Lords Sitting of 28 February 1951

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers

  RENT INCREASES
  2.35 p.m.
  LORD BROUGHSHANE: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
  [The Question was as follows:
  To ask His Majesty's Government whether they are aware that municipalities owning property are permitted to increase the rents of houses of which they are the freeholders, in order to meet the greatly increased cost of repairs; and will the Government take such steps as may be necessary to permit private individuals owning house property to be placed in a similar position, so as to enable them to increase rents to meet the costs incurred in carrying out necessary repairs.]
  THE PAYMASTER-GENERAL (LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR): My Lords, the answer to the first part of the question is, yes. In reply to the second part, legislation would be required, and there is no prospect of this at present.
  LORD BROUGHSHANE: My Lords, I have no doubt that the Government recognise the extreme urgency of the supply of additional houses. Will the Minister explain why private individuals are precluded from erecting houses which they are willing to erect because, unlike local authorities, they are not permitted to increase rents, to meet the increased cost of repairs?
  LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: My Lords, it will be remembered that the Ridley Committee dealt with this matter, and they pointed out that local authorities are under certain statutory obligations, in the management of their houses and in fixing rents, from which private landlords are free. In allocating houses they are required, for example, to give a reasonable preference to persons who are
  628
  occupying insanitary or overcrowded houses, have large families or are living under unsatisfactory housing conditions. These houses generally require subsidies from the Exchequer and from the rates to enable them to be let to persons who cannot afford to pay an economic rent. I do not think I can usefully add anything to that reply.
  LORD BROUGHSHANE: My Lords, surely it is desirable that anybody who is prepared to build houses should be given every facility for doing so. It is houses we want, more than anything else.

  HUMANE SLAUGHTER OF ANIMALS
  LORD DOWDING: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
  The Question was as follows:
  [To ask His Majesty's Government whether they can now make the statement promised in the debate of November 16, 1950, concerning the outcome of their discussions with the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, to prevent the recurrence of the suffering caused to animals through the breakdown of humanitarian arrangements during the peak period of slaughter.]
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH): My Lords, a list of slaughterhouses where conditions were alleged to be unsatisfactory during the peak period of slaughter in 1950 was prepared by the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. This list has been examined by the area officers of the Ministry of Food, and a summary of their reports on each slaughterhouse was supplied this month to the Society. Further discussions with the Society may be necessary on some of these cases, but I am confident that these consultations will be of great help in ensuring that all possible steps are taken to handle this year's peak kill with the least suffering to animals.
  LORD DOWDING: My Lords, whilst thanking the noble Viscount for his reply, may I ask whether the preparations which

  629
  are being made include any form of staggering the supply of animals to minimise the peak?
  VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I have no information on that point, but I feel confident that it is one of the matters which will be raised by the Society during the consultations which are taking place. I have great sympathy with the objects of the noble Lord, and I hope all that is possible will be done.

  FOREIGN AFFAIRS
  2.40 p.m.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY rose to call attention to Foreign Affairs; and to move for Papers. The noble Marquess said: My Lords, it is almost exactly two months since we in this House had our last debate on Foreign Affairs, and it seemed to me—and I hope your Lordships will agree—that it might be useful if I tabled another Motion to enable the House to express its views on the latest developments in the constantly changing situation. It is not that there are any very far-reaching events to record. In the Far East, the Korean war is still dragging on its weary way, while in Europe the feeling of tension still persists, and the meeting of the four Great Powers, which is so ardently desired, I think, by us all, is still apparently a long way off. There have, of course, been certain developments, and on the whole I think these have been favourable.
  First, there has been General Eisenhower's visit to the European capitals. That, I am sure we shall all agree, has been all to the good, for it represents a definite progress towards that broad strategic plan which is now recognised as being essential if the forces of peace are to be deployed to the best advantage. I am sure that your Lordships will all echo me when I say how great a debt of gratitude we owe to General Eisenhower himself for having been willing to come out of his honourable retirement to take up again that task which he carried through with such skill and success during the war. Then there is the meeting in Paris on the subject of the European Army, about which I hope to say something later. And finally, of course, in the Far East, there is the im-
  630
  proved military position in Korea, and the decision of the United Nations—to which His Majesty's Government were a party—to declare China an aggressor, as a result of her participation in that war.
  On all these topics I should like to say something, and in doing so I have been fortunate—indeed, we have all been fortunate—in having the advantage of studying the statement which the Prime Minister made in the House of Commons, and which must, I assume, be regarded as representing the views of His Majesty's Government on these matters. We have all read that statement with the greatest interest, and with much of what the right honourable gentleman said we should all agree. Indeed, I do not think that I personally could quarrel with anything in his broad assessment of the position. He has exposed several dangerous fallacies, and in that respect in particular I am sure that his speech will have done a great deal of good. But I could not help being struck, as I read, by a rather odd contrast between his firm and courageous statement of the position, both in the East and the West, and his extraordinarily hesitant attitude when it came to taking practical steps to deal with it. When he came to the question of action, to firm, positive, resolute action, Agag never walked so delicately as the right honourable gentleman.
  Take the Far East. He said quite definitely that the action of the North Korean Government in invading South Korea was a "warlike aggression and a direct challenge to United Nations"; and he went on to say that China, by intervening in the Korean War, had made herself a party to the aggression. He scouted, and rightly, the arguments of those who have sought to make excuses for the Chinese Government. He said unequivocally:
  "The issue is between the United Nations and North Korea backed by China in the field and by the Soviet Union at Lake Success. It is just stupid to suggest that China has done nothing amiss."
  Those were the Prime Minister's words. All this is patently true to anyone willing to face the full facts; and it is most valuable that the Prime Minister should have said it in such forthright language.
  But why, in such circumstances, boggle at crossing the 38th Parallel? Why the suggestion that His Majesty's Government might find themselves obliged to oppose

  631
  such a step or even that any political issue might be raised? It is surely not the view of His Majesty's Government that there is anything wicked or even improper in the United Nations' entering the territory of an aggressor when they are engaged in punishing the aggression. Take the case of Germany in the last war. No one thought it wrong, at the end of that war, that the Allied troops should cross the Rhine and enter German territory; on the contrary, it was universally agreed that it was absolutely necessary that they should do so, both for the purpose of the destruction of the German military machine and the elimination of the Hitlerite regime. In fact, the Allies occupied the whole of Germany with universal approval. There might, indeed, be certain special circumstances in individual cases which might make it unwise to go too far. I think that I myself expressed the view in an earlier debate that it was a doubtful policy for the United Nations Forces to go right up to the Chinese border. But at that time China was not in the war, and we did not wish to provoke her to enter it. Moreover, there were, I think, purely military arguments against going too close to the frontier; it might well create a situation in which the North Koreans could regroup their forces and build up supplies in Chinese territory where they could not be attacked. But neither of these considerations applies to the crossing of the 38th Parallel at the present time. I am afraid that for the Prime Minister to show this special compunction about a frontier (where there is, in any case, no good military line to hold) is liable merely to irritate American public opinion without any compensating advantage or good reason.
  Or again, why have His Majesty's Government shown such dilatoriness in recent debates at Lake Success in subscribing to the United States Resolution declaring China an aggressor? Why was there this odd hesitation on the making up of their minds? It is true that they finally decided to jump the fence, but why jib at it so long beforehand? A great nation such as ours is expected to give a lead in matters of this sort—not to tag along behind all the others. Such an attitude as that goes far to destroy the influence which we ought to exercise in international affairs. If we were finally
  632
  going to take the decision, why did we not do so immediately, when it could have had its full effect, and not give the impression of divided counsels? To postpone it, as we did, to the last possible moment could be calculated only to arouse bewilderment among our Allies at a moment when the closest confidence was most vital. I know the Prime Minister explained the delay by saying that the Government considered that China had committed aggression but that there should be no question of applying sanctions until it had been made clear that there was no chance of achieving a peaceful settlement through the Good Offices Committee or in any other way. I would not dissent from that. Indeed, I should be inclined to go further than the Prime Minister and say that it was very doubtful whether there could be any advantage in applying sanctions to China in present circumstances—whether the Good Offices Committee make progress or not. I think that this is an extremely doubtful point.
  I am sure that noble Lords in all parts of the House will agree—and this applies both to ourselves and to America—that the free nations will make a great mistake if they try to look at the Chinese problem in isolation. We must regard it as part of the whole great conflict which at present unhappily exists between the Communist and the non-Communist world. Any action that we take in the Far East must therefore be fitted into a broad strategic plan that covers the world. If we tie ourselves up too much in China we may fatally handicap ourselves in other areas yet more vital to us—I think that is common ground among us. That fact, to my mind, entirely rules out a full-dress war in China. And a limited war, which has been recommended in some quarters, seems to me a very doubtful proposition indeed.
  For one thing, it is very difficult to limit war. It has a habit of spreading and spreading. Moreover, I believe that it is doubtful whether we should achieve any good results, either military or political, merely by blockading the Chinese coast and bombarding Chinese cities. Those are, of course, primarily matters not for civilians like myself but for the Chiefs of Staff, who advise the Government on the technical aspects of such operations. No doubt the Government will adopt whatever attitude they think proper in the

  633
  light of the advice of their advisers and after consideration of the views of their Allies. But that is no reason, I submit, for hesitating to declare China an aggressor, which she clearly is. If noble Lords opposite will forgive my saying so, I cannot think that our vacillation in this matter has enhanced our credit or improved the general situation.
  There is one more question I should like to ask the Government, before I leave the Far East. What is the position with regard to the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty? I know that Mr. Foster Dulles has been to Tokyo and has discussed with the Japanese leaders the possibility of such a Treaty. I know that he has also been to Canberra and had similar discussions there. That is clearly right. But where do His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom come in? We are vitally concerned in this question. We are concerned because of Hong Kong; we are concerned because of Malaya and other Far Eastern territories; and we are concerned, above all, because we ourselves played an essential part in the defeat of Japan. I assume— and no doubt whoever is replying for the Government will confirm this—that there is no question of any unilateral American-Japanese Treaty; we shall be parties to any Treaty that is signed. But are we in the closest touch on this question with the American Government? Is Mr. Dulles coming here for discussions with His Majesty's Government in London? I understand that Sir Esler Dening was present at Canberra during the talks there; but was he there as a full representative of His Majesty's Government, with instructions from the Foreign Secretary, or was he there merely as an observer?
  Finally, are we in constant consultation with Canada, with Australia and with New Zealand on this question? I shall be glad of any information which His Majesty's Government can give us to-day. I must confess that I was not entirely happy about the Prime Minister's words on this subject in another place. He said: "We know something of their views"— which I took to be the views of the American Government. But surely that is not enough. I entirely agree with the Prime Minister that Australia and New Zealand, which took such a big part in the defeat of Japan, should have the fullest say in any question of a Peace Treaty. But we took a pretty big part,
  634
  too, in Burma and elsewhere and we have very great interests in the Far East. This is surely not a matter on which we could be expected to accept decisions which have already been made. We ought to be in the centre of the picture from the start; and I hope we are.
  So much, my Lords, for the Far East. I should like to turn now for a short time to Europe. I am bound to say that this same strange hesitation which has been so evident in the policy of the Government in Far Eastern affairs appears to me to be equally evident in their attitude towards European affairs, and in particular towards the rearmament of Germany. There is the same broad, bold statement of policy, and the same reluctance when it comes to putting that policy into practice. I do not pretend that the question of German rearmament is not a very difficult one. I agree that it is. It is no insult to the Germans to say that it is hard for us in this country, who have lived through two world wars, to feel any enthusiasm for the rearming of Germany. They are a great and virile nation who twice, as a result of their ambitions, have involved the world in war. No doubt they have a passionate belief in the greatness of their country—and who can blame them for that? But can we be sure that by rearming them we shall not be ultimately paving the way to another conflagration?
  On the other hand, can we expect the Germans to remain entirely helpless in the present situation, and is it to our interest that they should be? I have, as I imagine have all other noble Lords here this afternoon, given much anxious thought to this question, and I have come finally to the conclusion that if Western Germany— which is, after all, part of the free world —wishes to have a chance of defending herself and playing a part in the general defence of the West against the new peril from the East, she must be given the means to do so. And the best way to do this, surely, is to bring her in, if she will come in—because, of course, it is a matter for the free decision oil the Western German Government and the Western German people—as part of a European Army. Indeed, as I understand it, that is what the rearmament of Germany really means. So far as I know, it has never been suggested in any responsible quarter that Germany should have an absolutely independent army; and from

