Lords Sitting of 21 November 1951

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
Several Lords—Took the Oath.

MESSAGES FROM THE KING
2.37 p.m.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, I have the honour to present two Messages from the King, signed with his own hand. The first Message is as follows:
"I have received your Addresses praying that the Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Act, 1945, and the various Defence Regulations and enactments which you specify be continued in force respectively for a further period of one year until the tenth day of December, nineteen hundred and fifty-two. I will give directions accordingly."
The second Message reads as follows:
"I have received your Addresses praying that the Patents (Extension of Period of Emergency) Order, 1951, and the Registered Designs (Extension of Period of Emergency) Order, 1951, be made in the form of the respective drafts laid before Parliament. I will comply with your request."

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
2.38 p.m.
EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, I should like to take this opportunity of informing you that the Foreign Affairs debate will be interrupted al about 4 o'clock, when Lord Ismay will make a statement on the closer association of Central Africa. A further statement I have to make is that we shall continue with the Foreign Affairs debate until it is finished. In other words, we shall not adjourn for dinner but sit right on, as we did last week.

FUTURE OF BECHUANALAND
2.39 p.m.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government when it will be possible to report on the visits of the official observers to Bechuanaland and to announce the Government's policy in the matter.]
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (LORD ISMAY): My Lords, the reports of the observers who went to the Bechuanaland Protectorate in August are among the papers on Bamangwato affairs which I am at present carefully studying. Until I have made myself fully conversant with this complicated problem, I cannot make any statement on Government policy. But I hope to publish the observers' reports at an early date.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I am grateful to the Secretary of State for that reply.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
2.40 p.m.
LORD HENDERSON LORD HENDERSON rose to call attention to the international situation; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in opening this debate on the international situation, I should like to begin by offering my congratulations to the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, on his appointment as Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office. I think that perhaps the noble Marquess who leads the House and I can understand better than most noble Lords the feeling of satisfaction and pride which the noble Marquess must have experienced when he found himself appointed to the great State Department in which his father served as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I will not say that I hope the noble Marquess's stay there will be a long one, because I suspect that I might be accused by noble Lords on the other side of political insincerity. What I can do is to say that I hope that his tenure of office will be as interesting officially, and as happy personally, as was my own.
The Foreign Secretary since he took over his high office has made two major speeches, both of which we welcome. There was, quite naturally, throughout the world, widespread interest in those first pronouncements of the policy to be pursued by the new Government. For six years, Labour Governments have been responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs, and their principles and aims were well known; but with the change of Government there were many, not only in this country but elsewhere also, who wondered whether there would be any important change in British policy. Were we to have what is known as a strong foreign policy, and, if so, what would it involve? It seems that we need no longer wonder or speculate. We now know from the Foreign Secretary's speeches that the basic principles and aims of British policy in world affairs will not undergo any radical or material transformation. I listened to the Foreign Secretary's speech in another place on Monday, and even on Persia it seemed to me that the peaceful settlement which he hopes may be reached and the nature of that settlement correspond closely with what the late Government sought to obtain. I hope I am right in my assessment of Mr. Eden's speeches, and that the policy which he intends to follow will be substantially that to which the Labour Government sought to give effect; for on the basis of such a national policy it should be possible to have broad national unity, which would strengthen his hands in his work for peace.
There is no dispute about the cardinal problem in international affairs being the East-West division of the world. That is the root of most of our international difficulties and tensions. But I think I can say that it was not of our seeking or making. I do not believe that the primary cause of it is to be found in the opposing philosophies of East and West, though that is a factor. We have it on the authority of Premier Stalin that there is no reason why the Communist East and the free West should not be able to exist side by side. That is what we want. If we have doubts whether Premier Stalin means what he has said, it is not because we are endowed with a double dose of original sin; it is because Russia's policies and actions belie his words. We have only to look at some of the causes of the deplorable in-
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ternational situation: frustration of peaceful progress under the United Nations because of the unreasonable use of the veto by Soviet Russia; war in Korea because of Communist aggression; the delays in getting an Austrian Treaty because of Russian obstruction; the continued denial of unity to Germany because Soviet Russia insists on keeping her iron grip on the Eastern Zone; and the costly and burdensome rearmament programme which the Western Nations have had to shoulder because of the maintenance by Russia of armed forces and armaments far in excess of peace-time requirements. This is only a part of the formidable list that could be cited.
As Mr. Eden said, it is the depth and width of the forbidding chasm that separates East and West, mentally as well as physically, that is so disheartening for the present and so alarming for the future. Somehow or other that chasm has to be bridged, somehow or other the deadlock of minds has to be broken, before we can move into a more promising international climate. The difficulty is to get at the minds of the small group of rulers in Russia who dictate policy and who alone have the power to change or modify it. For that reason I personally have come to the view that it would be a mistake to rule out altogther a meeting at what is called "the highest level." The question of the timing of such a conference, if it were found to be desirable, would obviously require careful thought. I do not imagine that any one of us would regard the immediate future as the right time. I recognise that one of the strong arguments against such a meeting is that it would, like other conferences, involve the risk of failure, and failure in this case might even deepen our anxieties. But if we find that the deadlock between East and West cannot be broken by normal diplomatic and conference methods, would it not be wise to consider whether an effort should not be made to get things moving through a meeting of national leaders?
But the need for such a high-powered effort may not arise. As the defence strength of the West increases, it may enable satisfactory results to be achieved by the method of Foreign Ministers' and other conferences called to deal with definite and limited problems. That is the method which Mr. Eden regards as most promising, on the basis of his

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formula of "preparation, conference and agreement." That is the traditional and well-tested method of negotiating international settlements, and there is no reason to suppose it would not prove successful in these difficult times were the Soviet Government to participate with the sincere intention of collaborating for genuine agreements. I have faith to believe that if a successful start could be made along those lines on a particular problem, it might prove the beginning of a developing process that would gradually lead us all on to firmer ground. But patience and perseverence are called for. I do not think that any one of us expects any sudden change in Soviet policy or any swift transformation of the present international situation.
The Foreign Secretary has explained in another place the present state of negotiations in Korea for a cease-fire and an armistice. The position seems to be a little more hopeful than it appeared to be a short while ago. Agreement on the military demarcation line has been reached and attention is now being turned to the two questions of supervision and release of war prisoners. If success at this first stage is achieved, there will then be the opportunity to negotiate a peace settlement for Korea itself. Agreement on that would open the way for the third stage, which would be to consider other important political issues in the Far East which will still have to be settled. It would be impossible, I think, to exaggerate the relief that would be felt throughout the world if peace and co-operation were established in this important area, or the beneficial effects it would have on the relations between the Western world and the great continent of Asia. A successful outcome of negotiations on Korea and the Far East might, indeed, open the path to other agreements on problems nearer home. We share in the hope that there will be a successful outcome to the present negotiations, and that the United Nations representatives will do their utmost to assure that successful result.
My Lords, we on these Benches also wholeheartedly welcome the disarmament initiative taken by the three Western Allies. Huge armaments are not only a symptom of international tension; they are also a cause of international tension. I do not think that any of us really
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regards massive armaments as the best way to ensure peace. I noticed in the Daily Telegraph the other day the following statement:
"There is no Western Power, least of all this country, which would not be overjoyed to be relieved of the present burden of building up defensive strength."
I am convinced that that view is true, and that it represents the feeling of all Parties in Parliament and of the people in the country. And I am sure that it is a matter for national satisfaction that His Majesty's Government have closely identified themselves with this new disarmament initiative.
In the light of post-war experience, there will be general agreement that the linking of conventional with atomic weapons is not only a sensible and constructive proposal but a necessary one if progress is to be made. What is required is a scheme that will be fair to all, will be foolproof, and will deny to all nations alike any possibility of snatching an advantage by evasion. If there is to be real disarmament, there must be confidence both in the plan and in its implementation. Disclosure, verification and control, and the proposal that each stage must be faithfully fulfilled before moving on to the next stage, go a long way to providing these necessary safeguards. The aim is an all-in and an all-fair plan for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments. I feel that the three Governments deserve our thanks and approval for the practical lead that they have given at the United Nations. I hope that they will not relax their efforts to get an agreed scheme. While we must recognise both the political and technical difficulties involved, to get an arms pact would be an outstanding achievement, and one that would make a decisive contribution to the pacification of the world.
We are agreed that in existing conditions we cannot afford to let up on our defence programme. Its economic and social effects are so serious that no reasonable mind could suppose or suspect that we were undertaking it except as an imperative duty. It is a demonstrable consequence of Russia's policies and actions. We shall go on bearing the burden because we must and as long as we must, not for aggression, not for a preventive war, but to prevent war and to enable the British Government to speak

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and negotiate on a basis of equality with Soviet Russia. We need have no doubt that that is both right and prudent. What is called "the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union," we are told by Mr. Beria, one of the Politbureau rulers of Russia, "is based not on weakness but on strength," and the Soviet Union's "armed forces have all types of the most up-to-date weapons." How, then, can we be accused of evil intentions if we, too, seek to put ourselves in a position of strength, so long as a disarmament plan has not been agreed to and put into operation by all armed and arming Powers?
My Lords, we support the Government in their decision—which was also the decision of the late Government—to stand by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty until some new arrangement is made for the defence of the Suez Canal and the Middle East area. It is right that the four Powers responsible for the new Middle East defence scheme should proceed with their plan, despite its summary rejection by the Egyptian Government. We are living in an anxious world in which collective defence on a regional basis, entirely in harmony with the principles of the United Nations Charter, has perforce had to be developed. The European and Atlantic Powers have found it necessary to set up the North Atlantic defence community, and the underlying reasons for that are identical with those which have led to the proposal of a Middle East defence organisation. No one in the West wishes or seeks to interfere with the sovereign rights of the Middle East countries, but, in my view, no independent nation which is a loyal member of the United Nations can evade its share of responsibility for the collective maintenance of peace or defence against potential aggression, especially when its own security is at stake.
What has been proposed in the Middle East does not involve the acceptance of any obligation which we and a large number of other independent nations have not already accepted under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. If there is to be pooled security, there must be pooled defence. We share the hope that the Egyptian Government will have second thoughts; that they will seriously examine the proposals which have been submitted to them, and that wiser counsels will prevail. As I have said, these pro-
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posals are consistent with the principles and the basic obligations of the United Nations Charter. On the other hand, the action of the Egyptian Government in denouncing unilaterally the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty is contrary to the Charter, and I would add that loyalty to international engagements is in itself an important protection for the smaller Powers. I would also stress that the 1936 Treaty would come to an end with Egyptian acceptance of the Middle East collective defence plan.
The accusation that Britain is actuated by motives of imperialism is completely false. No nation in modern times has clone so much for the attainment of independence by other nations. I hope that Egypt and other Arab States in the Middle East have taken note of the statement made by the Pakistani Foreign Minister last week at the United Nations General Assembly. The words of this distinguished Moslem statesman must surely carry some weight. In the course of his speech Sir Zafrullah Khan pointed to the courageous example of Britain which, he said, had shown a measure of political faith unprecedented in constitutional history in having agreed to the creation of the sovereign States of Pakistan, India, Burma and Ceylon. Arab states in the Middle East will no doubt remember similar helpful action nearer home by this country. There is one hard fact which neither the Egyptians nor the Western nations can afford to ignore. It is certain that, without British help on a massive scale, Egypt would have been overrun and laid waste in the late war, and it is simply illusory to believe that Egypt, which occupies a key position in the Middle East area, could in the reasonably foreseeable future build up and maintain defences which would give her security from a major military aggressor.
That position is not peculiar to Egypt. It applies to other countries which have not hesitated to join in collective defence efforts for their mutual security. No question of derogation of sovereign rights has been involved. I am sure that we all realise what a serious thing it would be if the nations co-operating for the collective defence of the Middle East were faced, not only with a non-co-operative Egypt, but with a hostile Egypt. What we want is a friendly and co-operating Egypt, and I hope that terrorism will be

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called off and that there may be a resumption of conversations—as there must be sooner or later—which will lead to the willing association of Egypt with her friends and allies for the benefit of the security of the whole Middle East area.
I wish now to say a word about Germany. The German problem is the clearest proof in Europe of the chasm between East and West. There is perhaps no issue upon which an agreed solution would contribute more effectively to easing the present strained situation. In view of the Paris Conference of deputies in the summer—a Conference which proved to be completely abortive—the prospects of an early agreed solution cannot be held to be bright, but there can be no doubt that what the vast majority of the German people, in the East as well as in the West, desire above all else is the unification of their country. They have a passionate longing to be together again as members of one family, living on the basis of unity with freedom. That is a very natural and understandable longing. The enforced division is, in my view, an international wrong as well as a national injustice. But unity will never be brought about so long as Soviet Russia bars the road to unity.
It remains to be seen whether a helpful step in the direction of unity will be taken as a result of the United Nations discussion on the proposal to appoint an international Commission of Investigation to determine whether conditions exist in the Federal Republic, in Berlin and in the Eastern Zone for the holding of free elections. The Federal German Chancellor has declared that the foremost object of the policy of his Government is the restoration of German unity in a free united Europe, and that such unity must come from the free decision of the German people as a whole. That has been one of the aims of the three Western Allies for a long time, and they sought to obtain agreement on it at the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in Paris in 1949. Their efforts then were in vain, because the Soviet Government would not agree to co-operate. The present proposal would not, of course, bring unity, but it would be an important first step. Whether the Soviet delegate will continue to play according to past form, or whether he will use the opportunity to display a more co-operative attitude remains to be
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seen. But if agreement can be reached it would be welcomed, not only throughout the whole of Germany, but also throughout Europe.
The object of Western Allied policy towards Germany was stated by the three Western Foreign Ministers after their Conference at Washington last September to be the inclusion of a democratic Germany, on a basis of equality, in the Continental European community, which itself will form part of a constantly developing Atlantic community. They also said that they would instruct their High Commissioners to negotiate mutually acceptable agreements with the Federal Government which would have the effect of completely transforming their relationship with the German Federal republic. Discussions on the European Army have since been going on in Paris, and the results of these discussions will no doubt be reported to the North Atlantic Treaty Council at its meeting in Rome next week.
But at the same time negotiations have been carried on in Bonn on the Treaty which is intended to give Germany equality. I know that there were some difficult and complicated problems to be resolved before the master agreement and the series of contractual documents could be completed. I do not know whether the major agreement has yet reached its final stage, subject to decisions which may be taken at the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in Paris to-morrow.
It may be that what the Conference is intended to do is to discuss the points upon which agreement has not yet been reached, with a view to the Allied Foreign Ministers giving new instructions to their High Commissioners in the light of agreement on principles in Paris. I do not ask for information at this stage. I wish only to express the hope that the three Western Foreign Ministers will go as far as they can, and as speedily as they can, to bring the negotiations to a point where, to use Mr. Eden's words, we shall have approached a normal peace-time relationship with the Government of Bonn. Part of the decision at the Washington Conference was that the political agreements and the agreement for a German armed contribution to Western defence should come into force simultaneously. So far as I am aware, that is still the intention. If, however, there is to be a long interval

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between the completion of the political agreements and the signing of the European Army treaty, that would, in my view, be a good reason for reconsidering this part of the Washington decision. Once the political agreements have been completed and signed, to delay their operation for any length of time would, I believe, seriously diminish the value of a most important political development.
I realise, of course, that these are matters on which the British voice is only one of several; but when the Western Allies, rightly, chose a policy of progressive liberalisation towards Western Germany, and rejected the policy of keeping a tight grip on a defeated enemy, they decided that German democracy was worth encouraging and supporting, and that a democratic Germany had a place in the free West. To end the Occupation, to replace the High Commissioners by Ambassadors, to transform in law the Occupation Forces into Western Defence Forces—as, indeed, is already the fact—and to give Federal Germany the status of equal partnership with the West, will be a stroke of enlightened statesmanship. I will add only that we welcome the renewal by His Majesty's Government of the invitation to Doctor Adenauer to visit this country. But for the General Election his visit would already have taken place. I believe that such a visit will have a beneficial effect on the friendly relations and growing understanding which have been developed between the two peoples.
The last point to which I wish to refer is the application of Italy for membership of the United Nations. We are in full agreement with the Government's cordial support of Italy's request. By all accepted tests Italy's rightful place is in the United Nations, and I hope that a favourable decision may be reached at the present session. I go further: I hope that we shall soon see an end to the policy of exclusion of applicants on grounds which are not in harmony with the Charter. I remember that in one of our Foreign Affairs debates—I think it must have been some time last year—the noble Viscount the Leader of the Liberal Party, or his distinguished colleague the noble Earl, Lord Perth, spoke in favour of the universality of the United Nations and deplored the vetoing of nations who wished to become members. I forget how many such States there are but they are a good number,
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some behind the Iron Curtain and some in the free West. I believe that this exclusion is contrary to the spirit and intentions of the Charter, and that its practical effects are bad. I hope the Foreign Secretary will do all he can to put an end to this policy of exclusion, and that he will stand by the principle of universality, which can be made effective only by dealing with the accession of new members strictly on the basis of the Charter. We want neither exclusions nor horse trading on a matter which should be above disagreement and veto within the world organisation for peace.
My Lords, I realise that there are many problems which have not been touched upon; but I also realise that there are a large number of speakers to follow me. As a member of the Party which believes in fair shares for all, I hope that I shall receive some approval from your Lordships for not taking an undue amount of the time of this debate. I beg to move for Papers.
3.16 p.m.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, the noble Lord who has just spoken has surveyed the whole field of present-day foreign affairs, as is customary on such occasions by the spokesman of the Opposition Front Bench; and he has done so with admirable concision and brevity. There have been some complaints from one or two quarters during the present Session about the inordinate length of speeches that is now sometimes experienced by your Lordships' House. The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, is one of those who protested, and the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon, was another. The best after-dinner speech has been defined as one that is shorter than anyone had even dared to hope. I do not know whether the same test should apply in a speech in a legislative Chamber; but undoubtedly concision is a virtue, and undoubtedly there have been departures from it in your Lordships' House—particularly from the various Front Benches, including my own and in my own person, for I also must plead guilty. Therefore, I do not propose to attempt a complete survey and will deal with only two points.
My text for the first will be a paragraph in the gracious Speech—and this debate is really an extension of the debate on the Address, for we have postponed until to-day any special references

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to foreign affairs. The gracious Speech said:
"My Government will faithfully support the United Nations as the World instrument for peace and security."
That seems to me to be the essence of the whole matter, and the most important thing of all is to exalt the United Nations as the one hope of securing harmony and the maintenance of peace in the world. But if it is to be a world instrument it must itself be universal; and my first point is identical with the last which was made by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, namely the necessity of completing the membership of the United Nations. The noble Lord was good enough to refer to a speech which I made in your Lordships' House in July of last year, when I stated as fully as I could the arguments in favour of this proposal. I returned to the subject again, when the occasion offered, in September of last year, but I received at that time no support from any other quarter, inside this House or out of it, so far as I can recollect. We may find the first step to a world détente if only all the nations can be brought together to conferences of the United Nations. They could then talk among themselves and fully express their differences; and each one could be called upon, in the full glare of world publicity, to defend any actions that it may take.
At the present time, fourteen States are excluded. Immediately after the ending of the war, when the United Nations was first founded, Spain was excluded from membership, for the reason that the present régime in. Spain had been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, and was still so closely associated with those who had been the aggressor States. Those considerations have passed into the historic background. The Axis has disappeared; its very name is almost forgotten. Surely the time has come when that embargo on Spain should be lifted. In 1947, two years later, Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary applied for membership, and they were all excluded by the votes of the Western Powers, for the reason that those countries were not observing the Charter with respect to human rights. In reprisal, the Soviet vetoed the admission of Italy, Finland, Jordan, Portugal, Eire, Austria and some other States. The present Government of
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China has been excluded, and the seat allocated to China in the Security Council is held by the so-called National Government of China, although that Government represents no part of China except the island of Formosa. With respect to the exclusion of States for the reason that they are not observing the Charter on human rights, we cannot possibly enforce by international action our own ideologies in the internal politics of other countries. Although those three countries were excluded because they had undertaken by treaty to observe those civil rights, which made their non-observance an international matter, it is of very doubtful wisdom to bind nations by treaty to carry on certain internal policies and then hold them guilty of infractions of international law if they do something in their own internal affairs which we dislike and which is forbidden by those treaties. Indeed, the conception of the United Nations purports to forbid that, for one of the paragraphs of Article 2 says:
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State …"
As to the internal treatment of their own subjects by Russia, Czechoslovakia, Poland or any of the other nations that are associated with the Soviet, I do not know that they differ in any degree from that of which Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria have been guilty. Yet, no one would for a moment suggest expelling Russia and these other States. Why then should we exclude others which have adopted exactly the same policy? If Russia and her associates were to withdraw from the United Nations, and if the present Government in China, instead of being an applicant eager to come into the United Nations, were to refuse to come in, that would be the greatest blow which the United Nations and the world could suffer, for one half of the whole of the globe would be excluded from its purview. And just as the League of Nations collapsed, mainly, because the United States never joined and because, later on, Germany and Japan withdrew, so the United Nations would collapse because its membership was only partial and, as might be said, partisan.
Twice I have brought this matter before the House, as I have said, with no support. Public opinion, however, appears to be moving, for I read in a leading

