Lords Sitting of 20 June 1951

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers.

SAINT BENET GRACECHURCH BILL
2.35 p.m.
Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (MONEY) BILL
Read 3a, and passed.
BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I beg leave to make a short statement concerning the progress of business to-day. With your Lordships' permission, it is proposed that the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack shall make a statement on Persia between a quarter to four and four o'clock.

SUEZ CANAL NEGOTIATIONS
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, I beg to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they will now make known the terms of the offer in regard to the Suez Canal apparently rejected by the Egyptian Government.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD HENDERSON): My Lords, I have nothing to add to the statement which I made in reply to the noble Lord's Question on April 25. The arrangement that neither Government should comment at present on the substance of the present negotiations still holds good.

VISITS TO HOSTILE COUNTRIES
2.38 p.m.
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, I beg to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government what facilities, if any, are given for men or women to proceed through countries hostile to us to a country with which we are at war, and then to return to this country to carry on the propaganda of the enemy country; and to inquire whether, if such conduct is condemned, any punitive measures are applicable.]
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT JOWITT): My Lords, since the abolition of the exit permit system there have been no general restrictions on British subjects wishing to leave the United Kingdom. Their movements cannot be controlled once they are in a foreign country. Where the conduct of any British national is treasonable, a prosecution may be undertaken. The decision whether or not to prosecute is, of course, a matter for the Attorney-General.
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, the matter being sub judice, I should naturally not dream of pressing it further today. When it ceases to be sub judice, I should certainly be very grateful if a certain amount of bewilderment in my mind could be relieved, and if we could have explained to us what exactly is the moral difference between this case and, let us say, that of "Lord Haw-Haw."

NAVAL AIR SERVICE COMMISSIONS
LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they will say what opportunities are open to National Service men and others to obtain short-service commissions in the Navy as pilots and observers.]
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (LORD PAKENHAM): My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord for putting down this Question. National Service men can at present apply to train in their National Service time for flying appointments in the Navy as pilots or observers. The Admiralty are now introducing a new scheme, which will become operative immediately, whereby these

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National Service men will be able to volunteer during their training to transfer to a short-service engagement, which will extend their full-time service to four years. On transfer they will receive Regular rates of pay. All time served by these men after transfer, subject to their having been awarded their "wings," will count for gratuity at the rate of £175 a year. We hope that there will be a good response to this new scheme from all young men to whom the unique opportunity of service at sea and in the air appeals. At the end of their four-year engagement, these officers may volunteer for another four years, all of which will count for gratuity at the same rate. During this period they may be considered for permanent commissions in the Navy.
I should emphasise, of course, that this scheme is in addition to the existing arrangement whereby men between 17 years 4 months and 24 years may apply for a short-service commission of eight years at Regular rates of pay, with a gratuity on completion of £1,500. There will be similar opportunities for permanent commissions for these officers. These engagements carry varying periods of Reserve liability, up to seven years. The shortage of air crew is a most serious problem. In addition to permanent officers who specialise in flying, we shall now have two short-service schemes—the new four-year scheme for National Service men. with the option to extend it to eight years: and the existing eight-year scheme for all young men between 17 years 4 months avid 24. The House can be assured that we shall never rest until we have overcome the shortage.
LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, while thanking His Majesty's Government for their reply, which I am sure will be welcomed on all sides of the House, I should like to ask whether care will he taken to see that some assistance is given to these young men to obtain positions in civil employment when they complete their short-service commissions. I feel sure that if this assistance can be assured there will be no difficulty in increasing the number of candidates for short-service commissions.
LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, I think there is a great deal in what the noble Lord has said. I can assure him that the whole matter is under consideration at the present time.
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, arising out of that answer, can the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, say whether a pilot who does not volunteer for extended service is able to reach operational flying standard during his National Service period?
LORD PAKENHAM: It takes about two years, I understand, to become a pilot and a little less to become an observer.

TORQUAY CONFERENCE ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
2.42 p.m.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE rose to call attention to the results of the recent Torquay Conference of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise to move the Motion which stands in my name on the Order Paper. The Torquay Conference represents one more milestone on the rather tortuous road of international commercial relationships which we have been following for the past five or six years. The aim of this Conference was to free world trade from shackles and restrictions, but I very much doubt whether the Government's eventual aim of restoration of world multilateral trade will be found along the road on which the Government have been taking this country for the past five or six years. The general assessment, according to Press reports, of the Torquay Conference, is that it has been a failure, except, perhaps, from the point of view of the landladies and shopkeepers of Torquay, who I understand have enjoyed an unexpected winter season. The general assessment of failure is because of the small number and the small value of the tariff bargains that have been made.
I do not wish to weary your Lordships with many figures, but in deploying this case I must try to give a picture showing how small are the results in relation to our total trade. Out of a total import and export trade to the broad value of £4,900,000,000 a year, we have, as a result of the Torquay Conference, undertaken to reduce rates on imports valued at just over £4,000,000, and we have undertaken not to increase rates on imports valued at approximately £3,500,000

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On the other hand, this country has obtained concessions on imports into Europe, South America, the Philippines and Turkey, which are valued at just over £18,000,000. I give your Lordships these figures to show the small results in relation to the total of this country's trade. As regards inter-Commonwealth Preference, United Kingdom preference on imports has been reduced in one case only that of dried figs. It is true that Commonwealth countries have agreed to this reduction of Imperial Preference, because it so happens that they do not send any dried figs into this country. Preference reductions on imports to Commonwealth countries from this country affect some £7,000.000 worth of trade. It is satisfactory that in the Torquay Conference the Government have shown their assessment of the high value which they place on Imperial Preference by refusing, during the negotiations, to go more than a very limited distance towards reduction and elimination. This view of the value of Imperial Preference has been confirmed by the right honourable gentleman, Sir Hartley Shawcross, the President of the Board of Trade, in a speech which he made recently at the function of the Federation of Empire Chambers of Commerce over which my noble friend Lord Llewellin presided.
I submit that the most outstanding feature of the Torquay Conference is the failure of this country and the United States to reach any agreement whereby substantial reductions in, or the elimination of, Commonwealth preferences were to be bargained against United States tariff concessions. The reasons for such limited bargains are not difficult to deduce. They are threefold. First, there is a limit to the extent to which any country is prepared to sacrifice the protective value of a tariff imposed for the maintenance of its own standard of life, and there is a limit to the extent to which any country will sacrifice the revenue which it gains by a tariff. Secondly, during the past few years we have seen a genuine effort by all countries to get rid of the system of import licences, embargoes, quantitative restrictions and quotas. As these practices are progressively got rid of, the importance of tariffs becomes increasingly enhanced. Except in the minds of a few dreamers of a free trade world, and in the minds, perhaps,
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of some members of the Liberal Party who still cling to the doctrine of pure Free Trade, I believe that tariffs are now accepted in a trading area containing, on the one hand, a highly industrialised United States and, on the other, the rising competition in world trade from a revived Orient. While the wide inequalities in industrial capacity and the wide variations in the standard of living of the workers producing the same articles under widely different conditions continue to exist in various communities, the nations of the world are justified in taking such steps as they consider necessary to put themselves on an equal level of opportunity. That is what this country has been doing, and what other countries have been doing. It would be foolish not to admit that tariffs can be, and at times are, abused but the fact that one man gets drunk is not sufficient justification for the abolition of alcohol.
The third and most cogent reason for the small results at Torquay is the illogical working of what is termed the most-favoured-nation clause—the principle of non-discrimination. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade lays down in these rather ponderous words:
"Any advantage, favour, preference or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties."
The principle of non-discrimination has been accepted in this country, in the idealistic belief that it will assist in the revival of world multilateral trade. In fact, it has had quite the contrary result. Noble Lords will excuse my going back to those gentlemen, A and B, whom we all knew in our school days, when we were familiar with the number of times A ran much faster than B, or lifted a weight heavier than B, or performed some other athletic feat to the disadvantage of B. If countries A and B find it profitable to exchange concessions of approximately equal value, the most-favoured-nation clause insists that at the same time both A and B shall be compelled to extend these concessions to all other countries who are signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Nations, like humans, have their failings, and one of the failings of the

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individual is a dislike of giving something for nothing. The result is that country A hesitates to give a concession to country 13, because at the same time it must give it to other countries who are offering nothing in return. It is only natural that A and B should sit back and wait, calculating that if they wait long enough C and D will come to some arrangement advantageous to themselves, and that the concessions which they have tried to achieve will fall into the laps of A and B without their having to give anything is return. The Economist summed up the Conference very well on April 21, it these words:
"Torquay will have shown, not for the first time, that the most-favoured-nation clause can in certain circumstances be an impediment to tariff reductions."
That is the third reason why Torquay has failed to come to any comprehensive agreement.
The Havana Charter is dead, unratified and unmourned, but its mantle has fallen on this organisation, the G.A.T.T., whose signatories have been persuaded to put into effect all its main principles, including the objectionable provisions for non-discrimination. I must be fair in debate, and it is true to say that the protocol of G.A.T.T. provides that it shall continue for three years and can be renounced by any party on sixty days' notice. Meanwhile, these non-discriminatory provisions are having serious effects in throttling the prospect of valuable developments in inter-Commonwealth and Colonial Empire trade. I cannot reconcile the acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the principle of non-discrimination involved by the signing of G.A.T.T. and the tributes paid to the principle of Imperial Preference by the President of the Board of Trade and other Ministers. They seem to me to contradict each other.
The Government deny that the principle of Imperial Preference has been compromised. On looking up the debate on the American Loan in your Lordships' House, I saw that the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack said to my noble friend Lord Swinton:
" ! I confess I asked about tariffs and preferences, and I was told what Mr. Winston Churchill said, I think, in another place, that so far as he could see on that matter we were completely free."
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I am sure the noble and learned Viscount will be glad to hear those words repeated, because they support the contention of the Government that the principle of Imperial Preference has not been compromised. Nevertheless, sometimes the Government seem to be riding two horses, because the aim of the eventual elimination of Imperial Preference has been accepted by His Majesty's Government as the goal for their economic policy. Here I quote the words of the Prime Minister in another place, in the same debate—the same debate, the same subject but different expressions. He said:
"The elimination of all preferences would he such a step as would require a most substantial and widespread reduction of the tariffs and other trade barriers by a large number of countries. Thus it is recognised that the degree to which the final objectives can be reached at the initial stage can only appear at the negotiations themselves and as the result of a mutually advantageous settlement."
Therefore, I would submit that the eventual goal of this Government, if they can obtain concessions which they consider worth while, is the elimination of Imperial Preference.
I speak for myself, but on Imperial Preference I can think of no trading advantage or concessions which would compensate in value for the loss of this expression in terms of trade of a brother-hood of spirit and a community of interest which has carried the united British Commonwealth and Empire through the force of two world conflagrations. If you are illumined by the broad conception of the utter need to preserve the British Commonwealth and Empire, you will feel as I do. But if, as I fear, followers of Socialist beliefs feel no such urge in the international world they dream of and hope for, then they cart make out a case for the eventual elimination of Imperial Preference. That is where many of us on this side of the House part company with the Government, in our evaluation of the principles as being a symbol of something far greater than a mere expression of trade.
I should like to give your Lordships one example of the ill-effects of this principle of non-discrimination, in relation to the recent Pakistan Agreement. I must make it clear that I do not criticise the Pakistan Agreement; I believe that the Minister who conducted the negotiation

