QUEENSLAND-BRITISH FOOD CORPORATION

HL Deb 02 April 1952 vol 175 cc1327-44

4.49 p.m.

LORD OGMORE rose to draw attention to the Report of the Queensland-British Food Corporation for 1950–51; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I must apologise for inflicting myself upon your Lordships on two several occasions in one day, but I really think that the subject which I have put upon the Order Paper is a very important corollary to the two interesting and important debates that we have had yesterday and to-day. I shall give the reasons for my view in a moment. The Report of the Queensland-British Food Corporation for the year 1950–51 is just to hand, and this project is one which I commend to your Lordships' attention. It is important for two reasons: first, because it constitutes a joint endeavour by two Commonwealth Governments; and secondly, because it is an attempt to solve one of the burning problems of our time.

By an interesting coincidence—I had no knowledge that this was to happen—the Joint Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries is to answer me to-day. We often hear from him in this House about marginal land in this country. The amount of marginal land here is small compared with that in many other countries, particularly in the continent of Australia, and one of our problems—this, again, is not a Party matter—is how to make such land productive. It is often unproductive because of poor fertility, because the rainfall is small and badly scattered throughout the year, or for other reasons dependent upon the particular locality. Most of the easy agricultural resources have already been developed. They have not, perhaps, been developed to the fullest extent but, at all events, most of them have been developed to some extent throughout the world. We must find an answer to the problem of making the best possible use of the difficult land, not only here but in other parts of the globe as well.

The nature of the scheme to which I draw your Lordships' attention is this. It is a farming project in the central highlands of Queensland. The whole area is within the 20–25 inch rainfall belt and, apart from the rainfall being comparatively low, that rainfall, unfortunately, occurs mainly during the summer months: 19 inches, we are told, falls between October 1 and March 31. In some years they get very little rainfall at all, and temperatures vary from 60 degrees to 110 degrees. Surface water supplies are very limited. The original object of this scheme was to produce bacon pigs for the United Kingdom. That was found not to be a practicable plan, and now we have a project of this kind—namely, the production of sorghum and the fattening of cattle in order to enhance the supplies available in Australia. I do not think any of the cattle come directly to this country, though of course they add to the numbers available for slaughter in Australia itself. Cattle fattening was started, I believe, in order to make use of the land not used for growing crops of grain, and also to try to make use of the sorghum stubbles and residues after the sorghum itself had been harvested.

It has been decided that the area under crop is not to exceed 50,000 to 60,000 acres. The area for cattle is to be about 25,000 acres, and that for pigs is to be about 7,000 acres. I mention these facts because it has been decided—as is obvious, I think—that production on this scale is unlikely to make any significant contribution to United Kingdom food requirements. Therefore, the scheme has changed—and that is a point I want to emphasise. It has changed from what it was originally intended to be, and it is no longer a scheme to provide bacon pigs for this country. It is now a scheme to provide a certain amount of sorghum for this country and a certain amount of cattle for Australia, but mainly to provide results upon which we can base our plans for other and similar projects. It has, in fact, ceased to be a food producing scheme for the United Kingdom, and has become a pilot scheme both for Australia and for the world in general.

The results last year—that is, the year with which this Report mainly deals—are disappointing. The crops, due to late sowing and drought, were poorish. The sunflower cop was an entire failure. It seems that we have been fated to have some unfortunate results with sunflower crops, both in Australia and in Africa. Of the sorghum. 6,799 tons was shipped to the United Kingdom, and there was a balance left in Australia of 1,942 tons. The policy of cattle fattening has been justified. They have been breeding cattle for fattening, and this particular activity is the only one which made a profit. As to pigs, there has been no profit arising from their production; there has been a loss. With regard to finances, there has been a loss of £A245,077 on grain. On pigs, the loss has been £A21,364. The profit on cattle has amounted to £A12,697. So, on the whole project there has been a loss of roughly £A254,000. I personally am very pleased that there has; been a profit on the cattle, because I have always been a great believer in the development of cattle breeding and of cattle fattening also, not only for the sake of the profit but also for the sake of the humus which it provides for the land.

