HL Deb 02 May 1951 vol 171 cc618-35

2.39 p.m.

LORD VANSITTART rose to call attention to certain factors in the vital interests and defences of the civilised Powers; in particular to urge that no concessions should be made to the Communist Government of China on the basis of the cessation of hostilities in Korea only; to draw attention to new aspects of the problem of German rearmament; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I apologise for encroaching on your time to-day with a multibarrelled Motion, but I do not take many of your precious days: I believe I took only two last year, and this is the first this year. Moreover, when I last spoke in this House I pointed out that we might be living in what I called the "Twilight of our gods," and nothing that has occurred since then has made that prospect more remote; if anything, it has been brought slightly nearer. Ten days ago General Marshall said that we were living in circumstances of imminent peril; and last week President Truman added: The international situation might explode at any moment, and we must make every day count.

I therefore felt obliged to go on record to-day in good time. I think that in the light of those lurid warnings, any domestic storms in teacups must seem very small. The only really interesting question now is whether and how modern civilisation is going to survive.

A good many years ago Mr. Litvinov said that Peace is indivisible.

That sounded very clever, and the phrase caught on. But, like a great many of the clichés that have come prancing and rumbling down to us, it is not true. There are many kinds of peace, including the brand that we are now enduring, and many of them are highly divisible. It would be nearer to the truth to say that some kinds of war, though far from all, are indivisible. For instance, events in the Far East obviously affect prospects on the Western Front, and therefore I shall start in the Far East. It has seemed to me recently that the minds of those in authority in this country have been moving on the old wrong lines, on the assumption that you can placate the implacable, and that you can negotiate with conspirators. In evidence of that, I advance the really rather shaming proceedings that have been taking place in Paris recently. Similarly, I think that the minds of the Government and the Foreign Office, so far as the Far East is concerned, seem to be assuming that all Communists are not our inveterate enemies. But, in fact, they are. Thus, the Chinese Communists have never had any intention of coming to a settlement in Korea until they had satisfied them-selves that they could get the better of us by no other means. I submit to your Lordships that it is our duty to prove to them that they cannot get the better of us by any means. It therefore follows, logically, that peace, if and when it does come, must not be too easy, otherwise it will prove deceptive.

I had put down this Motion before the last Chinese offensive but in anticipation of it, and I think that most of us expected it. As I have said, I wanted to get on record in good time, and I am also most anxious to bring Anglo-American policies in the Far East closer together. There-fore, I venture to refer the House to what I said on Formosa in the last Foreign Affairs debate. I proved, I hope—at least, nobody attempted to answer me— that the Government by their own acts and deeds (very rightly. I think), by their own practice and preaching, in all that they had done and said in regard to the South African Protectorates and the Sudan, had absolutely inhibited themselves from handing over Formosa to the horrors of Communism without at least having ascertained that that was the wish of the decisive majority of the inhabitants of that island. I am pretty sure that you would not get 5 per cent. of them to vote themselves into butchery at this stage, in view of what has been taking place on the mainland. I do not think that any decent or self-respecting people or Government can possibly push 8,000,000 people into slavery without asking them their views.

Moreover, the transfer—leaving aside altogether the morality of the question—would be highly dangerous. There is no need to exaggerate. The American Chiefs-of-Staff have changed their opinions slightly about that. It may be that Formosa is not an absolutely vital area, but nobody can deny that it is a highly important one. We might easily lose control of the Pacific if it passed into hostile hands. A glance at the map will show that it would be extremely dangerous both to the Philippines and to Japan if that happened, and I venture to think that that is a risk which nobody should run. Moreover, the Government are not in the least obligated by the provisional Agreement signed at Cairo eight years ago. The advent of Communism has completely changed all that. I there-fore most earnestly hope to-day that the House will show clearly that we wish to be no party to any policy which would be not only foolish but wrong. The Government would lose absolutely nothing by making such a declaration, because the transfer of Formosa is not practical politics anyway. They are never going to get away with it. Such a declaration would bring us much closer to the policy of the United States—the practical policy in this particular respect.

