HL Deb 24 July 1951 vol 172 cc1155-88

3.16 p.m.

Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly:

[The EARL OF DROGHEDA in the Chair]

Clauses 1 to 4 agreed to.

Clause 5:

Procedure

(2) The Lord Chancellor may also make rules prescribing the manner in which applications under the said provisions are to be made, prescribing any matter which under any of those provisions is to be prescribed, making provision as to the evidence which may be admitted in proceedings under those provisions and generally for regulating the conduct of such proceedings

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment and the next are drafting Amendments, designed to ensure that the Lord Chancellor will have power, by rule, to designate the appropriate court for proceedings under any of the provisions of Part I of the Bill which apply to England and Wales. The alteration is needed because, as Clause 5 (1) stands, power is available only in respect of applications under "the foregoing provisions" of this Part of the Bill, and the power is needed to designate the appropriate court for the purpose of Clause 13 (4). Clause 13 (4) enables a court to give directions in certain cases for the restoration of property, and so on, which has been wrongfully taken in breach of the Bill. A Service man may wish to seek that relief independently of any claim for damages, and rules must provide to which court he is to go in the particular circumstances. Therefore I am asking your Lordships to sanction leaving out the word "foregoing," and, by the following Amendment, inserting the words "applying to England and Wales." I beg to move the first Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 8, line 44, leave out ("foregoing").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I beg to move the next Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 8, line 44, after ("Act") insert ("applying to England and Wales").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR had given notice of several Amendments to subsections (2) and (3), the first being, in subsection (2) after "made" to insert "and." The noble and learned Viscount said: This and the succeeding Amendments—that is Amendments 3, 4, 5, and 6, on the Marshalled List—all go together, and are moved for this purpose. If your Lordships will look at the top of page 9, you will find that the Lord Chancellor has power to make rules— making provision as to the evidence which may be admitted in proceedings under those provisions…. The Lord Chancellor has many duties cast upon him. He does not want to take upon himself, by rules or otherwise, the review and restating of the whole of the law of evidence. The substance of the matter is this—and we can borrow from the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, 1943. There was a rule which enabled the county courts to look at any letter or other document sent or tendered to it, and to admit the letter or document as prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it, if in all the circumstances it was thought just to do so. That was a useful power, because a man serving in the Forces abroad could not make an affidavit or get evidence submitted in proper form, proving that a letter was in fact written. What I am proposing to do by this Amendment is to limit the generality of those words and to make it open to the Lord Chancellor, upon appropriate rules, to make provision on the lines of the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, so that a letter or document, seeming to be bona fide, may be accepted as proof of the facts asserted in the letter or document. It is with that object that I move the first of these Amendments. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 9, line 3, after ("made") insert ("and").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

VISCOUNT SIMON

I venture to think that the change which the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor has indicated is an important one, and I imagine that it will be approved. As the Bill came before us, it certainly appeared that the clause would have given the noble and learned Viscount a much wider power than I feel sure he would wish to exercise, and a power that I do not think ought to be given. The possession of a general power as to the evidence that may be admitted would speedily put the Lord Chancellor in the position of a totalitarian judge: whatever he chose to say should be admitted would be admitted, and there would be nothing more to say. I do not think my noble and learned friend would wish to be in that position, and I am sure that most people would not wish to put him in that position. But it is a different thing to do what is provided in the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, for which I had some responsibility. It is desirable that information which, technically, cannot be proved by the production of a letter should none the less be regarded as adequately proved when it is shown that such a letter is genuinely in existence. A letter from a proper source, signed by a proper person, is, for all practical purposes, an excellent way of discovering facts of this sort. It is desirable to make proper provision for this, and I understand that that is what this Amendment does. For my part, I regard it as a wise change.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I beg to move the further Amendments.

Amendments moved—

Page 9, line 4, leave out from ("prescribed") to end of line 5.

Page 9, line 6, leave out ("such proceedings") and insert ("proceedings under the said provisions.

(3)Rules so made may in particular make provision for enabling a court, for the purpose of hearing and determining an application under the said provisions of this Part of this Act or in exercising any discretion for the purposes of the said provisions of this Part of this Act, to admit any document as evidence of any facts stated therein.")

Page 9, line 9, leave out ("foregoing") and insert ("said").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in subsection (3), to leave out "such" (where that word first occurs). The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment and the three following are all drafting. On the present wording of subsections (3) and (4) of Clause 5 there is just a doubt whether there is sufficient rule-making power to ensure that, in proper circumstances, applications may be made on behalf of absent Service men, and that, where they are so made, the court may, if it thinks fit, grant a right of audience to the person making the application. The county court already has power by Statute to allow any person to address the court on behalf of a party. In the circumstances postulated in this Bill, it is desirable that there should be power by rule, if thought fit, to enable the High Court to hear such applicant in person, just as it would have had power to hear the Service man in person if he were present. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 9, line 12, leave out ("such").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I beg to move the following Amendments.

Amendments moved—

Page 9, line 13, leave out ("the application") and insert ("any application under those provisions")

Page 9, line 23, leave out ("so treated by") and insert ("which")

Page 9, line 23, after ("court") insert ("has under the rules, power to treat").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved to leave out subsection (5). The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment and the succeeding Amendment may, perhaps, be considered together. They come to little more than drafting Amendments. The words proposed to be left out were intended to make it plain beyond all argument that the reference in Clause 2 (2) (a) to the levying of a distress includes levying of a distress for rates, and to provide the requisite machinery for enabling applica- tion for the issue of a warrant and for leave to proceed to levy a distress to be heard together. In fact, there is already sufficient power to do this by rule, and to that extent the subsection was misconceived. As to the declaratory provision about levying a distress for rates, it has been thought better to insert such a provision in the definition clause—Clause 6, and the second Amendment achieves this object. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 9, line 27, leave out subsection (5).—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 5, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 6 [Interpretation of sections two to five]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 10, line 13, at end insert— ("(2) It is hereby declared that in this Part of this Act the expression 'distress' includes distress for rates.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 6, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 7 to 10 agreed to.

Clause 11 [Appropriate courts and procedure]:

LORD MORRISON

This Amendment is purely drafting. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 15, line 31, after ("Act") insert ("applying to Scotland").—(Lord Morrison.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 11, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 12 agreed to.

3.28 p.m.

Clause 13 [Effect of failure to observe restrictions under Part I]:

On Question, Whether Clause 13 shall stand part of the Bill?