  635
  what I have heard I do not believe that the Germans want that themselves. That is a pure fiction of the Russian mind. But membership of a European Army is quite a different thing, and I submit that it has a double advantage. It enables her to come in on the basis of absolute equality with other nations, which I appreciate is important from the point of view of German national pride: and equally, it avoids the danger that the German forces will be built up as an independent entity, which might be used irresponsibly if an extremist clique, such as that created by Hitler, ever again gained power in that country.
  Some noble Lords may agree with the view which I have expressed; some may disagree. But surely it is a point on which some decision is immediately necessary. And yet it seems to me extremely doubtful, judging from the Prime Minister's speech, whether His Majesty's Government have any policy at all in that matter. The Prime Minister began by saying—again I am quoting his words:
  "In the decisions of the Atlantic Council was one to include in the integrated Force to be built up a contribution from Germany."
  I should have thought that that could mean only that His Majesty's Government were party to a decision to create an international force, mainly composed of European nations, including Germany, in a unified command. At any rate, that is what it clearly seems to mean. But then immediately the right honourable gentleman began a process which I can describe only as "hedging." He did not like certain features which he believed, though apparently he was not certain, were inherent in the provisional French proposals on this subject which were to be discussed at a conference in Paris. He was therefore unwilling to send a delegate to that conference. He thought it wiser merely to send observers. I personally do not quarrel with his view, but there are certain features of the French plan which are open to objection.
  There must be many people in this country who are not very enthusiastic about the political superstructure, and about the European Minister of Defence. But surely the way to eliminate such objectionable features, if indeed they are objectionable, is to send delegates to argue the British case, on the floor of the conference. That is exactly the part which
  636
  a great Power should play. But merely to send observers is, I should have thought, no good at all. For observers cannot speak; they have to remain silent; and therefore the point of view of His Majesty's Government will never be put until it is too late for British participation to be possible. I cannot believe a procedure of that kind is either useful or consistent with our national prestige. It reduces us to the status of a secondary nation, with no influence in European affairs.
  Nor is that all, my Lords. From a still later passage in the Prime Minister's speech, it is apparent that it is not merely certain features of the French plan which are giving the Government pause. They have not even made up their minds whether they want the Germans in at the present time in any circumstances. The Prime Minister suggests that it would perhaps be wiser to put it off until after the conclusion of the Four Power negotiations with Soviet Russia. His exact words were:
  "If we can get real and genuine settlement with Soviet Russia, the matter of German rearmament would become less important and fall into its natural place"—
  whatever that may be. It is only in the event of a failure of the Four Power negotiations that Germany will be allowed to make her contribution to the integrated forces which are being raised for the defence of Western Europe.
  And then, the Prime Minister went on to pour cold water on the Four Power talks themselves, or, at any rate, on one aspect of those talks. He said:
  "I would say a word here against the suggestion that all these difficulties could be smoothed out if we suddenly had a meeting of three or four men. I do not believe in these dramatic meetings."
  My Lords, I should be the last to assume that a meeting of heads of States would automatically remove all our difficulties; but I do believe, for what it is worth, that, in the case of dictators, that is probably the best chance of getting some concrete results. At any rate, it is far more hopeful than the kind of long-range slanging matches which have been a feature of recent diplomacy. I do not know why Marshal Stalin gave his recent interview to Pravda. Possibly, it was given to stiffen public opinion in the satellite countries, which certainly show some signs of becoming rather restive under the Russian yoke; or possibly it was

  637
  given to provide ammunition to Communists and fellow-travellers in the Western countries. I do not know the reason. In any case, it was a crude and malicious perversion of the facts, which is typical of Russian propaganda, and invited the prompt reply which His Majesty's Government gave it. But I gravely fear that the combination of long-range diplomatic bombardments and meetings of comparatively subordinate officials (which, as I understand it, is apparently the Government's alternative to talks by heads of States themselves), will never bring us to an end of the present tension. What we need is a new approach; and the only approach I can see is talks between the leaders of the four great Powers, at the highest possible level and with the broadest possible agenda that can be agreed; and in the meantime, if the Germans agree, the preparations for the incorporation of a Western German contingent in the European Army should be begun.
  LORD STRABOLGI: That is what the Conference is about.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: That is not the only thing the Conference is about. If the noble Lord will wait a moment I will explain what I have in mind. To put off the rearmament of Western Germany until the talks have taken place will probably mean postponing it into the indefinite future. It is almost equivalent to going back on the decision of the Atlantic Council to which I referred earlier, and to which we are, of course, equally a party. Moreover, I should have thought it was putting the cart before the horse. The purpose of the rearmament of the Western Powers, including Germany, is to give us a stronger basis for negotiation, whenever negotiations take place. To postpone the rearmament of Western Germany until after the talks would seem to me to be a nullification of the whole of that policy. It is, indeed, a tacit admission of the Russian contention—which we have never accepted—that it is we, and not they, who are starting the rearmament of Germans. They have already been doing it for months, and, possibly, for years. Finally, if the Four Power talks fail, as we all devoutly hope they will not, it will probably be too late to do anything about the Germans then.
  638
  Therefore, I cannot regard the Government's present policy as in any way adequate to meet the present situation. I would repeat what I said at the beginning of my speech. I find nothing to quarrel with in the broad statement of principles for which this country stands, as they have been expounded by the Prime Minister. They are clear and they are forthright. But when we come to the practical application of our policy, I cannot help feeling bewildered and deeply depressed. There appears to be no grip anywhere. We are just allowing ourselves to be pushed from point to point. The latest example is the appointment of the American Admiral to be Supreme Commander of the naval Forces of the Atlantic, which has come as a severe shock to the British people during the last few days. Could anything have been more mismanaged than that? It appears that the decision was taken—the noble Viscount the Leader of the House will correct me if I am wrong—nearly three months ago, and yet nothing—not one word—was said in Parliament in this country; it was left to the Danes to make the announcement to us. Nor, as it appears now, is there any certain necessity for this appointment. Your Lordships will have read a letter from Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope in The Times to-day, which makes that abundantly clear; and, after all, Lord Cunningham speaks with unrivalled authority on this subject. His Majesty's Government seem to have accepted whatever was proposed; and the result has been just that kind of friction which we are all most anxious to avoid.
  My Lords, in saying this, I assure the Government (and I feel certain they believe it) that I am rot trying to make trouble. I feel very strongly about this matter, in company, I believe, with the greater part of the British nation. I do not propose to say any more on the matter to-day. There are other noble Lords who can speak with far more expert knowledge and who will, I understand, take part later in the debate. But I do submit it as yet a further instance of the tendency to drift to which I have already referred. No doubt this is partly, and I think probably mainly, due to the fact that during recent months we have had no effective Foreign Secretary. We all have the deepest sympathy with Mr. Bevin; we all admire his unvanquished courage, and

  639
  we wish him an early recovery. But, in times like these, the Government must have a Foreign Secretary who can function. In the early days of this Government, when Mr. Bevin was in his full health, there was much in our foreign policy for which I think they can fairly claim considerable credit. There was the Brussels Treaty; there was the Marshall Plan—all solid contributions to world peace, as we all recognise, and matters in which we on the Opposition side fully supported the Government. It is since the Foreign Secretary fell ill that this deplorable change has become so evident.
  I should like this afternoon, with very real deference and with no wish to be impertinent, to make a suggestion to the Prime Minister. In past times, when the Foreign Secretary has fallen ill for any long period, it was, I believe, an absolute rule that another Minister should be appointed to act for him. There was, I think, a celebrated case when Lord Grey of Falloden fell ill and Lord Crewe took his place. Such a Minister was not a mere deputy who had to consult his chief; he was for the time being actually Foreign Minister, with the powers and the prestige of a Foreign Minister and a direct approach to the Prime Minister. Could not that device be adopted now? The Prime Minister cannot be expected to find time to direct the Foreign Office in addition to his other work: the Cabinet is overwhelmed with other business. Over and over again there has been evidence that the Prime Minister has not the time for all that he has to do. The appointment of an American Admiral to command the Atlantic Fleet, to which I have already referred, is a very good case of that. It was evident from the right honourable gentleman's answer, when he was questioned in another place last week, that he had not had time to give the matter his full attention. Nor can the Minister of State, however efficient he may be, fill the position of Foreign Secretary. In the nature of things, he has not the same authority. What is needed is a Foreign Secretary, in full health and vigour, to take charge of all those problems in the international field with which the country is now faced.
  We are still, I imagine, one of the most experienced nations in the world in the realm of foreign policy: we are widely
  640
  considered one of the wisest. If we really gave a lead, we should immediately exert an influence out of all proportion to our physical strength. But if we merely hang behind to see which way the cat jumps, as we have done recently over the Schuman Plan, over the recognition of Spain, over the declaration of China as an aggressor, and now over a European Army, we shall lose all that influence and sink to a position very near that of a second-class Power. That would be disaster, not only for ourselves but for the world. I would therefore most sincerely beg the Government not merely to enunciate fine principles but to act with firmness and resolution. If they will only take the lead, as this country has done in the past, they need not fear that they will not be supported. I beg to move for Papers.
  3.12 p.m.
  VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, my observations to-day will be more circumscribed than those included in the widespread and most interesting speech by the noble Marquess who has just addressed the House. I had not intended, for example, to speak on the matter with which he dealt in the concluding paragraphs of his speech, but since he has said what he has said with regard to the Foreign Secretaryship, I think it my duty to say that I believe that in those observations he has represented the general body of opinion in this country. That opinion is disturbed to think that the burdens of the Foreign Secretaryship have been so long in the hands of a man whose health is so precarious as Mr. Bevin's has proved to be; and with all good will towards him personally, and in a fully friendly spirit, I feel bound to say—and most of your Lordships I believe, certainly most of those on these Benches, will agree—that Mr. Bevin would be rendering good service to the country, which he has served so long and so well, if he were now to transfer the burdens of his office to a successor.
  For the rest, the noble Marquess took up the thread of events as it has developed since your Lordships last discussed foreign affairs rather more than two months ago. That debate took place at a moment of great tension, both militarily in Korea and politically in the world in general—a

  641
  moment which seemed at the time to be possibly one of imminent danger. Now, happily, there has been an easing of the situation in various directions. Both militarily and politically the tension is not quite so acute. In Korea, the military situation has been transformed in the last few weeks, and politically the latest Russian Note may perhaps portend an easing of the situation there. At all events, its terms are less ominous than anything we have heard from Russia for a long time past. At the end of a long screed of vituperation, which apparently is common form—I said common form not Cominform—in the Russian Foreign Office, there appeared a remarkable paragraph which may have great significance. The last paragraph, which most of your Lordships will have read, was as follows:
  "The Government of Great Britain expresses in its Note preparedness for negotiations with the Soviet Union in the spirit of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, with the aim of a lasting improvement in the relations between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. After all the above-said."—
  that is a reference to part of the previous Note—
  "the Soviet Government cannot regard with full confidence the statement of the British Government. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government is prepared to enter into such negotiations, striving to use all opportunities for improving relations with Great Britain. The Government of the U.S.S.R. will highly appreciate any step of the Government of Great Britain really directed at improving relations between our countries."
  That is a very welcome declaration, if it is acted upon in the spirit of the last sentence. It is remarkable that the ending should be so different from the substance of the Note, and from the substance of all previous notes. It almost looks as though the last paragraph had been written by a different hand, and, possibly, by a hand which matters more than those which had penned the previous paragraphs.
  LORD STRABOLGI: Will the noble Viscount forgive me for interrupting him for a moment, but this matter is rather important? Where did the noble Viscount find the text of the Note itself?
  VISCOUNT SAMUEL: I quoted from The Times. The Note was not given in full. Apparently there were parts cut out here and there, since a number of dots appear in places. But there is a whole column of the Note. I have not seen the
  642
  Note in full, and I do not know whether it has been published in this country. That Note, with its strange ending, reminded me of an extract that I happened to come across a few days ago, almost by accident, from a London newspaper of some years back. The paragraph contained a report of certain proceedings in the Westminster County Court, in the course of which a letter which had been written by a tailor to one of his customers in the following terms was read:
  "I have to-day issued a writ against you for the amount of your bill. Trusting for a continuance of your esteemed favours, I remain…."
  The analogy is so close that I thought the House would pardon me for quoting that letter.
  So far as the political situation is concerned, the dangers that confronted us two months ago were greatly increased by the degree of disagreement that prevailed at that time between the Government of this country and that of the United States. All of us regarded that situation with extreme concern, because we all know that nothing is more vital to the whole future wellbeing of the world than the closest possible harmony and co-operation between those two Governments. We can understand the spirit prevailing in the United States, which at that time was one of excitement and alarm. The people of the United States were conscious that they had made a very great effort in the interests of the whole of the United Nations in Korea; they were conscious that they had suffered an immense number of casualties—now returned at about 50,000 —and that they had just suffered in the field a very serious and quite unexpected military reverse; they were threatened with a great new danger from the mobilesation of the forces of Communist China. Moreover, they are constantly in a state of nervous alarm at the uncertainty of the internal situation in the United States: the danger of sabotage, the danger of traitors in high places, in Government departments and in munitions works—all that is an unseen danger which causes a natural and easily understood alarm.
  In these circumstances, it seemed to them that Europe, and particularly Great Britain, was holding back, unwilling to strike blow for blow, and even wishing to welcome, as they regarded it, the Communist Chinese aggressor to a seat in the