From that matter I pass to the problem of any sort of peace in Korea, and after all that has happened I submit to your Lordships that it would again be nothing less than a crime to make concessions, if the opportunity occurred, only on that narrow basis. Surely we owe something to all the people who have been murdered in Malaya—and others are still being killed—and to their relatives. Surely we owe something to the French in Indo-China—incidentally, a much more important key point than Korea. We have no right whatever to consent to anything which might result simply in a transfer of hostilities. At the present moment, France is being bled white in Indo-China, and if we were to do anything of that sort— which would be a very mean thing to do —it might result in her being bled to death altogther. All of us know that we need those French troops, as well as our troops in Malaya, on the Western Front as soon as possible. I do not say that the golden opportunity of making such a peace will occur; but if it does occur, and if we miss or mess it, it will never recur; it will be gone for ever. I also submit to your Lordships that unless and until the Chinese Communists sign and keep a peace of those dimensions, there can be no question of making con-cessions like admitting them into the United Nations. When the Government were about to recognise Communist China I warned them that I thought they were making a mistake, and I think that at the time the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition was of the same opinion. It has seemed to me since that the Powers who have recognised her are rather in the position of the fox in the fable, who lost his brush and wished the others to do likewise.

A week ago, Sir Gladwyn Jebb said that we recognised Communist China because, like the moon, it was there. I think the simile is unhappily chosen. We recognise the existence of Communist China; we recognise the existence of the moon. But we are not seeking to enter into diplomatic relations with the moon; nor is the moon peopled with the killers of our kin. She is not stained with the blood of the Gloucesters. So far as I am aware, His Majesty's Government are still pursuing the ultimate policy of wishing to push Communist China into the Security Council, and some time ago I heard one of their members even go so far as to say that he hoped that this China would take her proper place in the world. I dissent entirely. Communism is not welcome in China. It is never welcome in any country. It is always forced upon its victims, and Russia herself is the first example of that. Moreover, the second stage is always a blood bath, and for months past now the most ghastly massacres have been perpetrated on the Chinese mainland. The victims are paraded in the streets to the sound of drums and horns before being led off to the place of slaughter. The unfortunate populace are compelled to dance a sort of yellow Carmagnole in the streets, and whoop and wallow in affected sadism. Only last week we heard of one batch of 198 victims being dealt with at one go. All this was given over the Chinese radio itself: there is no question about it. The public were invited to bait and assault and spit upon these poor people before they were taken off in droves to be slaughtered. Only yesterday I saw in the Manchester Guardian another excerpt from Chinese reports which stated that twenty people are being put to the slaughter every day in Shanghai, and similar numbers in other cities.

Do we really wish such brutes to take their proper place in the world? What sort of place, and what sort of world? They should have no place in the world unless and until they learn to behave with tolerance, and sign and keep a peace such as that which I have already described. I feel that the time is long overdue when Western policy must have a moral basis. I have often tried to press that in this House. I have besought the Government to break with the worst offenders and not to increase trade with persecutors when their persecution was at its height. But all to no avail. I notice that only the day before yesterday the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, said in the Central Hall, Westminster, that we should lose everything if we lost our moral and spiritual values. I should like to know exactly what that means. Are spiritual values always to involve compounding from expediency with evil and compounding with this literally God-damned cruelty which reigns wherever Communism gains control of men's minds and bodies? If our spiritual values are really to involve handing over 8,000,000 people in Formosa to the slaughter, then I think we need a different set of spiritual values.

From that I pass very naturally to the problem of making peace with Japan. I should like to see that done very quickly. As President Truman has said, we must make every day count. It would seem to me that the American draft offers a very fair basis, possibly with some economic safeguards. The British draft I have not yet seen. I submit, however, to your Lordships that it is not in the least necessary for the speedy making of this peace that it should be signed by all those who once thought themselves concerned. It could, if necessary, quite well be done by unilateral treaties; I see no objection at all to that. The Russians have already said that they would not consider or discuss the American draft. I do not know what attitude they would take to ours—but I certainly would not give them much time. If they do not want to come in, let us go ahead without them. Similarly, if the British Government wished to show their draft to the Chinese Communists I should raise no objection. But, for Heaven's sake! let us not wait for them and let ourselves in again for anything like the farce that has been dragging on for years in regard to Austria. Let us not leave it too late on this occasion.