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article in The Times only a few days ago paragraphs deprecating these exclusions and counter-exclusions and using these words:
"There is a strong case for abandoning this undignified bargaining … and for agreeing to admit all nations who can fairly claim to be independent and who are not engaged in a war of aggression."
Evidently that means China in present circumstances. But as soon as the Korean question is settled, undoubtedly the seat which belongs as of right, under the terms of the Charter, to China—that is, to China, not to any particular Government of China—must be occupied by the Government which is governing practically the whole of that vast territory.
Then there is the statement made two days ago by the Foreign Secretary on this very point, and I venture to quote it at length—it is well within the rules of Order in this House—because it is of the utmost importance to this question and to the whole situation. Mr. Eden said:
"We in this House and in this country deeply regret that Italy is still excluded from the United Nations where, by every standard, she deserves a seat. We shall continue to do our utmost to secure her admission."
When an honourable Member interrupted to say
"And others too."
Mr. Eden replied:
"Yes, and others."
He went on:
"I approach these problems with a new mind and I agree with the honourable Member. I have certain views about this problem, which I am not going to put forward this afternoon. I will let them develop a little bit. It is desirable to have others, but I do not like bargains of that kind very much. I should like to see the United Nations much more representative than it is at the present time. How that can be done is a matter on which I am not going to embark at the present time."
Last night the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs returned to the point, reasserted his view and re-emphasised what he had already said. I am sure that those who share these opinions will be greatly encouraged by the forthright statement which has just been made by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, in which he is clearly speaking on behalf of the powerful Party which he represents here to-day. I venture to ask the Government and, more particularly, the Leader of the House, Lord Salisbury, who is himself one of the founders of the United Nations,
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having been at the San Francisco Conference together with Mr. Eden, whether he thinks there is any prospect of carrying into effect a policy such as has been adumbrated both by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, and by myself, that of making the United Nations what it was intended to be at the outset—the Parliament of Man.
Unhappily, however much we may desire to exalt it, the United Nations has proved useless to take any military action needed in any conflict involving one of the great Powers. In the Charter, a long section of ten Articles is devoted to provision for establishing a Military Staff Committee of the United Nations, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Powers represented in the Security Council. They arrange for contingents to be furnished by members whenever the Security Council think that military action is necessary. Those Sections were of great value in the case of Korea, and swift and effective action was, in fact, taken, under the magnificent leadership of the United States. But when it comes to any possible Third World War, how is it conceivable that the United Nations could take steps beforehand, through a military commission, when one member of that Commission would be the great Power which, in the opinion of the majority of the members of the United Nations, could be the only cause of a Third World War?
How can they sit down to make plans for armies and navies and an air force to put down an aggressor, when all of them know in their own minds that the possible aggressor is himself one of the members of that particular Staff Committee? In such circumstances, we have had to abandon hopes that those Articles of the Charter could be put into force, and the peace-loving members of the United Nations, the democratic members, have had to form regional organisations, or to maintain such unities as we have already achieved, the British Commonwealth itself, for example. The chief of these organisations is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: that is the principal body to ensure joint defence in any possible world war.
Now I come to my particular point—the relationship of this Organisation to the European movement and to European Union. European Union cannot, in itself, be a substitute for the North

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Atlantic Treaty Organisation. You may stretch the Atlantic to Turkey and Greece, but you cannot attempt so much violence to geography as to stretch Europe to cover America; and since the United States is the main factor in any measures for joint defence, it is obvious that our attention must be mainly devoted to the North Atlantic Organisation, rather than to the European Union. Nevertheless, the European Union is obviously good in itself. Anything that brings the nations together and provides for common action is an advantage to them and to the world. The European Union is a very fine conception, and it ought to receive the greatest practicable measure of support from this country. But how this Organisation is to develop is not yet clear. There must be some political organ which will have authority to carry out measures agreed upon by the members of the European Union; it cannot remain merely as it is.
It was only yesterday, I think, that we read that the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, had nominated the eighteen members to go from this country to take part in the Assembly, which is now about to sit at Strasbourg. My noble friend Lord Layton is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, and he is there at the present time, otherwise he would be addressing your Lordships, instead of myself, from this Bench. These eighteen members are nominated by the Prime Minister personally, after consultation with the other Parties. They are not nominated by this Parliament; still less are they elected by the people. They have no representative authority of any sort or kind. They go as individuals. Consequently, while the other organ of the European Union, the Council of Ministers, represents Governments, and, therefore, what they say carries authority behind it, the Assembly does not yet do so.
There is evidently a quite proper and natural desire that some more formal organisation should be established for the Council of Europe. There are three possibilities. One is that the European Union should consist of a grouping of various functional authorities—those carrying out the Schuman Plan on iron and steel; an authority dealing with transport, with inter-European trade, and
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another dealing with currency exchange; that those should grow into one single whole, and that there should be one political authority emanating from them. That is one possibility, a functional body. The second is that there should be some kind of federal organ. That term has been very loosely used, in particular in France. It appears to mean any kind of organ that can be created, including a number of different States. That is a very loose and, as I think, improper use of the word "federal." According to political science and international lawyers, a federation is a body of States such as exists in the United States of America, Canada, Australia, the Argentine and elsewhere. It consists, in the first place, of a single body for the whole area, a Legislature elected directly by the people of the whole area, with an Executive to act for the whole area, and, simultaneously, a number of separate local legislatures and executives within the area, the functions of government being divided between the two. One has exclusively one set of functions, and the other exclusively the other set. The federation deals with foreign policy and defence, army and navy, and so forth, in peace and war, conscription and international trade and tariffs; the local States deal with other matters. It is of enormous importance that in regard to this question of Europe we should know whether or not we are working towards a federal conception in that sense. That is the second alternative. The first is functional, the second is federation.
But there is a third possibility which is hardly ever mentioned—namely, confederation. Confederation means that all the various Parliaments remain as they are and function as they are, but that there is created a new central body to which certain functions should be given. I venture to suggest to your Lordships that our thoughts should be in the direction of confederation rather than of federation. To my mind, a Federation of Europe, like a United States of Europe, and on similar lines, would be quite impossible, certainly in this generation and probably for a long time to come. It would mean that this Parliament in Westminster, the French Parliament in Paris, and others in Brussels and Rome, or wherever it may be, would all continue in existence but would have nothing to say on questions of foreign policy, defence,

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conscription, the finance that belongs to them or international trade. All those matters would be handed over to this central Federal Parliament of Europe, which would be directly elected by the whole of the peoples together, Britain providing perhaps fifty constituencies, Germany so many, France so many—a conjoint Parliament like the Parliament in Washington and a cosmopolitan Government of the same kind. I feel perfectly convinced that, however desirable such a step may be in theory, and however valuable it would be as a step towards a Government of the world, it would never be agreed to by this Parliament or by any other of the Parliaments of Europe. Consequently, it would only rouse false hopes and an enthusiasm that would never be gratified by achievement. In planning for the future we may have to depend for some time on the functional bodies, or we may be able to secure a confederation which should be a combination of the present Parliaments, though not a supercession of the present Parliaments and Governments.
Those are my two points. I would add a supplementary word on an entirely different question. I shall be very brief. I have nothing novel to say, only to express my full support to His Majesty's Government for the steps that they are taking with regard to Egypt and the Sudan. There, I think, there are no disagreements in the nation—a very different state of affairs from that with regard to Persia. Here we are standing upon International Law, the sanctity of treaties and the supremacy of the United Nations, and on the principle that if Egypt has any grievance it should be settled in the ordinary course of law, and by established procedure. With regard to the Sudan, the Condominium was set up fifty years ago because of the action by Great Britain in sending a great army and of the victory at Omdurman. The Egyptians had been driven out by the Sudanese in the previous decades. That army was victorious and a new Government had to be appointed in the Sudan.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: May I interrupt the noble Viscount to ask him whether he is aware that three-quarters of the troops engaged were Egyptian and that nearly all the expenses were borne by Egypt?
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: Three-quarters of the troops were Egyptian. I am not sure that if there had been no others there would have been any victory; the precedents of previous expeditions by Egypt might again have been repeated. However that may be, the Joint Government was established, in fact. There was an agreement—and one party cannot by itself break that agreement. If there is a partnership and one partner chooses to withdraw, the other party carries on; he is not obliged to abandon all his own rights, interests and duties. I say "duties," for we have undertaken duties to the Sudanese people and we hive set up there during fifty years, mainly through our own officers—men of great ability—what has been a model Government in Africa. And we have given pledges that that Government shall not be changed without the assent of the Sudanese people. We have brought the people a long way towards self-government and there is now a Legislative Assembly. That Legislative Assembly has, within the last few days, passed a resolution of strong protest against the course taken by the Egyptian Government, which the Sudanese Legislative Assembly wholly rejects. There must be consultation with the Sudanese people, and that consultation must take a form that may make it genuine and effective. It must be carried out in ways suited to the traditions and the present social organisation of the Sudanese people. I trust that this policy of adhering strictly to our pledges and right of consultation will be maintained in another part of Africa—the South African Protectorates—where similar pledges have been made on the full authority of successive Governments. I hope that these pledges will not be broken arid that that trust will not be betrayed.

CLOSER ASSOCIATION IN CENTRAL AFRICA
3.42 p.m.
LORD ISMAY: My Lords, may I interrupt the proceedings of the House in order to make a Statement which has just been made in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies? The subject is closer association in Central Africa, and the Statement is as follows:
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are convinced of the urgent need to secure the closer association of the three Central African territories; and they believe that this would best be achieved by federation, which they regard as the only form of closer association likely to meet the requirements of Central Africa. As your Lordships will be aware, a conference attended by my predecessor and the former Secretary of State for the Colonies, and by representatives of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, was held at Victoria Falls in September to consider the scheme for federation of the three territories put forward by the London Conference of officials last March.
His Majesty's Government have studied the statement issued at the conclusion of the Victoria Falls Conference (the text of which is being made available to-day in Command Paper No. 8411) and are in full agreement with it. In their view the recommendations of the London Conference of officials achieve the two essential aims of any scheme of closer association: they provide effective and representative machinery, both executive and legislative, for the handling of common Central African problems, and they contain full and adequate safeguards for African interests. His Majesty's Government would accordingly favour a scheme of federation between the three territories on the general lines recommended in the officials' report. They believe that such a scheme would be in the best interests of the African as well as the other inhabitants of the territories. They recognise that African opinion in the two northern territories has declared itself opposed to the proposals in the officials' report; but they trust that, in the light of the assurances agreed upon at the Victoria Falls Conference, and of the economic and other
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advantages of closer association. Africans will be prepared to accept them.
The assurances agreed upon at the Victoria Falls Conference are, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, of great importance. It was unanimously agreed that, in any further consideration of proposals for federation, land and land settlement questions, as well as the political advancement of the peoples of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, both in local and in territorial government, must remain as at present (subject to the ultimate authority of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom) the responsibility of the territorial Government and Legislature in each territory and not of any federal authority. It was also unanimously agreed that the Protectorate status of the two northern territories should be accepted and preserved; and that this excluded any consideration now or in the future of amalgamation of the three Central African territories unless a majority of the inhabitants of the three territories desired it. His Majesty's Government fully endorse these conclusions and in any federal scheme would ensure that these rights should be formally embodied in the constitution. His Majesty's Government take the view that the statement of the Victoria Falls Conference which excludes amalgamation of the three Central African territories without the consent of a majority of the inhabitants should apply equally to amalgamation of any two of the territories or any part of them.
His Majesty's Government wish, finally, to draw attention to two other conclusions of the Victoria Falls Conference. First, there was general agreement that economic and political partnership between Europeans and Africans is the only policy under which federation could be brought about in the conditions of Central Africa, and that any scheme of closer association would have to give full effect to that principle. Second, the Conference expressed grave concern at the dangers which would flow from any weakening or dilution of the British connection and British traditions and principles in the three territories and agreed that

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they should be so strengthened as to ensure that they should continue to prevail. His Majesty's Government regard these conclusions as of the utmost importance.
His Majesty's Government are most anxious that there should be no delay in reaching final conclusions on the future relations of the Central African territories. The Victoria Falls Conference agreed that before decisions could be taken by Governments further discussion within each territory and between the four Governments would be required. The Conference therefore adjourned and expressed the hope that it could reassemble in London about the middle of 1952. His Majesty's Government endorse this hope and propose that the resumed Conference should take place about July of next year. They will do all that they can to help ensure that the intervening period is used to the best advantage for the necessary discussions in Central Africa.
3.50 p.m.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: My Lords, I should like to thank the Secretary of State for making this Statement at this early opportunity. Obviously, it deals with a matter of the greatest importance, which merits and shall receive our closest study and consideration. I am sure the noble Marquess the Leader of the House will agree that this is eminently a proper topic on which we should have a debate. I do not think there is any urgent hurry and I am not suggesting a debate before the adjournment, but if I may make arrangements with him when we return after Christmas, I think he will welcome and think it proper that we should have a full debate on this important, difficult and interesting question.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, I rise only to say that I agree entirely with the noble and learned Viscount. It is desirable that there should be a debate on this question. There is no special hurry, as your Lordships know, because the proposed Conference will not take place for six months or more. I suggest that the noble and learned Viscount should communicate with me, through the usual channels, after Christmas.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
3.51 p.m.
Debate resumed.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING): My Lords, I am very conscious that there are members of this House who between them have had long and intimate contact with almost every aspect of foreign affairs. Indeed, their aggregate personal experience would constitute no small part of that diplomatic experience of centuries which, as my right honourable friend the Secretary of State indicated last Monday in another place, has been so precious an asset to this country and so valuable a contribution to the councils of the world. I have only very recently been projected by a kind fate into that field and at a moment which can scarcely be regarded as either placid or uneventful, and therefore, in entering for the first time upon a debate on the subject of foreign affairs, I would respectfully desire to take the opportunity to assure your Lordships that it will be my zealous endeavour to keep the House as fully informed upon all such matters as fall within the province of the Foreign Office as the complex and delicate nature of many of the subjects may at the particular moment permit. If I am sometimes obliged at least to appear more reticent than the House or I myself would desire, I can only hope that the reticence will be ascribed to discretion rather than to discourtesy.
I do not for one moment attempt to parade that approach as being in any way a notable innovation. It will only be following the example of, amongst others, my immediate predecessor, who was always ready to give to the House in general, as well as to individual members of it, the fullest information at his disposal. May I express my own deep personal gratitude to him for the kindness of his references to me with which he opened his speech upon the Motion in his name? Although it is to some extent a diversion, perhaps I may add this one personal coincidence for the interest of the House. When my father became Secretary of Slate for Foreign Affairs in 1931, it was his lot to take over from Mr. Arthur Henderson, with Mr. Anthony Eden as his Under-Secretary, and now

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we get the three names again involved, even though, unfortunately, some of the persons are different.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: A family business!
THE MARQUESS OF READING: A family business. I entirely agree with the thesis advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, in his speech, that it is, as it obviously must be, greatly to the public advantage if the area of foreign policy can be, within necessary limits, sheltered from the storm of Party conflict. There may come moments at which opinions on some issue may so far diverge that criticism becomes necessary, and certainly in those circumstances no Party could resent criticism from the Opposition. But, at the same time, I think the noble Lord would agree in his turn that the late Administration, throughout almost the entire span of its life, had the benefit of the steady cooperation in foreign policy of the Opposition Parties, and that it was a source of solid strength to that Administration in dealing with other Governments.
There can be little doubt that a united nation is able to make the most impressive contribution to the United Nations. That leads me to say this: there is at times a perceptible tendency in some quarters to depreciate or deride the United Nations Organisation, to hold it up as merely a platform for the exchange of insults or as a forcing ground for the propagation of intrigues. Yet ultimately such a view can be sustained only by emphasising their failures and ignoring their successes. Nobody to-day regards the letters U.N.O. as standing for "Utopia Now Open," but those who profess to doubt whether U.N.O. has any reality need surely look no further than Korea, where forces from sixteen different nations are ranged under a United Nations Commander in a struggle to defeat just the kind of aggression that the United Nations Organisation was created to resist. Nor, leaving out of account for a moment all other advantages of personal contact and discussion, do I know of any other audience than the United Nations Assembly before which my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could have delivered his memorable speech of last week and in so doing have made so
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immediate and universal an appeal to the nations of the world for reason, moderation and good will.
It is at least to be hoped that his plea for the abandonment of the practice of adding rhetorical insult to political injury may evoke some response from those at whom it was directly and deservedly aimed. Russian and satellite practice in this regard is no doubt all part of the technique of toughness. Yet I doubt whether any one of us who, as an individual, may fall, however inadvertently, into the error of adopting such an approach to those who differ from him, feels in retrospect that his tactics have advanced his cause. One would like to hope that the time had now come when a similar reflection might influence the policy of nations. One of the difficulties—and it is not a difficulty altogether to be lightly discounted—is that even when the Russians speak in a polite language, in so many respects they and we do not speak the same language. At this time, apparently, there is not current behind the Iron Curtain the same international political vocabulary as is current on our side. Only the other day someone who had recently attended an international conference at which delegates from the Iron Curtain countries were present told me that when a resolution was put to which some of the Iron Curtain delegates objected, and the Chairman expressed his intention of taking a vote, they immediately announced that nothing would induce them to participate in so undemocratic a procedure. Once you get up against the initial difficulty of not speaking a common language in these matters, it obviously greatly enlarges the gap beyond its already formidable limits.
I do not for one moment differ from the analysis of the situation in regard to the difference between East and West which the noble Lord gave in his opening speech, but our problems at the moment do not spring exclusively from Communism. I suppose that we all hoped that the militant and virulent type of nationalism in Germany and in other countries which was one of the prime causes of the late war would have proved to be one of that war's most welcome victims. But, though its sphere of influence may have shifted, its spirit unhappily survives. Whereas patriotism infers a love of a man's own country,

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nationalism apparently involves a hatred of everyone else's. It is always deeply impregnated with xenophobia, and though that characteristic may prevent nationalistically minded countries from embracing Communism as being an alien and imported creed, it does not facilitate our desire to live beside and among them in peace and harmony. Yet there is an old saying that "it takes all sorts to make a world," and our purpose is not to interfere in the internal politics of other nations, but to persuade them that, however widely the nature of their régimes and ours may differ, we can still fruitfully and amicably co-exist and co-operate for the benefit of mankind at large.
If sometimes we are inclined to be depressed by contemplation of the inflammable material with which the world is charged to-day, we can perhaps take comfort from the thought that there are also a large number of international bodies working together in a wide number of spheres with a remarkable measure of agreement and thereby making a continuous and growing contribution to mutual understanding and concord. I may perhaps add, as a result of my own brief experience in relation to these bodies, that it is no good to-day for a novice to endeavour to confine himself to learning the A.B.C. of foreign affairs; he is compelled at a very early stage to go through the entire alphabet and try and sort out the innumerable permutations and combinations of letters by which these various bodies are now designated. The House will, I think, agree that it is greatly to be hoped that, even if there are already a number of bodies, and perhaps because there are already a number of bodies, there will soon be added to such bodies the Disarmament Commission envisaged by the latest proposals upon limitation of armaments which last week were put by the United States, France and ourselves before the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris. May I interject that copies of the Resolution setting out the precise terms of those proposals can be obtained from the Printed Paper Office by anyone desiring to study them at leisure and in detail; and I may perhaps add that further light is certainly thrown upon them by Mr. Acheson's luminous exposition of their provisions on Monday last.
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It is not for me at this early stage of my initiation to attempt any what is sometimes called aperçue d'horizon upon the state of the world, even if the ground had not already been so exhaustively covered during the past two days by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State. In any case, my noble friend the Leader of the House will wind up the debate and can then set for himself as extensive an itinerary as may then be required. I shall try for the brief remainder of my speech to confine myself to answering, so far as I can, the specific questions and dealing with the specific matters which have already arisen.
May I begin by for a moment stepping backwards out of this debate to the debate upon the Address, and taking up a question which was put by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Jowitt, in regard to the position under the Colombo Plan? The position there is this. The Report on the Colombo Plan which was published last November reviewed the six-year programmes drawn up by India. Pakistan, Ceylon and the British Colonial and Protected Territories of South-East Asia. The total cost of executing those programmes was estimated at the not inconsiderable figure of £1,868,000,000, of which £1,084,000,000 will have to be provided by external finance. Shortly after that Report was published, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the United Kingdom contribution over the six-year period may amount to well over £300,000,000, which would include releases from sterling balances, and the following other contributions have also since been announced: from Australia at least £25,000,000 sterling, of which £7,000,000 will be available in the first year; from Canada, 25,000,000 Canadian dollars for the first year; and from New Zealand, £1,000,000 sterling for each of the first three years. It must be borne in mind, too, that in addition 237,000,000 dollars have just been appropriated by Congress under the Mutual Security Programme for economic aid to South and South-East Asia in the year 1951–52. It is plain. I think, that this appropriation is of great importance to the economic development of South and South-East Asia, and will contribute powerfully towards those objectives which the Colombo Plan has in mind.