The results, on the whole, as I have said, are disappointing. It was assumed that there would be three bad seasons in seven but, as a matter of fact, three bad seasons have come together. It just shows how often the greatest experts can be misled in regard to these schemes. When we who now occupy these Benches sat on the other side of this Chamber, and the present members of the Government sat over here, we were constantly being derided because some of the forecasts which had been made by people who were regarded—and who regarded themselves—as experts went wrong. I need only instance the ground-nuts scheme and the Gambia scheme. In 1950 two Members of Parliament—one from your Lordships' House and one from the House of Commons—paid a visit to this Queensland scheme, and they expressed themselves in highly favourable terms upon it. Mr. A. Hurd who, as your Lordships know, is an agricultural expert—I believe he is an agricultural journalist and he frequently addresses the other place on agricultural topics—said this after seeing this scheme: What I saw impressed me tremendously and I shall take to the House of Commons an excellent report of the Queensland-British Food Corporation activities here. He added: I was impressed with the calibre of the men in charge of the various operations. I liked the way they got down to the fundamentals of the job without frills. And the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin—also on the spot—said it was obvious that the undertaking was in splendid hands for he had been impressed by the sight of so much achievement in so short a time. I make no criticism of those two gentlemen for saying that. I have no doubt that everything they said was perfectly justified, and that, in fact, they were quite correct in saying what they did. I am only pointing out that the greatest experts, seeing a scheme of this kind, can be a little flowery in their language.

The future of this scheme, I suggest, lies in research and in pilot schemes. I regard this as both. The belt covered in Queensland alone by the same sort of rainfall, in roughly the same area, is no less than 10,000,000 acres of potentially arable land, now occupied by wandering herds of cattle and sheep. The problem is how to convert this pastoral land into agricultural land, so that it can feed far more people to the square mile than it is feeding at the present time. I say that the project is well worth while and I would ask the Government to realise—they did not realise it when they were in opposition and gave us no credit for it—that there is no easy road in Commonwealth development. It is a hard and bitter road, strewn with the boulders of human failure and often watered, if watered at all, with the tears of human distress. In our previous debate to-day I said that one of the difficulties facing those of us who are interested in Commonwealth matters is that there is little public opinion in favour of it. Anybody can get a cheap cheer either at a public dinner or on the public platform, whatever Party he belongs to, by saying, "We believe in Commonwealth development." But when it comes down to the impact of that upon the public, he will find that there is little enthusiasm for it at all.

I should like to make three suggestions to Her Majesty's Government. First of all, the comparatively small expense of this scheme should deter neither Her Majesty's Government nor the Queensland Government from going on with it. One of the reasons why I am anxious for this debate to take place in your Lordships' House soon is that I understand that the Queensland Government are now making an inquiry into the scheme. I hope that neither of the partners in the scheme will decide to discontinue it, because I believe it is most valuable and will have far-reaching effects. The second suggestion I have to make is that owing to the balance of the scheme having changed in the way I have described, it is now not the Ministry of Food but the Commonwealth Relations Office who ought to be handling it. It is no longer a "food for Britain" scheme, but a pilot scheme. I certainly think the Commonwealth Relations Office should be the Government Department dealing with the matter.

The third suggestion I make is that in the next Report we should have more details. Perhaps the noble Lord would put my view on this matter to the Corporation. It so happens that there are few details of the successful portion of the scheme, the raising and fattening of cattle. Next year I should like to have more details in order to ascertain exactly why this particular portion of the scheme was successful whereas others were not. That is all I have to say on this matter and I shall be glad to hear what the Minister has to say about it. I beg to move for Papers.

5.4 p.m.

LORD RENNELL

My Lords, I think the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, comes at a particularly appropriate moment, because I understand, like the noble Lord, that an inquiry into the results of this scheme is pending in Queensland. The Report shows comparatively little success since the scheme's inception and I regret to believe that current operations will be even more unsuccessful. The fact is that Australia has a savage climate, savage in every sense. It goes to extremes, rarely understood or appreciated in this country, of which the whole Continent has had experience during the last three years. I shall give one case in point. In an old-established dairying area in New South Wales, of the last three years, two years have been of such excessive rainfall that thousands of acres of established lucerne have been waterlogged, and these years have been followed by a third year of almost complete drought. In the area in question, successful dairying has been carried on for twenty years. And climatic difficulties of this kind are apt to happen in every part of Australia.