When this Treaty is drawn up, it is, of course, indispensable that it should provide for some measure of limited Japanese rearmament. We cannot afford a power vacuum there. The position in Japan might become precarious if war were to break out in the West. With all that we must reckon. I understand the original reluctance of Australia and New Zealand to see any measure of Japanese rearmament, but they have now three considerable safeguards. The first is that the Japanese do not want to be rearmed. I think it very likely that they would be content with a certain amount of rearmament on land only, without an air force or a navy. The second is that Australia and New Zealand are now going to get an American guarantee. I do not myself mind in the least that they should get that guarantee without our participation. The essential thing is to get it done quickly: speed is the essence of everything now. That should give them a great measure of security and satisfaction. The third safeguard—although I do not share General MacArtbur's paeans of praise for the Japanese—is that they have behaved extremely well lately. Their island has been denuded of troops for the purpose of the Korean campaign, and had the Japanese been so minded, they might have given a great deal of trouble. They have not, in fact, given any. It would have been a very different thing if a similar experiment had been tried in Germany.

That brings me to the second part of my argument, the rearmament of Ger-many. I have spent a great part of my life on this particular problem, but I do not want to be in the least dogmatic. The course of events has, however, forced upon me certain considerations which I think would be worthy of your Lordships' reflections. My Lords, there is still a great deal of the evil spirit still in Germany. You can see it in such symptoms as the rise of a new Nazi party. I think it is a case where some caution is necessary. The Germans have not been repentant as a whole, either after this last War or after the First World War. They soon got themselves into a frame of mind where they looked upon themselves as victims rather than as aggressors. One can see traces of this everywhere—I mention just two or three. Take the book of Doctor Weizsacker, which is filled with complaints about the Treaty of Versailles. Take the utterances of Herr Kordt, who seems to have convinced himself that he was a good democrat. Or take the writings of General Guderian, which are filled with complaints of the acts of the Allies and contain no word about German misdeeds. For some time past, therefore, I have had some misgivings about the future of Germany.

About a couple of years ago Stalin made it manifest that he was going to rearm Eastern Germany, and he has been doing so on a considerable scale. In these circumstances I thought something ought to be done to stem a possible invasion of Western Germany; and I thought that, as a matter of humanity, the Germans should be allowed to take some part in defending themselves. Therefore, a year ago I put forward in this House a scheme for the limited and restricted rearmament of Germany. I do not propose to go into the details to-day. Nobody in this country seemed particularly interested, perhaps quite naturally, and in Germany the suggestion was received with execration, largely because it came from me. That matter dropped.

What happened then? The Allied Governments and the Government of Ger-many began to talk the matter over. They talked round and round the subject, and round and round this fruitless mulberry bush; and nothing whatever happened. Thereby we—by which I mean Western Governments as a whole—made the worst of every possible world. We garnered every possible disadvantage and no possible advantage, because the reaction of Germany to all this talk was significant and typical. From the moment they began to think that they were indispensable to us, they began to put up their terms, and tried to strike a hard bargain. In what I am saying, I wish specifically to exempt Dr. Adenauer. He has bargained, it is true, but I do not think he has bargained more than he was compelled to do by his political neighbours, both on the Right and on the Left—by the F.D.P. and the German Party, on the Right, and by the Social Democrats on the Left. Nor are the subsequent criticisms that I am about to make of universal application.

There is, of course, at the present moment a great deal of quite genuine pacificism in Germany, for which all allowance must be made. I would, how-ever, draw your Lordships' attention to the rather singular fact that throughout the century, hitherto, there has been a large majority of the German nation in favour of any war of aggression, and a singular reluctance when there was any question of a war of defence. But, apart from the genuine pacifists and apart from those who are actuated either by the desires of a reinsurance or of a Schadenfreude, a great many of them have spoken as if it would be a favour to us that they should defend themselves. Others have said: "We are not ready to defend you against Russia." To defend us! Others have said: "We hold the balance and we shall know how to use it." Others, again, have said that they would not be ready to participate in the defence of the West unless or until the Allies were in a position to win victories on the Elbe or even on the Vistula.