VISCOUNT SIMON

I should like to make an observation on this clause. I am not suggesting that it should not be in the Bill, though I do not think there is any such section in the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act. There are, however, one or two points about it to which I venture to draw attention now, and I have no doubt that the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, if he thinks them worthy of consideration, will consider them. Clause 13 provides what is to happen in the case where a person who is enforcing his remedy against the Service man proceeds to enforce it without obtaining the leave which, under Clause 2, he ought to obtain prior to enforcing it. It may be that he is enforcing a judgment, or it may be what is sometimes called a self-help remedy—for example, a distraint on goods for rent. Apparently the scheme of the clause is that, even though the person who proceeds without getting leave enforces his remedy, the effect of what he does will not be altered—subject to something which is in subsection (4). There may be cases in which the person has acted innocently, through some mistake or excuse which ought to be allowed for. On the other hand, it may be the case that the person has acted flagrantly, not caring whether the law requires him to get previous leave or not, possibly even "trying it on "in the hope that nobody would object. The purpose of the clause seems to be to draw a distinction between these two cases.

Subsection (2) says: In any action for damages for conversion or other proceedings which lie by virtue of any such omission, failure or contravention, the court may take account of the conduct of the defendant with a view, if the court thinks fit, to awarding exemplary damages in respect of the wrong sustained by the plaintiff. I agree, on the other hand, that subsection (3) makes an absolutely necessary provision. That subsection says: If … the court is satisfied that the defendant acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the omission, failure or contravention, the court may relieve the defendant from liability in respect thereof. The point that I want to mention, and which I should be grateful if the Lord Chancellor would consider, is: What is meant by "the court"? This clause seems to be drawn on the assumption that there are no such things as juries. But it is possible to have a jury in a proper case, in an action for damages for conversion, or other proceedings. There will be such cases. It is always important to know what is the function of the judge, and what is the function of the jury. I rather wonder whether it would be wise to leave in doubt what those functions are—if this does leave it in doubt.

Does the clause mean, for example, that if the judge thinks there is anything which could be criticised in the conduct of a person who has acted without getting leave, he has to tell the jury: "You may award exemplary damages"—which means punitive damages—"against him"? That is a very wide power to give. I do not know that the words "exemplary damages" have ever appeared in an Act of Parliament before. It is really a phrase used in the law books, because, for many kinds of cases which do not arise out of a contract, it is undoubtedly open to a jury to give, in the one case, nominal damages—the farthing of which we sometimes hear in libel actions—or, on the other hand, damages which are more than a measure of the injury actually done, in order to mark their feeling, that the person who has to pay the damages ought to be made to suffer. I find further difficulty in subsection (3) when I read that … the court … may relieve the defendant from liability. … I cannot think that means that the jury has anything to do with it; that, surely, must mean the judge alone. I am not very clear when I look at subsection (3) how these duties are to be divided.

Still more difficult do I find it to give proper interpretation to the words "the court" in subsection (4), if you imagine a case in which there is a jury. Subsection (4) says: In so far as it appears to the appropriate court to be practicable to remedy the results of any such omission, failure or contravention. … I do not know whether the Lord Chancellor has considered the point, but does that mean that the jury is to be asked what they think about it? I find it rather difficult to be sure. I have still more difficulty when I come to the fourth line of subsection (4), where it says: … the court may give any such directions for restoration of property. … That, I should have thought, must be done by the judge, even though a jury is sitting with him. I hope that I shall not be thought to be captious over this. It is no good leaving the matter in doubt. While I do not propose anything definite, it seems to me that the Lord Chancellor and those assisting him might consider whether something should not be put into the Bill to make the point clear. I do not think there is any definition of "the court" for this purpose in the Bill—sometimes it might be a county court, and sometimes the High Court. The difficulty is that we have become accustomed to imagine that cases that used to be tried by a judge and jury are now tried by the judge alone. That is by no means the law of the land at the moment. I do not think that the clause really makes provision as to how the duties are to be divided between the two elements in a court which consists of judge and jury.

3.35 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for the benefit of his consideration of this matter. Having listened to him, I feel that I had better look at the point carefully. He is perfectly right as to the structure of the clause as a whole. Normally speaking, I should say that in cases arising otherwise than out of contract—cases arising out of tort—damages are not strictly limited. For instance, in a libel action you are able to award a farthing damages, if you think that is all the character of the plaintiff merits; or, having regard to the conduct of the defendant throughout the trial, you can award damages which no doubt exceed any monetary loss sustained by the plaintiff. That is the general rule with regard to damages in tort. We are stating it here because there seem to have been some doubts about the generality and the application of that principle.

However, the principle of this is plain. This Bill differs from the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, and difficulty arises owing to the fact that, whereas the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, which we had during the war, applied to all His Majesty's lieges, this Bill applies only to a limited class of people—namely, broadly speaking, Service men. They have a special privilege which others of His Majesty's lieges do not have. Consequently, it is necessary to make up your mind in each particular case whether you are dealing with a Service man or with an ordinary member of the public. It may well be that in some cases it is difficult for the other party to find out. In some cases he will just assume, rather recklessly, and perhaps to his own advantage, that the man has not the privilege of being a Service man. In other cases, notwithstanding his best endeavours, he may believe that the debtor is not a Service man, and in perfect good faith he may proceed against him. Broadly speaking, the proposition we want to establish is this: that if the man has acted reasonably and properly, and taken all proper precautions, and then proceeds against the other man as though he were not a Service man, whereas he is, then, subject to subsection (4), the creditor shall be protected. If, on the other hand, he has neglected to take proper precautions, and has assumed that a man who is a Service man is an ordinary member of the public, then he shall be subject to exemplary damages.

I believe it is true to say that the words "exemplary damages" have never been in an Act of Parliament before in this sense, though there have been, if my recollection is right—I cannot assert this—two cases of an Act of Parliament recently in which it has been said that the court shall not award exemplary damages. I believe the words have been used, but in the negative rather than the positive sense. When we come to consider the words "the court," agree with the noble and learned Viscount that we are rather too ready to forget the old days when we had juries to a much greater extent than we have to-day. What I believe is intended is that it shall be for the judge to say whether there is any evidence of conduct on the part of the defendant which would justify an award of exemplary damages; and if he says that there is some evidence, then it is for the jury to take the matter into consideration, and to decide whether or not that evidence convinces them that it is a case in which exemplary damages ought to be awarded. That is the intention. I am not sure whether we use the appropriate language in using the words "the court," particularly having regard to the use of the same words in the next subsection, where it seems to me, I admit quite frankly, to be plainly the judge, as distinct from the jury. That leads me to think that I had better look at the words again to see whether we have achieved what is our object. Our intention was that that should be the function of the judge where he is trying a case with a jury. There is little enough time between now and the Report stage, but I will have the matter looked at in the meantime to see what the position is.