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did extremely well, and made the best bargain possible within the boundaries which His Majesty's Government have set up by the principle of non-discrimination. A new Agreement with Pakistan was necessary, now that India is divided into two, and we and Pakistan conferred. Investigations showed that the United Kingdom were receiving preference on exports from us into Pakistan to the value of £16,000.000; on the other hand. Pakistan was receiving preference on her goods entering United Kingdom to the value only of about £4,000,000. Naturally, Pakistan felt that there should be some redress of balance. Normally, the two parties would have got together and hammered out a successful bilateral agreement. But not so in the case of the principle of non-discrimination and the G.A.T.T., which forbids any party giving a preference unless it is given to all and sundry. The value, therefore, evaporated, because we could not give a new preference, or increase an existing preference, to Pakistan, or she to us, without giving it to Germany, Italy and Nicaragua. The Manchester Guardian, not a paper usually favourable to a tariff policy, summarised this position on April 3 as follows:
"The preference margin enjoyed by British cotton piece goods is reduced in the case of grey cloth from 45 per cent. to 5 per cent.; for printed cloth from 42 per cent. to 6 per cent. The margin for rayon fabrics drops from 30 to 10 per cent—Preferences for cotton, rayon, or mixed household textiles are wiped out."
At the moment, no great hardship is felt in this country because of these reductions: there is a sellers' market, and the manufacturers can sell all they can produce. But one day competition will again be acute, and we shall not be able to negotiate an Agreement with Pakistan for a readjustment of the surrendered preferences. What we shall have to do will be to go cap in hand to the contracting parties of the G.A.T.T. and ask for permission to increase preferences. As the other nations are all our creditors, it is not likely that we shall very readily be given permission to do so. One can envisage future Japanese competition in the Pakistan market, and its effect upon those industries in this country where the preference has been wiped out.
I should like in this connection to ask the noble Lord who is to reply one question, of which I have given him private
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notice. Have we the right under G.A.T.T. to increase or create preferences in respect of trade passing between Great Britain and the Colonies, including Southern Rhodesia and Tanganyika, without asking permission of the contracting parties? And, if we have that right, is it the Government's intention to make use of it should circumstances warrant? I believe that the need for freedom to increase inter-Commonwealth trade and multilateral trade within the sterling area is becoming increasingly important, because I feel convinced that our future dollar difficulties are far from solved. As your Lordships know, at the moment there is a great demand for raw materials and an intense industrial activity, due to world rearmament on both sides of the Atlantic. The dollar deficiency picture of 1947–48 has been drastically altered to our advantage by that demand for raw materials and rearmament activity. But at some time in the future rearmament has got to slow down; the outcome must be either war or a peaceful world settlement, because national incomes cannot indefinitely carry the present load of armament production. I believe that when this situation comes about the present industrial disequilibrium will be intensified, and once again we shall face the dollar shortage of 1946-47 in our trading accounts with the United States, if we are then still dependent on dollar imports for food and essential raw materials. And when that occurs, I believe that the threat to the standard of living of the British working man will be just as great as it was in 1946–47 and 1947–48.
In support of that argument I should like to refer to what Mr. Paul Hoffman said some time ago. He gave the warning not to celebrate too soon the closing of the dollar gap, because it was due to abnormal circumstances; and, further, that permanently to balance our account we needed to double the value of our 1949 manufactured exports to the dollar area. I beg leave to doubt the wisdom of this, or the ability to achieve this end by a policy based on the export by 50,000,000 people to a country of 150,000,000 people of permanently manufactured goods, most of which the 150,000,000 people can make just as well themselves. Surely, it is better to concentrate everything on a policy of

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obtaining all the dollars we can by the encouragement of dollar trade, while aiming primarily at developing the raw material resources needed by us and the rest of the sterling area. We should develop inter-Imperial trade, protected by a system of Imperial Preference and, secondly, a multilateral sterling trading area within Western Europe. I submit that those two primary objectives—the development of the raw materials and the development of the multilateral sterling trade area—are wiser aims than a policy based on a belief that the revival of world multilateral trade is just round the corner.
The President of the Board of Trade said recently that the British Commonwealth could not be a self-supporting economic unit, but that we could at any rate go a long way towards that by developing the sterling area unit, having regard to our advantageous world position in raw material resources. The Commonwealth and Colonial Empire has a commanding position, as shown by the following percentages of the world's supply which are produced from the British Commonwealth: nickel, 70 per cent,; gold, 61 per cent,; jute, 94 per cent.; rubber, 63 per cent.; ground-nuts, 62 per cent. and tea, 83 per cent. I give your Lordships some of the main world raw material requirements and the percentages of the production within the Commonwealth in relation to total world production. The Torquay Conference seems to try to guard the principle of Imperial Preference, yet it still accepts the limiting restrictions on Empire development, apparently in the mistaken belief that it is possible to achieve this restoration of world multilateral trade. The President of the Board of Trade said proudly that the percentage, of Commonwealth trade vis-á-vis foreign trade was higher than before the war. That is true, but he forgot to say that the war drove the trade upwards, and that ever since the war there has been a steady decline in the amount of that trade.
I should like to make one thing clear. I am not advocating isolation, or detracting from the need for the greatest amount of world trade; but I believe that past experience proves that the development of inter-Imperial trade of itself brings about a higher degree of activity in world international trade. The United States of America have every right to conduct their fiscal policy in any way which suits them
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best. We would no more deny them the use of tariffs than they should deny us the use of preference to the Commonwealth and Colonial Empire. If the Government's policy seems—as it does to me—hesitant and contradictory, the policy of the Party of which I am a member is firm and positive. For the record I should like to reiterate one section of the Declaration of Imperial Policy, which was published recently. It says:
"The Conservative Party has never supported any decision taken at Geneva, Havana or elsewhere, inimical to the general system of Imperial Preference, and we shall take all steps in our power to ensure that in the future our liberty in this direction is not impaired."
We reserve the right to restore that conception of ourselves that always prevailed before—the right to regard the British Commonwealth and Empire as an entity, however loosely knit together. This means that we pledge ourselves to re-examine from the start the working of the most-favoured-nation clause, and to see where it is harmful to inter-Imperial trade. While we shall keep all our Treaty obligations, as any successor Government are bound to do, we shall renounce any part of the Agreements which have been reached successively at Geneva, Havana, Annecy and now at Torquay, which may be prejudicial to Empire trade. There is no hesitation on our side where we stand in this matter of Empire Trade. We are for it. In conclusion, I would ask the Government where they stand on proposals for denouncing non-discriminatory provisions which hamper both Commonwealth and sterling area cohesion and expansion.
3.5 p.m.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, I cannot let this opportunity go by without saying a few words in support of my noble friend's Motion, because I feel, as do many others, that these international conferences on tariffs have been most inopportune. When one considers the systems of world trade, one can divide them into four. There is, first of all, the barter system, about which I will not worry. There is also the old free trade, which most people regard as being as dead as the dodo. Then there is the system we had before the war, which was tariffs with or without preference. Next there is this fourth system which sprang up during the war and which may be called, briefly, licensing. To-day, over the

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whole world the rule seems to be licensing, and the exception the ordinary tariff, outside the British Empire, which, so far as I know, is the largest area of free-ish trade in the world.
Why is this state of affairs continuing? There are several factors at work. First of all, there are the primary producing countries, who as a result of two world wars have greater urge than ever to be industrially self-sufficient. They have seen their imports cut off in two separate wars. The idea seems to be spreading in the primary-producing newer countries that the machine-minder is a more noble human animal than the man who tills the soil. Curiously enough, this is at a time when, in the older countries, precisely the reverse idea is beginning to prevail. Another factor is the new doctrine which has sprung up of essential and nonessential goods. This doctrine has sprung up all over the world, and the man who decides what is essential and what is not essential is the man who corresponds to our "gentleman in Whitehall." In these countries everything connected with industry is called essential, but the alarm clock which wakes up the worker in the morning, the garments he puts on to go to work, and the bottle with which he seeks oblivion from his toil in the evening, are all regarded as non-essential, and probably are completely barred as imports. It is a world-wide disease. The planners are rampant everywhere.
There is another factor, and that is the factor of fear. I do not think I exaggerate when I say that, outside these islands, the majority of the human race believes that we are on the brink of a Third World War; and those who have any money want to achieve safety for that money. It is well known that wherever goods can flow, it is not impossible for money to flow also, and only too often licensing systems are kept in being in order to prevent the flow of money by preventing the flow of goods. Lord Keynes pointed out that no trade balance can ever be relied upon to withstand the impact of heavy movements of money. Now there is abroad in the world a still further new idea, which is definitely post-war, so far as I am aware, and it has been bred by the sellers' market for raw materials. The old game in international trade used to be competitive devaluation of exchanges. To-day the
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position is almost the reverse: the primary producers able to exploit the shortage of the few essential goods are tending to keep their exchanges at a much higher level than their price level would justify. In order to do this, they have to prohibit or restrict enormously the import of consumer goods which otherwise would bring down drastically their price level. At the same time, by these artificial exchange rates they are able to buy cheaply the capital that they require for further industrialisation. It is the old story: they will take our tinplate and our machinery and stop our cloth and our whisky; meanwhile, we have to pay the price on our food and raw materials.
Now, my Lords, the trade world is in a most extraordinary mess. Instead of world trade being left to the merchants of the world to handle, it is in the hands of bands of Government experts, who travel about all over the world and meet together and play their little games of loaded statistics. Will this situation persist? Some people clearly think it will not—otherwise these conferences would never have been permitted. Moreover, I see that fairly recently the International Monetary Fund has issued a warning to its members that by March, 1952, they must eliminate or substantially modify any such restrictions and other forms of discrimination against trade. The majority of the members of that international body will, I suspect, take no notice of the warning at all; and that leads me to believe that the International Monetary Fund will probably pick on us. It is rather like the situation arising when a young and timid policeman, or a prefect in a school, not too sure of himself, finds himself called upon to quell some disturbance. Instead of plunging into the midst, he tends to skirt about on the outside, and to pick on one of the more inoffensive bystanders. I am sorry to say that, so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we have now descended into the category of the more inoffensive bystanders in the world to-day. Nevertheless, I hope that His Majesty's Government will give a pretty stiff reply when they get this intimation.
The United States have, I understand, drafted a Resolution to lay before the United Nations Latin-American Committee, which I believe is now sitting, asking them to study fiscal methods of stimulating investment in the under-developed

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areas. While it may be necessary for the New World to study this question, we in the Old World have studied it already—and Imperial Preference is our method. And it is working very well. The British Empire is the largest area with the freest trade that I know in the world to-day. I do not believe there is any hope of reverting to the pre-war system of worldwide trade, controlled merely by tariffs, until the basic causes of the prohibitions and licences which I have enumerated have been removed. In many countries there is no hope of arresting a heavy and persistent inflation. In that case, fixed exchanges and the removal of licensing are quite incompatible as yet. The International Monetary Fund stands for both those two objects: which is it going to go for?
Then again, what of Japan? Anybody who was engaged in world trade before the war knows that the impact of their rice-eating industrialisation upon the meat-eating and solid house-dwelling industrialisation of Europe was then an unsolved problem. If there had been no war I do not know what would have happened. In my humble view, it is quite impossible to admit Japan into any system whereby goods are exchanged freely subject only to tariffs. Before we talk of going back to any system ruled only by tariffs, we must certainly enlarge the area of trade where total prohibition does not exist to-day, and abolish the factors leading to that total prohibition. Let the International Monetary Fund plunge into the mêleée and pluck out the real culprits by the collar, even if they are rather rough people, instead of looking for inoffensive parties round the edge. We must go on ever widening the area over which Empire trade becomes greater and freer, and increasing rather than decreasing Imperial Preferences. That is the principal method by which we have chosen to develop what are at present the under-developed parts of the world for which we have a responsibility. Other people may choose other methods for the parts of the world for which they have responsibility; but our method has served us well in the past, and we do not think it has served the world badly. I beg to support the Motion.
3.19 p.m.
LORD FAIRFAX OF CAMERON: My Lords, the Torquay Conference went on for six months, and in that time the
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results achieved were very small indeed. It is not specifically to those results that I wish to refer, but rather to the principle behind those discussions for the reduction of tariffs and the continuation of the freeze on preferential rates. His Majesty's Government have said on more than one occasion that they are in favour of Commonwealth trade—and I am sure they are sincere in those statements. After six years of power, they have now learnt the value of Empire trade, and of the many valuable raw materials and other things with which it can supply us. But I cannot reconcile their expressed views in favour of Empire trade with their action in continuing those discussions to reduce the rates of tariffs and also of Imperial priorities. Both these tariffs and Imperial priorities intimately concern Empire trade, and any reduction in, them can only have an adverse effect upon it. As the noble Lord who moved this Motion has already said, the artificial obstacles to trade, such as licences and quotas, are steadily being brought down—and a great many of them have already been removed—so that tariffs and preferences will inevitably come more and more into their own, and will be far more effective. They are no longer the academic thing that they were immediately after the war, and any reduction in them must have a serious effect upon trade, and particularly for the smaller countries of the Commonwealth.
I realise that it is not easy for His Majesty's Government to reverse the position they are in, so far as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is concerned, because their position there is somewhat heavily compromised. We all know how it is that we have come to be so compromised through the conditions attached to the American Loan. But, in spite of the fact that it would be difficult to reverse that position, we cannot get away from the fact that we have surrendered a great part of the rights of control over our foreign arid Commonwealth trade; and, like convertibility, that is something that we just cannot afford. It is something which, so far as we are concerned, cannot go on for ever; and it will not. We had to give up convertibility pretty quickly, and we shall probably have to give up this Agreement as well. Both those things have sprung from the same cause. But this is of real detriment to the trade and the cohesion of the