Among those who in the past have taken that line are people like Dr. Schumacher, the Socialist leader. In these circumstances, I have long since withdrawn in my own mind the suggestions which I made last year. In any case I think that we are now too late. I do not believe that we could now get any valid German formations on foot before 1953, and in my judgment the danger point will come before that. In present circumstances, I would not wish that the Germans should take part in the defence of the West unless they asked us to allow them, as a favour to them to take part, because, like General Eisenhower, I do not want to sec any unwilling soldiers. The Germans never will be willing until they have taken the plunge and made up their minds to cast in their lot unequivocally with the West. That is something they have never done in my lifetime. From the days of Bismarck they have been taught, on the whole, to look the other way, and throughout my life the Eastern school has, on the whole, been stronger than the Western. A great many of your Lord-ships can, no doubt, remember the days of General Von Seeckt when practically all the generals were Easterners. It may be of interest to your Lordships to know that I have counted up to about fifty organisations, associations and societies which are either looking East or working East.

I think another point that your Lordships would do well to bear in mind is that Dr. Adenauer is now losing ground; and one of the reasons why he is losing ground is that he, at least, is a convinced Westerner. Therefore I venture to suggest that we should say nothing further to mislead the Germans into believing that we are prepared to bid for their sup-port by further concessions. I am convinced that we should probably only turn their heads in that way, and that some of their heads are hot enough already. In other words, I should like to see the same attitude adopted towards them as towards the Chinese Communists —in quite another context, of course: that is, that we should not run after them. Let somebody run after us for a change. We have not experienced that for a very long while. Let me sum it up by saying: "Don't go down the mine, daddy; let the mine come up to you." I believe that would be a more profitable line. I do not want to be misunderstood in any way. I am not suggesting that the idea of German rearmament should be dropped or abandoned—nothing of the kind. What I do suggest, as the hour of decision and destiny has drifted by, is that we shall be better advised to talk no more of the matter until there are sufficient supplies of heavy equipment avail-able. Meanwhile, in view of the urgency of the situation, there are other candidates upon whom any spare supplies which may become available in the immediate future might be more profitably bestowed. It might be a better immediate investment.

Here I must say a word to distinguish, and distinguish very sharply, my attitude from that of the extreme Left. That is a distinction that I never expected to have to draw, but some of these people have been performing such somersaults and volte-faces that I do not know where they are—and neither, I think, do they. Your Lordships are aware that I have never taken an indulgent view of German crimes during this century. I believe your Lordships like an understatement and you have one there. Throughout that period I have received an immense amount of abuse from that particular quarter: they invented the word "Vansittartism"; they pretended that I had said there were no good Germans except dead ones, and that I had said that every single German was guilty. What I actually said was that the nation was responsible. However, it is unnecessary to go into all those details. Now some of these people are busy turning cartwheels, possibly to please Stalin, and proclaiming that the Germans are such irredeemable brutes that they must on no account be allowed to defend themselves. That attitude seems to me to amount to saying: "Well, the Allies must die for them or the Mongols will kill them." I am surprised at that. Vansittartism never went so far as that, and I think your Lord-ships will expect me to be rather entertained by these antics. I shall certainly not disappoint you.

If, then, we are too late for immediate purposes as regards Germany, who are the other candidates who might be better immediate recipients of any spare supplies that we possess? In the United States, of course, there are a good many people who say Spain. They suggest that Spain is an integral part of Western Europe, and that you cannot argue with geography. They point out that whereas it might take two years to form ten valid German divisions, it would be possible to get a dozen Spanish divisions ready-made, provided that they were equipped; that is all that remains to be done. I know that such an idea presents considerable difficulties to the democratic parties, particularly the British and French Socialist Parties, and I think there are probably more pressing candidates. But if the Americans do decide to give any help in the Iberian Peninsula, to Spain or to Portugal—also a dictatorship—I hope that no objection will be raised in this country, because, after all, nobody can say that in the event of a Third World War the Iberian Peninsula would not have an important part to play.

