason only of that,
"a domestic fowl shall not be deemed to be prepared for use in fighting …"
Birds kept in fenced yards are liable to fly over the fence, so it will not be an
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offence under the Bill for the wings to be clipped. It is the four operations I have mentioned which are made illegal.
The second point of the Bill is to prohibit people keeping appliances for cockfighting. The one appliance which is kept for cockfighting is a metal spur which is tied to the bird's leg. It is a very wicked and vicious object, about a couple of inches long. It is sharp, and the birds carry on their fighting with it. Many people keep these spurs as museum pieces and in collections. Under the terms of the Bill, the court shall not deem it an offence if the spurs are obviously kept for sentimental reasons or by collectors; or if a person had a spur in his pocket, as I have now, he would not be liable to prosecution. This Bill will help to make it possible to enforce the law passed in 1853. I do not think the Bill will cause any trouble to people who want to keep fowls lawfully and reasonably, and I hope your Lordships will be good enough to give the Bill a Second Reading. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a. —(Lord Amulree.)
3.28 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, for reasons similar to those mentioned by me in respect of the Bill which preceded this one, I beg to give the support of my noble friends on this side of the House to this Bill. In addition, I think I ought to compliment the noble Lord on having the great good fortune to introduce two such Bills in one day for your Lordships' consideration.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: My Lords, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, I rise to give a welcome and full support to the noble Lord's Bill. I think it is fair to say that, whatever else is said about us or this country to-day, we are still paramount in the world in our interpretation of the word "sport." When we find a sport such as cockfighting debasing itself, we remove it from the realm of our activities and recreations. From what the noble Lord has said, however, there are obviously a few people who choose this cruel amusement for their own personal gain, either by trying to make a fortune out of a wager or by being paid what to-day would be called black market sums for managing and administering the cock stables for these fights. There is no doubt

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about it that the noble Lord's Bill will go a long way to remove this abuse. Before I close, I should like to say that this Bill pays a great tribute to our Parliamentary system, in that, in the middle of all the troubles, difficulties and arguments that we have to-day, we can give a few moments to bettering the lot of a few barndoor fowls. With those remarks, I beg to give Her Majesty's Government's support to the Bill.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

TOWN DEVELOPMENT BILL
3.30 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Lloyd.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
[The EARL OF DROGHEDA in the Chair]
Clause 1:
Definition of town development
1.—(1) In this Act the expression "town development" means development in a county district (or partly in one such district and partly in another) which will have the effect, and is undertaken primarily for the purpose, of providing accommodation for residential purposes (with or without accommodation for the carrying on of industrial or other activities, and with any public services and other incidentals needed) the provision whereof will relieve congestion or over-population elsewhere.
LORD HAMPTON LORD HAMPTON moved, in subsection (1), after "services" to insert, "including playing fields." The noble Lord said: In moving this Amendment, I do not think I need detain the Committee for very long. This Bill is called the Town Development Bill. I assume that that title means the complete development of our towns, old or new, to be in every way suitable places for habitation in modern conditions. If this is so, it is inconceivable to me how any town can regard itself as having reached that standard unless adequate provision, or as adequate provision as can be made, is forthcoming in regard to playing fields. I believe the Minister in another place agreed that provision for playing fields was desirable—I rather wish he had used the word "essential"; I think that would
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have been more suitable. There is no doubt that the Government now and for a long time past have been thinking in the same way. In regard to local education authorities' policy, the Ministry of Education issued a circular (No. 242) on December 7 last, part of which reads:
"No doubt there are certain directions in which drastic economies could not be made without serious detriment to the health and well-being of children and young persons; the Minister has in mind particularly, in the field of primary and secondary education, the expenditure on playgrounds and facilities for physical education."
It finishes up by saying:
"But with these reservations the Minister must ask authorities to review the whole of their expenditure under this Section with a view to making economies wherever possible."
In the Housing Act of 1936 we find these words:
".…that the layout and construction of public streets or roads and open spaces is part of the provision of housing accommodation."
There are many instances where land has already been scheduled for the purpose of playing fields by local authorities, but for one reason or another, chiefly financial, they cannot at present take up the land and develop it for its original purpose.
The National Playing Fields Association are anxious—and they are not alone in that anxiety—about the fact that there is no provision in the present Bill to empower the Minister to make grants for the purpose of playing fields. As the Committee probably know, this Association founded twenty-seven years ago, have done a great deal to improve the playing field situation throughout the country. From the outset, and after a most careful survey, they set themselves a target of six acres per thousand of the population. To-day, after twenty-seven year of strenuous effort and with the ready co-operation of local authorities throughout the country, they have been able to secure no more than roughly one and a half acres per thousand. The difficulty of finding big open spaces is great and is growing. The needs of housing, allotments, agriculture and aerodromes, and the requirements of other services, mean that competition for any available land is keener now than at any time in our history, yet the need for playing fields is greater, especially in the case of children. It is admitted that the scarcity of playing fields

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is a serious factor in road accidents among the children, and all social workers agree that the same lack of space for organised games is one of the causes of the more dangerous types of child delinquency. We want our children to be near their own homes to play games, but on grass and not in the streets.
We are spending hundreds of millions of pounds annually on our National Health Service, but surely adequate playing fields, or as adequate as we can make them, should be looked upon as an essential complement to that Service. I know that local authorities are doing what they can, and I feel sure that the Government is alive to the need. I realise that our present economic condition is a stumbling block to what the Government would like to do; but the general financial stringency throughout the country is a stumbling block also to what local authorities would like to do. We all sympathise with Her Majesty's Ministers in the harassing problems of to-day in keeping their estimates of expenditure pared down to the bare bone; yet I am informed on good authority, that in many cases quite a small grant, given at the right time and in the right place, may make just the difference between the ability to develop a site probably already scheduled, and sadly letting it go. Once gone, in all probability it can never be recovered.
The National Playing Fields Association have done, and are doing, what they can in the matter of grants, and are, I believe, allocating £27,000 this year for the purpose of playing fields. Distributed throughout the whole country that is not a large sum, but necessarily their funds are limited. By the way, I am sorry that the Chairman of the Association, Lord Luke, cannot be with us to-day. I know he wanted to speak, but I believe that at this moment he is flying on his way to Helsinki as a member of the Committee of the Olympic Games. In addition to these grants, throughout the history of the Association there have been many generous private gifts of land and many schemes sponsored by local authorities. Could not the Government play their part for this purpose, looking upon it as a long-term investment—a gilt-edged investment—and one carrying with it in the years to come a rate of interest out of all proportion to the capital involved? I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 12, after ("services") insert ("including playing fields").—(Lord Hampton.)
LORD SILKIN: I rise to support the Amendment, which I regard as perhaps the most important Amendment on the Marshalled List to-day. It is an Amendment which, I am sure, will command the support of the whole Committee. I anticipate that the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, will tell us how sympathetic he is to the idea of playing fields, and then possibly will tell us that we cannot have the support of Her Majesty's Government to provide them. That support is important, not only for the full reasons, which I wholly support, given by the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, but because it is urgent that playing fields should be provided at the very beginning of the development of a large area: once the area becomes built on it is too late.
In these days there is a tremendous amount of pressure upon local authorities to use their land to the fullest possible extent. There is the financial pressure, the desire to build at the highest possible density. There is also pressure from agricultural interests—and quite rightly—who are anxious that wherever possible not a single acre of land should be used for purposes other than farming. It is quite likely that local authorities developing areas under the conditions of this Bill will succumb to that joint pressure, unless they have some encouragement from Her Majesty's Government. Therefore, I should like to see these words inserted in the Bill, showing that it is a matter of serious policy on the part of the Government to ensure that, wherever development of this kind takes place, the question of playing fields must be taken into consideration. I think on Second Reading the noble Lord, Lord Woolton, said that there was not much money involved in this matter—that local authorities could easily provide the money because these playing fields were being provided in areas where land was cheap, and I think that that is true. At any rate, to a certain extent there is a good deal of truth in it. There is not much money involved, and one would say that the Government can much more easily afford the small amount which may be involved than some of the local authorities who are going to incur considerable expense in rehousing their

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populations outside their areas, or the receiving authorities who are going to incur expense in providing for the people who will be going to their districts. So we are not talking about a great deal of Honey.
I am much more concerned about a gesture; about having it on record in the Bill that the Government do attach importance to the question of playing fields, and will make some contribution. The amount of that contribution really does not matter. I am not at all concerned whether the contribution is small or large. Indeed it is left entirely to the discretion of the Minister; there is nothing in the Bill at all which affects it. But I attach importance to the principle of making a contribution, and I hope, therefore, that if the noble Lord is not able to accept the Amendment, at least he will be prepared to go back to the Minister and tell him that there is really strong feeling in the House about it—as I believe there is—and that it is not a question of spending any large amount of money, but really of showing the concern of Her Majesty's Government on this question and of ensuring that at the outset of development provision is made for playing fields. If the noble Lord can give us an assurance that he is prepared to do that, then, perhaps, we shall live to fight another day.
3.43 p.m.
LORD LLOYD: I do not think that here is a great deal between us here—certainly there is not on the principle of my noble friend's Amendment. We recognise, as fully as he does and as fully as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, does, the necessity of playing fields in any properly developed community. Of course, your Lordships must remember that these town development schemes are going to be worked out as planned development, with all the essential amenities planned in advance. I can give this definite assurance to my noble friend: that the Government have very much at heart the whole question of proper provision being made for playing fields in any development that takes place under this Bill. The noble Lord, I think, stated that there is no provision in the Bill for this purpose. That in a sense is true; but perhaps in another sense it is not entirely true. In all cases these schemes have to be considered on their merits and
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what is done will depend upon a number of factors—for example, the amount of money the "exporting" authority will be able to contribute, the amount of money the county council will be able to contribute, the state of the finances of the receiving authority, and so on. All these things have to be taken into consideration before the Minister decides how much he ought to give to any particular scheme. When all these factors have been taken into consideration, the Minister will assess the burden that is going to fall on a receiving district and how much he can give. When he assesses this burden he can take account of expenditure on the acquisition of land for playing fields under Clause 2 (2) (b) of the Bill.
LORD SILKIN: if that is the case, would the noble Lord say what is the objection to saying so in terms?
LORD LLOYD: The objection to this Amendment, I am advised, is a legal objection.
LORD SILKIN: Oh!
LORD LLOYD: If the noble Lord will listen to what the objection is before he starts making disapproving noises I think we shall get on faster. The legal objection, I am advised, is that these words would tend to throw doubt on the generality of the words "public services and other incidentals needed." As the noble Lord, who has been much concerned with these matters, knows, if you particularise some particular activity you may well in legal drafting, throw doubt on various other activities. In this case, I am advised, if you particularise playing fields, you will tend to throw doubt on other necessary things, such as churches, parks libraries and community centres—to give a few examples. Therefore I do not think that I can accept the Amendment. I am prepared to give the noble Lord an assurance that we are concerned about this matter; we shall do everything possible to see that these things are planned as a whole and that all the necessary amenities are contained in the plans. I hope that perhaps my noble friend may be content with that assurance.
3.46 p.m.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I am sure we cannot really accept as satisfactory what the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, has just said. I quite appreciate the

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noble Lord's position. Perhaps he will accept the suggestion of Lord Silkin and have another talk with the Minister about this matter. I have found myself in the position of the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, on many occasions; I have been told to withstand pressure to accept Amendments. I have been given various reasons, but never have I been given the reason which the noble Lord has now advanced—that there is a legal difficulty because if he has the example of playing fields inserted in the Bill it may prevent the building of churches. I think that that is straining our credulity a little too far. I would ask the noble Lord, if he would, to take this matter back. We in this House have this afternoon been dealing with a Children and Young Persons Bill, and we have been considering how to deal with child delinquency and the victims of it. I would suggest to the noble Lord that, as my noble friend has already said, this Amendment does not commit anyone to anything except the principle. Surely it is far better in this new town development to ensure having adequate playing fields for young persons. Even to-day there is agitation in the heart of this City of Westminster to block up roads and stop traffic passing along them, so that children shall be able to have some reasonable recreation.
Does it not sound common sense, as my noble friend has said, that before this town development gets bogged down, before licensed premises are set up for some future children to hang around, or cinemas are built in which children will be given the sort of mental food which some of the modern cinemas do feed to children, playing fields should be dealt with as a first essential? I do not suggest that they are an essential merely so that we can bring up "little Mo's" or people of that kind who will carry off world championships in the field of sport; but they are at least essential for the health and recreation of future generations. I beg the noble Lord to have another word with the Minister and see whether he cannot give us some better news at the next stage of this Bill.
LORD MIDDLETON: I should like to support the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and his noble friend. I have been concerned with the Playing Fields Association
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ever since it was started, and I feel very strongly that this is an Amendment which should be accepted. In my view, it is not only the matter of playing fields which is so important. It has been my experience in cities where I have been concerned with youth organisations that I have continually had to investigate the reasons why boy scout troops and boys' clubs had disappeared. It is most necessary that in new town development some provision should be made for youth organisations to carry out their function, and I hope that the Amendment may be accepted at this stage of the Bill.
LORD LLOYD: I have only a few words to say on the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth. Neither of us are lawyers, but I was surprised to hear from him that he had never heard of the doctrine of ejusdem generis which I thought would have been as well known to him as it is even to such a non-legally minded person as myself. I really think he need not have lectured me so violently on my lack of desire to see playing fields, having regard to the fact that I had just told him that the Government were particularly keen on this matter. Indeed, I think there is very little on the matter of principle which divides us. Finally, I would say that I am always susceptible to the noble Lord's blandishments; and in view of the general desire expressed, I am perfectly prepared to have another look at this matter. As he knows, I can give no promise, but I am prepared to take it back to see whether we can meet this point.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I am sure we are all grateful to the noble Lord.
LORD HAMPTON: I also should like to express my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, for what he has just said—that he will take it back to the Minister and think again. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth: I could not quite swallow the excuse about the legal difficulty. Surely an open space or playing field cannot be put on the same plane as a new building for any purpose whatsoever. It is one of those things that are essential, and when new towns are springing up this is the time of times, as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said, when we should be thinking of developing them properly under modern conditions. On

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the assurance which the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, has given, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2 [Exchequer contributions to council of receiving district]:
Exchequer contributions to council of receiving district
2.—(1) This section applies to development to be carried out after the passing of this Act as to which the Minister of Housing and Local Government (hereinafter referred to as "the Minister") is satisfied—
(b) that the provision of the accommodation will relieve congestion or over-population in—

(i) a county borough, or

(iv) a county district outside the county in which the development is to be carried out,

or in two or more such local government areas.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved, in subsection (1), to add to sub-paragraph (iv) of paragraph (b):
"or where the Minister is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, a county district inside such county "
The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is to provide for exceptional circumstances. In the normal case, where a district council desire to disperse their surplus population and get the benefit of this Bill, they have to disperse it outside their own county. There may be exceptional circumstances which make it desirable and convenient, indeed, essential, to disperse it within the county. An example which I gave on Second Reading was Ilford. I hold no brief for Ilford; I have not been approached by them; but Ilford happens to be a good example of what I mean. Ilford is a congested area, and if they disperse their surplus population, they can do it only in the county of Essex, a considerable distance away. It seems to me that that is the kind of case which the Minister might be prepared to treat as exceptional, so as to give Ilford and the receiving authority in the county access to the benefits of this Bill. It would be entirely in the Minister's discretion and he would have to be satisfied that it was exceptional. There would be no fear of a wholesale introduction of large-scale
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extensions of the provisions of the Bill. There may be half a dozen cases throughout the country, but where such cases do exist, I think it is important that they should be met. I beg to move
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 19, after ("out") insert the said words.—(Lord Silkin.)
LORD LLOYD: The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has stated his first proposition correctly. In the normal case, the county borough or district council which wishes to export its surplus population has to do it outside the boundary of the county. That was the situation when the Bill was first introduced, but I think the noble Lord is under a slight misapprehension when he cites the case of Ilford
LORD SILKIN: I realise that the Ilford case is met because it is on the outskirts of London, but I had that sort of case in mind.
LORD LLOYD: The Ilford case was met in Committee in another place. Strong representations were made about Ilford and, as the noble Lord knows, there is provision in Clause 2 of the Bill which covers the Ilford case and all other cases where the district is part of a large conurbation—to use another awful phrase. I think the point is satisfactorily covered. If the noble Loud wishes to include in the provisions of the Bill any district council that may wish to export population within the county, then I am afraid I must resist his Amendment. In our opinion, that would widen the scope of the Bill in a way which we never intended. The object of the Bill is to assist built-up areas with enormous surplus populations to export them to new towns. That is a matter of national concern, and we believe it should have national financial assistance. But when a small district wishes to export its population for some reason, perhaps because the planning authority thinks it should not expand further, that is only a local affair, which does not come within the main purview of this measure. That is not the problem we are tying to solve. In any case, if a local planning authority decide that any district should not expand in their own area, the district council can obtain a contribution from the county council under existing powers provided in Section 126 of the Local Government Act, which empowers county

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councils to contribute to any expense of county districts. We think that they ought to help the district councils and that the problem does not come within the purview of this measure. I am sorry, but I am afraid I cannot accept the Amendment.
LORD SILKIN: I do not think the Amendment is of world-shattering importance. I think the noble Lord is wrong, but I do not propose to press this to a Division.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Clauses 3 to 7 agreed to.
Clause 8 [Provision for participation by agreement]:
On Question, Whether the clause shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD SILKIN: I should like to say a word about Clause 8 (1) (c). The point I want to make is not on the merits of the clause, because I do not understand what its merits are: the point I want to make is on the drafting. I have spent a good deal of time trying to understand the meaning of subsection (1) (c). Sometimes I think I do understand it, and then, as I go on, I find I do not. Nobody ought to be put in that position. I think I have got the meaning here and, if I have, the idea is so simple that surely it could be put in much simpler words than are here. I am not going to torture the noble Lord by asking him to explain what subsection (1) (c) means. Oh, I see he has a brief! What I ask him is this: Will be please try between now and the next stage to reduce this paragraph to its simplest terms and produce something which even the least intelligent of us can understand?
LORD LLOYD: I must confess that anything on Local Government Bills which the noble Lord, Lord Silk in, does not understand is Greek to me, but I have taken the precaution of finding out what this means, anticipating that the noble Lord might be in difficulty. Neither of us is a lawyer—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: He is.
LORD LLOYD: Then the noble Lord should not try me with the provisions of this subsection. It is his profession which
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clothes all these simple things in this horrible language. I will take it back and have a look at the drafting, but I am advised by my legal experts that this is the simplest legal way in which the particular object we desire to achieve here can be expressed.
Clause 8 agreed to.
Clause 9:
Provision for participation under order of the Minister
9.—(1) If it appears to the Minister that any action required for the purposes of town development within the meaning of this Act (being action for the taking of which by an authority eligible to participate provision could be made, with the authorisation of the Minister under subsection (1) of the last preceding section if needed, by an agreement to which the council of a receiving district were parties) is prevented or hampered by inability or unwillingness of the council of the receiving district to take that action or to concur in providing by agreement for its being taken, and application in that behalf is made to him by that authority, he may after consultation with the council of the receiving district and the council of the county in which the receiving district is situated make provision by order—

(a) for authorising the authority by whom the application is made to take that action, or to assume any obligation with respect thereto for the assumption of which by them provision could be made as aforesaid, and for requiring the council of the receiving district to permit the taking by that authority of that action;

(b) for imposing on the council of the receiving district any obligation with respect to that action for the assumption of which by them provision could be made as aforesaid, and for conferring on that authority the right to enforce an obligation so imposed as if it had been assumed by the council of the receiving district by agreement with that authority; and

(c) if any agreement with respect to that action has been made by the council of the receiving district with that authority, for varying the terms thereof.

LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved, in subsection (1) to omit all words in parentheses, beginning "being action" down to and including "were parties." The noble Lord said: My reason for putting down this Amendment is exactly the same as that for my remarks on Clause 8. I am not sure that I understand this correctly; and, if I do, I can say only that it could be put much more simply. The Amendment proposes the deletion of the words within brackets in Clause 9. I agree that they are a limitation of the powers which are conferred upon the Minister. But

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surely, if that is the intention, it could be put much more simply. The words which I am moving to omit are:
"(being action for the taking of which by an authority eligible to participate provision could be made, with the authorisation of the Minister under subsection (1) of the last preceding section if needed, by an agreement to which the council of a receiving district were parties)."
What those words are supposed to mean is, "such an agreement as is contemplated in the previous clause." If that is what it means, why does the Bill not say so? If it means something else, then I cannot make out the words at all. I am moving the Amendment to get the noble Lord opposite to elucidate what the wording means. If he is successful in doing that, I beg of him to take it back to see whether the intention cannot be expressed in simpler language. One day this will have to be interpreted.
I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 8, line 43, leave out after ("Act") to ("is") in line 47.—(Lord Silkin.)
LORD LLOYD: I have not been asked to construe so often since I was at school, but again I will endeavour to elucidate for the noble Lord, to the best of my ability. I am advised that what this does, as the noble Lord says, is to limit the power of the Minister. Clause 8 sets forth the fact that authorities may participate in any development of this kind. It then sets forth the sort of things they can do: for example, subsection (1) sets out the kinds of action that one party acting on behalf of another party, in fact, acting as the agent for the receiving area, may take. It authorises
"any action outside their area by a participating council … being action which apart from this subsection they could lawfully take if it were for the benefit of their area but whcih is not, or may not be, for the benefit thereof;".
That, I believe, is quite simple. Clause 8 (1) (c) would take me quite a long time to explain, though I am well fortified. However, I wish to spare the Committee if I can. I will run through the rest of the provisions if the noble Lord wishes, but I feel that they are fairly plain sailing. All Clause 9 (1) does is to say that the Minister may not make an order if people have not done something which is outside its provisions. But if they have failed to do something which they could
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do under Clause 8, he is in a position to make an order. That is how I understand it. Clearly, if we did not have the words in the Bill the Minister could make an order for almost any reason at all; his powers would be unlimited. So this Amendment could go impossibly far. I gather that the noble Lord put it down only to torture me. I hope that I have satisfied him and that, in the circumstances, he will be prepared to withdraw the Amendment.
LORD SILKIN: I cannot say that the noble Lord has related the intention of the words to the words that are actually there. I think I understand what is intended, but I cannot make the words of the clause correspond with what is intended. However, I understand that the noble Lord will see whether these words can be elucidated—I agree that some kind of limitation is necessary—and on that understanding I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 9 agreed to.
Clause 10:
Contributions to authorities participating from the Exchequer and local authorities benefited
(3) Where the council of a county borough or county district are satisfied that the provision of accommodation by my town development within the meaning of this Act will relieve congestion or over-population in their area, they may, in pursuance of undertakings in that behalf given by them with the approval of the Minister, make contributions to any authority participating in the development towards expenses incurred by them in relation to the development.
LORD LLOYD LORD LLOYD moved to add to subsection (3):
"A council, when giving an undertaking under this subsection, may lay down, as conditions to which payment of the contributions undertaken to be made is to be subject, such conditions as it may appear to that council to be expedient to impose for securing the intended relief from congestion or overpopulation."
The noble Lord said: This Amendment is consequential on an Amendment carried out in another place to Clause 4, which now appears as subsection (2) of the clause. That Amendment made it clear, if that was necessary, that a local authority contributing to the expenses of the council of a receiving district could attach to its payments conditions Of the

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type mentioned in subsection (2). All this Amendment seeks to do is to give a parallel opportunity to contributions which a participating authority may make to another authority in town development. To give an example, suppose that the Manchester Corporation were themselves carrying out a development at Leyland, and that Salford wished to participate in it—letting Manchester do the work—and wished to house some of their population at Leyland as well, but that Manchester did the work for both. This Amendment enables Salford not only to contribute to Manchester's expenses but also to make conditions in respect of their contributions, even though they are not doing the work—one condition might be that they should have so many houses of those being built at Leyland, or something of that sort. This Amendment is on all fours with the Amendment made in the other place and, as I say, it is almost consequential upon it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 10, line 39, at end insert the said words.—(Lord Lloyd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 10, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 11 and 12 agreed to.
Clause 13:
Re-transfers of land, and other adjustments, after carrying out of town development
(4) Subject to subsection (2) of section nine-seen of this Act, no order shall be made under this section unless a draft thereof has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.
4.8 p.m.
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved to leave out subsection (4) and to insert:
"(4) An order under this section shall be subject to special parliamentary procedure."
The noble Lord said: This is a matter of procedure and machinery, and not of principle, but it is one which has been taken seriously into consideration by the local authorities and their representatives. I put it forward from their point of view with a good deal of confidence that it will be the means of saving expense, elaboration and time in carrying out the procedure under the Bill. Clause 13 is the tidying-up clause, under which, after the county borough, for instance, has completed
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the development in, say, the area of a county district, the Minister comes in and makes an order adjusting matters as between the two authorities, probably by transferring the property in the new development to the authority which will administer it, which will be the county district. That is merely an illustration. In any event, this tidying-up order will necessitate the investigation of boundaries, sites and financial compensation, and possibly other subsidiary matters, such as title, and so on. In other words, it will not be a simple order, but will contain a good deal of detail.
Under the present provisions of the Bill, all that is provided for is the submission of such an order to Parliament for approval or rejection—the more general procedure. That is a valuable safeguard, and we should value it very much. But experienced administrators of local authorities venture to suggest that what is wanted is something more, and that is an opportunity of holding an inquiry (if it is thought necessary) and taking evidence before the order is made. That is the whole point of this Amendment: to give the parties interested—the Ministry and the two local authorities—an opportunity, if it will be useful, to hold an inquiry and take evidence which will enable them to adjust these difficult matters in detail (ownership, compensation, title, and so forth) before the order is made. The representatives of the local authorities feel confident that that will be of the greatest value and assist them to get the things through quickly, cheaply and without undue contention. Perhaps I may assure the Minister that this matter has been considered very closely in detail by the local authorities and is put forward by them, with, I think, complete unanimity, through their representative associations. I have informed myself of the opinion of the association most concerned, and I venture to support it as a practical matter which may save a little trouble in the future. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 12, line 40, leave out subsection (4) and insert ("(4) An order made under this section shall be subject to special parliamentary procedure.").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD SILKIN: Could the noble Lord explain why he regards it as important to have this procedure for Clause 13 and not

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for Clause 9, where the Minister is over-riding the views of the local authority? I should have thought that that was much more relevant.
LORD KENNET: The answer to the noble Lord must be that the clause deals with a different subject matter. One likes to confine one's suggestions for changes in a useful Bill to the minimum of what one thinks is most necessary. The answer would be that it is thought that the corpus of cases in which this procedure would be most useful and necessary would be those raised under Clause 13.
LORD LLOYD: So far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, we recognise the doubts which exist in the minds of local authorities about this question of re-transfer of development to the authority who is finally to administer it. One answer to the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, is that the amount involved in Clause 13 is considerably more than in Clause 9. In Clause 9 we have only the receiving authority with no burden placed upon it, as no development has yet begun. In Clause 13 we have the handing over for a consideration of what may be a considerable development, involving a great deal of money, and clearly it is desirable that too heavy a burden should not be imposed. Equally, one wants to ensure that there is not an unjust price awarded to the developing authority who perhaps have spent a great deal of money. My right honourable friend was of the opinion that the ordinary affirmative procedure would have been enough to cover all these cases, but if local authorities feel strongly on this particular point, I have his authority to accept this Amendment and we shall be pleased to do so if it sets any doubts at rest.
LORD KENNET: I am much obliged to the noble Lord. I can assure him that it has the unanimous support of the local authorities, as a matter of substantial practical importance, and that it will receive the warmest welcome by them.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 13, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 14 agreed to.
Clause 15. [Continuation of sewage disposal or sewerage systems]:
4.15 p.m.
LORD KENNET: This Amendment and the next in my name are both put down by me in the hope that they will receive the agreement which has been accorded to the other Amendment. These Amendments are consequential upon the first Amendment, and the whole effect is to produce a re-arrangement of the Bill consequent upon the change just made in Clause 13, in order that the Bill may read more clearly. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 45, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
("(2) Where the Minister is of opinion that an order should be made—

(a) under section six of the Public Health Act, 1936, by virtue of paragraph (a) of the preceding subsection, or

(b) under section nine of that Act amending or revoking such an order as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection, or,

(c) under paragraph (b) of the preceding subsection.

he shall give notice of that opinion to all authorities appearing to him to be concerned, setting out a provisional draft of an order and stating a period, not less than twenty-eight days, within which objections may be made and if either no objection is made by any such authority within the time stated in the notice or all objections so made are withdrawn, the order may be made in the terms of the provisional draft, or with such modifications only as appear to the Minister to be immaterial, but an order shall not be made in any other case unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament")—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD LLOYD: The noble Lord is perfectly correct. This Amendment is consequential on our acceptance of his last Amendment, and I am it very pleased to accept it.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 15, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 16 and 17 agreed to.
Clause 18 [Repeal of s. 19 (5) of Town and Country Planning Act, 1944]:
4.17 p.m.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN had giver notice of an Amendment to omit Clause 18. The noble Lord said: The Amendment which is standing in my name is to leave out Clause 18. I observe, however, that the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, has a similar

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Amendment on the Marshalled List. The object of my Amendment was to leave the clause out of the Bill altogether. The object of the noble Lord's Amendment is to leave it out and to put another even more obnoxious clause in its place. This raises a question of major policy, and if it were to be debated in a serious way, and in the way in which I think it should be debated, it would take a considerable time, but there is a good deal of business on the Order Paper to-day, and I am sure that noble Lords would welcome any effort to save time this afternoon. I feel, therefore, that it might be advisable not to move my own Amendment, but to let the noble Lord's Amendment go through, with the understanding that I shall move my Amendment to delete the new clause on a further stage of this Bill. If that is acceptable to the noble Lord, I shall be prepared not to move my Amendment at all to-day, but to put down an Amendment to delete the new Clause 18 on the further stage.
LORD LLOYD: I am perfectly prepared to agree with the noble Lord, if that suits him.
LORD SILKIN: I thought it might suit the House. It would suit me to move it now.
LORD LLOYD: I beg the noble Lord's pardon. I will move my new clause, and we can have a debate on it next time.
LORD LLOYD LORD LLOYD moved to leave out Clause 18 and insert the following new clause:
Repeal of restrictions on disposal of land by local authorities and development corporations
"18. So much of section nineteen of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, and of section five of the New Towns Act, 1946, as restrict the power of the Minister under those sections to consent to the disposal of land by a local authority or development corporation shall cease to have effect and, accordingly, the enactments specified in the Schedule to this Act are hereby repealed to the extent specified in relation thereto in the third column of that Schedule."
The noble Lord said: This Amendment arises out of an error which occurred through the original clause not going far enough. It was intended to repeal part of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944. Unfortunately, it went the whole way through the House of Commons and through the Second Reading in your
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Lordships' House before anyone noticed that we had failed to repeal the reenactment of the same piece of legislation in the Eleventh Schedule of the 1947 Act. It was, therefore, necessary to delete the original Clause 18 in the Bill for that purpose, if for no other; and, since we are doing that, we should at the same time insert the provision of which I gave notice on the Second Reading—the provision to repeal part of the New Towns Act of 1946. In view of what the noble Lord has said, I will confine my remarks to a minimum. I will merely say that these two Amendments remove a limitation on the Minister's power to give permission to local authorities either to sell their houses or to make leases of more than ninety-nine years. I do not think that at this stage I need say any more about it—we shall be debating the matter more fully on the Report stage. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 18 and insert the said new clause.—(Lord Lloyd.)
THE LORD CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: The Question is, That the Amendment be agreed to, subject to the insertion of "1944" in place of "1947" as printed.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MERTHYR LORD MERTHYR moved, after Clause 18 to insert the following new clause:
". The Council of a receiving district shall, before carrying out any development under this Act, consult with the councils of such of the parishes in its area as will be affected by such development as to the manner in which the development is to be carried out."
The noble Lord said: I must say that when I had finished drafting this Amendment I was astonished at its modesty. It is asking a very small thing indeed: that before development takes place in a parish the council of that parish should be consulted as to the manner in which the development is to take place. The Amendment does not require the permission of the parish council. It cannot hold up the development unless there is agreement. All it says is—and this is surely a very small thing—that the parish council must be consulted. I take it that it is part of the policy of Her Majesty's Government to encourage the ordinary form of democratic local government as applied to parish councils. It must be a discouragement to parish councils if development on any scale takes place in

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their own area without their being consulted at all. On the other side of the picture, surely there must be occasions when the parish council could contribute something really useful, in the words of this Amendment:
"as to the manner in which the development is to be carried out"—
not whether a house shall be built but, perhaps, where it might be built; something as to the siting and elevation, and the material. When all is said and done, there is no compulsion on anybody to accept the decision of the parish council or to do more than merely consult them. That being so, I submit that this Amendment is inherently reasonable. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 18 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Merthyr.)
LORD LLOYD: I have a great deal of sympathy with what the noble Lord would like to do. We do not want to see local authorities overridden. At the same time I think the Amendment, if accepted, would introduce a new principle into local government. Obviously we desire that local people should assent to what is being clone. After all, the rural district councils are elected on a parochial basis, and often a member of the rural district council is a member of the parish council. I think we must assume that the district council has an access to the views of the parish council. It must do so, in fact, because its representatives, as I say, are elected on lint basis. We must also assume, therefore, that it will take their interests into consideration. I do not think we should introduce such an entirely new principle into local government; I think it would be wrong to do so. While, therefore, we have every sympathy with what the noble Lord desires to do, I am afraid that I cannot accept the Amendment.
LORD MIDDLETON: I am sorry that the noble Lord cannot accept this Amendment. I have been a district councillor for over twenty years, and also a parish councillor. Sometimes I have found myself unable to attend the district council meetings at the right time because of lack of transport. I remember a case where it was decided by the district council that cottages should be built at a certain place. If the parish councillor had been there he would have been able
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to point out that every few years a certain spring came to the surface and made that place impossible for building. I think the Amendment extremely reasonable and I wish the noble Lord could accept it.
LORD MERTHYR: I should like to make one or two observations upon what the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, said. I submit that there is room for new principles in local government. The noble Lord suggested that district councils were in some way elected by the parish councils. He seemed to be under the. impression that members of district councils were also members of parish councils.
LORD LLOYD: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord. I think he misunderstood me. I did not say that the district councils were elected by the parish council members. I said that on occasions the district councillors were also members of the parish council.
LORD MERTHYR: I gladly withdraw my interpretation of the noble Lord's remarks. Of course, it may be that a district councillor does not live in his own parish or in the parish he represents. He may live in neither place; he is not bound to live in either place. This new principle to which the noble Lord is objecting might be a very good principle, and I would ask him whether he will kindly consider this matter again, for the reasons put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Middleton. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 19 agreed to.
Clause 20 [Provisions as to orders under this Act]:
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET had given notice of an Amendment to omit subsection (2).
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, said that this Amendment was consequential.
Amendment moved—
Page 15, line 38, leave out subsection (2).—(Lord Kennet.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 20, as amended, agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
LORD LLOYD LORD LLOYD moved after Clause 23 to insert the following Schedule:

"SCHEDULE

ENACTMENTS REPEALED

7 & 8 Geo. 6. c. 47.

The Town and Country Planning Act, 1944.

Subsection (5) of section nineteen.

9 & 10 Geo. 6. c. 68.

The New Towns Act, 1946.

In section five, in the proviso to subsection (1), the words from "and the Minister shall not consent" to the end of the proviso.

10 & 11 Geo. 6. c. 51.

The Town and Country Planning Act, 1947.

Subsection (5) of section nineteen of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, as reprinted in the Eleventh Schedule."

The noble Lord said: In rising to move the insertion of the Schedule which your Lordships will see on the Order Paper, I need say no more than that it is consequential on the Amendment we made to Clause 18. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 23 insert the said Schedule.—(Lord Lloyd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD LLOYD: This Amendment also is consequential on the Amendment we made to Clause 18. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
In the Title, at end insert ("and part of subsection (1) of section five of the New Towns Act, 1946.").—(Lord Lloyd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
House resumed.

DEFAMATION BILL
4.30 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, I rise to move the Second Reading of the Defamation Bill. It is a measure which was introduced into another place by a private Member, Mr. Lever. It has received full consideration in Committee, and afterwards, as well as a Second
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Reading in another place. It now comes before this House in the hope, and I think in the expectation, that by a united effort we may carry it into law. In other circumstances, I think it would have been proper, in moving the Second Reading to speak at some length and in some detail on the general subject and contents of the Bill, and I must still refer to some of the principal matters in the Bill. But I think it will be for the general convenience of the House if I limit what I have to say now to the minimum which is proper; and other noble Lords, no doubt, will also want to take part in the Second Reading debate. It must be recognised that this is a very important Bill, of wide application, and that on more than one point questions may reasonably arise on which a difference of opinion is possible, with the result that, when we come to Committee, we shall have to discuss some of these clauses with a good deal of elaboration and care. I shall not do any injustice to the importance of the subject if I now make a statement which is briefer than I should otherwise make, in view of the obvious desire of the House in due course to get on with what remains of the Business on the Paper to-day.
It is thirteen years ago since the then Lord Chancellor, my noble and learned friend Lord Maugham, appointed the Committee on the Law of Defamation, the Report of which I hold in my hand. It may be convenient to say that it is Command Paper 7536, of the year 1948. The Committee is known, I think, as Lord Porter's Committee, with a very distinguished list of persons who accepted the duty of carrying through the inquiry. It was headed by Lord Porter, who has taken a large part in drawing up the Report. It included, for example, Lord Justice Birkett; it included another who is now a High Court Judge, Mr. Justice Slade; and it included others with special knowledge of this subject, such as Sir Valentine Holmes. It included other members who might specially appreciate the importance of this subject in connection with writing articles and editing and producing newspapers. It included, also, some others who would take a general view of the importance of the subject. As I have said it was thirteen years ago that these men were appointed, and the Committee lost no time in beginning their work. But the war came, and

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much of the work of the Committee was inevitably postponed.
When the war was over, the Committee resumed their work and took a very large body of evidence and, manifestly, discussed those different points very closely. The Report to which I have just referred was made in the year 1948, nearly five years ago, and, as I have said, it is available as a Parliamentary Paper. Nothing has been done. I do not think it was disputed by anybody that some reforms in the English and Scottish law of defamation were important, and there was a considerable measure of agreement as to what these reforms should be. When the Committee had finished their deliberations and drew up their Report, they were able to deal with a great number of these subjects and, in almost every case, their conclusion is a unanimous conclusion. Where there is any difference, it is a difference which is represented by the contrasted view of one or two members. And yet, so far, nothing has been done to implement the Report. Here, in this Bill, comes the opportunity which Parliament now has—and there is time to do it—of carrying through what undoubtedly would be a very important and useful reform of the law. I am not saying that the Bill contains every change which some people would think wise, but if it is carried into law, it will effect some extremely important improvements in the law, and I think it will be the general feeling that it is very important to get the Bill on to the Statute Book.
I will mention three or four of the most important matters which are dealt with in this Bill, and make a short reference to the Report of Lord Porter's Committee on the subject at the same time. If your Lordships have a copy of the Bill in your hands, you will see that in the first clause there is provision as to broadcast statements. A good deal of difficulty has arisen during recent years in deciding whether or not broadcast statements are to be classed as libels or as slanders. In most cases, I think people who broadcast have a written text; but, of course, the noise that comes out is the noise of the voice. The broadcast is heard by the ear and one might, therefore, regard it perhaps as a communication which is made just for the moment and then passes into oblivion, as distinguished from something which is regarded as permanent and,
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therefore, of a more serious character. I refer now to page 13 of the Committee's Report, where it is pointed out, I think very justly, that:
"A defamatory statement transmitted over the radio in a broadcast, reaching, as it may, an audience of many millions, is calculated to cause as much, if not more, damage than a written report in a newspaper however large its circulation."
Accordingly, in the first clause of this Bill, following the recommendations of the Porter Committee, the provision is that:
"For the purposes of the law of libel and slander, the broadcasting of words by means of wireless telegraphy shall be treated as publication in permanent form."
That is the same as saying that it is to be regarded as a libel rather than as a slander. I may point out that Clause 16, near the end of the Bill, makes it clear that what is said in this first clause does not apply to short-wave messages—such, for example, as are sent out from time to time by police cars and the like. It refers to broadcasting and, no doubt, to television, which we owe to a central authority. That is Clause 1.
Clause 2 is, again, a clause of great importance. It is one of the clauses in which the distinction between slander and libel may be of some importance. I think there are authorities who take the view that we ought to assimilate the law of libel and the law of slander. I will not enter upon discussion of that point now, except to say that I know there is such an argument and in due course we shall have to consider and weigh it. Throughout the Bill, the broad distinction between slander and libel is maintained—the distinction, broadly speaking, being that libel is a defamatory statement in some fairly permanent form, like a written statement, whereas slander is a libellous statement which does not possess that permanent character, because it is merely spoken. The reason for Clause 2 is this. It is an important branch of the law of slander that, whereas a man may complain of defamatory words which are spoken of him in the way of his office, profession, or trade, and which naturally tend to injure his reputation in that office, profession or trade, he cannot bring an action and cannot recover damages, even though the words spoken were defamatory of him, unless it be a statement made about him in the way of his office. For example, a teacher would certainly be