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Empire, and I believe that, knowing that fact, it is thoroughly unrealistic to continue with it.
In my view, this country will have to make a very big decision in the near future. By going on as we are going now, and have done since the war and at Torquay—in effect throwing away a large part of our Empire trade, and separating ourselves from the Commonwealth because we are in effect, so far as trade is concerned, treating Commonwealth countries just like any foreign country—we are becoming more and more like any small European Power, and more and more dependent upon the United States of America. Just because, as another Lord has already said this afternoon, we happen to have favourable dollar balances at the moment, we do not perhaps feel the pinch quite so hard in that respect. But that state of affairs will not continue for ever. We shall find out our weakness. We are certainly no longer in a position where we can attract the confidence that is due to us as leaders of the great Commonwealth and Empire. If we go on as now, as at Torquay and Geneva and other Conferences, it means that we are taking the easy way out, throwing up our responsibility as a great Imperial Power, with responsibilities beyond the seas to all sorts of countries and peoples. We are throwing away that responsibility, and we shall be taking the course that it would be all right for some small countries to take, countries with no responsibilities outside their own territories. But that is not the course for us, because we did not start off in the position in which they started. We have an Empire for which we are responsible, and at the moment we are not taking up those responsibilities in the way we should.
The other course which I believe is open to us is to regain our right to have an Empire trade policy, which at the moment, in point of fact, we have not got. We must have a policy which we can control ourselves, in consultation with other countries of the Empire, and not something that is at the discretion of about thirty or forty completely foreign countries, who do not in any way share the responsibilities that we have. Without such a unifying force as an Imperial policy—an Empire trade policy one might call it—of this sort, the Commonwealth countries must surely drift more and more
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apart. Either the countries of the Commonwealth will look for foreign aid, and to leadership from foreign countries, instead of from us, or else, as some of them are already doing, they will turn to Communism.
I believe now that I can give a case which will in some way illustrate this point. One of the biggest disappointments of Torquay was the way in which Canada gave up a good many preferences, though I have not been able to get hold of the details, as I do not think they are yet available. Canada moves further and further into the orbit of the United States. That, of course, is not entirely a result of this Torquay Conference, or of the Geneva Conference. I believe—and this view, I know, is shared by a good many other people—that her action is a result of the treatment which she has received from the United Kingdom since the war. We have treated her with considerable indifference, and with little regard for the great help she gave us during the war. We have not treated her in any way as an Empire country. I should like to give a few figures to illustrate our indifference to trading with Canada—something which is quite inexcusable—and so allowing her to drift away from us. I would assure the noble Lord, Lord Hawke, that these statistics are not "loaded." Between 1945 and 1950, the United Kingdom imports from Canada dropped by £20,600,000, whereas in that same period Canada took from us £106,000,000 more in goods than she had taken before. Her imports from us went up something like five times. If that points to one thing, surely it is to a reluctance on our part to trade with Canada and certainly not to any reluctance on her part to trade with us.
It would be interesting to compare those figures with the trade between Canada and the United States. Since 1947, Canadian exports to the United States have gone up by 900,000,000 dollars—that is to say, they have doubled. Her exports to us, as I say, have gone down by £20,000,000. That is a rather striking comparison. I know that His Majesty's Government say that a great part of the responsibility for the falling off to such an extent of trade with Canada has been due to our own shortage of dollars. But the Canadians did not want only dollars in return for goods they could send us: they wanted other things—things that we can provide,

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most particularly iron and steel goods. It is interesting to see that since the war we have not sent to Canada all the iron and steel goods that we could have done. I have some figures here which will reveal clearly that we did not. Before the war, in 1938, we sent to Canada 88,000 tons of steel goods. In 1947, we sent only 23,000 tons and in 1948 we sent only 41,000 tons—that is, half the amount of steel goods that we had sent in 1938.
That was not the case with other countries, European countries, to whom we exported steel goods. The figures we sent to them did not drop after the war, they rose. To Finland in 1938 we sent 17,000 tons of steel goods, and in 1948 we sent 78,D00 tons—that is to say, the amount went up by four and a half times. To Sweden in 1938 we sent 12,000 tons of steel goods, and in 1948 we sent 89,000 tons that is, an increase of seven times—and Sweden was a neutral country during the war. But, worst of all, in 1938 we sent 4,000 tons of steel goods to Russia and in 1948 we sent 21,000 tons—or an increase of five times. Yet to Canada our exports of steel goods dropped by half. We cannot say that the dollar situation caused a drop in trade between Canada and the United States, and if Canada is moving away from this country we have only ourselves to blame.
Now, my Lords, His Majesty's Government have undoubtedly become more converted to the value of Commonwealth trade. Unfortunately, the damage is already done, and it will take many years to restore confidence in this country, and also to restore the flow of trade between the various parts of the Commonwealth most seriously affected—notably Canada. I believe that if the Commonwealth is to stay together we must have a wholehearted Empire policy, and not be led away from that aim by any such outside influences as the various promoters of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, because without that policy our Commonwealth is just going to split apart. A policy of Empire priorities is, to my mind, in no way exclusive, and will not cut off us or any part of the Empire from the rest of the world.
Such a policy is not anti-American, as it is so often thought to be. In fact, the worst blow the Americans could
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receive from us would be the splitting up of the Empire, so that they would have to take care of the pieces. They already have enough burdens on their shoulders, without any more. We are in a position to understand the mechanics of our Commonwealth in a way that no other foreign country, and certainly not the Americans, can do, because, after all, we have always been much more closely concerned with it than anyone else. We know that it can exist only on a basis of preferential trade in some directions. But there are different kinds of preferences, and it is only well-meaning ignorance which makes people try to persuade us to throw over our tariffs in what they believe to be the interests of free world trade. But it does not free world trade as far as we are concerned it makes it much more difficult.
I do not believe that words are enough. It is not enough for His Majesty's Government to say that they believe in Empire trade, and think that no further action is required. There must be a policy for the promotion of Empire trade, and no policy to that end can possibly work so long as there still exists the "freeze" of preferential rates. I do not suggest that His Majesty's Government should contract out of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. That would indeed be a very invidious situation for them. But as the Torquay results show, most of the nations which are now party to the General Agreement seem to be just about at the end of the concessions they can make. They do not seem to have many more up their sleeve. Surely now is the time to make a change in the terms of the General Agreement. I believe that there is to be another meeting of the parties to this Agreement fairly soon, and instead of His Majesty's Government going there with one or two more concessions to make, let them take that opportunity of altering things a bit so as to restore to us the freedom of trade that we have lost.
3.35 p.m.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords, think this debate has been a very useful one—particularly useful in that in his opening speech my noble friend Lord Balfour managed to see the wood through the trees, and tried to put the details in their true perspective and against the real background. I expect I express the

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view of many of your Lordships in saying that I find it extraordinarily difficult to follow the results of these various conferences. They go on for a very long time, they produce voluminous reports, and they do not seem to lead to any great results. I am not sure that that is always a bad thing: it is much better to have no result at all than to have a bad result. I do not think it is very profitable to discuss these conferences piecemeal. What we should really like to know today from the noble Lord, who can always be very clear when he has something to be clear about, is: Have the Government got a policy; what is that policy; and does their action conform to it?
In trade policy, as in foreign policy or defence, it is necessary to have a long term plan. I should have thought that was the one thing which the planners ought to have. It is very important that short-term action should not compromise the plan. We should all agree that we have a great interest—I suppose a greater interest than any country—in promoting world trade, but practical realities do not always conform to academic theory. Countries increase their mutual trade when they are individually prosperous. If they are not individually prosperous, they do not increase their mutual trade. That applies equally to great and small countries. When the slump came in the United States in 1929 its external trade was cut as by a knife. Not only does the willingness of countries to do mutual trade depend upon their internal prosperity, but they will always do what they think necessary in their economic defence.
I must say that I think it is unwise today to try to make countries accept treaties or obligations which they may not be able to carry out. It is much better to have obligations which countries can carry out, and where they will go a little further than the bond because there is good will behind it, than to have a bond from which they will always be trying to escape. If you try to make the obligations too strict, you will find that the treaties will be denounced or that use will he made of "escape" clauses; that people will insist on "escape" clauses being put into the treaties; and then, quite unevenly as between one country and another, use will be made of those "escape" clauses which, when they are used, and, above all, when
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they are used unevenly, may make a treaty almost valueless. That leads me to say that I believe—and I am not talking theory now—that it is profoundly unwise to try to prevent two or three countries from making mutual arrangements, beneficial to them all, unless they extend them to the whole world.
I am very glad my noble friend raised the question of the most-favoured-nation clause. That is perhaps the supreme example where theory and practice conflict. I was four times President of the Board of Trade and I had a good deal of experience of it. I came into a tradition where the most-favoured-nation clause was almost the Ark of the Covenant. Well, it is an ark in which I have progressively lost faith, and a covenant which I find more honoured in the breach than in the observance. One must use decent language in dealing with these international obligations, but I was going to say that a country "works a racket"; at any rate it performs a successful manoeuvre. Your Lordships may be familiar with the classical instance of a treaty made by Switzerland, I think, with Germany. The object of that treaty was, as between the two countries, to reduce the tariff on canned milk. Both countries had a most-favoured-nation treaty with the rest of the world, so that if the duty on canned milk was reduced by Germany for Switzerland, it had to extend all round the world. But they found a very ingenious way out of this, for it was arranged that the reduction in the duty was to be granted on canned milk the product of cows pastured at an altitude of more than 1,000 metres. The "M.F.N. "clause was, technically, left untouched, but the benefit extended to no one except the cows on the Alpine pastures.
The noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, was quite right in what he said in this connection; I have seen it happen over and over again that the "M.F.N." clause has prevented deals which would have benefited two or more countries, and by making both countries more prosperous would have enabled them to do more trade with the rest of the world. In the past we very wisely excluded Imperial Preference from the most-favoured-nation clause. I want to ask the noble Lord. Lord Lucas, this specific question. In my time, in all our commercial treaties when we put in a most-favoured-nation

