FOREIGN POLICY

HL Deb 02 May 1951 vol 171 cc639-94

3.47 p.m.

Debate resumed.

LORD STRABOLGI

My Lords, I am sure that your Lordships would wish me to thank my noble friend the Chancellor of the Duchy for reading us that most interesting, though grim, account, and I know that all your Lordships will join with my noble friend in extending our sympathy and sorrow towards the relatives of those who have lost their lives in this heavy fighting. The report we have just heard read gives added importance to the debate initiated by the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, which, as the noble Earl who spoke from the Liberal Benches said, ranged very wide over most of the world, and was almost the opening of a full-dress foreign affairs debate in your Lordships' House, which is always an occasion.

I wonder if the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, would permit me to throw some doubt on the statement which he has made before in the course of his speeches in your Lordships' House, as to the origin of the trouble in Malaya. I have been at some pains to find out what I could—as indeed is the duty of us all —about this troublesome situation in Malaya, and I am assured categorically on the highest authority that the revolt in Malaya is indigenous: it is a native movement and is not actuated or initiated from the Chinese on the Chinese mainland. There can be no gainsaying the fact that this most painful trouble began while the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists were in the ascendant on the mainland of China. If the Chinese are to be blamed, then the Chinese Nationalists can be blamed equally with the Chinese Communists. I would ask the noble Lord to look into the matter more closely—I know how careful he likes to be about these things— and I think he will find that, unfortunate as this business in Malaya is, it is a native affair and can be settled eventually on the spot. If we could get the good offices of the Pekin Government, I am sure that the Colonial Office and everyone else concerned would be only too pleased.

I should like to make a further comment on the speech of the noble Lord who initiated the debate. I am sure that he will not mind my suggesting that a policy based on atrocities by other people is not always a good one. It is so easy to parade the atrocities of your enemies at the moment. I am not quite old enough, and I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, is old enough, to remember the great campaign—the Midlothian campaign—of the late Mr. Gladstone, when he created in Britain tremendous indignation, and righteous indignation, at the atrocities of the Turks in the Balkans. Our whole policy in the Middle East was built up on the basis of those atrocities at that period. The atrocities argument can be used ad absurdum. The noble Lord is now inclined to look with some sympathy upon the Japanese and suggest that they should be rearmed. But it is not very long ago—and I do not think we should have such short memories—that the vicious conduct of the Japanese towards our own kith and kind in prisoner-of-war camps horrified all decent people. I myself have listened almost in astonishment at the horrors unfolded when the noble Lord himself has spoken of the atrocities of the Germans in their concentration camps and during the rise and burgeoning of the Nazi movement.

There is no end to this, and in your Lordships' House I have drawn attention to some horrible doings by our Allies in South Korea—the South Korean Government. I think I am right in saying that the most reverend Primate, the Arch-bishop of York, has also drawn attention to excesses and cruelties inflicted on the peasants by the South Korean Government. We can go on to the horrible loss of life which took place when the affairs in India were settled between India and Pakistan—a loss of life which all decent Indians, Moslem or Hindu, regret very much indeed. Therefore, to try to sup-port a policy which I understand is the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, of spreading this horrible war because he does not like what is happening in China, is an example of basing a policy on atrocities and their affront to humanitarian feelings—which I know the noble Lord feels, as indeed we all do—will lead to a bad policy with a bad result.

I was equally astonished to hear the noble Lord's new views on Germany and German rearmament. May I be allowed, very respectfully, to support the arguments of the noble Earl opposite? This is no time to talk of rearming the Germans, when we are having the greatest difficulty in providing sufficient equipment for our own forces and those of our reliable and close Allies like the French. I can only repeat what I have ventured to say before in your Lordships' House, that we should always consider this—and I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, is beginning to take the same view—that we cannot be sure, in case of a Third World War, on which side the Germans will be ranged; whether they will think it more advantageous for the future of their nation to range themselves with the Easterners or the Westerners. I think that is a factor which cannot be lost sight of.

As the noble Lord says, neither the Japanese nor the Germans themselves are very anxious to rearm. There are very strong pacifist movements in both countries, especially in Japan, where there is a strong antimilitarist movement. I should have thought that the best statesmanship at this time for all the Western Powers, ourselves and our friends, would be to encourage antimilitarism and pacifism in these former nations who have broken the peace of the world so recently, and who have inflicted such suffering on their neighbours. If the Germans would become out-and-out pacifist, I think the rest of Europe would feel a great deal safer. The noble Lord talks about the "civilised Powers." I should have liked him to define that term. He is always very careful in his language, and I should like to know what he regards as a civilised Power. He would not have considered the Japanese or the Germans civilised Powers quite recently, and I am glad to see that he has some reservations with regard to the policy in certain quarters —particularly in the United States—of going full-speed ahead with the re-armament of both Japan and Germany. I do not want to be pedantic, but I do not think "civilised Power" quite provides the description needed. It is a fact that the Hindus and the Chinese regard us as uncivilised. A great part of Asia regards the so-called West—ourselves and the Americans—as uncivilised, and I have heard of one great Power, which I shall not specify, described as going from barbarism to decadence without an intervening period of civilisation. I think the adjective "civilised" needs a good deal of explanation and definition.

Speaking for my noble friends on these Benches, I do not think that I am in any way misrepresenting them when I declare that the general attitude of the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, and the policies which he puts forward with such skill and eloquence, do not meet with our support. We think that they are dangerous policies. We think that to spread the war in Asia would suit the ends of those we reckon to be our enemies. The noble Lord is "more Royalist than the King" in these matters or, to put it in another way—I do not want to be in any sense objectionable—he is more American than General MacArthur. I have paid tribute to the merits of General MacArthur as a soldier, and I again do so to-day, but, after all, General MacArthur was prepared to treat with the Chinese Commander-in-Chief in the field. In the terms of the Motion, the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, is not even prepared to go as far as General MacArthur in that respect.

LORD VANSITTART

I must take objection to this. The only occasion upon which I mentioned General MacArthur in my speech was when I said that I disagreed with him. That was with regard to his praises of the Japanese. Other-wise, I mentioned him not at all

LORD STRABOLGI

I do not suggest that the noble Lord mentioned General MacArthur—I mentioned him. He is now one of the leaders of a very powerful section of opinion in the United States of America which is apparently not yet in a majority. I was complaining—if the noble Lord will allow me to complain, because his words are heeded well out-side the confines of this Chamber—that he is going even further than this section of American opinion.

LORD VANSITTART

I should be glad if the noble Lord would be more specific on that point. He is making statements about my speech, and he offers no evidence at all. I now ask him to provide the evidence.

LORD STRABOLGI

My evidence is in the Motion of the noble Lord: … no concessions should be made to the Communist Government of China on the basis of the cessation of hostilities in Korea … We surely want to bring the hostilities in Korea to an end, and I was illustrating that by reminding your Lordships that even General MacArthur was prepared to deal with the Chinese Commander-in-Chief in the field. But apparently the noble Lord is not prepared to do that.

LORD VANSITTART

I will not interrupt the noble Lord any more, but I will deal with him when I come to reply.

LORD STRABOLGI

I hope the noble Lord will point out any way in which I have been unfair to him, because that is the last thing I wish to be. What about the other section of American opinion, that headed by the President, the Secretary of State and, apparently, the majority of leaders of opinion in that great democracy? I hold in my hand a copy of a cable from Washington which appeared yesterday in the News Chronicle and was mentioned in other papers, setting out the essential American terms, as they are described, for a settlement in Korea. I do not think I am misrepresenting the noble Earl, Lord Perth, when I say that this follows largely on the lines adumbrated in his speech. Mr. Dean Acheson, the United States Secretary of State suggests three heads under which a settlement could be achieved of this horrible business in Korea—for it is a horrible business: not only have we lost the splendid young soldiers to whom the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander, referred, but the whole country has been ruined and devastated; and the sufferings caused to the innocent and helpless peasantry are appalling. There will be little left of Korea to save unless this matter is re-solved soon in a peaceful way. The three main heads for a settlement are, according to the American Secretary of State: first, an end to the fighting; secondly, concrete measures against a renewal of the attack; and thirdly, the abandonment by the enemy of his attempt to conquer the Republic of Korea.

That third head is, I suggest, of very great importance. It is interpreted by the correspondent of this newspaper, Mr. Waithman, a well-known journalist, whom probably Lord Vansittart knows quite well. I do not know whether the noble Earl, Lord Perth would entirely support this view, but this is Mr. Waithman's interpretation: This appeared to leave no room for further doubt that the United States is willing to suspend the effort to unify North and South Korea under a single freely elected Government and leave the Communists in possession in the North. The conditions which Mr. Acheson indicates are clearly not in conflict with the plan for a demilitarised zone along the 38th Parallel. My interpretation of that is that this is a temporary arrangement which the Americans are now canvassing through Mr. Dean Acheson. This is an immediate arrangement for a cease-fire, a cessation of fighting.

THE EARL OF PERTH

It may be as the noble Lord says. I should not like to say. I should think that even this newspaper's interpretation of a very carefully-thought-out statement may be rather dangerous. I should not like to commit myself.

LORD STRABOLGI

Of course, I accept what the noble Earl says. At the same time, this correspondent is in Washington and he is surrounded by that atmosphere; and I should think that what he says is, at any rate, not unworthy of notice. But my reading of this very important statement by the Secretary of State is that these are temporary terms to bring the fighting to an end as soon as possible, after which a general statement can follow. I hope that will mean a unified Korea, with a properly elected Government elected under free conditions, and a chance for the Korean people to decide their own future and form of government. If that is "self-determination," to use the noble Earl's expression, I admit that I cling to it. I think it is the best way of settling these matters.

As regards what has been said about Formosa I am conscious of some dubiety. We have to be very careful, knowing what we do about Asiatic elections, as to how the voices are collected in Formosa. I take as a precedent Alsace-Lorraine. Alsace-Lorraine was torn from France and remained in the German Reich for about the same period as Formosa, having been torn from China, was held by the Japanese after the end of the Sino-Japanese war. There was never any doubt in any Frenchman's mind about the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. And I have no doubt that the majority of Alsatians and Lorrainers thought the same, but there was no question of taking a plebisicite or of sounding the wishes of the people. I imagine that the Chinese (they are Nationalists as well as Communists, and we have to reckon with that nationalism), whatever their political affinities, when told that there is some doubt about the future of Formosa would take the same attitude as did the average Frenchman when spoken to about the future of Alsace.

I was in Formosa after the Japanese occupation, and I have a good many Chinese friends. I do not think it is misrepresenting the Chinese attitude to say that the average Chinese, after he has looked after his family, thinks next about his country. He has strong patriotic feel-ings—as strong as those of the ordinary Westerner. If I am right, it is no good our attempting to extend our field of conflict with a people such as the Chinese. After all, they are the most numerous racial group in the world, and they occupy an immense territory. Moreover, there are those who say that, in spite of the atrocities and excesses, the present Chinese Government is the first for several generations ever to approach a good standard of honesty. I should have thought that the policy of His Majesty's Government in trying to make terms, and eventually come to a firm friendship and workable relations, with the Government of Pekin was the right one. I am certain that if His Majesty's Government listened to the siren voices of the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, and those who speak as he does, and refused, or at any rate lent their support to a refusal to make a beginning of a settlement of the Korean affair, and on the contrary lent themselves to a policy which would only spread the conflict, they would be condemned by a considerable majority of the British people.