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entitled to bring an action if someone said of him that he was an ignorant person, not fit to teach. But if somebody said of him that he was a person who when on holiday, was of immoral life that in itself would not give the teacher a right of action.
That situation is plainly wrong, and the Committee deals with it very usefully at page 14, pointing out that as a matter of fact, words like those would be extremely harmful to the man's reputation in his calling, even though they are not spoken of him in the way of his calling. In that I should think everybody would agree. Therefore, the Committee provide that by this clause we should amend the present law and abolish the requirement that in such cases the spoken defamatory words must be actually spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his calling; and that, instead, there should be provided, as will be seen in Clause 2, that even though the words are not spoken of him in the way of his calling, if they are calculated to disparage him in his calling, then the conditions are satisfied which will enable an action to be brought. I do not feel any doubt that, assuming that we maintain the broad distinction between slander and libel, your Lordships will accept that recommendation.
I will not delay your Lordships in regard to Clause 3, beyond saying that the matter is dealt with carefully in paragraph 54 of the Report of the Porter Committee, on page 15; and anyone who cares to read it will there see a very clear justification for Clause 3. I think people are sometimes a little in doubt as to what is meant when one says that in certain slander actions the plaintiff must prove "special damage," whereas if the complaint is one of libel special damage need not be proved. I think I speak correctly when I say that the requirement of special damage means that the plaintiff must prove actual pecuniary loss which directly results from the defamation of which he complains. Broadly speaking, that is true of slander, though it is not true of libel.
Then, my Lords, in Clause 4 we come to what is both a complicated and an interesting matter. The side note describes it as "unintentional defamation." That is the language which is used on page 16 of the Porter Committee Report.
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This is a problem which has puzzled not only lawyers but, I think, other people too, such as journalists and writers, for years. A man writes a story in which he has to give his character a name. He does his best to select a name which will not fit anybody—perhaps he invents a name—and in the story his character is not a very desirable one. Then it turns out that, after all, there is somebody who has exactly that name, and, what is more, somebody who can produce a witness who will say that when he read the story he really thought it referred to the gentleman in question. It sounds farfetched but that does sometimes happen, and there is no doubt at all that our law (and I think rightly) does not inquire into what was the intention of the writer. what was in his mind, but asks the objective question: is it the fact that these words about this person with such-and-such a name, having been published, the words really have been regarded, and reasonably regarded, by those who knew him, as referring to the plaintiff?
For example, there was a famous case which mentioned the name of Artemus Jones, and the writer of an amusing sketch imagined, I believe, that when he wrote about Artemus Jones he was using an imaginary name for the purpose of his story, without the smallest idea of referring to any known, existing person at all. At any rate that is what he said. But this is what he wrote in his description of a fictitious character who was enjoying a holiday abroad and, according to the story, not behaving strictly as he did at home—in fact, in the story he was a churchwarden:
"Whist! There is Artemus Jones with a woman who is not his wife, who must be, you know, the other thing."
Thereupon a gentleman whose name was Artemus Jones issued a writ for libel. He called somebody who knew him very well (I think it was his father), to testify that when he read these words he thought they referred to the plaintiff—and the gentleman got very heavy damages. Well, the proposal is that the strictness of the law in this respect should be altered. A still more remarkable case perhaps is another which is to be found in the books, which concerned a man whose name was Harry Newstead, who lived in Camber-well, of whom somebody wrote:
"Harold Newstead, thirty years old Camberwell man, who was jailed for nine months, liked having two wives at a time."

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That might have been all right about one person named Harold Newstead, but it certainly was not right about another person named Harold Newstead. They both lived in Camberwell, and the latter person brought an action and got damages. He said that he was accused of bigamy, whereas he was not a bigamist at all.
Well, something has to be done, and Clause 4 of this Bill deals with this un-intentional defamation. It provides, in substance, that if a person has published defamatory matter quite innocently, not meaning to defame another person, and then finds that there is a claim against him alleging that he has damaged the other person, he can make an offer of amends, by a suitable statement that will relieve the feelings of the party aggrieved. I need not read the details to your Lordships, but if he does that, and does it promptly, he is not to be held liable in damages. I should have thought that that was a reasonable compromise. It is discussed with very great care and fullness in the Porter Report, at pages 16 and 17. Practical justice, which is what we are all after, will be done if the person alleging he has been wronged gets a retraction or explanation, suitably published, without hitting the innocent libeller, if we may call him such, in pecuniary damages.
Then, my Lords, there follows a clause, again of much importance, to which I must call attention as I go along, headed "Justification." I expect your Lordships know what lawyers mean by "justification." This Bill deals with civil defamation, and not with criminal libel. As your Lordships know, in any action brought for damages or defamation because the statement of which the plaintiff complains is an injurious one, it is a complete answer to say, "You may complain as much as you like, but what I have said is true." It rests, of course, on the defendant to prove that the statement is true, but if he can do so, then no damages can be recovered. I think some people have had doubts as to whether that is an altogether wise law, but at any rate I should regard it as much too fundamental a principle to be changed. It has been the law of this country for a very long time.
I recall having read some years ago a most admirable biography of Sir Frank
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Lockwood, written by his friend, Mr. Augustine Birrell. In that book Mr. Birrell records the fact that Sir Frank Lockwood frequently appeared for a publication which used to be conducted by Mr. Labouchere and which still survives, though with a rather different content—a periodical called Truth. Mr. Labouchere, in those days, took infinite trouble to collect all the necessary material to justify some frightful libel which he thought fit to publish in his paper; and Sir Frank Lockwood used to appear for him and, in due course, prove that what was said was true. Mr. Birrell referred to Mr. Labouchere, in that book as "that bold and judicious libeller, who deserved well of the Common Law Bar."
The only modification this Bill seeks to make on the subject of justification is in Clause 5. The reason for it is to be found on page 20 of the Porter Report. It is that truth is a perfectly good defence, if you prove it, to any action for defamation. But there may be cases in which you are unable to prove the truth of every single item of what you have said. In such circumstances, if, as a matter of fact, you have proved the truth of all that matters, and the only thing that remains is some little matter which is not justified, then under Clause 5 the defence of justification does not fail by reason only of the fact that the truth of every charge is not proved—provided that the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff's reputation, having regard to the truth of the remaining charges. If, for instance, you said of a man, whom otherwise you were justified as exposing as a rogue, that he had been sentenced to five years' imprisonment, whereas he had been sentenced to only three years' imprisonment, it would certainly seem unreasonable that he should get damages just because you made that small mistake.
Clause 6 deals with a matter which we must consider in more detail later—that of fair comment. It is a difficult subject both for lawyers and for laymen. It is fully discussed in the Report, on pages 21 and 22.
When we get to Clause 7 we are in a still more difficult territory, the law of defamation in connection with what is published in a newspaper. The principal Act on that subject, I think, on our

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Statute Book, is the Law of Libel (Amendment) Act of 1888. It contains elaborate provisions which, in some cases, protect honest reports contained in newspapers of proceedings which none the less may involve libellous matter. But I will not go into it now. Clauses 7, 8 and 9, I think, cover the topic, and I hope will be found to cover it admirably. Clause 10 is a rather special clause which I think was introduced in the House of Commons limiting the privilege of a statement published
"by or on behalf of a candidate in any election to a local government authority or to Parliament. …"
I do not think it is of great importance, and it will be enough for the moment to say that I believe it was largely inspired by a decision which goes by the name of Braddock v. Bevins, reported in 1948, 1 King's Bench Division, at page 580.
I do not think I need delay your Lordships now about the other clauses. I hope that I have said enough to show that this Bill does some very useful things, and that here is an opportunity of making these very useful changes. I very much hope that we shall not miss the opportunity. As I pointed out at the beginning of my speech, it is thirteen years since the then Lord Chancellor realised that it was necessary to examine the law of defamation and consider in what respects it should be changed and improved. And the present Bill, the Defamation Bill, which I have the honour now to present to the House on Second Reading, contains a great many of these reforms, largely in the way recommended by this most authoritative Committee in their Report presented to Parliament five years ago. My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a—(Viscount Simon.)
4.56 p.m.
EARL JOWITT: My Lords, in rising to say what I have to say about this Bill, I want to make it plain that I am speaking for myself alone. There is no Party issue involved in this Bill, and I have no authority to represent the views of anyone else. I am in the happy position of being able to say exactly what I think about this Bill; and that I propose to do. I should like to add one other matter—and
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it is this. This House is peculiarly well fitted to take a Bill like this in hand, modify it and transform it into a better measure—if indeed it needs that treatment. I very much hope that the mere fact that we are under some pressure of time will not prevent us from properly fulfilling our function and going very carefully through this Bill. If it should be that pressure of time does prevent us, and if, as a result, the Bill is lost by the end of the present Session, I think that the Government of the day ought to take it in hand and make themselves responsible for reintroducing it.
I say at once that I like this Bill better than nothing, but there are some respects in which I regard it as most disappointing. My dilemma is this: am I or am I not to try to get this Bill improved, as I think, or shall I say: "Oh well, if I try to get it improved, I may lose the Bill altogether. In that case I had better have it as it is." I feel that dilemma. But I also know this. If we pass a Bill now dealing with this topic the chances of another Bill dealing with the same topic being passed in the next twenty or thirty years, are negligible. It was in 1891 that the last substantial measure dealing with libel and slander was passed. It will be another fifty years before we get a chance of another substantial measure. On the whole, I have come to the conclusion that we ought to do the best we can to improve this Bill and make it into a better measure.
Before I go on to indicate the respects in which I consider the Bill defective, I should like to say how greatly we all appreciate the work of Lord Porter and his Committee. The Bill is largely founded on the work of that Committee. For my own part, if the Bill had more closely followed the Report of that Committee I should have liked it much better. There is one important point on which I differ from Lord Porter, or, rather, from Lord Porter and the majority of his Committee. But in the main I accept the conclusions of the Committee, and I am frankly sorry that some of the conclusions to which they came do not find their place in this Bill. Let me briefly give some illustrations. I do it now quite deliberately. I am aware of the fact that we are in a difficulty by reason of another debate which is to come on later. I suggested, indeed, that it might be convenient to postpone consideration of this

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Bill in order to allow the other debate to come on. For my own part I should be, and I shall now be, very ready for that to be done. I gather, however, that there are technical difficulties in the way. If they can be got out of the way, I am prepared to allow that to be done. As things are, I think I must make my speech because this is an important matter. I am sorry that the most reverend Primate should have to listen to it—I know how much work he has to do.
The Report of Lord Porter's Committee, at paragraph 160, dealt with the question of damages. They said that this was a class of case in which the Court of Appeal ought to have considerably wider discretion in dealing with damages than in the ordinary case. With that observation of the Committee I find myself in complete agreement, and I feel that it is a pity that there is no provision in this Bill to that effect. At a later stage I shall move an Amendment in order to have this matter discussed.
May I give your Lordships one striking illustration from my own experience? There was a case in which two brothers were travelling in a car and the car came into violent collision with a lorry, the accident being entirely the fault of the lorry driver. The insurance company who, of course, had to pay thought to themselves that they would get off with smaller damages if they made the brother who was the passenger—who suffered a fractured skull—bring his action against the brother who was driving, rather than against the lorry driver. So they organised a system whereby the lorry driver was to deny liability—though he had already been convicted of the criminal offence of dangerous driving—and the brother driving the car should admit liability. Both brothers brought actions—the brother who fractured his skull to recover damages for the injury he had sustained, and the brother driving, who fortunately had escaped with no injury, for libel, because the insurance company had said he was guilty of careless driving. The brother who fractured his skull got £900 and the brother who had been said to be guilty of negligent driving got £1,000. The Court of Appeal felt they could not alter this decision, but one Lord Justice said this:
"I can well imagine the passenger saying to his brother the driver, 'You have all the luck. I had my skull fractured and I only get £900,
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but because someone said you fractured it you get £1,000. And it was only said to my solicitors, who would not believe it for a moment'."
The learned Judge goes on:
"In the course of twelve years at nisi prius, I have been struck by the contrast between the frequent niggardliness of verdicts in cases of personal injury and the invariable profuseness in claims for defamation. A soiled reputation seems assured of more liberal assuagement than does a compound fracture."
Anyone with any experience in the courts will know that that is true. That being so, Lord Porter and his Committee made the unanimous recommendation that in this class of case the Court of Appeal should have a wider discretion than in ordinary cases; and, for myself, I regret that that recommendation does not find its place in this Bill.
The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, who introduced the Bill, dealt with unintentional defamation. I agree with what he said, but I am a little afraid that the clause in the Bill, as crafted, is too narrow to achieve its object One of the main recommendations of the Porter Committee, on which they were unanimous, was that the publisher of that which turned out to be a libel should not be rendered liable by the mere fact that somebody else was guilty of malice. Take the case of a man who writes a letter to, or an article for, a newspaper. He refers to what appears to be an imaginary person, but some real person brings his action. So far as the publisher is concerned, he took all reasonable precautions. He had not the slightest reason to suppose that a real person was being libelled. The writer, however, all the time had at the back of his mind the intention of defaming this man. As the law stands, the publisher of the newspaper is made liable by reason of the malice of the other person, the writer. The Porter Committee, if I understand them aright, said that that was wrong and that in future the publisher should not be liable for malice—except, of course, for his own malice or that of his own servants. But that recommendation finds no place in the Bill.
The Porter Committee left open the question of onus of proof. Is the publisher to prove that he took all reasonable care or is the person libelled to prove that the publisher did not take reasonable care? I do not very much mind, but I have had a great deal of

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experience in this subject, and I know how authors writing a book see this matter to-day. An author may take a common name like John Smith and hope, because of the mere fact that the name is common, that that will give him protection, in which case he runs the risk of a large number of John Smiths saying they thought it applies to them. Or he may take a very rare name, such as Marmaduke Pickenthall, in which case, if it turns out that there is such a person, he will say that, quite obviously, he is the person referred to. I remember one case which I had for George Moore, the writer. Afterwards he assured me that in his next book he was going to refer to his characters by numbers! There is a very real problem here.
The Bill provides that the publisher has to prove that not only he but every servant concerned with the publication of what turns out to be a libel has not been guilty of negligence. In the case of the printer, every single printer would have to be called to prove that he was not guilty of negligence before this defence would be available. Moreover, this defence does not apply to any libel where the words are "defamatory on the face of them." If a novelist writes a novel, he cannot make it consist entirely of compliments. He must have some villain in the novel, and that is defamatory on the face of it, though it is not defamatory of any particular person. I think that point wants looking at. We shall have to examine this clause with some care to see whether it is in workable form. The payment of money into court is a thing which has long been an anomaly in this law. In many cases there are three defendants—the writer, the publisher and the printer. They do not always agree on the line they are going to take. One pays money into the court, and the others do not. Why should not that money be paid out and the action abandoned, so far as it concerns the first defendant, but be continued in regard to the other two? That is a recommendation of the Porter Committee but, for some reason that I do not understand, it is not to be found in the Bill.
There is the very difficult question of evidence in mitigation of damages. This is dealt with in paragraph 156 of the Porter Committee's Report. It is the
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case that to-day we may find a man who is a real rascal recovering damages on the footing that he is a completely honest man. The Committee say, in paragraph 149:
"Subject to what is said below as to cross-examination to credit, the rule in Scott v. Sampson may operate in practice so as to enable a notorious rogue to recover damages for defamation upon the basis that he is a man of unblemished reputation."
But, of course, if he is called into the box and asked to give evidence, he can be cross-examined on credibility. The practice is—and I have followed it myself on more than one occasion—to call such a man into the box and ask him no questions. If counsel does not ask him any questions, the other side cannot ask him any questions on credibility. Counsel submits him for cross-examination, but all cross-examination is inadmissible because he has given no evidence. This is the sort of case which should be covered. It was considered by the Porter Committee. The useful clause in the Bill is Clause 11, dealing with agreements for indemnity. I myself have never had any doubt that these agreements were legal. But I do not like the phrase at the end of the clause,
"which the person indemnified knows to be defamatory."
My reason for disliking that phrase is that an indemnity may often be required in these circumstances. You may be writing a book, an article or a paragraph about some man or some event, and, if you are honest, you will frequently have to say all sorts of defamatory things. Defamatory they are, but they are also true. It is in just those cases, where you are writing defamatory things about some living person of your knowledge, that you would want to be indemnified if you could get an insurance company to agree. The fact is that you are saying what you are firmly convinced is the truth, and you are prepared to justify it.
I have in my criticism so far indicated some of the points, although not the most important ones. I now come to the question where I differ from the Porter Committee, and I think it right to indicate it briefly, in order that it may be considered, and so that I may put all your Lordships who can bear it in possession of the argument. I have long been of the opinion that the law of libel and the law of slander ought to be assimiliated. I ought

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perhaps to disclose this—I will not say, interest, but prejudice. When I was at Oxford I was fortunate enough to be trained in the law by Sir William Holds-worth, the writer of the great and famous book A History of English Law. I learned Holdsworth's view on this matter almost in my first few lectures at Oxford. He records it in Vol. XII of A History of English Law, on page 378, and I should like to read it to your Lordships. It is as follows:
"In the eighteenth century, political developments necessitated important changes in the criminal law; and the division of the tort of defamation into libel and slander—a division due historically to the need of finding some remedy for the mistakes made by the common law in the initial stages of the development of the tort—still disfigures the law. But the definition of the tort of libel was on the whole satisfactory; and it has formed a good starting point for the development of, and a sufficient framework for, the many detailed rules which the modern expansion of literature and journalism has necessitated. If the rules applicable to libel were applied to all kinds of defamation, and the fact that the defamation was oral was only allowed to weigh in considering the measure of damages, no serious complaint could be made against our modern law."
I have not attempted to lobby or get any opinion on this matter, save this. I have asked Sir Percy Winfield, who, as your Lordships know, is the author of a great book on the law of tort, for his opinion. He has authorised me to say that he thinks the tine has now come to abolish the distinction between libel and slander. I have also asked Professor Goodhart of Oxford, and he, too, thinks that the distinction should be abolished. He feels that there is little danger that the number of slander actions would increase. I have not gone further than that, but I am fairly satisfied from casual conversations that the overwhelming weight of academic lawyers to-day would be in favour of abolishing the distinction.
Still, the law has remained like this for several centuries, and if your Lordships want to realise what the law is, you will find it stated conveniently in paragraphs 33 and 34 of the Report of the Porter Committee. Broadly speaking, for a slander—that is to say, something spoken, which you hear with the ear—you cannot bring an action, save in specified cases, unless you have sustained pecuniary damage. In paragraph 34 it is well stated in this way:
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"It is, in practice, difficult to prove special damage in any action for defamation. A man's reputation as a private individual or in the way of his calling may have suffered grievous harm without its being possible to prove any direct pecuniary loss. His friends may shun him, his professional earnings or his business takings may decrease. But loss of such society does not amount to special damage within the eyes of the law."
The exceptions indicated by the Porter Committee were three originally. The first was:
"Words imputing a crime. …"
There is in the books a whole mass of legal decisions about this matter. It must be a crime which can be punished with imprisonment. Thus, to say that a man behaved himself in a disorderly manner in a hotel and had to be turned off the premises is not actionable, the punishment for that being a fine. To charge a churchwarden with stealing the parish bell-ropes is not actionable, as he had possession of them in his capacity as churchwarden. To charge a trustee of a school with having embezzled £25 of the school money is not actionable, as the plaintiff, being a trustee, could not embezzle money which his duty as trustee did not require him to receive. What a farago of nonsense all that is! Would it not be far better to get rid of it altogether? I should add that words imputing a. mere suspicion of a crime are not actionable; to say of a man that the police strongly suspect that he is guilty of a murder, and have him under observation, is not actionable.
The second exception mentioned by the Porter Committee is:
"Words imputing … contagious or infectious diseases."
Just think of that. To say that a man has leprosy, scarlet fever or, obviously, venereal disease, is actionable without proof of special damage. But to say that he has delirium tremens, that he is insane, or that he is suffering from softening of the brain, cancer or consumption, is not actionable. All these are the ideas of two hundred years ago and, to my mind, it is appalling that they should clutter up our text books, and that our students should be made to learn them.
The third exception mentioned is words spoken in relation to professional business. Thus, to say of a clergyman that he committed adultery is actionable per se, without proof of special damage, if he holds a benefice. If he does not, then