It does not follow from that, however, that the scheme in one area like Queensland is necessarily a bad one. Still less does it follow that schemes of this sort should not be attempted. I entirely agree with what the noble Lord has said about the scheme. I regard it as one of the most valuable and interesting experiments that is being made, even though I may differ from the ideas which led to its creation. In the course of the last three years, in wandering about Australia, I am convinced without a shadow of doubt that coarse grains like sorghum can be grown on a considerable scale. The mistake that I think was made at the inception of this scheme was the manner in which it was attempted, and the fact that the scheme was limited to what has now become an experiment in one particular area. In my view a great deal of weight should be given to some of the criticism which is current in Australia about this scheme, that it was an attempt to do something on too large a scale in a limited area which had not been proved. These are the same criticisms which were rightly applied to the ground-nuts scheme in Africa, but it does not follow that even if the criticisms were right in Africa, they are necessarily right here. I think they are right, but within certain limitations. It is probably wrong to attempt to grow sorghum in a limited part of what has proved to be an area of erratic rainfall, where the average cannot be taken as a guide. It would have been much better to start a number of smaller schemes in widely spaced-out areas. After all, in developing a new process it is common business prudence not to put too many eggs in one basket, but to scatter the eggs in dumps, so that if the basket is kicked, all the eggs are not lost.

The second thing that I think was wrong was to attempt direct cultivation. This is a very debatable point, but I submit that it would have been more profitable to this country, as a parent of the Overseas Food Corporation in Queensland, and financially probably more successful, if the money which has been expended had been expended not in trying directly to grow sorghum, but in inducing other people to grow sorghum. It would have been better, I feel, to provide machinery, loans, supervision, and, above all, assistance in clearing the bush. It is true, as the noble Lord has said, that there are between 8,000,000 and 10,000,000 acres where theoretically sorghum can be grown I believe that the area is actually considerably greater, because there is not included an area in the extreme north-west where experimental sorghum is being successfully grown at the moment. If direct cultivation was necessary, it would have been much wiser and more prudent to try a number of different areas simultaneously, even though the unit cost of cultivation would have been higher, than to do it all on the tablelands of Queensland, as has been attempted.

Further—and I do not intend any political implications in saying this—there is a great deal more to be said for harnessing the desire to make profit on the part of people who cultivate than for hiring people to cultivate for you. I believe it would have been more profitable and more successful to guarantee a price to people, with financial assistance, where necessary, to start cultivations, than to hire people to cultivate for you. That is the view widely and commonly held in Australia, and it is ore that I think is probably right. It means that a profit, or part of it, will inure to the person doing the work, instead of to the Corporation responsible for the scheme. But even if it meant a lesser theoretical profit (though in point of fact, a loss has been made), I believe that it would have been more successful.

I am particularly impressed in this connection by a private attempt—of which the noble Lord who is to reply is no doubt fully aware—to cultivate sorghum on a considerable scale in an area west of the area where the Overseas Food Corporation have been operating—namely, in a rather arid area between Daily Waters and Newcastle Waters. The attempt there has not been any more successful, let me say, than the attempt of the Overseas Food Corporation. But after three years of work there, during which the private persons concerned have made no money, and, indeed, have incurred considerable losses, their faith in their capacity to grow sorghum remains, completely undiminished; and they would have planted sorghum again this year had any seed been available. As the noble Lord is aware, seed was not available owing to the failure of the crop last year. This enterprise—and it is not a small enterprise—will be started again, I hope, in the coming season. That shows that not only those responsible for the Overseas Food Corporation but also local private people are satisfied that the growing of sorghum on a considerable scale is possible if proper provision is made to take the bad years with the good over a longish period. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, that the mere fact that the Corporation have not had success in nearly four years' operation is no reason for terminating their operations now. I do not think an experiment of this sort can be said either to have failed or to have succeeded in a period of less than seven years.

If, therefore, an inquiry is to be held, whether under the auspices of the Queensland Government or of Her Majesty's Government in this country, I hope that the terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry will not be so phrased as to lead to a decision to shut down the whole enterprise. Rather should they be framed in a form which will enable the Commission to recommend alternative areas of experiment, and alternative methods of administering the experiment—for instance, by offering financial inducement to private people, under guaranteed prices, machinery and so forth—to allow the experiment to continue where it is now located, and to experiment also in other parts of Australia. After all, we are trying to do something in a vast Continent. Between the district where the Overseas Food Corporation are trying to grow sorghum, to certain parts of Western Australia, where the same sorghum can be grown, lies an area of possibly 1,500 to 2,000 miles. What is impossible in one place may turn out to be quite possible in another. We must not judge this experiment by the fact that it has failed in one area. We have tried it in only one area, but, as I submit, we should have tried it in several. I therefore entirely support the views expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore. I should like to add most particularly that I hope the noble Lord who is to reply will be able to say that, if an inquiry is held, it will not be an inquiry with a view to closing down this experiment, but with a view to seeing whether it can be continued, as I think it should, on the lines I have indicated.