VISCOUNT SIMON

It is more difficult in subsections (3) and (4) than it is in subsection (2).

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I think so, too. I will look at it and see whether the ingenuity of the draftsmen can improve the words to make sure that our intention—and, I think, our common intention—is properly carried out.

LORD SALTOUN

I do not want to delay your Lordships, and I hope the Lord Chancellor will excuse me if I ask him to enlighten my ignorance. Is not a penalty which is punitive contrary to English Common Law? Is it not a mistake to introduce it into a Statute, if it can be avoided?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The noble Lord has it wrong. It is not really that. If there is in a contract a provision that a breach of that contract, a delay, or something of that sort, shall involve a certain amount of money, it cannot be enforced. That is contrary to the law, because it is regarded as a penalty and not as a genuine pre-estimate of the damage. This is a different proposition. We are dealing with damages for tortious action, and the general principle of the law is that for a tortious action the damages are, as we say, at large. The noble Lord may know that if there is a libel action with an accusation which is persisted in up to the very end, and perhaps with a good deal of cross-examination and that sort of thing, the jury are perfectly entitled to take all those things into consideration and award substantial damages. That is what we call exemplary damages. A jury are entitled to give swingeing damages. We want that principle applied in these cases where a man has acted carelessly, but, on the other hand, where he has taken all proper precautions and has been let down because of his information, we want to see him properly protected.

LORD SALTOUN

I am much obliged to the noble and learned Viscount.

Clause 13 agreed to.

3.42 p.m.

Clause 14 [Period of residence protection, and scope of three succeeding sections (protection of tenure under lettings at a rent)]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

These are drafting Amendments, consequential on the addition in another place of a new clause, which is now Clause 17. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 17, line 25, leave out ("two") and insert ("three").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Amendment moved— Page 18, line 12, leave out ("two") and insert ("three").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 14, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 15 to 19 agreed to.

Clause 20 [Modifications of Rent Acts as respects occupation by employees]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved to add to subsection (3): or will have such accommodation at their disposal at or before the time when it is proposed that the order or judgment should take effect. The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment raises a point of some importance. We have provided in this Bill that in certain cases the court shall be able to make an order for possession, notwithstanding the fact that alternative accommodation is not available. It has been pointed out to us that the factor which ought to be considered is not merely whether alternative accommodation was, at the moment of the bringing of the proceeding, available, but whether alternative accommodation is available at the time of the making of the order. Imagine a situation of this sort. Let us suppose that a level-crossing keeper or a lock-keeper is called up. The landlord may have to say: "I am sorry, but I require the use of this cottage for the new level-crossing keeper"—or, it may be, lock-keeper. He may be able to lay his hand on his heart and say, "I have no alternative accommodation to offer you." But if in truth he knows that he is shortly going to have alternative accommodation available, then it is wrong that he should be able to turn this man out simply by using the present tense and saying, "I have no alternative accommodation." He must have regard not merely to what he has, but to what he will have. Accordingly, we have put down this Amendment, which limits and restricts the right of the landlord in these circumstances, not merely causing him to look at the present, but also to look at the future. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 28, line 7, at end insert ("or will have such accommodation at their disposal at or before the time when it is proposed that the order or judgment should take effect.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)

THE MARQUESS of READING

We agree that the insertion of these words is a substantial and necessary improvement. We are glad to see their appearance in the Bill.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 20, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 21 [Modifications of Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948, where tenant is a Service man]:

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

moved to omit Clause 21. The noble Earl said: I am moving the omission of Clause 21 for the purpose of asking the Lord Chancellor what procedure is intended under this Bill, particularly in the case of men who are serving and who, for one reason or another, may succeed or become entitled to an agricultural holding. It seems to me that in such cases the matter cannot be allowed to remain as it is. It is obvious that some action has to be taken, otherwise the land will simply run wild. I am asking what the position will be, particularly, in the case of a man who is serving and who succeeds to a property because his father dies. Perhaps he cannot get compassionate leave, or perhaps he does not want compassionate leave. What action is proposed in that case? As the law stands at present the man is unable to let that land, as was formerly the case, owing to the Agricultural Holdings Act. It seems possible, that the land might be allowed to remain in an unfertile and uncultivated condition. I shall be grateful if the noble and learned. Viscount can explain what is intended shall happen in such a case. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 28, line 20, leave out Clause 21.—(The Earl of Selkirk.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I am grateful to the noble Earl for raising this matter on Second Reading, because it gave me notice in advance of the point he had in mind, and I have had an opportunity of consulting with my right honourable friend the Minister of Agriculture. I will answer the noble Earl in this way. In the first place, let it be remembered that in certain cases the Ministry of Labour have the power and the right to screen. It may be that the man is engaged in such an important task that he should not be called up. I do not say that that is general, but it may happen in some cases. Secondly, be it observed—and the noble Earl will bear this in mind—that the provisions of Clause 21 of the Bill relating to agricultural holdings do not require the Ministry of Agriculture to withhold his consent to a notice to quit simply because the tenant concerned has been called up. They require only that, whenever notice to quit is served on such a tenant, and he in turn serves the necessary counter-notice within the period prescribed by Section 21 of the Agricultural Holdings Act, the Minister shall take into account, as one of the factors to be considered, the fact that the man has been called up. If the other factors—such, for instance, as letting the land fall into a state of absolute neglect, and so on—outweigh the considerations of hardship which consequently arise, the Minister may still give his consent to the notice and allow the tenant to be turned out.

Clause 21 of the Bill also requires not only that the Minister shall take into consideration the fact that the man has been called up but that the call-up shall also be taken into account if the issue is referred, under Section 25 of the Agricultural Holdings Act, to the Agricultural Land Tribunal for decision. Here again, there is nothing to say that that consideration shall be overriding. It is merely a consideration which must be weighed in the balance, in conjunction with the other considerations about the land becoming derelict. As the noble Earl will understand, there is a presumption that a man who actually leaves for military service will have been able to make reasonably satisfactory arrangements for the farming of his holding while he is away. If those left in charge fail to do their job properly—and, incidentally, fail to take the advice of the National Agricultural Advisory Service, which is always available to them—they will be prejudicing the man's position, by increasing the likelihood of the Minister giving his consent to any notice to quit served by the landlord, on the ground that the holding is being allowed to deteriorate in the tenant's absence.