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you have to show special damage. But to say the same thing of a physician may be quite safe, unless he can show special damage. You can say it of a schoolmaster. Indeed, when this House in its judicial capacity came to consider this matter, it said that it would be an extension of the law to hold that an imputation of morality against a man in his personal capacity was actionable per se if he were engaged in any profession or occupation in which a good moral character was especially requirable. The majority of the Porter Committee seemed to agree, but Mr. O'Sullivan and Professor Wade dissented on this.
I remember the case of the headmaster of a famous public school who had retired from the school owing to illness. He came back after about a year, and found that there was a rumour going about that he had misconducted himself with some woman of the town, and all sorts of details were given. It was wholly untrue. It was most damaging to this man. He came to me and asked my advice about bringing an action. I told him: "You can do absolutely nothing. Even if you were still headmaster of the school you could do nothing. If you retired and these people said that the real reason for your retirement was that you were 'kicked out' by the council for your bad behaviour, you could do nothing." Is that right or is that just? I submit that the time has come when this thing ought to be altered.
Lawyers are often accused of preventing all reforms. This very matter was the subject of a Select Committee of this House in the year 1843–109 years ago. There was a Committee of eighteen members, and the lawyers were as follows: Lyndhurst, who was Lord Chancellor, Brougham, Denman, Abinger, Cottenham, Langdale and Campbell. Anybody who knows the history of those times will think it absolutely amazing that Lyndhurst, Brougham, Campbell and Cottenham can have agreed on any single proposition. But they did. They made a report, and this is what they said in it:
"At present, while for any words reduced into writing which in any way tend to injure reputation, though communicated to only one individual, the law gives a remedy—there is no remedy, without proof of special damage, for mere words, however injurious to
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reputation, and however publicly spoken, unless they impute an indictable offence, or apply to a man in his business, or import that he is labouring under an infectious disease: so that"—
this was the law then—
"falsely and maliciously to impute in the coarsest terms and on the most public occasion, want of chastity to a woman of high station and unspotted character, or want of veracity or courage to a gentleman of undoubted honesty and honour, cannot be made the foundation of any proceeding, civil or criminal; whereas an action may be maintained for saying that a cobbler is not skilful in mending shoes."
They reported that the distinction between libel and slander did not rest on any solid foundation,
"and that whenever an Injury is done to Character by Defamation there ought to be Redress by Action."
I believe everybody would be in favour of that, were it not for this trouble—and this is what is always trotted out. It is said: "If you allow people to bring actions for slander, you may get many frivolous actions; you may get a large number of actions about trivial complaints," and so on. That argument has been raised many times, and was used in particular in the case to which I now come—the Slander of Women Bill. In 1891, another lawyer—a very distinguished one, Lord Nacnaghten—introduced a Bill into this House. He described the existing law as a reproach to the administration of justice, and he said this [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 354, col. 1705]:
"Loss of reputation, loss of friends, loss of health, exclusion from society are not regarded, and a woman who is assailed by an attack on her chastity by spoken words, however gross the slander may be, cannot appeal to the law to vindicate her character unless she can prove that she has sustained some pecuniary damage, or some loss of that kind. As regards written words the law is different. In that case an action is maintainable without proof of special damage. Eminent judges have over and over again found fault with this state of the law, and in this House, sitting in its judicial capacity, it has been described as unsatisfactory, and it has been denounced as barbarous."
Lord Halsbury, who at that time occupied the Woolsack, said this [Col. 1706]:
"I must say when the Bill gets into Committee, I shall endeavour to place upon its passing and coming into operation such restrictions as to costs and otherwise as will diminish what appears to me to be the serious danger which would result from opening a new field of litigation upon this subject of words spoken."

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The Lord Chancellor of the day was answered. Lord Bramwell said this [Col. 1707]:
"I suppose, whenever you allow an action to be brought for anything, you open up a possibility of vexatious proceedings, and the only way for your Lordships to stop vexatious proceedings to a certainty is to stop all actions whatever, because as long as any are allowed there is a chance of vexatious actions being brought."
The noble Lord added this:
"I do not, for my own part, apprehend that there will be any unreasonable or undue quantity of vexatious actions in consequence of this proposal of my noble and learned friend."
He then quoted Chief Justice Holt, who said that whenever, words tended to take away a man's reputation he would encourage actions for them. Lord Selborne added [Col. 1709]:
"The law in regard to this particular class of case has always appeared to me to be a reproach to us."
So the Act was passed. Words spoken and published after the passing of the Act which impute unchastity or adultery to any woman or girl do not require special damage, and the Act contained this useful proviso, which I should be very well prepared to have applied here:
"Provided always, that in any action for words spoken and made actionable by this Act, a plaintiff shall not recover more costs than damages, unless the judge shall certify that there was a reasonable ground for bringing the action."
What has our experience been? Have Lord Halsbury's fears been proved to be right or not? I think everybody will agree that the fear of there being a large number of vexatious actions by these women has proved to be wholly wrong. There is more than that—and this, unfortunately, was not noticed in the Committee's Report. Other countries have adopted the same principle. In New South Wales and Queensland in Australia, the law of libel and of slander has now been assimilated and I am informed—I have made special inquiries—that all the lawyers out there are satisfied that slander actions are rare and no more numerous in Queensland and New South Wales than in any other of the Australian States. Here let me add that this has never been the law of Scotland. There is no distinction between libel and slander in Scotland. I suggest that in this matter at any rate we might now bring ourselves into line with Scotland.
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I do not know the position in Canada, but I believe I am right in saying that the doctrine does not apply to Quebec at all, but it does apply to the other Provinces. It was comparatively recently—I think about the 1920s—that nearly all the Canadian Provinces introduced the Slander of Women Act and, so far as I have been able to find out—I do not speak with any authority about this—there has been no increase in that form of action to any noticeable extent. In America, the position appears to be this—as my authority I quote from page 54 of the Third Edition of Gatley which is a book well known to lawyers. He says:
"The American decisions advance a less artificial ground—namely, the degradation of the plaintiff in the eyes of the hearers. If such a criterion were consistently applied, the necessity of proving special damage in cases of slander would be the exception and not the rule."
Everybody agrees that this is a logical step. I suppose everybody agrees that if we do not take the step now we shall not do it for fifty years All experience shows that this fear of there being a crop of comparatively trivial cases has not materialised, and I suggest that we can guard against it well by the provision as to costs and so on. I would remind your Lordships, that this is a form of action which is not allowed to be carried through under the legal aid procedure.
There is my dilemma. I think this Bill is an improvement on the existing law—and particularly having regard to Clause 2—but even there, to my mind, it does not go far enough. I feel strongly that it is not altogether satisfactory and that we might do something better. This is a compromise matter, worked out in another place. It is a Bill we have to take in hand and re-form, if necessary, and make it a more workable measure. I hope it will be possible in the course of the discussions on the Bill for some of the things which I have indicated, to be done. Meanwhile, I am in entire agreement with the Bill having a Second Reading at the present time.
5.32 p.m.
LORD PORTER: My Lords, I do not wish to detain the House, but there are one or two things which were said by the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, about which I should like to say a few words. First, with regard to the question of damages, the noble and learned Earl

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said it was a pity that the Bill did not contain some provision enabling the Court of Appeal to deal with damages more drastically than they do at present. Well, my Lords, in our Report we did, in fact, recommend that, but I do not think any of us desires it to be confined to this matter. There are great difficulties in saying that, as between a case of one kind—say, an accident case—and, on the other hand, a case of defamation, the Court of Appeal shall use a different measuring rod in deciding what the damages shall be; whether they will readily upset the jury in the one case and, in the other, not upset the jury except in extreme circumstances. We were not anxious to do that. We were desirous of giving the Court of Appeal generally a stronger line in cases when they feel that damages given are wrong and not tying them to the present idea that, unless it is monstrously wrong, they should not differ at all. With that view I still agree. I am speaking for myself, but I think the majority of my Committee would agree with me on that. But that is not a matter which can be put right by Act of Parliament. It is not a matter which can be put right in a Bill dealing with defamation. It is a wider problem, and I think it is a problem which might be tackled—indeed it is to some extent being tackled at the present moment by the Master of the Rolls' Committee. I am sure that it is much better dealt with there than in one particular Act. That is all I desire to say with regard to damages.
With regard to unintentional defamation, I have a great deal of sympathy with Lord Jowitt. It is true that the recommendations which the Committee made have been watered down to a very great extent, and I feel that that is a pity. One has to consider, on the one hand, whether it is desirable to get this Bill through this Session, or whether the danger of putting a great strain upon people who are at present being hit by unintentional defamation shall be allowed to continue—whether that provides sufficient justification for saying that the Bill must be drastically amended, or whether we should accept it as it is, even though it is imperfect. I think the part about which I feel most strongly is the suggestion in the Bill that any publisher or newspaper who publishes an article which
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is defamatory should have no protection if the person who wrote the article was malicious. I have known a case in which a novel was written by a woman who disliked a certain body with which she was associated. The publisher, in perfectly good faith, published the book. He could have no possible means of knowing that it referred to any particular body of people. Yet he had to pay damages. And, of course, as things are now, he would still have to pay damages—because the lady who wrote the book was malicious. The only question is whether, with that imperfection, with that mistake, as I think it to be, it is more desirable that the Bill should get through than that it should be postponed.
With regard to the question of mitigation of damages by cross-examination, that again, I feel, is not a matter which can be readily dealt with in a Bill dealing with defamation. It is much too wide a topic. If you are going to allow cross-examination—or, rather, evidence, for it is not cross-examination—as to credibility in the one case, you must allow it in all. Therefore, though I think it is a pity that the matter has not been considered generally, I do not think it is one which ought to appear in a Bill dealing with defamation. It should appear in a wider Bill. With regard to indemnity, I do not wish to detain the House, but there is one important part of the Bill to which I wish to refer, and that is the question of putting libel and slander on the same terms. It is true that two members of the Committee would have liked to do that. The noble Earl referred to Gatley on slander—
EARL JOWITT: I merely quoted Gatley as to the American law.
LORD PORTER: I understood that the noble and learned Earl quoted Gatley as to what Gatley thought, as well. That was my understanding, but I gladly withdraw it if it was not a correct one. Our general rule was that there might arise a large number of unnecessary claims, even slight questions of quarrels between neighbours over the fence, which I have known to happen. I can remember trying a case in which I should have awarded—the man having some right—anything from a farthing to five pounds. But there was a very sympathetic jury, and with all my endeavours I could not prevent the jury from giving him £100.

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It is that class of case which one is anxious should not occur in this country. It is all very well to say that Scotland (which I shall leave to other hands) does not do it. Scottish juries do not give large sums. Someone once said that the Scots are a cautious nation—cautious in what they say and in what they do. I do not think it is fair to say that because one system acts with one nation it will also act with another. After all, we have for many years put up with the distinction, and it has riot worked badly.
It is true that there are certain matters in which amendment has had to be made—the slander of women, for instance. We have suggested some amendments in our recommendations, and the Bill makes some amendments. The Bill deals with the question of the disparagement of a man in his profession, and takes care that the matters of which the noble and learned Earl has been complaining should be dealt with—and dealt with in this way: that if you say something that might disparage a man in his profession, but not merely in respect of his act in the course of his profession, if it is likely to injure him in his profession then he is protected. That has been put in. The noble Earl will be able, if necessary, to discuss the matter upon the Committee sage, but at the moment there is that protection.
The only other matter with which I think I need deal is that raised by the noble and learned Earl when he made great play with the opinions of various professors, in Oxford and Cambridge, and elsewhere. I have the greatest regard for their ability, knowledge, research and impartiality, but they have not to make the law work. That is the difficulty and the difference between us and them. We have to see that the thing goes, and they have not. I always remember that when a colleague of mine (not in this country) was elected to one of those bodies he said he had the greatest gratitude for his election, the greatest admiration for their efforts and knowledge; but he prayed them "to be kind to us who sit in another capacity" and to remember that, if it were not for the mercy of God, they might be Judges themselves. I beg to commend the Bill to your Lordships.
5.42 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLCR (LORD SIMONDS): My Lords, I intervene for only two or three minutes in this debate. I do so in the first place because it is the first opportunity that Her Majesty's Government have had to thank my noble and learned friend Lord Porter and those who worked with him for this Report. It was a labour of many years, and a labour that was made more laborious because it had to be interrupted for so many years by the war. It is, in fact, a valuable contribution to legal literature on this branch of the law, in addition to being of great assistance to those whose task it was to frame this, Bill. That is my first and pleasant duty, to thank the noble arid learned Lore. Secondly, I should thank the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, for the trouble which he has taken in sponsoring (if I may use that word) this Bill, and for the accustomed clarity with which he has expounded it.
The third thing I want to say is that, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, I welcome this Bill. There are undoubtedly points which remain in controversy and they can be dealt with, if necessary, on the Committee stage. I do not know whether the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, who has spoken so forcibly on the question of the assimilation of the law of libel and slander, proposes to seek to amend the Bill in that respect, but, if he does, there will no doubt be a controversy, because I can assure your Lordships that, cogent as are the arguments which he has addressed to your Lordships in favour of assimilation, the arguments against it are, in my humble opinion, very much more forcible, and indeed won the support of all but two of the powerful and learned Committee over which my noble and learned friend Lord Porter presided. Therefore, I would not have you think, as you may have thought, listening -to so powerful an argument, that there is nothing to be said against it. In fact, for my part, I belie that the case against such assimilation is overwhelming. But, having said that, I dc not propose to go into it any more tow. I have intervened only to tell your Lordships that this Bill has blessing of Her Majesty's Government, and I hope you will give it a Second Reading.
5.45 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I should not have ventured to address the House in the company of the most eminent lawyers who have already spoken but for one fact—that is, that I believe that in some small measure I am responsible for this Bill and for the Porter Committee. It was in 1938, I think, that Sir Alan Herbert introduced in another place a Private Member's Bill dealing with a number of defects in the law of defamation. While I personally thought that the law needed altering, and to a certain extent needed altering in the direction in which he was proposing to alter it, I thought that his Bill was so bad that it was incapable of satisfactory amendment. I therefore put down the usual Amendment, "That the Bill be read this day six months." I think I had the other place with me at that time. Incidentally, Sir Alan Herbert has since written a book in which he deals with this episode and says that I was put up by the Labour Party. I should like to state publicly here and now that I was not put up by anybody at all. I was speaking purely on my own behalf, as I am to-day. It looked as if the Bill was going to be defeated, but the Government of the day came to the rescue and offered us a compromise, the Porter Committee. This was accepted by both sides, and that is how the Porter Committee came into being. I am very glad that it did.
There was, of course, a danger that, in view of that kind of origin and the main purpose of Sir Alan Herbert's Bill undoubtedly being to make it more difficult for people to institute successful proceedings for libel, the bias of the Committee might well be in that direction, and that in any case they might concentrate much more on the difficulties of those who publish defamation rather than on those of the persons defamed. It has been, I recognise, difficult to hold a true balance. I think I shall not be unfair to the Committee if I say that, on the whole, most of the recommendations are recommendations which are for the benefit of people who defame rather than those who are defamed. That may well be necessary in view of the existing state of the law. But I think it is necessary for this House to see that we hold a balance between the two. After all, people who are defamed have rights. People are as entitled to
1112
enjoy their reputations and not to have them destroyed, as are people who make statements which are capable of being regarded as defamatory to receive consideration.
I personally feel that the Bill could be improved in two main respects and, at the proper time, I propose to put down Amendments for the consideration of the House. The first is to Clause 5 of the Bill. I think that that clause goes too far. In effect it says that you may make a number of separate charges, or, as it is called, utter a number of libels against a person, and if, by and large, most of them are true, then you will not be regarded as being guilty of libel because one or other of them is not true and does not materially injure the plaintiff's reputation, having regard to the truth of the remaining charges. I think that that is capable of a good deal of abuse and misunderstanding.
I noticed that in introducing the Bill the noble and learned Viscount gave as an example the case of a person who is alleged to have been sentenced to five years' imprisonment whereas in fact it was only three years' imprisonment. I would respectfully say that that kind of case is not covered by this clause at all. The kind of case that is covered by the clause is one where you make a number of statements which are damaging to a person's reputation and which are true. but in addition you make one or two other statements which are not true. I should have thought that a person whose reputation was damaged in that way should have the right to damages, in whatever amount the jury thought right, in respect of the charges which have not been proved to be true. If one is allowed to make some charges which need not be true, so long as the bulk of the charges are true, there is a great danger that people will be reckless or tend to become reckless about the kind of statements they make. I do not want to elaborate this case. It was discussed at great length in another place, and I may say that opinion in that other place was practically evenly divided in numbers and, in regard to authority, those who took my view predominated. However, I give the noble and learned Viscount notice that in due course I should like to continue that discussion in this House.

1113
I admit that the other question—namely, that of group defamation—is a most difficult one. That also was discussed at great length in another place, and of course it was the subject of consideration by the Porter Committee. I do not think that anybody who took part in the discussions, either in another place or on the Porter Committee, was prepared to justify group defamation. Everybody regarded it as an evil which ought to be dealt with if it were practicable, and from my reading of the discussions and of the Report, the whole objection of those who were against inserting a provision of this kind in the Bill was that it was not workable, that there were difficulties of definition in regard to race, creed and so on. Well, that may be so, and at the end of the day it may turn out that even with our large number of members of the highest legal authority, it is impossible to devise a form of words to achieve the object which we should all like to achieve. However, I think it would be desirable that we should try, and therefore, again on the Committee stage, I propose to put down some kind of Amendment, not necessarily one which will be completely watertight, with a view to testing the views of the House. Indeed, if I may be greatly daring and the noble and learned Viscount is willing, I should like to have the privilege of discussing with him a form of words which may be acceptable—
VISCOUNT SIMON: It will be a pleasure.
LORD SILKIN: —to see whether we can agree upon something worthy of being placed before this House. Subject to those two observations, I should like to pay my tribute to the Committee, to the initiator of the Bill in another place, and to the noble and learned Viscount who has made it so much clearer to all of us. Realising, as I do, the dilemma of my noble and learned friend the Leader of the Opposition, that there may be a conflict between making this Bill as good as we can and getting it at all, I hope that we shall be able to resolve the conflict and that, properly amended, the Bill will in due course be placed upon the Statute Book.
5.56 p.m.
LORD TUCKER: My Lords, I should not feel justified in intervening in this debate, especially at this late hour of the evening, were it not for the fact that I think I am one of only some six or seven members of your Lordships' House who have ever tried a libel or a slander action. I do not pretend to ha re anything like the experience in that type of litigation of the noble and learned Earl and the noble and learned Viscount in their days at the Bar, which were no doubt much more profitable than any incursion of that kind that ever fell to my lot. But I do feel that the view s of, I was going to say, the unfortunate judge who sometimes has to carry out the kitty or put it into practice, might sometimes be heard on these occasions. When I heard the noble and earned Earl quote academic lawyers on this subject, it made me feel determined to rise to my feet to have my say on the subject, because I fee that those who have to try these cases are, perhaps, in that respect at any rate, qualified to express an opinion, whereas the academic lawyers, much as we respect them and accept their advice, have not in fact had the onerous task of trying these cases. I sometimes wish they had, when I read some of their criticisms and observations.
In the course of my forty years experience of the law, I have always felt that the law of libel and its practice are a blot on our legal system. It is one of those types of action which I think have brought the question of the expense of the law very much into disrepute. Most of the expensive and often very unnecessary actions are lib actions which involve enormous costs. They have been made more expensive by the ingenuity of lawyers, who have designed all kinds of terrors by way of interlocutory proceedings for those who venture upon those dangerous seas, and I welcome this Bill as I think it goes some way to removing some of the blots on the law of libel.
I would agree that it is possibly capable of improvement in some respects, but I join issue with the noble and learned Earl when he suggests that the law of libel and of slander should be assimilated. I am going to be guilty of what he called "trotting out" the argument that it would tend to lead to unnecessary and frivolous actions. I firmly believe that it would.