What we want in this country after two world wars is not a series of new foreign adventures but a period of peace, retrenchment and recuperation. I am astonished that the Conservative Party have not seized on this point. The people want a chance to recoup their fortunes and to enjoy a little peace. If the Conservative. Party were to adopt the old policy of "Peace, Retrenchment and Reform" they would win a wonderful amount of support.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

The noble Lord's Party have not been very successful in their policy!

LORD STRABOLGI

At the present stage of my speech I am afraid that I was not praising my own Party Government. The Labour Government, owing no doubt to adverse circumstances, have, perhaps, not pursued this path as resolutely as might have been good for the country. We now have an opportunity of reversing the trend a little and, above all, of avoiding any further adventures or commitments or embroilments anywhere in the world. After all, two world wars have caused financial, economic and, to a certain extent, moral exhaustion, and we need time to recover. But we can do our duty, as may be seen from what our troops have been doing in Korea, if we are attacked. Our duty is to uphold the tenets of the United Nations, but any deliberate enlargements on our commitments any-where, or any embarkation on new adventures or warlike projects will not receive the support of the British people.

4.10 p.m.

THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD

My Lords, I do not propose to follow the lines of the noble Lords sparkling oration to which he has just treated the House, except to say that we should all, no doubt, like to be left to pursue a policy of peace and retrenchment; but when one starts doing that one is liable to be attacked by somebody else. I propose to make only a brief intervention in this debate this afternoon, and I trust that it will not be considered irrelevant to the Motion of my noble friend Lord Vansittart. I wish to make a few observations about the proposed cuts in the overseas broad-casts of the B.B.C. I think I am justified in doing so by the opening phrases of the noble Lord's Motion: To call attention to certain factors in the vital interests and defences of the civilised Powers. I regard our overseas broadcasts as such a vital interest. No one on this side of the House, I imagine, objects to occasional bouts of economy on the part of the Government, but I submit that this is one of those economies which should definitely not be attempted at the present time. My right honourable friend Mr. Eden stated recently in another place that he considered that our European broadcasts were one of the most vital aspects of our defences, and many people will agree with that view.

I know a little about this matter because I worked for a time during the war in the Political Warfare Executive, which controlled the policy of the B.B.C.'s European transmissions. These broadcasts undoubtedly achieved a remarkable position in Europe. Your Lordships will all remember the terrible vicissitudes which we suffered at the beginning of the war, and the policy wisely laid down was factually to tell the truth without, of course, any taint what-ever of defeatism, and thus to obtain an impregnable reputation for reliability. And that reputation stood us in good stead later on, when the reputation of Dr. Goebbels for veracity of statement was becoming seriously impugned. Brilliant as this misguided and unlovable man was, he took a different and ultimately disastrous view about the functions of propaganda. To him it was always ancillary to the blitzkrieg. It was a weapon of attack and, therefore, in common with the other methods of attack employed by our late enemies, every form of dirt and lies and misrepresentation were considered by him to be part and parcel of the game. A good example of that is Goebbels' story about British sailors throwing a dead cat into the grave of Captain Langsdorff, commander of the "Graf Spee" and a distinguished and gallant German naval officer, when what in fact had happened was that he was buried with full honours, and a volley was fired over the grave. Another example of this Machiavellian method was Goebbels' story about Mr. Churchill arranging the sinking of the "Athenia" when, as he knew perfectly well, the Germans themselves had sunk it. For a while what I will call this realpolitik of the ether was brilliantly successful, and it may have done some-thing to undermine the morale of the French armies during that first cold winter of the war. But when at length the tide had turned, and it became evident that the Germans had not won the war, then this technique at once lost all credibility; and the German broad-casts became regarded in Europe as a tissue of dirty lies and, except by quislings, were listened to, if at all, with contempt and disbelief.

It was at this point that the patient policy of our European services came into its own, because the occupied countries knew that we had told them the truth when we were, as all the world thought, in extremis. And in the dark months of occupation they were animated, amid the slaughter of hostages and the other conventional refinements of German rule, by this calm voice from London, giving them the news which, as they were well aware, was their only source of truth. It was brilliantly successful in France, Holland, Belgium, Scandinavia, Italy and many other countries, and it sustained their burdened spirits with the conviction that this horror was not a perennial one, as they must otherwise have feared—a fear which would have sapped alike their confidence in them-selves as civilised human beings and their determination to resist the invader. My own observations convince me that in moments of international tension it is still to the B.B.C. that people turn for un-biased news. The facts of the situation which I wish to bring to your Lordships' attention are, briefly, these. The B.B.C. had requested a grant of £5,330,000 for the year 1951–52, which was an increase of £645,000 on the grant for 1950–51. At first, His Majesty's Government announced that they were willing to grant only £4,650,000, but later, after many protests, both in the Press and in another place, the right honourable gentleman, Mr. Morrison, as your Lordships will remember, announced that he was prepared to grant an additional £100,000. The total "grant this year would therefore be £4,750,000 which, although an increase of £65,000 over the 1950–51 grant, is still (if my calculations are right) £500,000 less than the sum which the B.B.C. had calculated would be necessary to maintain their overseas services at the same pitch of efficiency as during the past year.

We have to remember, of course, that the cost of running the overseas services has increased since last year, partly owing to increases in salaries, partly to measures which have been taken to stop Soviet jamming and also to certain other precautionary measures. It appears, there-fore, that the B.B.C. will be compelled to make savings of approximately £500,000 on the overseas services and by cutting capital expenditure, presumably on equipment. I understand that the overseas services will now have to go off the air for some hours each day—and this at a time when Russia is stepping up her poisonous broadcasts by making use of transmitters in the satellite countries which were previously confined to their own domestic networks. At the peak listening hours, in the evening, medium-wave transmitters in Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania have now begun to broadcast Communist propaganda, in foreign languages, directed to other countries, for as much as five hours in the day. At the same moment, when we are whittling down this vital weapon in order to achieve a comparatively paltry economy, the "Voice of America" is, I am informed, expecting to receive an additional 200,000,000 dollars from Congress, for expansion in the immediate future.

My Lords, I should like to refer to another aspect of any possible withdrawal by the B.B.C. from foreign broadcasting; and that is, that the "Voice of America" will appear to listeners on the other side of the Iron Curtain to be the only alter-native to that of the Kremlin. This appears to me to be most undesirable from the point of view of the conduct of the cold war, in which Western Europe is obviously an intensely important factor. Many listeners who may feel spiritually neutral between America and Stalinist imperialism might be stimulated to active partnership in the choice between Russian Asiatic barbarism and Western civilisation, and I feel that if we were to allow this to crystallise into a Russo-American conflict, we should be wantonly discarding one of our most precious assets. Further, I assume that the wavelengths abandoned by the B.B.C. will almost certainly be taken over by Russia or her satellites, probably without a break, which will mean that when our friends tune in they will no longer be hearing the voice of a friend but that of an enemy.

My Lords, this spurious economy has been universally condemned by public opinion. I have not found one single newspaper which has raised its voice to support it. Even the Daily Herald and that splendid impartial old thunderer, the New Statesman, came out in opposition to so dubious a means of saving so trivial a sum. I refrain from dilating on a similar article in the Tribune, as I am anxious not to cause the Party opposite any unnecessary embarrassment at a period which we think may be mortal in their existence. I have always been told that many undesirable elements congregate round one's deathbed, usually for acquisitive purposes, but we will leave the Tribune out of it.

I am not frightened of the size of this cut, which is not a large one, but I am frightened that it may be the thin end of the wedge, and I hope very much that the noble and learned Viscount will be able to give me two assurances in this matter: one, that no further encroachments will be made upon these services; and the other, that as soon as the financial position makes it feasible they will be restored at once to their previous vigour, and that the effectiveness of the one weapon which is already in use in the prosecution of the cold war is not to be further enfeebled by false economies.

We must think of what we have to meet from Russia. Diplomatic and international language has been debased by the Russians to a level which would surely have caused even the late, unlamented Dr. Goebbels to lower his eyes in holy awe. We have recently been regaled by a direct comparison beween Mr. Churchill and Hitler, to the detriment of the former, when Mr. Gromyko called Mr. Churchill a cannibal. Mr. Molotov having previously, at Lake Success, delicately referred to another delegate, with whose views he did not agree, as a crocodile. This, my Lords, is the language of Communism. One can only say that one pines for the courtesies of the past—to the Congress of Vienna, when the victor was chivalrous to the vanquished; and one feels grateful that the Victorian generation passed away, secure in the pathetic illusion that progress was ripening from "precedent to precedent." I feel that this steady, remorseless stream of filth that is seeping over the ether, morning, noon and night, twenty-four hours a day round the clock, like the smell of a sewer, must be met and answered. We have a splendid and a tried instrument for doing so. I believe that these broadcasts are, or at any rate should be, one of the prides of our country. They have sustained ancient, civilised nations through lengthy vicissitudes in the past. They are experienced, and not enervate. Much as we admire our American friends, and clearly wish to co-operate wilh them, in my view it would be slavish to surrender the initiative in this matter to them. After all, we have our own thoughts, our own beliefs, and our own mode of life, prior to theirs. Let us therefore not slide, with dreary acquiescence into a second-rate position. Enfeebled as we are by the war, and by other factors which I will not detail now, we are still the most stable civilised major Power on the Continent of Europe. Let us therefore not be forgetful of our past.

4.26 p.m.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

My Lords, I hope the noble Earl will not think it an impertinence if I say a special word about his speech, because I had the privilege of hearing the maiden speech of his father in the House of Commons. That was a long time ago, and I do not sup-pose there is anyone, except possibly Lord Samuel, who also heard it. I remember how he fired a broadside along the Liberal Benches, which were then fully manned and supported by hordes of recruits like myself, and how he devastated many of our Ministers with his attacks. If I may say so respectfully, there is an echo of the noble Earl's father's talents in the speech that he has made, and, being in this special position, I should like to pay him this compliment. I congratulate him also on his ingenuity. How anyone could have imagined that this Motion covered a debate on the British Broadcasting Corporation passes my comprehension.

As a Back Bencher I should like to make a suggestion to the noble Marquess opposite. We are his sheep. The Government have to carry on the work of the Government, but all Back Benchers and "unofficials" are entirely in the hands of the noble Marquess. I wonder whether he could see his way to give us an opportunity now and again to debate some political topics in this House. It would be of immense help. At present, if the Front Benches prefer to be silent there is nothing that we on the Back Benches can speak about, unless. Lord Vansittart puts down a Motion such as the one we are debating to-day. Perhaps the noble Marquess will give us a little latitude. We have, of course, a great deal of work to do. I opened the Blue Paper this morning and read what your Lordships had done Die Martis; I saw the notice about the Parliamentary golf handicap and I found, too. that we shall have to restrain our partisanship to-morrow while we discuss rag flock. If the noble Marquess could give us an opportunity occasionally to debate a political topic, I feel sure it would not be abused.