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These contributions fall somewhat short of the original estimates of the needs of the area for the first year or so, but the movement of world price levels during the last year has altered the balance of payments of the undeveloped countries which are members of the Plan in their favour, and the figures in the original Report are therefore now out of date. But on a purely tentative estimate, it is now hoped that there will be sufficient finance available in 1951–52 to enable those countries to carry out their development programme for the year. Confirmation of that must await the next meeting of the Consultative Committee. On that basis, I can only assure the noble and learned Viscount that His Majesty's Government are extremely conscious of the need to proceed with the economic development of South and South-East Asia, and that they will continue to give full and firm support to the Colombo Plan. Indeed, they are now considering, in conjunction with other Governments concerned, whether a meeting should not take place at an early date at which the Committee can meet to discuss the progress made hitherto and to lay down lines for the future. Although last year Burma, Siam, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Associated States of Indo-China were invited to take part in the Plan, hitherto only the three Associated States—that is Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam—have decided to do so, and the Plan therefore remains to a large extent a Commonwealth affair. Nevertheless, we have again made further approaches to Burma. Siam, Indonesia and the Philippines and we await their reply. That, I hope, gives the noble Lord information as to the present progress of the position under the Colombo Plan and, at the same time, the Government's decision to go as far as possible to implement it.
The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, in the course of his speech dealt with the question of Germany, in which I know that both he and the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, have taken a very close and active interest in past years, when they were, in their turn, members of the Government. This matter has been very considerably discussed in another place in the last few days, and I do not want to develop the position at any length. But as regards the one particular matter which
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the noble Lord raised—the question of elections—he will remember that we put to the United Nations Assembly (at the suggestion, I think, of Dr. Adenauer) the proposal that elections should be conducted under the supervision of a United Nations Commission. Although the idea was not enthusiastically received by the Russians, at the same time one may hope that it will find its way on to the agenda and, in the end, will prove to be an acceptable method of dealing with the problem. The suggestion which came from the other side of the border, from East Germany, that elections should be carried out under the supervision of the four Occupying Powers, looks a little too much as if it meant that each Occupying Power should supervise the elections in its own Zone, and we have some hesitation as to whether that would be satisfactory in all four Zones.
The noble Lord was good enough to welcome the proposal—which indeed is not a new one—of Dr. Adenauer's visit to London. As he knows, Dr. Adenauer is to-morrow meeting the three Foreign Secretaries in Paris. Certainly it is our intention, as it was the intention of the previous Government, to proceed as rapidly as possible but, at the same time, with all the necessary care, towards the greater integration of Germany into the comity of European Nations. The noble Lord knows that, towards that position, there are at the present moment at work the two bodies to which he referred, the one dealing with what might be called the military aspect, and the other with the contractual arrangement, which is envisaged as altering the relationship between occupier and occupied. Obviously, that is not so easy a piece of negotiation that it can be very swiftly completed. At the same time, it is not a treaty; it is a contractual arrangement between the nations concerned, and they have to give some attention to the preservation of certain powers which, in spite of the conclusion of the agreement, they may still think it necessary to retain. Subject to that, one hopes that the steps being taken to advance that matter and bring it to a conclusion will not be long delayed. The sooner it comes the more greatly we shall be pleased, provided always, as I say, that it contains the safeguards which we hold to be essential for the future.
The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, dealt also with the question of Egypt, and I

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was grateful to him for the support which he gave to the attitude we have so far adopted in regard to Egypt, and also to the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, for his endorsement of that view, both in regard to Egypt and to the Sudan. I had the privilege of repeating in this House the other day a Statement made by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State in another place, and I think that Statement of our attitude gave general satisfaction to both Opposition Parties in the House.
May I deal for a moment with the questions which the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, raised in regard to a United Europe, and to the application of what has come to be called the doctrine of universality in regard to the United Nations Organisation? With regard to the position which the noble Lord, Lord Layton, raised the other day, here I think it is right to say that it is not due to any uncertainty about the position taken up by the British Government that there may have been what appears to be slow progress in connection with the Schuman Plan and the European Army. There are steps which had to be taken in regard to ratification of the Treaty which have not yet progressed very far. There are, of course, a number of difficult problems which have to be surmounted before any agreement on the military aspect can be reached. The general attitude was clearly stated by the Foreign Ministers in the Washington Declaration of September 14 last, and all the information we have is that it is perfectly clearly understood on the Continent. It is not our intention actually to enter into membership of those organisations, but we do desire to help, and we have shown our desire to help by providing observers to assist in the negotiations which have been going on under both those heads.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: This is a very important matter. I think I understood the noble Marquess correctly. When he said "those organisations" he means that it is not our intention to allow our troops to enter the European Army. Have I understood that aright?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: What I mean is that we are not prepared at the moment to enter either of those organisations, the Schuman Plan or the European Army plan. We have, how-
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ever, attended both meetings as observers, and we wish to be associated as closely as we may for the practical purpose of carrying out those plans once they are established, while, at the same time, not forgetting the peculiarity of our own position in regard to our relations with the Commonwealth countries and with our eyes upon the Atlantic. I hope that that may to some extent clear up the position. I do not want to go into the matter in much detail because, as the noble Viscount has pointed out, it had received much attention from my right honourable friend the Secretary of State, both in his opening speech and, also, in his closing speech, which the noble Viscount did not read. Perhaps I may be allowed to read an extract. In his speech [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons; Vol. 494, Col. 40] my right honourable friend said, referring to a speech of Mr. Younger, which had preceded his:
"He"—
that is, Mr. Younger—
"referred to the importance of ensuring that the United Nations should not become an anti-Communist alliance. I am in absolute agreement with him in that. Not only am I in agreement with him, but, as I think he probably noticed, there were some sentences in my opening speech in Paris which showed clearly my view on that point, and though I do not want to be drawn further at the moment I will say that I would like wider representation at the United Nations than there is now, even though that means that it must often come from the two different points of view."
Of course, the position is not quite so simple. I do not want to indulge in any prophecy but there has been a submission of an advisory case to the International Court of Justice, which has given two opinions as to the legality of the position as to the constitution of the United Nations, so to speak; and those two advisory opinions have still to be surmounted. I think I may leave it with the indication that my right honourable friend gave, that he certainly had not closed his mind to proceeding somewhere along the road of wider representation.
The other matters, I think, have been dealt with to a large extent in the speeches made by my right honourable friend in another place. I do not want to incur the reproach of having taken up too much time in your Lordships' House in the early stage of this debate. I hope that. so far as it is possible, these replies

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cover in the main the topics which have been raised up to now. For the rest, I can say only what I think is obvious: that we shall direct all our efforts to the two complementary aims of the preservation of peace and the maintenance of the rule of law. Your Lordships will, I am sure, agree that these aims are inseparably united, for when peace is disturbed the rule of law is at once imperilled; and when the rule of law is violated, peace is, in its turn, assailed. Yet the unalterable fact remains that the preservation of peace is the prerequisite to the survival in any recognisable form of that civilisation which, with all its defects, has over the centuries led mankind along an upward road.
4.24 p.m.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I should first apologise to the noble Viscount. Lord Samuel, for having interrupted his speech. There was no disagreement that the welfare of the Sudanese is the prime object of our policy; what I thought was that we must have a debate on the subject at some time. I also felt that the information we have up to now is sketchy and inadequate, and that the noble Viscount's remarks were less than generous to our Egyptian Allies in the joint campaign which was led by Kitchener. I congratulate the noble Marquess. Lord Reading, on his first speech from that Bench as a representative of the Foreign Office. We all welcomed the tone of Mr. Eden's speech. It was a great relief to hear that he was trying to check the full momentum of fostered hatred. I hope that we have come to the end of the calumny and slander which have prevented many people from making their honest contribution to the peace of the world by expressing their views. Furthermore, it was very encouraging to hear Mr. Eden say that in his judgment the best thing we could do would be to consider some field of endeavour in which there was a hope of progress. That was a helpful and encouraging suggestion. On the present occasion I am going to follow Mr. Eden's advice and deal with one thing only—the Middle Eastern defence scheme. Perhaps I ought to make it clear that I speak for myself; as I listened to my noble friend Lord Henderson, I thought it very necessary to make that point.
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We have in the Eastern Mediterranean a Four-Power Defence Pact, which means that we are so arranging our forces there that in the event of an attack we shall be ready with our defences. Only a few days ago I was presiding at the Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference at Istanbul. While I was there I spoke to many Turks. It is necessary for us, I think, to understand the Turkish approach to Middle Eastern affairs. It is not the same as the Arab approach; indeed, it differs widely. I apologised jokingly to one eminent official for having participated in the Gallipoli Expedition. He said without a flicker "We have forgotten all that; what we remember is the fidelity you showed in the Crimean War." It does not matter to the Turk whether the head of the Russian State is called the Emperor, or the Tsar, or Joseph; he is concerned with protecting himself against his powerful northern neighbour. The other members of the Pact are, of course, the United States, ourselves and France. I do not want to give offence, but I should not have thought the introduction of France would do much to sweeten our relations with the Arab States. But the curious thing about this Pact is that there are no Middle Eastern States in it.
I have been round that part of the world and talked to some of the people of the Middle Eastern States. One surprising thing is that, whilst some of the leading men are conscious of the world situation, most of the people are not thinking in terms of Russia at all. They say, in effect, that there may be a war but, if so, it would be a flatter for the "quality," not for people such as themselves. They say that they have their own local problems, and that they will try to keep out of the war. One of their local problems is their quarrel with the Jews, and the other is the occupation of the Canal Zone. If I can suggest any line of action or say something that might help in those directions perhaps I shall be faithfully carrying out Mr. Eden's suggestion.I will say first a word about Israel. Israel is a fundamental element in the restoration of the Middle East. If things go on as they are in the Middle East there may well be revolution. It is not possible for that area to continue with the standard

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of life and the difference between rich and poor which at present exists there. No social structure would stand it. In Israel, the most striking thing about it is not only the gigantic and heroic efforts now being made. En Israel nobody is doing nothing; everybody is working and they have managed to establish, at a cost of great economic sacrifice, a standard of ordinary life which is much higher than and most encouraging as compared with that of their neighbours. For instance, a man carries your bag to the ship. He is clean, efficient and quiet, and he refuses a gratuity. It is rather different from the scuffling underpaid porters that one knows so well in any other Mediterranean port. You can see it right down from Israel to Beersheba and from Beersheba down to the Gulf. Anything that can be done to let Israel be the leavening that will leaven the lump is well worth the attention of mankind.
The second thing is the problem of Arab refugees. I have a great deal of sympathy with the Arabs on this question of refugees. It is a very hard thing that the refugee problem should have been laid upon their doorstep. It is not of their making. Even a scanty reading of history will make it clear that it is not Islam that has persecuted the Jews. Worse infamies against the Jews were perpetrated by our own Christians centuries ago, and it is not fair that the Arabs should carry the burden of the refugee problem. I will not go into the question of how the refugees got there—it was a most foolish and wilful war which brought them there to Jericho and to other places. Something must be done to help them. If you go into Israel you find that the country is packed by these aluminium and tin huts sixteen feet by ten feet, new clean huts and each packed, but the doors are still open. Is anybody going to say that Ben-Gurion is wrong to keep the doors open? Would any man who is a true Jew say, when there are gathering clouds over the world: "I will shut the door of a Jewish home?" It is the first time that they have had a home since the destruction of the Temple. Nobody would say that, and yet that very fact makes it physically impossible to receive back these people. Therefore, I say that it is not fair that that burden should be laid on the Arabs.
What is the answer? It is said that 400,000 of these people come from German-occupied countries. They are
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the flotsam and jetsam of Hitlerism. They have to be accommodated. Moreover, the noble Earl, Lord Manvers, the other day raised the question of property—I am not talking about the restoration of individual property; I am talking about the taxation laid upon the Jews. If one could assess in money the guilt of Belsen and Dachau, I am informed that 1,500,000,000 dollars worth of money has been taken away from the Jews. Would it not be a good thing if, before we again set up the Reichstag, which in the past has not been remarkable for its devotion to democracy, we asked the Germans to make a contribution to the damage that has been done to world Jewry? It would take time, and might affect the quarrel between the Arabs and the Jews. At the same time, the Arabs and Jews that I have spoken to, men in authority and of influence and knowledge, have told me that they have not the faintest intention of attacking the other side. They fear that the other side will attack them. It is the old business in miniature, and if one could, by this non-aggression Pact offered in Paris the other day, get this problem out of the way, then we should begin to see that united Middle East which is the only solid base for a Middle Eastern pact or Middle Eastern defence against aggression.
I come now to another point—that is, the Canal. We have offered our assistance, on the Pact as offered, to all the Arab countries and we have done it with a prospectus (if I may use that term without offence) of a most attractive kind—"Give us the facilities for our troops to come in, and we will undertake that nothing we do shall impair in the least your sovereignty. The troops will go there in good will." What do they all say? These people are Arabs. They say: "Apply that in Egypt. How can we trust you when you still persist, against the wishes of the Egyptians, in having your troops stationed on the Canal?" Perhaps the noble Marquess will let me continue. I fear that he dissents on that.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I do dissent.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: That is a normal relationship. This Treaty of 1936, which is the only time the Egyptians have ever put pen to paper in a Treaty, was a great triumph for Mr. Eden. The Egyptians signed it because they were

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terrified of the Italians—that was one reason. Their signing was also due to the fact that we occupied the Citadel of Cairo and the barracks of Kasr et Nil. That is always a factor when you are negotiating. But, in my judgment, as regards that Treaty, they are in default in denouncing it and in failing to co-operate in the way that is laid down in the footnote to Article 8, or one of the Articles.
I want to ask the noble Marquess this question: How do we stand about this Treaty? I cannot understand the position and I ask for information. So many things have been said about it. We are allowed under the Treaty to have 10,000 men and 400 pilots in a specified area called the Canal Zone. May I refer to my own association with this area some five years ago? This matter has been "on the carpet" for a long time. We were due to get out of Cairo in eight years. In 1936 we did not go because of the war, and the Egyptians did not mind: it was all as between friends. The problem now is not as between friends but as between litigants. I want to ask the noble Marquess what force we have in Fayid. I cannot understand why we have this enormous force on the Canal. Are we going to fight the Russians or the Egyptians? Why does the Secretary of State for Air have to announce that he has just sent 10,000 men to Egypt by air? I do not know. I am not a soldier, but I cannot understand whom we are going to fight.
At the same time, I may ask the noble Marquess this question. Are our actions taken under the Treaty? In the gracious Speech, it was said:
"We shall proceed to assert our rights under the Treaty,"
and the Treaty says 10,000 men. Are we to have x thousand men more? Have we some right to do this or is it the same right that enabled Wolseley in 1882 to take Cairo with a squadron of Cavalry? Does this Treaty terminate in 1956? I understand that it does. Do we then start with a clean slate? If so, it does not matter. Five years is nothing. But a great deal has been said to indicate that the Treaty will not terminate in 1956. Anyhow, a Note was issued by the Foreign Office, saying there was no provision for unilateral denunciation at any time. If that means before the termination of the Treaty, cadit qtœustio; there
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is nothing in it. But if it means that we are going to keep the soldiers there, Treaty or no Treaty, then I think it requires some elucidation.
The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, and many other speakers, have adduced a new argument. In some way there is a moral obligation to accept forces if a body calling itself "the free world" insists on imposing it. I should like to have a little clarity on that point. We are told that we ourselves have agreed to American bases in Britain, so why should the Egyptians complain at having British troops? That is the argument. But suppose that we did not want the American bases? Would it be a moral delinquency to the free world if we asked the Americans to move the atom bomb bases somewhere else? It is dangerous to suggest that there is a moral obligation which enables strong Powers to impose bases upon weak Powers without the consent of those weak Powers. I hope that when he replies the noble Lord will deal with this matter.
My Lords, there are some soldiers present, and I hesitate to deal with the strategic question. In 1946 I spent a good many months on this question, and I should like to ask what is the military value of having these men in Fayid, performing their own labour and boycotted by the Egyptians? We talk about the Suez Canal. The Canal has become a sort of magic word. It was not the Canal that made Egypt a strategic centre. In the time of Alexander and Napoleon, Egypt was still a strategic centre in the world: the Canal had nothing to do with it. I am not saying that the Canal is not useful, although I believe that for about half of the last war it was not operated. In any case, it does not do to be too much obsessed with this idea of the Canal. Here, in peace time, to hold our position on the Canal we have to have these massive armed forces, expensive to maintain and being boycotted locally. In time of war, if we take the position as it is now, and as relations are at present between ourselves and Egypt, we should have to operate there by means of railways, every foot of which would he liable to sabotage. So the Middle East base comes to nothing in a military sense. If it were decided to land at Aleppo or Alexandretta, it would be impossible to get from Alexandretta without picketing every inch of our supply line, because the