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Already there are a number of actions which have their origin in the back garden or the public house, in which people bring actions in respect of words spoken, which they seek to bring within the present law by saying that they have suggested the commission of a criminal offence. I have had to try a number of those trifling actions—actions which assume a far greater importance in a court of law, before a jury, than they do when you read of them in cold print. I think that to throw open the courts to actions with regard to the spoken word, merely because it is defamatory but where no damage can be shown to have accrued, would be a dangerous and, in my view, an unnecessary move. It is fortunate that this class of action cannot be brought at the public expense under the system which now exists for assisting litigants. If that system were ever extended to libel and slander actions the position would be even worse than I apprehend it might be if the law were in these respects assimilated. I do not attempt to speak for anyone except myself. I do not know what are the views of other judges who have had experience in trying these matters, but, for myself, I should be strongly opposed to the suggestion that the law of libel and slander should be assimilated.
6.1 p.m.
VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, I think we have come to the end of this debate, and I will add only two or three words before the House is asked to give this Bill a Second Reading. It may be convenient to read the paragraph in the Porter Report—it is paragraph 38—which sums up the reasons which Lord Porter and the great majority of his colleagues thought would lead to the conclusion that there ought not to be assimilation between the law of libel and slander. This is what the Committee said:
"Arbitrary and illogical as the present law is, it does not seem to us that the true solution lies either in abolishing slander actionable per se entirely or in assimilating slander to libel and making all defamatory statements actionable without proof of special damage. Slander is often trivial, not infrequently good tempered and harmless, and in that form commonly enough a topic of conversation. If all slander were actionable per se, the scope for trivial but costly litigation might be enormously increased. So far as slander in ordinary conversation is concerned, it is not normally taken seriously by speaker or listener, and, in the great majority of cases, does little or no harm"
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I read that to put it on the record without arguing further. That is the view, as I gather, which my noble and learned friend Lord Tucker is also disposed to hold. I am sure we should all like to congratulate him on what, I think, is the first occasion of his intervening in the public debates of this House.
The only other quotation from the Report which I should venture to make has reference to one of the observations of Lord Silkin. If I did not use a happy illustration for the purpose of explaining the clause when I spoke of a man complaining that it was not true he had been sentenced to five years' imprisonment as he had been sentenced to only three years' imprisonment, let me read the paragraph in the Report which explains why the Committee take the view they do. And it is that view which is exactly translated in this Bill. Paragraph 81 reads:
"In this respect, we think that the existing case law has in the course of its evolution tended to encourage too close a dissection of each sentence, indeed of each phrase, in a defamatory statement and to overlook the real effect of the statement when read as a whole. Judged by first principles, a plaintiff should not he entitled to recover damages if the defendant proves that the main charge or gist of the libel is true, even though he fails to prove the truth of some minor charge, provided that such minor charge does not add appreciably to the injury to the plaintiff's reputation."
That, at least, is the view which the Porter Committee put before us. I avoid making any further speech. Your Lordships' House has other business with which it wishes to deal, and many have assembled for that purpose. After this debate, I beg to ask your Lordships now to give the Bill a Second Reading.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

THE DEAN OF CANTERBURY
6.5 p.m.
LORD AMMON LORD AMMON rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether there is any legal action that can be taken against Dr. Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury, for his alleged statements reflecting on the conduct of British troops liable to create ill-feeling between Her Majesty's subjects and those of other nations; and to bring the Established Church into contempt and disrepute. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I hesitated for a considerable

1117
time before I placed on the Order Paper the Question which stands in my name. My hesitation was clue to the fact that I did not want to give colour to any thought that I wished in any way to limit liberty and freedom of expression, either civil or religious. But there comes a time when one inquires whether there is not a point at which liberty can develop into licence, and whether it can then do great harm to the body politic That is why I have put down the Question which is now before the House.
The whole country has been stirred on this matter, as is evidenced by what has appeared in the Press, and a great deal of attention has been directed to the remarks made recently by the Dean of Canterbury. Those remarks have reflected very much on the conduct of troops of the United Nations Forces, and therefore our own troops must be more or less concerned. Dr. Hewlett Johnson has also stated that a certain amount of germ warfare is being carried on. Normally, it would not matter a row of two pins if it were only Dr. Hewlett Johnson who, in a private capacity, said these things: but the fact that he is the Dean of Car terbury makes a great deal of difference. It is very difficult for people—and especially people overseas—having regard to the particular connection of the Church of England and the State, to believe that such statements are without Government responsibility, and that there is no real foundation of fact for them. Not only is there that ignorance abroad, but my correspondence—and my post-bag has been very heavy lately—has told me that it also obtains to a very large extent in this country. Your Lordships know the character of the Bill which we have just been discussing, and I hope that nothing will be said in this debate which will bring any of us within the ambit of that measure. Were it a question only of individuals, then, as that Bill has indicated, there is a remedy. But when the whole libel is against the nation, when people who are near and dear to us may be connected therewith. it is another matter.
What I particularly wish to draw to the attention of the House is the position occupied by the gentleman whose conduct we are considering. His political professions are no concern of mine: they are a matter for his intelligence and his
1118
conscience. But I am bound to say that I marvel at the insensitiveness of one whose duty it is to preach the Christian faith that he should be able to extol a materialistic doctrine cm philosophy based on hate bitterness and all uncharitableness. It is that. I venture to suggest, that makes it worth while that we should give some consideration to this matter. It is now four years since I was in China. I traveled, it would seem, further than did the Dean of Canterbury. I had the privilege of addressing a good number of universities, and I met numbers of missionaries and others engaged in that very arduous and self-sacrificing work. Incidentally, several of my own relatives are in the mission field. I am wondering what is going to be the position of the Chinese Christians, in view of the statements made by a high dignitary of the Church, from what they might, to a certain extent, consider the centre of Christianity.
Here is a man who is in charge of one of our greatest historic and sacred shrines saying, in effect, that the Christian people with whom he is associating are guilty of conduct outside the range of even ordinary humanity, apart from anything else, and saying this to those who have always looked to us for religious instruction and guidance. What hope will there be of re-starting our work in the Far East in future? This sort of thing brings us into conflict with other nations and brings the Church into disrepute and bad odour. I sometimes wonder whether it is not a question of mental instability, for it is difficult to believe that one who has been abroad and slandered his own country and who then comes back to walk about quite freely and meet with the tolerance of public opinion, can have given a thought to what might happen if he had gone the other way. Would he have dared to go back to that country which he holds up to us as a pattern and example after behaving in such a way?
I do not know the Dean, and I am not concerned about him as an individual. But I am very much concerned that, at a time when the world, is sitting on a gunpowder barrel, when we are trying to do everything we can to bring the nations of the world into closer harmony, things should be said which are likely to cause suspicion and unreason. I have put down this Question in order to give an opportunity, not for us to wreak vengeance on anybody but for an

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authoritative statement to be made on the position which such a person as the Dean occupies in relation to the affairs of both Church and nation. I hope that it will also give the authorities concerned an opportunity to make clear, if they are able to do so, their abhorrence of such conduct being used in connection with warfare. All the questions I have raised need an answer, and there can be no place where such a Question will be treated with greater respect than in your Lordships' House. For these reasons, I beg to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.
6.14 p.m.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER
BURY: My Lords, I know a great deal more about the law of defamation than I did earlier this afternoon. As the discussion of that Bill went on, I became more and more frightened about what might happen to some of us, until I remembered that anything said here is privileged. The matter we are discussing now is to me, and to all of us, a most unwelcome matter; but in view of the publicity that it has received, I think it is as well that it should be debated in this House. Therefore, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ammon, who has asked this Question, and I appreciate very much the way in which he has put it. By asking it, he enables me to repeat what I have frequently said during the last few years. I have published statements making clear the precise position of the Dean of Canterbury and my own attitude to him. But such statements are very quickly forgotten, and I welcome this opportunity to make the position as I see it both better known and, if possible, better understood.
I welcome this debate for another reason. The Dean is a citizen as well as a churchman, and it is valuable that the Lords Temporal, as well as the Lords Spiritual, should discuss his position, and if, as a result, a common mind is reached as to the right attitude to adopt towards him, it would be a strength and comfort to me and to the Church. Your Lordships will understand that I am particularly affected in many ways by the Dean's activities, not least in this way. Many people on the Continent, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, unaccustomed to the liberty which we enjoy, in Church and State, are convinced that no Dean
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of Canterbury could possibly speak in public except as the mouthpiece of the Archbishop of Canterbury. Accordingly, in all innocence, they attribute to me all the opinions expressed by the Dean. Indeed, there are many people on the Continent who believe, oddly enough, that the Archbishop and the Dean are one and the same person. Herein lies the chief damage wrought by the Dean. Everyone here, and in the Dominions and in the United States, realises that the Dean speaks for nobody but himself, and that his words carry no weight, except such weight as he is able to give them. But on the Continent and in Eastern countries nothing can convince people that one who bears the name of Canterbury in his official title does not speak for the Archbishop, for the Church, and in some sense for the generality of Christian people in this land.
What is the complaint against the Dean? It is important that we should ask that question and be sure that we get the right answer to it. I think it is important for ourselves that we may be sure we are judging him rightly and justly, and not giving way to prejudice and passion. It is important also for other people, for there are some who, in revulsion from the Dean's utterances, become—dare I say?—as blind, as unreasonable and as stupid about the Dean as the Dean is himself. We should try to help them to escape from that kind of fanatical disease. And dare I say that I think it is important for the Dean himself that we should define the complaint against him as fairly as we can, so that even now, if possible, he may be brought to see where his gravest errors lie?
There is no charge against the Dean because he holds certain political and sociological views. As a citizen, he is fully entitled to hold these, however mistaken they may be. As a churchman, he is fully entitled to hold them, since (as I shall explain later) in the form in which he holds them, he does not deny any Christian doctrine. He is therefore within his rights; and he has broken no law, civil or ecclesiastical. But he holds a prominent and responsible ecclesiastical office. He bears in the title of his office the name of Canterbury, which holds a venerated place in our national and ecclesiastical history and which has a deep significance all over the world, both for

1121
the Anglican Communion and for all English-speaking people. The Dean's first and final duty, therefore, is to the ecclesiastical office which he holds; and he must do nothing to misuse or compromise that office. The complaint is that over a long period of time he has seriously misused and compromised his office, and that he did this in two ways—first, by a degree of unreason and self-delusion, obvious to everybody but himself, which robs his judgment of the respect which is required of a holder of his office. He is sincere, passionately sincere; but he really can no longer see himself, his views or political affairs objectively. He has lost all sense of the right proportion of things, and all the general controls of common sense.
I need not refer in detail to his utterances about germ warfare. I find that he has circulated a document to all of your Lordships, and you can read it and judge for yourselves. If he had said that, in his view, in the light of what he had heard in China, there was a case which called. for investigation, nobody would have complained—though it is relevant to add that Soviet Russia has vetoed every suggestion of an impartial inquiry. But what he has done is to ignore the moral obligation which binds all men, and especially a man in his position, tint in any matter, great or small, both sides must be heard before a judgment is made—and particularly so when on each side there is a great family of nations, and when the issue at stake is the future peace and welfare of the world. But the Dean has chosen to regard himself as a sufficient and competent judge in a matter of the utmost importance and of obvious difficulty arid complexity. I would say that by this obvious failure to seek a fair judgment after hearing both sides, by his clear incompetence, which I and your Lordships would share with him, to judge such an issue in such a matter, he brings resentment and ridicule upon himself and upon his office.
The Dean brings back with him, and has circulated to your Lordships, a document signed by 400 Chinese Christians, of all ranks and denominations. He proclaims that in China religion is free, and he believes it. My Lords, there are many people in England who know far more about the state of religious affairs
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in China than the Dean does. Many of us have had words and messages passed to us from Chinese Christians by strange and devious ways which count for more than anything that the Dean has heard. We have knowledge which he lacks, or ignores, as to what it means to be a Christian in China at the present time; what it means to be a deviationist from the appointed policy; what it means to decline to sign a document such as that which he has brought back with him; and what it means not to respond sufficiently to "ideological remouldings." One absent name amongst those 400 names may be far more significant to anybody who knows than the whole 400 who put their names to that document.
All that we know we cannot say, because to do so would only make things worse for so many of our Christian brethren. The Dean does not know what a pain and sorrow it is to many of us to hold silence, because that is what we are asked to do, for fear that if we spoke we should bring worse things upon our Christian brethren. It is lamentable that he should show himself so ignorant of the fact that there is another and more sombre side to the picture of the Church in China than that which he so happily observed. The existence of that other sombre side, well known to us, discounts the Dean's assertion of religious liberty; it robs his documents and his words of almost all of their significance—except this: that many of our Christian brethren in China do, in fact, believe what they have been indoctrinated to believe; and even if they do not believe it, they must still profess to do so.
I do not want to detain your Lordships too long, but only an hour ago there was put into my hand this document which has been circulated to your Lordships. Part II says at the beginning:
"The Archbishop of Canterbury has impressed upon me the duty of making contact with Christian leaders in countries I visit on my vacations, and of ministering to our people. I fulfilled both to the letter in China."
In his Press conference the Dean spoke of his journey as a mission to the churches, and in the very next sentence he said that he was fulfilling the wishes of the Archbishop of Canterbury, almost implying, although he did not actually state it, that I had sent him to China.

1123
My Lords, he never even told me that he was going to China. I feel it incumbent upon me to refer to his statement that I have impressed upon him the duty to make contact with Christian leaders, and so forth. I wrote to the Dean after the Press conference and asked him to what he referred. He referred me to correspondence we had over three years ago, in 1948, and I looked up the letter which he had in mind. In that letter I said that it had been reported to me that in his visits to the Continent he did not visit the leaders of Churches, and that he did not minister to the British community in those places. I then said:
"Perhaps as things are it is better that you should do neither."
I went on to say:
"There is a dilemma. You cannot go at one and the same time as both a minister of religion and as an ambassador of particular political views."
My letter ended—and this is most remarkable, in view of what he says in this document:
"There is only one way in which this dilemma can be solved. Either you must cease your political partisan activities, or you must resign the office of Dean so as to be free to pursue them without compromising your office."
That was three years ago, and that is the letter to which the Dean referred me. He says in this document that I had impressed upon him the duty of making these contacts. But I merely impressed upon him the duty of resigning if he went on doing what he was doing. I say that as, perhaps, contributing to your Lordships' judgment of how far the Dean's judgment can be relied upon.
Secondly, even if the Dean had shown better judgment in testing and trying his views, there remains the further charge that in the way in which he has conducted himself he has misused and compromised his office. He is free to hold what views he likes. But he has made it his chief concern to advocate them with all the fervour of a fanatic. He has become an active agent for their propagation. He has (although probably he does not realise it) allowed himself to be exploited by the managers of the political system which he supports for their own ends. So he has, if I may borrow a word used recently by the right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Chichester, allowed himself to "blur" the clear Christian witness of his office and of Canterbury.
1124
The Dean is no atheist. He is not an official member of the Communist Party, and has never signed "on the dotted line." He denies no Christian doctrine. He sincerely believes that Christian principles of peace-making and social justice are better applied in Communist countries than they are here. That is not in itself heresy. It is drawing a conclusion, from which I completely dissociate myself, from the same Christian doctrine that I hold. It may be wildly wrong, but we all have a right to be wrong—and it is most useful to a great number of us. But by thus throwing himself into what is a partisanship, and what must be regarded as a blind partisanship—as he once confessed to me, in a moment of candour, he is not very good at seeing both sides of a question—he is inevitably regarded by many people as sharing the atheism on which Communism is based, and as condoning the grave consequences of an atheistic conception of man and of truth. By that inevitable influence, he blurs the Christian witness against atheism and shocks those who know the sufferings and persecutions which Christians have had to bear at the hands of Communists. The Dean cannot complain if people fail to understand, or find it difficult to believe, that it is on what he regards as Christian principles that he persuades himself to accept, applaud and propagate a Communist system which is openly and declaredly atheist.
So we are confronted with this melancholy spectacle. What is to be done? Let it be said, firmly and frankly, first, that the Church has no power to proceed against him. He is not guilty of any heresy in any legal sense. If he is guilty of unreason and self delusion to a remarkable degree, these faults do not, short of the stage of certifiable lunacy, expose anyone to legal consequences—and it is fortunate for us all that they do not. There is one charge that could suggest itself, with which the Church has machinery to deal, and that is the charge of unbecoming conduct—for by his actions he has exposed himself to a charge of conduct unbecoming his office. There is a Measure in force called the Church Dignitaries (Retirement) Measure, 1948, under which there can be a trial for unbecoming conduct and, in the end, if there is a conviction, there may be a petition by which a dignitary

1125
can be removed from his office. But it is expressly provided that:
"No proceedings shall be instituted if and so far as the allegations relate to
(b) any question … of the social or political opinions or activities of a dignitary."
Now that is explicit and conclusive.
I would go a little further than this. In the parallel Measure relating to incumbents, which came first, the exclusion was of any charge
"in respect of … the social or political opinions"
of an incumbent—opinions alone, without any reference to activities. It was to meet objections from Members of Parliament that, in the Measures relating to dignitaries and bishops, we inserted this extra safeguard which included activities as well as opinions. Indeed, the first Measure ran a real risk of not getting through the House of Commons because it was supposed that the position was not sufficiently safeguarded. There you are. There will very shortly be a Measure before your Lordships amending the Incumbents Measure, to bring it into line with the Dignitaries Measure, and to secure that activities as well as opinions are excluded.
May I say that the Church was very willing to put in those words? They were designed to secure that every clergyman should enjoy the full rights of every other citizen to freedom of speech and action in social and political matters. Church and Parliament were in agreement on this point. For myself, I hope that they will remain so. It is not for the Church to try to change the law in order to extrude the Dean. We could not if we wanted to, because we cannot introduce a Measure directed against a single individual. That becomes private legislation, and the Church Assembly have no power of private legislation. Even if we could, we would not remove that clause and bring him possibly within the ambit of the Measure. There is no limit to the powers of Parliament: but, for the same reason which binds the Church. I personally hope that Parliament would riot be so ill-advised as to try to remove the Dean from his office or to restrict his freedom of utterance. This right of freedom of speech is a very precious thing. It is a vital part of our tradition—civil and ecclesiastical,
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both. Every freedom can be abused. If it is abused often enough and severely enough, steps have to be taken to prevent the possibility of abuse, and thereby every man's freedom is limited. It is a tragedy that abusers of freedom thereby jeopardise other men's freedoms. But it is wisdom to bear with folly and unreason and delusions, short of real danger to the body politic, as a price well worth paying to preserve this precious freedom of speech.
The Dean, I would say, is not yet a danger to the public safety. He may be a public nuisance. He is certainly a thorn in the flesh to all of us, and he causes indignation and real sorrow to many people. But the Church of England and this country have stood up to a great many other victims of unreason and self delusion and blind partisanship, and have come through it successfully. I think we can put up with the Dean. If the Press could only lose interest in him, everyone else would soon do likewise. Even if the price we have to pay for freedom is rising, as a letter in The Times said, it is still worth paying. May I say that on the Continent and in the Far East, where the Dean does his worst damage, he would be no less mischievous but, I would say, more mischievous, as the extruded Dean, than as the Dean in office? At least, we can say that he is a signal example of the fact that we have a conception of freedom utterly different from that of those countries which he adopts as his own.
May I say one word more? In the Question of the noble Lord there are only one or two words to which I take exception. The noble Lord ends by saying that the Dean brings the Established Church into contempt and disrepute. Well, it may seem so, and many feel acutely, as I do myself, the harm that he does. But, on a more considered view, I do not think that it is true that the existence of the Dean brings the Church into contempt or disrepute. For, as of this country, so of this Church, it is to be said that one of our greatest glories which serve to keep us in the way of living truth is this right of members, short of heresy, to speak the truth as each sees it. Like every other great possession of the spirit, it is open to error; and yet we gain by the possession more than we can ever lose by limiting our possession of it. So, I conclude.