  643
  Security Council of the United Nations. Here, on the other hand, there was a sense of grievance that there had been insufficient consultation on matters of the greatest importance with people in this country; that there had been a lack of consideration for our own public opinion, particularly with regard to the atomic bomb. The declaration, not a considered declaration, by the American President which dealt with that matter seemed to many of us to indicate that at any moment at the discretion of the American Officer Commanding in the Far East the atomic bomb might be launched as a weapon in the Korean campaign. For people in this country, that possibility not only raised a great moral issue but exposed us and all the countries of Europe to the danger of reprisals in kind—and all this apparently without any consultation with His Majesty's Government. Your Lordships may have seen Professor Arnold Toynbee's quip, that "there should be no annihilation without representation." At all events, in these matters our voice should be heard.
  How often in our past experience, in the long history of this country, have we had records of cases in which we have blundered into wars unwillingly and unexpectedly, wars that need not have happened, wars into which we were provoked almost through impatience, resentment and offended national pride? The classical example is the Crimean War, which has been generally regarded as wholly unnecessary. Many of us, too, though no doubt some noble Lords would disagree, would also count the South African War as an unnecessary war. How many defeats have been suffered, how many campaigns have been prolonged, through disagreements between generals in the field and Governments at home? How many of these disasters have occurred through quarrels amongst allies engaged in a joint campaign? All these elements have recurred again and again, century after century, in every part of the world.
  It has been said that the only lesson of history that man has ever learnt has been that men do not learn from the lessons of history. It is much better if we do. There is another lesson which we ought to have learned, and which I believe we have learned—namely, that aggression
  644
  must be made not to pay. The way of the transgressor is hard, it is said. It is for us and the progressive nations of the world to ensure that the way of the aggressor should be made hard. We and the Americans were in full agreement on that point at the outset of the Korean war. If there have been difficulties, if there have been disagreements, it is not for lack on this side of the Atlantic of recognition of the fact that North Korea has been an aggressor, that China has aided and abetted her, and that China is now engaged in open support of the aggressor.
  We have made our effort. It is not true, as it is thought in America, that we are dragging behind; and that fact has been fully realised and expressed by General Eisenhower himself, to whom we would all wish to pay tribute in terms such as those used by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. A few days ago General Eisenhower broadcast to the whole of the American people. It is estimated that he had 50,000,000 listeners, of whom 15,000,000 viewed him also on television. In that nation-wide address, listened to by the whole American people, he paid the most generous tribute to the efforts, both military and economic, of the European countries, and of Great Britain in particular. I think his speech has done much to redeem that situation in the view of American public opinion.
  General Eisenhower spoke of the restored morale of the European peoples. That, unquestionably, is the essential point in the whole matter. For in war it is not only the numbers of men who are engaged that is important; nor the power of their arms; nor the skill of their generalship. Though all these things are essential, what matters most is the spirit that animates the troops, the sailors and airmen, and the morale of the nations that sustain these armed forces in their efforts. That morale can be maintained only if the forces and the nations are convinced that the cause in which they are fighting is a right cause, that they are making sacrifices for a cause which is worthy, and which can be justified in the consciences of ordinary men and women, and which will stand the adjudication also of history. In the case of the Korean war, there was a wanton, unprovoked, flagrant act of aggression, exactly the kind of act that

  645
  the United Nations was established to prevent, or, if they did not succeed in preventing, to repel. There was an instant response on both sides of the Atlantic, on which all of us were agreed. Further, as I have said, the Chinese were aiding and abetting, and at a later stage strongly reinforced this act of aggression. We all know that the so-called fact of the unrestrainable enthusiasm of multitudes of Chinese volunteers is a transparent figment. But when it came to the question of how the situation should be dealt with once it had occurred, there was not the same unanimity, especially on the question of the admission of China to the Security Council.
  I will not repeat what I have said on various occasions on that matter, but I should like to quote the opinion of my noble friend Lord Perth, whom your Lordships will remember as Sir Eric Drummond, for forty years the devoted Secretary-General of the League of Nations, who would have been the spokesman of these Benches to-day if he had not been suffering from a slight disability which led his doctor to recommend him rot to take part in this debate. My noble friend has given me a note on this point, which seems to me so cogent and interesting that I will read it to your Lordships. He says this:
  "As to the representation of China in the Security Council, surely no one can to-day reasonably maintain that the Government of Chiang Kai-shek represents the people of China. Its jurisdiction is limited to Formosa alone. Yet, under the United Nations Charter, a member China is of the Security Council. I hold that by passing the Resolution condemning the People's Government of China as an aggressor, the members of the United Nations have admitted that that Government is the de facto Government of China; and, if so, she has surely the right to be a member of the Security Council. This in no way means rewarding an aggressor. The Peking Government would remain an aggressor, whether recosnised as a member of the Security Council or not. The question is in no way bound up with her action in Korea; it is one of international law, and should be solely considered as such. I feel that the presence of the Chinese People's Government in the Security Council, even if she is an aggressor, could not but make negotiations for a peaceful settlement easier."
  Then we have this recurring danger of friction between the military power and the civilian power, with generals and Governments being at cross purposes. This danger may arise on the question of the 38th Parallel, to which the noble
  646
  Marquess has referred. To the commanders in the field—and one cannot help but sympathise with them—this imaginary line on a map is, as such, of no special interest. What they are concerned with, every day and night, is fighting tactics; with shooting and being shot at: and with battalions, companies and patrols. One can understand that they resent the feeling that they are tied by a string, the other end of the string being in the hand of some committee in Washington or London or in the United Nations. While that is true, the Governments have to take into account that it may be advantageous to have a pause in the actual military campaign—something like an undeclared, tacit armistice, possibly only in the military field, to create an atmosphere in which negotiations may take place. If that action ended hostilities and shortened the war, it would save far more of the soldiers' lives than would be lost by any interference or handicap upon the tactics of the hour. Both those considerations have to be taken into account, and no doubt His Majesty's Government and the other Governments in conference are considering the question of the 38th Parallel, not merely as a matter of general principle on drawing the line, but in the light of the military considerations, on the one hand, and the political considerations on the other, both of which are valid.
  Then the noble Marquess asked why the Government delayed so long in agreeing that the United Nations should stigmatise the Chinese Government as aggressors, and he condemned them roundly for that delay. The proposal as first put forward by the American Government was not limited merely to the question of aggression; it was intimately bound up with other matters. The question of Formosa was hinted at, and the question of sanctions was also bound up with it. To my mind, the Government were right to be exceedingly cautious before they accepted a Resolution which might commit them to go much further both in relation to Formosa and in relation to sanctions. We have all realised from the beginning of this Korean incident that the Formosan question is the most difficult and delicate of all. For many years we have adopted the rule, and rightly so, that this country would not intervene in the constant civil wars in which the people of China have

  647
  been unhappily engaged. I do not think this country would consent to be drawn into a war against the 400,000,000 people in China, with the possibility—indeed, the likelihood—that it might extend to a war with Russia, in order to maintain in Formosa the administration of Chiang Kai-shek. There may be a division of view between certain elements of American public opinion and elements of opinion here which gives rise to an almost inescapable difficulty, and it is the business of the Governments on both sides of the Atlantic to endeavour to cope with that situation.
  Then, with regard to sanctions, the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, to-day made what appeared to me to be a most important statement, which will be read with interest throughout the land. Here I should like to strike a note of caution which is, I am sure, most necessary. It may be said that it is not intended to embark upon military measures, and that it is proposed to adopt only financial and commercial sanctions. But it is very difficult to apply economic sanctions with-out some form of a blockade. A blockade soon requires naval action, which gives rise to incidents, and before you realise the situation you find yourself in a state of belligerency. It was mentioned that we were in favour of sanctions in the case of Italy and Abyssinia. But that was a wholly different case. In the first place, economic sanctions would probably have been sufficient to stop the Italian aggression in Abyssinia if they had been extended to oil; for it was well known at the time that to stop the sending of supplies of oil to Italy, which could have been done, would have rendered her powerless from a military and naval point of view. Furthermore, I think those of us who at that time favoured the application of sanctions would have been prepared to face the risk of the Italians adopting military measures themselves in resistance, because the matter could have been decided by naval action alone, and a preponderance of power in the Mediterranean between Britain and France, as against Italy—Germany then not being rearmed—would probably have quickly decided the issue.
  VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: Perhaps the noble Viscount will allow me to interrupt. He will remember that the difficulty
  648
  in the case of Abyssinia was that the United States would not co-operate in an oil embargo. An oil embargo without the co-operation of the United States would have been practically useless.
  VISCOUNT SAMUEL: Would it have been useless? The noble Viscount, who was the central figure at that time, knows much better than anybody else in your Lordships' House what the situation was. But were the United States approached; and did they definitely refuse to take part in an embargo? However, I do not know that we need go into these historical incidents. But that would have been my answer to people who say that I, and others like me, were in favour of sanctions at that time, and now boggle at them in the case of Korea. I remember quoting during an earlier debate on this subject (I forget the name of the author of the saying) what I believe to be a good maxim with regard to imposing sanctions without being sure that you will be able to make them effective:
  "Let not thy will roar when thy power can but whisper."
  It is a mistake to plunge into sanctions against China without being sure what will happen next and, above all, what the final stage will be.
  Meanwhile, two Committees have now been set up by the United Nations— namely, the Good Offices Committee, to promote an ending of hostilities, and a second Committee to study the position in regard to sanctions. For our part, we earnestly hope that the success of the first, or approaches along other lines, may make recourse to the second unnecessary. In any case, the United Nations would not be deprived of another possible procedure. My noble friend Lord Perth asked me to draw the attention of your Lordships to a resolution passed by the Assembly of the United Nations on November 3, 1950, accepted by Great Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet bloc, and carried by fifty-seven votes to nil. The Resolution recommended the permanent members of the Security Council
  "to meet and discuss, collectively, or otherwise, and, if necessary, with other States concerned, all problems which are likely to threaten international peace and hamper the activities of the United Nations, with a view to their resolving fundamental differences and reaching agreement in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter."