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clause, it was provided that it should apply only to foreign countries. The word "foreign" was the governing word. This, while obliging us not to give a concession to one foreign country which we did not give to another, left us free to do what we pleased with preference, and grant preference within the Empire. I want to know whether that practice and that formula is still maintained.
Let me take an example from the past, which I think will not be contentious, to show how valueless "M.F.N." may be when looked at from another aspect. Before the First World War, there was in existence the old Austrian Empire of which I think Mr. Gladstone said that if it had not existed it would have had to be created. In those days there was a tariff running round the whole of the Austrian Empire. They could put up their tariff as high as they pleased against the rest of the world, and they did put it up pretty high. But we did a great deal of business with the Austrian Empire. Then came the First World War. After that war was over, the Austrian Empire was split up and whatever value the Peace Treaty may have had ethnologically, economically it was disastrous. Vienna, the capital, which with its expertise, its knowledge of banking and merchandise was capable of conducting the trade of a continent, was left without a country.
There was a desire in the countries concerned to draw closer together, and I believe that would have been the best thing which could have happened in the world economically. If it had happened it might well have saved some territorial disasters which afterwards occurred. Some of those disasters might never have happened if the old countries of the Austrian Empire had been allowed to draw together in a customs union, I pleaded for it at the time; I am not being wise after the event. But after the Empire was split up, each of those countries—there were five or six of them—had, as part of the Peace Treaty, a mostfavoured-nation agreement with the rest of the world. So, without the consent of all the world they could not make their customs union. It was a great pity. Certainly we did far less trade with those individual countries who could not put tariffs against us than we had done before with the Austrian Empire. Therefore I say that I do hope we shall stop making
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a fetish of "M.F.N." For my part I will support anybody who on good occasion "gives it the go by." It has ceased to be useful; it has almost ceased to be respectable.
I find this General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade a strange and illogical document. It brings in a large part of the Havana Charter which no one will ratify. The Government have been loyal to their word that they would not commit us to this awful thing without the approval of both Houses of Parliament, and I do not think it has their own approval now. A lot of the Havana Charter has been incorporated into our economic organisation by this General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and by Annecy and the rest of the Agreements. I must say that while we are bound by whatever treaty has been entered into, there is a time limit and there are also powers to get out of these things. Without committing us to what we should do, I say that we must hold ourselves free to get out of any entanglement which, on careful consideration, it is seen would be an impediment to us. One of the first things it would be wise to do would be to have an Imperial Economic Conference.
But is it not a very illogical document? If you read it, you find that customs unions are blessed, and groups of countries, large or small, are encouraged to make customs unions. I do not quarrel with that. I think you do more world trade as between large units. I have always thought so. But in customs unions, those within a union can increase or lower their tariffs against the whole world outside it. While blessing and encouraging customs unions, this odd document or collection of documents frowns upon the less rigid and less exclusive system of Imperial Preference. Exactly the same arguments which are used in favour of a customs union, which is a strict and comprehensive fence, can be used, and rightly used, in support of Imperial Preference. Therefore both customs unions and Imperial Preference ought to be equally commended.
This is not a case of theory. In fact, Imperial Preference has increased the trade of the Commonwealth and Empire with the rest of the world. If somebody says I put that too high, no one can challenge the statement that after we extended widely the whole range and scope and

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mutuality of Imperial Preference at Ottawa, not only did the internal trade within the Empire increase but the trade of the Empire with the world outside increased to an even greater extent. We must reserve our full freedom to grant and receive preferences. If we have lost it, we must be free to recover it. That is not only a vital Commonwealth interest; I believe I do not put it too high if I say it is a world interest as well, because I am sure it is only if the British Commonwealth and Empire is economically strong that it can play its full part in the economic and strategic defence of a free world.

PERSIA
3.52 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, may I take this opportunity of repeating to the House the Statement which has just been made in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs? It is as follows:
"In my statement to the House yesterday I mentioned briefly the demands with which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company delegation to Teheran had been presented, and I promised to take an early opportunity to inform the House of the subsequent course of events.
"When the Company's delegation met the Persian representatives yesterday evening, it made proposals which were designed not only to meet the Persian Government's present and urgent need for funds, but also to indicate an arrangement which would maintain the efficiency of the industry and be consistent with the principle of nationalisation. The terms of the aide-mémoire in which these proposals were set out have been published, but it may be as well for me to summarise them here. Briefly, the content of the aide-mémoire was:

(1) That the Company was prepared to place at the Persian Govment's disposal £10,000,000 as an advance against any sum which might become due to the Persian Government as a result of any eventual agreement, on the understanding that the Persian Government would undertake not to interfere
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with the Company's operations while discussions were proceeding;

(2) That the Company would, moreover, pay to the Persian Government £3,000,000 a month, from July onwards, during such time as might elapse until an agreement had been reached;

(3) That the Company proposes, as a possible basis for an agreement, that the Persian assets of the Company might be vested in a Persian National Oil Company and, in consideration of such vesting, the National Oil Company should grant the use of those assets to a new company to be established by the AngloIranian Oil Company. The new company would have a number of Persian directors on its board, and would operate on behalf of the Persian National Oil Company. At the same time, the distribution of oil products within Persia itself would be transferred to an entirely Persian-owned and operated company on favourable terms as regards the transfer of existing assets.

(4) As regards the Persian demand, made at the meeting on June 14, that the Company should hand to the Persian Government the total proceeds, less expenses, from the sales of Persian oil, from which 25 per cent. would be deposited in a mutually agreed bank against any claims which the Company might prefer, this was not acceptable. The point was made that the delegation had gone to Teheran for discussions, and regarded it as unjustifiable that the Persian Government should put forward a demand of this kind before discussions had even started. Moreover, the delegation was confident that when it had had opportunity to explain in more detail the complicated machinery of the Company's business, it would be plain to the Persian representatives that their demand would be neither commercially possible nor acceptable to any company.

"It seems hardly necessary for me to expatiate on that offer. Money for present needs is there, acceptance of the principle of nationalisation is there, and an obvious foundation for fruitful

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partnership is there. His Majesty's Government are convinced that all fair-minded opinion will regard the Company's proposals as eminently reasonable.
"Unhappily, however, the Persian delegates required only half an hour in which to arrive at a contrary opinion. They declared that the Company's proposals conflicted with the new Persian nationalisation law and expressed stir-prise that the Company's delegation should have found need to ask for a postponement of the meeting arranged for June 17 in order merely to formulate such proposals. The Persian delegates concluded by saying that they had no authority to deviate from the letter of the nationalisation law, and in consequence considered discussions closed.
"The leader of the Company's delegation thereupon replied that, even if the proposals were not consistent with the letter of the law (which had never been agreed to by the Company), they were consistent with the principle of nationalisation and would undoubtedly fit in with the liberal interpretation of the law; that it was apparent that the Persian representatives were expecting complete capitulation to their demands without discussion; that he noted with regret the Persian decision to break off the talks; and that he was left with no alternative than to communicate that decision to London and ask for instructions.
"His Majesty's Government have learned of this development with concern, not only for the future of the Anglo-lranian Oil Company and the free world supplies of oil but also for the future of Persia itself. In the area of the Company's concession the natural wealth of the region has been made available to the Persian people. Their labour, combined with the capital expenditure and the technical and organising skill of the Company's engineers and administrators, has built up a vast industry. Thanks to this fruitful co-operation, the Persian Government have enjoyed a consistent and growing source of income, which the Company itself offered in 1948 greatly to increase. Thanks also to this industry, tens of thousands of Persian
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workers at present enjoy housing conditions, educational facilities and health and other social services on a scale which the working people of Persia enjoy in no other part of the country. These are facts which are attested in the Report of the International Labour Office entitled Labour Conditions in the Oil Industry in Iran, published last year in Geneva. The Company has made, and is making, an immense contribution towards raising the standard of living in Persia. Indeed, the seven-year development plan on which such high hopes had been;placed, but which, unhappily, appears to have been abandoned, had as an essential factor the receipt by the Persian Government of increased royaltie— freely offered by the Company—from the production and sale of oil. It seems that the present Persian Government are blind to the needs of their country.
"Instructions are being sent to the Company's delegation to return to this country. Meanwhile, we propose to follow up the application we have already made to the Hague Court by a further application for an indication of provisional measures to preserve the rights of the United Kingdom, pending a decision on the merits of the case. We for our part still desire to see a stable, independent and prosperous Persia. Our feelings in that regard have not changed and will not change.
"The difficulties that have arisen in Teheran must not for a moment obscure the difficulties of our people in Abadan and the oilfields. I want them all to know that we at home realise the strain and burden of anxiety under which they have for long enough been working. Riots, abuse, misrepresentations, and uncertainty about the future have made conditions most difficult for them. They, better than we, will know that it needs but slight deviation from their high technical skill to cause a mistake which could lead to irreparable damage and most serious disaster to life and not only within the installations for which they are responsible, but perhaps throughout the neighbouring townships. While our people are there and responsible for operations, I am confident that no such mistake will be made, and that they will continue to do their duty.

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"As I have repeatedly informed the House, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to stand by idle if the lives of British nationals are in jeopardy. It is the responsibility of the Persian Government to see to it that law and order are maintained, and that all within the frontiers of Persia are protected from violence. If, however, that responsibility were not met, it would equally be the right and the duty of His Majesty's Government to extend protection to their own nationals."
4.2 p.m.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords, I am sure the whole House will be grateful to the Lord Chancellor for that full Statement. We should all agree, from what we have read to-day, and from what we have now heard, that the offer made by the Company's delegation was very beneficial to Persia and should have been treated as a fruitful basis for further discussion. We should all wish to be associated with the message of sympathy and good will which formed part of the Statement, and which will go out from both Houses of Parliament, and from the whole country, to our fellow countrymen in Persia who are doing, and will continue to do, their duty, however difficult and onerous their task may be. All noble Lords on these Benches—and I am sure I speak also for noble Lords in all quarters of the House—wish to associate ourselves, without any qualifications whatsoever, in the firm declaration with which the noble and learned Viscount's Statement closed: that we
"are not prepared to stand by idle if the lives of British nationals are in jeopardy. It is the responsibility of the Persian Government to see to it that law and order are maintained, and that all within the frontiers of Persia are protected from violence. If, however, that responsibility were not met, it would equally be the right and the duty of His Majesty's Government to extend protection to their own nationals."
I should like, on behalf of all those who sit with me, to assure the Government that in that firm, wise and right Statement they have our fullest support.
4.5 p.m.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, your Lordships' House will be grateful to His Majesty's Government for the steps they have taken to keep Parliament and the country fully informed of the course
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of events in Persia. The Statement which we have just heard, and especially the concluding sentences in it, leave no doubt as to the gravity of the position. We earnestly hope that the Persian Government will keep under control a situation which they themselves, and they alone, have created. If, unhappily, it should prove to be otherwise, then the course which His Majesty's Government have announced that they will take is the only one possible, and will therefore have the approval and support of the nation, and, we trust, of the whole Commonwealth.

TORQUAY CONFERENCE ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
4.6 p.m.
Debate resumed.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH): My Lords, in resuming the debate on the Motion standing on the Order Paper in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, I should like to echo the words of the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, in saying how grateful we are to the noble Lord, not only for tabling the Motion but also, if he will allow me to say so, for making one of the most constructive speeches that I have heard from the other side of the House for some time. If I congratulate the noble Lord, I hope that he will not think that I have any sinister purpose in so doing. However, I would, first of all, join issue with him on one of the few things with which I did not agree in his speech—because the longer he went on the more difficult I found it to quarrel with much of what he said.
I would not write down the Torquay Conference as a failure. The noble Lord gave some bare arithmetic. My figures are somewhat like his. We received benefits affecting U.K. exports worth £70,000,000, in terms of 1949 trade; we had concessions withdrawn on trade worth £10,000,000; and we made concessions on U.K. tariffs affecting U.K. imports worth about £7,800,000. But the profit and loss account in hard figures is, surely, not the only thing to take into consideration. As the noble Lord quite rightly said, perhaps some of the critics