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For the reasons I have given, the Dean is a public nuisance to the Church and to the State—to the State as a citizen, doubly so to the Church, both as a citizen and as a churchman. I believe firmly that he is to be endured with such patience as we can command unless and until either he breaks some law, ecclesiastical or civil, or becomes a real danger to the public safety, when it will be the duty of Her Majesty's Government to take action. I trust that the Church and State may agree in this conclusion, and that we may help each other by sharing this liability between us, believing it is still a small price to pay in order to keep supreme and unblurred our belief in freedom of speech as of vital concern to Church and land.
6.40 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Ammon, has put on the Paper a Question which, as it is on its face a legal question, it falls to me, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, to answer. But I am indeed glad that the most reverend Primate spoke before me, for this question raises a moral issue and a question of church discipline upon which he speaks with an authority which far transcends mine: and, so speaking, he has surely made clear to your Lordships and, I hope, to the whole world, how the conduct of this vain and foolish man is regarded by all men of good will.
I have said that it falls to me to answer the Question—and so I will, so far as I properly can. I use those guarded words, for the question is really how far the Dean of Canterbury has rendered himself amenable to the criminal law of this country. That is a question which it is not for me or for any member of Her Majesty's Government to answer but for the Attorney-General to decide; and he has said in another place explicitly, I think yesterday, that in his opinion the evidence available against the Dean of Canterbury:
"… does not disclose a prima facie case of treason."
He dealt with no other evidence; but he permits me to say that he still has under consideration whether in any other respect the Dean has rendered himself amenable to criminal law. I can obviously say no more upon that question: it would not be right for me to
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do so. But perhaps I may be permitted to add one sentence. It is this. It surely would not alter one jot our view of the wickedness and folly of the Dean's conduct, even if it is proved that the common law, which embodies the wisdom of our ancestors, or the statutory law, which from time to time Parliament in its wisdom has thought fit to enact, have alike failed to foresee and to provide for such wickedness and folly as this. That is all I can say upon this subject to-night.
6.44 p.m.
EARL JOWITT: My Lords, I had intended to make a speech; but I can relieve your minds: I do not intend any more to do so. I do not intend to do so because, after the noble words of the most reverend Primate, there is really nothing more to be said. If he will allow me to say so, I thought that his speech, so full of tolerance, so full of wisdom, has set us all an example of the line we ought to take. I feel with him that this sort of excess is the price we have to pay for our own liberty, and that, if we were to try to get rid of this "turbulent priest" as in years past they tried to get rid of a turbulent priest, we might have even greater trouble. For the rest, I can well understand that this man must be a thorn in the flesh to the Archbishop—indeed, I confess he has been a thorn in the flesh to me. But I hope that after this debate the Press, and every other organ of publicity, may leave this man severely and entirely alone.
6.45 p.m.
LORD TEVIOT: My Lords, I hope I shall not be one of the "stupid people" to whom the most reverend Primate referred at the beginning of his speech. I entirely agree with what has fallen from the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, in regard to the speech of the most reverend Primate. I feel that the Archbishop demonstrated in his speech that every effort has been made by him to deter the Dean from continuing to behave as he has done in the past—but to no avail. It does not appear that anything will stop this man from carrying on as he has been doing during the last two years. If he is dangerous in the Church—and I consider him to be—I do not think he would be more dangerous, in fact I feel it would

1129
be very unlikely that he would be more dangerous, out of the Church. It seems to me, from what has fallen front the Archbishop, that the Dean is quite unfitted to occupy the great position he does within our Church. We should be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ammon, for having raised this question. There is no doubt, I think, that all of us realise that there is great and genuine public concern and distress about the actions of the Dean.
I should like to ask the Government a question. How did the Dean finance these long trips of his throughout the world? They must have been very expensive, and I should like to know where he obtained the money from. None of us can get the money to go abroad for more than a very short time. Who is responsible for putting this money at his disposal? I understand that the Dean has a salary of £2,000 a year. That seems to me to involve a full-time job, yet he absents himself for very considerable periods in order to go about the world.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER
BURY: He is governed by the Statutes of Canterbury Cathedral, which require him to be present for so many days a year. So far as I know, he has fulfilled that quota. The rest of the time is at his own disposal.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Can he not he dispensed from that quota in the future?
LORD TEVIOT: I wish it to be understood that what I am going to say does not mean that I depart one iota from my desire to see that free speech and the liberty of the subject are not interfered with in any way. The Dean, acting as he has done, as the Dean, has in my opinion and I think in the view of the general public done a very great deal of harm. As a private individual he is of no importance: let him go about as other people do. There are some in our country who agree with him and speak: as he does. But I come now to what is a most serious thing, particularly in a high dignitary of the Church. He has borne false witness not only against his neighbour but against his country and his country's friends. Many people still take notice of what is laid down in the Commandments of the Bible, and that is what, in my view, with great respect to the Church, he has done. I feel
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strongly that we have tolerated the Dean too long. As has already been said, he has lowered the prestige and the status of our Church, not only in this country but throughout the world.
It is said, and the most reverend Primate has said, that there is no power existing to-day to deal with him, to remove him, to "unfrock" him, or whatever is the proper phrase. The word "impossible" should not be in our vocabulary at all. I would draw your Lordships' attention to this. It is said:
"if ye have faith and doubt not, it shall be done";
And again:
"All things are possible."
I cannot believe that the removal of this man from his office is an impossibility. The Communism which he supports is the curse of the world, causing misery to millions, as we well know. Undoubtedly, there are millions, and the majority of the millions in the world who are longing for those who are against Communism—and I believe that this applies even in Russia—to stand up and destroy this pernicious creed. That must happen unless civilisation based on the teachings of Christ is completely to be destroyed. The most reverend Primate has referred to atheism. We know that atheism is a brother to Communism.
I urge the Government to go into this question of powers for the removal of this Dean. Is it impossible so to increase the powers of the hierarchy of the Church, or to give them new powers, to enable them to remove not only the Dean but also others throughout the country whom I would not mind seeing unfrocked? There are certain places in the country where your Lordships and I go to stay, where we say: "What is the parson like here?" And sometimes the answer is: "Oh, a poor creature who has no influence whatever with the people." I think it should be within the powers of the hierarchy of the Church to get rid of people who are not fit for their calling. If this sort of thing goes on and the Dean continues his campaign, what will it lead to? It will lead to hate and brutality, and that, in the end, means war. He must know perfectly well of the appalling suffering and misery, of the rule of fear, murder and kidnapping—it was admitted yesterday in another place that kidnapping was going, on now in Berlin. It is all very well for noble

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Lords to laugh about this. It is no laughing matter at all. It is a most serious thing about which the public are deeply concerned, as I am, and I do not see that I am making a joke of this question at all. My remarks are perfectly genuine and it is with deep feeling that I make them.
The Dean must know, as we all know, that these people, whose activities he appears to support, are endangering the peace of the world. I say that it is time that a stop was put to his activities. We have all been circularised with a document. It must have cost a pretty penny, judging by its size and the expensive paper on which it is printed. The Dean makes an appeal to the Archbishop of York, to the Archbishop of Canterbury, to the British people, to all Christian leaders and so on. The Powers he supports, as has already been stated, refuse an impartial inquiry into the terrible indictment he has brought against not only the United States but, incidentally, ourselves. I hope that the Government will not take this matter lightly and that they will do something, so that, when this sort of thing happens or if it continues, the hierarchy of the Church may be able adequately to deal with it.
6.56 p.m.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I am sure that, when the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, was making his interesting speech, the most reverend Primate, the Lord Chancellor and my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition must have been echoing the cry:
"Save me from my friends,"
because the noble Lord made just the kind of speech which, if your Lordships were swayed by it, would undo the good of the judicial and, if I may say so, fair-minded arguments that we have heard from the previous three speakers.
During the Second World War, at a very critical period, the noble Duke, the Duke of Bedford, who, I believe, is to intervene later this evening, rose in his place in your Lordships' House and, if I may use the expression, made an extremely violent pacifist speech. Nobody agreed with him, so far as I know—least of all myself. But so enraged were certain noble peers that, strangely enough from the Liberal Benches, two noble
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Lords rose and tried to move "that the noble Duke be no longer heard." Much as I disagreed with every word that had fallen from him, I resisted that Motion. I am glad to say that I had some support, and it was not carried. For exactly the same reason this evening I oppose the noble Lord, Lord Ammon, his proposal, and the noble Lord, Lord Teviot. The arguments were put even better than I can put them by the most reverend Primate himself. I noticed that, after the most reverend Primate had abused his Dean to loud cheers from the Benches opposite, when he proceeded to stand up for the right of expression and freedom of conscience and speech, the Benches opposite were strangely silent.
LORD TEVIOT: No.
LORD STRABOLGI: Yes, they were silent, and my noble friends on these Benches can bear me out.
LORD TEVIOT: I must interrupt the noble Lord. I was sitting here and, though I am a little deaf, I was almost deafened by the "Hear, hears!" on this side.
LORD STRABOLGI: I shall go to my doctor to-morrow in that case, because I certainly did not hear them. However, I want to draw your Lordships' attention to another episode in this venerable House. I remember vividly with great pride the late Marquess of Crewe, whom I like to think of as the last of the grand seigneurs, rising from the Liberal Benches and protesting with great force and great eloquence against the continued suppression of the Daily Worker by the Coalition Government—with, incidentally, a Labour Home Secretary. On the ground that the Press should be free and not unduly interfered with, the noble Marquess, speaking with the authentic voice of historic Liberalism, made his protest—in vain for the time being. But eventually it was listened to.
I have one or two things to say on this subject, which I do not propose to modify in any way. I do not accept the charges about germ warfare in Korea or North China, or wherever it was. I accept the disclaimers by the Foreign Office and the American Government. Nevertheless, I should like to see an impartial inquiry on this matter. I agree with the most reverend Primate and with the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, on that,

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because this story has now gone round the world; and though I accept what my Foreign Office say, and even what the American Government say in this matter, there are a great many people who will not do so. They include people who are well-disposed towards us and to our cause, not Communists at all but they will be thinking that there may be something in this story. Therefore, I should like to see an impartial inquiry. But again, if I may quote the most reverend Primate—this is one of the things I cheered almost alone—both sides must be heard at that impartial inquiry. There should be a representative or spokesman from both the accusers and the accused. I must say that I am surprised that the Russians should have vetoed the International Red Cross; in their place I should certainly have accepted that organisation. But I think some means ought to be found to get sonic other body which carries respect, which certainly should be impartial and which would, as the most reverend Primate says, hear both sides. But, having said that, I accept the Foreign Office denial of this charge.
I rise in your Lordships' House and, with the greatest emphasis I can command, I say that it is an unworthy action of my noble friend to attack the right of the very reverend Dean of Canterbury to express his opinion. His opinion happens to differ from mine, but he has every right to express it. My noble friend Lord Ammon has fought, all his life for certain principles, one of the most important of which was liberty of conscience, liberty of expression and freedom of speech. I, too, have fought for those principles for a good deal of my life, and I consider that his action to-night is a betrayal of what he has set out to achieve during his life that is why I wish to protest.
EARL WINTERTON: If the noble Lord will allow me to intervene to ask one question I may be able to shorten my remarks later on. Does the statement which he has just made, that neither your Lordships' House nor anyone else should do any thing to affect freedom of speech, apply to a criminal offence? Assuming that the Government find that this man has been guilty of such an offence, would the noble Lord attack his noble friend behind him in the same terms?
LORD STRABOLGI: Of course not. I should have thought that question was entirely irrelevant and unnecessary. Anyone guilty of a criminal act can be proceeded against. That has nothing to do with freedom of conscience and of speech, which the most reverend Primate defended and which, in one sentence, the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, also defended. The opinions expressed by the very reverend Dean of Canterbury are opinions to which he is entitled, and to suppress them would be a crime against liberty. For that reason, I, and I believe many of your Lordships, would be prepared, if it came to the point, to resist such suppression.
Perhaps I may put this point to the most reverend Primate, who I can see is going to be in some difficulty in the months ahead. Some of his brethren in God have from time to time expressed extreme Conservative opinion. At some stage we in this country might have a Left Wing Government and certain members of the Bench of Bishops might protest in public, in this House and in their pulpits against what they thought were measures or legislation injurious to the public. They would be perfectly entitled to do so, and if any attempts were made to suppress or silence them I should in the same way resist that attempt; and I believe many of your Lordships would do the same. I will quote an actual case which I believe the noble Earl who was good enough to intervene just now, to my great pleasure, will remember. The late Bishop of Durham, Dr. Hensley Henson, a very eminent Churchman, was a very high Tory in politics, and he vented his resentment bitterly against the miners of the North of England during a particularly critical and difficult period of industrial strife, and the resentment felt against the then Bishop of Durham on the part of the miners, their families and friends, was equally bitter. There were demands that he should be dealt with, or should be proceeded against, for the harm he was doing to the country in increasing industrial strife. Of course, no action was taken, and, indeed. I should have resisted such action.
LORD LAWSON: They were going to pitch him and one of his pals into the river.
LORD STRABOLGI: I have heard a miners' leader, a highly respected man and a follower of the Church, declare—and he meant it—that it was a good day for the devil when Hensley Henson was elevated to the See of Durham. No doubt in your Lordships' House and in another place, there is similar feeling in some quarters against the very reverend Dean of Canterbury—
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER BURY: May I intervene, not to correct in any great detail what has been said, but to say I am not sure that the noble Lord is not confusing the Bishop of Durham and the then Dean of Durham. It was the Dean of Durham who was nearly put into the river. But I really wanted to intervene to say that when Bishop Hensley Henson resigned the bishopric, there was no man in the world to whom the miners of Durham were so devoted.
LORD STRABOLGI: Then the miners showed a Christian charitableness for which we must all admire them. I sympathise with the most reverend Primate, but I do not think that on this occasion I did confuse the Dean and his Bishop. In a case of that kind, if there were any movement against a right reverend Prelate for political activities against a Left Wing Government, or in time of great industrial tension, it would be the duty of your Lordships to stand in defence of the same principle as I am standing now, and I believe your Lordships would do it in the event.
Now I am going to call to my aid against my noble friend—and it is far more dangerous when a noble Lord on these Benches takes his line than when a noble Lord opposite does so—what a great figure in the Labour Party (I refer to my right honourable friend Mr. Chuter Ede) has written in the Hansard Society's publication on Parliament and the Liberty of the Subject. If your Lordships will bear with me for a moment or two, I will venture to quote these words written by a man who, as Home Secretary, made very few enemies:
"The community must be prepared to face the fact that if we claim freedom for the propagation of ideas with which we agree, we must grant others freedom to advocate ideas which we detest; and it must accept this proposition not merely as a matter of logic
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and fair play but as a fundamental principle. The suppression of an opinion whether by Government or by public pressure is, in the words of John Stuart Mill"—
I have been quoting Mr. Chuter Ede, who now goes on to refer to the writings of John Stuart Mill, whose writings in certain countries, and in certain circumstances, the most reverend Primate will know have been described as subversive, just as I have heard the Sermon on the Mount also described as subversive—
"'robbing the human race, posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion still more those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception, and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with error'."
Now, if I may, I quote again from Mr. Chuter Ede. He states:
"if civil liberty is to exist in more than name it must be founded on toleration; not the toleration which is a euphemism for indifference, but an active toleration which not merely permits but encourages the expression of diverse opinions, believing that only so can an understanding of the truth be attained and preserved."
I prefer the views of my right honourable friend to those of my noble friend Lord Ammon. Since 1914 the lamps have been going out all over Europe. They are flickering now in France, and the lamps are not burning any too brightly in the United States. I refer to the lamps of liberty and freedom. Do not let us put any more out here.
7.11 p.m.
EARL WINTERTON: My Lords, I would make only this comment on the speech which has just been delivered by the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi. Throughout his speech, which, if I may say so, seemed to me at times to be slightly irrelevant to the subject, he tended to confuse the issue and so also, to some extent, if I may say so with great respect, did His Grace the Archbishop, to whose speech all of your Lordships listened with the greatest interest—it was on the highest level of statesmanship. What is at issue here is not the question of liberty of speech. What is at issue is whether or not this man has so behaved that he is unfit to be a member of any Christian church; whether, as a subject of Her Majesty, he has committed

1137
an offence which is punishable by law. Those are the two matters which are at issue in this debate, and I rather regretted that the noble Lord opposite, to whom, despite political differences, I have been bound for many years by ties of friendship, should have made the charge against noble Lords on this side of the House that we are not interested in liberty of speech. We are just as much interested as is the noble Lord.
I should like in the speech which I wish to make to your Lordships—and it will be brief, for I know that all your Lordships are waiting to hear my noble friend the Leader of the House speak on this most difficult matter—to present very shortly a slightly different point of view from any that has yet been put forward in the debate. The Dean of Canterbury is an avowed, acknowledged, and orthodox Communist. He is not, as the most reverend Primate has pointed out, actually a member of the Communist Party; but one would need to be very jejeune or very naive—and I am sure the Archbishop is neither—if one supposed that the fact that he has not signed on the dotted line makes him any less a Communist.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER BURY: If I may, I should like just to explain. To the best of my belief, in Russia you cannot be a member of the Communist Party unless you are avowedly an atheist. The point. I tried to make is that communism now does mean atheistic communism. The Dean is not an atheist and therefore is not a subscriber to atheistic communism.
EARL WINTERTON: I am very much obliged to the most reverend Primate. I appreciate his point. The point I was making was that it was obviously not to the advantage of the Communist Internationale that this man should be acknowledged as one of its members; but that he is one of the most active Communists in the world outside the Iron Curtain must be clear to anyone. He believes with fanatical ferocity in Communism, and he equates this religion of Beelzebub with the Christian religion. He has persuaded himself that Christianity and Communism are one and the same thing. It may be—as is sometimes suggested—that he is mentally deranged. I have been told by a churchman whom I greatly esteem that that is
1138
so. But it is quite certain that he is sincere in his convictions. Now what are the tenets of this horrible code which the Dean supports? You must lie, you must slander, you must bear false witness, you must tolerate cruelties as horrible as those of the Nazis when you are told to do so by the hierarchy of the Party. As to his going to Communist China—where, as the Archbishop in his most eloquent speech has said, Christian people are being subjected to horrible tortures—the moral offence of this man was in going there and being on terms of friendship with those torturers, quite apart from anything which he has said since he got back. The moral offence is that he has gone to be a colleague of torturers and apparently to approve of that torture. That shows that his moral turpitude in that respect is as great as in other things which he has done.
Now, of course, he is very valuable to the Communists. I deprecate the idea which has been apparent in some of your Lordships' speeches this afternoon which might be expressed as, "Poor old man, no one takes any notice of him; he is old and decrepit and he does not matter." My Lords, he matters a great deal to the Communists. They have no more valuable adherent in this country than the Dean of Canterbury, for the very reasons which have been mentioned by the Archbishop in his speech. I am going to say a few words about Joyce afterwards—the Mr. Joyce who was executed for treason. Doctor Hewlett Johnson is more valuable in many ways to the Communists than Joyce ever was to the Nazis. The Nazis did not take Joyce very seriously in the latter stages of his career. But the Communists take the Dean of Canterbury very seriously because, as the Archbishop has pointed out, he is connected in many peoples' minds with the Church of England and with Canterbury Cathedral, and is even confused with the Archbishop himself.
The point seems to me a very simple one. The code in which he believes, the code of Communism, tells him that he must utter foul slanders against the United Nations and the troops, living and dead; that he must lacerate the feelings of millions of people—because that is what he has done—the relations and friends of those who are fighting or who have died in Korea, and, incidentally, that he must do the greatest mischief he can