  649
  Therefore, there is one further diplomatic resource, if it can be so called, before we have to admit failure on the part of the United Nations. The upshot of the whole matter is that we are now, after all, learning some of the lessons of history. We are alive to the fact that it is vital to avoid friction between Allies. We understand that by some means we must prevent Governments and commanders in the field from being at loggerheads, and we have learnt that policies should not be decided by hot, temper, but that cool heads in the council are the best support for stout hearts in the field.
  3.42 p.m.
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD HENDERSON): My Lords, we all are, I am sure, grateful to the noble Marquess and the noble Viscount for the speeches with which they have opened this debate. It is clear from those speeches that there continues to be general unity regarding the foreign policy of this country. As has been said, since our last debate there has been no change in the main outlines of the international situation, nor has there been any change in the principles of the Government's foreign policy. In the debate which followed the Prime Minister's return from Washington, I stated our resolve to give continued loyal support to collective effort under the United Nations to deter aggression, to see the rule of law respected, and to establish lasting conditions of peace and security. These words remain true to-day. I would emphasise that we are pursuing British foreign policy in the context of our Commonwealth responsibilities and of our loyally to our friends and partners.
  I think noble Lords will agree that the recent Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers proved once again not only that the ties of unity remain as strong as ever, but that this family of free nations has a valuable—indeed an essential— contribution of thought and leadership to make to the solution of the world's problems and the search for peace and security. With the United States of America, whose partnership with ourselves is vital to the attainment of these aims throughout the world, and with our other friends of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, we are actively
  650
  working in intimate association and close understanding, and I believe it to be indisputably true that the whole Western world (and perhaps some who are not in that part of the world) draws hope and confidence from that strong peace partnership.
  Since our last Foreign Affairs debate two important developments have taken place with regard to Korea, and reference has already been made to them. One is military and the second political. A few weeks ago the United Nations forces, faced with overwhelming man-power superiority on the land, had retreated three-quarters of the way down the Peninsula, and rumours were rife of pending withdrawal to a small bridgehead in South-East Korea. A remarkable change of fortune in the military position has brought United Nations forces back to within sight of Seoul, and in some places to the South bank of the Han River. This development changes the outlook for a peaceful settlement in Korea, since the Chinese must by now be coming to realise that their interests lie in negotiating a settlement of Far Eastern problems and that they cannot get away with any fruits of aggression. It also effectively provides the answer to Marshal Stalin's latest declaration, that United Nations troops know that they are fighting an "unjust war" in Korea. If Marshal Stalin is so convinced that these troops who are displaying such a magnificent fighting spirit, are imbued with a sense of injustice at the United Nations' action to resist aggression in Korea, then he must be seriously misinformed (unfortunately not for the first time) by his political and military advisers as to the facts of the situation.
  This transformation of the military situation has led, as we all know, to a good deal of public discussion of the question: What is to happen when the United Nations forces reach the 38th Parallel again. The noble Marquess has criticised the attitude of the Government. The essence of the Prime Minister's statement was that the 38th Parallel ought not to be crossed again until there had been full consultation with the United Nations and, in particular, full inter-Allied consultation. Since then General MacArthur has publicly stated that if and when the issue actually arises he will

  651
  not arbitrarily exercise his authority as Military Commander,
  "if cogent political reasons against the crossing are then advanced and there is any reasonable possibility that a limitation is to be placed thereon."
  Noble Lords will realise that the present military situation is a fluid and changing one. Moreover, the change from winter conditions will affect both sides, perhaps in different ways. The question, therefore, of holding any particular military line is at the moment academic, and this applies still more to the 38th Parallel which is not a military line. It is, however, a line of political significance, and it is advisable that its political implications should be discussed. Obviously, therefore, it is a matter of major importance that before the United Nations forces arrive at the 38th Parallel the question of what is to be the guiding policy should have been settled. As noble Lords know, discussions are proceeding in Washington in which both the political and military aspects of the question will be fully considered. The House will not expect me to speculate as to their outcome.
  Then there is the political development. Noble Lords have been reminded that the General Assembly passed a Resolution on February 1. I thought the noble Marquess used rather strong words of criticism with regard to the attitude of His Majesty's Government on the original Resolution. I listened with great interest to the observations of the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, who I thought provided a convincing reply, and I need not go over the same ground. The Resolution did three things. First, it named China an aggressor in Korea; secondly, it appointed a Study Group of the Collective Measures Committee to examine "additional measures" which might be taken to restrain China; and, thirdly, it set up a Good Offices Committee to explore the possibilities of peaceful settlement of the Korean problem in accordance with the statement of principles transmitted to Pekin by the Cease-Fire Group on January 13.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I did not intervene when the noble Viscount was speaking. He pointed out that there had been an earlier Resolution—which is perfectly true—and that that was amended. I think I am right in saying that the Australian Government gave their adhesion to the amended Resolu-
  652
  tion a certain period of days before His Majesty's Government found it possible to do so.
  LORD HENDERSON: I cannot answer that particular point, but I do not think there was any delay in the adhesion of the British Government to the Resolution in the final form passed by the General Assembly. I listened with interest to the comments of the two noble Lords with regard to sanctions. The important thing about this Resolution is that "additional measures" will not become a live issue until the Good Offices Committee has reported failure in its efforts. Even then the application of "additional measures" will not be automatic. The Study Group will first have to examine the problem, formulate its recommendations, and then report to the General Assembly. Only at that stage will sanctions become an issue for decision. His Majesty's Government believe that the Good Offices Committee, under the President of the General Assembly, will proceed with its work expeditiously.
  The Government are determined to do everything in their power to secure a peaceful settlement of Far Eastern problems. To this end we see great merit in the proposals tabled in the United Nations on January 26 by Mr. Lester Pearson, Canadian Minister for External Affairs. The first point in Mr. Pearson's programme is the convening of a SevenPower Conference to be attended by representatives of the Central People's Government of China, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., the United Kingdom, France, India and Egypt. This Conference would arrange for a cease-fire in Korea, and having made these arrangements, would then go on to discuss the withdrawal of all non-Korean troops from Korea and the unification of the country; and would finally pass on to the related problems of Formosa and the assumption by the Pekin representative of China's seat in the United Nations.
  This is a positive programme. If the People's Government of China are sincere in their protestations of peace, it is not easy to see any reason why these proposals should not be acceptable to China. It is surely in China's interests to discuss all these problems at a conference table, where she would be on equal terms with the other countries represented. She cannot wish to stay indefinitely in North

  653
  Korea, facing a determined and resolute United Nations army, with hitting power vastly superior to her own. Her casualties through military and air action, let alone through disease and other causes, have been enormous. It is, of course, true that she has almost unlimited man-power, but can she continue to throw away so many human lives so recklessly and with such indifference to the suffering of her sorely-tried people?
  The fortitude of the Chinese people in the face of famine and pestilence has been the admiration of the world. But there can be little admiration for a Government which is prepared to sacrifice, without a qualm and in an aggressive enterprise, so many thousands of human lives—lives which could contribute to the country's prosperity and recovery after twenty years of devastation caused by the Japanese invasion and by civil war. The people of this country— whatever their Party and whatever their convictions—sincerely want peace. The Chinese Government do not seem to be aware of that wish—or if they are they deliberately ignore it, and prefer to join with their Russian colleagues in describing us as "warmongers." I am sure that some noble Lords must have read with interest the recent open letter in the Manchester Guardian to Mao Tse-Tung from my noble friend Lord Lindsay of Birker, in which he appealed to Mao not to be misled by information regarding this country provided by the British Communist Party, which seems, regrettably, to be Mao's only source of information.
  There is no ill-will in this country towards China; on the contrary, there is a vast fund of good will. But the actions of the Chinese Communist leaders make it difficult for the good will to persist and to fructify More good will from Pekin, and less display of doctrinaire animosity towards the West, less use of Soviet thought processes, jargon and clichés, would open the way for the latent good will in the West towards China to reveal itself. On behalf of His Majesty's Government, I make this appeal to the Chinese Government: "Co-operate with the Good Offices Committee. You have nothing to fear from co-operation with the United Nations. You will make a settlement far harder by turning your back on the United Nations and refusing to negotiate. You say you want peace in Korea. The United Nations have shown
  654
  the way to peace. It is solely within your power to join with the Good Offices Committee to bring about a peaceful settlement in Korea."
  My Lords, I would add only that a settlement in Korea would surely be most welcome to the Korean people themselves, whose sorrows and tribulations through the continued fighting are of grave concern to His Majesty's Government.
  Your Lordships have been reminded that Mr. John Foster Dulles, who has been charged by the President of the United States with the task of preparing the ground for a Japanese Peace Treaty, has recently completed an exploratory tour in which he visited Japan, Australia and New Zealand. During his stay in Tokyo he had most useful discussions of an informal and personal character with the United Kingdom political representative there. In the light of these conversations, and of consultations which have been taking place between us and Commonwealth Governments over the past three years, we are resolved to do everything possible to agree with Commonwealth and other Allied Governments on a policy which will enable us to conclude an early Treaty of Peace with Japan, while safeguarding the: essential interests of the countries concerned.
  In this connection I should like to assure the noble Marquess that His Majesty's Government prefer a multilateral form for the Peace Treaty with Japan, rather than a series of bilateral Treaties, as has been suggested in some quarters. On the signature of a Peace Treaty, the basis for the Allied Occupation of Japan will be removed. When that time comes, Japan must not be denied the means of protecting herself against Communist aggression. The problem is how to reconcile this need with safeguards to ensure that Japan does not again embark on a policy of aggressive expansionism. Most careful consideration is being given to this question, but it would be idle to suggest that, whichever course we may decide to adopt, we shall not have to face some risks. In particular, we recognise and warmly sympathise with the need of Australia and New Zealand for some guarantee of their security against future aggression from any quarter, and I may add that the general question of security in the Pacific has been

  655
  under informal discussion among the Governments concerned. I can assure the noble Marquess that His Majesty's Government are in the closest touch with the United States Government, as well as with the Commonwealth Governments on this question, and that our views have been clearly expressed.
  I have mentioned in connection with the Pearson proposals for a settlement of the Korean problem, the related problem of Formosa. As noble Lords will be aware, His Majesty's Government have gone on record on several occasions in stating that they abide by the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations in relation to Formosa; but under the Cairo Declaration the Formosan problem cannot be dissociated from the Korean problem. They form part of the same settlement. So long as China is committing aggression in Korea the unification and independence of Korea (as called for in the Cairo Declaration) is prevented, and the operation of the Cairo Declaration is thereby also prevented. With an honourable settlement of the Korean problem on the basis of the Pearson proposals, or something like them, the way will be open to discuss the problem of Formosa.
  I come now to the question of German rearmament and the European army, to which reference has already been made. Both these matters have to be considered within the context of the North Atlantic Treaty defence arrangements. The Prime Minister made it clear on February 12 that we have agreed to the need for an armed contribution from Germany. I quote his own words:
  "We have accepted the need for a contribution from Germany but the time, method and conditions will require a great deal of working out."
  This is a realistic view of the problem. A German contribution cannot be produced at once. I noticed that The Times stated a few days ago that the Western Powers
  "are in no position to make actual, within a short time and on a substantial scale, the participation of Germany in Western defence."
  The simple fact is that there are many factors to be dealt with before a result can be achieved.
  First of all, we must proceed apace in our present work of building up the forces of the democratic States of the Atlantic Alliance. That need was, I am sure, fully appreciated and approved in the
  656
  Defence debate in your Lordships' House last week. The great majority of the Germans feel this, too. They want some assurance that the partnership to which they are being asked to belong is capable of offering them security. More than once German spokesmen have indicated the vital and urgent importance of Allied forces in Germany being greatly strengthened. All this means that the first essential step is to build up as quickly and as efficiently as possible the integrated force under General Eisenhower, for the defence of Western Europe, including Western Germany. That is precisely what the North Atlantic Treaty nations are now actively engaged upon. Secondly, detailed arrangements have to be worked out with the German Federal Government about the form and manner of the German contribution. These arrangements must be such that German units are integrated in the defence forces in a way which would preclude the emergence again of a German military menace. As the Prime Minister has stated, they must be democratic forces democratically controlled. Exploratory discussions on the technical military questions have already begun with the German Federal Government, and they are still going on in Germany.
  This question of integrating a German contribution into the forces of the Atlantic Treaty nations is also, as has been already stated, closely tied up with the French proposal for a European army. This proposal is now being discussed at a conference in Paris, at which His Majesty's Government are represented by an observer. It is still too early to predict the results of this conference. Both in another place and in your Lordships' House, the alleged aloof attitude of the Government and their decision to be represented by an observer and not by a full member have been the subject of criticism. I will deal quite briefly with the point. As originally put forward, there were a number of features of the French plan for a European army which His Majesty's Government could not accept. This applies particularly to the proposals for a political superstructure, with a European Minister of Defence, responsible to a European Assembly. We are also doubtful about the military practicability of the plan, whether it would really make an effective military contribution to the Atlantic organisation for the defence of