I think there is a fair safeguard against the danger which the noble Earl envisages. I entirely agree, of course, that we must prevent land falling into a state of absolute disrepair which will damage that land and also the neighbour's land. We must prevent that but, at the same time, we must have due regard to the hardship considerations. The only way in which we can do that is to not make one or the other absolutely prevail, but to have these considerations weighed in the balance by the appropriate Minister.

LORD SALTOUN

The noble and learned Viscount has spoken so candidly that I hesitate to speak, but there are one or two points which may be of interest, and which proved very important during the last war. One is that a large number of proprietors or tenants of small holdings are entered on the books of labour exchanges as "Labourers." Since that is so, they are classified as labourers when they join up. This is not the case with farmers. The fact that it is so with smallholders has militated against their securing any compassionate reliefs. The second thing is that in the spring, if a smallholding is left unworked for a week or two it is almost fatal. The noble and learned Viscount knows, I am sure that One weed makes seven years' seed.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

That is true, and we must guard against it if we can.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

In view of what the noble and learned Viscount has said, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 21 agreed to.

3.52 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

moved after Clause 21, to insert the following new clause—

Facilities for action on behalf of men serving abroad in proceedings as to tenancies

".—(1) Where in the course of any proceedings brought before a court under the Rent Restrictions Acts, or of any proceedings consequential upon the making of a reference or application to a rent tribunal under the Furnished Houses (Rent Control) Act, 1946, or under this Part of this Act, it appears to the court or tribunal—

  1. (a) that the proceedings relate to a tenancy vested in a service man;
    2. 1169
  2. (b) that a person other than the service man desires to take or has purported to take, a step in the proceedings on behalf of the service man at a time when he is or was serving abroad; and
  3. (c) that the said person, in seeking or purporting to take that step, is or was acting in good faith in the interests of the service man, and is or was a fit person to take that step on his behalf, but is or was not duly authorised to do so,
the count or tribunal may direct that the said person shall be deemed to be, or to have been, duly authorised to take that step on behalf of the service man.

(2) The provisions of the preceding subsection apply in relation to the institution of proceedings before a court as they apply in relation to the taking of a step in such proceedings, and apply in relation to the making of a reference or application to a rent tribunal as they apply in relation to the taking of a step in proceedings consequential upon the making of such a reference or application; and references in that subsection to proceedings brought or a reference or application made as therein mentioned include references to proceedings which purport to be so brought or to a reference or application which purports to be so made, as the case may be.

(3) Where in the course of any proceedings a court or tribunal gives a direction under subsection (1) of this section, the person to whom the direction relates shall have the like right of audience in those proceedings as the service man himself would have.

(4) The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries may make regulations—

  1. (a) for enabling a counter-notice under subsection (1) of section twenty-four of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948, to be served on behalf of a service man at a time when he is serving abroad, in a case where a notice to quit is given to him as mentioned in subsection (1) of section twenty-one of this Act; and
  2. (b) for enabling any act or proceedings consequential upon the service of a counter-notice under subsection (1) of the said section twenty-four to be performed or conducted on behalf of a service man at a time when he is serving abroad, either in such a case as is mentioned in the preceding paragraph or in a case where subsection (5) of section twenty-one of this Act applies in relation to the service man.

(5) Regulations made under the last preceding subsection may contain such incidental and consequential provisions as may appear to the said Minister to be necessary or expedient for the purposes of the regulations.

(6) The power to make regulations under subsection (4) of this section shall be exercisable by statutory instrument, which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(7) References in this section to a time when a service man is serving abroad are references to a time when he is performing a period of relevant service and is outside the United Kingdom."

The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment arises in the part of the Bill which is to protect a man's home. It applies only to that part of the Bill. There are times when, in protecting a home, some active step has to be taken. Suppose a Service man is abroad: he cannot take any active step. It is most unlikely that he will have left anybody with power of attorney to take any step on his behalf, and there must be someone to act for him. In normal cases it would be the wife. We have to make it plain that the wife has alocus standi and can act for him; and that is the object of this clause. In another place we put down on Report stage a new clause which was rather hastily drafted. After some discussion it was withdrawn, and this is a new effort to deal with the matter.

The problem arises in this way. The object of Part II is to provide the Service man with security of tenure of his family home while he is away on service. There are certain existing curbs, such as the Rent Restrictions Acts and, indeed, the Agricultural Holdings Act. If he is a Service man, a critical time may arrive when he is out of the country in the course of his duty, and he may have gone away without giving anybody express authority to take the necessary action on his behalf should occasion arise during his absence. It is obviously important in such a case to provide that some suitable person should be empowered to take the necessary action on his behalf. Generally it would be his wife, but the problem may arise even in the case of an unmarried Service man who may have someone living with him to look after his home in his absence, or to look after his children. That is the object of this clause.

I should like to draw attention to one more point. In subsection (1) (b) of the proposed clause your Lordships will see the words that a person other than the Service man desires to take or has purported to take a step in the proceedings on behalf of the Service man at a time when he is or was serving abroad…. The verb in the present tense—"is"—squares with the words Service man desires to take … The past tense: … has purported to take … squares with the words: … was serving abroad … That is to say, the man was serving abroad at the time when his wife has taken or purports to take proceedings on his behalf. He would ratify that retrospectively, as it were. I think that is an essential part of the protection. I beg to move that this new clause be there inserted.

Amendment moved— After Clause 21, insert the said new clause.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

THE MARQUESS OF READING

We are in complete sympathy with the purpose of this clause because we realise that in most cases the Service man is not likely to have left formal power of attorney which would enable anybody to act on his behalf. At the same time we think it is drawn in extremely wide terms. Subsection 1(c) says that the court has to be satisfied: … that the said person …is or was acting in good faith in the interests of the Service man, and is or was a fit person to take that step on his behalf, but is or was not duly authorised to do so. That would let in a large number of people, very respectable in themselves, acting from the best motives but perhaps from a misguided sense of public duty, who might wish to insert themselves into this position without any particular qualification for it.

VISCOUNT SIMON

They might even be rivals.