1139
to Anglo-American amity. It is not for him to inquire into the truth of the matter that would be contrary to the code. I doubt whether he knows that he is doing wrong by spreading this lie, because he has been morally anæsthetised by the companionship which he has kept for so many years. We are told that nothing can be done about it officially by the Church. I, of course, accept what the most reverend Primate has said in this connection. It would be very wrong, especially for a new recruit to your Lordships' House such as myself, to attempt to controvert anything which the Archbishop has said. I accept it. I notice, however, that the Archbishop did say that Doctor Hewlett Johnson had misused and compromised his office. I should have thought that in any other organisation except the Church of England a man who misused and compromised his office would be brought under some sort of disciplinary action. "Misused and compromised" is a very strong phrase for the Archbishop to use, but I accept it. But it seems that owing to the peculiar constitution of the Church of England—which, as a loyal Churchman, I do not quarrel with—nothing can be done about it.
I would venture to demur from one statement made by the Archbishop, that the Dean had never denied any Christian doctrine. I seem to remember that there is a Christian doctrine which says:
"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour."
This man has borne palpable false witness against his neighbour.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER BURY: My Lords, I take that to mean: "Thou shalt not wittingly bear false witness against thy neighbour." The noble Lord has not proved that the Dean has "wittingly" published false witness, although in fact he has published false witness. That is really the issue. Does one deal with a man by his acts or by his intentions in a matter?
EARL WINTERTON: I do not wish to make a frivolous joke which will be resented by your Lordships' House, but the next time I go to church I shall remember to say "wittingly." I am very much obliged to the most reverend Primate and accept the point which he
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has made. To be serious I did not imagine that that was the meaning of the Commandment. We have been told by the Government—and the Chancellor put his case very clearly, as one would expect from him—that for the moment nothing can be done, but I am very glad that the matter is under consideration by the Government.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Earl will forgive me for interrupting, but it is not a matter for the Government: it is a matter for the Attorney-General. I should like the House to be clear about that, because it is a very important constitutional point.
EARL WINTERTON: My Lords, I apologise to the noble and learned Lord. I should have said that it was under the cognisance of the Attorney-General. I do not want to be sarcastic, but I cannot help remarking that this puissant nation to whom millions of tortured beings behind the Iron Curtain look for aid, this great land so fertile of new ideas and inventions, like the Comet, has no means or machinery for dealing with this enemy of Western civilisation, whom all Parties are prepared to support in this House even when he has grossly slandered Allied troops.
LORD STRABOLGI: Will the noble Earl permit me to interrupt in my turn? Is he suggesting that we should bring in retrospective legislation? How otherwise can we deal with this?
EARL WINTERTON: I said I accepted the situation, that we have no means of dealing with the Dean. The noble Lord could not have heard what I said. I must give him the same advice as the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, recently gave me in another debate—he must adjust his hearing aid. No doubt the noble Viscount who is going to reply to the debate will consider this point. I understand that the difference between the case of the Dean of Canterbury and that of Mr. Joyce is this—I am using a non legal phrase, but one which I think will make clear my point to your Lordships. The difference is that Joyce, in the slanders which he broadcast, gave succour and comfort to an enemy with whom we were at war, while in this case I understand we are, from a technical point of view, not at war with Northern Korea, because it is a United Nations war, and

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we are not at war with Communist China; therefore it is open to the Dean, or any other person of malevolent intention like the Dean, to say things in these various undeclared wars we are fighting in different parts of the world, such as Malaya, which are highly detrimental to the course of the campaign, and we cannot proceed against him, as we did against others in the last war.
So far as I know, no one in your Lordships' House, certainly no one in another place, raised any objection when Joyce was brought to trial or when another person, whom I do not want to name because of long-standing affection and friendship with his relations, was brought to trial. No one then said, "Do not make a martyr of this man." No one then said, "He is not worth the trouble." No one then said, "Do not give him an advertisement." No one then said, "This is merely a Press stunt." Joyce was brought to trial and hanged by his neck until he died, because he had committed treason. Morally but, of course, not legally, the case of the Dean of Canterbury is no better than that of Mr. Joyce—no better at all. He has made charges against the Allied troops as slanderous as anything that Joyce said about Allied troops during the war.
I know we are an illogical nation, and may I say that your Lordships share occasionally in that illogicality, but illogicality can go too far. I have consulted more than one constitutional authority as to whether the law as it stands at present is sufficiently strong to deal with actions that would be legally treasonable if we were fighting a declared war instead of an undeclared one. It may be that there is nothing in this. It may be necessary to continue to put up with the Dean. While accepting fully what the most reverend Primate and the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor have said, I do not think your Lordships will be able to go away this afternoon and say that the whole thing is disposed of, and that it does not really matter. Your Lordships have shown yourselves in accord with the leading articles in The Times and other papers in thinking that this had better be forgotten, but I do not think that it is going to be forgotten. Throughout Western civilisation there is going to be continual protest against what
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the most reverend Primate called the misuse and compromise by this man of a great and distinguished office. I think that unless some solution can be found in future, both the Church and the Government will be subjected to considerable criticism from many quarters, including those across the Atlantic.
7.29 p.m.
THE DUKE OF BEDFORD: My Lords, I am afraid that history is about to repeat itself: the Duke of Bedford is going to say things which will cause many in this audience to desire that he "be no longer heard." I cannot help feeling that the noble Lord, Lord Ammon, may be under some kind of misapprehension on perhaps a minor point. I read through the Dean's speeches, but I could not find in them any reflection on British troops, although he certainly gave it to be understood that he considered the Americans had been employing bacteriological warfare. It was suggested by the most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury that the Dean should not reach conclusions without first hearing both sides. That is very wise and excellent advice, always assuming that he is allowed full facilities for hearing both sides. But do not the majority of your Lordships and other ordinary people constantly come to pretty strong conclusions, especially over Communist countries, when you have heard only one side?
The Dean was not speaking primarily because of his own convictions and the results of his personal investigations. He was conveying to the Churches of this country a message of protest given to him by a very large body of Christian Churches and organisations of China. Anybody who knows anything about Churches in far-off lands is aware that there is no more honourable and respected body than the Christian Churches of China. It was suggested that these Churches are being persecuted. Locally, I do not doubt, that is true. But what one has to remember, and what people continually forget, is that in a country as large as China anything can be locally true. I am convinced, from information given me by reliable people, that to-day in China there is both persecution and freedom, side by side, no doubt depending largely on the character of the local Communist officials.

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No person who is not mentally perverse can read the list of the signatories to that protest, and see the positions which they occupy, without realising that here the Dean has something of considerable weight. The signatories include members of the Roman Catholic, Baptist, Methodist and Congregational Churches of the Salvation Army, the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A. and many other religious organisations. Several hundred people have signed, including Bishops, the General Secretary of the Y.W.C.A., the Chairman of the National Christian Council of China, the Chairman of the China Baptist Council, the Secretary of the National Committee of the Y.M.C.A., the General Secretary of the Central Office of the Anglican Church, the Chairman of the Pekin Church Federation and the Pastor of the American Board Mission: also a Professor of the National Nankai University, together with some prominent medical men and members of hospital staffs.
Moreover, this protest was not given to the Dean under the instructions of the Chinese Communist Government. It was quite a spontaneous affair, got up during the course of his visit within the space of a few days: and when he had a personal interview with Mao Tse-tung the latter was unaware that this protest had been made, and was rather interested. Moreover, these representatives of the Christian Churches did not rely on official information, but sent their own representatives. They state that the Reverend Wang Tzu-chung of the Peking Congregational Church went to Korea and North-East China as a representative of the Chinese religious bodies, and saw the various germ-laden insects dropped by the U.S. armed forces, as well as the shells of the containers carrying the insects. Many Christian Chinese doctors have seen the germ-disseminating insects and other carriers spread by the American forces. The Dean records that at a conference the Reverend Sun Peng-shi, a minister of the Church of Christ in China, told him that he had found in his own garden, on the snow, after an American raid, strange insects unknown in the locality, at a season when it is unusual for insects to appear. I need hardly tell your Lordships that any naturalist is aware that you do not find normal insects walking about on the snow
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in the middle of the winter. Moreover, one of the investigators was Madame Tsi Teh-chuen, the widow of the well-known Chinese Christian General Feng.
I have also read the reports, or alleged reports, of the admissions of captured American airmen. Normally, one would regard such statements with the most profound suspicion. We all know how easily they can be faked, or obtained by torture and similar means. But, making every allowance—and it has to be a very generous allowance for this—parts of those statements are quite impressive. It would have been perfectly easy for the Communist authorities to get intimidated airmen to say that they had dropped bombs carrying germ-laden insects and other things on different places. But it would not have been so easy for them to invent and forge the immense amount of technical detail, given in an extraordinarily natural way, which those airmen are claimed to have given when they described "hush-hush" lectures which they attended on germ warfare. If they are fakes, they are uncommonly clever ones. Moreover, there are certain interesting features about them. They contain irrelevant details, which are usually the hallmark of genuineness. Those who drew up these reports also point out that some of the statements made must be mistakes, due to the lack of scientific knowledge on the part of the airmen. Certain insects which, they claim, carried certain germs could not, in fact, have carried such germs, though perhaps other insects could have done so.
The end of these documents is also rather interesting. It contains an alleged expression of regret by the airmen for having acted as the tools of capitalist Wall Street in injuring citizens of the People's Government of China. Here the style is entirely different, and we drop into familiar Communist propaganda. It looks very much to me as if the Communist authorities, having got some really weighty evidence, could not resist the temptation to "paint the lily" by adding some of the usual Communist stuff. Certainly, anybody clever enough to fake the impressive first part would also have been clever enough not to spoil his work by this very crude ending.
A very natural question which has rather been hinted at this afternoon is: Why did the Communist Government

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refuse an impartial inspection? With regard to the Swiss Red Cross, as soon as the Communist refusal to allow inspection was known, a very anti-Communist friend of mine said: "There you are. What have you to say to that?" I replied: "On the face of it, it looks bad for the Communists, as though they fear a fair inquiry; but I want to hear both sides." Having heard both sides, I think that here, at any rate, the Communist Government have some reason. They point out, to begin with, that the Swiss Red Cross, though it operates internationally, is not an international body. They also point out that during the last war the Red Cross reported on Nazi concentration camps and said that it could not find much wrong with them. Personally, I think it is possible that in this matter the organisation may not have been inaccurate in regard to those camps which it visited at the time when it visited them—which, of course, is not to say that it would have been accurate in respect of all camps at all times. But if your Lordships, in your zeal for German rearmament have not already forgotten what you used to say and think about Nazi concentration camps, you may, I think, have some sympathy with the Communist Government in feeling that an organisation which could report so favourably upon them was not likely to make a very competent research elsewhere.
They also object to the Swiss Red Cross because it reported favourably on the screening operations on Koje Island at a period when, as has now become obvious, owing to conditions there no efficient screening could possibly have taken place. They also object to the fact that the officials of the Swiss Red Cross, working in Korea, wear the United States uniform and submit to United States military law, conditions which the Quakers have been unable to accept. When Monica Felton made her complaint of the treatment of civilians by American troops, the Swiss Red Cross said that it was not within their competence to examine the ill-treatment of civilians. When Mr. Dean Acheson later told them to investigate they were, however, willing to do so. Whether the Communist authorities are willing to accept other really neutral investigation appears to be somewhat in dispute. It has been claimed that they have asserted their willingness, and have
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even invited certain British scientists to make an inspection, although possibly because they have been connected with the Government they have not felt at liberty to do so. On the other hand it has also been stated that they have refused offers of impartial inquiry by investigators other than the Swiss Red Cross. Their reasons for refusal, however, I do not know. I do agree with the noble Lord that it is most important that, whether the American Government altogether agree or not, we should press and do everything possible to promote a really impartial inquiry. Some of your Lordships may have read in The Times a few days ago what I thought was an extremely fair and reasonable letter on this question by Professor Levy. He suggested that perhaps India might be entrusted with an impartial investigation.
In regard to this whole matter, I would remind your Lordships—as I did not very long ago—of the very great need for avoiding unconscious hypocrisy and an "ostrich" policy. Already we and the Americans have given our blessing to the use of atomic and napalm bombs, instruments of war every hit as devilish as, and in my opinion more devilish than, germ warfare. Moreover, we and they have departments investigating germ warfare, and presumably they do not work for fun.
LORD STRABOLGI: Would the noble Duke forgive me? I do not want to spoil his case, but if he will allow me to say so, all nations must keep up an anti-germ warfare department just as they keep up an anti-gas department. That does not mean to say that they are going to use it. They must know what can be clone in order that defences may be prepared.
THE DUKE OF BEDFORD: I appreciate the noble Lord's point. But I have certainly gained the impression that more than purely defensive measures are being investigated. However, this is all very "hush-hush" and we may have to keep an open mind on that question. I should also add that those who on the plea of military necessity, use these very diabolical instruments of war, may also—I do not say they will—under the stress of military necessity make inaccurate statements about them. I would remind your Lordships that when the crime of dropping an atom bomb on a Japanese city was committed, the excuse was given

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that it was necessary to save the lives of American soldiers. Subsequently, however, it was established that the Japanese had been making inquiries as to the surrender terms which the Allies would accept. The statement, therefore, that the bomb had to be dropped to save the lives of American troops was a false statement. More than that, some years ago I attended a Conference at Oxford addressed by some very distinguished atomic scientists. They told us, among other things, that when the dropping of the bomb was under contemplation certain persons in America suggested that before this was done Japanese representatives should be invited to witness the destructive effects of the dropping of the bomb on an uninhabited place. This humane and reasonable suggestion was, however, turned down by the American Government who, we were told, seemed to feel that the dropping of a bomb on the city would so terrify the world that in future no one would dare to embark on war. Subsequent history has indeed given its terrible comment on this supreme example of doing evil that good may come.
I should like now to say a word or two about the Dean himself. I happen to know him, not very intimately, but I do know him personally, and he is one of those people whom it is eminently desirable to know personally before you pass severe judgment upon them. All who know him personally do not doubt his sincerity. Moreover, most of them—at least, those that I know personally—while they may think that he is quite partial in some of his judgments, do not consider him in the ordinary sense a fool or as one who speaks inadvisedly. He has been attacked severely in this House for his partiality to Communism. But your Lordships have to remember that it is folly to pretend, after all the reliable, impartial evidence we have now had from the Quaker delegation and other people, that everything in Communist countries is evil. In Communist countries there is good and evil, and in democratic countries there is good and evil. There can be no peace in the world until one-sided fools on both sides realise the good, as well as the evil, on the other side, and the evil as well as the good on their side. When a person like the Dean tries to
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draw the attention of his fellow-countrymen to the good on the other side and to the shortcomings on his own side, he is performing a Christian service of reconciliation, no matter how unpopular the task may be, because the essence of Christianity is to see good, in so far as you can reasonably see it, and make the best of your enemies and potential enemies, as well as your friends. I must confess that for quite a long period, though I never doubted the Dean's sincerity, I too felt that he had been badly led "up the garden path" by Communist propaganda and by Communists. Some months ago, however, rather unexpectedly, I met him again. I sat next to him at dinner and later heard him address a large and representative London audience, almost exclusively composed of non-Communists, and later deal very ably with many searching questions. After that experience I found that I had to modify some of my views very considerably.
The question has been discussed of the Dean's loyalty and duties. The Dean's first loyalty is to God and to what he believes to be the truth, and his duty is to tell it in the service of Christ in the ministry of reconciliation. His duty to the State, and even his duty to the Church of England, is merely a secondary matter. I realise that there are complications here. I sympathise with the most reverent Primate the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, and also with the noble Lord, Lord Ammon. But the problem of a State Church is something apart from the Dean's personal duty to God. I myself some time ago left the Church, partly because it was a State Church and partly because, in my opinion, it was a warmongering Church. I felt that in either capacity it was being disloyal to Christ. But there are some people who feel that, even if they disagree very strongly with the body of which they are a member, they should stay within it and try to reveal to it what they believe to be the truth. Certainly the Church—that is to say, the true Church of Jesus Christ—can be brought into disrepute only if it does things which are disloyal to Christ and unworthy in the sight of God. The duty of the true Church, like the Dean's duty, is to God. It is not to agree with the State in all its political views on any occasion when it may choose very strongly to express them.
7.51 p.m.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, after listening to the speech of the noble Duke I was reminded, I must say, of the remark attributed to the late Mr. Balfour, as he then was, in addressing in another place an opponent after his opponent had sat down. He said:
"Much of what the right honourable gentleman has just said is true, and much of what the right honourable gentleman has just said is trite. Unfortunately, what was true was also trite, and what was not trite was not true."
I am left in much the same position by the speech of the noble Duke.
In this matter we are, I think, dealing with two cognate and distinct problems. There is the political problem, fundamentally ridiculous, that people are in danger of treating seriously; and there is the religious problem, fundamentally serious, which people are in danger of treating with levity. The political problem is a ridiculous one. I frankly cannot agree with my noble friend, Lord Winterton, in thinking that the Dean is a gift to Communist propaganda; I think that that is the greatest possible mistake. The Dean with his ridiculous vanity, his fantastic Press conferences and his grotesque rolls of papers is a gift to the comedian. He has succeeded in doing what more serious investigation would certainly have failed to do: he has succeeded in impressing upon the common man the fundamental improbability of the charges which have been made and the total absence of evidence with which they are supported. If he had been in the pay of the United Nations he could hardly have done that job more thoroughly.
EARL WINTERTON: Perhaps I may be allowed to amend my point and to say that the Dean is a joke—but he is not regarded as a joke behind the Iron Curtain or on the Continent.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I agree with my noble friend. Behind the Iron Curtain the Dean is sometimes mistaken for the Archbishop, and in any event he is associated with Canterbury. That is true and it is lamentable. But in answer to the argument I am bound to say this. I do not so far despair of the intelligence of our Christian brethren behind the Iron Curtain as to suppose that they do not know full well that Judas Iscariot was
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not the last Christian to betray his Master. I think they will know how to assess the Dean according to the coin with which, unfortunately, they are more familiar than we are.
The plea that we should invoke the power of the State to dismiss the Dean, promulgated most forcibly in another place, is not so much misguided as it is impossible. Deans are appointed by letters patent, and I think it has been from time almost immemorial considered, from the terms in which such letters patent have been couched, that they cannot be reversed. The appointment is not accompanied, like that of Ministers of the Crown, with a proviso that it shall be during Her Majesty's pleasure. Nor is it accompanied with a proviso which exists in the case of the appointment of judges, that they hold office so long as they behave themselves properly. The Deans are appointed by irrevocable letters patent, and they cannot be got rid of by any action of the State. It is wrong to invoke the power of the State; the Church of England is far too Erastian already and it should not be made more so by demands that it should dismiss from office an ecclesiastical dignitary for his activities. Indeed, much harm can be done by these frequent appeals to the State to dismiss the Dean of Canterbury. It leads to the impression that there is something that the State can do about it. Only this morning I read in my paper that seventy innocent American clergymen had sent a telegram to Her Majesty asking her to dismiss the Dean of Canterbury. I am sure they would not have done that if they bad not read on the Order Paper of another place a request asking for the same thing. I think that these attempts to invoke temporal power in these matters are a mistake.
But I think the religious problem cannot be so easily ridden off. I cannot agree with the most reverend Primate that the Dean does not cause scandal to the Church of England: I think he does; not so much because he is a Communist but because he is a clown, and we cannot afford to have clowns in gaiters in the Church of England. Things are far too serious with religion for us to be able to afford to have people whose idiotic conduct causes them to be laughed at. Let us face the facts. For the great mass of the people the Dean is the biggest

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laugh since the Rector of Stiffkey in his barrel, and it is intolerable that the Church should be made a mockery by the antics of an egocentric dotard.
This matter of dealing with high dignitaries of the Church is not one that can be ridden off easily by pleas for free speech, or even by the noble sentiments expressed by the most reverend Primate. The fact is that it was not the Church who appointed the Dean of Canterbury: it was the late Mr. Ramsay Macdonald; and he was appointed not because he was a Christian but because he was a Socialist. That is known to everybody who is willing to talk about the realities of the patronage of the Church. I am a Churchman myself—perhaps not a very good one—but I do find it intolerable that those whom I was taught in my Catechism to regard as my "pastors and masters" should be appointed in this way. What is worse is that, having got them there, the Church cannot even get rid of them—nor can those who appointed them—however remote from the realities of Christian life they are. The Houses of Parliament are the real criminals. Lord Winterton quoted the phrase used by the most reverend Primate to the effect that the Dean had "misused and compromised his office." Despite this he cannot be got rid of by the Church—as he could if he were the President of the Methodist Conference. This is primarily the fault of Parliament.
I remember that in 1947, in another place, when the first of two Measures (to which the most reverend Primate referred) was introduced, a handful of Members was assiduously lobbied by a small ecclesiastical minority in an attempt to get the House to reject the Measure, on the spurious ground that in some fantastic way it could be used as a means of depriving aged clergymen with violent political opinions of their livings. And they very nearly succeeded. The result was that when the next Measure came up for consideration by the Houses of Parliament, an appeasing clause was introduced, excepting the political and social activities, however extravagant, of its dignitaries, from control by the Church. Now, whereas I am wholeheartedly opposed to the suggestion that the State should punish or dismiss high dignitaries of the Church for political or social activities, I think it is the least measure
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of freedom that the Church can claim, that if it is not allowed to appoint its own dignitaries it should at least be allowed to get rid of them if it does not want to keep them. But that it is not allowed to do. The people who have prevented it are the two Houses of Parliament, and in the present case we have an example of the results of a system which could be tolerated only if it worked no harm in practice: and that the Dean's case shows is not the case.
LORD STRABOLGI: I think the noble Viscount is a little wrong there. The Church can get rid of its dignitaries on certain grounds—for instance, heresy and unbecoming conduct, et cetera.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I am perfectly well aware of that. I only said that it could not get rid of them if it wanted to. That is what I am complaining of. You can have it one way or the other. You can make the Church a sort of Civil Service, in which case the civil servants can be got rid of by the State, but the thing has no spiritual reality at all. Or, the Church is a free, spiritual community—and then, if you must appoint its high dignitaries, you might allow the Church to get rid of them if it does not want them. That can be done in every other religious community in the land, but not in the Church of England. It is precisely the situation to which the noble Lord opposite drew attention that I was complaining of.
There are a few questions which remain to be asked about the Dean which, I think, are worthy of an answer. What has he really done for Christianity in the lands which he has visited? That is not a political question; it is a religious question. Has he visited the Christians in prison? Has he made provision for their necessities out of his ample stipend or out of the funds with which he is provided by his Communist hosts? Has he protested to the Communists about their atheism? Has he himself in foreign lands offered an unmistakable and sincere Christian witness? Those are questions which Churchmen are entitled to ask of their high dignitaries and, though I agree with the Archbishop that in many respects one wishes the Dean would not pretend he is a Christian at any time, we are saddled with the fact that he is a high dignitary of the Church. We are entitled to an answer.