But in my view there are more important matters than that. I should like to see a great deal more attention given to the Mediterranean—notably to Greece and Turkey. Both have desired to come into the Atlantic Organisation, and the Americans have wished them to come in; but I understand that the British Government, on the contrary, have found some difficulty in admitting them. It may be that the noble and learned Viscount who is to reply to-day will explain what the difficulties are. If they are thought to be insuperable (I cannot believe that they should be), at least let us have a valid and early Mediterranean organisation, in which both the Greek and the Turkish Armies would be immensely valuable. I understand, also, that the Italians now wish to exceed the limitations in armament imposed upon them by treaty. I venture to remind the House that I urged that that should be done a long while ago, when it first became apparent that the satellites were exceeding their limits. I hope that, if that is the case, the Italians' wishes will meet with immediate approbation, for I see no reason why the West should tittup along behind the galloping times.

I should also like to see both Spain and Yugoslavia enabled to play their part in this organisation. I should not, however, be anxious, in view of the shortage of heavy equipment, to send much to Yugoslavia, unless we could be sure that if we helped Tito he would help us—in other words, that he will definitely assist us if we are attacked. I feel, however, that we might now be able to do something which would enhance the probabilities of peace, by making it clear that in any case we would not allow Yugoslavia to succumb, because in my judgment we cannot afford to do that. If that did happen, Greece would go next, and then Turkey, and then the Middle East, and then perhaps India and Pakistan; and we might have lost the Third World War without striking a blow. I dislike very much the idea of giving any assistance to a tyrant of that kind. I think that most of his reforms are rather in the nature of window-dressing, and that the Communist Party is still the only pebble on the beach; but the facts speak for them-selves. If we had such an organisation as that, properly equipped wherever possible, we might be in a very different position, for if the Russians struck West into Western Europe, there would at least be the possibility of the Allies' striking upwards at the soft under-belly of the new monster to liberate the enslaved nations. That might make a vast difference to the history of Europe, and might even bring down the Communist edifice altogether. I suggest that it is worth reflecting whether that investment would not be more profitable than running any further after tardy and recalcitrant Germans.

Now, my Lords, I have almost finished. But in this House a week ago to-day I put down a Question in regard to the Suez Canal, and as I did not receive an answer which in any way tranquillised me, I said that I would mention it later. Had the proposals which we have apparently made to the Egyptian Government been made in times of piping and permanent peace I could have understood them, though even then I do not think I should have sympathised with them. But at the present time they seem to be almost suicidal. Those of us who have spent some of our lives in Egypt know that the Canal cannot be defended from a distance, and if there is any question of being re-invited to return in times of danger, what are we facing now? Can the danger possibly be greater than it is now? One more point, which has been in the minds of those of us who have any experience of the country, has invariably been that of sabotage. We have always felt that if the Canal were left in Egyptian hands there could not be any guarantee against sabotage. On the contrary, it would almost certainly happen.

For what are we really asked to run these grave risks? As I understand it, it is for the friendship of the Egyptian Government. But can we in present circumstances secure that? The position seems to me to be quite a simple one. We have to deal with an unstable and unpopular Court, and with a Government which is a bad Government. It is a Government of the rich, who have always ground the faces of the poor and who are still doing so; consequently there is a good deal of unrest in the country which is exploited by the Communists, who, I think, keep their biggest mission of all in Cairo. To distract attention from their own shortcomings this Government have embarked upon the iniquitous course of stoking up xenophobia in general and Anglophobia in particular, and until they modify their policy at home I do not see how they are to get out of that vicious circle. But even if we got that friendship, what exactly would it be worth in the present crisis? I suggest that in practical terms it would not be worth much, for the simple reason that the Egyptian Army has never been a fighting machine. It gave a very poor account of itself against Israel, and I do not think it could be counted upon to give a much better account against a more formidable adversary. Therefore, I feel that we should somehow convey to the Egyptian people, and to their Government that, while we are glad to have their friendship, our friendship to them is worth a great deal more.