Now, my Lords, may I say, on this question of Korea, which I understood was to be the subject of the debate, that people think it does not matter what happens and that there is what is called a stalemate. In my judgment there is no stalemate at all; there is a very dangerous situation developing. There are at least three major dangers in sight. One is the firm welding together of the Chinese Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and even the bringing into play of the alliance made between Mao Tsetung and Stalin, which I think depends upon any attack from Japan. The second danger is the formation of an Asian and even a non-white bloc in the world against us. When we examine the situation we can have no doubt at all that there is no sympathy for the views that are put forward, as for example in the brilliant speech of Lord Vansittart, in any Asian country. And when we remember the remarks which General MacArthur made about the way to deal with Orientals, as he called them, the danger docs not appear to me to be wholly unreal.

The third danger in the situation is that we may see before long the dissolution of the United Nations Organisation. In our time we have seen the dissolution of the League of Nations. If China were to accept the decision of the Security Council and to say: "Very well; we have applied time and time again for admission; you will not have us. We do not want to join," what would be likely to happen? Russia might, by the use of something like the Stockholm Peace Petition (which has enormous propaganda value in the world), form a new organisation with herself and China as the backbone. If, in fact, these fears are well-founded, it behoves us to examine the situation frankly and to use our utmost endeavours, subject to the claims of justice, to bring the conflict in Korea to an end.

I want now to speak frankly about the American contribution to our alliance. During the last war I served in an American mess. I believe it is a complete fallacy to think that Americans do not like plain speaking, if it is truthful. I believe that they appreciate frank speaking so long as it is courteous, and that they prefer to have a candid opinion when it is properly expressed. Courteous evasions they consider "stuffed shirt." Mr. Lester Pearson, a person who should know, recently made two forthright speeches. He is well in a position to judge. He said that Canada is not an echo of Washington. He said that, whilst acknowledging the great contribution in life and blood which America had made and was making in this vast conflict, the people of Canada were not necessarily ready to accede to every proposition that came from Washington, and if they thought it necessary they would even be ready to oppose some of them.

I say quite sincerely—and how could one feel otherwise?—that we deeply sympathise with the Americans, in whose country so many homes have been and are being bereaved by reason of the war in Korea. But on the political side the American approach to foreign problems differs entirely from our own. I remember that in the times when the late Earl of Birkenhead made such notable speeches, we on the Back Benches were told that it was not our duty to think about foreign affairs. We were told that Sir Edward Grey would make a statement and that would suffice. When Lord Ponsonby suggested that treaties should be debated in the House of Commons; it was regarded as a most revolutionary proposal. In America it is entirely different. Foreign affairs in America are regarded in the same light as, or almost as being part of, the internal affairs of the country. The conflict between Republican and Democrat essentially touches upon foreign affairs at every stage. American judgment, the White House or the State Department have to be guided not by considerations external but by the internal political situation.

There are many examples which one could give, but I do not wish to say anything that could possibly be misunderstood in the United States. I suggest, however, that we might take, as a simple example, the speech made recently by Mr. Matthews, who, I think, is Secre-tary to the Navy. He said: I want to be an aggressor for peace. That means, in effect, "I want to start a war in order to ensure peace in the future." It was immediately explained that he spoke only for himself, but he was not removed, for he comes from Nebraska, and I understand that to find a Democrat from Nebraska is an almost impossible proposition. You will find examples of this sort again and again given by the correspondents of The Times. I could multiply them, but I do not wish to do so. I believe that frank talking, a truthful exchange of views as between friends, is the best way of dealing with the matters which we are considering. We have been told: "Do not mention America; do not say a word in criticism of America; above all, do not criticise General MacArthur." That was being said at the very time when there were the sharpest possible exchanges going on between the State Department and headquarters in Tokio. We should be very poor and unworthy politicians if, with all these things going on, we maintained silence. We consider ourselves to have had great experience in international affairs, and surely we have a right to express our opinion.

Now, what is our experience? The British Commonwealth is, I suppose, saving China, the greatest Asian Power to-day. When we take India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia and New Zealand into account, we are an immense Asiatic Power, and it is our duty to bring to bear our unparalleled experience with a view to arriving at a solution of present problems. I have no criticism to make of His Majesty's Government. Reading, as I have been doing, the records of recent years, I have been deeply impressed with the courage and perseverance of the late Mr. Bevin in pressing forward with what I consider to be a policy of solution and reconciliation. The Commonwealth has a special position. Take the case of India. India to-day is in a very powerful position because she has a number of officers who were trained during the time of the British Administration. Delhi and, I suppose, Karachi, but more particularly Delhi, is very experienced, and, what is more, is a friend of ours. No other European Power is held in anything like the same respect in India as we ourselves. They are our friends, and in these difficult times, through their friendly associations with Pekin, they have been invaluable to the British Government in dealing with our problems. I was very sorry indeed to read the letter to the Veterans from General MacArthur, with its reference to the way in which to deal with Orientals. It gave the greatest offence in India. I was sorry it was not possible for someone in this country to say a word of reproof.

One turns to the present situation with the honest desire to bring this shocking conflict to an end. We have heard to-day the list of United Nations casualties which the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, read out. But the casualties on the other side are shocking, too. These people have no air power. Wearing only sand shoes, they have been plunging in thousands across minefields. The great ship "Missouri" has been sending thousands of shells amongst them. Their sufferings have really been gigantic. At the earliest moment that it is possible to do so honourably this slaughter should be brought to an end.

Some people think that the whole matter is very simple. We live in an age of jargon. If you want to be a diplomat, all you do is to take down the book of words, thumb over the pages and find the right expression, such as: "It is a blue print,"or" a vacuum," or, again, "the free world. "People who employ these phrases do not think for themselves. Such people, I believe, hold the view that Mao Tsetung is just a satellite of the Kremlin. This is more or less the view which you find set forth very widely in America. If Mao really is only a satellite of the Kremlin and is acting under orders from the Kremlin, it is a pretty bleak outlook for the world. It means that whilst we have persuaded Norway and Luxembourg to join the Atlantic Pact, Stalin has progressed so well with China that he now has 500,000,000. willing Chinese allies. If that really is so—but, of course, it is ridiculous to imagine it—the best thing that we can do is to retire into gas-proof caves for the rest of the short life that is left to us. In fact, however, there is no evidence to lead us to believe that that is the case. That there has been a great Communist upsurge throughout Asia, no one denies, but to say that that is a military movement controlled from the Kremlin is an absurdity. We find no British officer with experience in the East who believes that—not one. Letters have appeared in the Press from men of experience and certainly of strong passions, like Sir John Pratt and Dr. Purcell, but nowhere do we find that opinion.

Moreover, it was not until two years ago that the Kremlin wanted to have anything to do with the Chinese Communists. They did not want the Chinese Communists to win, and they did, not recognise them; and that was the situation at least until July, 1948. It was only a few weeks before we recognised the Chinese Government that the Russians, who had previously faithfully recognised the Chiang Kai-shek Government, transferred recognition to the new Communist Government. Finally, if this ridiculous fantasy, this nightmare, is true, how is it that there is no Asian State neighbour to China which takes that view? No one in India, in Pakistan, in Indonesia or in Burma will support the view that we have to fight world Communism, as General MacArthur says, on the spot in China.

We come to the situation between ourselves and the Chinese in the Korean conflict. What appears to be happening is that throughout last year there have been twin policies. We have not had very much to do with them. We have contributed our forces, and no doubt we are represented on some committees in Washington; but the policies have been the policies of the State Department, or of General MacArthur, and the two have been running not at all parallel and certainly quite independently. The history of last year has been of utterances and actions by General MacArthur, and denials—the best that can be done in the political situation—by the State Department. In the end, there was a crisis, and President Truman had to dismiss the General. What has been the effect of this conflict on the minds of the Chinese? Let us suppose that the Chinese are trying to protect their new-found independence. Is that not the possible reason for their behaviour in the course of the last year? It certainly is amazing to hear China described as an aggressor. The history of China in the last hundred years has been that everybody has had a"cut"at her. This morning I took the Cambridge Modern History from the shelf and looked at the index of China. There were the Germans at Kiam Chao, the Russians at Port Arthur, ourselves at Weiheiwei, and the French elsewhere. The whole business only stopped when the Italians asked for something and did not get it. Most of this happened in my boyhood, and I can remember the Russo-Japanese War. This is a very learned House, but I do not think there are any historians who can point to anything in the history of China in the spirit of external aggression. Perhaps noble Lords will say,"Ah, but this is different."That is true. An advance in self-sufficiency and in the power of self-defence has been manifest in Chinese behaviour to-day, and I do not deplore that in the new China. It must be a wonderful thing for the Chinese, after all the encroachments that have been made upon them, to feel that they can hit back.

It is suggested that we should not have recognised the Chinese Government. It is a sad thing if we cannot recognise any-one of whose behaviour in every single act we do not approve. Mr. Acheson's despatch said clearly—and at the end of 1949 Mr. Churchill said the same thing— that here is a Government, an effective Government. The Pekin Government are the successors of the Chiang Kai-shek Government. I visited Chiang Kai-shek and stayed with the American missionary in whose compound he was living. He was then in his heyday, and at that time, when he was fighting the Japanese attack, the Americans were giving him help. I refer to what was called the Manchurian Incident of 1932. In passing, I should say that, while all the Western Powers attempted to encroach on China and grab something from her, the one country that never did that was the United States of America. What they say about their long friendship with China is perfectly true. At that time, in 1932, it was the Church Lobby at Washington which was effective in defending Chinese interests, and not any mercantile or commercial interests. It was in 1932 that Chiang Kai-shek started the war of liberation against the Japanese. He received no help from us, or from the United Nations. For nineteen years China has been doing her best to shake off foreign invaders—and this is the country which is now described as the aggressor! Later the efforts of Chiang Kai-shek and his American supporters were devoted more to putting down the new Communist movement than opposing the Japanese. Then the Americans got out, after General Marshall's inquiry, and the Communists carried on the war against the Japanese. I beg your Lordships to remember that the people who were allied with us in fighting the Japanese were the same Com- munist Chinese now in control at Pekin. Not a bad beginning for considering our relations to-day!

Throughout the past year the Chinese have had certain objectives. First of all, they have said that Formosa belongs to them. I was astounded at the remark of the noble Earl, Lord Perth, about that. We went to Cairo and met the Government of Chiang Kai-shek. We said that Formosa belonged to China—as indeed it did until 1894, when the Japanese took it away from them. "Formosa was stolen from China"—those were the words used; there was not a word about a plebiscite. The Cairo Declaration said that Formosa should be given back to China. The Chinese are now asking to have it back, and we say, "Because you are Communists, we are not going to keep our word. "If we say that our plighted word depends on the interests of State, we are adopting one of the fundamental principles of Communist faith.

LORD WINSTER

In this matter of Formosa, was not the pledge given to China bound up with the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan?

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Exactly. And what does that mean? We are now going to make a peace treaty, and China is not to be invited to discuss it. That is worse and worse.

The second question is that China fears the rearmament of Japan. Throughout the year she has been seeing conflicting statements from the State Department, and from Tokio Headquarters. Formosa was blockaded. The Seventh Fleet was sent to Formosa, and behind the Seventh Fleet there was active organisation for the purpose of attacking the Chinese Government on the mainland. Chiang Kai-shek's generals repeatedly referred to it. They boasted that they had a million guerrillas fighting. The new Communist Government had to cope with a famine, in which 9,000,000 people were affected, and a million guerrillas, while in Formosa armed forces were being trained under the protection of the American Fleet. Do we expect the Chinese to feel happy or to think that their independence is not being affected?