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I accept it from the most reverend Primate that the Dean has never denied the existence of God or any other Christian doctrine. Nevertheless I can remember nothing which he has said at any time in the last twenty years which implies that he believes in God or any Christian doctrine. I myself am not impressed by arguments that Deans of Canterbury must necessarily not be atheists unless they expressly deny the existence of God. It is, moreover, for consideration whether and how far the Dean has observed the Canons of 1603. If he has not observed them, he is guilty of an ecclesiastical offence, and even under the mutilated law as it exists at the moment we can get rid of him by appropriate ecclesiastical proceedings. The Canons of 1603 are very onerous.
I should be happy to dispense with his attendance in Canterbury Cathedral altogether, but I do not see that we should necessarily overlook any peccadilloes which he may have committed against the strict letter of the ecclesiastical law. After all, we got rid of Mrs. Monica Felton, not because she was a Communist but because she did not attend to her duties in one of the new towns. She thought that her Communism was more important. I do not see how, if, as we are led to believe, the Dean of Canterbury occupies an important position, he should be allowed to spend so much of his time abroad instead of attending to the duties of his office. These things should surely be within the discretion of the Church. They are not so, in accordance with the present law, except within the very limited measure given by the two Acts of 1840 and 1892. That, surely, only illustrates the evil which we are discussing this evening, which is a serious one—namely, the plight to which the Church of England has been reduced by Parliament. I must say that if we are in danger of taking the Dean too seriously from the political angle, we should also be making a mistake if we allowed the mockery which this vain and ridiculous old man must excite to blind our eyes to the dangerous plight to which the Church of England has fallen.
8.5 p.m.
LORD CALVERLEY: My Lords, I should like us to get back to the Question which is on the Order Paper. It is:
"To ask Her Majesty's Government whether there is any legal action that can be taken
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against Dr. Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury, for his alleged statements reflecting on the conduct of British troops liable to create ill-feeling between Her Majesty's subjects and those of other nations; and to bring the Established Church into contempt and disrepute."
I have been impelled to intervene in this debate because there are two sections of opinion. There is one section which is of the opinion that the Dean of Canterbury can "get away with it" because he is a high dignitary of the Church. On the other hand, I have come across two or three people, highly placed, in Yorkshire who are inclined to believe that there is something in the germ warfare allegation because the Dean of Canterbury as a dignitary of the Church has made the accusation. When my noble friend put into his Question "British troops," I wondered whether any legal action could have been taken in Korea, if "Lance-Corporal Hewlett Johnson" (if there had been such a person) had made himself a nuisance in the barracks by spreading gloom and despondency and performing actions prejudicial to good discipline. I came to the conclusion that the men in the canteen would have said that he was "crackers," and they would have made allowances for him because, on the face of it, he seemed to be a very nice sort of chap.
LORD STRABOLGI: If I may interrupt, I should like to ask a question.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Oh!
LORD STRABOLGI: I beg your Lordships' pardon? This is a debate. This is the House of Lords.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: We are well aware of that.
LORD STRABOLGI: I should like to ask a question on something which has been puzzling me throughout the debate. I have since been looking at the document issued by the Dean of Canterbury. What are the attacks on the British troops which are complained of?
LORD CALVERLEY: There have been 3,000 casualties since we started this armistice business. There are 3,000 British casualties, and also they are part of twenty nations who have made a great contribution, unexampled in the history of this world, to try to fight against what was called "aggression."
LORD STRABOLGI: We all agree with that.
LORD CALVERLEY: My noble friend says that we all agree with that. The reason I bring in the British troops is because for nine and a half years I had the experience of listening to 2,000 complaints. Let us suppose that those fellows are "grousing" at this apocryphal Lance-Corporal Hewlett Johnson, and the company commander has got to know about it. The lance-corporal has been arrested and tried and given six months in the "glasshouse" because he was guilty of bringing contempt upon Her Majesty's uniform and being absent without leave. That is what has happened, and that is what has been happening. He would have been dismissed from the Forces on coming out of the detention barracks because he brought contempt on the Queen's uniform. My point is this. In going about, in his symbolic garments, abroad, all over Europe, in Moscow and in Pekin, the Dean has brought contempt upon the Church to which he belongs. That is another reason why we should try to investigate what he has been trying to do, to see what can be done with this man who has brought Christ's Church at Canterbury into disrepute. That is the serious issue, and I wonder if anything can be done.
I am scrapping the few notes I have made because I do not want to detain your Lordships too long. I believe that when Mr. Vyshinsky saw the Dean in what he would call "those funny garments"—I refer to the knee breeches, the gaiters and the rest of it—and when they were explained to him, he thought that they had high propaganda value. I do not know whether the Church has any power in this respect, but when the Dean goes overseas again I wonder whether he might be made to go in flannel "bags" and a tweed coat, thereby puncturing his propaganda value. What can we do? We cannot stop this man from talking, because we believe in freedom of speech. I wish only that he would go to Hyde Park Corner, either in his "glad rags" or in his flannel "bags," and expound his doctrines there, because I am sure he would need police protection; or he might kick up such a "shindy" that he could be charged before a magistrates' court—this, is a bit of knowledge of the law which I have gained simply through a little experience in
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magistrates' courts—with being a public mischief and causing a breach of the peace. I spent a couple of days thinking what penalty could be imposed. This being a first offence, the only thing a magistrate could do would be to bind him over for six months, in the sum of £5, to be of good behaviour. That is about all we could do with him, and he would want to put on his martyr's crown.
My Lords, I think there ought to be a restatement of the matter. The right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Chichester, himself I believe a former Dean of Canterbury, speaking the other day in Canterbury, said that this business has been "blurred" somewhat. We have gone on now for two years. There is a lot of misrepresentation in regard to what we are trying to do in Korea, and I think there should be a restatement, not so much by politicians but by men of the calibre of Dr. George Bell, stating, on behalf of the Council of the Christian Churches, that we are not in Korea simply for the fun of being there but because we have been driven there by China and Russia. I think that is necessary because of the amount of criticism from people who suppose that the Dean is right. Only yesterday I said to one such person, "You want to get hold of the White Paper and see what is happening. Then you will see what the United Nations have been trying to do."
In 1948, when the most reverend Primate introduced from the Church Assembly a Measure which related to Church discipline, I intervened to ask him to be patient with what I called his "thorn in the flesh." He has used that expression this afternoon. He has shown infinite patience, and great Christian tolerance. It has been worth while having a debate like this to-day. I personally am grateful to my noble friend for asking his Question. We have had an opportunity of hearing not only speeches from laymen but also a most valuable contribution from the most reverend Primate. For that reason, I am glad the Question has been asked. I hope that some remedy may be found. It may be that he can be tried by his peers—that is, by the Canons of Canterbury Cathedral. Let the senior Canon take the chair. Let the Dean be

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asked to come along—I see an incredulous smile upon the most reverend Primate's face. I should like to be present to see what really would happen.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: He would be "fired" by the Canons, would he not?
LORD CALVERLEY: He could be fired from a cannon, but I think that is too drastic. I do not wish to go as far as that. But I think the Chapter might meet, and might be able to hold an impartial inquiry. Of course, if the decision of that inquiry went against the Dean he would say that it was not impartial, but otherwise. I have spoken long enough—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
LORD CALVERLEY: I am sorry the noble Earl should say "Hear, hear!" I have been here since half-past two waiting for this debate. However, I will not go on. I merely express my gratitude to my noble friend for bringing this Question before us, and to the most reverend Primate. I shall sit down now in order that the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, may speak.
8.17 p.m.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, I wish to say only comparatively few words in winding up this debate, for there is, I think, very little that I can add to what has already been so well said this afternoon. I am not at all surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Ammon, put down his Question on the recent antics of the Dean of Canterbury. In answer to Lord Teviot I might say in passing that I am afraid I cannot tell him who financed the Dean's trip. I even doubt whether I could get that information, and I would suggest to the noble Lord that he should himself approach the Dean, who I am sure would be delighted to satisfy his curiosity. But there is one thing at any rate on which I am certain. The vagaries of that dignitary have caused the strongest indignation among all sections of opinion in this country. That is evident from the remarks of noble Lords in every part of this House. Indeed, it is certainly not an edifying spectacle to see one of the great dignitaries of the Church of England crossing the world to pay a visit to the enemies of
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Christianity and then, apparently without any real effort to verify the facts, lending the authority of his great position to completely baseless charges against our allies. So far as one can see he seems to have swallowed the Chinese allegations whole. He seems not only to have no doubt at all, but never to have been prepared to have doubts.
In the document which has been circulated to your Lordships, to which reference has been made to-day—and I thought the circulation of that document was a somewhat unusual procedure—he quotes evidence from Chinese doctors and Divines, who under a Communist régime can hardly be regarded as being entirely impartial. I would say to the noble Duke, the Duke of Bedford, who I am afraid has left us, out who seemed to take very much the same view as the Dean, that such evidence as that in a country such as China is to-day, can hardly have been expressed entirely through free will.
There must have been, inevitably, a measure of duress about it, and that we all of us know perfectly well. The same applies to the "confessions" of the two young American airmen to which he referred. One wonders how those "confessions" were extorted. The Dean quoted all that evidence provided by his hosts, but he made no reference at all, as was pointed out by the most reverend Primate, to the American offer to agree to a full inquiry on the spot under the International Red Cross, which is an authority whose integrity is absolutely unquestioned throughout the world He made no attempt to explain why the Chinese Government so curtly rejected that offer. And yet, to any objective mind, that refusal to accept the Red Cross is really conclusive; proof that this elaborately fabricated case would be unable to stand up to impartial scrutiny. Yet the Dean never mentioned it. To him, it appears, the Communists must always be right.
I will say for the noble Duke, the Duke of Bedford, that he did not shirk that issue. He said that the International Red Cross was not an international body. No doubt, the International Red Cross is situated in Switzerland; it must be situated somewhere; but it is, I should have thought, universally recognised in every civilised country to be absolutely

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above suspicion. It is one of the most distinguished of all international bodies, and I could not help thinking, as I listened to the noble Duke—I am sorry that he is not here now—that he appeared to me to be just a gramophone repeating the ordinary propaganda that comes out to us day after day from Moscow. We can hear it any night sitting by our own firesides—not coming to your Lordships' House at all, but merely turning a knob. We, here, know the noble Duke. We are used to him. He dearly loves to be in a minority of one. That is really his spiritual home. But if on this occasion he is able to take so tolerant a view of the Dean of Canterbury, I am afraid that many of us cannot. We cannot believe that the régime which the Dean seems quite happy in supporting is compatible with the teaching of Christ. In such circumstances, it is evidently right and proper that we in this House should make it clear at the earliest possible moment that we entirely repudiate his irresponsible and most reprehensible statements. That we have done this afternoon, and I am sure we are all immensely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ammon, for giving us the opportunity.
But the noble Lord's Question, of course, goes a good deal further than that. He asks whether there is any legal action that can be taken about the Dean in view of his obvious unsuitability to occupy his present high position in the Church. He thinks that some steps should be taken to prevent his continuing to be in a position where—to use the noble Lord's own words—he can "bring the Established Church into contempt and disrepute." That view has been supported, and very naturally supported, by other speakers this afternoon, and I must confess that in the first flush of my indignation I tended to share that view myself. But further consideration, I say frankly, has led me to modify that opinion It is not for me, as a humble member of the laity, to enter into these specifically ecclesiastical matters which were spoken of with great force, and I thought in an extremely interesting manner, by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, this afternoon. They are a matter, I should have thought, for the Church rather than for me.
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Returning to the actual subject of the Question, I think it is evident that in any case, whatever we may think about his suitability or unsuitability for his present position, there is no legal action that the Church, at any rate, can take as things are at present. The Dean has committed no offence such as heresy which would make him amenable to Church discipline. He has not been drunk in the pulpit, he has not pawned the church vessels, he has not been guilty of flagrant immorality. He has not committed any offence of that type. He has, indeed, I should have thought, been guilty of "unbecoming conduct" in another sense, which one might have imagined, if one had not heard the Archbishop's speech this afternoon, would have brought him within the provisions of the Church Dignitaries (Retirement) Measure of 1948. But it seems—if I understood the most reverend Primate rightly—that we in Parliament, in our wisdom, decided that the term "unbecoming conduct" should not embrace opinions and activities of a political character. Of course, that excludes the Dean entirely from the scope of the measure.
And if the Church cannot deal with him it is extremely doubtful whether the State can do so either under the existing law. As my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor has already told the House, inquiries are being made and one is quite certain that we must await the result of those inquiries and make whatever decision may be necessary when the time comes. I am bound to say—and I am here speaking personally—that I remain, frankly, doubtful whether a prosecution in a case of this kind would not do more harm than good. That is my personal view. At any rate, we must await the results of the inquiries and see what they are. But if the proposal is, or should be, that special legislation should be brought in to deal with this particular case, I want to make it absolutely clear now that the Government could not contemplate that.
Of course, the Dean's conduct has been deplorable. It has profoundly shocked not only Churchmen but, I think, the whole broad mass of public opinion throughout this country. For, after all, extreme vanity and boundless gullibility are always an unattractive combination. But I should have thought that it was the Dean's own reputation which had mainly

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suffered—and here I agree with the Archbishop—not that of the Church of England. I really cannot believe, if I may say so with deference to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that any objective observer could seriously attempt to tar the Church with the Dean's brush. And if, indeed, there had been any doubt on that point, I should have thought that it would be entirely removed by the speech of the most reverend Primate this afternoon.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I do not wish to interrupt the noble Marquess unnecessarily, but I think he has attributed to me a view which I did not actually express, and I should therefore like to say so.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I understood the noble Viscount to say that what the Dean had done had inflicted considerable injury upon the Church.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I said that it had caused scandal in the Church, but that was because he was a clown, not because he was a Communist. We cannot afford to have clowns in gaiters.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The fact remains that the suggestion was that he was doing harm to the Church. That is what I said. I do not care whether it was said that he was doing it as a Communist or as a clown. But I do not think it has done harm to the Church. I think the speech of the most reverend Primate, if there was any feeling of that kind, should have removed it. He could not have made it clearer that he repudiated in most explicit terms the actions and opinions of the Dean. In such circumstances as that, surely, to regard the Dean as a serious menace is to lose our sense of proportion. He is not a menace. If I may use rather frank words, he is merely a foolish old man, puffed up with conceit, hankering after publicity—not an attractive sight, but certainly not a threat to our institutions.
EARL WINTERTON: My Lords, may I, with the greatest deference, ask the noble Marquess a question? Is it not rather a dangerous argument to say of a man who has committed such an offence that because he is foolish we shall not deal with him?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I thought that up to now we were putting the argument on the basis that he has not committed an offence. At the same time, I think in a case of this kind, where it is a question of political statement, the question of how far he constitutes a danger does enter into the matter. At least, I should have thought so: I do not know. I am only expressing my view. I feel that to alter the law of the land to take action against a matter of this calibre is rather like taking a steam-hammer to crack a nut. Indeed, it might have a bad effect. It might give ammunition to Communist propaganda by lending colour to the suggestion that he was being; persecuted for his beliefs. I am quite certain that, if it became common currency in other countries, it would do more harm than anything the Dean is likely to say, and I should have thought it was the very thing which the Communists would prefer.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Marquess but I think he mis-states the case. It would be trying the Dean for his beliefs. What else could we be trying him for? The noble Marquess said we might give the impression of trying the Dean for his beliefs, but that is what we should be trying him for.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I do not know: we have no; had our report yet. But: if it turned out that he had spread absolutely false statements to the detriment of his country and that there was no foundation for the allegations he made, I should not have thought that that was purely a matter of expressing a political opinion. However, I am not going to pontificate on that subject.
There is another point which I think I ought to put to your Lordships. If we brought in legislation of this character, I should have thought it would be difficult so to frame it that it would be, as it were, sui generis. I should have thought that almost inevitably such legislation would create a precedent which might be used for far less justifiable interferences with individual liberties. Indeed, it might encourage that type of witch-hunt which to our great regret we have seen in other countries increasingly. That is what the broad common sense of this country has always avoided, at any

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rate within recent centuries—if I may say so, with all deference, to the noble Earl, Lord Winterton.
EARL WINTERTON: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Marquess at this late hour, but I was talking purely of the future. I think it is the duty of the Government to consider whether, in the case of what might be described as undeclared war, the law of treason and sedition is as strong as it was.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I assure the noble Earl that we will take into account everything that he has said: he speaks with great experience. All I would say is that I should regret anything which was likely to facilitate a witch-hunt. I think that is a thing which we in this country have always loathed. As I have said, we cannot regard the Dean as a danger. That is my view. He is not guilty of treason—at least, we hear from the Attorney-General that there is no prima facie case of treason in the inquiries which we have made. I would point out that this is no case of a rather obscure legal point. It is a very simple point. There is no evidence—and that is a point we can all understand.
Although I agree entirely with what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Ammon, and by other noble Lords, as to the Dean's conduct, and although I find it just as exasperating as it has seemed to them that he should have behaved, and is behaving, in this way, I feel bound to advise the House not to allow itself to be carried away by its very natural resentment, or to take steps which might well create a most undesirable precedent for the future. As I have said, the real truth is that the Dean is not dangerous: he is merely contemptible.
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And the course most consistent with the dignity of this House and of this country is to treat him with the contempt he most surely deserves.

CITY OF LONDON (GUILD CHURCHES) BILL
Reported, with Amendments.

SCOTTISH AMICABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and referred to the Examiners.
PIER AND HARBOUR PROVISIONAL ORDER (BRIGHTON) BILL
PIER AND HARBOUR PROVISIONAL ORDER (GREAT YARMOUTH) BILL
PIER AND HARBOUR PROVISIONAL ORDER (SEAHAM HARBOUR) BILL
PIER AND HARBOUR PROVISIONAL ORDER (HERNE BAY) BILL
PIER AND HARBOUR PROVISIONAL ORDER (KING'S LYNN) BILL
PIER AND HARBOUR PROVISIONAL ORDER (MINEHEAD) BILL
Reported, without amendment, and recommitted to a Committee of the Whole House.
House adjourned at twenty-three minutes before nine o'clock.