  657
  Europe, and whether it might not involve delay to the rapid achievement of our integrated North Atlantic defence force. Noble Lords may have observed that, in his speech opening the conference, M. Schuman said that
  "if the result of our initiative were to endanger, or merely to delay, Atlantic defence, and if this were proved, we would not hesitate to withdraw our proposition."
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Is that not an important argument for the view that we should be represented at the conference? Apparently, His Majesty's Government take the view that that would interfere with North Atlantic defence. If we only have an observer, we are unable to say so.
  LORD HENDERSON: Not at all. His Majesty's Government are waiting to see what emerges from the conference. If we were represented by an active member, we might have to accept any principle agreed on. That was the case in point in connection with the Schuman plan— acceptance in principle. Our position is that, while we have not yet approved the plan for a European army, we have not rejected the idea of it as part of the North Atlantic integrated force should a work-able scheme be produced. We wait to see how the conference will develop, and we reserve our judgment until we see what proposals actually emerge from the discussion.
  Then, thirdly, there is a political side to this question of a German contribution to the defence of Europe. Before there can be a German contribution there must be an agreement with the Germans themselves on the nature of their contribution. And this agreement must be endorsed by the German Bundestag and the necessary alterations made in the German Constitution. This agreement necessarily has a political aspect. If Germany is to contribute to the defence of Western Europe, she cannot be expected to do so from a position of inferior status. As General Eisenhower has said:
  "I personally think there has to be a political platform achieved, an understanding that will contemplate an eventual and an earned equality on the part of Germany before we should start to talk about including units of Germans in any kind of army."
  This means that we have to reconsider the whole question of the Occupation régime in Germany and the various controls still exercised by the Allied Powers.
  658
  Such reconsideration of the occupation régime is of course in harmony with our fixed policy of political evolution in Western Germany. Here I should like to say that in framing and executing this policy we rely greatly upon the advice of the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Germany, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, who is discharging his difficult and onerous task with great success and with the full confidence of His Majesty's Government. The current stage in this process of political evolution is that discussions are now to be undertaken with a view to the establishment of contractual relations which will replace the Occupation régime. But, here again, there are complicated problems, and time will be required for the necessary negotiations.
  It is only against this broad background that the question of a German armed contribution can be seen in its proper perspective, as one part of a vast complex of military and political problems. It was with these practical and inescapable considerations in mind that the Prime Minister said that
  "the time, method and conditions will require a great deal of working out."
  This does not mean any going back on the Brussels Conference decision. His Majesty's Government are hopeful that the Soviet Government will accept the proposals made by them, together with the United States and French Governments, for a preliminary meeting between, representatives of the Four Powers on March 5. If Moscow agrees to a meeting, it will be possible to assess whether the Soviet Government really desire a détente. An answer to the decisive question of whether there is a chance of removing underlying causes of international tension can be found only through business-like discussion. Only in this way can we get to the root of things. Understanding will not be achieved by long-distance exchanges, or by volleys of hostile propaganda. This has always been the view of His Majesty's Government.
  This does not mean, however, that we remain silent in the face of unfounded accusations and abusive attacks. We must not hesitate to place on record the responsibility of the Soviet Union, so that we may know where we start from. This has been done in terms of the facts in

  659
  the British Note which was delivered to the Soviet Ambassador on February 17. This Note points out clearly, what is already known to the world public, that present discord with the Soviet Government does not spring from any particular aspect of the German problem, though that problem is an element. Disagreement had been obvious, and the tension caused by Soviet policy had become acute, long before a German contribution to Western defence was recently accepted in principle by the Atlantic Treaty nations. What does lie at the root of world tension is the persistent pursuit of threatening policies by the Soviet Union, with its formidable armed strength as an overshadow. To ignore that obvious fact would be for the Western democracies to place in jeopardy their own security and their own way of life. It is an equally obvious fact that our great co-ordinated efforts to redress the overwhelming armed preponderance of Soviet Russia and her satellites, as the Atlantic Treaty partners are resolved to do, do not constitute a threat of aggression to anyone.
  My Lords, there can be no doubt that public anxiety at the gravity of the situation created by Soviet policy and actions is world-wide. We share that anxiety, but we shall not enter any Conference in a mood of appeasement. But neither, on the other hand, will we close our ears to new proposals genuinely and honestly put forward with a view to removing the causes of international tension. We are conscious that no effort is too great in furtherance of the cause of peace and freedom. The Government have been reproached for failing to take the initiative in calling for a Conference. It has been complained that we have left the initiative to the Russians. We have also been charged with time-wasting tactics in dealing with the original Soviet proposal.
  We have taken the view that a Conference whose agenda did not enable essential matters to be discussed was almost certain to be abortive. We have taken the view that if a Conference is to hold out any prospect of removing causes of international tension, if it is to have any chance of making a positive contribution to peace and security, and succeed in allaying present fears and strengthening future confidence, then it must have an agenda, which (to use the
  660
  Prime Minister's words) shall correspond with the realities of the world situation. As noble Lords know, the Russians pro-posed a discussion simply on the demilitarisation of Germany. It was the Western Allies who have proposed a Conference that would really tackle some of the root causes of world tension and anxiety, and among these causes is undeniably the immense armed strength of Russia and her satellites. The Western Allies have in fact displayed strong initiative in seeking to get a Conference agenda that would offer, if not the certainty at least the possibility of tangible results, given a sincere desire by the Soviet Government for an agreement.
  My Lords, Marshal Stalin alleges that we have done him a wrong in saying that the Soviet Union have not disarmed. But the fact remains that the Soviet Union have under arms more than 175 divisions, whereas the total forces of all members of the North Atlantic Treaty are but a fraction of this number. These countries have used their vast economic resources to make good the havoc of war and to improve living standards in the five continents. Every nation on the free side of the Iron Curtain knows that the powerful war-time forces of Great Britain were speedily run down by demobilisation. If the peoples of the Soviet Union also are not aware of that incontestable fact, it can be only because the Soviet Government have deliberately kept them in ignorance.
  We have concentrated on economic recovery and social advance. We endured years of austerity, not to become an armed threat to anyone but to create the Welfare State which is the admiration of all the free nations. Now we are compelled, by the non-co-operative policy of the Soviet Union, to divert an increasing proportion of man-power and material resources (which would otherwise have continued to be used for peaceful development) in order, with our democratic partners, to strengthen the common defences of the democratic world against any further encroachments by Communist imperialism.
  What proportion of Russian economic resources is devoted to military ends, including the manufacture of costly armaments? According to Marshal Stalin it would be unthinkable that the Soviet Union could remain mobilised when her man-power was needed for the peaceful economic reconstruction of her country.

  661
  No one would deny that the Soviet Union has had to undertake vast tasks of reconstruction, but no one can doubt that the unfortunate Russian peasant, living in conditions which would not be tolerated in this country, would be immeasurably better off if he had not to carry those 175 divisions on his back. And what say has the Russian peasant in deciding the proportion to be set between armaments and economic progress? None. The question is settled for him by the Kremlin. In this country the assumption of the heavy additional defence burden, the acceptance of the inevitable tightening of the economic belt, are matters to be settled, with full opportunity for discussion and opposition, by the representatives of the people, in (he full light of open debate and with no barriers to public knowledge.
  My Lords, recent statements by the German Federal Chancellor and the Social Democratic leader, Dr. Schumacher, show that they are in broad agreement with the attitude which His Majesty's Government have adopted towards a Four-Power Conference. Both have issued warnings against the danger of any illusory agreement leading to the apparent neutralisation of a united Germany. This, in the view of Dr. Adenauer, would be tantamount to the surrender of the country to Russia.
  As regards the Communist plan for the unification of Germany, Dr. Schumacher charges the Eastern Zone authorities with trying to kill liberty through unity, whereas Western Germany seeks to achieve unity through liberty. That is why Federal Germany insists that the first step towards union must be the holding of free, equal, direct and secret all-German elections. I wish to make it clear that, while striving to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union, we shall take no action which will weaken the ability of the German Federal Republic to preserve freedom and independence, and to associate herself, if she chooses, with the other countries of Western Europe.
  Finally, my Lords, let me repeat what I think I have made clear already. We should welcome an opportunity to discuss the matters at issue between the Communist East and the democratic West. We are prepared, with our Allies, to enter a Conference with the aim of securing a
  662
  genuine improvement in the relations between the two sides. The world pines for relief from the present tension and release from present fears. It is not mere assurances of good intention that it looks for but action for peace. And it waits for a practical response by Russia.
  4.20 p.m.
  LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, today's Order Paper was originally occupied by a Motion of mine, which I gladly withdrew when I understood that the House wished to debate Foreign Affairs. But having listened to the speeches of the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, and the noble Lord who has spoken for the Government, I shall have to speak at some little length on that particular Motion, because it is obvious that it may become an important matter in the near future. That Motion pointed out that no Government or group of Governments have the right to transfer Formosa to Communism without having made sure that that is the wish of a decisive majority of its inhabitants. I do not think for a minute that such a majority would be obtained. It is quite likely that there would be a verdict that the Formosans wanted neither the Communists nor Chiang Kai-shek. In any case, they have been separated from China for fifty-six years, and they are fully entitled to self-determination. The Government are, I think, completely committed to that principle, though perhaps they may be unaware of it.
  On February 9, Dr. Malan entertained —I hope that is the right verb—Mr. Gordon-Walker, and took advantage of him by pressing for the immediate transfer of the three Protectorates to South Africa. Mr. Gordon-Walker conducted himself with tact and dignity, and replied in this way. He said: "We feel that no people anywhere, whether we are responsible for them or not, should simply be moved from one jurisdiction to another without full consideration of their views." That, of course, is the doctrine on which His Majesty's Government, to their credit, have stood firm in the Sudan, in spite of Egyptian pressure. It is also a doctrine which I think all of us here adopt as regards Northern Ireland. It is also a doctrine which ought to apply to Kashmir, where no one in his senses would really believe that a population 95 per cent. Moslem wish to continue to live under Hindu rule.

  663
  Therefore, it seems to me that the Government are committed to the remnants of self-determination; and so also are all other civilised Governments, unless, of course, they are going to adopt the genial cynicism of the late M. Philippe Berthelot, who was for so long head of the French Foreign Office. He used to say sometimes in negotiations "Let us stand on our principles till they give way." There is no question of giving way this time, because the population of Formosa is 8,000,000—I am taking the Chatham House figure; I see that the Economist puts it at 7,600,000. It is, of course, a greater figure than those of the populations of many of the small Western European countries. It is twice as large as the figure for Denmark or Norway. It is a great deal bigger than that for Switzerland; considerably bigger than that for Sweden, and little less than that for Belgium. No one would dream of transferring a mass of white population without "full consideration of their views"—to quote Mr. Gordon-Walker again.
  So we reach this position; that the Government are committed as regards white, brown and black men, but that there are in this country a considerable number of people who would willingly transfer 8,000,000 yellow men without asking their views at all. That is a form of racial discrimination. The record of arbitrary transfer in the last six years has been quite awful. Three Baltic States have not only been annexed but depopulated. The peoples of Central and Eastern Europe have been enslaved. For that result the Government, and other like-minded Governments, have only one excuse, and it is unanswerable—that they could not have prevented it except by the use of force. Here is a case where an arbitrary transfer could be stopped simply by preventing the application of undue force. That is what the Americans have proposed to do, and yet there has been considerable outcry against it in a certain section in this country. The fact is, of course, that that particular section of opinion is bent on appeasing the Chinese Communist. And that situation requires some comment from me.
  Communism everywhere is our enemy, and I hope that in future there will be no concessions to Communism anywhere,
  664
  except at a high price. I hope (and here I must differ materially from what the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel said to-day) there will be no question of allowing Communist China into the United Nations, still less into the Security Council, unless she calls off not only the war in Korea but the war in Malaya and the war in Indo-China as well. Every one of us knows perfectly well that she could do so by lifting a finger, just as the Foreign Secretary so often, and so wisely, said that Russia could with a word have stopped the war in Greece at any moment. I hope that we are not going to compound for anything less than real peace. I cannot for a moment accept the argument put forward this afternoon, which is in effect that, because a man is condemned for a crime of violence, he automatically becomes a member of "my club." I would not admit that.
  On the contrary, I remember that at the beginning of the Second World War the League of Nations, in a dying effort, rose and threw out the Russians because they had attacked little Finland. Now we see a case where another huge country, Communist China, has attacked another little country—South Korea; and not only South Korea but us and the French and the United Nations itself. At that moment, His Majesty's Government, and every like-minded Government, are fain to declare that they will not push her out but rather that they desire to push China into the innermost Councils of the United Nations. That is in flat contradiction with all our principles. These things should not be done, except at a really convincing price. Therefore, I do not want any more settlements with Communism anywhere whereby we transfer tangible and valuable goods, and then find, six months later, or even less, their pie-crust promises are broken. The point which I am trying to make here is that if we are going to have a settlement with Communist China let it be a really lasting settlement, one that will bring real peace in the Far East and, incidentally, enable us and the Americans and the French to withdraw some of the troops from the Far East to Europe where they may be needed. That, I think, is a sound doctrine.
  Of course the more callous appeasers will say: "Communist China is entitled to have everything she wants, on account of the provisional agreement concluded at Cairo eight years ago." But that