THE MARQUESS OF READING

They might. I see the grammatical point which the noble and learned Viscount mentioned. At the same time, I think it will cause doubts in the minds of some to have the words: "… or was serving abroad" appearing in the clause. I do not know whether some rearrangement of the wording in this subsection can be made in order to make the position a little clearer. It might be a little confusing in its present form. Subject to those criticisms, which may appear superficial but nevertheless are of some importance, we are entirely in favour of the clause.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I agree that there is a danger from the rather ostentatious friend who thinks that he or she is qualified and ought to defend the Service man. The best answer, I think, is that given in subsection (1) of the proposed clause, that: "… the court or tribunal may direct"—not "must" direct. I do not think we can do more than leave this matter to the discretion of the judge. But I will certainly look at the point again.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clauses 22 and 23 agreed to.

Clause 24 [Protection during short period of training]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment and the next three are to do to Clause 24 what we have done to Clause 5: that is, to extend the rule-making power in a limited sense. I have already described this object, and I do not think I need discuss it any further. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 33, line 17, leave out from ("court") to ("to") in line 18.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I beg to move this Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 33, line 45, after ("section") insert ("taken out any judicial process with a view to, or in the course of, the enforcement of a judgment or order or").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I beg to move this Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 34, line 2, after ("proceeding") insert ("to the enforcement of the judgement or order or").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I have already dealt with the reasons for this Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 34, line 5, at beginning insert ("The references in section five and subsection (1) of section eleven of this Act to the provisions of Part I of this Act shall include references to the provisions of this section, and ").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 24, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 25 agreed to.

Clause 26:

Renewal of tenancy expiring during period of service or within two months thereafter

(3) In the preceding provisions of this section the expression "proprietor" means, in the case of a business or practice carried on by a partnership firm, a partner in the firm on terms and conditions entitling him to not less than one-half of the profits of the firm, and, in the case of a business or practice carried on by a company, a person holding shares in the company amounting in nominal value to not less than one-half of the issued share capital of the company.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved to add to subsection (3): and, in relation to a business or practice carried on by a partnership firm or by a company, references in those provisions to the proprietor of the business or practice include references to a person being one of two such partners in the firm or, as the case may be, being one of two persons each holding such shares in the company, and references to the working proprietor of the business or practice shall be construed accordingly.

The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment shows the ingenuity of the draftsmen—I am now dealing with the Part of the Act which deals with the extension of the lease for business premises. During the Committee stage in another place, it was provided that the qualification for proprietorship should be reduced from 75 to 50 per cent. of a partnership. It followed, of course, that you might get two people each having exactly 50 per cent. of the partnership. Consequently, there might be some argument as to who was the proprietor—and, indeed, whether there was any person whom one might describe as the proprietor. If that were so, both of them might fail to get any relief, neither being the proprietor. As the whole operation of Part III hinges upon the fact of a man being, "the proprietor" at the appropriate times, it is important that we should have some provision dealing with the situation where there are two partners, each of them earning 50 per cent. of the partnership business, and the partnership business holds the lease of the premises. For that reason, I suggest that your Lordships should approve this Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 35, line 45, at end insert the said words.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 26, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 27 agreed to.

Clause 28 [Application for grant of new tenancy]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

In the case of a tenancy for a fixed term, subsection (2) of the clause as at present drafted gives the landlord the right to require the tenant to elect whether or not he is going to apply for a new tenancy. Obviously, the same principle should apply in the notice to quit case as in the effluxion of time case, and the Solicitor-General, during the debate on the Report stage in another place, undertook to consider the introduction of this Amendment. In the notice to quit case, the position of the Service man is fully protected by making the question of putting the tenant to his election dependent on the notice to quit being given so as to take effect at least four months ahead. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 38, line 10, leave out from beginning to ("the") and insert ("come to an end—

  1. (a) by effluxion of time, or
  2. (b) by notice to quit given by the landlord so as to expire not less than four months after the giving of the notice,").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is consequential on the Amendment to which we have just agreed. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 38, line 13, leave out ("expire") and insert ("come to an end").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment is drafting. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 38, line 20, leave out ("such a notice") and insert ("a notice under this subsection").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is drafting. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 38, line 22, leave out ("that period") and insert ("the said period of one month").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 28, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 29 [Power of court to grant new tenancy]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment is to take out the reference in Clause 29 to the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) Act, 1946, which has come to an end and is no longer on the Statute Book. It came to an end by effluxion of time; it was limited to five years. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 40, line 24, leave out from ("order") to ("there") in line 27.℄( The lord chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 29, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 30 to 36 agreed to.

Clause 37 [Application by Service man for renewal of tenancy of business premises]:

LORD MORRISON

This Amendment is a Scottish counterpart of a similar Amendment made to Clause 26, at page 35, line 45. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 45, line 12, at end insert ("and, in relation to a business or practice carried on by a partnership firm or by a company, references in those provisions to the proprietor of the business or practice include references to a person being one of two such partners in the firm or, as the case may be, being one of two persons each holding such shares in the company, and references to the working proprietor of the business or practice shall be construed accordingly").—(Lord Morrison.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 37, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 38 to 44 agreed to.

Clause 45 [General provisions as to payments to make up civil remuneration]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

At first sight, "notification" may seem to be a very different thing from "death." I am proposing to substitute "death" for "notification." The reason is that in an earlier draft of the Bill we had the words "notification of death." "Notification of death" has now gone, and "notification "no longer appears in the Bill; so we must have "death" instead of "notification." I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 51, line 36, leave out ("notification") and insert ("death").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

moved to omit the proviso to subsection (3). The noble and learned Viscount said: This is the Part of the Bill which enables local authorities and the like kind of bodies to make up the balance of civil pay. At the bottom of page 51, your Lordships will see this proviso: Provided that, in determining the sum to be paid under this subsection regard shall be had to any pension or other sum which may be paid or granted out of public or charitable funds to or for the benefit of the widow … Several of your Lordships took the point of view: Why should we have regard to charitable funds? You will find that the next Amendment on the Marshalled List is to leave out the words "or charitable." I have done far better than that. I suggest that we leave out the whole proviso. As this is a matter of discretion, and not of compulsory power in the making up of civil pay, I do not think there is any need for this proviso, and I suggest that we take it out altogether. Incidentally, the Amendment has the effect of taking out the words "or charitable," which might give rise to some controversy. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 51, line 40, leave out from beginning to end of line 44.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

THE MARQUESS OF READING

I am very much obliged to the noble and learned Viscount for having removed altogether this proviso from the Bill. He knows that there is on the Paper immediately following this Amendment an Amendment of mine put down because I could not reconcile myself to an obligation being placed on the local authority, in these circumstances, requiring them to take into account all gifts from charitable funds. I need not labour the point, fortunately, because the noble and learned Viscount has met us in ample measure by removing the whole of the proviso. I am very much obliged to the noble and learned Viscount for his consideration of our objection.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

4.10 p.m.