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people are our enemies. Therefore, I put this question to the Government: Is not the good will of the countries who are cooperating of some military value?
As regards the soldiers, I have looked up and I remember well a wonderful letter which was sent by the noble Marquess's grandfather to Lord Cromer—in our family we were not his supporters; we had a photograph of Mr. Gladstone in our parlour. This letter said:—
"I would not be too much impressed by what the soldiers tell you about the strategic importance of these places. It is their way. If they were allowed full scope they would insist on the importance of garrisoning the moon in order to protect us from Mars."
That is the sort of common sense that we are accustomed to associate with the noble Marquess's famous grandfather.
I hesitated a great deal before venturing to address your Lordships' House on this subject, because we are surrounded by Ambassadors, people who know Egypt well, by Secretaries of State and by all sorts of people of great knowledge and vast experience. But I have had my own experience to which I shall refer. I have been there. I have known Egypt for forty-eight years. I had the great pleasure of entertaining Zaghlulo when he came to make himself tiresome to Lord Curzon. From April to October, 1946, I was engaged in attempted Treaty revision on behalf of Mr. Bevin in co-operation with Sir Ronald Campbell. During the time I was there I lived in two palaces in a terribly hot summer, and I had 150 servants. I was not allowed to go out without an armed escort, because of the recent murder of Lord Moyne. In order to pass the time, in addition to reading, I had a series of solo lunches to which all the Egyptian leaders were invited. They are willing and friendly people. Sometimes these solo lunches and the conversations lasted far into the afternoon. I had lunch with Conservative leaders and Popular leaders. They were most genial and, in their hearts, great friends of this country, and nearly all of them had been occupants of British prisons. I learned from them what they really thought, and if there is one fallacy which is likely to lead this country to dishonour and shame it is the belief that these agitations in Egypt are just a student affair.
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Why do the Government not call this off? We are not dealing with anything of that kind at all. We are dealing with a great patriotic movement. We have all seen such things. I have seen a lot of them. I was in the South African war, and I saw the Irish rebellion. My noble friend will remember that I tried to be Secretary of State for India. We must distinguish between crime and national feeling. Both have much the same manifestations, but they are quite different. You can always suppress crime, because public opinion is always with you. You can never suppress patriotism, because public opinion is always against you. Therefore, if we are going to proceed on the basis of the firm hand, the multiplied forces and so on, we are heading for disaster. Parliament will shortly be going away for seven weeks. I do not know how the situation in Egypt will develop in that time. I know that we desire friendly relations, but those can be based only upon one thing, and that is that no troops of any nationality are stationed in the independent Kingdom of Egypt without the consent of the Egyptian people. It may be said that that is just sabotage, that it will ruin our chances. But that is not so. In 1946, with the help of Mr. Bevin, we arrived at some such arrangement, and the soldiers consented to it. We had an arrangement by which our troops went away, and a joint military board was set up; and when the occasion arose we went back, in whatever force was necessary, to a willing and co-operative Egypt. I say that that, at any rate, is a pointer to something that might be of help in the present difficulties.
Secondly, when I hear Conservative speakers talking about the Commonwealth of which we are all so proud, they all seem to forget that we are the greatest Asian Power, and that in our Commonwealth there is the greatest Moslem Dominion in the world—Pakistan. My noble friend referred to some remarks about what we had done in India. We are proud of our achievements. But he did not mention that in Karachi there had been demonstrations on behalf of Egypt. I am not blaming him but the Government when I say that I was amazed that in Mr. Eden's speech there was no mention of the fact that in the last fortnight the Foreign Minister and

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the Prime Minister and the Governor-General of Pakistan have all offered their help. All we can offer is this skinny Middle-Eastern Pact, to which no Middle-Eastern people are attached. We can have it, but we must learn that in the Middle East, as in Asia, the people are demanding freedom: and in the Mediterranean, as well as elsewhere, freedom can be demanded only by free people.
4.49 p.m.
THE EARL OF HALIFAX: My Lords, the noble Viscount who has just sat down made the observation in the course of his speech that he was addressing your Lordships with some misgiving. I can assure him on behalf of all your Lordships that he has qualities of head and heart which will always make us anxious to hear anything he may have to say, even if, as I suppose may be the case, my noble friend who leads the House has some observations to make that will not be in complete agreement with everything the noble Viscount has said. All the speeches to which we have listened this afternoon have shown the immense assistance it has been to the House to be debating the subject of foreign affairs under the shadow of the comprehensive and able review given a day or two ago in another place by the Foreign Secretary, to which the noble Lord who introduced the Motion and the noble Viscount who spoke last paid very generous tributes. For it has had this merit: that against a background of the world picture—and no debate on foreign affairs can have for its theme anything less than the world—noble Lords have been able to select topics on which they feel strongly or have particular knowledge and can give your Lordships the benefit of their judgment. I hope I may exhibit, if not a vast store of knowledge, at least a similar measure of restraint, for I desire only to address myself to one subject.
In the briefest possible words, I wish to lay before your Lordships a few reflections that have formed themselves in my mind as the result of a two months' visit to the United States, from which I have just returned, and in the course of which I had the opportunity of much discussion with Americans of all sorts, right across that immense continent. If any justification were needed for my venturing to impose on your Lordships by speaking for a few minutes on that topic, it would
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be because of my conviction that at bottom, when much has been said on various topics that we may discuss in this House, such as how best to treat the problem of Germany, what may be the right solution of the problems of Indonesia or the Far East, how best to organise the forces of the Atlantic community, and the like, the whole fortune of the world ultimately depends on what is the broad opinion held in the British Commonwealth of Nations of the United States and on the broad opinion held in the United States of the British Commonwealth of Nations.
I hope I shall not be thought to be unduly presumptuous in making so large a statement and claim, but the conclusion that was left in my mind as the result of the opportunities I have had in the last two months—a conclusion which I checked to the best of my ability with those with whom I came in contact—was that on the international side of thought in America the mould was much more firmly set than would have been held to be in the case even two or three years ago. The large lay-out of the world and its implications seemed to me—and, as I say, my opinion was supported by that of those with whom I came in contact—to be very much more widely recognised by the great hulk of American citizens, with the result that any open advocacy of isolationist policy in the United States is to-day extremely rare. I wish we might all realise what an immense revolution in American thought that is. Any man who had predicted, even ten years ago, that that would be the position in 1951 would have been predicting something that to many Americans—indeed, to most Americans—would have seemed a fantastic illusion, and to a great many Americans would have seemed a most horrifying nightmare. Yet that thing has come to pass. And if we are to give a large share of the credit where credit is due, let us generously give it to Molotov and Vyshinsky and the wise planners of the Kremlin, for they have had a great deal to do with it.
That does not mean that Americans are happy about the rôle that world events have forced upon them. Indeed, how could any nation be happy, facing the cruel sacrifices of Korea, especially in the light of the revelations of the last few days. Still less does it mean that there is not violent criticism of the

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Administration in the foreign field—there is. But where such criticism is made it is, in my judgment, criticism rather of methods than of purpose. A man will criticise the methods of the Administration while emphasising all the time that he is as concerned as anyone else to secure the purposes to which the Administration is endeavouring to work. By and large, I think it does mean that the broad obligations of new responsibilities in the sphere of world leadership are widely accepted by the majority of the American people. With that I would couple this observation, which, I think, is not always appreciated at its full value in this country. While I think that what I have tried to say is true, I believe it is also true that the American acceptance of these new responsibilities of world leadership is largely, if not always consciously, based upon the assumption of continuity of partnership with the British Commonwealth of Nations. If that observation surprises any of your Lordships, I would say it is at least certainly true that the world situation would be very differently viewed now in the United States if the people there did not feel that that partnership was something on which they, on their side, could count. I do not think that there are any words either too generous or too great to acknowledge what has been done by America in her relations with this country—through the war, by Lend-Lease, and, since the war, through Marshall Aid.
Whilst saying that—and no one in the world feels it more strongly than I do—I do not suppose that any responsible American would attempt to delude any British visitor or himself with the idea that they had done those acts from any motives of pure philanthropy or simply with a view to creating a kind of large Santa Claus effect. They, like we, are intelligent enough to know that the recovery and the strength of the British Commonwealth of Nations is an essential and vital element in the security of the United States. Therefore, in my judgment, this partnership between the two, of which we speak so often, is something essential to both, and something to which each has a perfectly distinctive contribution to make. Moreover, I conceive it to mean something in regard to which my friend Mr. Herbert Morrison has no need
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whatever to be afraid of this country becoming the 49th State of the Union, any more than Colonel McCormick of the Chicago Tribune has cause to fear (as I think he has feared from time to time) that the United States may become the latest and the largest of the British Dominions. I think these things cancel one another. I think it is on that basis of recognised partnership, of mutual value to both sides, that the Prime Minister, when he goes to Washington in January, will have a great acclaim.
It does not follow from all that, however, that everything in the garden is beautiful. I should like to mention one or two things which in my judgment are less than beautiful. First, there is, as an earlier speaker recognised, the fact that for America China is always a tender spot, and it is a very tender spot to-day. I think any divergence of policy in that field—and here the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, who introduced the Motion, was quite emphatic—needs, and will need, the most careful handling. I do not believe there is any short cut out of such divergencies as exist to-day, and they must probably wait a better and different atmosphere for treatment. Nevertheless, the utmost care in the handling of them will always be necessary. The attitude that American opinion will take towards this country and the British Common wealth will, in the long run, depend largely upon the judgment they form about the efforts that we are making, first to help ourselves, arid secondly, to help Western Europe to resolve, in whatever may be thought the wisest manner, the real obstacles that exist in the way of closer and more effective unity.
Lastly, I should like to mention a consideration which has formed itself in my mind and which, although not generally stated in public, I feel is of some importance. Many Americans to-day appear to me to be greatly puzzled by, and resentful of, criticism of their international action. Being themselves very conscious of motives of the utmost benevolence, they see themselves the target of attacks based on mistrust and misrepresentation, and all expressive of a certain measure of dislike. Americans are much more sensitive to dislike than we British are. The reason is not difficult to understand. Up to a comparatively few years ago it

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was possible for them to adopt the posture, on some Olympian height, of detached and rather disinterested virtue. Being outside the hurly-burly, they were fairly comfortable, and were able to assert high purposes that were everybody's admiration and to feel that, if only other people were actuated by the same high motives, all troubles would be at an end. That was a very enjoyable situation in which they found themselves so long as it might last. But all that has now altered. They find it impossible to step down into the market place without stepping into opposition to something or somebody. What has been for us for centuries past a practice and a habit, and something to which we have been well accustomed, is quite new to the American people, and for that reason they mind it very much more than we do. The importance of that seems to me to be simply this: that it is right that we here should be aware of this attitude, because that is part of the setting in which the dangers of the future are to be appreciated, and it is important that we should appreciate them correctly.
In my opinion, those dangers of the future do not arise from what I would call differences of method in the pursuit of a really common policy—and by "common policy" I mean a policy concerning the ends of which each partner has real confidence in the other. For example, I do not think that the recognition of Communist China, annoying as it was to America, or the American approach to Franco, annoying as it was to us, really matter unduly, because each is at bottom convinced, I hope, of the main purposes the other is trying with it to pursue. Therefore, these divergencies in the foreground of our policies do not seem to me to be of vital importance, unless they come to be set against the background of either loss of mutual respect for each other's character and capacity, or mistrust of the ultimate goal to which the endeavour of each is being directed.
On the first point, mistrust of each other's character and capacity, the requisite elements for mutual respect will readily suggest themselves to all your Lordships, and I need not dwell on them. I add only this: in my view this country need not fear any loss of respect for its
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position in the world if it is able to show, as I think my right honourable friend the Secretary of State did show the other night, that we know quite clearly what we want to do, and that we are endeavouring to follow a consistent course for its achievement. As regards the second point—namely, the mistrust of the ultimate goal to which the endeavour of each may be directed—I feel bound to say, in all frankness, that the suggestion that the United States are less sincere than ourselves in pursuit of peace, and that we are in danger of being dragged at their heels into an unnecessary war, is a suggestion that anyone knowing American opinion to-day regards as fantastic—as fantastic as what I understand, though I was not here, was said in the Election about the Prime Minister himself being anxious to have a war. It is quite fantastic and bitterly resented in the United States, and in certain circumstances it is capable of doing real harm.
I therefore beg all whom my words may reach to remember how voices and echoes get magnified in the passage across the Ocean. I hope that the leaders of all Parties will be, as I am sure they will be, at one in condemnation of that kind of thought and speech, and will make their feeling plain to those who look to them for guidance, so that we may make it plain to the whole world that those discordant voices in the wilderness are not the authentic voice of Britain. I say that because I cannot doubt that thoughtful men of all Parties, as they look out upon the world to-day, must realise that the friendship between these two great democracies may well spell to the world the difference between safety and destruction. If they feel that, they will also feel that no effort on the part of any of them can be too great to ensure that that partnership endures.
5.10 p.m.
LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, the noble Earl who has just spoken always makes a profound impression on the House, but I cannot recall hearing, even from him, a more enthralling and absorbing speech than the one to which we have just listened. I have no doubt that it will be studied in many places and for a long time. I hope that he will forgive me if I do not attempt to follow him in a field where his authority is unique and I hope that I shall be forgiven, also, by other noble Lords, all of

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whom have interested us greatly in different ways, if I stick to a prepared line rather more than is usually attractive or even justifiable in the middle of a debate. My reason for doing so is that I propose to speak entirely about Germany. I have not spoken on that subject, in which I take a passionate interest, for nearly four years in your Lordships' House. I desire to be brief, and therefore perhaps the House will allow me to proceed along this course. I should just say that I am speaking entirely in a personal capacity. I hope that nothing I say will embarrass the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, or any other noble Lords. I follow the admirable example of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, in perhaps expecting a little more latitude than when I was a Minister. Further, I should add that I am not speaking as the provisional Chairman of the Anglo-German Association which is in process of being formed.
In this effort to be brief I propose to leave out vast and vital topics, topics of social and economic questions included. On the question of Germany's economic progress I would say only that there was what is called a miraculous transformation in June, 1948. That, of course, coincided almost to a few weeks with the appearance in power of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, and my own withdrawal. It is not for me to explain that away indeed, I should not have paid much attention to it, except that in civil aviation, within a few weeks or months of the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, succeeding me, the Corporations began to pay their way. When that sort of thing happens twice, it makes one think—to say no more. I shall not even deal with such an important question as that of war criminals, a matter about which I have strong views, and which I believe is to be discussed by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, later in the debate.
I intend to confine myself to one aspect only—namely, the right Allied political policy, in the broadest sense, and in particular the right British political policy towards Germany to-day. We have great and honoured Allies, but none of us desires—and, for that matter, I feel sure none of our Allies would desire it—that our British policy should be a mere mean between, or merely resultant of, the policies of our Allies. In my view, the right British attitude to Germany to-day can be summed up in three propositions—
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and I mean them literally. The first is that we should offer friendship to Germany, not, of course, as a sufferance; not in any exclusive or bilateral sense, but on precisely the same footing as we offer friendship to our other respective neighbours. Secondly, that such a policy of friendship is an urgent duty, in the first place on moral grounds, and secondly, on grounds of strategy—or, put more bluntly, on grounds of our own national safety. Thirdly, I submit that such a friendship is impossible unless and until we treat the Germans as complete equals, not only individually, which most of us do and have done for a long time, but as a nation, which, of course, is still far from the case at the present time.
I lay particular stress on the moral claims of this policy, because they are inevitably obscured just now by so much strategical thinking. For six and a half years we have interfered in countless ways, though to an ever-diminishing extent, with German life. In the long run, such interference would have been justified only by its effect on the German mind and soul. We have claimed—I have made the claim myself before large German audiences, and I expect the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has made it—that we have been acting throughout as a trustee. Amid many mistakes, including, no doubt, a large number of my own, and many misadventures, we as a country have persisted in the effort to live up to that claim. When history comes to be written, it will be concluded, I believe, that under the devoted and inspiring guidance of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, we British have accomplished much during the last three and a half years. In the last few years the Germans have proved, first in the regions, and then, when it was formed, in their Federal Government, that they can make democracy work. Their leaders of all Parties, men like Dr. Adenauer, Dr. Schumacher, Herr Arnold, Dr. Reuter, and Herr Brauer, to mention only a few, have proved themselves, I venture to say, as good democrats as any similar number that could be found in any country in Europe. The Germans, in my experience—certainly the best Germans—have not been slow to pay tribute to the political help that we British have given them.
But now, six and a half years after the surrender, the time has come when any

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further one-sided, imposed, interference must do more harm than good. Therefore, in the discussions now taking place between the Western Allies and the Germans we should, in my strong conviction, press for the discontinuance of any controls on the internal or the external activities of Germany, unless they are either accepted by some, at least, of the Western Allies in their own case, or are welcomed by the Germans in their own interest. An example of the latter is the continued presence of Allied troops on? German soil, which the Western Germans actually desire. So much for what I call moral argument.
I should now like to say a few words—and they will be very few—on diplomacy and strategy. Whatever the merits or demerits of Potsdam—and I am not on record, in so far as I existed politically, as having offered any constructive alternative at the time—three immense developments have occurred since that time. First, the progress—which it was open to doubt at the moment of Potsdam—of a genuine German democracy, of which I have already spoken; secondly, the menace presented by Soviet Communism to the free world; and thirdly, the emergence of a European ideal. These last two developments, as I see it, have in their turn combined to produce three far-reaching results. Between them they have dismissed all possibility, even if we had desired it, of indefinitely subordinating the Germans. It is impossible, after all, to hold back the Russians with one hand and hold down the Germans with the other.
In the second place they have greatly increased the importance of securing active German assistance and friendship. The military and diplomatic arguments to this effect are too well known to require repetition in this very brief review. Thirdly—and this is perhaps a case of good coming out of evil—there has emerged a clear new prospect of reconciling German equality of status with security for her neighbours. The various discussions on the various plans for European integration are familiar to the House. But whether we are thinking of the Schuman Plan, the European Army or even the mere fact that the Western Germans to-day desire the presence of
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Allied troops on their soil in self-defence, surely we are granted an opportunity such as was denied the toiling statesmen throughout those years of 1918 to 1939. If we follow the right course to-day—and I hope the Government will follow it; I have certainly no reason to suppose that they will not—we can satisfy Germany's natural, human and, as I would say, moral claim, not only without endangering, her neighbours but in a manner indispensable to the defence and security of those very neighbours. It is not often that the points of view of the moralist, the soldier and the anxious statesman trying to ward off future perils, so happily coincide.
I can do no more this afternoon than touch on the deep-rooted and, at the same time, very topical question of German unity which is never far from any German's mind. I hope and believe that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chichester will be discussing that question later on. Certainly there is nobody whose name stands higher in Germany than that of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chichester, for reasons which will be familiar to all of us in view of what he has done during the last few years. I am sure that German unity is the aim of the present British Government, as it was of the last. I offer only two observations. The first is that the time has gone by when German unity could be secured on a Potsdam basis of Four Power control. When German unity does come, as one day I am sure it will, with great benefits not only to Germany but to Europe, Germany must clearly enter as an equal partner whatever grouping exists. Secondly, whatever happens now or later, we must on no account discourage what I believe to be the desire of the great majority of Germans for an ever greater intimacy with the West will only add, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, that no country has a more obvious and natural interest than Germans, in that reconciliation between East and West which, in spite of everything, remains the common object of us all. To put the matter in the crudest possible way. if another war broke out—which God forbid!—there is no country which would suffer quite so much as Germany.
What I have said may seem very general to those confronted with the prac-