5.15 p.m.

THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (LORD CARRINGTON)

My Lords, I feel it is rather a pity that the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, appears as the second Order on the Paper, because it is an important subject, and we should all be grateful to him for having raised it. It is very suitable that he should have raised the matter, because he was Under Secretary for Commonwealth Relations when the Overseas Resources (Development) Bill was passing through your Lordships' House. The facts about the Queensland-British Food Corporation's farming results for the year up to September 30, 1951, are set out quite clearly in the Annual Report, and there is little I can add at present to the information therein contained. The financial results of the year's activities which the Report describes are disappointing, as the noble Lord has said. The Report shows that between October 1, 1950, and September 30, 1951, the Corporation lost £A355,058—all the figures I give, of course, are in Australian pounds. Without taking into account interest which, of course, the Corporation must expect to meet out of trading profits, they have lost £A245,077 on grain production and £A21,364 on pig-raising. The small trading profit of £A12,697 which they have made on cattle fattening and breeding is modest when set against the losses on grain production. The losses up to October 1, 1950, amounted to £A213,242, so that the aggregate losses since the Corporation began their farming have been £A568,300. This figure takes into account, of course, the fact that all interest due up to last September on the advances made by the two Governments has been paid.

As can be seen by reading the Report, it is the severe loss on grain production which has been the chief reason for the disappointing financial results of the Corporation. Why has the loss on grain been so high? First, last year's drought was exceptionally severe. The full effects of the drought are not yet apparent, but already it is being spoken of as being as severe as that of 1902, and it has ruined nearly half the last year's crop. Of the 53,700 acres sown, 12,800 acres failed to germinate owing to lack of rain, and the crop on a further 11,200 acres was so poor that it was not worth harvesting and was grazed off by cattle. The average yield for the whole acreage planted was only about six bushels to the acre, compared with a yield of eighteen bushels to the acre obtained in the previous year. Low yields per acre are the main reason for the Corporation's lack of success. Last year's yield was exceptionally low, but that in each of the three years has been below the original expectation. Secondly, costs of production have proved higher than was expected in the original estimates. Although some of this increase has been due to the rise in prices, this cannot be said to be a vital factor, since the Corporation have benefited from the rise in price for their product. There is no doubt that the actual costs of production have proved higher than was envisaged

Unfortunately, the Corporation's annual report was not recording one exceptionally bad year on grain. The fact is that grain production has been unprofitable from the start. The first harvest was afflicted by late frosts, the second by floods and heavy rain, and the third by drought. I need hardly say that I do not want in any way to belittle the Corporation's efforts. Ploughing and planting many thousands of acres is an enormous task, and if success had depended upon their efforts alone. I have no doubt that the crops would have turned out successfully. But when a series of mishaps such as the Corporation have experienced occurs, it is right to look carefully at all the evidence to see whether these disasters have been an exceptional run of bad luck or whether something of the same kind must be expected in most years. Grain growing has not hitherto been developed in Central Queensland because of the uncertain climate, and this was an experiment to see whether it was possible to grow sorghum economically in these conditions. It may be that the risks are going to prove more serious than was first thought. Unfortunately, the effects of the severe drought of last year are not likely to be limited to the past year's crop. The drought persisted well into this year and the dry soil may well lead to a disappointing harvest this year. By February 14—the latest date on which planting is practicable owing to the risk of frosts at harvest time—the Corporation had planted 62,000 acres. Unfortunately, 46,000 acres had to be planted dry and rather late. There are risks because the growing season may be short, but I cannot now, of course, make any guess as to the probable yield this year.

The pig side of the Corporation's enterprise is being developed slowly, and the Corporation regard it as being still on an experimental basis. It will be remembered that when the scheme was first launched it was intended to be primarily a scheme for the production of pig meat. However, right at the outset it was realised that there were some awkward problems to be solved before the pig side of the enterprise could be developed at the pace originally envisaged. The idea of relying on sorghum as the staple diet for pigs was new in Queensland. The initial cost of establishing the piggeries proved to be much higher than was originally estimated, and the experiment in range feeding which is going on at Peak Downs is an attempt to find a way of reducing the capital cost of the piggeries. The results of the past year show how right the Board were to slow down the pace of this side of their enterprise. Their trading loss in the past year on pigs was £A21,000, and apart from the need to establish the economics of the scheme there are still some technical problems to be solved if good pig meat is to be obtained. This is particularly true in the case of range breeding, because of the longer period which it is necessary to keep the pigs until they are fat.