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of Torquay forgot to take into consideration that this is the third Tariff Conference we have had since 1947, and that at each succeeding Conference concessions are more difficult to find. But surely other and valuable things were achieved at Torquay. First, we have the prolongation of the concessions of Geneva and Annecy, which are now, with relatively few exceptions, carried on until 1953. I am sure the noble Lord will agree that that is most valuable. We also hope to haw as new members Turkey, Peru, the Philippines, Korea, Austria and Western Germany. I feel that the noble Lord will agree that the inclusion of Western Germany is a step in the right direction; it brings her tariffs down; it is a step forward in the direction of the goal at which we are aiming, to have a world of lower tariffs; and it also makes Western Germany subject to the other provisions of the General Agreement, which are the code of commercial conduct. This is a subject to which I shall refer later. On balance, I think we have benefited even more than the Torquay landladies to whom the noble Lord referred.
Perhaps at this stage I may refer to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Fairfax. I hope he will not mind my saying so, but I was really shocked at what he said. I was shocked because it illustrated the fact that he had not even troubled to read the White Paper before he made his speech, since the figures that he said he could not get are in that White Paper. He wanted to say that it was the fault of this country that Canada had given up the preferences she grants. Surely he should have acquainted himself with the fact that all the preferences we enjoy in Canada are non-contractual; that Canada has a sovereign right to give them up at any time without consulting anybody. As a matter of fact, she did consult us, and we were able to have the concessions she made at Torquay put in a manner which did not affect us greatly. But the important thing is this—and I am now quoting from a speech made by Mr. Abbott, the Canadian Finance Minister, in the Canadian House of Commons on May 8, 1951. Mr. Abbott said:
"This Government has never taken a rigid or doctrinaire position on the matter of preferences, either with respect to their retention or modification."
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Mr. Abbott ended by saying:
"In the course of the Torquay tariff negotiations, as was the case at Geneva and Annecy, in order to obtain valuable concessions from United States. Western Europe and other non-Commonwealth countries we agreed to the modification, and in some cases to the elimination of certain margins of preference."
But Mr. Abbott went on to say that, in spite of that, his Government were still adherents to the principle of Imperial Preference. If the noble Lord had acquainted himself with that, he would not have made the statement he did.
LORD FAIRFAX OF CAMERON: The noble Lord will not deny that Canada is moving closer to the United States and away from this country, and that is an exceedingly unfortunate development.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I will not trouble to deny that. One has to take into account the geographical position of Canada. But to say that it is the fault of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that Canada gave up these preferences at Torquay, is something which is just not correct.
LORD FAIRFAX OF CAMERON: I think the past few years speak for themselves.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: Now I will return to Torquay. I think perhaps noble Lords might be interested to know that the Torquay Protocol is open for signature until October 20, and that the concessions agreed at Torquay have to be brought into force by the signatories to the protocol thirty days after signature. It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to sign the protocol; and to give elect to the concessions made on the United Kingdom tariff as from September 1. That is the most convenient date for our customs administration. According to my present information, all except one of the Orders will be subject to the negative Resolution procedure. In addition, one change of duty has already been incorporated in the Finance Bill.
May I follow the noble Lord, Lord Balfour, in what he called the "failures of Torquay"? It was regrettable and disappointing to everybody that we could not reach an agreement with the United States, with Benelux or with Italy. I think both we and the United States were

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very conscious of the unbalance of trade as between the United States and the United Kingdom, and every effort was made to come to an agreement. It is quite true that, in the negotiations as between ourselves and the United States, the question of Imperial Preference arose and the Commonwealth countries were consulted. We could not see our way clear, after these consultations, to make the concessions in the preferences which the United States wanted made. Having said that, if I leave aside for one moment the question of preferences, I may say that we should still have had very great difficulty—it would have been almost an impossibility—to reach agreement on the basis of the bare figures of the concessions that were going to be made on either side without any regard to preferences. Not only does the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade talk about reciprocal concessions, but it also talks about mutually advantageous concessions. That is what we could not find between the United States and ourselves—anything to satisfy the criterion of mutual advantage. As regards Benelux, noble Lords know that they are a low tariff group of countries. They are countries which find it difficult to make any further concessions in their tariffs, and in view of all the circumstances we were quite prepared to have an unbalanced tariff agreement in favour of Benelux. But we could not obtain the assurances we felt were necessary regarding guarantees against import restrictions, and so we failed to come to any agreement. In the case of Italy, the failure to come to any agreement was due to the absence of concessions on their part which we felt were necessary.
I now come a little nearer to the point raised by the noble Lord. Lord Balfour of Inchrye, and also by the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton. It is true that the Torquay Conference was held under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or G.A.T.T., as it is called. Now G.A.T.T. was intended to be a measure to take the place, in the interim, of the International Trade Organisation which was to be set up under the Havana Charter. The International Trade Organisation envisaged something far wider than "G.A.T.T."
VISCOUNT SWINTON: What is "G.A.T.T."?
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: It is a hateful word, but I used it to save my breath and the time of the House. It is an abbreviation of "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade."
VISCOUNT SWINTON: I thought a "gat" was a gun. I thought it was a thing you carried in your hip pocket to use against another fellow.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I believe some people do, in another country.
The reduction of preferences or tariffs was only part of the policy behind the International Trade Organisation. There was a desire on the part of all who were parties to the Havana Charter to bring into existence a far better code of commercial conduct throughout the world. I am not going to weary your Lordships with all it expressed, but if you turn to Article I of the Havana Charter you will find the objectives clearly set out. Most-favoured-nation treatment is the very basis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and it is the only sanction which that instrument can possibly have. If you do away with the most-favoured-nation clause in the General Agreement, you might as well tear up the General Agreement altogether. It was the intention of His Majesty's Government to recommend to Parliament, if conditions at the time were favourable, that we should ratify the Havana Charter; but our minds have changed. The reason for that is that we have now learned authoritatively that it is not the intention of the President of the United States to ask Congress to ratify the Havana Charter. That means that the International Trade Organisation will not come into existence; and it appears that American thought is that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade can be fashioned into an instrument to take the place of the International Trade Organisation.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: May I ask whether His Majesty's Government agree with that view?
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I am coming to that. This really brings into existence an entirely different situation and it is one to which we shall have

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to give some very careful thought. The noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, has almost taken the question out of my mouth. Can the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade be made an effective instrument to carry out the objectives envisaged by the International Trade Organisation? Can it do those things? Well, my Lords, I should not like to say anything that would militate against the successful conclusion of any future discussion of this question, but any such discussion will have to be approached with some care. The Americans themselves may have considerable difficulty in pursuing what they think is the correct end. There is the matter of American internal legislation. There is the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which, as we think, stands as something of an obstacle. We also think that the customs administration of the United States may have to undergo some drastic alteration if the General Agreement is going to take the place of the International Trade Organisation.
That, then, is the position at the present time; and I think noble Lords opposite will agree that this is not the best time to start once again an international conference on these issues when there are so many difficulties in the world upsetting trade in every country. But His Majesty's Government support the doctrine of multilateral trade on which the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is based. It is true, as Lord Balfour of Inchrye said, that our present obligation is such that we can withdraw from it on giving sixty days' notice. But the reason why we support the General Agreement is that we are a great trading nation. We are the greatest trading nation in the world, and as such, we have some very heavy responsibilities. I always listen with great respect to any words uttered on the subject of trade and commerce by the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton. He was four times President of the Board of Trade, and I suppose he knows more about this subject than any other noble Lord in this House. He would, I am sure, agree that the United Kingdom holds a very substantial position in world trade; that we have a very great contribution to make; and that, having been leaders in world trace for hundreds of years, we cannot forsake our position overnight.
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I do not think it is necessary for me to remind your Lordships what our position is in Commonwealth trade. If the noble Lord, Lord Fairfax, had done me the honour to read the speech I made is this House on June 6, on the occasion of the Economic Debate raised on a Motion by the noble Lord, Lord Cherwell, he would not, I think, have said some of the things he did say to-day. I said in that debate:
"I need not remind your Lordships of the vital importance of our trade with the sterling Commonwealth. In 1950 we drew almost two-fifths of our food and little less than one-half of our raw materials from the sterling area, and we sent to them a little under one-half of our total exports A great expansion of our trade with the rest of the sterling area has been a buttress of our post-war economic recovery, and no efforts should be spared to reinforce this vast structure of trade, the greatest in the world."
We must export somewhere and we must get our other imports from somewhere else than the sterling Commonwealth. I agree that we have not seen the last of the expansion of either our exports to sterling countries or our imports front them. But what are we going to do in the meantime? Lord Balfour of Inchrye said that on this matter he was not a subscriber to isolationism. We cannot, indeed, afford to be solationists. We have got to get our exports into every country in the world, and we cannot do that and be isolationist about the principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We have to keep up at all costs our dollar exports—certainly while our present unbalance is so serious.
I do not think, therefore, that the support of His Majesty's Government for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is inconsistent with His Majesty's Government's policy on preference. Article 17 of the Havana Charter, while it calls for a reduction in preferences, also recognises their existence as legitimate and says that any negotiation that is entered into in that regard must be entered into on the basis of mutual advantage. There is nothing inconsistent in that. The noble Lord, Lord Balfour, was quite right in saying that the freezing of the preferences was one of the bargains in connection with the Loan Agreement of 1945, and it was eventually spelled out in the Havana Charter. The answer to the question he specifically asked me—I acknowledge the fact that with his usual courtesy

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he gave me prior notice of the question —is "No." We cannot, under the freezing rule, create any new preferences, nor can we increase any existing preferences. That is why we cannot do it in the case that the noble Lord mentioned.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: The noble Lord has said that that was so under the G.A.T.T. (as it is called), which can be denounced on sixty days' notice. He also related it in some way to the American Treaty. I thought that I received the firmest assurance, when the American Treaty was going through, that we were in no way bound in the matter of Imperial Preference.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: We cannot create new preferences and we cannot increase the preferences in existence at that particular time.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: Does the noble Lord mean that, as from the date of the American Loan—the original American Loan—we were not entitled to create any new preferences?
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: That is right. That is the answer to the question that the noble Lord asked me. I will now reply to the question put by Lord Swinton. G.A.T.T. recognises the existing preferences, and there is nothing to prevent us, if the need arises, from negotiating an agreement on the most-favoured-nation clause, with the usual exception for Imperial Preference.
There was another question which both the noble Lord, Lord Balfour, and the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, asked me. After telling us what the policy of the Conservative Party is, they asked: What is the policy of His Majesty's Government on Imperial Preference? I think I can be just as plain as was the noble Lord. Speaking for ourselves—and we hope the other Commonwealth countries would take the same view, although I should point out that, so far as non-contractual preferences are concerned, they are entirely sovereign in the matter—this is our position: we would not cancel or reduce any preference which we granted unless we were satisfied that the corresponding advantage to be gained from the reduction of foreign tariffs really outweighed the advantages
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of the preference to us and to the Commonwealth. Naturally, there might be occasions where we should have to look at the balance of advantage or disadvantage particularly from the point of view of the United Kingdom, but generally we always consult the Commonwealth and consider these matters in relation to the Commonwealth.
Through it all runs the principle of mutual advantage, and that is why, if I may stress the point again, the policy of His Majesty's Government is not inconsistent. It is no more inconsistent than was the policy of the Conservative Government in 1938, because the Conservative Government in 1938 did reduce some preferences. I will not weary your Lordships by reading them out; I have a substantial list here of preferences which were reduced in 1938, obviously because the counter concessions offered showed a balance of mutual advantage.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: I should like to ask one question before the noble Lord leaves this point, because I want to be clear and to understand the reply that the noble Lord is giving us. As I understand what he says, the Government's policy is that they would be willing to negotiate the reduction of any preference if they saw a compensatory trade advantage to this country in some other direction?
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: And to the Commonwealth.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: And to the Commonwealth. Therefore, in the Government's view, the door is open to the complete elimination of Imperial Preference, if sufficiently great compensatory advantage is obtained. That is the question I want to put.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: The noble Lord is putting to me a hypothetical question.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: No.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: In his own speech, the noble Lord put many conditions, and he went so far as to say that there never could be a compensatory advantage.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: In my view.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: In your view—and those factors would have to be taken into consideration. I think perhaps the noble Lord went a little too far that way, but we say, quite definitely, that we should not cancel or reduce any preference which we give unless we were sure that the compensating reduction in the foreign tariff was—I will not say overwhelming, but on balance decidedly in favour of ourselves and the Commonwealth.
LORD HAWKE: Before the noble Lord leaves that point, may I ask him a question arising out of it? Suppose that an entirely new article of trade comes into purview—atomic energy tubes, for instance, or something like that. Are we precluded from giving a preference on a completely new article like that?
LORD LUCAS or CHILWORTH: At the present moment, as I said at the opening of my speech, owing to the fact that the Havana Charter will not now be ratified, and the International Trade Organisation will not come into existence, we have an entirely new set of circumstances arising, and the position of ourselves, America and the Commonwealth will have to be carefully considered. In those circumstances, I am not prepared to give the noble Lord any answer to that question.
LORD FAIRFAX OF CAMERON: May I ask the noble Lord this question?—I am sorry to interrupt him again. Do I understand that under the freezing of preferences we could create no new preference? Is that so?
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: Yes.
LORD FAIR FAX OF CAMERON: It is?
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: Yes. I think I said that. We cannot create any new preferences. That is the position in which we stand to-day. I have tried to be as plain as the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, paid me the compliment of being. We shall go into these negotiations when they come (I do not know when that will be: when the conditions are ripe for them) because we think we have a great contribution to make. I repeat that this country has a great record. It has learnt a great deal in being not only the greatest trading country in the world but also for
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a very long time the greatest creditor nation of the world. A country is not the greatest creditor nation of the world without learning many lessons the hard way. We have learnt those lessons, and we shall deploy all that knowledge and, I hope, wisdom, to the benefit of everyone else.
4.40 p.m.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord for the courtesy of his full reply. I will not attempt to re-argue the case, but I must say that I thought it a depressing reply. The purport of his speech is that the Government continue to adhere to the most-favoured-nation clause; that the Government are willing to put Imperial Preference in pawn, to be redeemed by any bidder who will come up to their reserve figure. As to our freedom within the Empire family, the speech gave a depressing answer to my question asking whether or not we were able to increase existing preferences or to create a new preference. I thank the noble Lord for his frankness in a reply which to me, and to many other noble Lords, was extremely disappointing in that particular regard.
There are two points I want to put to the noble Lord. As I understand it, he said that the intention of His Majesty's Government had been to bring the Havana Charter before Parliament for ratification. That will not now be done because America is not going to ratify. The noble Lord said the question which the Government asked themselves was: Can the G.A.T.T. be welded into an effective instrument to do the job of Havana? My question is: Should it he done without Parliament having an opportunity of discussing those particular things which would have been discussed had the subject under consideration been the ratification of the Havana Charter? I hope the Government will take note that we on this side of the House, and Members on the Opposition Benches in another place, should feel that we were being side-tracked (and I know the Government would not wish to do that) if there were not an opportunity for Parliament to debate some of the provisions which we should have debated had the question been one of ratifying the Havana Charter.
The noble Lord announced that as from September 1 the Government are to adopt the Torquay proposals all of