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tical complexities of the various negotiations in progress, to which I wish all success. But I have always found myself—I do no know whether others have—that in German arguments the really difficult disagreements over what appear to be details usually spring from concealed differences over fundamentals. Once you can clear the fundamentals, then the details move forward apace. As regards fundamentals, I am not dissenting from what I conceive to be the trend of the policy of the Government, as expressed in those elevated and deeply earnest speeches of the Foreign Secretary in another place, but I am trying to indicate an emphasis, an urgency, a conviction, not merely as to where we ought to arrive as some future date but as to where we ought to arrive at once. Speed, if ever it was, is of the essence of this particular business, for I fear that to proceed at any pace except the maximum is never to get there in a spiritual sense at all. I am not talking mainly in strategic terms, though the strategic case for speed is surely overwhelming; nor mainly in diplomatic terms, though I know of no diplomatic problem more urgent. Thank Heaven our High Commissioner, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, is so good and outstanding a man! I am thinking of what I mentioned earlier, of the mind and soul of Germany, and, may I venture to add with great respect, the mind and soul of our own country.
Many Englishmen and Englishwomen have made a great and lasting impression for good on Germans during the last few years. Members of the Control Commission come first into our minds—some of them members of your Lordships' House—but also one thinks of the many high-minded well-intentioned visitors from this country, and one does not forget the many people here who have welcomed Germans, including prisoners of war in the early days, into their homes. I would say that the benefit has not been entirely on one side. I myself believe that there are few limits to what the good will and initiative of voluntary societies and private citizens in both countries can accomplish on behalf of Anglo-German understanding. On the Governmental plane, from everything I hear, Mr. Morrison's visit to Germany made an excellent impression. We all await with the keenest pleasure the visit of Dr. Adenauer, a real
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German statesman and a truly great European.
But behind all that, conditioning all that, lie the great decisions of policy which would face any British Government in power in the immediate future. Has not the time come, six and a half years after the surrender—if I remember rightly, the occupation of France ended three years after the end of the Napoleonic War—to take the important steps forward which I know are being, discussed, a new departure in spirit which will be understood not only among experts and diplomats, but among millions here, in Germany and everywhere. We have held out the right hand of friendship to Germany quite a number of times—I have done so myself on occasions—but somehow I fear that the left fist has always seemed to be clenched for a counter—blow should it prove necessary. Has not the time come—and I appeal to the noble Marquess—to hold out both hands unreservedly at last? Has not the time come to say and prove in action that we are ready to treat not only individual Germans but the German country on a friendly and normal—which can only mean an equal—basis? I know the question put in that way may sound very general and even vague, but the answer translated into deeds will certainly be lost on no one in Germany. For good or for evil, its effect will be indubitable and enduring. In my view everything depends on making the new contractual relationship something in which from its first moments the great mass of self-respecting Germans can take a pride, and not something they have to be ashamed of or apologise for.
I recognise the difficulty of much more being said by the Government this afternoon, and I am not looking for any concrete pronouncement from the noble Marquess. But I beg him, and through him I implore the Government, in the critical times ahead to give an affirmative, a cordial and effective answer to this plea, one which will uplift the hearts of all who are witnessing, as they are, with intense sympathy a great people's struggle to redeem themselves, to lift themselves out of the mire, and also one which will uplift the hearts of the still wider circles who pray continually for a strengthening of all those forces which are operating in the world for peace.
5.30 p.m.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, I see that there are still eight speakers on the list, and accordingly I will endeavour to be as brief as I can. I propose to speak on only two subjects—Egypt and Malaya. But before proceeding to do so may I be allowed to refer to a point made by the noble Lord who has just sat down—that concerning war criminals? I understand that Mr. Shigemitsu, my old friend, has been liberated. I am sure that all his friends will rejoice as I do. I knew him very well indeed; we were colleagues in China for many years, including the period when Japan took action against the Chinese around Shanghai. I can only say that during all that time his sentiments were quite admirable, and I was all the more distressed when I heard that he found himself in the dock with the rest; I could hardly bring myself to believe it. J therefore rejoice, as I am sure all his friends rejoice, that Mr. Shigemitsu has at last been liberated. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, is to touch upon this point later. I realise that it is a very contentious subject.
Last night I was thinking over the sort of line upon which I might address your Lordships. This morning I was looking at two organs of the Press. The first was The Times, and it contained an article which opens with these words:
"All is quiet in Ismailia. The ugly situation that developed at the week-end has been ended by arrangement between the local authorities on the two sides. … "
I turned to another paper and saw a message from Cairo dated yesterday, Tuesday, which said that a Note had been addressed to us containing certain charges. I should like to read the paragraph as published—I am not responsible for the translation: indeed, I hope that it is a mis-translation. The Note says:
"It is undeniably demonstrated to the Egyptian authorities that numerous British civilians, elsewhere in the city of Ismailia, participated coldly and deliberately in the massacre of innocents—firing on the population and the Egyptian police force from windows and balconies of their houses and apartments,"
"These British civilians are guilty of the most abominable crime against the inhabitants and police of the city which has given them hospitality."
Your Lordships will observe the situation reads somewhat differently from that stated in the other and presumably earlier report. The later has, I presume, still to be confirmed. But if this latter report
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is correctly reported, what could be more provocative or more dangerous at the present time? This is surely a direct incentive to violence. I must say that when I read this I was considerably alarmed.
Like, I suppose, most other noble Lords, I have felt a sense of relief during the last few weeks that at the helm of foreign affairs there should be a man (I am proud and glad to say that I have served many years under him) who has the necessary experience, technique and knowledge to such a fine degree as our present Foreign Secretary. I do not think anybody in this House will disagree with that statement. Mr. Eden has something which is not only the result of experience but which is inborn in some people, and that is what the French call doigte, which may be translated as "touch." It is of great importance to know when to do a thing, and why it should be done. That is vital in foreign affairs. Your Lordships may also remember that Mr. Eden is something of an Oriental scholar. I believe that in his youth he took Middle Eastern Oriental languages. I can remember seeing him reading texts in Persian and, I believe also, in Arabic. It has even been whispered that he once composed a Persian poem. Such a knowledge of the language is a very great advantage, for it is of great importance that the Foreign Secretary of the day should know something of the type of mind with which he has to deal. That specialised knowledge must be of great assistance to Mr. Eden.
The situation in Egypt obviously is extremely bad. It is no good blinking that fact. I believe that the policy enunciated in his speech as Secretary of State in another place, is right: we have to stand firmly on our Treaty rights. There can be no doubt about that. At the same time, nobody in his senses can be pleased at the situation with which we are now faced. It is a distressing and unpleasant one. I do not pretend to have any inside knowledge of these matters; I speak only of what I have seen in the Press. Yet I cannot help feeling that there may be small chinks of light here and there. For example, there has been, so far as I have seen, no suggestion that any portion of the Egyptian Army has been involved in any incident up to date. That is borne out in the statement in The Times to which I alluded

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earlier. Our Commander-in-Chief, General Erskine, must have been in touch with the Egyptian military authorities to have arranged that the Egyptian police shall be disarmed. I repeat, nowhere has it appeared that up to date the Egyptian Army has been drawn into this most unfortunate affair. I hope this will continue. In passing, I should wish to pay my tribute to General Erskine and his troops. They have withstood provocation of an extreme degree. Those of your Lordships who have seen rioting may know what it means to have to stand up to the throwing of brickbats, broken bottles and other unpleasant implements—to mention no worse. It is difficult to maintain a high level of restraint in such circumstances: and that is just what our people there have had to put up with. Your Lordships will agree that the conduct of our troops has been altogether exemplary.
There is another chink of light, it seems to me, though. as I have said, I speak without any inside knowledge. The summary dismissal by Egypt in an almost insultingly short space of time of the four-Power proposals made in Cairo does not seem to have made a good impression in the surrounding Moslem States—quite rightly, too. After all, this proposal is a great departure—indeed it is an enormous departure. It is an offer to include on an equal footing all these Middle East States in this new system of defence that we are building up. To me it is beyond measure distressing that the Egyptians should so summarily have dismissed this offer, because it is a big departure; it is a really big affair, yet it was just thrown in the mud and not even considered properly. I cannot believe that in the various capitals of the surrounding Moslem States they can be very happy about that. That is coupled with other factors. True, it is only a straw in the wind and it may not be even that. Yet there might be in it something helpful. And let us remember that amongst the surrounding Moslem States there is one man—I am talking now of five or six years ago—who stood out head and shoulders above everybody in the whole area: I mean King Ibdn Saoud, a great statesman and King of Saudi-Arabia. He is no longer so young as he was at the time of which I speak, but at that time he exercised a restraining and healthy influence. I can quote cases where he did so. At the risk of indiscretion I may even inform your Lordships that
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there was a moment when, on reports which came to some of our authorities, it was considered a good thing to invite him to join the war on our side. It was done against my advice. He was invited and he refused; and he refused for very goods reasons. Although he was such a staunch friend of ours he saw at that time that he could be more valuable as a friendly neutral than as a co-belligerent.
I come to Egypt itself. I am not going to mention names—it would be most unwise to do so—but I know of several Egyptian statesmen who are not happy at the present turn of affairs. One hopes that so long as things do not get worse—and they must not be allowed to get worse—the time may come when something may emerge along such lines. The difficulties are enormous. We all know what "face" means to Orientals. It is a term primarily derived from China. Yet every nation has its "face"; we too have our "face," and it is a very big one. We do not like being humiliated, and we also can be quite touchy. These people have got themselves into a state of frenzy. of surexcitation, of nationalistic growing pains. It must be very difficult at the moment—in fact it is almost impossible—to see how, without loss of "face," which is always fatal, a solution can be found. It certainly cannot be found very quickly. To return to where I began, I personally am all the more glad that at this time of trial, strain and test it should be our present Secretary of State who is handling it, because he alone has certain qualifications which should help him to handle this tangle successfully.
Now just a word on the Sudan. I was delighted to hear the declaration which was read by the noble Marquess on the Sudan, for let us remember this. The inhabitants of the Sudan are there "for keeps"; they and their children and their grandchildren will be there. So they naturally have an eye on the future. It is all very well for us who are there now, and who perhaps will not be there tomorrow, to look at it one way; it is quite another matter if one's personal fortunes and the safety and security of oneself and of future generations are at stake. In other words, no one, naturally, wants to be left in the lurch. It is a very human feeling. Therefore I felt that declaration was excellent. I was only sorry that it had not been made earlier, because I

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know that when I was out in those parts there was a time when the Sudanese just did not know where they were. A great many of them were groping for some grain of comfort and sustenance and support; they did not know what line to take. Therefore when the flow of propaganda and such like reached them from the north, some of them, who I think otherwise might not have done so, sat on the fence. All the more reason, then, to welcome the declaration which has just been made by the Government. I am sure that it will make a great difference. The Sudanese are grand people—we all know that. The one thing that I trust will not occur is the holding of a plebiscite on the conditions which appear to have been so far suggested: that all officials should be withdrawn.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Suggested by the Egyptian Foreign Minister.
LORD KILLEARN: Yes, most definitely. That would mean pandemonium. It would be insanity. You can imagine the whole government of the country stopping—and then what? The Sudan is not quite a normal country. The pagan South are not so highly educated politically as we here are and they are very much dependent on their officials to keep them straight and run the administration. I mention this point only to emphasise the absurdity of the proposal. I was indeed surprised to read in the Press—it cannot surely be true—that the Secretary-General of the United Nations was supporting this proposal. If he did, he cannot have known the facts of the local situation.
I have already kept your Lordships longer than I intended. So I will pass hurriedly to my other subject, Malaya. Malaya is not strictly foreign politics, but the Rules of Procedure of this House are so delightfully lax—if that is the appropriate word—or better, elastic, that one can bring into a debate almost anything one likes. Malaya plays a considerable role in the whole question of our foreign policy. I am already on record twice on that subject—I had forgotten what I said but I looked it up two nights ago—first, on April 13, 1949, and secondly, on April 15, 1950—it is rather curious that there
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was just one year in between. I appear on both occasions to have been so venturesome as to address your Lordships on the subject of Malaya. Reading through what I then said, it seemed to me—though this sounds conceited—that I put it rather well. I said that the situation was pretty desperate, for the reasons which I then gave. That was two years ago and there was a tendency in some quarters at that time to say, "This man is an alarmist. He is over-painting the picture." But I was not. I knew that at the time, because understatement is always better than over-statement.
Unfortunately, events have proved up to the hilt that what I said then was not inaccurate or alarmist, was not an exaggeration, and the situation in the two years which have since elapsed has become even worse. I still come back—am still unorthodox—to the same solution which I came to then, namely, that extraordinary times require extraordinary measures and extraordinary men. In other words, with the machine that you have out there you are putting too much of a strain on the set-up. We English are peculiar people; we are indeed very odd people. We have certain attributes that others have not to the same extent. One of them is that we get on with each other and that we can make work things which I doubt whether any logically-minded people could make work. I venture to say that the governmental machine, the régime, out there is totally unsuited to a time of crisis such as the present: it is not really workable in a time of peace. though somehow it has creakingly worked.
Will your Lordships first think of what it consists? There is a Commissioner General at the top. Unless his powers have been altered since I was there, he has no executive authority. That must be difficult for him. He is responsible to two masters, the Foreign Secretary and the Colonial Secretary. Under him, or next to him, or with him, are four Colonial Governors—I am not sure that there are not five, but at least there are four. One is called the High Commissioner for Malaya, then there are the Governors of Singapore, Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak. Each of those Governors has to report to the Colonial Office; at the same time presumably copies go to the

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Commissioner General, and the Commissioner General, with his function of coordinating, no doubt makes his voice heard. So it goes on. My Lords, honestly, is that the sort of structure which is at all fitted to cope with a national emergency? Can it be? It cannot be. Therefore, I had a considerable feeling of relief when it was announced that the Colonial Secretary was going out to Malaya: first, because the situation clearly is extremely unpleasant and must be urgently dealt with, and secondly, because, having worked with the right honourable gentleman in Cairo, I know that he will take decisions swiftly and act upon them quickly and if necessary drastically. He has that determination, which is so much wanted. I still hold that the true solution lies in a supreme authority, able to get on with the job and given full authority to get on with it. That is the right answer.
My Lords, I have come to the end of the few remarks I had to make. It all comes to the same thing: that really successful diplomacy is silent diplomacy; that is to say, if you are successful the thing never comes out. The test of your success is the lack of publicity. In other words, you should have vision to see or to try to see a little ahead what is going to happen and then take your measures to see that it does not happen. The more successful you are, the less limelight you get, and the less risk there is of a clash. Therefore, I would put, first, vision. Then I would put fairness, and by "fairness" I mean that your first job is to serve the interests of your country fairly; and, subject always to that, your local client should know that, if he can convince you that he has a good case, you are ready to put that case up to your principals. That leads to confidence. Then I come to the last of my ingredients to successful diplomacy, namely, that your fairness must be linked with firmness. You must know what your policy is. You must know clearly from home what your instructions are, what your authority is, and what you have got to do; and when you know that, you must be firm about it. I am speaking now as the man at the other end of the wire. You are the captain on the bridge of the ship; the navigation is left to you. But you have your sailing orders. You have to decide how best to navigate. How you actually
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get to your destination is a matter for your own discretion, so long as you keep within the limits and bounds of your instructions. For that, you must be clear what you are aiming at, what your instructions are; then follows determination to put them through, fairly but firmly, but always giving the other fellow credit for what he has to say on his side—and that may often be quite a lot. My Lords, I have detained you long enough.
5.55 p.m.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords. our debate to-day has taken place with the advantage of our having been able to read and study the two days' debate which has taken place in another place. I noticed one salient fact about that debate—namely, that really nothing new was said. The Foreign Secretary really told us nothing. He said nothing which has not been said before, and he told us nothing which has not already appeared in the Press. I am not entirely surprised about that, because if it is true that the new Chancellor of the Exchequer has found the Treasury till rather empty, I understand it is also the case that the new Foreign Secretary has found the Foreign Office cupboards uncomfortably full of skeletons which have accumulated during the past three years. Indeed, I have been told that even the housemaids' closets have been pressed into requisition in order to accommodate the superfluity of skeletons. But the fact that the Foreign Secretary's statement contained nothing or very little that was new, did not at the same time prevent that statement from being extremely impressive and from giving a great sense of reassurance, due to the qualities of the man himself. Quite recently, since the Election, I have travelled through three countries, and on all hands I found that the Foreign Secretary's qualities of integrity, experience and knowledge inspire respect and beget confidence.
I noticed another thing in the debate, in the speech of the former Foreign Secretary, Mr. Morrison. He said that there was no change in policy. Well, perhaps there has not been much time in which to effect changes in policy. But sometimes it is the case that a change of man can be almost as important as a change of policy. Indeed, I myself have known warships which have not done at all creditably under one captain, but have become extremely smart and efficient

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ships under another captain. But the particular point that struck me about that remark of Mr. Morrison was that, if indeed there has been no change of policy under the new management, it seems rather to destroy those remarks about warmongering and about the Prime Minister rubbing his hands in front of the microphone at the prospect of trouble in Egypt. Those remarks seem to me to have been proved to be merely Party electioneering, for if there were no change of policy how would such statements possibly be justified? I am bound to say that I think that Mr. Morrison, knowing that the possibility of a defeat at the polls existed, with a consequent change in the Foreign Secretaryship, was extraordinarily irresponsible to hang round a possible successor charges of warmongering, which would simply feed material into the hands of the enemies of this country. I was very glad indeed to see that one of the most respected members of Mr. Morrison's Party—namely, Mr. Glenvil Hall—was at pains during the Election to dissociate himself from that form of propaganda, and I am quite sure that many other members of the Party felt the same way as did Mr. Glenvil Hall.
My Lords, this afternoon very little has been said on the subject of Russia. I should imagine that that is because we are all getting rather tired of the performances of the Russian representatives at various conferences. There was the Russian reaction to the disarmament proposals which were put forward by America, France and ourselves—proposals which, even if they required discussion and possible amendment here and there, were nevertheless obviously completely fair and put forward with a great sense of justice. They were dismissed by Mr. Vyshinsky with the charge that the Atlantic bloc were thirsting for a third world war, and that American policy is aimed at a new war, a new stream of blood. Really, how does one go on in face of that sort of thing? In view of that, I was very surprised indeed to find Mr. Crossman informing us: that rearmament has got more to do with Washington than with Moscow. How that can be squared with the remarks of Mr. Vyshinsky, I really do not know.
All we ask from Russia is co-operation. We do not wish to indulge in a crusade
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against Communism in itself. Our relations with Yugoslavia alone prove that fact. We are willing to deal with and to negotiate with a Communist country, but, like all free nations, we quarrel with Kremlin imperialism using Communism—and I doubt if the men in the Kremlin have any personal belief in Communism at all—as a tool for aggression. However, we have to face the fact that Russia has now rejected a perfectly fair and square proposal for disarmament, a proposal which, in effect, said: "Let us have the cards on the table all the time, face upwards." That has been rejected. Russia prefers, apparently, to be the leader of the mad dog pack of nations. I think the matter can be well summed up in the words of an American official who said: "Russia has got so used to putting in phoney nickels that she would not know how to use a good one" I think that that is about the situation.
I feel some diffidence about saying a word on the subject of Egypt, after the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Killearn, who speaks with such vast experience and knowledge of the country. The situation is, indeed, as the noble Lord said, an extremely awkward one. After all, we are not in this business as an individual country; we are a member of the United Nations. We are also an integral part of Western defence, and Western defence simply cannot afford to be driven out of the Middle East and North Africa, leaving a vacuum for Russia—which, unlike nature, adores a vacuum. We have to maintain the bridge between Africa and Asia and to guard an area where at present Russia has no satellite States, but where fanaticism, racial hatred and abject misery combine to make a cauldron simply seething, not merely with discontent, but with revolution. It is that abject misery of the Egyptians which, I believe—I am probably uttering a commonplace—is the cause of the present situation with which we are confronted in Egypt. There you have this abject misery; a few rich at the top, and, below, this great population of 23,000,000, densely packed into that comparatively small area and living below the level of their very animals. The result is that mob violence has risen and has been directed against the Government and all foreigners. "Kill the Jews," "Kill the British," "Down with