Then we come to the denial of their right to be present even at the Japanese Treaty negotiations; and within the last few days there is the announcement that the old Fascists in Japan are being liberated. The victory is going to be undone. There are 200,000 people, at any rate, on the liberation list. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association is to have its officers come into the open again. That may be right, or it may be wrong: I have no desire that these people should be oppressed. But look at it from the point of view of the Chinese, who have just established themselves with a Government, who have all these internal difficulties and see all these things happening: Formosa taken away; revolutionaries being trained in Formosa; the Government not allowed to have a word in the Japanese Treaty; Japan to be rearmed and the old Fascists restored. And then there is a boast that bases are to be established from which the whole coast can be controlled by air—and American power is air power—from Singapore to Vladivostock. I think it is possible, at least, to imagine that one of the explanations of the Chinese action is intense anxiety as to whether their independence can survive at all.

What is the story of the war? It is that for months the Chinese did nothing at all. At the beginning of the war everyone blamed Stalin. There is a frontier between Russia and Korea. It was said that the Russians had withdrawn to Northern Korea only in order to send in more forces. But not a single Russian has appeared. Stalin is waging this great war for world Communism, and not a single Russian has been scratched. If that were true, it would be appalling; but it is absurd. The fact is that for months the Chinese did nothing. They constantly issued warnings. I will not weary your Lordships with the whole of it, but they said: "Let us come to U.N.O. "The answer was, "No." They said that they were entitled to be in U.N.O., but the answer was still, "No." What about Formosa? It is blockaded. A plebiscite?—the Americans did not even say that. What General MacArthur said was that Formosa was necessary; and what Mr. Gross said in the United Nations, at a critical moment, was that Formosa was necessary for the defence of the United States. If Stalin said that the Isle of Wight was necessary for the defence of Russia, or if France claimed it for herself, what effect would that have on us?

If your Lordships read the story, I think there is something to be said for the case that the Chinese have shown remarkable patience. They said: "Do not cross the 38th Parallel. "We did cross the 38th Parallel. I believe it was October or November before there was any definite evidence of Chinese troops on the spot. They then said: "We have valuable and important electrical installations on the Yalu River." They said: "We will send Mr. Wu to New York." Mr. Wu was kept waiting a fortnight for his visas. Why was that? It was because the elections were not until November 7. Mr. Wu came forward, and we read in the papers that he had a harsh voice and that he addressed the Assembly in a very harsh way. If the "Missouri" came up the Thames and started shelling the Festival of Britain site, I think we, too, would have a harsh voice. Mr. Wu's statements were a genuine attempt to make peace. Then the Asian countries (I will not weary your Lordships with all the details) played a most helpful part in the whole business. They understood it, they were sympathetic, and they played a part. Then the whole thing turned on whether or not the cease-fire was genuine; and up to a certain time there was real hope of a solution, on the basis of the honest world against China, and a settlement which meant peace. Then we were misled—I am sure we were wrong about this—into declaring China the aggressor, and China sent forces into the field.

But if one considers the question of aggression, one must consider the whole picture, and take it from the time when Formosa, which belonged to China, was seized by Chiang Kai-shek, who began to encourage the insurrectionary movement and support a revolutionary movement against the existing Government. China may well say: "Aggressor! I am protecting myself." Mr. Wu said: "You have advanced to the Yalu River, and 200 aircraft have made 1,000 sorties across that river. Our electrical plants, on which we depend, are in danger. We apply to you for a neutral strip. "That was one of the proposals made about Christmas time. What was the answer? I would ask your Lordships to look at a report which appeared in The Times. The answer was purposely delayed because it was thought, to use that precious phrase, that it is possible to negotiate better from strength, and that when we were on the Yalu River we could then talk to the Chinese. I do not profess that this is a complete story, but I think there are the makings of a case for showing that China should be treated as being genuinely anxious for peace, and genuinely determined to maintain her independence. What the situation is to-day I do not know. There was an offer from North Korea. 1 do not know whether we consider that North Korea exists, or not. If we do consider that North Korea exists, then there was an incursion over the 38th Parallel. If we do not consider that North Korea exists, then it was a civil war. In any case, every effort should be made, even in the difficulties that have been caused by this vote for China as an aggressor, to try to explore the avenues for peace which China is evidently anxious to open.

THE EARL OF PERTH

The noble Viscount has made a most interesting statement in saying that we should try to explore the avenues for peace which the Chinese are evidently willing to open. On what authority does he base that statement?

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

The noble Earl is a great diplomat, with unmatched experience, but I should have thought that the replies given to the Asian Powers' proposals by Mr. Wu, and this new offer from the North Koreans, were all tentative efforts to make peace. That is what I meant. I do not know that they have done anything that would be acceptable to us, or acceptable to the Americans, but it does not show just an aggressive desire to advance. It is compatible with the theory that the Chinese are nervous about their position, and determined to defend their independence.

It may be asked what power we have. In his speech to Congress General MacArthur did not even mention that Britain and the Commonwealth had sent forces to Korea. We cannot, of course, make any material contribution comparable to what comes from America. But, as I have said, we are an Asian Power, and we have the good will of the biggest States in Asia. If something like a Commonwealth Conference, or the Asian members of the Commonwealth Conference, could be called together, which was done with hopes that were only just defeated earlier in the year, and if we could impress upon the American Government, first, that we have nothing to do with the attempt to enforce the Syngman Rhee Government over the whole of the Korean Peninsula; secondly, that we have no intention of withdrawing our recognition of the Chinese Government; thirdly, that China should take the place to which she is legally entitled, as we think, in the United Nations; and fourthly, that the Cairo Declaration about Formosa, so far as we are concerned, stands—if we could make that dear, and unite the Asian members of the Commonwealth in that sense, then I think that might have some effect on American opinion. There have been two speeches made during the last few days. One was by Senator MaeMahon, who pointed out, when attacked, that they had to consider the opposition of their major Allies; and then there was the speech by Mr. Harriman two days ago, in which he said the same thing. We came very near to it before, and there is no reason why, with our experience and desire for peace, and the American power, there should not be some road which would lead us to a peaceful and, above all, to China, a just conclusion.

5.0 p.m.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, I had not intended to intervene in this debate this afternoon. It is not quite a usual Foreign Affairs debate, for though the wording of the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, ranges pretty wide, it was clear from what he said that his main purpose was to enable him to ex-tract from the Government the answer to certain questions which he had already asked them in the past, and to which he had received no satisfactory answer, and also to express views which he, personally, very strongly holds. I hope that he will be more successful on this occasion than he has been in the past. But clearly, in such circumstances, it is not incumbent upon others to intervene unless they have a personal contribution which they wish to make. Therefore, I do not propose to explore all the ground which was covered by the noble Lord in his opening speech.

There are, however, one or two other speeches which have been made later in the debate, about which I think I ought perhaps to say a word, however brief that word may be. In particular, there is the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, to which we have just listened. The noble Viscount made a very powerful speech to your Lordships. He spoke with his usual gusto and distinction. He praised, without reservation, the Chinese policy of His Majesty's Government, from the very moment of their de jure recognition of the Communist Government of China onwards; and he said, with the utmost definiteness, that those who took a different view were utterly wrong. None of us can complain of that. The noble Viscount is just as entitled to his own view on this difficult question as any of the rest of us. But I think that it is hardly reasonable that he should blame us for the subsequent events which have ensued since that recognition. After all, it was not our policy which was adopted —it was his, and he admits it.

On this question of recognition, the Government went "the whole hog." They recognised the Communist Government of China not only de facto but de jure. They did everything they possibly could to ingratiate themselves with the authorities at Pekin. They did not wait to ensure a common front with the United States; they did not even wait to ensure a common front with the Commonwealth, although, in fact, the Colombo Conference was just pending: they recognised before the Conference opened. They went straight ahead and acted unilaterally. If the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, and others who share his view, were right, they ought to have succeeded in establishing a special position with the Government of Mao Tsetung, which, as 1 understand it, was the very purpose of their policy. If they were correct in their thinking, they should have been welcomed in Pekin with open arms. They should have created by their action a bridge to bridge the chasm between the East and West. The United States might have continued to be un-popular in China, but we should have been popular, and we should have been able to act as a go-between between the two countries.

Some of us were always sceptical about this happening, as the noble Viscount knows. And, perhaps impertinently, from the very first we warned the Government in successive speeches that the opposite was likely to be the case. We said that their action was not calculated to assist the unity of the United Nations; that it would succeed only in driving something approaching a wedge between ourselves and the United States, which was the one thing which the Russians wanted; that it would encourage our enemies; that it would discourage our friends, and that we should get very little response from the Chinese themselves. Can anyone say now that we were entirely wrong? So far as I know, we have gained no advantage at all by our recognition. Our British traders continue to be treated with studied discourtesy, and the British Government themselves have had very little better treatment. Indeed, in my view we have exposed ourselves to a serious humiliation, in that our recognition of China has not been reciprocated by them. Above all, the cleavage of opinion between ourselves and the United States on this question, which the critics of Government policy always anticipated, has not only become a fact but is, perhaps, the most disturbing fact in the world to-day. If we felt that we were right then, we think it a thousand times more to-day.

I do not for one moment say that the time might not well have come when de facto recognition of Mao Tsetung's Government—or, at any rate, of the area which is under their control—would have been useful. If we had not been so precipitate, we might well have brought the United States along with us to that point. But I still maintain that to recognise de jure, unilaterally, at the moment we did, was a catastrophic error, of which we have not heard the last. What the future is going to bring for Korea and the Korean war, of course none of us knows yet. The Chinese army has now joined in the battle. The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, said that it was absurd to describe China as an aggressor. I really do not know how else one can describe her, unless the noble Viscount himself takes the view that the United Nations have been wrong from the start in their policy. The United Nations came in to prevent an aggression by North Korea on South Korea. The Chinese came in on the side of North Korea, who were the aggressors in this war. If the noble Viscount does not call that aggression, I do not know what he calls it. We have heard, in the important and moving statement which was given to us this after-noon by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander, that at this very moment the Chinese are engaging even larger forces in an effort to defeat the United Nations. I would join, if I may, in everything which was said by the noble Earl, Lord Perth, in praise of the gallantry of our troops in this war. I imagine that there has never been a nobler chapter in our military history; and while we sorrow deeply with the relatives of those who have lost their lives, I am sure that all our hearts swell with pride at the story which has been told to us today.

We may, I hope, look forward with confidence to the defeat of this offensive, as others have been defeated in the past. By itself, of course, that will not bring the war to an end. But it may well bring the Chinese Government to a frame of mind which is more favourable to a reasonable settlement. If a negotiation comes—and I, like the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, and the noble Earl, Lord Perth, hope that there will be a negotia-tion—and if the Chinese are willing to take part in that negotiation (of which I am bound to say I see no evidence at the present moment; but one must always hope), I hope very much that all out-standing issues between the United Nations and the Chinese Government will be brought into the discussion. I person-ally should not—and in this I may not be quite in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi—desire to see a settlement on the Korea question only. If there is to be a settlement between China and the United Nations I should like to see it cover all the issues outstanding between us, otherwise we shall merely have another explosion in a few months' time and no good will have been done. Therefore I would rule nothing out.