To-day I saw in the morning papers that there had been a very unruly session of the Egyptian Parliament in which we were described as "dogs," and were told that the only thing we understood was force. I wish very much that the Government would take an attitude which would dispel that illusion, because it seems to me that the same sort of thing is going on in Persia. There, also, there is an extremely weak Government, and an extremely bad Parliament. They also are employing xenophobia in general and Anglophobia in particular to distract attention from their own shortcomings. I read with attention the statement which the right honourable gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made in another place yesterday. I cannot find it very tranquillising. He said—very rightly, of course—that we would not negotiate under duress. But suppose the other side seems to say: "We are not going to negotiate; we are taking pos-session." In that event we shall toe carried no further by any statement of that kind. I should be grateful if the Government to-day would make it plain that we shall not hesitate to use force if British lives are endangered; and I would point out to the House that British lives will be endangered on a very large scale if anything in the nature of forcible expropriation is attempted. I hope that we may have some tranquillising assurance on that point to-day, for I feel that the moment has come when it is the duty of the Government to make it felt all over the world that we are still a great and respectable Power and that we have said enough.

It was my intention to end my speech as I began it, with a reference to Anglo-American relations. But time has drifted on, and I will be as brief as I can. There are only two points in that connection I want to mention. There are often com-plaints in the British Press—or, anyhow, in one section of it to which I referred in my last speech. But, so far as Americans are concerned, they seem to me to have one very valid complaint against us. That is with regard to the amount of trade that is still going on with China. I do not want to go into details (your Lordships will find those in Monday's House of Commons Hansard) but all sorts of very important things— iron and steel, locomotives and a great deal of rubber, for instance—are still being sent to China. I submit to your Lordships that that should be stopped, especially in view of the casualties that are being inflicted not only on our own troops but on Allied troops. It was also my intention to say something further about the anti-American campaign that has for so long been waged in a certain section of the Press in this country, but I do not now propose to detain your Lordships upon that matter. I venture to end my speech by saying in one sentence what I could have said more adequately in a quarter of an hour: You cannot treat Uncle Sam like Aunt Sally. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.

3.23 p.m.

THE EARL OF PERTH

My Lords, the noble Lord who introduced this Motion has covered much ground and a great deal of the world in what I think may fairly be described as a very able and very brilliant speech. But he will for-give me if I do not follow him in what I may call his world tour; I do not think it would be appropriate to do that to-day. I must, however, say this: that because I do not follow him in his world tour he must not take it for granted—as I think he sometimes seems inclined to do—that his views are acceptable to the House as a whole. I must say frankly that I disagree profoundly with some of his theses. I should like now to look at the wording of the Motion. Part of its purpose is stated to be to draw attention to new aspects of the problem of German rearmament. It also refers to the cessation of hostilities in Korea. I personally do not consider that the question of a German contribution to the defence of the West, whether through a European army or otherwise, is a matter of any practical urgency. I therefore intend to limit my remarks to-day to Korea and the Far East, and related subjects. But before doing so I should like to pay a tribute. I feel sure that all your Lordships will have read with great sorrow in this morning's newspapers of the very heavy casualties that British forces have suffered in Korea. I think we ought to extend our great sympathy to all relatives and friends of those who have died. I feel that those gallant and brave men have died just as much in defence of their country as did those who fell in the two Great Wars.

To return to the Motion, I understand that the proposition of the noble Lord is that the Communist Government of China should not be bribed to cease hostilities in Korea through concessions made to them elsewhere. If I am right in my interpretation, I am in full agreement with the noble Lord's proposition. We must at all costs adhere to the principle that aggression must not be allowed to pay. But a cessation of hostilities means that the Governments whose forces are actually engaged in fighting are prepared to discuss a settlement, and surely, if there are such discussions, representatives of the parties concerned must meet. Ultimately such discussions are bound to take place; we cannot imagine a continuance of war in Korea for an unlimited and indefinite period; and if discussions are to be held ultimately, then the sooner they can take place the better, so that we can avoid this terrible loss of life and all else that war means. In this connection, I should like to ask whether the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack, who I understand is to reply on behalf of the Government, can tell us something as to what is happening to the Good Offices Committee which was set up by the Assembly? Have that Committee been able to establish contact with the Pekin Government? I do not want to press the noble and learned Viscount for a definite reply to-day, if he thinks that it would not be in the public interest to answer, but some of us are very anxious to know whether the Good Offices Committee have made any pro- gress because on the establishment of that Committee we originally set considerable hopes.