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Acheson, "and so on—those are the cries that are uttered.
It is very natural—and I believe that Lord Killearn would confirm what I say in this connection—that in such a situation the Government of Egypt try to canalise that mob violence off against the foreigner, to divert it from themselves, and, in particular, to direct it against us. And that has led to the revolutionary situation which exists. If Egypt were to accept our offer, then the mob violence would be turned against her Government, because there would no longer be a scapegoat foreigner against whom to direct it. The Middle East Command, as now constituted, may, in the long run—but I fear it will be a very long run—ameliorate the situation in Egypt and the Middle East. If it can achieve peace and security in those areas, then social and economic progress will follow—but I agree it will be in the very long run. The establishment of a Middle East Command must be accompanied by a clear intimation that the West seeks to promote the sovereignty and independence of the Middle Eastern. States and to relieve poverty, ignorance and disease, which infallibly make for revolution.
I think it is a very hopeful sign that President Truman has acted promptly by appointing Mr. Edwin Locke, with the rank of ambassador, as co-ordinator of economic and technical aid in this area between the Mediterranean and the Arabian seas, and has given him 160,000,000 dollars to spend in order to strengthen the economies of the Middle East States. What has been happening in the past is that we have been developing a defensive strategy in this area while neglecting signs of economic strain, such as caused the Persian kettle to boil over, and the West has not been co-ordinating its political and economic policies in that region. As a result we have had crisis after crisis, which we have attempted, in each case, to solve by ad hoc policies. But ad hoc policies are no proper foundation for the conduct of foreign affairs; they must be conducted upon the principle of foresight.
Now, I venture to put this question to the noble Marquess the Leader of the House. I regret that I have not given him notice of it, but he may think it worth while to say something about it. We are at the present moment in Egypt the
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target of all the attacks and all the violence, although, as I have said, we are acting very largely in the cause of Western defence, and we are also a member of the United Nations. Is there some intention of taking this affair of the Treaty to the United Nations and getting a United Nations declaration upon it? It seems to me that if we did that, we should be in a much stronger position, and that the Egyptian Government might well hesitate if they found themselves confronted with a decision of the United Nations upon the subject of that Treaty, accompanied by our perfect willingness as an individual country to negotiate a new Treaty and accompanied also by a most honourable and generous offer—as it is—to Egypt to take her place alongside the great Powers of the world in the organisation of Western defence. I merely ask if something of that nature can be done, so that we do not alone remain the target of the attack in Egypt, but that Egypt is confronted with a decision of the Atlantic Powers and of the United Nations. I know of the Foreign Secretary's argument about bases—that it would be no shame upon Egypt to accept arrangements with us similar to those which we have accepted with America about bases here. That is perfectly true. But if stupidly, or foolishly, Egypt refuses to agree open-handedly, we cannot go on keeping troops of one nation indefinitely in the territory of another nation which does not want to see them there. That state of affairs will, sooner or later, have to come to an end.
My Lords, I am endeavouring to speak very briefly for I know how many speakers there are to follow me. But following what the noble Earl, Lord Halifax, said, I should like to say just one or two words about the approaching visit of the Prime Minister to the United States, a visit which I think we may say we hope will redound—in every sense of the words—to our credit. Mr. Churchill certainly enjoys great popularity in the United States. I went to Washington at the time when Mr. Attlee was on his way to visit President Truman. I remember that when I arrived at the airport I was passed very swiftly through passport control, through quarantine and through the immigration authorities and the customs. I was not asked to open a bag, my passport was not even looked at, and, in the course of the whole business, I had only

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one question addressed to me, and that was: "Why did you not bring old Churchill over with you?" He certainly enjoys great popularity, but at the same time he might find the climate just a little more bleak than he has been accustomed to, because, although I do not say it is too serious as yet, there is a growing opposition to lending more money to Europe. In some quarters it is said that Mr. Churchill has taken over an insolvent concern and is coming over to America to ask for help in reconstructing the business. Many American businessmen, like the man in the song, are reciting:
"My taxes are high and my profits are small."
They do not feel in a particularly generous mood. They think that Europe has had about enough from them in help. I am not saying that that is a general feeling, but it exists. They are very tired of the recurring crises in this country and in Europe and of having to launch the lifeboat so repeatedly. They want to see Europe getting on a sound economic basis and they do not like to see a country living above its income. As I think the noble Earl, Lord Halifax, said, they wish to help only countries which are determined to achieve a stable economy by their own efforts as far as possible and by avoiding extreme policies which produce disequilibrium. In those circumstances, I think Mr. Churchill must expect a certain amount of misrepresentation, which he will certainly be able to correct, because it will be said that he has come to extract hard-earned dollars much needed by hard-working men, and steel and raw materials which are seriously needed by American industry.
Speaker after speaker has emphasised to-day that we are faced with a difficult and complex situation. I feel more and more that we are faced by questions in our foreign relations which are almost impossible to answer. After all, there are doors to which there are no keys We are in difficulties with Russia, China, Persia and Egypt. Is it possible to make any offer to Russia that we have not already made, or any offer to China about the Korean trouble which has not already been made, or any new offer to Persia or to Egypt? In every one of these instances we have gone to the limit of conciliation. How can we go further without sacrificing not only our own interests but those
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interests of which we are part guardians with the Commonwealth? I keep on asking myself the question: What more have we to offer than we have already offered in each of these critical and complex situations? There is a Spanish proverb of which I have always been fond, which says that if one goes on knocking on a closed door, the Devil will open it. If we tried to go much further in conciliation, we might find ourselves in a very uncomfortable position. If these problems are not solved and remain to confront us with such dangers. I think the responsibility clearly lies upon other shoulders than our own.
I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, is going, to deal with the question of war criminals. I feel a personal interest in that because I took part in a debate initiated by the noble Lord on the subject of Shigemitsu. The noble Viscount, Lord Jowitt, will perhaps allow me to say that he was not quite at his best in answering that debate. It happened that General MacArthur took a different view of the subject than the noble and learned Viscount, and Shigemitsu has been released. In the course of that debate I said that vindictiveness is not an English trait. What we like is a good fight, and the principle of shaking hands after the fight is ingrained in us from our schooldays upwards. Vindictiveness and long-drawn-out rancour ill become this country.
6.16 p.m.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, after spending fifty years close to the heart of British government, I have listened with absorbed interest to the able speeches on a variety of topics, the history of which I have been privileged to watch grow, but I do not propose at this hour to be drawn into any of them. I am going to have a one-track mind and open up a new question. After giving notice to the noble Marquess the Leader of the House, I am raising briefly a question which. though pertinent to our foreign policy, has not yet been mentioned in any recent debates in either House—namely, the question of clemency for war criminals in ex-enemy countries. I shall confine myself to the international aspects, as distinct from the controversial judicial and moral aspects, on which my views are well known. My choice of that subject conforms to the excellent plan of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to tackle

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and solve "definite and limited problems" one by one and thereby to reduce the international tension.
In the war crimes question we have a definite and limited problem, the solution of which is not difficult and would greatly diminish, at any rate, a grave risk of international tension al a key point in the policy of the Atlantic Treaty Organisation. May I develop that theme? In the international situation the outstanding feature is, of course, the deplorable division of the world into two camps, Communist and non-Communist. That has already resulted in protracted and gruelling wars—small wars, but wars which collectively draw too many troops to distant theatres. Even more dangerous than the present hostilities is the precarious situation along the line of the Iron Curtain, where the vast plains of Eastern and Central Europe lend themselves to the deployment of big battalions which, as we have seen in Korea, still count for a great deal. To counter that threat, the Atlantic Pact Powers, after weighing all aspects, have rightly sought the co-operation of Western Germany, pending, one hopes, the formation of a united Germany. The German population, predominantly Christian and non-Communist in character, are gradually realising that their interest coincides with our own, and that their security can best be assured by associating themselves with the Atlantic Pact nations, in order to establish the balance of power, with no offensive or war-like aims whatsoever, but solely to secure peace.
If that plan is to succeed, the closest co-operation and mutual respect is necessary between Germany and the Atlantic Pact Powers, and especially with this country. A certain amount has been done, as the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, mentioned, and Dr. Adenauer's visit should do a great deal of good. But more is required. As stated in the declaration issued on October 20, after the recent session of the Atlantic Treaty Organisation at Ottawa:
"All obstacles which hinder co-operation on an equal footing should be removed."
I believe that the noble Earl, Lord Halifax, said something of the same kind, as also did the noble Lord. Lord Pakenham. Probably the greatest obstacle to wholehearted co-operation is the perpetuation of the war crimes policy,
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and the retention in prison of so many condemned prisoners. The subject is essentially a human one, capable, if neglected, of arousing fierce and sustained resentment, or, if generously handled, of starting a genuine reconciliation. We cannot hope for mutual trust between nations, and especially their fighting forces, which is vital to the operation of the plan, so long as the principal German leaders, and a great number of lesser folk, are kept in prison. How should we feel to-day, and in this House, if the situation had been reversed—and it was a near thing at one time—and our political leaders, as well as Admirals of the Fleet, Field Marshals and Marshals of the Royal Air Force were for years and years to be kept locked up in custody in the Tower of London under German guard, with hundreds of less important people in prison elsewhere? I am certain that we should flatly decline to ally ourselves to those who were treating us in this way until that humiliating and ever-present stigma had been removed.
What I am urging, then, in the vital interest of ending tension and securing efficient, wholehearted co-operation with Germany, is an end to the war crimes policy. It has had a good run, and any advantages that it may have possessed must have been realised by now, and there is no benefit that I can see in continuing it. Already, of course, a certain amount of clemency has been shown, and I think that was greatly stimulated by the debate that was initiated here in May, 1949, by the right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Chichester. In the British Zone the clemency inquiry started in August, 1949, about two months after the debate; and, so far as I can ascertain, it resulted in the release of only about 124 prisoners, out of 560-odd, by June, 1951, when responsibility for clemency was transferred from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Since then I have had no news. In the American Zone the process began later, in March, 1950, but was more rapid. After a year, out of 28 death sentences no fewer than 21 were commuted, and there were large reductions in many other sentences, resulting in many releases, after allowing for time already served. In Japan, General MacArthur's admirable clemency regulations were issued early in 1950. After a number of minor Japanese war criminals had been freed, Mr. Shigemitsu,

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who has been referred to by several noble Lords, was released on parole exactly a year ago to-day, on November 21, 1950; and exactly a fortnight ago, on November 7, having earned the maximum credit for exemplary behaviour under the regulations, his sentence expired. Judicially, I am glad to say, he is now completely free. There have also been some spectacular releases of German Generals in Belgium, and of at least one in France. It seems that clemency is rather in the air.
Your Lordships may ask what more can be done. People who have been concerned in the revision of sentences tell me that, with the best will in the world, little progress is possible on present lines. It is desperately slow, as I have shown, and they are blocked by certain very much criticised features in the legal instruments under which the trials were held, although, as I have said, I do not want to be drawn into discussion of those. Some more rough and ready method is necessary if we are to make progress. Of course, the simplest plan is often the best plan, and the simplest plan would be to amnesty the lot. Unfortunately, we do not stand alone in this matter, and I think other methods will have to be considered. On the whole, with these very delicate discussions going on in Paris, I thought it better not to go further into details. However, I have some ideas on the subject, and if the course were deemed appropriate I should like to submit some proposals direct to His Majesty's Government. To-day, however, I am concerned only with establishing the principle of clemency.
In that connection, with your Lordships' permission, I will read one or two extracts from speeches by one whose authority to speak on this question cannot be challenged—namely, the most outstanding figure in the world at the present time, the present Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill. The first extract is from a long speech he made on the Address on October 28, 1948. That speech seems rather to have been lost sight of, because I should certainly have brought it up in 1949 had I realised that it had been made. Mr. Churchill said [OFFICIAL REPORT, COMMONS; VOL 457, Col. 256]:
"Revenge is, of all satisfactions, the most costly and long drawn out retributive persecution is, of all policies, the most pernicious.
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Our policy, subject to the exceptional cases I have mentioned, should henceforward be to draw the sponge across the crimes and horrors of the past—hard as that may be—and look for the sake of all our salvation, towards the future. There can be no revival of Europe without the active and loyal aid of all the German tribes. … "
The second extract is much more up-to-date. It is from a speech made at Dover on receiving the Freedom of the City on August 15, 1951, which I saw reported in only two papers. The speech was as follows:
" … It is a characteristic of our people so often in the hour of victory to throw away with one hand what they have gained so painfully with the other. I am quite sure it is our interest and our duty, and if you like our Christian duty, to do the best we can to blot out and sweep away the hatred and vengeance of the past."
There was also a short allusion to the subject, rather on the same lines, in a speech made at Liverpool on October 2, 1951. It is a little more controversial, but I do not quote it in a controversial spirit:
"The Government have, after long delays, adopted a more conciliatory policy to Western Germany, and now seek German military assistance against the Soviet menace. But they kept up their demolitions of factories and trials of German generals so long after the end of the war as to rob their present attitude of any sign of magnanimity and of the priceless advantages it may sometimes win for the victors."
Those words, my Lords, will
"touch the hearts of men and bring them back to heaven again."
They will encourage the hope that Britain has come back to the principles of decency and charity for which we fought the war. But words must be followed by deeds, for
"Hope deferred maketh the heart sick"
and we must not delay too long. I do not expect a complete answer to-day, and I have raised this matter mainly to get it on record.
6.33 p.m.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, the usual custom was that on rising at this time one used to say, "At this late hour I will not unduly detain the House," and I will follow the usual custom. I begin by expressing my regrets to the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, that I unfortunately had to keep an old appointment with my deputy-Leader in another place, who is the ex-Foreign Minister, because as I was speaking to-day I thought I had better keep the appointment and try to pick his brains a little. I have read what I could of the noble Marquess's speech

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on the tape, and I shall read it in full tomorrow with. I am sure, pleasure and enlightenment. I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, for what he said about the poor efforts of myself and my noble friend Lord Brabazon to try to curtail the length of speeches. If the noble Viscount will look at the times of beginning and ending of speeches in the OFFICIAL REPORT I think he will find that there is considerable improvement, and I shall certainly deserve a vote of thanks from the three Chief Whips, who are the main sufferers on occasions when many speeches are too long.
The noble Lord, Lord Hankey, will forgive me if I do not follow him. He will know the reason—it is because I also wish to follow the example of brevity. I will touch on only one subject. I gave notice of this last week, but I was told that it was rather delicate to raise it in the debate on the Address because of certain negotiations, and was asked to put off my remarks until to-day. Since then. I see that there have been references to the State of Israel by the Foreign Secretary and by my right honourable friend Mr. Herbert Morrison. I propose to discuss the part of Israel in the defence of the Middle East, her relations with the British Commonwealth, and the future prospects and happiness of the people of Israel. As I have said, there has been brief reference to this subject in another place, both in the first speech of the Foreign Secretary, and also one short, but important, reference by my right honourable friend Mr. Herbert Morrison.
We are all talking strategy in these days. The distant rumble of the guns is almost heard. Everything now has to be co-ordinated or arranged or considered from the strategical aspect of affairs. The tremendous event of the re-emergence of the State of Israel as an independent nation has been one of the greatest episodes of our time. Some of the finest minds in our political world—including the late Lord Balfour, the present Prime Minister, the late Earl Lloyd George and many others—have worked as Gentiles for the consummation of this tremendous event. I, myself, for thirty years have ventured to try to convert Gentiles, agnostics and doubters by pointing out that not only was the re-creation of this State important from the religious, his-
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torical, political and sentimental point of view, but it also had important strategical aspects. I have used that argument again and again for thirty years in both Houses of Parliament and outside, and in the United States of America as well. At last I hope that people are beginning to see the strength of this argument.
Remember that the State of Palestine—now the nation of Israel—first of all occupies the main land passage between Asia and Africa, and for centuries that alone has given it tremendous strategic importance. Secondly, it is on the main air route from Western Europe and Britain to India and Australasia. Thirdly, from there you can safeguard the Suez Canal. Now, during all those years, my friends and I have argued that we were backing the wrong horse, as we have so often done, irrespective of Governments—I repeat: irrespective of Governments—in thinking that we can rely indefinitely on Egyptian friendship, Egyptian dependence upon us, and the non-emergence of Egyptian nationalism. We have pointed out that danger and no one would listen. At the Foreign Office and in the other offices and Ministries concerned—and this, I am sorry to say, affected all the Governments in turn—there was this fixation for the romantic Arabs who were going to be our great friends in the Middle East, these Moslem States which were going to be such a bulwark, first against Italy, then against Germany and now, I suppose, against Soviet Russia. Look at them now. In Moslem Persia we all know what has happened. In Iraq there is rising nationalism and xenophobia, and but for the accident that there happens to be a friend of ours in the highest office—I hope this will not lead to his assassination—there would be violent anti-Western feeling in Syria. We have heard from my noble friend, Lord Killearn, and others with great knowledge, including my noble friend Lord Stansgate, of what is happening in Egypt. Your one sure friend, the one people who have the Western outlook, the one people who will stand by you, are the Jews in Israel, whose re-emergence as a nation many shortsighted people, in their ignorance and prejudice, tried to check and hamper.
Have we learned our lesson now? Do we yet realise that in this Moslem sea, this Arab sea—we have good friends in Pakistan and Ibn Saud has been men-

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tioned as our faithful friend, but apart from these Moslems the one sure island of Westernism is this small State of Israel. Now they have been invited to come into this proposed arrangement for the defence of the Middle East; and, as is not to be wondered at, it appears that there are some hesitations and doubts in Israel. For one thing, this new Government have their economic difficulties. They fought on four or five fronts against the neighbouring Arab peoples armed with British weapons and encouraged, I am sorry to say, in certain exalted quarters. They must still maintain a large army. They have opened their frontiers to every Jew from every country. Any Jew could come in, and they did their best to try to settle all those Jews and give them work and a home. It is a policy which has almost ruined the State, coming, as it has, on top of a considerable military effort. It is not unnatural that there are these hesitations about throwing in their lot immediately with Turkey, France, the United States and ourselves. Another reason is that many of their co-religionists are on the other side of the Iron Curtain and they are still hoping to give them refuge and sanctuary. Nevertheless, I believe that the orientation of Israel is towards the West. The culture, the traditions, the education, the habit of life and the outlook are Western; they are our natural friends and Allies. What they need above all is economic help.
So far, that State has been largely kept in being, has been kept viable by the tremendous contributions of Jewry throughout the world—in the United Kingdom, the United States, South Africa and elsewhere. Wherever there are communities of Jews they have contributed to this great work and helped these unfortunate refugees from Nazism and anti-Semitism in many countries. But, in spite of the generous contributions which have been pouring in, the State is almost ruined economically. A well-known and experienced diplomat representing one of the States with a mission accredited to Israel was asked what could happen: how they could net out of their economic difficulties. He replied that the difficulties were insurmountable at present; they would he overcome: but how they would be overcome he did not know.
But in the meantime the State of Israel needs help. There you have, apart from
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the Turks, the best native army, the best fighting force, in the whole of that area—as they have shown. They deserve economic help from ourselves and from the other members of the Western Alliance. I hope this appeal will not fall on deaf ears, and that the Government will consider this matter. We know the Prime Minister's history on this matter. He has always been sound on this question—it is one of the few things in which I have always agreed with him. I hope there will be a bold turn in our policy, so that we can hold out an offer of real help to this infant State of Israel. They need help quickly. Let me hold out a few material baits. At Haifa there is the finest harbour in the Levant. Then there are those great aerodromes available, and a position from which you can hold the Suez Canal against all threats and all dangers. I would go further. I am not now speaking only as a member of the Labour Party and certainly I am not enunciating any official Labour doctrine, but I believe in, and my friends have advocated for years, a much closer association between the British Commonwealth and this new emerging State of Israel.
I point to the precedent of India. India is a Republic in name; it has a President. India is independent from every point of view; and yet we have, thanks to the genius and courage of one man, the present Leader of the Opposition in another place, an India which remains loosely, but I believe steadfastly and permanently, within that curious organisation known as the British Commonwealth. If that is the case with India, I do not see why in time Israel may not also become a part of the British Commonwealth on similar terms. If that is called Imperialism and an example of expanding the British Commonwealth, I think, nevertheless, that there are very good arguments for it, and I am prepared to meet the charge. It could have been done a decade ago, or two decades ago. If twenty years ago there had been a right policy in Downing Street and a little encouragement from the other side of the Atlantic amongst American Jewry, we might have had a Palestine which would have been a British Dominion—to the great content of the Palestinian Arabs, so many of whom are now helpless and impoverished refugees. We lost our chance then and we lost it ten years ago.