But I say, with all deference to the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate—and I know that this is an expression which he views with great dislike—that we have got to negotiate from strength rather than from weakness. Aggression must have failed if we are to get a satisfactory result. I do not mean by that, necessarily, a total defeat; but the aggression must be shown not to have been successful. In my view that is a hard fact which we ought not to ignore if this aggression is not to become the forerunner of others in the future. It seems that some noble Lords, and in particular those who take the kind of view which Lord Stansgate takes, are still entirely impervious to these facts. It seemed to me, as I listened to the noble Viscount, that the worse the Chinese behave the more violently pro-Chinese he becomes. To-day he would not hear a word against them. They may be fighting our troops in Korea; they may have been condemned by the United Nations; but they must be right. The infallibility of the Pope is nothing compared to the infallibility of the Chinese! If I may say so, I greatly admire the noble Viscount's independence of mind: he has always shown it throughout a long and distinguished political life. But never in all my experience, I think, have I heard so strangely biased a point of view as that which he put forward this afternoon. There is, if I may say so without impertinence, an interesting thing about the noble Viscount. Once he "gets a bee in his bonnet" it continues to buzz busily; and the more uncomfortable its situation becomes, the louder it buzzes— and, if he will allow me to say so, it not only buzzes: it stings.

The noble Viscount thought it right to-day to make some pretty severe reflections on the policy of the United States. He thought the Americans would like it. Well, my Lords, he may be right; but I am more doubtful than he is whether it is a wise course to emphasise what he himself described as the sharp divisions between the English and the American points of view. It does not matter, in the long run, what he says about the Conservative Party in this country; but it does matter dreadfully what he says about the United States. As he knows, these things are reported in the American Press—and very often given a twist which probably he himself never intended, and so serve to exacerbate an already sufficiently delicate situation. There is to-day—and we cannot ignore it—a real danger of serious friction between ourselves and our American friends, close collaboration with whom is so vital to the peace of the world at the present time. Mostly, one fully admits, this is the result of genuine misunderstandings of our respective positions, which are only too often exploited by irresponsible mischief-makers on both sides of the Atlantic. But I was really shocked to see such a man as Lord Stansgate lending himself to such a course. What good can possibly come from speeches which can be calculated only further to inflame the position?

We must not forget that there are to-day several danger spots, quite apart from China, where close collaboration and understanding between ourselves and the United States is essential if further trouble is to be avoided. There is, for instance, Persia, to which the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, referred this afternoon. Is this really a moment for airing differences between ourselves and the Americans? Surely it is rather a time for concentrating on those things on which we agree and not on those on which we hold divergent views. The noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, in his admirable and brilliant speech this afternoon, emphasised the value of a wise use of information services in putting our point of view—principally, as I understood it, to the occupied countries and countries behind the Iron Curtain. But what is true of these is true equally of our friends and Allies. It is vital that nothing should be said at the present difficult period which can tend to poison the atmosphere; and I cannot feel that Lord Stansgate's speech this afternoon was of assistance from that point of view.

5.16 p.m.

VISCOUNT PORTMAN

My Lords, I rise with some trepidation after the brilliant speeches we have heard this afternoon in this debate initiated by the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, on the course of foreign affairs. I should like— to quote the words of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate—to speak plainly for a few minutes about what some of us feel concerning the present world situation. I propose to start at what I may term the far end of the line, the Pacific. But I shall not attempt to follow Lord Vansittart from point to point around the world. I will, instead, travel across the world as the situations have developed.

To-day we have heard this very distressing news from the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, about the new attacks which have opened in Korea and which our troops are now facing. A short time ago we heard of what has already been referred to as the defensive Alliance between two of our premier Dominions, New Zealand and Australia, and the United States. The most disturbing factor in connection with that Alliance was that the British Gov- ernment were kept out of it. Why were we kept out of it? The reason is, in the opinion of many of us, that for some time past this Government have been showing a vacillating policy towards China in trading methods, and especially in war materials; and these Dominions, who are in a far better position to realise the true situation in the Far East than we are at home, felt that they needed a stronger and more single purpose to help in their protection. It appears at the moment as though hostilities, far from coming to an end, may spread at any moment. The spreading will not be any of our doing; it will be the doing of China or of her associate Russia, and we do not know where it is going to occur. It may go towards the East—to Formosa and other islands in the Pacific. I feel that Australia and New Zealand and the United States have seen this danger, and have acted accordingly in their own way. On the other hand, it may go towards the West: and that very important point, Indo-China, the "rice-bowl of South-East Asia," seems to be a glaring spot for the next attack. All I can say is that, if His Majesty's Government will not recognise that fact, I am afraid that, according to the present state of things in the Far East, we are in for some very unpleasant awakenings.

I will not say any more about the Far East but will come a little nearer home and touch upon some events of the past twenty-four hours. I was present in another place yesterday afternoon when the right honourable gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs read his statement on Persia, and I may say that it filled me with dismay and shame. Never have I heard such a weak and vacillating statement, and such ignorance of what was going on, at a time when our own people, and millions of our money and our own diplomatic representatives, were in danger. I can only say this much: that it seems to me that we are offering enemies nearer home, backed by Russia, every opportunity to twist the lion's tail, punch his nose and treat him abominably, as has appeared in the Press to-day. Again, I blame His Majesty's Government for a weak and vacillating policy. The Government do not seem to realise—and I ask your Lordships to note this—that we are lighting a flame which may set a spark to the powder, because not only have we our interests in Persia but there are vast American interests in Iran and Saudi-Arabia, and also a bone of contention in Haifa.

What is going to happen? We may choose to let our people down but I can assure your Lordships that I should not be convinced that the Americans will let their people down. If this spread of nationalisation, such as has occurred in Persia, continues, with a show of force and without any willingness to negotiate, the Americans will go straight in and war will be declared. We had another shameful example of weakness only this morning—that is, Egypt, who has had the effrontery, after all we have done for her, to turn round and tell our Ambassador that she will have nothing to do with our negotiations and that we must get out. At this time, this is a situation which smacks to me of absolute world revolution, of absolute disregard of British strength and British uprightness of purpose. In other words, Britain is finished. I am using strong language and I mean to do so, because to many of us the position reached appears to be past the danger point, and one which will land us in the most appalling trouble.

I will turn for one moment to Western Germany. I noted, with great respect, as I always do, the opinions of my noble friend Lord Vansittart on the rearmament of Western Germany. But the one point which I feel, from information that I have received, is absolutely predominant in their minds is that they will have nothing to do with rearmament until they have seen the Western Allies armed. We know so well—I have heard this from people who have come from the Con-tinent—that the one people of whom the Russians are frightened are the Germans; and if the Russians saw that we were arming the Germans before ourselves, that would be the signal for the Russians to attack at once—and I have no doubt that that belief is correct. That is why the East Germans have been armed by the Russians to be the spearhead of an attack. If we want help from the Germans, we must rearm in the West with all speed and then we shall be able to secure German co-operation. I do not want to contradict the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, on other points, but I feel that that part of his speech was the truest of all. And there I will leave the matter for other noble Lords who are to follow me.

5.24 p.m.

LORD WINSTER

My Lords, the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, will not mind my saying that, charm he never so wisely, he will not persuade me that the way to preserve good relations with the United States of America is for us to take a lively part in the fierce domestic strife which sometimes goes on there. Of course the United States is part of the United Nations, and her policy there concerns us; but where her domestic policy is concerned, I am sure that the only safe rule to follow is for us to keep quite clear.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

I never said a word about domestic policy, The noble Lord will forgive me for interrupting, but I am well aware that it is most improper to express an opinion upon American internal policy. I have never done such a thing. I merely contributed my view, such as it was, of the relations between our two selves in this international struggle.

LORD WINSTER

As I have said, we have a right to express our views on her policy in connection with United Nations. We must be very careful, in doing that, to see that we do not get on to the mora difficult ground of domestic politics. I had no intention of speaking originally of Korea, but it so happens that I was in Washington and at Lake Success when General Wu came there when this controversy was at its height. I am bound to say that at Lake Success I never heard of one single conciliatory word spoken by Mr. Wu, either in public or in private. We were all filled with admiration for the great efforts made by Sir Benegal Rau to put before General Wu proposals for a cease-fire. I think everybody will agree that Sir Benegal Rau and his colleagues in that matter put forward proposals which any Government with any desire for peace, could honourably have accepted, and they might well have led to a ceasefire and to the cessation of these hostilities in Korea. Never, during the whole of his visit, did I hear one single conciliatory word uttered, or any step made, to meet what Sir Benegal Rau and his friends were putting forward.

As regards the existing situation, I noticed that the words of the Motion moved by Lord Vansittart are: … to urge that no concessions should be made to the Communist Government of China on the basis of the cessation of hostilities in Korea. … I am bound to say that if the Government were to adopt the words of that Motion I am afraid that the hostilities in Korea would continue indefinitely.

LORD VANSITTART

May I correct the noble Lord? I did not say "on the basis of the cessation of hostilities in Korea." I said in Korea only." That makes a great difference.

LORD WINSTER

"In Korea only." I feel then, that the hostilities in Korea would continue indefinitely, because the Chinese Government are just as well aware as we are, and the United Nations are, of what has been expressed publicly in the Press of America by the Generals; and they know all the difficulties with which we are confronted in trying to bring this United Nations action in Korea to a successful termination. They know all the doubts that are expressed of our ability to do that. Unless we express our willingness to treat with the Chinese, I do not see how there can ever be any hope of bringing those hostilities to a conclusion.

In asking your Lordships' indulgence this afternoon, my intention was to speak on the subject of the rearmament of Germany, which forms part of the Motion of the noble Lord. We have had two wars against German militarism in this century, and each ended with a decision that we must keep Germany disarmed. We rescinded that decision after the First World War, and that led to disaster. Now, after the Second World War, the Russians have again gone back on the decision. They have armed 70,000 Germans in East Germany, and supplied them with tanks, machineguns and artillery, which brings us face to face with the question whether we must not rearm Western Germany. After each war the decision has been gone back upon, and each time the result has been catastrophic. It has resulted in more armaments than before. Germany has always been proved a very dangerous nation to trust with arms, but at the present moment, if we are to discuss the rearming of Germany, it seems to me that what we are confronted with is, on the one hand, the idea of creating a Frankenstein monster in Germany and, on the other, the Russian octopus. It is certainly not a very agreeable choice of alternatives which confronts us.

There are two main considerations which I think we have to remember when we start discussing this matter. The first relates to Germany. Can we really hope to keep a virile race, one of great intellectual abilities, permanently disarmed and in a condition of inferior status to other nations in Europe to which, with much justification, they consider themselves superior? The second consideration is this. We can tackle only one danger at a time, and one has to consider which is the immediate and the greatest danger. Surely, at the moment Russia is the immediate danger; and if we have to deal with her, surely we must do so by using any means which come to our hands. If thereafter, having dealt with Russia, we find Germany again constituting a danger, then in turn we shall have to deal with that matter. But if we go on considering every possible contingency and danger, we shall get nowhere. The solution is to deal first with the immediate and most threatening danger, and then see what comes along after that. I am quite sure that Germany will look East or West according to self-interest. It may be convenient for the Atlantic Powers to think in terms of Germany taking the first shock of aggression on German soil, but Germany is more likely to be thinking in terms of a unified Germany and of the restitution of the Polish provinces, and she may make those things the price that we may have to pay for her assistance in Western defence.