  665
  agreement has already been shattered. It provided, among other things, for the return to China of Manchuria. The Russians, since then, have seized the ports and the railways, and have dismantled the industrial equipment, so the Treaty is no longer valid. Moreover, the transfer was to be part of a general treaty with Japan, which has not yet even been drafted. And I very much doubt whether it ever will be concluded. I doubt whether Russia or Communist China will be willing to sign any treaty on Japan that the Western Powers could or would accept. According to this provisional agreement, Formosa was to be transferred to a friendly China, not one who is killing all of us, anywhere and at any time when she can. I agree with the Lord President of the Council, who said that the Chinese have not wholly accepted our terms. The last time that a chap kicked me in the stomach when I offered him a drink I also came to the conclusion that he was not wholly sociable.
  The advent of Communist China has altered things entirely. Communism is a cruel system, the most cruel the world has ever seen, and no decent person would dream of shovelling masses of humanity into Moloch's maw. I think that only idolaters would do that. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, expressed some bewilderment on the apparent reluctance of His Majesty's Government and others to brand China as an aggressor. I think I can offer him —I regret that he is not in his place but I offer to his substitute—some explanation of that reluctance. A great many of those I have just termed idolaters were very frightened of branding China as an aggressor, or even of recognising the plain fact of aggression, for fear that they might have to discuss sanctions.
  Only about a fortnight ago, I saw a resolution, signed by a number of prominent politicians, saying that they deeply regretted that China had been branded as an aggressor. Branded—I want you to note the verb "branded." What is wrong with the old English verb "to call." Since when are we expected to brand a spade a spade? Having recoiled from this glimpse of the obvious, the signatories then went on, I think I am giving the exact words, "strongly to oppose all forms of sanctions." Well, nobody need
  666
  have been so frightened as that. As a matter of fact, I think it would probably have been better to start by agreeing to consider sanctions, and then to rule out any practical measure which was not considered appropriate or practical.
  It is certainly my own view, and I think it would be that of most people wellinformed on this subject, that in view of Nehru's courtship of Pekin and the probable recalcitrance of other Asiatic countries such as Indonesia and Ceylon, it would in practice be difficult, if not impossible, to impose any other measures of restriction other than those already in force, particularly as I understand that the Government have now, wisely in my view, clamped down on oil. We should all have paid heed some time ago to the Norwegian Foreign Minister, a man of marked moderation, when he suggested that no more war materials or potential should go to Communist China. I am bound to say that those who now export substantial quantities of rubber to Communist China seem to be very much in the same boat as those who used to send metals to Germany and Japan up to the eve of the 1939 war. I hope that His Majesty's Government will look into this question, which disquiets me considerably. Their responsibility seems to me to be great.
  At all events, there is no objection whatever to at least discussing sanctions-Contrary to common supposition, talk does not commit one to doing anything. I remember that when I was a boy in the last century, I sometimes heard on the Continent—never here—that to talk of love was to make love. We all know that that is an entirely out-moded technique. It is not true. Similarly, it is perfectly possible to talk of sanctions without necessarily operating all sanctions. If all amorous talk everywhere had been matched by amorous actions, the world would already have been more over-populated in relation to its food supplies than the learned expert, Lord Boyd-Orr, seems to anticipate.
  I am fully in agreement with all those who do not wish to see the war extended in the Far East. I say that without one iota of consideration for Chinese Communism, but merely because it would be gravely prejudicial to the conduct of a war in Europe. At the same time people must not let their nerves run away with them so far that they would sooner see

  667
  soldiers of the United Nations shot down in Korea than talk of love to anyone but Mao and Chou, and Wu and Pu. That does not seem to me at all a dignified attitude. In fact, there is growing up a school of thought which shies off collective security if the adversary looks large, and if the consequences have to be visited on Communists instead of Fascists. Well, people who wish to take that line are inevitably moved towards it, because they also adopt the doctrine of Americaphobia, and so they drive themselves to supporting the Chinese Communists.
  I have seen arguments that the South Koreans should be branded as aggressors. That is very plucky, is it not? They are small; that is quite all right; there is no risk there whatever. On the other hand, I have seen from the same quarters expressions of hope that the North Koreans would win. Again, from like-minded quarters I have seen it argued that the Chinese Communists were entitled to burst into Korea because those dangerous bandits, the United Nations, were approaching their borders. Look where the doctrine of the idolaters leads them. The armies of Hungary, Bulgaria and Roumania are approaching the borders of Yugoslavia with visibly hostile intent. Tito then would be entitled to precipitate a Third World War by attacking the bunch immediately. Of course, they do not believe that. Oh, no. The idolaters are quite simple people. They have two measures, and one is very simple. It is that the Americans are always wrong." I am willing to love all mankind except an American," said Dr. Johnson. But he said that on April 15, 1778, and I never knew that any portion of the Left had taken their political doctrines from a High Tory of the eighteenth century. I know that there have been occasions in this Anglo-American cooperation when we have felt that we had been insufficiently informed. There is a lot to be said on that matter, and I do not propose to go into it now. I see that another bone of contention is to be discussed in another place next week. I only hope that between now and then, neither in the Press nor anywhere else, will it be discussed in tones which are bound to be music to Communist ears.
  I suggest in this dark hour, which may toe the real twilight of the gods, that all
  668
  of us, on both sides of the Atlantic, should make it our daily duty to ourselves, quite apart from what we say in public, to stress the identities rather than the difficulties. I suggest that anybody who fails in that duty will be failing in his duty to something more than man. I suggest that all of us together should look back over history, and look back fairly frequently, and take the broad view of it. Thirty years ago the Americans were branded in all quarters because they retired from Europe, because they would not join the League of Nations, and because they ventured to ask for some interest on the money they had lent us. Now here they are in Europe up to the neck. They have not only joined the United Nations, but have taken the lead in making collective security a reality. They have poured out far more money than ever before, in fabulous proportions.
  I will say nothing of the enormous benefactions received by this country, or even of the enormous largesse bestowed upon Germany. I will take two relatively minor matters, which may have escaped a good many ears and eyes. In the last few years the Americans have made a free gift of 2,000,000,000 dollars to Italy, and but for that gift Italy would not be in the line at all. She would have gone Communist, whereas she is making good at present and is able to take her place in Western defence. This fact is entirely due to the Americans, and to nobody else. Again, only last week the American people insisted on making a free gift to India of 2,000,000 tons of wheat, at a little bagatelle of a cost of 190,000,000 dollars; and that although Nehru had done his best to give offence not only to the United States Government, but to the American taxpayer as well.
  In spite of all these generosities and virilities (this has been a matter that has long been brewing in my heart, and your Lordships must forgive me if I take occasion to let it out to-day, because not a single one of us would have deemed it possible in 1946), by gad! in certain quarters the Yanks are wrong again. I hear talk—I have stacks of papers at home—of" American imperialism" and of" unprovoked American aggression"— it has gone as far as that—and the Americans are to be taught and educated, reduced to reason," told where they get off," and all the rest of it. I will not bother your Lordships with much of my

  669
  collection, but I should like to give you two typical examples from an organ of the extreme Left—and not so extreme as that, either. At the end of January it wrote that the Russians were now less of a menace to peace than the pressuregroup type of American democracy. That is a pretty thing to appear in a British newspaper! I wonder if the people who say and print those things have any idea of the extent to which they are imperilling the very existence of the people of this country. A week later it was on the job agair —and this time I want your Lordships to listen to every word of it.
  LORD STRABOLGI: Which paper was it?
  LORD VANSITTART: Reynolds. This quotation I am going to give is from the issue of February 4. It said:
  "It is new at least arguable that American isolationism is less of a danger than American interventionist."
  Things of that kind are absolutely horrifying. It went on—and this is almost comic:
  "It is at least important to keep the Americans friendly enough so that we can go on trying to talk them out of Formosa."
  That seems to me to be a very low price to put on Anglo-American friendship. Meanwhile, everything the Americans do is wrong. I ask myself, I ask this House and I ask the country: What the devil do these people want? I will tell you. I remember years ago I, together with the late Bernard Shaw, had to open the site for a proposed national theatre. I had to present him with a large turf on which was a large key, and to make a speech in which I expressed the urgent need of the British people for a national theatre. I have always remembered that occasion, because it is the only one on which I ever" opened my trap" between leaving school and coming to your Lordships' House. Mr. Shaw replied as follows:
  "On an occasion like this the first thing to ask is: 'Do the British people want a national theatre?' Of course they do not; the British never want anything."
  Well, he was wrong—as he frequently was —because, with the exception of a small, peevish minority, we all know very well what we want. We want the closest possible relations with the United States; we want a just and equitable partnership; and we mean to have it. And we do not
  670
  mean to let any bunch of wreckers at either end stand in the way.
  We have seen two huge and avoidable wars come and go, with their trail of horror and misery; we have seen 100,000,000 lives and 1,000,000,000happinesses go down the drain of time; and all that while there was one thing which would have left an ocean of tears unshed, and might have saved this wretched century: it was full and foreseeing American participation, America in time. Well, she was not. It was crying for the moon. But now, by a modern miracle, the full moon has come down, not only for us, but for all the tremulous peoples of Western Europe—and, by Heaven! the lunatics do not want it after all, and start making up to Mao and Chou and Wu and Pu by every means under the shining stars. I have pointed out, and friends of mine in the United States have pointed out, that that sort of conduct plays straight into the hands of dangerous Right Wing tendencies on the other side—people who are only tepidly interested in our welfare. And, believe me (you should reflect on this), we are not necessarily out of that wood yet. It would be a mistake to take everything for granted. Only on February 14, I saw that 108 Members of the House of Representatives had signed what they called a" Declaration of Policy," which seemed to me to be heading, if anything, in the wrong direction. It is all very well for people to write that it is at least arguable that American isolationism is now no more dangerous, or less dangerous, or any way you like, than American intervention ism. Just imagine for a moment that you had even a semiisolationist President in the White House, one who was publicly committed to help us only from the sea and air, with a minimum support on the ground. That would spell our common doom. The only difference would be that ours would come sooner than theirs.
  The fleetingly famous Abbé Sieyès was once asked what he had done during the reign of terror (and what a little" tiddler" was that compared with the reign of terror that has raged in Europe in the last thirty-four years!) and he replied: " J'ai vécu,"—" I lived." Survival, that is the business of all of us now, irrespective of Party. Therefore, we should" put aside childish things" and, above all, we should put aside childish people.