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If we are not to lose it in the future it means a good deal of fresh thinking on both sides of Downing Street—and it is time there was a little fresh thinking. I am glad the Government are having a long Recess; it will give them time to think. I am glad, too, that so many high offices are held by members of your Lordships' House, for they, too, will have more time to think than those who have to contend with the hurly-burly of the House of Commons. Vision is needed; and without vision the people perish.
6.47 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, has rendered a great contribution to this discussion on international affairs by bringing forward the subject of war criminals. I should like to follow him in emphasising the need for a reconsideration of the present position of these war criminals. I have been active in this matter for a long time, both by word of mouth and by correspondence; and I wish to express my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, for the attention which he gave me in the days when he was at the Foreign Office. There are many anti-Nazis who are greatly exercised about this question, simply on the grounds of justice. I realise that the question has now to be looked at with a due regard to the revival of the Nazi movement which is now taking place, and I should not wish that unregenerate Nazis who have committed grave war crimes should now be set free. But most of the war criminals undergoing sentence in West prisons—I think about 200—are not in this category; and I believe that, given the will and the impetus from the highest authority, it should be possible to make a comprehensive, systematic and swift review of these cases with a view to the release of those who could be released without danger, and the reduction of the sentences of those whose sentences ought to be reduced.
There is no doubt of the gravity, as well as the complexity, of the international situation, but there is one feature which, I suggest, is not sufficiently realised. While the Soviet Union is fully armed and the Allies are rearming on a large scale, neither in the Soviet Union nor among the Western Powers is there a decided or agreed political strategy. On the Western side, the result of the first year of Western rearmament has
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seen a remarkable change in the balance of world power. But political consciousness has not kept pace with the growth of military strength. Without an agreed political strategy, the Western Powers might be tricked or divided, or rush blindly into an atomic war. On the Eastern or Russian side, there were signs of divided counsels in the Kremlin before rearmament began. For example, in 1948, when Europe was at Russia's mercy, there were good grounds for thinking that there was a military party in favour of an all-out attack, and a propaganda party which believed that the Communist victory which was being won in Asia could be won without war, by threats, promises and penetration. And that party prevailed.
Since rearmament, the signs of indecision on the Eastern side are, I suggest, clearer. As the episode of the Soviet delegation to San Francisco for the Treaty of Japan, the zig-zag tactics of the truce negotiations in Korea, and Marshal Stalin's new reference to atomic control all suggest, the Communist leaders do not yet seem to have made up their minds between a policy of speeding up aggression, with the risk of a general war, and a policy of trying to slow down the pace of Western rearmament by a proof of their own peaceful intentions—and even by real concessions. In these circumstances, the formulation by the Western Powers of an agreed political strategy is of first-rate importance for the world, and it seems to me that British experience over many centuries gives Britain the special responsibility for the initiative in the formulation of such a policy. What should that policy be? It is idle to expect an early all-round settlement of outstanding problems, foolish to pin faith now in a great peace conference with everything on the table. Something much more moderate and definite is required. We have a choice now, in the making of which every step taken helps. Broadly, the choice is between a policy of steady advance towards successive settlements in different fields, by a combination of economic, political and military factors, and the policy of piling up armaments to a climax, with a view to demanding an overall settlement by the tactics of an ultimatum at a fixed date. The crux lies in Europe and in Germany, the centre of Europe. I welcome the words which fell from the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, and his

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appeal for a new spirit in the attitude of this country and the allied countries to Germany, especially this insistence on the attitude of treating Germany as an equal. It is the unity of Germany which is the testing point.
In yesterday's issue of The Times, your Lordships may have noticed a report of conversations in Berlin between Bishop Dibelius, the head of the German Evangelical Church, and Herr Grotewohl of Eastern Germany, following conversations between Bishop Dibelius and Chancellor Adenauer referring to the unity of East and West Germany. I have known Bishop Dibelius for twenty years, and since the war have often discussed the future of Germany with him, and with many other Germans in responsible positions. I have no doubt at all that, so long as East and West Germany are divided, there will be trouble in Europe. The reunion of East and West Germany is vital to the cause of peace, arid the continued schism can only be a seed of war. Knowing some of the difficulties and delicacies of the situation, I hope there will not be too much haste in these particular conversations with Herr Adenauer. I realise that the enrolment of German divisions in a Western Powers army has much to be said for it as a weapon against Communist aggression, but there are many difficulties lurking. The possible gain therefrom might be more than offset by the danger to German morale, through the German fear of Germany being not only, perhaps, the battleground of contending world Powers but the scene of civil war between Eastern and Western Germans. Nor must we forget the real danger of a military passion once again taking control of the German people, and the genuine fear of a militarised Germany which is held by both France and Russia.
In the conversations which Bishop Dibelius had with Herr Grotewohl, reference was made to Herr Grotewohl's offer of free elections in East Germany, for a general election throughout Germany for an all-German assembly. It is true that such an offer, if it is to be of value, must be publicly backed by the Soviet Union, but the interest is that Herr Grotewohl's offer went just far enough to show that the Russians might make a binding offer and were considering the possibility of closing the Communist; régime in East
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Germany. If such an offer were to come from Russia in precise and binding terms, it would confront the Western Allies with their first chance of having a Communist satellite régime destroyed, not by a war but by the peaceful power of the ballot, and of seeing the triumph of freedom over totalitarianism achieved in a great country with all of Europe looking on.
I would go further and say that, if Germany could be united in a free democracy, then the collapse of the Communist régime in East Germany, as the result of free elections, would be bound to make a profound impression on all other satellite States in Eastern Europe. If a watertight offer were made, and endorsed by Soviet Russia, with conditions of adequate preparation for free elections, thorough control of the election itself, proper safeguards and guarantees for personal safety, both before, during and after the election, in my opinion, it could not be lightly turned down. It could not simply be described as unacceptable without a reason being given. Towards this object the policy of the Western Powers should, I believe, be first directed, under the influence of a British lead. More will follow as time goes on. Later (I know it must be later; it can only rightly be later), the starting of peace negotiations with Germany would depend upon Russia signing the Peace Treaty with Austria and withdrawing all Russian forces from that country. But this policy of steady advance towards successive settlement in different parts of the political field, by negotiation from sufficient strength over a period of years, requires great effort, great patience. It may be prolonged and will make big demands on our staying power, but it is hope for the future.
I mentioned an alternative policy. I know the making or the choosing of a policy must take time, and every step taken is part of the choice. But the question is, in which direction are the Governments of the West looking? The alternative policy is the piling up of more and more armaments as rapidly as we can to a maximum, with a view to achieving a new overall settlement by a big diplomatic "show-down." To certain temperaments in certain moods this may be attractive, but there are at least three decisive arguments against it. First, the belief that you will ever get an overall

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final settlement by force of arms conceals a fallacy. Even if we knew what such an overall settlement requires, especially with regard to Asia, there is no reason to believe that, however far reaching the concessions, it would be final unless the West kept up a considerable defence effort, military, political and economic, or the Soviet régime in Russia itself were destroyed, which is inconceivable without a Third World War. Secondly, exclusive concentration on vast rearmaments in the end undermines the foundations of Western political and economic strength. If Russia were to offer more specific and serious concessions—of course, they must he tested and probed to the utmost—the need to answer them will grow. This is a factor which no democracy can ignore. Thirdly, the piling up of more arid more arms for an early climax carries the tactics of an ultimatum with it which may, if rejected, either lead to humiliating political defeat or aggressive war. That is, indeed, a gamble with the destiny of mankind.
In this latter connection I should like to call attention to a certain danger which appears to be raising its head once again with regard to atomic weapons. In December, 1950, President Truman, after conversations with Mr. Attlee, issued a statement in which he expressed the hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb, and assured Mr. Attlee of his desire to keep him informed of further developments which might change the situation. Mr. Eden on December 14, when this was reported in another place, suggested that machinery was required to act as a liaison between the United Nations and the commander in the field. No more was heard of any possible use of atomic bombs then. But recently, not on the side of the Government but on the side of representatives holding important positions, the language has been less restrained. On October 5 last, Mr. Gordon Dean, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, in a speech to the University of Southern California, said:
"We have definitely entered on an era when we can use atomic weapons tactically as well as strategically."
He urged that when a situation arose where the use of any kind of weapon was considered justifiable, serious considera-
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tion should be given to the use of the atomic weapon
"provided it can be used effectively from the military standpoint and that it is no more destructive than is necessary to meet the particular situation."
Mr. Alfred Friendly, the well-informed correspondent, in the Washington Post on November 11, only the other day, said:
"There has been heavy public pressure to use atomic weapons in Korea and Congressional agitation to this enl, growing in recent weeks, will probably increase. For the notion of annihilating the Red Chinese and North Korean enemy with an atomic inferno is an appealing one. But, according to Government sources who are most Concerned with the problem, here are some of the reasons which deflate the idea"—
and he proceeds to set them out. For example, they would reduce the stockpile, it would be uneconomic, it is unsuitable terrain, and it would be bad propaganda. I mention that only to show that it is not any kind of responsible opinion of the Government in the United States, but that there is a certain amount of public pressure in certain large sections of the American people—not, I hope, characteristic. I simply call attention to that danger I have no doubt from what was said in another place yesterday, that the Government is fully alive to this problem. I would only say that such a terrible use of an atomic bomb, as a preventive weapon, whether on Asiatic or European human beings, would do incalculable moral harm to the whole Western cause.
My Lords, in what I have said, posing the choice broadly as it seems to me, I do not in the least suggest that the Government have the latter alternative at all in their minds. All I am saying is that every step at this moment counts in the direction in which we are going or are to be drawn. Times are grave, beyond our thought. The chasm between East and West is deep and `vide. It is for us on the Western side to rise to the height of our ideals. I am convinced that the British Government has a great part to play in the leadership of the West. The policy which I trust they will foster and advance is a policy making for justice and peace. a policy of proceeding by successive stages to the ultimate goal in a firm, patient, calm spirit very congenial to the British temperament arid, as I believe, capable of being most worthily executed

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and upheld by His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
7.10 p.m.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, looking back over the years since I first became associated with foreign affairs in another place, it seems to me that the debates which have taken place in both Houses of Parliament this week equal in importance, if they do not transcend, any discussions on international affairs that have taken place within living memory. To the problems of the West which predominated a generation and more ago, have been added the tremendous problems of the Middle and Far East—all intertwined, one with the other. The responsibilities which rest to-day upon His Majesty's Government, as indeed they did upon the late Government, are indeed tremendous. I hope that I shall evoke greater gratitude from your Lordships in respect of the length of my speech than did even my noble friend on my left, who asked that your gratitude should be extended to him.
In the few remarks which I shall address to your Lordships I propose to travel out to the Far East. It is a subject in which I have taken great interest for a considerable number of years, since it was my privilege in early manhood to serve on the Manchurian border. My next encounter with that part of the world was in another place when I spoke on the Treaty of Peace Bill for giving effect to the Versailles Treaty in the year 1919, and pleaded the cause of China. I pleaded that the acquisition by Japan of Tsingtao and the Kiaochao territories should be rejected by the Peace Conference, and I remember saying at the time that, were that acquisition not rejected, the Province of Shantung would turn the future for a hundred years. It has turned it for the last thirty years, and I think it is quite likely to turn it for a considerable period of time still to come. I remember that, as I developed my theme, the House began to empty—slowly at first, then very rapidly—and I think that one of the very few Members left in the House towards the end of my speech was my noble friend on my left. The only reason he remained was that—as usual to the great benefit of the House, and as generally happened on most days of the Session—he was waiting to catch the Speaker's eye.
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Let me now come, if I may, to the Far East and to the position in Korea to-day. I do not propose to deal with the conversations and negotiations that are taking place with regard to an Armistice. but I notice that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his speech in another place, said:
"For our part, we earnestly hope that these fresh proposals will lead to the early conclusion of a secure and genuine armistice and the restoration of peace in Korea "—
as, of course, we all do. He went on:
"If that is achieved, the way will then he open for discussions of a political settlement of the Korean problem, and then, perhaps, for a wider settlement of ether problems in the Far East."
I wonder why the Secretary of State used the word "perhaps." I am not asking the noble Marquess the Leader of the House to give me an answer, nor, indeed, am I posing any questions to him to-night. But I hope that that word "perhaps," which seems rather ominous to me, does not entail that in the negotiations for a wider settlement any conditions are to be imposed which—let me put it bluntly—ought not to be imposed. I do not propose to deal with them now or to detail them, but I refer to such conditions as the entry of China into the United Nations on terms to which she could not agree, and other conditions of that nature.
A further point arises in this connection, and it is this. When the Foreign Secretary says that "perhaps" there will be discussions for a wider settlement of other problems in the Far East, we know, of course, that those discussions must come—as we hope will be the case—once an Armistice has been arranged. How are those discussions to be conducted? Again I am not asking the noble Marquess to give me an answer to-night. I am just expressing thoughts which are passing through my mind on this subject. How are these discussions to be conducted? Are they to be conducted through a Commission of the United Nations, in which this country may play a minor part? After all, we have had examples of decisions emanating from the United Nations with which a great many people in this country are in disagreement. The Resolution which has been passed by the United Nations defining China as an aggressor nation was not in accordance with the views, as I understood them, of the late Government. The telegram

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on which the Resolution was based has not, I am given to understand, been included in the White Paper which dealt with that particular aspect of the Security Resolution.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Viscount for a moment to say that we always regarded it as quite plain that the North Koreans were the aggressors, and that China came to their assistance. I said that so many times, and it seems to me quite unarguable.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: Very well, but on what evidence was that based?
VISCOUNT JOWITT: On evidence which everyone in this House knows.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: Not on the telegram which said the Chinese were aggressors.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: I do not think the noble Viscount needs a telegram to make certain that after aggression had been started by the North Koreans the Chinese came in to support it: the evidence is in the number of our men who were killed.
LORD STRABOLGI: The noble Lords are at cross-purposes.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: I do not think the noble and learned Viscount is speaking of the same Resolution. I am talking about the Resolution in which the Chinese were named as aggressors, and not about the original Resolution in which the North Koreans were named as aggressors. I am sorry that I have not with me the telegram on which that Resolution was based. Having given expression to the opinion that the Chinese were aggressors, the next thing to do, as was pointed out by my noble friend Lord Perth and by Sir Benegal Rau, was to elect them under the terms of the Charter to a seat in the United Nations. That was not done.
I come back to the point of the method under which the negotiations which must follow the Armistice are to be discussed. It is obvious that when we come to these negotiations the interests of Great Britain may differ from those of the United States. In his interesting speech the noble Earl, Lord Halifax, told us that
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there may be a possibility of divergencies of policy between ourselves and the United States. In the speech which he made to the Pilgrim Society of New York about eight days ago he further said that in discussions of this nature we should choose our words. He continued:
"When we differ, do it in friendship and realise that an occasional difference of opinion is not an unhealthy sign."
We all subscribe to these admirable sentiments. I hope that in these negotiations for a settlement in the Far East the breathing space which we are enjoying to-day has been employed by His Majesty's Government in discussing the various points of difference there may be between ourselves and the United States in regard to a Far Eastern settlement.
As I have said before in your Lordships' House, I hope that a distinction will be made between Communism in China and Communism in Russia. In a speech I made in your Lordships' House on July 31, I said that it was fantastic to suppose that Mao and his associates would allow China to be dictated to by a lot of foreigners in Moscow. I see that in an article in the Sunday Times, Sir David Kelly, who was until a few weeks ago British Ambassador in Moscow, after saying that the big question of the future is Russian relations with China, continues:
"All I can say is that the Chinese representatives who come lo Moscow are treated on a different and higher plane than those of European satellites and that the whole Chinese background suggests that there can be no question of Pekin being pushed around by Moscow."
I hope these matters will be taken into consideration by His Majesty's Government when they are considering a solution of the great problems that wait to be decided in the Far East. I do not wish to detain your Lordships any longer. We find ourselves to-day in circumstances which in certain eventualities may lead us into the horror of a devastating struggle. I think we must accept that. Unless we do so we may not take the necessary precautions to meet and overcome the danger, if it come. On the other hand, we must all earnestly hope that solutions to the vexed problems which confront us will be found, so that mankind can go forward into a real era of peace and of steady progress along the road of civilization.
7.28 p.m.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: My Lords, this debate occurs in your Lordships' House after two days' discussion on foreign affairs in another place, two days which have been distinguished by two remarkable speeches by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Notwithstanding that fact, I think anybody who has listened to the speeches here to-day will realise that this House has a distinctive contribution of its own to make, which it has surely made to-day. I should like to congratulate the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, on his speech. We all know him to be one of the most brilliant speakers in the House, a master of wit and epigram—two qualities which, if they get at all out of hand, are apt to be rather dangerous in discussing foreign affairs, of which I had some experience for the last six and a half years. If the noble Marquess will allow me to say so, I thought to-day he succeeded admirably. I was much more satisfied with his speech to-day than with his speech on the last occasion, and I hope this is the kind of speech we shall hear from him. I would warn him of this: as speaker on foreign affairs in this House, he will find that the Foreign Secretary always says, "No, this is not a convenient time on which to have a debate." When I used to press Mr. Bevin, he used to say, "There is no convenient time on which to have a debate on foreign affairs." And if the Under-Secretary has anything to say at all, the Foreign Secretary in another place will inevitably say that he must say it first. The task is not an easy one, but I am sure the noble Marquess will do it as well as it can possibly be done.
That I am right in saying that this House has a distinctive contribution of its own to make is exemplified by such a speech as that which we heard from the noble Earl, Lord Halifax—a truly remarkable speech with which I humbly but entirely agree. During the last five or six years I have been over to America on several occasions, and I have discussed these problems, in my own small way, with members of the American Bar Association, of which I have had the honour to be an honorary member for some twenty years. They are, as we all know, a most influential body of men. The difference between the feeling for this country (I think my dates are right) in 1946 and this year was quite remark-
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able. The problem was far easier and far better to deal with. I respectfully agree with the noble Earl that this idea that we may be dragged into an aggressive war at the heels of America is the vaguest moonshine: first of all, because they would not seek to drag us into such a war; and secondly, because, even if they did, inconceivable as it may be, we should not be dragged. Therefore, I venture to think we may leave out that proposition.
We have all enjoyed, too, the speeches of the noble Viscount. Lord Stansgate, the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, and the noble Lord, Lord Killearn. I am not one of those who assent to the proposition which I think my noble friend Lord Strabolgi enunciated, that there must be some kind of a definite limit to a speech. I do not think this House objects to speeches being long provided they are well-informed, constructive and sincere. Speeches of that character we most certainly have had to-day. Neither does the House in the least mind—at least, I do not—if any noble Lords on these Benches have a little venture on their own and do not conform completely to the orthodox Party view. I very much enjoyed the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, although I did not agree with it. Certainly it gave food for thought, and I think it all to the good that the noble Marquess should apply his mind to the sort of questions which the noble Viscount asked.
I am not going to keep your Lordships long, because I have no fresh contribution to make, and at this hour, when we are all anxious to hear the noble Marquess the Leader of the House, I think the best thing I can do is to sit down. I should, however, like to say just a few words on a matter of which the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, started discussion today—namely, the subject of war crimes. I am sorry the noble Lord, Lord Winster, thought that when we discussed this matter on a previous occasion I was below my form. I am rather consoled, however, because I did not realise that the noble Lord thought I had a form below which it was possible to fall. Of course I agree that "vindictiveness long drawn out" is wrong. But why add the words "long drawn out"? Vindictiveness itself is wrong. And when Lord Hankey told us that he was going to