I have some little difficulty in discovering exactly what decisions have now been reached in regard to this matter of German participation in Western defence. So far as I know. America and ourselves are agreed on the matter in principle, but with very necessary reservations in regard to the time of raising the German units to be called in. We are agreed that there should be no German units until the Allied forces are strong, and so on. But the position at the present time seems very uncertain, and I have the feeling that perhaps there has been a little going back on the decisions which were reached on the subject at the Brussels Conference. Of course, any Frenchman that one meets in the streets of France could give a long category of excellent reasons why Germany should not be allowed to rearm, and no doubt the reluctance of the French authorities to make an announcement on the subject has been due to their feeling that they must do it just at the right time. It is a matter of timing in order to carry their people with them, and in that regard I think they will have very great difficulty in carrying the French nation with them until there are in Europe very strong Allied forces, there to be seen and looked at. Now that the Schuman Plan is out of the way, I feel that it may be easier for France to come to a decision on this matter.

With regard to Germany herself, I see that Chancellor Adenauer has rejected neutralisation. He says that that, which would involve demilitarisation, would be a disaster for Europe. I am bound to say that I think it would also play very much into the hands of Russia, for I believe that the neutralisation of Germany, even if no war took place, would infallibly end by Germany coming under Russian influence, which in turn would lead to the disintegration of Europe, and give Russia the mastery over Europe, without even having to fight for it. In that respect, the cold war would be to the advantage of Russia. So, however reluctantly, I feel forced to the conclusion that we should accept German participation in the defence of the West. If Russia crossed the Elbe, the few Allied divisions available to-day certainly could not stem the flood. If there were a military collapse in Western Germany, the Iron Curtain would be pushed further West, to France and to the Low Countries. Without German participation I feel there would foe no hope whatever of being able to hold the Russians on the Elbe, if they were determined to cross. These facts seem to lead inevitably to the conclusion that we must have German participation in the defence of the West, and, as I understand it, the North Atlantic Council agreed that German participation was necessary, and must be enlisted.

The rearming of Germany, of course, involves very great risks indeed. What precautions are to be taken? A great many precautions have been suggested. One suggestion is that she should have only land forces, and no air forces; another, that her contribution should be a very subordinate element in a com- bined defence force. A third suggestion is that the matter should lie until the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has built up sufficiently strong forces to hold off Russia, and that when such strong forces have been built up, then Germany would have to choose between helping or being left out, because we should be able to manage without her. I think that the former perhaps is rather too simple, and that the solution lies in the direction of the latter alternative. But it depends upon our being in time to build up those strong forces.

There is also the question whether we could expect Germany ever to assist in this matter on conditions which emphasise her inferior status. The idea is that if she is allowed to participate in Western defence some control ought, and at first would, be exercised; but I believe the point would be reached, and in not too long a time, when control of that matter would become impracticable. I will put it in this way: that what we could control would be of very little value, and what would be valuable could not be controlled. That, I fear, is one of the great dilemmas with which we are confronted. I fully appreciate the fears of the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, about this rearming of Germany, but the fact remains that the danger from Russia is very great and very real. Russia to-day constitutes a far more dangerous enemy that Hitler ever did. I have seen it stated on good authority that for every bomber Hitler sent against us, Stalin could send one hundred: so Russia is a most dangerous enemy.

LORD VANSITTART

It may set the noble Lord's mind at rest if I indicate that I did not oppose the rearming of Ger-many. What I suggested was that it would be wiser to talk no more about it while we are continuing to do nothing, which was making things far worse. That was all I said.

LORD WINSTER

I think there is nothing between the noble Lord and myself. I was referring to the fears and anticipation of the noble Lord. However, I hope I have made it clear that I feel we must bide our time in this matter until we are sufficiently strong, to make sure that we do not have to pay too stiff a price for the support that we receive from Germany.

LORD VANSITTART

That is right.

LORD WINSTER

I am happy to think there is no difference between us on this point. We are repeatedly told that war is unlikely this year. I am constantly reading such statements, and I never know upon what basis they are made. At the present moment, Russia is quite able to attack if she wishes to do so. I do not think she refrains from doing so out of charity, or because the Russians are such good sportsmen that they do not think it would be "cricket" to attack until we were ready. I should like to know the grounds for the belief that Russia is not going to attack now, or in the near future. What we do know is that if she were to attack this year she would find Europe practically without any frontal protection. If she did overrun the West in an initial attack, she would, as far as lay in her power, destroy every vestige of civilisation in the countries which she overran. When we—as we confidently believe that we should do—eventually liberated those countries, we should find nothing left there. If Russia ever does reach the Atlantic or the Channel, civilisation will receive a most terrible blow. Whether it will be possible for civilisation to recover from it is, I should say, very problematical indeed.

A start has been made at long last to build up the land and the air forces and to furnish the equipment to meet the threat of Russian aggression. And, indeed, what we heard to-day—that President Truman has said that every day must count—is profoundly true, because there will be no time to build up once the aggression has begun. We must be ready to meet it when it occurs, for if we are not we shall have no opportunity, as we have had in the other two wars, of building up strength after the shooting has begun. We must face the fact that the effectiveness of Western defence to-day is at a very low level. The magnitude of what is required must certainly find its reflection in our economic policies. In our economy from now on the demands of rearmament must undoubtedly come first. The Western defence programme may be a satisfactory programme but it is still only a programme. It has great value as proof that we are in earnest, but it will not add to our effective strength for some considerable time. It is a welcome earnest of good intentions, but that programme has yet to be put to the proof. As a matter of personal opinion, I must say that I doubt if we shall get through this rearmament on the £4,700,000,000. I shall not be surprised if that estimate is exceeded or if we find that we shall not get through without even more drastic action in our domestic economy than we have yet contemplated taking. We shall require better planning, more foresight and, above all, far more decision than has been shown during past years.

The politicians have had many meetings. They have had conference after conference on this question of Western defence, but they have not yet made an Army which is worthy of an enemy's consideration at the present moment. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is making progress, but it still rather resembles an inverted pyramid. A very large headquarters indeed is controlling very small forces—something like twelve divisions at the present moment, though those are, I hope, to be doubled by the autumn. But first steps have been taken, and now confidence must be built up in Western Europe. I was much impressed by what the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, said this afternoon on that subject, for, indeed, we must pay attention to this question of political warfare. Western Europe is all too prone to accept the myth of Russian invincibility. Political warfare can do a great deal to break down that myth and to give self-confidence to the people of Western Europe. Anything which interferes with that, I am sure, is a lamentable mistake. Political warfare can do much, but Western Europe will never have real confidence until the people see that Western defence has some teeth in it.

One more point I venture to make is that morale is a tremendous factor in war and in our defence efforts, and to beat Russia we have to keep freedom alive at home. Far too many authoritarian minds and processes are at work to-day in this country for my taste. We must keep our economy strong, we must accept the mission of leadership in the world and build up and maintain our strength, sacrificing practically all else to that end. I feel that when the difficulties with which they are confronted are taken into consideration, the Government may claim to be doing well. But compared with the need, I am afraid that what is being done is still very slow progress indeed. In conclusion, I should like to repeat what has been said in the past in your Lordships' House—namely, that if we are to carry through this immense task of rearmament in face of these dangers, then a great requisite is frankness on the part of the Government with the people about what is being done. May I remind your Lordships of what the noble and gallant Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery said on that subject: Once a Nation conceals things, or is not frank and open, or hesitates when it becomes necessary to take practical measures to implement some agreed principle, then suspicion creeps in and the results may be catastrophic. The more the Government take the country into their confidence about what is being done, the greater will be the reward they will have in the efforts which the people will then make.

5.47 p.m.

LORD AMMON

My Lords, I find myself in accord with much that the noble Lord who has just spoken has said, but I must ask him to excuse me if my remarks do not follow along the same lines, because I want to return to the question of China. I referred to China a month ago in the debate on Foreign Affairs which we had in your Lordships' House, and I then ventured to say that I thought the policy of our Government was driving China into the arms of Russia. I also said—and I realise that three years have elapsed since I was in China— that there was a great deal of good will in China towards this country, and, hard as it might seem, the reverse was the case so far as America was concerned. In the course of interviews which I have had with people who have recently come from China—in some cases only in the last few days—I have gathered that there is still a considerable amount of good will towards us over there. That is borne out to a large extent by the fact that our Christian Missions and hospitals are still kept going. They are not being interfered with, and they are receiving the support of the Chinese Government, though, of course, European people have come home.

As I see it, a good deal of the difficulty which exists arises because of the wrong emphasis concerning what we are fighting against. We are not at war with Communism; we are at war with aggression. I think we have to keep that point clearly in mind, because there can be much misunderstanding on this matter and it can do a great deal of mischief. After all, we found an ally in Communist Russia during the war, and we may yet find other allies if we handle things properly—for instance, in Yugoslavia and other countries which are against aggression. It is to that point that I wish particularly to refer for a moment. I do not think that Russia cares two straws whether a resounding victory is won in Korea by the North Koreans or not. Her game is being played for her in the shedding of blood which is going on. She will fight to the last American, the last Chinese, and the last Britisher, so long as they play exactly the game which she wants. I feel certain also that Russia does not want a strong China. I believe that, to a certain extent, we are missing a good deal by not making it clear to China that we are not concerned so much to fight expressions of Communism, if such they are, but we are concerned in fighting aggression itself. We have to remember that China is very much concerned about the rearming of Japan. She is sceptical about getting support if a revived Japan turned aggressor. China has never been an aggressor nation and has never sought to extend her territory at the expense of others. She has always been against the "foreign devils" and has always been cautious about trusting them too far. With these things in mind, I think that a great deal can be done if we make it clear to China that we are not concerned with her domestic policy and that the United Nations are prepared to stand by her should there be aggression from outside.

If this war is carried on, the Chinese are going to fight, and fight hard, and we shall drive China more and more towards closer co-operation with Russia. From many points of view that would be disastrous. Not only would it further inflame the Far East, but it would supply Russia with millions of brave and good soldiers. Our own "Chinese" Gordon had some experience of their bravery, and we see the same thing now on the Korean front. I think we can afford to adopt a different line to-day. I should like to quote an extract from a letter by a well-known publicist, Sir Norman Angell, to the New York Times, which puts my view far better than I can. He says: We can overcome, and, still better, deter, military aggression with military force. In creating that force we can usefully ally ourselves with the Communist Tito, perhaps with an anti-Communist Chiang Kai-shek. But if we use military power to dictate or to appear to dictate to other nations, Asiatic or European, what social or political or economic system they may adopt for themselves, we shall awaken a nationalism which in the end will defeat us. That seems to be common sense. I would remind the House that not long ago the Americans were looking upon us as imperialists and were not so friendly to us as we should have liked them to be. These things die hard, and China has a long memory of what she has suffered at the hands of other Powers. It requires a great deal of patience and thought to bring about the reconciliation we wish. Basing my view on the whole history of China, I would say that China will never become Communist in the way that Russia is Communist, and that if we drive her to it, then it will be almost against herself. It would be far better to spend our time and thought and energy in making a friend of that great country. We should take the line of friendship and make it clear to China that we are not against her because she is Communist, but because, unfortunately, she has been drawn into an alliance to do the work of an aggressor whose concern it is to keep the world in a state of turmoil and unrest. I believe there is a section of opinion in America in favour of friendship with China, and of removing her fears and making her feel we are to be trusted.