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which, except one, need a negative procedure. The one which takes the affirmative procedure, he said, was incorporated in the Finance Bill. This House cannot touch the Finance Bill, so it seems a little curious that the Government should put forward affirmative Resolution procedure, to use the words of the noble Lord, in relation to something that we cannot touch in this House. Perhaps the noble Lord will consider that point, and perhaps, through the usual channels, we might have some information on it, because the noble Lord is virtually saying that the Government are following a procedure which denies this House an opportunity of exercising its right.
If I may be allowed, I must raise a point that was made by my noble friend Lord Swinton. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas said that under the Anglo-American Loan arrangements we were bound to freeze existing tariffs and not to impose any new tariffs. In Column 801 of Hansard of December 18, 1945, my noble friend Lord Swinton said this:
"It is clear that we enter the Conference absolutely free. We shall only reduce or eliminate a preference if we get an agreement which is better for us and for our partners."
We were absolutely free. But the noble Lord says we were not free. We cannot debate this matter any more this afternoon, but there is a direct conflict here. We understood from the Government that We were completely free. We now hear from the noble Lord that we were not free, in that we were unable to increase preferences and that existing preferences had to be frozen. As I say, we cannot pursue this matter any further to-day, but there is that conflict which I feel must be cleared up—and I am sure the noble Lord will welcome an opportunity to do that as much as we should. With those remarks, and thanking the noble Lord for his reply, and also my noble friends who have supported me in this debate, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: Before the noble Lord withdraws his Motion, by leave of the House I should like to say that I cannot conceive that Parliament will not have an opportunity of discussing any proposals for a revised General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In answer to his question about the affirmative Resolution procedure, I would
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say that in order to increase a rate of duty one has to have an affirmative Resolution. We cannot debate this matter this afternoon, but I do not want it to go on record that I said that the rule about preferences was part of the Loan Agreement. What I said was that it was part of the bargain made at the time of the Loan Agreement. If the noble Lord will look up the whole history, he will see that it is a very highly technical business.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords, I can speak again only by leave of the House. I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, was in the House in 1945: that was our misfortune. But one of the most important issues raised in the whole of the debate on the American Loan, and one of the conditions on which we supported it, was that it was made perfectly plain to us that we were not committed on preferences in any way at all. That matter was raised in another place, and it was answered there by the Prime Minister. I raised it here and the noble Lord, Lord Keynes, said, if I may summarise it, that I was perfectly right: that there was no such commitment, and that it was very well understood in the State Department. We raised this specifically, because in regard to this matter the whole of the White Paper was very obscure. I raised it in the debate and the Lord Chancellor confirmed what Lord Pakenham had said—namely, that while We had agreed that we go into trade negotiations, the whole essence was that we were in no way committed in regard to preference that we and our Imperial partners were to be the sole judges of the merit of any agreement We should make; and that unless we were satisfied we would not make it.
Both Lord Pakenham and the Lord Chancellor made it perfectly clear to us, and quite frankly it was on the assurance given in that debate, and which I believe has been carried out ever since and has never been challenged in America, that we voted for the American Loan. It would be most unfortunate if there were now to be any doubt on any question in regard to that matter. There is a clause in the Agreement about import arrangements: that if you purchase from one country, equally you must purchase from another—I put it rather loosely. There was a question as to whether we could

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buy anything in any quantity we pleased from our Colonies, and as to whether that applied also to the Dominions. That was quite a separate matter. That was a matter of the volume of imports and the limitation of imports. It had nothing to do with tariffs, and on tariffs we were to be absolutely free.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

THE PALACE OF WESTMINSTER
4.50 p.m.
EARL STANHOPE EARL STANHOPE rose to call attention to the Report of the Joint Select Committee appointed to inquire into Accommodation in the Palace of Westminster (H.L. 26 of 1945) in so far as it affects the precincts of the Abbey and of Parliament Square; and to move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, a short time ago, on the Motion of my noble friend Lord Mottistone, your Lordships discussed the erection of the building which it was proposed to put up on the site of the old Westminster Hospital. Thanks largely, I think, to the able way in which he put his case, your Lordships agreed—and so did the Government—to consider very seriously the effect of that building on the precincts of Westminster Abbey. There is a further precinct to which I wish to draw attention to-day—namely, Abingdon Street. In my opinion, it is just as possible gravely to impair the view of the Abbey of Westminster by inappropriate buildings erected in Abingdon Street as by buildings on the site of Westminster Hospital.
In the second place, I want to put right an expression of the views of the Joint Committee, of which I happened to be Chairman, because those have been put, I think, in a way which the Committee certainly did not intend, in a reply to a Question asked by my noble friend Lord Halifax, on November 19, 1947. Lord Henderson then said:
"Following the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee on Accommodation, 1945, it is proposed eventually to erect a building for members and officials of both Houses of Parliament on the Abingdon Street site which bas recently been acquired with money voted for that purpose."
The Committee said nothing of the kind. If your Lordships will turn to paragraph 19 of the Committee's Report, you will see it stated that:
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"The Committee recommend that, pending a decision being arrived at as to how this increased accommodation shall be found, premises in Abingdon Street and Bridge Street be acquired so that parliament will be in a position to make such use of them here-after as may be desired."
What the Committee had in mind was this. The Committee had already agreed that it was essential that a senior officer of each House of Parliament should reside within the Palace of Westminster. So far as this House was concerned, it was felt that that officer should be the Yeoman-Usher of the Black Rod, because he is the Secretary to the Lord Great Chamberlain, who is responsible for the whole Palace of Westminster. When Parliament is not sitting, his jurisdiction includes the House of Commons. There is only one part over which the responsibility of the Lord Great Chamberlain does not extend—and this is a matter which is always discussed and argued at some length, as I think Lord Morrison knows. It is claimed in some quarters that the minister of Works, as he is now called, is responsible for the Great Hall of Westminster; the Minister of Works claims to be Keeper of the Great Hall. Others claim that the Lord Great Chamberlain is responsible. But apart from this conflict, the whole Palace of Westminster is the responsibility of the Lord Great Chamberlain; and his deputy is the Yeoman-Usher of the Black Rod. We found accommodation for the latter official, but we did not find, as a Committee, that it was possible to provide accommodation for the Lord Chancellor.
We had evidence from a succession of ex-Lord Chancellors, and from the Lord Chancellor of the day, that in view of the very heavy work which the Lord Chancellor has to perform—and as your Lordships know he has to change his clothes in order to appear as we are accustomed to see him on the Woolsack, or when he sits as a judge when the House is carrying out its judicial function—it is necessary for him to be resident either in or very near the Palace of Westminster. Therefore, the Committee suggested that we should acquire this house in Abingdon Street with a view to having flats made to accommodate the Lord Chancellor, and possibly, also, such officials as would find it a great convenience to live near at hand. Your Lordships, too, would no doubt find it convenient to have living close by officials such as the Clerk of the