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establish the principle of clemency, may I most respectfully remind him that the principle of clemency was established 1,950 years ago'? Of course I agree that if it is possible to review these cases, and release people who ought to be released, that should be done. But do not let it be thought that His Majesty's judges, when they send anybody to prison, are offending against the principle of clemency, or are actuated by vindictivness. That is not so, of course.
LORD HANKEY: I did not say so.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: The noble Lord did not suggest it. It is not the mere fact that a man is in prison that justifies his release from prison: it is the fact that authority should always be ready to look at a case afresh, and if it finds reasons for exercising clemency, then it should be exercised. I do not suppose the noble Lord would want to go further than that, and certainly so far as that I should be very ready to go with him.
I was relieved to hear from the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, that there is no suggestion that we shall join in a European Army, and that our attitude with regard to that proposal is to be as it was with regard to the Schuman Plan. These questions are so fundamental that I feel, speaking for myself, that if Parliament is to be called upon to surrender part of its sovereignty, it ought to be done only after the people have been consulted at a General Election. I should be entirely opposed to this Government, or indeed, any other Government, unless this matter had been made a very plain issue before the electors, dealing with such a topic. I do not say that these things may not happen, but I do say that they are enormous questions on which obviously the country ought to be consulted.
Agreeing, as I do, with the general tone and tenor of Mr. Eden's speech, I have nothing more to say. I recall some of the aphorisms of Mr. Bevin to me. He always used to quote that old saying: "It is not a question of not taking risks. Any line you take involves risks. All you can do is to make up your mind which is the right risk to take." On the whole, it seems to me that Mr. Eden is making up his mind to take the right sort of risk. Another thing Mr. Bevin said to roe was that in foreign affairs more than anything else the quality needed is patience. Mr.
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Eden, in his speech, seemed to me to show that he possessed that quality. Therefore, I am happy to think—I am not going into any of the minor controversial topics—that the broad issue that emerges from this debate is that this House is behaving itself as a Council of State, and that, in the main, foreign affairs are outside the realm of Party politics.
7.37 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I take it that the House will not wish me in winding up this debate to attempt another general survey of British foreign policy. That would be merely to re-duplicate what has already been done much better, first by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary in another place, and here this afternoon by my noble friend Lord Reading. My purpose in rising is to answer, to the best of my ability, questions which have been quite properly put to the Government by noble Lords who have spoken, and I will, I can assure the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, be as brief as I can. These questions have covered, as was, I imagine, inevitable, considerable ground. There has been reference to the Far East; there has been considerable reference to Egypt; there has been reference to Middle East defence; and there has been reference to Europe and, in particular, to Germany. Very varying views have been expressed on all these topics. I was amused, as was the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Jowitt, to note that practically every speaker from the Opposition Benches, whether he spoke from the Front Bench or from the Back Benches, prefaced his remarks by saying that he spoke only for himself. I thought that a very welcome return to individualism, and extremely acceptable to us on these Benches.
Very little of the debate has been concerned with the Far East, but I feel I must say a few words about that aspect, and especially about Korea. I am afraid that I have nothing very encouraging to say about the progress of the armistice negotiations. They have dragged on, as we know, from week to week and from month to month, and, even now, they do not show any sign of coming to an immediate conclusion. We can only hope that, as the various difficulties are gradually moved out of the way, a moment will come when real progress can be made. I do not think one can say more

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than that to-night. In the meantime, however, I should like on behalf of His Majesty's Government to express our absolute confidence in General Ridgway, who has shown most extreme patience and assiduity in trying to get an agreement. I should also like, as I am sure would all noble Lords, to pay a. special tribute to the United Nations troops, who have continued to perform their military duties under conditions which must be of a particularly trying kind.
I am sure the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, will forgive me if I do not enter into the wider issues which he raised, not because I do not think they are important or because I did not find what he said about them interesting, but because, as he knows, these questions are extremely delicate. I do not want to go beyond what has already been said by the Foreign Secretary or to say anything which would arouse controversy here or elsewhere. I would, however, say this with regard to the Resolution which branded China an aggressor. I do not want to go into the events which preceded or followed it, but with regard to the actual Resolution I should have thought there was no doubt at all that it merely recorded a self-evident fact, and in that I agree entirely with what was said by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Jowitt.
There is also the question of Persia. This was a subject on which certain very highly coloured flies were thrown over to me by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander, in the debate last week which, as the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, said to-night, was a precursor of this. I should very much have liked to reply to what he said, but personally—and I am sure the House will agree upon this—I do not think it will be helpful to us if we continue to wrangle on this subject. I am certain that the main object is to see what can be done to find a way out of the deadlock which at present exists, on a basis honourable to both countries, and I think we had better leave it at that.
Now I come directly to Egypt, which has played a much larger part in our discussions this afternoon. As your Lordships know, I adverted to this subject in my speech on the debate on the Address last week, and there is not a
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great deal that I can add regarding the general attitude of His Majesty's Government. I would repeat—if, indeed, it is necessary for me to do so—that, just like our predecessors, we have no imperialistic motives in our attitude towards this unhappy dispute. We are only concerned, first, with the sanctity of treaties, and, secondly, with the defence of the free world, which is, after all, a vital consideration, not only to ourselves, but to our sister nations of the Commonwealth and our Western Allies. We are not in the Suez Canal Zone for our own pleasure. It is indeed an extremely expensive commitment at the present time, but pending other arrangements—which we still hope may be concluded—we must remain there; and, in doing so, we have the sanction of the Treaty of 1936.
The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, asked me a number of searching questions on this Egyptian problem, and I should like to thank him for his courtesy in giving me notice of the questions he intended to ask. The first question, as I understand it, was this: Is it right that the obligation imposed on Egypt to accommodate troops on the canal is imposed solely by the Treaty and ceases in 1956, or does it persist after that date? I think that was the question. I would suggest to the noble Viscount, with all deference, that the form of his question is in fact a little misleading. The position, as I understand it, is this: under Articles 8 and 16 of the Treaty of 1936, if either party after 1956 is asked by the other party it must agree to negotiate on a revision of the Treaty. If direct negotiations between the two parties fail, then it must agree to have recourse to arbitration, either through the League of Nations—I am quoting the actual provision of the Treaty but, of course, in actual respect those words are no longer applicable, because the League of Nations no longer exists—or, alternatively, through such other procedure as may be agreed by the two parties. Pending the decision of the arbitrator who is selected, the Treaty continues in its present form. There is no provision, so far as I know, which would allow of unilateral abrogation of the Treaty, either by Great Britain or by Egypt. That is the answer as I have been able to obtain it to this question of the noble Viscount.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I am grateful to the noble Marquess. I should lust like to ask this further question: If unfortunately this dispute persists in 1956, shall we be in the position of saying that although the Treaty has terminated its twenty years, we still have a right to maintain our troops on the Canal?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: As I understand it, the position is that if the Egyptians come to us in 1956 or after and say that they would like to have a revision of the Treaty, we can either agree to direct negotiations with them or we can say that we should prefer reference to an arbitrator. In that case, both parties would have to accept the final decision of that arbitrator, whoever it might be. Pending the decision of the arbitrator we should be fully entitled to remain where we were. That is the information I have received.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I am most grateful to the noble Marquess, because this is a very difficult matter. We talk a great deal about the independence of Egypt, and it now appears that Egypt is not and never will be independent, because she will never he able to get rid of the troops unless some arbitrator agrees on some reference which the noble Marquess has not defined.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble Viscount must remember that this was a perfectly freely negotiated Treaty. I know that he does not accept that, but I was in the Foreign Office at the time, and no pressure was brought upon Egypt. It was rather a difficult negotiation which went on for weeks and months, but which was freely negotiated, and Nahas Pasha made a perfectly plain statement in the Chamber of Deputies afterwards in which he made that clear. Therefore, if the Egyptians want to alter the provisions of the Treaty now—and I do not criticise that—they must do it through the ordinary form prescribed by the Treaty which they signed.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: Will the noble Marquess allow me to put a question to clarify something he has said which may prove to be a point of importance in the future? He said that the Treaty provided that, after the due date, if there were any disagreement it should be referred to the League of Nations. The League of Nations is no longer existent.
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Alternatively, it should be referred to an arbitrator. The question I want to ask is: is the United Nations the inheritor of the status of the League of Nations in a matter of that kind, as it is in a great many matters?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I myself asked the same question as the noble Viscount, and the information I received was that in this particular case—I am not making a general observation—it is not the inheritor. Therefore, we have to fall back on the second alternative provided in the Treaty.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: I am very grateful to the noble Marquess.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, asked me a second question. He asked whether power exists in the Treaty of 1936 to exceed the prescribed number of troops in the Canal Zone and, if not, under what power recent reinforcements have been sent. As I listened to him, I could not help thinking that this question seemed to show a strange misunderstanding of the position. He seems to suggest that by increasing the number of troops in the Suez Canal Zone we are infringing a Treaty to which Egypt is still adhering, and that we are bound by the provisions of a treaty by which they are equally hound. But that is not the position at all—the opposite is the fact. By abrogating the Treaty, as they thought right to do, it is the Egyptians themselves who have taken illegal measures under the Treaty, to deprive us of our own rights under that instrument, and the increase in our forces is merely for the purpose of maintaining those rights which accrue to us under the Treaty which was quite freely signed between us and Egypt. That, to me, seems to be clearly the position, and to say that we are breaking the Treaty is to put it exactly the wrong way round. We are maintaining our rights under the Treaty and Egypt has abrogated it. I would also say in this connection that I seemed to get the impression when the noble Viscount was speaking—and he will correct me if I am wrong—that he feels that this Treaty of 1936 was imposed on Egypt. I was sorry that he said that, because it is a thing which has been said outside, and it has created a very wrong impression. I repeat once again, it was

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freely negotiated; and it is much better that we should continue to look at it on that basis.
The noble Viscount asked me a third question, which had reference to my speech on the debate on the Address last week. He asked whether, when I made a reference to the establishment of American bases in Great Britain, I meant to imply that the obligations on us are the same as those imposed on Egypt in respect of forces on the Canal. Well, of course the circumstances are not identical. The presence of British troops on the Suez Canal is specifically legalised by the provisions of the Treaty. The presence of American airmen in this country—no doubt the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Jowitt, will correct me if I am wrong—is the result of a voluntary agreement concluded between the late Government and the United States Government. But the purpose for which both the agreements were made is, I maintain, the same: they are both examples of joint co-operation by two sovereign States with the aim of buttressing international peace. Personally I can only regret that the spirit which inspired the Egyptian Government in making this arrangement in 1936 has apparently given way since to what can be described only as a narrower nationalism.
The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, questioned the military value of the Suez Canal. He said he did not believe that it had any strategic value.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: That is going rather far. I only pointed out that the strategic value of this area was recognised long before the Suez Canal was cut.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY:
That is as it may be; but the noble Viscount would not deny the strategic value of the Canal.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: No.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: It is a view which is shared by every strategic expert in the free world at the present time. The noble Viscount quoted an extremely trenchant letter from my grandfather to Lord Cromer, written between sixty and seventy years ago. I thought it very characteristic of certain sections of the noble Viscount's Party: they live
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obstinately and unrepentantly in the distant past. My grandfather was very much of a realist, and I am certain that if he were to look now at the cleavage between the Communists and the free world he would see very clearly the strategic value of Egypt and of the Canal Zone. Of course, by far the best way out of the present impasse would be for Egypt, even now, to show herself willing to enter into negotiations with the four sponsoring Powers on joint defence for the Middle East. If the Egyptian Government were to modify their present attitude and agree to that, I am quite sure that they would not find His Majesty's Government backward in co-operating in the discussions. I can only hope that they will find themselves willing and able to do this.
That brings me to the Four-Power proposals for defence of the Middle East. These, of course, are closely allied to the Egyptian problem, and they were referred to by Lord Stansgate and by other noble Lords. The purpose of these proposals, as my noble friend Lord Reading has said, was the same as that of the military aspects of what has come to be known as N.A.T.O. The object is to provide machinery for sovereign States in vitally important areas, without any derogation of sovereignty, to co-operate freely for the joint defence of the area. The value of a scheme of that kind should need no justification by me or by anybody else. There is no suggestion that the Middle East Command should interfere with problems and disputes within the area of the Command; nor is it suggested that the Supreme Commander should be empowered to move forces in the territories of States taking part without the agreement of the States concerned. What is envisaged is clearly voluntary co-operation for a common object.
I would entirely agree with Lord Stansgate that one of the greatest dangers to peace to-day, not only in this area but everywhere, is the tendency of countries during years of comparative peace to try to adopt a detached attitude, in the hope that, if war ever comes, they can keep out of it. In fact, as we all know from the experience of the last thirty years, that is quite impossible. If a world war breaks out everybody will be sucked into it. Moreover, there is no doubt that, were one of these States invaded, the first thing it would do would be to appeal to the

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United Nations for assistance. If that is true, as I believe it to be, then it is merely common sense that plans should be completed now to enable such assistance to be given effectively. States must not expect to get advantage out of international organisations unless they are prepared to accept the full obligation of membership. That cannot be said too often. It is for these reasons that we must all regret the decision of the Egyptian Government up to now not to co-operate. I believe that if that attitude of non-co-operation persisted on their part, or on the part of any other Middle Eastern States concerned, they themselves would be the greatest sufferers. I hope sincerely that after further consideration they will modify their present views. If they will only do that, a new sense of stability will be created in one of the main danger areas of the world.
Questions in this connection were raised by both Lord Strabolgi and by Lord Stansgate touching the position of Israel in relation to the Middle East Command. As these noble Lords will probably know, in the original communication which was sent to the Middle Eastern countries, Israel was included. But no specific invitation to join has yet been sent to Israel or to any other country. I understand, however, that it is the full intention of the sponsoring Powers that Israel should have the opportunity to cooperate with others if she so wishes. I hope that noble Lords will not ask me to go any further than that to-day.
LORD STRABOLGI: I am afraid that I must make one observation. You cannot expect Israel to co-operate and take all the risks concerned in this matter unless you give them some help economically and thus assist them to maintain their forces and be powerful.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I have heard of other States who refuse to co-operate unless they get some financial assistance. It is not a position which applies to Israel alone.
LORD STRABOLGI: We have had plenty ourselves.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: It is a matter which will have to be discussed when the time conies. With regard to the actual position with relation to the Command, I have said as much as I can this afternoon.
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Now I come to Europe, and especially to Germany. Here the ground has already been so fully covered by the two speeches of my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary and by that of Lord Reading that there is very little I can add. The Foreign Secretary dealt with the unhappy response, or lack of response, by Mr. Vyshinsky to Allied proposals for disarmament. He also said in another place that the Allies were examining the Soviet counter-proposals. Whatever we may feel about the proposals, it is right that they should be properly examined. He also explained the negotiations for the future of Europe, to which Germany should make a contribution as an equal partner, and he spoke of a new contractual relationship, to which the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, referred this afternoon, between Germany and the Occupying Powers, which is to take the place of the present Occupation Statute. All those negotiations, as noble Lords are aware, are at present proceeding. They have not reached a stage at which it would be useful if I made any statement—if, indeed, any statement could be made.
I would, however, make just this comment: that His Majesty's Government are convinced that these negotiations provide Germany with the best means of fulfilling her legitimate aspirations, while safeguarding the common interests and security of the other members of the European community. We fully understand and share the desire of all Germans for the reunification of their country and will support them in all efforts to bring about such reunification on terms that are acceptable to the Germans themselves and compatible with those ideals of individual and national freedom which the Western countries share in common. Meanwhile, we and our American and French partners are pledged to maintain our essential rights and our forces in the Federal Republic and in Berlin in the interests of international peace and stability and the defence of the West. That statement, I realise, having listened to him, perhaps does not go so far as the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, would like; but there are many of us, I am sure, who feel that in this matter there is an "inevitability of gradualness," and it is hopeless to go too fast—indeed, it would not be practicable. I hope, however, that the clear statement

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made will go some way to satisfy him. He devoted much of his speech to this particular question this afternoon, as was natural, because, as we all know, he speaks with a very special knowledge of this particular problem. In any case, I can assure the noble Lord that I will bring everything he has said to-day to the notice of the Foreign Secretary.
LORD PAKENHAM: I am much obliged to the noble Marquess.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY:
Then the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, and the right reverend Prelate, the Bishop of Chichester, raised a question about the future of those who had been convicted of war crimes. Here, again, a definite statement as to future policy is much more than they will expect from me, but they will, I am certain, like to know that the whole question of German war criminals is under the active consideration of His Majesty's Government and will, no doubt, form a part of the general negotiations over Germany which are impending.
My Lords, I have tried, in the time at my disposal. to answer the questions which have been addressed to, me by noble Lords who have spoken. They have been many and various, and inevitably it has not been possible for me to deal in detail with all the points raised. But I hope very much that the House will feel that I have at any rate done my best to cover the ground. I agree with what I think was said by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Jowitt, that in more ways than one this has been an extremely satisfactory debate. Above all, as so often before, it has served to make clear that, though we may disagree on individual issues—and perhaps that is inevitable—on the main principles and purposes of British foreign policy we all remain united. I thought that was clearly apparent from the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, who opened the debate.
We all believe, in the first place, in the closest and most cordial relationship between the British Commonwealth and the United States, to which the noble Earl, Lord Halifax, referred in the very moving speech that he delivered to us this afternoon. We all regard that as absolutely vital. For this conjunction, this close co-operation, or whatever you
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call it, between the British Commonwealth and the United States, constitutes the one effective counterweight to the pressure which is being brought against the free world by countries further East. If freedom is to survive, there must be a partnership, an absolutely confident partnership, based not only on mutual sympathy, but also on mutual interest; and anything, that impairs that partnership or that sympathy and understanding will be disastrous for the whole free civilisation. It is for that reason that I hope, in particular, that not only all of us who are fortunate to be here this afternoon but those in wider circles who have the opportunity of reading the noble Earl's words will ponder them, because I believe they represent a very important contribution to thought at the present time.
Secondly, we all believe in the maintenance of an enduring peace through the United Nations and the ancillary institutions which are connected with it. On these two aims all our hearts are fixed. It is in relation to those basic aims that we must consider our actions in all parts of the world—in the Far East, the Middle East, Europe and wherever danger threatens. But I would just say this. I hope that we shall not delude ourselves into thinking that enduring peace can be secured merely by dodging each crisis as it arises. Peace, if it is to be a really solid thing, must rest on far sounder and stabler foundations than that. It must be based on the acceptance by all countries, great and small, of a common standard of conduct, a common respect for law and, above all, a recognition that in an interdependent world none can prosper unless all prosper.
It is easy to say that; and I realise that we are all still very far from that ideal. Human nature is extremely imperfect. National ambitions and ideological hatreds still play too large a part in the moulding of national policies. While that unhappy position persists, we have no option but to provide ourselves with the necessary means to deter potential lawbreakers from disturbing the peace. In passing, I would say to the right reverend Prelate, if I may, that I hope he will not disturb himself too much about the irresponsible use of the atomic bomb. He quoted statements which had been made by, as I understand it, comparatively

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junior people. But the Foreign Secretary, who has had access to the same material as the late Prime Minister had, gave a most confident assurance on this point, just as the late Prime Minister did on a former occasion in another place. Therefore I do not think that we need worry too much about that.
But, to return: the establishment of this general standard of conduct must form the object of all our policy. That is the reason for our rearmament and that is the reason for the measures which we and other law-abiding countries have felt obliged to take in Korea and elsewhere. I quite agree with what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, that rearmament by the Western Powers will never, by itself, provide the cure for our present differences and difficulties. But what it can do is to create a climate which encourages a resort to reason, instead of a resort to force. It will, I can assure your Lordships, be the object of His Majesty's Government, in conjunction with their Allies and, above all, with the United States, that, while we must rearm—and we cannot avoid rearming—we shall equally and at the same time pursue the larger aim of settlement
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by agreement, in the firm faith that sooner or later, though it may be a long way ahead, hatred and suspicion will give way to mutual understanding. It is in that faith that I hope we shall all, in all parts of the House, go forward, trying, as the Foreign Secretary said in his speech, to find a decisive solution for each individual problem as opportunity offers, but looking forward, too, to that happier future when the present unhappy divisions give way to a larger unity, and when, if I may quote a very fine phrase which was once used by Lord Balfour,
"the boundaries of nations become, not the lines which divide them, but the links that hind them together."
8.11 p.m.
LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, we have listened with very great interest to the speech which has just wound up what I think has been a very interesting debate, and I think noble Lords will agree that there is nothing left for me to do but formally to ask leave to withdraw the Motion standing in my name.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.
House adjourned at twelve minutes past eight o'clock.