On Question, Whether Clause 45, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?

LORD LLEWELLIN

I am afraid I have not given the noble and learned Viscount any notice of this point, but may I ask one question in regard to subsection (4)? So far as I can understand it, that subsection means that if the provisions of the Justices of the Peace Act come into force, and, in consequence, the salary of a justices' clerk or his assistant is raised, he will not be able to claim the difference between his salary in the Service and his increased salary as a justices' clerk. I am not sure whether I am right in reading the subsection in that way, but, if I am, it seems to me that we are treating justices' clerks in a different way from that in which local government officers will be treated, because presumably local government officers will receive the difference between their existing Service pay and whatever is the rate of pay for their job at the time, whether it has been increased or not. I notice that this was a completely new clause introduced in Committee in another place. There was no discussion in regard to subsection (4), and it seems to have been passed over in silence. I should like to ask whether the noble and learned Viscount can give any reasons for it having been included at all. By this subsection these officers seem to be treated in a different way from others.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I confess I was not prepared for this question, and I do not really know what the answer is. If the noble Lord will put down an Amendment on Report stage, I shall have an opportunity in the meantime of finding out precisely what the subsection means. All I can say at the present moment is that the time of the coming into force of the 1949 Act would alter the basis of their remuneration and dislocate the operation of the provision. But I do not quite understand that at the moment, and if the noble Lord will approach me before or on Report stage I will be properly instructed and will be able to give him his answer.

LORD LLEWELLIN

I am much obliged. I will put down an Amendment for that purpose.

Clause 45, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 46 to 52 agreed to.

Clause 53 [Protection of life policies (industrial assurance, and collecting societies)]:

On Question, Whether Clause 53 shall stand part of the Bill?

THE MARQUESS OF READING

We have put down no Amendments to this clause, but there is a question which I think I intimated I should like to put to the noble and learned Viscount in regard to page 55,line 10. Clause 53 (2) defines the expression "relevant premium" in its context in the provisions of this Part of the Bill, and lays down what conditions have to be complied with in order to bring it within the definition. One of the conditions is: that at the beginning of the period of service one year's premiums or more had been paid on the policy on which it fell due. My question is directed to the period of one year. It is, I think, felt by some of the organisations which are mainly concerned to administer this kind of insurance that one year is a somewhat alarmingly brief period, and that its very shortness might lead to an abuse of the protection extended by the Act. The noble and learned Viscount will remember that during the war, I think in 1940, an Act, admittedly of general application, was passed which extended certain protection against forfeitures of policy. That Act contained a somewhat similar clause but relating to a period of two years. That period has now been departed from in favour of one year, and the question I desire to ask is why the shorter period has been substituted in this Bill for the longer one appearing in the Act now upon the Statute Book.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

As the noble Marquess has said, during the war the period was two years, but that was laid down in an Act of general application. It was felt that as we are here dealing with a limited Bill applying to soldiers only, we ought to cut down the period which we had in war time and which applied to everybody. If it be said (and it may be) that we are being rather too kind and stretching the point rather too far in favour of the soldier, may I say that I would rather be accused of doing that than be accused the other way round. The reason we felt that we ought to depart from the principle of the war time two years, is because here we are dealing with a limited class, the very class we want to protect.

THE MARQUESS OF READING

I am much obliged to the noble and learned Viscount. Of course, we share his desire to give every protection to the Service man, but I was anxious to get the explanation on record.

Clause 53 agreed to.

Clause 54 [Protection of life policies (friendly societies other than collecting societies)]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 57, line 40, leave out ("that time") and insert ("the time when the forfeiture took place").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 54, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 55 agreed to.

Clause 56 [Provisions supplementary to the three preceding sections]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 60, line 27, leave out ("the prescribed form") and insert ("in such form as may be prescribed by regulations under this section").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 56, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 57 and 58 agreed to.

Clause 59 [Evidence as to performance of relevant service]:

THE MARQUESS OF READING had given notice of an Amendment, in subsection (1) after "shall" to insert: be issued by the Admiralty, Army Council, Air Council or Minister of Labour (as the case may be) to any person requesting it and appearing to them or him to be interested in the matter upon such terms and conditions, which may include the making of a charge, in such form and within such period from the making of the request as may from time to time be prescribed by regulations made under this Act by the Minister of Labour and National Service, which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament. (2) Such a certificate shall

The noble Marquess said: This is the most substantial of the Amendments which my noble friends and I have thought necessary to put down in regard to this Bill, and it is a matter which was very considerably discussed at all stages of the progress of the Bill through another place. It arises in this way. Part I of the Bill lays down that it is the purpose of the Bill to ensure that persons who, in certain circumstances, apart from the fact that the person against whom they are proceeding is a Service man would have the right to proceed to judgment or to carry out various other legal processes, shall not, if the person against whom they are proceeding is a Service man, proceed to enforce those remedies except with the leave of the court. But Clause 59 contains a provision to this effect: A certificate stating that a person has performed or is performing or is to perform a period of relevant service issued by the Admiralty, the Army Council or the Air Council, or, in special circumstances, such as when dealing with conscientious objectors, by the Minister of Labour and National Service— shall in all legal proceedings be sufficient evidence of the facts stated therein for the purposes of this Act except to any extent to which it is shown to be incorrect. What that clause says is that, where you have this situation, a certificate issued by any one of the three Service Departments, or by the Ministry of Labour, shall be evidence in legal proceedings. And that might be of very considerable assistance to the creditor, or whoever might be the person proceeding against the Service man, when he has to go to the court to obtain leave to carry his proceedings to their final end, and when, also—if he does not take every necessary precaution—he may find himself liable to the exemplary damages under Clause 13, to which the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, called attention a few moments ago.