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Parliaments, and the Clerk of the House of Commons. There was no question whatever in our minds of putting up new buildings in Abingdon Street. I am not blaming Lord Henderson. In the first place, he was not replying for his own Department. Secondly, I have to confess to your Lordships that I am much more to blame than he was.
I say that for this reason. At the last meeting of the Committee when we were considering the various means by which we could increase accommodation in the Palace of Westminster, and discussing the proposal of Sir Charles Barry for buildings additional to the Palace, to my great joy a member of the Committee proposed as a Resolution that:
"The Committee recommend that this proposal"—
that is, Sir Charles Barry's proposal for completing the Palace of Westminster—
"should be studied as a long-term project."
That was the only recommendation the Committee made for new building. But, unfortunately, when the proofs were sent to the printer that sentence was omitted. Therefore, Lord Henderson naturally knew nothing whatever about it. I, as Chairman of the Committee, regret to say that I am responsible for the omission. And I did not find it out for a very long time afterwards—in fact, not until my attention was called to it by the member of the Committee who had proposed the Resolution. As he was a Member of the other place, I suggested that he should call the attention of his own House to the matter. But that was in 1945, when we had many other things to occupy our attention, and it was not done.
I think the whole Committee were unanimous in supporting this proposal of Sir Charles Barry, and I hope that your Lordships will look at what was proposed because we have included it as an Appendix to our Report. You will find it on page XXI, and the elevation on page XXII. My view is that it is a most attractive scheme. It would give an elevation on the side facing Parliament Square very much like that on the river side of the Houses of Parliament. It would provide a wonderful finish to Parliament Square, and it would hide that conglomeration of motor cars which is to be seen in New Palace Yard. It would make available 247 rooms for Members of Parliament or
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Government offices, and a further eighty rooms in which papers could be housed. I admit that it is a very expensive proposition. At the time when the Committee considered it, the scheme was expected to cost £2,100,000. I am afraid that it would probably cost double that amount now. To realise what it means, stand outside the Palace, look towards Whitehall, and visualise the prospect with Westminster Abbey on one side and such a frontage on the other. Of course, some of the plans would have to be slightly modified. I think your Lordships will agree that it is no longer necessary, in the place where the present Grand Committee Room stands, to have a covered place for horses. Not many of your Lordships ride down to the House in these days. You will also see there is a large entrance at the corner of Whitehall. Traffic in these days is very different from what it was, and obviously the entrance would have to be more or less where it is now.
I am not suggesting for a moment that the scheme should be put in hand now. A few days ago I had a letter from my noble friend Lord Schuster in which he said he warmly approved of my putting this proposal forward, and that the more he thought about this plan the more he liked it, provided it was not done now, because he did not think the financial situation of the country was such as to make it advisable. I go much further. I am in the happy position of having been opposed to the members of the Front Benches of all three Parties in the support which they gave to the erection of the buildings for the Festival of Britain on the South Bank. I am one of those who come into London by Hungerford Bridge, and as I watched those buildings going up, I found among those who travelled with me in my third class compartment almost universal agreement that they were a terrible waste of man-power and materials which could have been much better used in erecting houses for the working classes or for building schools. I am afraid we were rude about those buildings. We called the Concert Hall, which I think is one of the most ugly buildings I have ever seen, "Morrison's Folly," because it is much too large for chamber music and too small for any orchestral concert to be given at democratic prices except at a loss. We called the great top on the other side, "Morrison's Circus."
I am not going to suggest that we should put this building up now; nor do I expect the noble Lord, Lord Morrison, to pledge himself some day to the erection of Sir Charles Barry's scheme. I hope that long before that scheme is put into operation the noble Lord will be sitting on this side of the House, and not on that. What I hope he will say this afternoon is that he will agree that no building shall be erected in Abingdon Street until this House has had an opportunity of seeing a sketch of the elevation, discussing the proposal and approving it or otherwise. By putting this Motion now, I am giving an opportunity for the Ministry of Works to consult Parliament and not say that they have already called for tenders and any alteration is too late. Many years ago, I heard a story about the Lord Wemyss who was the great-grandfather of the present noble Earl. He met the architect who had been made responsible for building the new War Office in Whitehall and said to him. "You have a great opportunity now to complete the Palace of Whitehall." The architect's reply was, "But that would only be Inigo Jones over again!" The result has been that ever since we have had to endure the pepper pots we see on the roof, and the heavy columns and cornices. I suppose I am the only member of your Lordship's House who has been into every room in the War Office and can say that those rooms are just as bad from the inside as the building is from the outside. On this occasion we do not want it said that we had only made Sir Charles Barry over again.
As an old First Commissioner of Works, as the Minister used to be called, I used to say that the buildings erected by the Ministry of Works were often better than any others we could find in a provincial city. Their post offices, telephone exchanges and so on were admirable, and I mourn, not only as a friend but as an admirer, their chief architect, Sir James West, who died only a day or two ago. There are many fine architects in the Ministry of Works, but I think they have one failing they sometimes forget the importance of the question of elevation. I sometimes wonder whether somebody from the Ministry of Works went over to New York and thought it might be advisable to have some parts of London something like New York. If we tried to
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copy any part of New York in London, we should be committing an atrocity no less than if New York tried to copy any part of London. Let us stick to our own methods of building.
The noble Lord, Lord Morrison, was kind enough to show me the elevation which had been proposed by the private company who had originally intended to build in Abingdon Street. It is an extremely clever sketch, taken from about the Cœur de Lion statue, so that the new buildings were somewhere in the distance and naturally reduced in size owing to the perspective. But when we come to look at it carefully, we see that the buildings are two storeys higher than Nos. 6 and 7, Abingdon Street, which exist there now. My view is that these new buildings would have been two storeys too high. It is possible that the plan was approved by the Fine Art Commission. We expect something better from the Ministry of Works than we expect from private builders—I throw that as a gift to the noble Lord, Lord Morrison, because I am strongly opposed to nationalisation. The Ministry of Works are responsible for historic buildings and it is their duty and privilege to see that the Abbey of Westminster remains for generations to come the place not only of worship arid praise, but of beauty and of admiration. I hope we may be able to open it up and make it even more attractive and beautiful than it is to-day. For that reason, and in order to say that any scheme to the contrary has not the support of the Committee of which I was Chairman, I have put down this Motion. I beg to move for Papers.
5.8 p.m.
VISCOUNT MERSEY: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Stanhope has asked me to say a word or two on this Motion. I am afraid that I am not entirely in agreement with what he has said. My noble friend presided admirably over the Committee, who were convinced that this House, and both Houses of Parliament, were due to expand it future and that more space was necessary. The proposal which my noble friend has put forward is at present the only way by which we can obtain more space. But there is another side of the question: there is the æsthetic point of view. Westminster Hall is one of few buildings in this country of its size, shape and history, and it is

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a legacy of two remarkable Kings—perhaps not very good Kings, but men of exceptional character. The result of building an arcade along the side of the roadway would be that the north facade of Westminster Hall would be entirely obscured: one would see nothing of it at all except by going on to the roof. That is my only objection to the noble Earl's proposal, but I cannot help feeling that it is rather an important one.
5.10 p.m.
LORD MOTTISTONE: My Lords, I should like to confine my remarks upon the subject now before your Lordships' House to the question of Abingdon Street. Before doing so, however, I feel that I should declare to your Lordships that I have, in a way, a personal interest in the neighbourhood, though not in Abingdon Street itself, in my capacity as Architect to the Dean and Chapter of Westminster for the purpose of rebuilding the canonical houses which were destroyed or damaged in the war. I hope that this fact will not make your Lordships feel that I should not join in this debate. The houses to which I refer surround the Little Cloister, which, as I expect your Lordships know, lies near the Chapter House, to the west of Old Palace Yard, behind number five, which is usually known as Labouchère's house. It is this house which abuts upon the King George V Memorial, and which is eventually to be demolished, in accordance with the scheme approved by both Houses of Parliament in 1939 and confirmed by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, in this House in 1947. The reason for the proposed demolition was to complete the Memorial, and to unmask the whole of the fine stone facade of the so-called Paladian House next door, which faces north towards Parliament Square and which is at present partly hidden by the projection of Labouchère's House. It is only when Labouchère's House is demolished that my professional interest will be apparent to the eye from Old Palace Yard; and even then it will have no direct bearing upon Abingdon Street itself. I therefore hope that I may be allowed to say a few words about that street, as, although I am not directly concerned, my close connection with the neighbourhood has furnished me with some knowledge of the problem.
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With regard to any new buildings in Abingdon Street for I fear that there must be new buildings there—I believe we have an opportunity seldom vouch-safed to us. We have the opportunity for once of avoiding the accusation so often levelled against us, that we are too late in expressing our views about planning. I therefore feel that we should all be most grateful to the noble Earl for bringing this question into prominence now, before any detailed plans for the street have been laid. Now is the time for us to express any views that we may hold, and to put them forcefully before His Majesty's Government. If we agree that Abingdon Street will have to be rebuilt in some form—and I am afraid that we must; I think it would be asking too much, and the need for accommodation is too great, to plead successfully that the whole area up to the Abbey Precinct Wall should be left entirely vacant—then I suggest to your Lordships that there are four aims to be borne in mind.
First, the view of the Abbey from the south-east, from Lambeth Bridge and the other side of the river, must be preserved, by keeping the buildings in Abingdon Street low, no higher, in fact, than those which at present survive. Secondly, much-needed accommodation should be provided for some of those who work in the Palace of Westminster—a suggestion which has to some extent been pointed out in the Committee's Report, and for which Abingdon Street seems to me eminently suitable. Thirdly. the splendid 14th century Precinct Wall of the Abbey, and that remarkable building known as the Jewel House, which is at present almost entirely hidden, should be preserved and exposed to view. Fourthly, the ever-present need and continually expressed desire for a place close to the Abbey for memorials to the distinguished sons and daughters of our country and Commonwealth should be explored in this connection.
I believe that all these aims can be turned into realities if a long low building is constructed throughout the length of Abingdon Street: a building of three storeys only, above the ground floor level, these three storeys containing the accommodation to which I have referred. I put forward the suggestion that the whole of the ground floor should be open throughout its length and width, so that

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the building would stand on columns forming an open colonnade or loggia, on lines similar to the library of Trinity College, Cambridge, or the market hall of, appropriately enough, Abingdon, or High Wickham, and many other similar examples which I could call to mind. This loggia would provide a view of the Precinct Wall behind it, and would form an admirable setting for memorials and commemorative sculpture.
I would further suggest that the northern end of the new Abingdon Street building facing Parliament Square could be terminated by the white stone facade of the Paladian House in Old Palace Yard, to which I have referred, if this were taken down and re-erected a few yards behind its present frontage line. I read in the Report of the Joint Select Committee on Accommodation in the Palace of Westminster that, although the frontage of this House (No. 7) is fine, it has, to quote the words of the Report, "a perfectly abominable interior." Therefore, I can see no harm in preserving the facade only, and moving it as I suggest. If that were done, the Jewel House would be exposed to view, Lest any noble Lord doubt the practicability or wisdom of this manœuvre, may I recall to mind that an exactly similar feat was accomplished when the 18th century facade of 37. Great George Street, at the corner of Storey's Gate, was taken down and re-erected on the Horse Guards Parade in 1910, to form the front of the Paymaster General's office? It is next door to the Admiralty.
Finally, my Lords, may I put in a most earnest plea that, whatever is done with Abingdon Street, or, indeed, with all the sites and properties which adjoin this Palace, the Abbey and Parliament Square, the excellent plan, put forward as a longterm project, by the Architectural Review, and often referred to in your Lordships' House, should not be lost sight of, so that the through traffic routes may be sufficiently diverted to enable all who come here in their thousands, for work, prayer or sightseeing, to appreciate the beauty and significance of these time-honoured precincts—and, incidentally, to enable the Lord Chancellor and his successors in office, if they have a lodging built for them in Abingdon Street, to proceed there in safety, to the admiration of all beholders.
5.20 p.m.
LORD REA: My Lords, so much and such interesting ground has been covered by the noble Lord who has just spoken that I will confine myself to one point, and that is strongly to support the suggestion of the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, that Abingdon Street should be cleared before any final decision is taken about what is to be re-erected on that site. In previous matters of this sort—I refer to the debates on the new Colonial Office and Carlton House Terrace—we were told in each case that we had come too late upon the scene; that we should have paid half-a-crown at Burlington House to see the proposals, and made our objections then. I suggest that those buildings (like St. Paul's Cathedral and Canterbury Cathedral) are not the property merely of the citizens of Westminster, or of the Houses of Parliament, but that they belong to the Empire. It is not easy for people in Ottowa or Canberra to come to Piccadilly to see what proposals are intended.
The second objection was one of expense, and in these days that is a very real objection indeed. I remember the noble Lord, Lord Morrison, with courteous obstinacy or obstinate courtesy, stating that the expense involved put all these plans quite out of the question; and he produced as a trump card that one specific proposal would cost as much as, I think he said, £150,000, I suggest that we owe Westminster Abbey 1,000 years of recognition in the past and, I hope, another 1,000 years in the future, so that the £150,000 which Lord Morrison mentioned, albeit casually, represents only about £3 a week if we look backwards, or 30s, if we look backwards and forwards. I mention this because it is my own cherished hope that these houses in Abingdon Street will be razed to the ground, so as to give us a magnificent view of the East Wall of College Garden and the south-east view of the Abbey. When we remember that a hundred years ago Victoria Gardens, on the south side of Victoria Tower, were a huddle of ugly slums, should we not again do what our ancestors did a century ago and carry on to the west more green grass and more grey stones, and open up the Abbey in an even better precinct than it has now?
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF WORKS (LORD MORRISON): My Lords, your Lordships have returned, I hope for good, to your own House, renovated, I trust, to your satisfaction, and are already looking forward to further improvements to the amenities of this House. Not only that, but your Lordships are giving me, or any representative from the Ministry of Works who may be unfortunate enough to occupy this position in which I am now, fair warning that only the best will be acceptable to you. We have had an interesting debate in which four noble Lords have taken part. The noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, said that he is in favour of Barry's extension, but he does not want it done now. Well, so far so good. He also said that no building should be put up in Abingdon Street until the House had seen the plans and elevation. If I might put it in my own way, one of the things he said was that he was particularly keen that there should be no skyscrapers in Abingdon Street. The noble Viscount, Lord Mersey, who has now left the House, intervened to say that he was not in favour of Barry's extension. My noble friend, Lord Mottistone, made some useful Suggestions, to which I am sure he will not expect me to reply until I have had an opportunity of consultation with arehitects of equal eminence to himself. The noble Lord, Lord Rea was anxious that historical mistakes should not be repeated. In view of the general discussion, it seems that if I were to put the point of view of the Ministry of Works in regard to the issue which has been raised in so interesting a fashion this afternoon, perhaps that would be the best reply I could make to noble Lords who have spoken and to the House in general.
We are obliged to the noble Earl. Lord Stanhope, for raising a matter which must always be of interest to both Houses of Parliament: how best to provide the necessary accommodation for Peers and for Members of Parliament so as to enable the machinery of Parliament to function. I find that there is a tendency outside to think that when once a Chamber for each House has been provided, the difficulty has been overcome and that nothing else is required. This, of course, is a complete fallacy, and the ancillary accommodation required, such as committee rooms, libraries, refresh-
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ment rooms, et cetera, are just as important as the actual Chambers. The noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, has spoken much too modestly of the Committee over which he presided in 1945. That Committee made a number of valuable suggestions about accommodation in the Palace of Westminster, and I am only sorry—as I am sure he is—that the process of complying with a number of their recommendations is proving a rather long-drawn-out one. But that was foreseen by the noble Earl's Committee at the time. Of all those recommendations, I think posterity will be most grateful to the noble Earl and his Committee for the recommendation which led to the acquisition of the Abingdon Street site.
May I remind your Lordships of the circumstances prevailing at that time? This site, which consisted of a number of houses owned by various interests, was about to be sold to the National Association of Local Government Officers, who intended to erect a block of office buildings upon it. To comply with the provisions of the London County Council Improvements Act, it was necessary for the promoters to approach the Commissioners of Works for their consent to the elevation of the proposed building. The Office of Works, as it then was, consulted the Royal Fine Art Commission and exhibited drawings of the elevation in the House of Commons Tea Room. As no objections were raised, the plans were approved. In 1945, at the time of the noble Earl's Committee, the scheme of development was about to take effect. During the war the houses on the site had been severely damaged; they were due to be demolished prior to development and there was obviously little time to be lost if the site was to be preserved for Parliament. The Ministry of Works brought this state of affairs before the notice of the noble Earl's Committee and suggested that the site should be acquired for a building scheme in order to supplement the deficiencies of accommodation in the Houses of Parliament. It would, I think, have been a real disaster if the opportunity had been lost. Apart from land in Bridge Street, which would be difficult and expensive to acquire owing to interference with the trading interests concerned, the Abingdon Street site is the only land available for disposal in the vicinity of Parliament.