5.57 p.m.

LORD CHORLEY

My Lords, before the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor speaks, I should like to intervene for a moment to support the speech which my noble friend Lord Ammon has just made. He spoke with a knowledge of China and with that invincible common sense which is a characteristic of his utterances in this House. It seems to me that he is absolutely right when he says we have to realise that in China there is now a feeling that at last they are able to stand up to the foreign aggression which, as my noble friend Lord Stansgate pointed out in his remarkable speech, has been characteristic of the whole relation-ship of Western Europe and China over the last 150 years. We have to appreciate that that is the reason for what the noble Earl, Lord Perth, described as aggression; the Chinese people at last feel that they are a united nation, and in a position to fight back against Western imperialism. When I said, in a speech in your Lordships' House last autumn, that to the Chinese the advance of United Nations forces, and particularly of the American contingent in these forces, over the 38th Parallel towards the Manchurian border appeared to be an attack on their security, the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor attacked me on the ground that obviously it was not. It is not a question of what it appears to be to us. but what is appears to be to the Chinese, and I do not think the impartial historian, coming to look at these events in the future, will have any doubt that that is what happened.

The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has said that, in his view, if the present Chinese offensive fails it may well be that it will bring the Chinese to a more favourable state of mind towards coming to a settlement of this problem. I would ask the Government to be prepared, in conjunction with the Americans, with some plan against that eventuality, be-cause at the moment there is nothing which is clear at all. We have vague policies in favour of some sort of United Korea, but it is not at all clear how that United Korea is to be governed, or how it is to be defended against aggression by one side or the other, and afterwards rehabilitated. Unless we are prepared with some clear policy of that kind, I cannot see any sort of successful negotiations being opened up for the Chinese. So long as European forces are in the peninsula of Korea the people of China will think that the same old aggression is still going on. It appears to me that what we have to do is to find some method of persuading the Chinese that that is no longer so. If we could do that, we should be well on the way towards finding a solution.

In the course of the debate to-day it has struck me that there is one possible method of doing this. The initiative in connection with all these negotiations has been taken by those parts of our own Commonwealth which are in Asia, and tribute after tribute has been paid to the work of Sir Benegal Rau, and to Prime Minister Nehru, in respect of their attempts to get the negotiations going. The difficulty over the next years will be to have some sort of garrison in Korea which can keep order and see that the country is re-established after all this terrible devastation, and which can prevent new attacks being made by one side or the other. It seems to me that the only way that can be done is by an agreement that such police troops—which is all that they will need to be—as are required in Korea are furnished by, say, India and Pakistan, and by other Asian members of the United Nations, the European troops being excluded. I feel that this is an avenue which is well worth exploring.

It is a significant fact that in Pekin the only Ambassador who has access to Mr. Chou-en-leh, the Foreign Minister, is the Indian Ambassador. The only way in which it is possible for us to get into effective touch with the Chinese Government is through India, and our own attempts to establish real diplomatic relations have failed. I am disappointed about this, and I admit that it is largely the fault of the Chinese. But we have to face the fact that through India and Pakistan, and the other Asian members of the Commonwealth, there is a much better opportunity of establishing reasonably good relations with the Chinese. I feel that we ought to have a realistic policy and should base our proposals to the Chinese People's Government on a realistic attitude of this kind, making it clear that we should be content to have the Asian members of the United Nations used in this way, in order that a settlement which saves the prestige of the Chinese and also protects their interests against foreign aggression may be achieved.

6.2 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, we have had an interesting debate, and a series of most brilliant speeches, which the orators seem to have enjoyed very much and which certainly those of us who have listened to them have enjoyed. I should have enjoyed them more if all the time I had not been somewhat oppressed with the fact that I had to reply at the end of the debate. I confess that it is rather difficult to reply to all these speeches without saying something which will make a very difficult situation still more difficult. Your Lordships will not mind, therefore, if I am somewhat cautious in my answers, although at the same time I feel that I shall be able to tell your Lordships quite plainly what is the attitude of His Majesty's Government.

The controversy about whether or not we were right to recognise Communist China is becoming a sort of hardy annual in this House. I have expressed my views very definitely before, and I will briefly express them again. If I may say so, with the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, it is not a question—to use the phrase that he used —whether we should admit Communist China into the United Nations. China is a member of the United Nations and a member of the Security Council. The only problem is: Who is China? As I see it—and this is my quarrel with the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition—if you regard recognition of Communist China as though it were a sort of testimonial of character, a kind of Nobel Prize, or something of that sort, then, speaking for myself, I would certainly not award that prize to Communist China. But I conceive that that is not the problem at all. The problem is not one of policy, but one of fact; as to who, in fact, governs China. Of that, I venture to say, there can be no doubt.

We may or may not like it; we may even think it is deplorable; but it is a fact that the only Government whose writ runs in China is the Government of Communist China. It is really playing with facts to pretend that the Government of Chiang Kai-shek is in control of China. There is a question whether we should recognise China de facto or de jure; but the legal consequences are exactly the same. If everybody had recognised Communist China as the de facto Government of China, then China would have found her seat at the United Nations long ago; we could have discussed all these matters with her there; and, of course, it is any-body's guess as to whether, if we had had that advantage, this situation would ever have developed. But it is nothing to the point to say: "What a bad situation we are in!" We recognised Communist China; other countries, 'for reasons which seemed to them good, did not recognise Communist China. The result is that Communist China was not there. I am entitled to say that all that has happened is, or at any rate may be, due to the fact that Communist China was not there.

I pass now to the next question. Speaking for myself and the Government, I have no shadow of doubt but that Communist China is guilty of aggression; the war started by an act of wanton aggression by the North Koreans against the South Koreans. Into that controversy Communist China, without notice of her intention, threw her weight and joined. It seems to me quite impossible to say that Communist China is not guilty of aggression. Indeed, I thought that the most forceful and interesting speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, really amounted, when one analysed it, to little more than this: that there were extenuating circumstances. I have no doubt that there were. But on the simple question as to whether or not China was guilty of aggression, I should have thought that it was quite plain that she was. What must we do, therefore? I would say this. In the first place, I would agree with the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, that there must be no appeasement, if by appeasement is meant weakening on this particular issue. As Lord Ammon so truly said, we are not fighting Communism or Communist China; we are fighting aggression. And we must stand firm and continue to fight that aggression as long as it is necessary. Our immediate aim—and it can be easily stated —is to bring about a cease-fire in Korea. Unfortunately, it takes two to bring about a cease-fire. We are perfectly ready to have a cease-fire—and that is not appeasement at all—if the Chinese are willing; and we are prepared to discuss the whole problem. Unfortunately, we have not been able to secure a cease-fire.

I was asked by the noble Earl, Lord Perth, what has been the result of the efforts of the Good Offices Committee. I am sorry to tell him that they have been unavailing, and we have had no response to them whatever. I remain of the opinion that we must go on trying to see whether we can get a favourable response. We must make it quite plain that, so far as we are concerned, we are most anxious and willing to have a cease-fire, and that we will do everything in our power to make it possible. But, alas! at the present time, so far from there being any indication that the Chinese are prepared for peace the unpleasant fact is—it is no good my trying to conceal it from your Lordships; you are entitled to know— we have had absolutely no response whatever. I sincerely hope that wiser counsels will prevail, and I am convinced that just because we may be bitterly disappointed, and because wiser counsels have not prevailed hitherto, it would be unwise to contemplate at the present time any extension of the war. It is difficult to see what the consequences of any such extension might be. I am tolerably certain that the extension of the war would be welcomed only by those who are our enemies or our potential enemies. For the rest we must, as I say, go on trying.

All the other questions, which I agree are exceedingly difficult—Formosa and the like—are questions which will arise only if and when we get our cease-fire. Do let us go by stages. Let us tackle one problem at a time. It is not until we have that cease-fire and can talk that these other problems will arise; and when we have the cease-fire, when happier and better relations prevail, these problems which at present look so difficult may become far easier. With regard to that particular question, your Lordships will remember the speech of the Prime Minister in which he called attention to the Cairo Declaration and pointed out that that was, and remained, our policy. Of course, there is nothing under the Cairo Declaration to prevent a consideration of the wishes of the people of Formosa, if they can be clearly ascertained. But all these matters lie in the future, and may not present anything like the difficulties which we now anticipate.

Thus the first thing to achieve is to try to bring about a cease-fire in Korea and a settlement there. If I may say so, I think it would be a profound mistake to attempt to mix up this problem with the problems of Malaya and Indo-China. I am perfectly certain that we ought to try to isolate these problems and deal with each of them separately as it arises. That, as I have said, is the fundamental problem to-day and everything is at stake in this. Is China prepared to show herself and to behave as a law-abiding, useful and civilised member of the comity of nations? If so, I have every hope that we may bring about a cease-fire and, thereafter, a peaceful settlement in Korea. I can assure my noble friend Lord Chorley that if and when we can get the cease-fire, we shall have proposals to make in order to see whether we cannot secure a settlement in Korea which satisfies everybody.

I was asked some questions about exports to China—I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, who talked about locomotives, iron and steel and the like. So far as locomotives are concerned, the export was stopped as soon as fighting broke out in Korea. With regard to iron and steel and rubber, the fact is that steps have now been taken, as your Lordships know, to deal with that matter. An answer setting out the figures was given in another place by the President of the Board of Trade as recently as April 30. The Minister of State on the same day said that he was satisfied that, as a result of the controls which we now operate, no strategic raw materials of any significance were going to China or North Korea. I may add that the same is true of manufactured articles of strategic importance.

I was asked a question or two about the Japanese Peace Treaty, and I may tell your Lordships this. Lord Vansittart urged us to get that Peace Treaty quickly, and I think he is right. He will perhaps know that it is now nearly four years since this Government advocated an early and prompt Japanese Peace Treaty. By that Treaty we want to restore to Japan her independence, and we hope that she will no longer be an economic or defence liability of the Western Powers. We do not think that unilateral treaties will answer the purpose. We think that the Peace Treaty should be multilateral, open to all the Powers at war with Japan (I think there were over forty of them, which one does not often realise) but that it should not be held up if any of them finds pretexts for delays. I hope that, in the course of a week or so, the Government may be able to give your Lordships further information about this matter, and I may tell you that negotiations are proceeding between the representatives of the United States and our representatives in a most cordial and friendly atmosphere. I think that offers some satisfactory assurance.

The noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, asked me to deal with the question of Greece and Turkey, and I will do so briefly. We fully appreciate the anxieties of both Turkey and Greece in regard to their own defences and, of course, their im- portance to the whole problem of the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty countries. The inter-relationship of one with the other is plain for us all to see. Your Lordships will remember that we are already pledged to the defence of Turkey by the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1939. I need hardly tell your Lordships that we stand firmly by the engagements and obligations of that Treaty. France, too, is bound in the same way. Although, of course, these Powers are outside the North Atlantic Treaty, yet we have considered their relation to it, and it has been decided that their case is best dealt with by arrangements made under the North Atlantic Council. I do not know why, but Lord Vansittart—at least I thought he did, but perhaps I am doing him an injustice—rather seemed to blame us for this. The fact is that that decision was taken recently by all the parties to the Atlantic Treaty. This was the last time the question was raised in N.A.T.O., and, therefore, I see no ground for supposing that there is any division of opinion on the subject since that conclusion was unanimously endorsed by all the parties. Of course, its implementation will no doubt follow upon, and develop together with, the whole conception of the Mediterranean Command.