I am going to be bold enough to outline briefly the kind of settlement which I should like to see in Korea and in the Far East. Perhaps your Lordships know that I hold that the Pekin Government are already legally entitled to sit on the Security Council. The noble Lord who moved this Motion does not hold this view, and I think that the noble Mar-quess the Leader of the Opposition also holds different views. I realise, too, that that view is challenged by some of the members of the United Nations, Powers which have not recognised the Pekin Government. In a reply which I received to a supplementary question that I put the other day, I was told it was not likely that the majority of the Assembly or of the Security Council would agree to refer the question of the position of the Pekin Government as regards the Security Council to the International Court for an advisory opinion. I would ask His Majesty's Government to reconsider that view, and perhaps sponsor a resolution. After all, the International Court is the body which legally ought to interpret the United Nations Charter: it is the only body that can do so. To my mind an analogy can be drawn between it and the Supreme Court of America, which alone is entitled to construe and interpret the Constitution of the United States of America.

It is possible that the International Court may say that this is a political and not a legal question, but even that would be progress. We should know a little more about where we stand. Even if the Pekin Government are entitled to a seat on the Security Council, we must remember that that Government have been named as an aggressor. I am afraid there can be no doubt whatever about that aggression, and even the Indian delegate, to whom I should like to pay tribute for his unceasing efforts for a settlement, which I hope he will continue, must recognise the fact of the aggression. I wish he could bring home to the Pekin Government that it is that fact that makes a settlement so difficult. The Pekin Government must realise that the United Nations, if they are to continue to exist, must resist aggression from whatever source or whatever cause it springs. Some people in this country are a little apt to forget (your Lordships, of course, must be exempt from this accusation) that the United States came immediately to the rescue of the United Nations when aggression took place in South Korea. We must be most grateful for that, and for all the great efforts which the United States have since put forward. Apart from the question of the position of China on the Security Council, I think a settlement would clearly have to include the status and future of Korea as a whole. What we should all like to see is a unified and independent Korea, per-haps under the ægis of the United Nations, at any rate for a certain period, untiltilings have settled down sufficiently to allow free and unprejudiced elections. Above all, I feel that a demilitarised and neutralised Korea is essential. I should like to see a guarantee of that demilitarisation and neutrality given by the United Nations and, if required, supplementary guarantees given by the Pekin Government and the Government of the United States.

I am rather inclined to think that a similar solution might be applied to Formosa. That island, too, might well be placed under the ægis of the United Nations, for the present at any rate, and it also should be demilitarised and neutralised with the same guarantees. As things are at present, I see no valid argument in favour of a return of Formosa to the Pekin Government. I should like to know what the people of Formosa really wish. I do not think that has ever been ascertained. Although apparently self-determination is rather out of favour, as a Liberal I find it is the right method of settling difficulties of this kind. I am not at all impressed by the argument that Formosa ought to be given to the Pekin Government because of the Cairo assurances. The Cairo decisions were reached in entirely different circumstances, and I do not understand why we should be bound by those decisions, or some of those decisions, when agreements such as those reached at Yalta have been consistently violated. After all, the Cairo agreements were concluded when we were fighting desperately against Japanese aggression. To hand back Formosa to a Government which had been declared an aggressor is, to my mind, very repugnant.

Lastly, it seems to me that any settlement ought to include consultation with the Pekin Government about the terms of the Japanese Treaty. China has been at war with Japan for nearly twenty years, and whatever we may feel about Communism, there is no doubt that the Communist Party played a great part in the resistance movement. I quote an impartial observer of considerable authority, who has written an article in International Affairs which I think is entitled, "China and Communism." He says: I think the Chinese Communist forces probably did more to fight the Japanese than any other forces in China. I put forward these purely as personal suggestions. His Majesty's Government may consider that to-day they are incapable of practical fulfilment, but I would ask that they should bear them in mind. Above all, I would urge that no consideration of prestige should delay a possible settlement of all the troubles in Korea and in the Far East.