There you have the position that, in order to get the leave of the court, the creditor has to show that his debtor is a Service man. The next step, according to this Bill, to help him to show that, is to say that a certificate shall be evidence. But there is a totally unbridged gap, in that what the Bill does not say is that it shall be anyone's duty—the duty of any of the Departments concerned—to provide that certificate. Therefore, you are left with the position that the creditor has to show that the man is a Service man. There may be a document, which can be produced to the court, to say that he is a Service man or to give other particulars about him, or which may show that he is not identifiable. But what does not exist is any machinery for saying that in order to help this person—indeed, in certain circumstances to help the Service man himself—it shall be the duty of the Department concerned (the creditor has to find out which Department) to produce a certificate giving, so far as they can, the necessary particulars from their records to say either (1) "This man is, according to our records, a serving soldier, sailor or airman", or (2) "He is, according to our records, not serving"; or (3) "So far as our records reveal the situation, he is not identifiable."

In order to make that procedure of any value to persons proceeding under this Bill, and seeking to protect themselves against possible actions for damages at a later stage, it is surely essential that they should not have to leave it to the caprice of the Department concerned as to whether they produce a certificate or not, but shall be able to turn to the Department and say: "I want to know from you, so far as your records go: Is this man a Service man, or is he not—in other words, can I properly and safely proceed with the action I have started up to the end?" That a person proceeding under this Bill should be left entirely in the air as to whether the other man has been, is, or may be in the future, entitled to the protection of the Act seems to us a quite illogical and impractical situation. We feel that the only way to remove an objection which, in our view, is a very substantial one, is to insert a clause imposing a mandatory obligation upon the Department concerned to issue a certificate when they are asked so to do. Having further considered the Amendment as printed on the Marshalled List, I propose to ask leave of the Committee to move it in a slightly different form and at a slightly different place.

The reason the Amendment appears on the Marshalled List in the form it does, is that subsections (2),(3) and (4) were not inserted in the Bill until the Report stage in another place, and the Amendment which we have put down, which I think reproduces verbatim the Amendment which was moved in Committee in another place at the appropriate point, and in the appropriate words, as the Bill then stood, became inappropriate in form, and perhaps rather unhappy in position, once these new subsections had been introduced. I should like, if the Committee will permit me, to adopt the form now set out in a Manuscript Amendment of which I have given notice—although brief notice—and to move, at page 64, after subsection (3), to insert as a new subsection (4): a certificate to the effect mentioned in one of the subsections (1), (2) or (3) above as may be appropriate, in each case shall be issued by the Admiralty, Army Council. … and so forth, and then continue in the wording of the Amendment as it stands on the Marshalled List. That, I think, puts the Amendment in its right place and in its right form. Without some Amendment imposing a statutory obligation upon the Department concerned to produce these documents, the mere presence in the Bill of a clause which says that the documents shall be legal evidence is, essentially, valueless. We have produced an Amendment which we feel is the best we can devise in the somewhat hasty circumstances in which we have had to consider this Bill. We are not eternally wedded to it, and if it should be—as perhaps it may—that the noble and learned Viscount has some alternative proposition to make, we shall, of course, gladly consider it. Meanwhile, we think that our Amendment, or some Amendment in this form, is essential to the proper working of the machinery of the Bill. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 64, line 12, at end insert— ((4) a certificate to the effect mentioned in one of the subsections (1) (2) or (3) above as may be appropriate in each case shall be issued by the Admiralty, Army Council, Air Council or Minister of Labour (as the case may be) to any person requesting it and appearing to them or him to be interested in the matter upon such terms and conditions, which may include the making of a charge, in such form and within such period from the making of the request as may from time to time be prescribed by regulations made under this Act by the Minister of Labour and National Service, which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a Resolution of either House of Parliament.")—(The Marquess of Reading.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I always like to agree with your Lordships when I can, and all the more when I think there is no very great point between us. I have no doubt at all that the satisfactory working of this provision will depend far more upon the good will of the Service Departments than it will upon any statutory or mandatory command. It was for that reason, I think, that in another place, when this suggestion was made, it was said: "Why do you want all this pother about a statutory demand when you can be assured of the good will of the Service Departments?—as, in fact, you can." I am not going to stand upon that. I realise that your Lordships may think you had better, if only as a matter of form, have a statutory obligation put upon these various authorities.

The only point of substance which leads me to quarrel with the noble Marquess's Amendment is that it contains a time limit. It is true that it is within a time limit prescribed by regulation, but I think it is bad for this reason. In the majority of cases, the Service Departments will be able to do this in ten to fourteen days, but there will be some cases which will take very much longer. When a Department has to deal with the name "Jones," it may take rather a long time to find out all about the Jones concerned; or when a Department has an inquiry in which the name is misspelt, which happens as often as not, it may be difficult to find out about the man within ten days or so. Therefore, if we are going to prescribe a time, it must be ample time in which to deal with the longest case. Then there is always the danger that, if the prescribed time is the ample time appropriate to the most difficult case, people will begin to think that that is the standard time they should take in every case, and the last state of affairs will be much worse than the first.

I suggest that we had much better not attempt to assert a time limit. I can assure your Lordships that in the majority of cases the Service Departments will carry out their inquiries in ten days or a fortnight. If an emergency happens and there is an absolute spate of these requests, obviously, unless we enlarge our machine, that will slow matters up; but we do not anticipate trouble. I am not prepared to accept the time limit, even though it be prescribed by rule, because it would have a bad effect. I, too, have made an attempt at drafting, and I have here a Manuscript Amendment which I will now read. I hope the noble Marquess will think it satisfactory. Clause 59, page 64, line 17, at end insert— (6) The Admiralty, the Army Council, the Air Council and the Minister of Labour and National Service shall respectively be under obligation to secure that, on inquiry made to them for the purposes of this Act as to a person therein described, if the information appearing from records kept by them is such as to enable a certificate falling within subsection (1) or subsection (2) of this section to he given as to a person appearing to answer that description, or is such as to justify the giving of a certificate falling within subsection (3) of this section, such a certificate shall be given. Provided that no certificate the giving of which would in the opinion of the authority to whom the inquiry is made be against the Interests of national security shall be given. I hope that meets the wishes of the noble Marquess. If it does, I am perfectly willing to move that Amendment at this stage. I hope that the noble Marquess will think it satisfactory and will not press his Amendment.

VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN

I should like to comment on one or two points in what the noble and learned Viscount has said. I agree with him entirely that a procedure of this kind would work properly only if it had the good will of the Service Departments, and, I may add, of the Ministry of Labour, who will be concerned in the actual calling-up. I think it will be much easier for these Departments to do what is required if the duty is made mandatory now. Procedures change from time to time, and if this is made mandatory now, the Departments will have it in mind when they design their procedures. I also agree that we should be better off without the time limit, because that time limit may become the standard. As the noble and learned Viscount said, if a man is serving at home and his name does not happen to be Jones, the information may be produced much more quickly than it could if the man were abroad and his name were a common one. I think we should agree with the noble and learned Viscount about the time factor. Then we come to the security provision. At the moment I am not quite clear whether the noble and learned Viscount had any particular case in mind or whether he spoke of a general safety clause to prevent its being mandatory on a Government Department to disclose something which would be against the interests of national security.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

It is the latter: I have no particular case in mind at all.

VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN

I am much obliged to the noble and learned Viscount. I see the point.

THE MARQUESS OF READING

The noble and learned Viscount has been good enough to propose this Manuscript Amendment. After consideration of it, we are satisfied that, although it may not go the entire length we think is desirable, it certainly goes far enough to remove our main objection. In these circumstances and especially in this period of our Parliamentary duties, we think it right that we should accept that Amendment. Therefore, I propose to withdraw my Amendment, on the understanding that if I do so the noble and learned Viscount will move his, and it will be accepted at this stage.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I beg to move the following Amendment.

Amendment moved—

Clause 59, page 64, line 17, at end insert— (6) The Admiralty, the Army Council, the Air Council and the Minister of Labour and National Service shall respectively be under obligation to secure that, on inquiry made to them for the purposes of this Act as to a person therein described, if the information appearing from records kept by them is such as to enable a certificate falling within subsection (1) or subsection (2) of this section to be given as to a person appearing to answer that description, or is such as to justify the giving of a certificate falling within subsection (3) of this section, such a certificate shall be given. Provided that no certificate the giving of which would in the opinion of the authority to whom the inquiry is made be against the interests of national security shall be given."—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 59, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 60 to 65 agreed to.

First Schedule:

SERVICE RELEVANT FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT

(ii) Service, otherwise than by way of training, in pursuance of any obligation or undertaking, whether legally enforceable or not, to serve when called upon as a commissioned officer, not being an obligation or undertaking to accept a permanent or short-service commission.

(iv) Service in pursuance of any enlistment for a period not exceeding eighteen months with a view to service in Korea.

4.39 p.m.

VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN moved, in Paragraph l (ii) to leave out "otherwise than by way" and insert "except for the sole purpose." The noble Viscount said: My reason for moving this Amendment is that if a man does his duty in the Services, he will undergo training of some sort at some time or another, whether or not he was called up for operations. In Clause 14 we see distinctly and clearly that protection is afforded for relevant service other than a short period of training. The words in the Schedule are not the same, and it would be a deplorable thing if a commanding officer could not train a man without the man running the risk of losing the benefit of this Bill. I suggest that the words appearing in my Amendment avoid the difficulty I have tried to describe. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 69, line 10, leave Out ("otherwise than by way") and insert ("except for the sole purpose").-(Viscount Bridgeman.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I think the noble Viscount has a real point here and I am grateful to him for calling our attention to it. Unfortunately, I think it runs through the Bill and we may need other Amendments. If the noble Viscount will withdraw this Amendment, I will undertake to put down an Amendment on Report stage to cover the point. There may nave to be other consequential Amendments throughout the Bill. I accept in principle what he said.

VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN

In view of the undertaking given by the noble and learned Viscount, I shall certainly with draw my Amendment and not move No. 40, which deals with the same point.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN moved to add to subparagraph (iv) of Paragraph 1: and in such other theatres overseas as may be designated as Operational. The noble Viscount said: This Amendment is of a rather different character. It seeks to amend that part of the Schedule dealing with service in Korea. I have never liked the idea of service in Korea, or in any other theatre of war, coming into the law of the land; I do not think that is a good thing for a number of reasons. However, I feel that it is intended that this Bill, when it is placed on the Statute Book, shall be a continuing Act, and it ought to be so drafted as to apply to any other occasion on which a man is asked to extend his service and take part in a particular operation. I am bound to say that I am not certain whether the words in the Amendment quite meet the case, but if they do not, no doubt we shall be told. I feel that there is another point here. We should like to see any case of this sort, which may easily happen in these times, covered in advance, rather than have to wait and argue whether a man does or does not come within the orbit of the Act when he is fighting in some place like Korea. I beg to move.

Amendment moved.— Page 69, line 24, at end insert the said words.—(Viscount Bridgeman.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I am in rather a different position in regard to this Amendment, though, again, I think it is a real point. On the last Amendment I had the consent of the Service authorities for what I said, but in regard to this one I have not yet obtained their consent to make any alteration. However, I think it is manifest that there is substance in the point. Here is a Bill which is intended to become part of the permanent structure of our law, which will go on long after your Lordships have forgotten where Korea is. Why should it be limited to Korea? There is force in that point. On the other hand, I think the answer would come: "This is really historical. It so happened that in Korea there was this eighteen months' engagement, and if—which heaven forbid!—a corresponding situation should arise elsewhere, then you would have to consider it on its own merits, and you would not want it said that you had pre-judged the position." I believe that is the reason for the hesitancy of the Service Departments. I have not quite finished my discussions with them as yet, and, though I have no authority to say that they will agree to this Amendment, I think it possible that they might agree if the noble Viscount would substitute some such words as these: "as may be designated by Order in Council." I want to make it quite plain that I have not their authority to agree to this yet, but I am always hopeful of securing their agreement between now and the Report stage. I ask the noble Viscount not to press the matter to-day, but to let me explore the position; and if I obtain their authority, I will do it on those lines. I must make my position plain, and the noble Viscount must not blame me if I do not get authority, because at the present moment I have not got it, and I may not be able to get it.

LORD SALTOUN

If the noble and learned Viscount is going so far, would it not be better to cut out "Korea altogether and just have: in such theatres overseas as may be designated as Operational"?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

That is the substance of what I am suggesting. The sub-paragraph would then read: Service in pursuance of any enlistment for a period not exceeding eighteen months as may be designated as operational by Order in Council.

LORD SALTOUN

I beg the noble and learned Viscount's pardon.

VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN

The noble and learned Viscount has been so helpful that, of course, I shall fall in with his suggestion; and if he would wish consultation in the ordinary way between now and the Report stage, I should be pleased to take part. In view of what he has said, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

First Schedule agreed to.

Remaining Schedules agreed to.

House resumed.