  671
  I hope that they will be put aside, and that our Americaphobes will be repudiated consistently by everybody, because, if unwisdom were to have its way on either side of the Atlantic, it could still complete a long process of catastrophe and finally extinguish those lights which Edward Grey saw going out all over Europe on that summer evening of 1914.
  4.48 p.m.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF YORK: My Lords, I should like at once to associate myself with what the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, said about the importance of the closest friendship with the United States. It would be a disaster if there came a serious rift between ourselves and that country, and would be the greatest victory which the Russians have won in the cold war. All of us who value this close friendship between ourselves and the United States are bound to feel anxiety at the criticisms and the tension of both sides of the Atlantic. The United States are undoubtedly highly critical of this country at the present time, and it is useless to disguise that there are large numbers of people in this country who are fearful lest America might in some way involve us in a world war. We must do everything in our power to avoid such a serious breach. It is a matter of vital importance that the people of the country should understand more clearly than they do the great generosity which the United States have displayed to us and also to the rest of the world. That generosity has been something astounding. I am certain that a large number of people in this country are quite ignorant of what America has done, and I believe that when they understand more fully how America has contributed to the safety of the world much of this misunderstanding will pass away.
  Notwithstanding what the noble Lord has said, I feel that I must make a brief reference to the question of the appointment of a supreme admiral. I make reference to it because it is undoubtedly causing a good deal of feeling in this country. For the main part of my life I have been connected with naval people, and to be quite honest, when I read the announcement I felt great surprise and a certain sense of humiliation. But the real reason why I regret this appointment at the present time is that it will give
  672
  to those who say, and say quite falsely, that we are a satellite of the United States, an opportunity to point to this decision that an American admiral shall command the Fleets. I imagine that it would be impossible for our Government to take any further action in this matter. But the American people are a generous people, and I cannot help hoping that when they realise the feeling which the appointment has created in this country they will be capable of the generous action of withdrawing it and agreeing to the appointment of a British admiral. I can think of no single step which the American people could take which would call forth from this country greater gratitude and do more to build up our confidence in the American people.
  Having said that, I agree entirely with what the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, has said: that the central pivot of our foreign policy must be the closest possible understanding and friendship with the United States, however much we may disagree with them from time to time on various matters. In the recent debate on Defence one phrase was uttered which stuck in my mind. The noble Lord, Lord Ismay, said that we were confronted with the" gravest peril in our history," and, so far as I know, no noble Lord on either side of the House attempted to contradict that statement. The speeches to which we have listened to-day show that the international situation is probably better now than it was even a few weeks ago, but no one denies that it is to-day full of the utmost gravity.
  Here again I feel that the people of the country as a whole do not realise the great peril in which we are now standing. There is a quiet whispering campaign going on from Communists and fellow travellers, saying that there is really no possibility of a war; that war is so unreasonable that no one is likely to embark upon it, and that Russia, a peace-loving country, is being forced most reluctantly to arm in her own safety. That is the kind of whisper, and sometimes more than whisper, which is going on throughout the country. It is partly that which leads so many people to sign these gigantic peace petitions. I feel that it is the bounden duty of the Government to make clear and definite statements about the actual position of danger in which the country is, and to make those statements in such

  673
  a plain way that the great masses of the people may easily understand them. There is a far greater interest to-day in foreign politics than at any previous time in our history. The people want to be told. They want the facts of the situation explained to them. They want to be told the truth, and, if it is not possible to tell the whole truth, at any rate I hope they may be told much more plainly part of the truth; for if the country realises the danger in which it now is I am certain that we shall have far greater national unity than we have at the present time.
  There is another and much more vital direction in which more information is required. It is much more important to get information, if possible, to the other side of the Iron Curtain. The people there are ignorant of what is happening in the rest of the world and of the attitude which the rest of the world is taking to them. I recently had a remarkable illustration of that fact. Many of us have received a pamphlet containing a large number of speeches, letters and, I think, sermons by Archbishops and Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church. It is called, The Orthodox Church in the Fight for Peace. Incidentally, I may say that this booklet is produced much more beautifully and expensively than would be one containing utterances by Anglican Archbishops or Bishops. The remarkable thing about this pamphlet is that there is no doubt about the earnestness and sincerity of the appeals for peace. I know some of the writers. I am certain that they are absolutely genuine and sincere. But what struck me most was the fact that throughout they are obsessed with the idea that the rest of the world is about to attack them. Again and again they refer to the arming of the rest of the world against peace-loving Russia. We know how perfectly absurd those statements are, but they are genuinely believed by millions of people on the other side of the Iron Curtain.
  I ask the Government whether anything can be done, or what is being done, to try and bring home the facts of the position to the people on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Of course, the leaders, the people in the Kremlin, know the position, but the mass of the people in those countries are now hopelessly deceived. I am not for a moment asking the Government to tell us how
  674
  they are carrying out whatever is being done or what particular methods they propose. Obviously, that would bring suppression of those methods by those on the other side of the Iron Curtain. I hope that in various ways an attempt is being made to bring home to the people of Russia that we have no hatred against them; that we are a peace-loving people and that our rearmament is to defend ourselves against the militant and aggressive policy of their own Government. It is unfortunate—it is almost disastrous— that it is so difficult to get news from the democratic countries through the Iron Curtain. Apparently fellow travellers are the only people who are allowed to enter behind the curtain, and as a rule they go to attend peace congresses, and so on. I believe it is not doing them an injustice to say that the majority of them are cranks, and that they represent only a very small minority in this country. They give a totally false impression of the views and opinions of the people of this country. I do not know what can be done; but if the world is to become a world with a spirit of peace in it. something must be attempted in the way of educating the great mass of people on the other side of the Iron Curtain.
  There is only one other point I wish to make. I hope that we shall rearm quickly and thoroughly, but I trust that, side by side with rearmament, there will be a continuous attempt at negotiation and that we shall not wait until rearmament is completed before holding talks on the highest level. I agree with the appeal made by the noble Marquess opposite that talks should be held on the highest possible level. I have always been surprised that talks have not been held with Stalin. Of course, I have no special knowledge of these subjects, and I have imagined that there night be some conclusive reasons against attempting talks on the highest level. But, as the noble Marquess has expressed his feeling that such talks should be started, I feel bound. to say that it seems to me to be a common-sense way of proceeding. I know it is sometimes said that if we were to talk to Stalin now he would regard it as a sign of weakness; but all we know of Stalin shows that he is far too shrewd a man to imagine that. Of course, such talks might fail; though even if they did we should not be in any worse position than we are at the present time

  675
  But if the talks succeeded, or even made an approach towards success, that would indeed be a great gain for the peace of the world. But while those negotiations are going on, there must be no suspension of rearmament. If we carry through our rearmament quickly and thoroughly, then we, together with the United States, may once again be able to save civilisation from destruction.
  5.1 p.m.
  LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, in this debate I propose to draw your attention to a very pertinent matter in connection with our relations with the United States which I feel should be cleared up at the earliest possible moment. The point has already been touched upon by other noble Lords, and particularly by the most reverend Primate. I suggest that it was a pity that the country should first learn of the appointment of an overall American Naval Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic through a mere release of information from Copenhagen. It is another instance of His Majesty's Government failing to take the country more into their confidence. They are largely to blame for the difficulties which have arisen over this highly important appointment.
  The Prime Minister has said in another place that there is to be an Eastern Atlantice and a Western Atlantic force, under a Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who would be an American naval officer. He said that the Eastern command would include the British area under a British admiral, in association with Coastal Command, and that the Western area of the Atlantic would be under an American admiral. I should like to deal for a moment with the actual technical operation of this organisation. In naval warfare, as your Lordships are aware, it frequently becomes necessary to divert forces to many different areas. It becomes necessary to divert forces not only from one side of the Atlantic to the other, but also from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean where it is proposed to establish a different command.
  LORD STRABOLGI: Or the Pacific.
  LORD TEYNHAM: As I understand it, the Supreme Atlantic Naval Commander would not be in a position to divert forces to the Mediterranean or any
  676
  other theatre of war. Presumably, such diversion would have to be decided by the new North Atlantic Pact Organisation, or by a Chiefs of Staff Committee if brought into being. Therefore I cannot see the necessity for the appointment of a Supreme Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Atlantic, who will merely group together the Eastern and Western Atlantic Commands.
  During the last war, the Eastern and Western Atlantic were under different commands, one British and one American, and this system worked extremely well under the Chiefs of Staff Committee. I am completely unconvinced that there is any call for a change in the organisation which we had in the last war. The Prime Minister has asserted in another place that the experience of the last war proved the necessity for a Supreme Naval Commander in the Atlantic. I would say, on the contrary, that the last war proved no such necessity; and in any case, if difficulties had arisen there was nothing to prevent such a command being set up at any time. In the words of one of our most distinguished admirals which appear in a letter that he has written to the Press to-day:
  "The proposed appointment will merely be a fifth wheel in the coach, and liable to be an embarrassment to the naval authorities on both sides of the Atlantic."
  Apart from these technical matters, I feel that the Prime Minister grossly underestimated the sentiments of the British people when he agreed to the appointment of an American as a Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic. Does he realise that up and down the country this matter is being discussed in every public-house and village inn and is giving rise to expressions of astonishment and feelings of humiliation, as was mentioned by the most reverend Primate?
  I should like to ask His Majesty's Government whether, in fact, the name of a British admiral was ever put forward for this post, and if not, why not. The argument that the American fleet in the Atlantic will be larger than ours has, I suggest, no bearing whatever on the case. Surely the test of the matter is not the size of a nation's forces, but the best man for the job in the circumstances. I would ask your Lordships to recall the period of 1918 in the First World War, when, in fact, the British Army was considerably larger than the French, and yet for psychological reasons

  677
  we willingly put our Army under the command of a Frenchman, Marshal Foch. The Atlantic is undoubtedly of supreme importance to Britain. On the other hand, I would say that the Pacific is the vital area for the United States; and I do not think anyone would consider suggesting that a British naval commander should be appointed in the Pacific.
  I should like to make it quite clear that we on this side of the House are raising no quarrel with the United States; rather are we concerned with the failure of His Majesty's Government to realise the immense importance of the Atlantic to our well-being. We are still the greatest maritime nation, and dependent on sea communications; and the defence of the Atlantic is a matter of life and death to the British people. I am sure that our American friends will not be misled by the storm that has arisen over the proposed appointment. I myself served with the American Navy in the last war, and all of us in the Service have the greatest respect for their fighting ability. But 1 would remind His Majesty's Government that even the American Press realises the position with which we have to contend, and that we have a very great claim for the appointment of a British admiral. I think it is true to say that if the appointment of an American Supreme Naval Commander in the North Atlantic is confirmed, it will be the first time in history that the Home Fleet and the major part of the Royal Navy will have been put under a foreign command and that Britannia is no longer responsible for the shores of England. Even the Daily Worker had a most appropriate cartoon on this unfortunate proposal, which I commend to His Majesty's Government —although, of course, it was published in that journal for an ulterior motive.
  It is no use His Majesty's Government trying to brush aside the real import of the proposed appointment of an American Supreme North Atlantic Commander by saying that a British admiral will be in command of the Western Approaches of Britain, because such a local commander will have to take orders from the Supreme Commander. In fact, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that a crisis, for instance, in submarine warfare in the Caribbean might lead to a dangerous thinning of our forces on the coasts of
  678
  Britain, and even perhaps, in certain circumstances to the removal of the whole of them. I am sure the British people will never support any organisation which might leave this country unprotected by the possible dispersal of our fleet.
  During the last war, when the Army was suffering reverses beyond its control, it was the shield of the Navy which held the country together and kept up the morale of the people; and this fact ought never to be forgotten. I am convinced that if at any time it was known that the Navy was no longer under the direct control of the Admiralty and of a British admiral, this knowledge would have a grave effect on the morale of the people. The whole matter is a very sorry business, and has undoubtedly been very badly handled by His Majesty's Government. It shows a complete lack of knowledge and understanding of the position that the Navy holds in the minds of the British public.
  Nothing in the associations of men and nations is ever too late to remedy, if the will to do so is there. The question is, have His Majesty's Government the will to-day to put matters right, and will they make representation to the United States for a reconsideration of the proposed Supreme Commander's appointment? I fervently hope that His Majesty's Government will act quickly, and will not leave the matter in the position that it is at present. I cannot help feeling that if the British viewpoint had been expressed fully and with understanding in the first place, these unfortunate circumstances would never have arisen. I should like to ask His Majesty's Government whether the countries of the British Commonwealth were consulted on this matter, and, if so, did they agree with the appointment that is proposed.
  I should further like to ask His Majesty's Government what are the real activities of the so-called Standing Group, which was mentioned in another place, under which the Supreme Naval Command will apparently function. I think I am correct in saying that the Standing Group is a sub-committee of a Military Committee which advises the Defence Committee of the North Atlantic Pact Organisation. I would ask your Lordships to look a little more closely at this top-heavy structure. The Standing Group is apparently somewhere near the bottom of this tier. It consists, I understand, of