As the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, said, the one side of the Corporation's activities which has shown a small trading profit of £A12,000 in the past year is cattle. Although many properties in Queensland have suffered disastrously during the drought of the past year, the Corporation's cattle have been kept in fine condition and have been fetching good prices. The leading article in the Rockhampton Morning Bulletin on Januuary 14, 1952, on "Lessons of the Drought," said: The rotation of flush and drought years has gone on in Central Queensland for nearly 100 years, yet the number of people engaged in animal husbandry and agriculture who go along making the most of the good times and resigning themselves to the bad is astonishing, to say the least. It was left to the British Food Corporation, with no more than two or three years' experience of local conditions, to demonstrate that even in a period of severe drought it is possible to fatten cattle fit for market on stubble pastures. While other stock owners were bemoaning the decimation of their herds the British Food Corporation was yarding one of the choicest consignments to enter Rockhampton sale yards. However, we must recognise that the Corporation's properties are not stocked with cattle on an economic basis, now that the growing of sorghum (which has provided a useful reserve feed in the form of stubble or residues) has up to date been produced at a loss.

Furthermore, the profit of £A12,977 does not allow for any contribution from the cattle side of the enterprise towards the payment of interest or the head office expenses. There is also a limit to the expansion which could be envisaged on the cattle side. Over the past year, the Corporation have been carrying about one beast to thirty acres. The average for Central Queensland is nearer one beast to fifteen acres. Hence, if the Corporation doubled its cattle—and I doubt whether it could do more, even if this were possible—it could not hope to make a significant increase either in its profits or its production. And, of course, the risks of losses in drought would increase seriously. We are pleased with the results which have been achieved on cattle in contrast to the loss on grain and on pigs, but I should not like your Lordships to feel that this very modest trading profit on cattle gives ground for greater optimism about the future of the scheme.

The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, has suggested that the character of the scheme has changed since it began. The original plan prepared by the Overseas Food Corporation envisaged that there would be 160,000 acres under sorghum at any one time, and that this would be used to produce pigs at the rate of 320,000 per year by 1950–51. However, immediately the Board of the Corporation was appointed, they realised that pig production at that rate could not be hurried and that they would have to go slowly after thorough investigation into the methods of production. That change was made in April, 1948, so it will not be news to the noble Lord. Then, while the Corporation were going slowly on pigs until they found out how best the job could be tackled, it was decided to go ahead with the production of sorghum for export to the United Kingdom. After two unsuccessful harvests, the Board decided that, until the Corporation had consolidated its position, the acreage should be limited to about 60,000 annually. It would be truer, I think, to say that the original plans have proved incapable of fulfilment, rather than that the character of the scheme has changed.

It has also been suggested that the Government ought not to economise too much on the scheme. Up to date, the total loss, as I have already said, is £A568,000. A great deal of experience has been gained, but the cost has been heavy.

LORD OGMORE

I did not say they should not economise. I am a believer in Government economy wherever possible. I said that the scheme should not be abandoned because of the expense. If it is possible to economise, well and good.

LORD CARRINGTON

I am glad to hear that the noble Lord believes in economy. I take his point. What I was trying to say is that we must be careful how we spend money, because we have very few resources and a great deal on which to spend the money. We must make sure that the money we have is spent in the most useful way possible. The noble Lord also said that he thought the responsibility for the scheme should be transferred from the Ministry of Food to the Commonwealth Relations Office. I do not feel, however, that this is the right time to consider a change of responsibility. Although the scheme has had disappointing financial results, and although we are all agreed that it will make a useful contribution to our knowledge of the problems of farming marginal land, the Corporation have by no means given up the objective of operating commercially. Indeed, they regard it as of first importance that this should remain their aim. Only by showing that their properties can be farmed successfully and on a sound economic basis can they hope to encourage such further development in Queensland as might make an important contribution to food production. Responsibility for this kind of project is more appropriate to the Ministry of Food, which is a trading Ministry, than to the Commonwealth Relations Office, whose functions are not commercial. If the question of responsibility is to be discussed, the right time to do this would, I think, be after the Corporation have made their review and a decision about the future of the project has been taken.