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It is much to the credit of the noble Lord and his Committee that they saw the need for speed and advised the acquisition of the site before it was too late. Up to the present I have given credit to the noble Lord for this act of foresight. Your Lordships will, perhaps, remember Pope's line about those who:
"Do good by stealth, and blush to find it Fame."
I think it was Charles Lamb who improved on this when he said:
"The greatest pleasure I know is to do a good action by stealth and to have it found out by accident."
The noble Lord, in his modesty, is going one better and now would have us believe that it was by accident that he did any good at all. What the noble Lord meant, I think, when he suggested buying the Abingdon Street site, was that we should revive Sir Charles Barry's scheme for completing the Palace of Westminster by a new building, extending it to St. Stephen's Porch outside Westminster Hall and New Palace Yard, eventually joining up with the Clock Tower.
May I examine exactly what the Committee did say? I quote from paragraph 19 of the Report:
"The needs of legislators in a modern democratic assembly are likely to grow, rather than to diminish, and these can only be met by new building, or by taking in and converting other houses outside the present precincts…. The Committee recommend that, pending a decision being arrived at as to how this increased accommodation shall be found, premises in Abingdon Street and Bridge Street be acquired, so that Parliament will be in a position to make such use of them hereafter as may be desired. A further proposal is to complete the plans for the Palace of Westminster as prepared by Sir Charles Barry by a building in the same arehitectural style as the rest of the Palace extending from St. Stephen's Porch along the edge of the roadway outside Westminster Hall and New Palace Yard to the corner opposite Whitehall and thence eastwards to join up with the Clock Tower…."
According to the noble Earl, as he has told us this afternoon, a sentence was left out of the Report, which said:
"The Committee recommend that this proposal"—
that is, Sir Charles Barry's extension—
"should be studied as a long-term project."
Apparently, it is this long-term scheme which is to get us out of our accommodation difficulties. May I ask why, then, did the Committee recommend the acquisition of the Abingdon Street site?
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During the war, most of the houses had been so severely damaged by bombs as to make the ruins suitable only for demolition. Surely, the only possible justification for acquiring that site was to clear the ruins and erect a new building. That has been the development suggested to the Committee by the Ministry, and that was the project put to the House of Commons in 1946. The actual wording in the Houses of Parliament Vote, Class VII, was:
"Purchase of site in Abingdon Street for additional building."
It was to acquire this land for the purpose of a building scheme there that the House of Commons voted the sum of £260,000: it was certainly not for a scheme for protecting the amenities of the Abbey or those of the Dean and Chapter.
Let me go back to the Barry scheme. In actual fact, it was studied by the Ministry at the time the Committee raised the matter, and the Ministry came to the conclusion—and I hope I shall be able to persuade your Lordships to come to it also—that it really is not a practicable scheme at the present time. If you look at a drawing showing the effect of building Sir Charles Barry's extension on the present layout of New Palace Yard and the roadway outside, you will find that some of the results would be something like the following. First, the extension would reduce the amount of parking space in New Palace Yard by 36 per cent. Noble Lords who have the advantage of parking in Old Palace Yard may not appreciate that the parking space in New Palace Yard is already inadequate for the needs of the House of Commons; and at times cars have actually to be parked on the pavement, and seriously interfere with foot traffic, so great is the shortage; and the suggestion has been made that cars of Members of the House of Commons should be allowed to be parked in Old Palace Yard.
Secondly, the extension would project thirty-three feet from the present boundary into St. Margaret's Street, reducing the width of the roadway by eighteen feet. Thirdly, it would, I suggest, be a serious blunder to enclose New Palace Yard by a high building. The effect would be, as the noble Lord, Lord Mersey, said, completely to blanket out Westminster Hall and to restrict the view from Parliament Square of the Clock Tower. There is

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yet another danger: members of the public who might want to see the time by Big Ben would have to go out into the middle of the road to see it. The familiar view into New Palace Yard would also go, and the sunken lawn with the statue of Cromwell would disappear. Incidentally, the Grand Committee Room and other accommodation on the West side of Westminster Hall would be destroyed. The plan provided for a single entrance archway for all traffic going into and coming out of New Palace Yard instead of the present pair of double gates.
May I return to the proposal regarding the Abingdon Street site? I must make it clear that this site is needed to meet the serious deficiencies, both for Lords and Commons, in the accommodation of the Palace of Westminster. The noble Earl has asked me what sort of accommodation we propose to provide there. The project has still to be worked out in detail, but, roughly, the Ministry of Works will provide accommodation which will either help to meet the deficiencies pointed out by the noble Lord's Committee or, by rearrangement, will free rooms in the Palace of Westminster required for other purposes. It is only in this way, I suggest, that we shall be able to provide essential accommodation in the vicinity of the two Chambers for those whose work necessitates their being there. I have been asked what sort of building, architecturally, we propose to erect on the site. I need not remind your Lordships, and the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, in particular, that the Ministry of Works are still working on the excellent tradition which he followed when he was in charge of the Ministry; and they are fully aware of the need for protecting the amenities of this important site. We shall take every step possible to do so, both by consulting the Royal Fine Art Commission, and by exhibiting our plans in both Houses of Parliament, so that there can be adequate discussion of them before the building commences.
We must, of course, remember that the site has cost £260,000 and that it was specially acquired for a building scheme. If noble Lords will forgive my saying so, I cannot help thinking that there has been some exaggeration in this talk of a threat to the Abbey. I invite the noble Lord, Lord Rea, to go with me and see
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what it is that is threatened. If a new building is erected on the Abingdon Street site, the passer-by in Abingdon Street will no longer be able to see the wall which surrounds the Chapter's garden. He will no longer be able to see the public lavatory which adorns that wall. He will no longer see the back of the Victorian building which, I believe, houses the Industrial Court. On the other hand, the scheme of development will provide for the demolition of No. 5 Palace Yard, which is on the site wanted to complete the set-up of the King George V Memorial Scheme.
In reply to the reference to the Jewel Tower. I may say that it is our intention to open up the approaches to the Jewel Tower, that interesting survival of the Old Palace of Westminster, to which, if my history is correct, Charles I resorted after his unsuccessful attempt on the five Members. The completion of the Poets' Corner clearance scheme by the removal of No. 5 Old Palace Yard, as approved by Resolution of both Houses of Parliament as long ago as 1939, will add to the amenities of the Abbey surroundings, and I am confident that it should be possible to erect a building on the site adjoining Abingdon Street which, whilst enabling us to overcome the deficiencies of accommodation in the Palace of Westminster, will not impair the amenities of this historic neighbourhood. In the light of what I have endeavoured to convey to your Lordships, I hope that the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, will now be sufficiently satisfied to withdraw his Motion.
5.41 p.m.
EARL STANHOPE: My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble Lord opposite for what he has said. Perhaps I may be allowed to explain shortly one or two things on which I think the noble Lord is not quite clear. He asked us why the Committee suggested acquiring the Abingdon Street site. I have tried to explain that it was in order to provide a flat for the Lord Chancellor and, perhaps, for one or two other officers of both Houses of Parliament. In fact, the Lord Chancellor is now accommodated in the Palace of Westminster, but the Yeoman-Usher is not. Where he lives I do not know it may be miles away. So, at any rate, there is something that might be done there. One thing that was clear to

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every member of the Committee was this: that all Members of another place who came before us suggested that the House of Lords should have our Committee rooms on the other side of Abingdon Street, so that the House of Commons could take over our Committee rooms just outside this Chamber. Similarly, every member of the House of Lords suggested that Members of another place should find their accommodation for interviewing their constituents, and so on, somewhere outside the Palace, either in Bridge Street or elsewhere.
It was made clear to every member of the Committee that no member of either House of Parliament would be expected to cross the street and go very far from the Chamber. Otherwise, if an unexpected Division took place, it would mean that members would be unable to get back in time. Therefore, the only real way by which accommodation can be found for Members of Parliament so that they can see their constituents, consult people, have Committee rooms and so on, is by adopting something in the nature of Sir Charles Barry's scheme. The noble Lord said that the scheme would mean that the buildings would project into the roadway. I am not quite sure whether he is right. I have not a scale to measure the plans. He may be right and I may be wrong. He may not have observed that the present footpath would become a covered footway colonnaded. Those of your Lordships who went out yesterday afternoon, and saw the public waiting in the rain to get into the Houses of Parliament, will realise the advantage of having a covered footway.
It was the noble Viscount, Lord Mersey, who objected to hiding the Great Hall of Westminster. I think, if noble Lords will go and look at it, they will agree with me that that would be an advantage, and not otherwise. At some period the roadway has been raised by something like twelve or fifteen feet, with the result that one looks down on the Great Hall of Westminster, instead of looking up. Unfortunately, the whole of the proportions of the Hall have been destroyed and, what is more, all sorts of excrescences have been built between the buttresses, completely ruining the outside of the Great Hall. I am strongly in
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favour of everybody being given a chance of seeing the inside of the Great Hall: it is magnificent. But in my view the outside has been ruined. Why Lord Morrison thinks that people would have to go out into the middle of Parliament Square to see Big Ben, I do not know. I can assure him—as he will see if he will look at the plans again—that Sir Charles Barry's scheme is for buildings that are low, and Big Ben will be a long way above them. Therefore, people will not have to go out into the roadway to see the clock. I will say nothing further now, except to thank the noble Lord for agreeing that both Houses of Parliament should see the future scheme. I hope that he now agrees that the knowledge and experience of this House are infinitely superior to those shown in another place. And that is why the scheme which was passed by another place has been criticised, and properly criticised, here to-day. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
5.46 p.m.
LORD AREHIBALD: My Lords, we are expecting a Message from another place concerning the Leasehold Properties (Temporary Provisions) Bill. I suggest that, as we have concluded the business on the Order Paper, we adjourn during pleasure. We may receive the Message by 6.45. If it comes earlier, I will let noble Lords know.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

LEASEHOLD PROPERTIES (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) BILL
8.1 p.m.
Returned from the Commons, with certain of the Amendments agreed to; one other disagreed to, but an Amendment made in lieu thereof; and certain others disagreed to, with a Reason for such disagreement.
House adjourned at two minutes past eight o'clock.