The noble Lord asked me a question about Yugoslavia. I am anxious to deal so far as I can with his point, but it is such a huge subject that I am sure he will not mind if I deal with the matter rather briefly. With regard to Yugoslavia, I can tell him this. We are closely watching the situation in the Balkans, where, of course, the psychological and economic pressure of the Cominform States on Yugoslavia shows no sign of abatement. We have already demonstrated in the various credits which we have extended to Yugoslavia our interest in maintaining that country's capacity for resistance. We are now, in conjunction with other Governments, examining with great sympathy the possibility of meeting Yugoslavian requests for military supplies and equipment from this country. So I hope I can give Lord Vansittart some assurance on that matter.

That brings me to say a few words about the question of Germany. My Lords, to hear some of these speeches you would think there was a large cache of arms hidden away somewhere, and that the question was to whom should we devote them: whether we should devote them to Germany or to somebody with rather better antecedents. Of course, that bears no relation to the facts as they are. I quite agree that if you have, as we have at present, only somewhat limited reserves of arms, it is obviously better to use them in arming your own people and people upon whom you can thoroughly rely. On the other hand, do not let us make the mistake of talking about German rearmament as if we contemplated a completely separate army in Germany. That is not so at all. The whole scheme is that there shall be German contingents integrated into the force under the command of General Eisenhower. If we are going to try to defend Western Europe, surely it is right that those people, if they want to come in, should come in. There can be no question of forcing them to come in. But for the moment the reality of the situation is that we must obviously arm first ourselves and the French and our Allies. I am afraid that that answer will have to go for a considerable period of time, by reason of the circumstances I have indicated.

Now the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, made a charming speech on broadcasting. He takes rather too gloomy a view of the matter. In fact, the amount we are spending this year is rather more than we spent last year; but I quite agree that it would have been useful if we could have spent a good deal more. Unfortunately, when you are dealing with questions of economy, whenever you come to any particular item everybody raises his hands in horror and says, "Not that one." You may be told that you are a Government of wastrels, spending money right, left and centre; but when you try to reduce expenditure on an item everyone cries out in horror against it. I quite agree with the noble Earl that this is a useful method of spending our money. I believe that our broadcasting has done good, is doing good and will do good, and I should myself be glad to see it extended, let alone not reduced. But at the present time we must cut our coat according to our cloth; and although the saving on this item is a small one, yet here, as everywhere else, it must be brought about if possible by closer and better administrative arrangements. The noble Earl asked me if I could give him some assurance about the future—whether or not we could ever contemplate such a thing again. I cannot peer into the future, but so far as our present intentions are concerned we do not anticipate having to make any further inroads into the amount of money spent in this way. The noble Earl will, of course, realise that no one could possibly say more than that concerning what the future may bring forth.

There is one other matter which one noble Lord mentioned—I think it was Lord Portman. I am sorry I was not here at the time, but I have a note of his question. He referred to the tripartite agreement which had been made between Australia, New Zealand and the United States. He cast aspersions upon us about that matter. I confess that I have always felt some anxiety lest someone should think and say something of that sort, but I little thought it would be the noble Viscount. I can assure him that it is wholly and entirely untrue. The request —and it was a clamant one—to give our blessing to this arrangement came from Australia and New Zealand. And the reason why we were not in, why our name is not mentioned, is because, thank good-ness! it goes without saying that we are in; and if any attack were ever made on Australia or New Zealand this country would go to their aid with every man and every shilling she had in support.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, perhaps I may be allowed to say a word in support of the noble Viscount, Lord Portman. I think I myself made rather the same suggestion at the time when the noble Viscount the Leader of the House originally announced that this agreement had been reached. It does not seem to me merely a question of whether we should go into a war in which Australia and New Zealand were involved. I am sure we should go in. The question is whether we are to be on all fours with the three signatories with regard to prior consultations. That is the important thing.

VISCOUNT PORTMAN

My Lords, if I may be allowed to intervene, I should like some assurance, if possible, that in view of what has happened with regard to this Treaty between the two Dominions, we will call a council over here of the Governors of these countries for further consultations on our policy in the Far East.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I cannot give the noble Viscount any assurance, beyond saying that I will certainly pass his suggestion forward. I understand the point of view which noble Lords have advanced and I am quite certain that there need be no need for any anxiety at all on this matter. The ordinary channels of co-operation with the Commonwealth countries which have operated so successfully and so long will still be available, and there will be in this, as in all matters, the closest possible consultation. With regard to Persia, I am not going to say anything at the present time beyond what I said yesterday. I think, if I may say so, that the noble Lord was rather rushing in where, at any rate at the moment, I fear to tread. Whether that gives any indication of our respective positions I do not know! I hope I have dealt with the various problems which have been raised, though I know I have dealt with them briefly. I am grateful to your Lordships for the tone and temper of this debate. I have tried, though, as I say, briefly, to give your Lordships factual explanations, without being too controversial on any of the points at issue.

6.30 p.m.

LORD VANSITTART

My Lords, in one respect this has been a remarkable debate because it is obvious that some of those who have taken part in it have not, in fact, read my Motion. If your Lordships will look at it, you will see that I urge that no concessions should be made to the Communist Government of China on the basis of the cessation of hostilities in Korea only. I did not say anything about not making peace with them. That is a very different thing. I will run through the debate as quickly as I can, because it is possible that I am not the only person who will be glad to get away. The noble Earl, Lord Perth, recorded his usual profound disagreement with me, but as he then went on to endorse practically everything I said about Formosa, that is the kind of criticism which I take very kindly. He said also that the Chinese Communists should be consulted about the Japanese Peace Treaty. I said the same about that too, but I do not want them to be consulted for too long, otherwise we shall drift into a big loss of time. The noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack agrees with me that this Japanese Peace Treaty must be concluded as quickly as possible.

The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, raised a number of points, one of which was about Malaya. He seemed to cast doubts on any Chinese participation, but I think it is a matter of common knowledge that the Chinese Communists are the backbone of what is going on there. As I have already pointed out in this House, the Chinese Government can stop it by saying a word. I drew the analogy the other day with what went on in Greece—and Mr. Bevin said of these troubles that the Kremlin could stop them by raising a finger. The cases are very parallel and I cannot accept the disclaimer—

LORD STRABOLGI

Would the noble Lord allow me to interrupt? I gave way to him when I was speaking. May I remind the noble Lord that the Chinese Communists in Malaya are Malayan citizens? They are residents, sometimes of the third and fourth generations in Malaya. They are not concerned with Pekin.

LORD VANSITTART

We can go on splitting hairs about this for a long time, but the fact remains that the Chinese Government could stop it if they wished—

LORD STRABOLGI

No.

LORD VANSITTART

Just as they could stop the war in Indo-China. The noble Lord and other speakers also deprecated any suggestion of rearming Japan. I am afraid that they must take their heads out of the sand and realise that it is impossible to defend anything without troops. That is elementary. Some defence, therefore, will have to be organised, otherwise the burden on the Western Powers, which is already crushing, will become much too great.

I come back to the terms of my Motion, and as the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, said that he was speaking for his Party, or anyhow for a number of friends, I think I am entitled to ask him two questions, to which I should be glad to have replies, because they are the whole sum and substance of my Motion here to-day. I want him to tell me, "Yes" or "No," whether he and his friends are prepared to hand over Formosa to the Chinese Communists with- out consulting the wishes of the inhabitants; in other words, whether—"Yes" or "No"—they are prepared to abandon the whole principle of self-determination. That is a question to which I should be glad to have an answer.

LORD STRABOLGI

I think the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor answered that point much more authoritatively than I could.

LORD VANSITTART

I do not think I have received a clear answer. The Lord Chancellor has given as careful an answer as he could on behalf of the Government, but no such reticence need be imposed upon the noble Lord. He is quite free to tell me exactly what he and his friends think about it.

LORD STRABOLGI

I support the Lord Chancellor.

LORD VANSITTART

I think that the noble Lord is taking undue shelter, and I cannot bomb him out of it. I have entirely failed to draw him. I entirely appreciate the reasons for his caution: it is a most difficult question for him to answer. I answer it flatly myself in this way: I say that they are certainly not entitled to do that. I stand by the principle of self-determination.

Another point I made was that there should be no concession to Communist China on the basis of Korea only. My point is perfectly clear. I should be as glad as anybody to make peace; I should be delighted. But I am not prepared to pay the high price proposed, which is based only on a cease-fire in Korea. That would be too easy. These fellows come over and kill many of our people and then the suggestion is that they have only to say: "We have had enough now. We will go into the United Nations and take Formosa," and all the rest of it. I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi: can he answer, on behalf of his friends, whether they are prepared to make concessions to the Chinese, with regard to allowing them into the United Nations and with regard to Formosa, on the basis of a treaty which does not include calling off the war in Indo-China and in Malaya? Indo-China is a vital point. I insist that we ought to have a clear answer to this question. If there are to be any con- cessions, I say that none should be made unless the Chinese Government are prepared to call off the war in Indo-China too. I think that is a reasonable attitude. Any other would be grossly unfair to our French allies.

The next speaker was the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate. About his speech I have not much to say beyond what the noble Marquess has already said. The noble Viscount said one thing that shocked me a great deal, something to the effect that the behaviour of people should have no influence on our conduct towards them, or should not influence our recognition. In the course of my speech I said that it was time that the Western politicians had a moral basis. What the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, said, of course, is the absolute contradiction of that. I think he said something also in opposition to withholding Formosa from the Chinese Communists. I would point out to him, in connection with what I have already said, that the reason I am opposed to it is not because they are Communists, but because they are brutes and abominably cruel; and the handing back of Formosa to the Chinese Communists would result in as many people being butchered there as on the Chinese mainland. That is the main reason I am utterly opposed to it. Then the noble Lord, Lord Ammon (he is not now in his place), said that we were not fighting Chinese Communists or anything of that sort; we were fighting aggression. That is the one thing that no man on earth can possibly do. You cannot fight aggression any more than you can box with a smell. What you are fighting are aggressors, and the aggressors in this case happen to be Chinese, and Chinese Communists. You are not fighting an abstraction; you are fighting something which is concrete, and deadly concrete.

I come now to the speech of the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor. I was very glad to have his assurance that all exports of any consequence to China, all war material or potential, had, in fact, ceased. I hope I am right in applying that assurance in particular to rubber. I am sure it is time that that was stopped altogether. With regard to the Japanese Treaty, the noble and learned Viscount agrees with me that we should not wait too long. I should like to know at some later date how long the Government intend to wait. I feel strongly that we should not be dragged into any set of negotiations which could be interminably protracted and lead to the sinister farce which has gone on in regard to Austria. I think the whole House will be opposed to anything of that sort. Speed is the essence of the matter. As to German rearmament, I abide by what I said. I am not opposed to it as such, but I am opposed to going on talking about it and then doing nothing. That always produces the most disastrous results, particularly in that country. As I said previously, we shall be well advised to defer any further talk about it until there are sufficient supplies of heavy equipment, and we shall then have to decide where to allocate them. With those remarks, I apologise for trespassing on your Lordships' time. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, with-drawn.