Many people, before the Queensland-British Food Corporation, have found the immense difficulties which lie in the way of development in some of the more marginal areas in Australia. The hazards of drought and bush fires which face many producers there are a constant challenge. We must all share the concern which the Corporation feel at the disappointing financial results of three years' hard work in the field. However disappointing it may seem to us here, your Lordships will realise how much more disappointing the results seem to the men in Queensland who have worked day in and day out to make the scheme a success. Yet, because of the results, I welcome the decision of the Board to seek independent advice on the future of the scheme in the light of the Corporation's experience up to date. It was originally envisaged that such a review should take place not later than seven years after the establishment of the Corporation. I think that, in view of the outcome of last year's harvest, the Corporation were wise to initiate the review now. I believe the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, thinks that the review is to be undertaken by the Queensland Government, but it is not. It is the Corporation itself which has initiated the review.

Here, perhaps, I may say how interested I was in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Rennell. It would not be right for me to act on what he has said to-day; rather should I wait until this review has been made. But I will certainly bring his remarks to the attention of the Chairman of the Corporation. The decision to have the review has been welcomed by my right honourable friend, the Minister of Food, and he will, of course, be consulted by the Chairman of the Corporation about the composition of the committee. The Corporation will announce in due course the names of the people who are to undertake this task for them.

I do not want to anticipate the results of this review. It will involve a comprehensive examination of the Corporation's experience so far, and its future prospects in the light of local conditions. When the Board have formed their view on the basis of this report they will submit their recommendations to the Government of Queensland and to the Ministry of Food. At that stage, it will be necessary for both partners to confer together about the future. We must all regret that this; scheme has not enjoyed the measure of success which at first seemed likely. The idea of the development of primary production in any of the Commonwealth countries is one with which we are all in sympathy. But we must make sure that the development is soundly conceived and is successful. We welcome this inquiry which the Corporation have initiated, in the hope that it will provide an independent assessment on which we can all form a clear view of the future prospects of the Queensland-British Food Corporation.

5.33 p.m.

LORD OGMORE

My Lords, we have had a full, frank and indeed, excellent exposition from the Minister. He has not, perhaps, answered my questions in quite the way I should have liked; but he has answered them, which is something, and he has given us a good exposition of the scheme as a whole. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, for supporting me and for having given us the benefit of his personal experience in Australia. I think the debate has shown, if nothing else, how unreal are so many speeches that we hear from the public platform, and so many articles that we read in the Press, by people who glibly talk about the Commonwealth as if it were necessary simply to turn on a tap and out would pour bananas, sugar, cattle and a hundred-and-one other benefits. There are many problems which we have to solve, and I hope that one of the fruits of this debate in your Lordships' House will be that the public will become a little more educated in this matter, and will be prepared in due course to make the necessary sacrifices which are implicit in Commonwealth development.

One matter which surprised me in the noble Lord's speech was what he said about the Government's decision concerning what I may call the overlording responsibility for the scheme. When we were in office there was hardly a noble Lord on this side who did not press us to remove this scheme, and others of its kind, from the Ministry of Food, either to the Colonial Office or to the Commonwealth Relations Office. In my own view the test should be whether the scheme is a commercial one or whether it is a pilot scheme. Primarily, of course, every pilot scheme will have a commercial aspect. If this is not primarily a pilot scheme, as I think, why are the Ministry of Food spending a half of £250,000 with the prospect of getting no cattle and very little sorghum? If it is a commercial scheme, it is not worth the candle so far as the British taxpayer is concerned.

LORD CARRINGTON

What is really wanted is a scheme that will prove to the people of Queensland that it is possible to make a commercial success of producing sorghum, cattle and pigs; and that is what this scheme seeks to do.

LORD OGMORE

That is what I meant: something that shows people what may lie ahead.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY)

A pilot scheme is a scheme which will show that things can be grown there. A commercial scheme is one which shows that things do grow there and can be made to show a profit.

LORD OGMORE

That is a distinction without a difference, and perhaps we are splitting hairs. I know that if you go to a farmer in Africa and say to him, "You ought to grow a new crop," or, "You ought to grow your crops in a different way," he will say, "You try it and show me that I am going to make money out of it; if you can do that, I will try it." I have had that sort of thing said to me by farmers in Africa. That is the real test of a pilot scheme: whether you can grow things in a certain place and whether, if you can do so, you can grow them at a profit, as the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has just said. This pilot scheme should not be under the Ministry of Food. It should be under the Colonial Office in territories for which the Colonial Office is responsible and under the Commonwealth Relations Office in the territories for which that Office has direct responsibility—or, as in the case of the Dominions, where it has a diplomatic responsibility. Here I am trying to increase the responsibilities of the Department of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, and he is not saying a word. I should have expected him to jump up and support me. I think we have had a very interesting debate, and I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.