  679
  three representatives, one from Britain, one from France and one from America —none of whom, I would point out, is a naval officer—who hold their meetings in America, and who would, presumably, be in a position to give orders to the Supreme Naval Commander in the North Atlantic. Surely this organisation is far more cumbersome than that which existed in the last war, and is one that would inevitably lead to many difficulties. I would say that it is quite unnecessary for an efficient naval command, and the sooner we get back to the Chiefs of Staff Committee the better.
  It has been suggested by a number of supporters of His Majesty's Government in the country that we are driving a wedge between British and American relationships by our attitude over the appointment of an American admiral. I submit that this is quite untrue. What we are endeavouring to discover is whether a British officer was in fact put forward by His Majesty's Government for the post of Supreme Naval Commander, North Atlantic, and if not, why not. Also, we are demanding that we should be kept more fully informed of the proposed setup under the North Atlantic Pact as it may affect our Naval Command.
  5.13 p.m.
  LORD WINSTER: My Lords, I share to a large extent the views and feelings expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, who has just resumed his seat, in this matter of the appointment of an American admiral. My chief feeling about it is that it is a business which has been badly, I would almost say clumsily, handled. The announcement was made in what I thought was rather a bald and perfunctory manner. The Prime Minister seemed to be genuinely surprised by the scene which his words created. He appeared to me not quite to understand what all the fuss was about. The fact is, of course, that the announcement he had to make came as a painful shock to the nation. It mortified the Navy, and if our flag officers are capable of being wounded, I would say the announcement was wounding to them. The incident has had one really good effect: it has revealed how proud our nation is of the Navy and how instinctively it grasps the fact that the Navy and our national security are bound indissolubly
  680
  together. The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, said that this matter is being discussed everywhere. May I give your Lordships an instance from my personal experience? When I went down to the country after the announcement had been made, the first thing that my chauffeur said to me was:" Well, I said to the wife last night, 'What's this? The British Navy going to be ordered about by an American! I wonder Nelson doesn't come down from his statue.'" I think that is completely typical of what has been said by all sections of the community up and down the country during the past few days.
  I think we ought to acknowledge the good feeling shown in this matter by several American newspapers, whose editors have completely recognised our feelings in the matter and have spoken in very generous terms about it. But, having said that, I must express my surprise how it ever came about that this appointment was made. There must have been private talks behind the scenes amongst the representatives of the Atlantic Pact, and I should have imagined that the American representatives themselves would find it natural to say:" Well, after all, we have General Eisenhower. All these people are ' giving him the glad hand ' and saying how delighted they are to see him appointed supreme commander on land. It would be ' a bit stiff' to take this naval appointment as well." Surely the First Lord of the Admiralty must have known what was in the wind. I should find it difficult to believe that the First Lord was not made acquainted with what the naval feeling in this matter would be, and that he would not show himself entirely sympathetic to those feelings on the part of the great Service of which he is the political head.
  Having said that, I am bound to say that I differ from the most reverend Primate and the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, on one point. I am not sure that it would be at all wise to press for the cancellation of this appointment. I have referred to the sympathy which has been shown us in America. If now the appointment were to be cancelled, a great deal of that sympathy might turn possibly (I do not say it would) to rather hurt feelings. I am not at all sure that it would be a good thing for the appointment to be cancelled. We can be perfectly sure that Admiral Fechteler is a

  681
  highly competent man, and he will receive from his naval colleagues in this country complete loyalty and be met personally with the greatest friendship and good comradeship. I think the blow of disappointment would have been softened had the Prime Minister explained that possibly the representatives of the many nations in whose hands the power of appointment lay may have felt that, in view of the size of the American naval forces, it was appropriate to offer the command to an American. That may have been one of the penalties of having reduced our Fleet to such poor proportions. Our Fleet no longer visually occupies the great position in the eyes of the world that it once did. Perhaps the Prime Minister might also have explained that the appointment was not for all time. Presumably, it will be for either eighteen months or two years, and in due season it will pass to another admiral. It might pass to a British admiral. There will probably be something in the nature of a roster.
  The fact that an American holds the position first implies no comparison in professional abilities between an American admiral and a British admiral. I think the announcement was an occasion for a little gracefulness, which unfortunately was not shown. I noticed that immediately afterwards Mr. Callaghan, who occupies a position on the Naval Board, went down to Sidcup to make a speech, and said he could not understand why there should be reference to the nationality of the Supreme Commander. Of course, the honourable gentleman could not possibly say one word in criticism of the Prime Minister's announcement, and surely there was no need for him to refer to the matter at all; but I am genuinely astonished that anybody who sits on the Board of Admiralty should say that he could not understand why anybody thought there was anything in this question of the nationality of the commander.
  But perhaps in our very natural feelings about this matter what is rather overlooked is whether the system of command which has been organised in the North Atlantic is or is not a good system. I naturally should be reluctant—in fact I would not venture—to criticise an appointment, a system of command, which had the approval of the Chiefs of Staff. It seems rather cumbrous, and I am bound to say that I thought that in making the
  682
  announcement the Prime Minister shifted a little from one foot to the other. At one moment the admiral would be a supreme commander, and then, when things got a little hot on that point, he suddenly dwindled down to a sort of supreme strategical coordinator.
  But at any rate I am quite clear about this: that the Prime Minister was fallacious on one point. On being questioned about the ability of the Supreme Commander to transfer forces from one to another of the area commands, he said:
  "The right honourable gentleman will remember that in the last war there were very heavy submarine attacks in the Caribbean, and that forces were transferred from our commands here to assist. Then the situation changed and we did not at that time, I think, get back our forces in time because of the rather elaborate machinery."
  It is my recollection that those submarine attacks took place in the Carribean practically at the moment when America came into the war, and there was no elaborate machinery. America had just come into the war, and at least to my recollection no system of command had been set up at that time. So that comparison is completely fallacious. Neither have I any recollection of any elaborate machinery in the Atlantic. So far as I recollect, the Battle of the Atlantic was fought and won with extremely little machinery of any sort; in fact the main factors were the C.-in-C. Western Approaches and his opposite number on the other side of the Atlantic, and between them they handled the business. So much for that. I think it is a most unfortunate business, and in my view most of the trouble has arisen because it was rather gracelessly and perfunctorily handled.
  A great deal has been said this afternoon about Anglo-American relations. I need hardly say that I could not possibly feel less strongly on this subject than do noble Lords who have already referred to it. The safety of the world depends upon the maintenance of completely good relations between the United States and ourselves. It is not only the Press and irresponsible people who give trouble in this matter. I was in Washington when the Prime Minister was having his talks with the President. One might almost say that the Prime Minister was on a very sticky wicket. He had a very difficult task indeed to perform in those talks. His task was not made any easier by the

  683
  fact that the Minister of Defence seized the opportunity to make a speech violently criticising General MacArthur on a point upon which General MacArthur had been completely exonerated by the Foreign Secretary.
  From Washington I went on to Lake Success, where again our representative, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, was having an incredibly difficult time putting over the English case, and saying that, while we could agree about China being an aggressor, everything must be done to prevent the conflict in Korea from spreading into a general war, and that the application of sanctions would be very difficult. Sir Gladwyn Jebb had a most difficult task to perform at that moment, at a time when there was a very severe conflict of opinions, in keeping sweet the relations with America. His task also was not made any easier by a speech by the Minister of Works, to the effect that he thought China was quite right and that in their position he himself would have done the same thing. Only recently I have seen a letter, signed by a group of supporters of the Government and couched, to my mind, in most harsh terms about America. I quote one passage from that letter:
  "Unfortunately, the past few weeks' discussions in the Political Committee seemed to show that the United States is more anxious to establish Pekin's enmity than its friendliness."
  I think that was a most unfortunate thing to put in a letter of this nature. I know, of course, that these views do not represent those of the Government. I know that the Prime Minister has not the time to take up all these points. There is a very wise motto which says that if you stop to throw a stone at every dog that barks, you will never get to your journey's end. But at the same time speeches and statements like these are not the way to sweeten Anglo-American relations, or to keep them on the even keel and the good footing upon which we wish to see them.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: The Prime Minister might control his Ministers.
  LORD WINSTER: It is true that a master of foxhounds is supposed to be able to stop his hounds running riot.
  My Lords, something has been said this afternoon about Yugoslavia. Of course, what is going on there is following the well-known pattern of the war of nerves
  684
  which Russia carries out. The Russian radio is blasting away in Roumania at the present moment, accusing Yugoslavia and Marshal Tito of planning an invasion of Albania—and Greece is brought in, too. It is the regular Russian technique of accusing people of starting to do something that she has every intention of doing herself. It is going on at the present moment, and I am sure that all your Lordships were glad to see that a reference was made in another place recently, under the usual formula, that His Majesty's Government would watch the matter very carefully, and could not view with indifference any hostile measures which might be devised against Yugoslavia. We would agree with all that. But there is a matter in connection with Yugoslavia that I should like to mention, now that we are perhaps coming into a little closer touch, and it may be possible to say some things quietly and in a guarded way.
  During and since the war, the world has been steeped so deep in horrors that the mind is almost blunted by them. Brutalities have been on such a scale that it is almost impossible to comprehend them. Few things can be more appalling than the abduction of children from Greece; that is a most terrible thing. I am not entirely certain of my information, but I believe that Yugoslavia has done something in that respect. I think that a small batch of children have already been returned, and I have heard that it is in contemplation that an even larger batch of children are to be returned. I wonder whether His Majesty's Government have the opportunity of impressing upon Marshal Tito how very deeply we feel in this matter, and equally of letting him know what an excellent effect it would have in this country if, by contrast with some of the satellite States, he were to set an example in this matter and return all these children to Greece. I make no apology for referring to the matter. I am sure that it is one about which your Lordships must feel very deeply. I would ask whether His Majesty's Government feel that they could do anything in that direction at all.
  I should like to say one word about Spain, with whom we are now exchanging Ambassadors. I notice that Mr. Ernest Davies said recently:
  "The strategic interests being worked out in the West do not depend in any way on the help of Franco Spain."

  685
  That does not coincide with what I have seen of the opinions of a great many military authorities in America, who have been taking great interest in this matter of Spain and her position in the scheme of Western Defence. I should have thought that the defence of the Mediterranean was certainly bound up to some extent with Spanish good will. But now that Ambassadors are being exchanged, I say let us start in a spirit of good will, and stop any recriminations. Let us make a new start in this matter, and drop recriminations about old events. I do not feel that recognition of and diplomatic representation with another country should, except in extreme cases, have any reference to the ethical standards of the Government of the country concerned. I think that diplomatic representation with another country is a method of doing business with that country. After all, if we look around and see where we are represented at the present time, it is a little difficult to know on what principle we proceed in this matter. We are represented in Russia; we recognise the Chinese Government; we are in diplomatic relations with the Argentine; and we have relations with Marshal Tito, whom I think we might describe as something analogous in the Communist world to a National-Liberal-Conservative. I hope that, now that Ambassadors have been exchanged with Spain, a great effort will be made to establish friendly and good relations and that recrimination will stop.
  Now a word about the Four-Power talks. We have been busy examining these various Notes and interviews. I see that The Times said we were examining them like the Romans used to examine the entrails of a fowl, to see what the omens were. My view is that none of these Notes, and none of these statements, means that Russia has altered her policies or plans in any way, and that we have just to go on reconstructing our defences as we are doing at the present moment. I think our line must be to make it clear that we are always willing to talk, but, equally, that we are going on rearming. We should also make it clear that, since General Eisenhower has made this tour of Europe, the free world is really pulling itself together, and is beginning to represent a very formidable enemy indeed. If these talks are to take
  686
  place—and here I would repeat what I have said in reference to Spain—let us for the moment drop all recrimination. The noble Lord who spoke for the Government said—very properly, if he will allow me to say so—that of course we must make our proper and firm answer when misrepresentations are made. I am sure the noble Lord will agree with me that the less we have to do that the better. If we can avoid having to do anything of the sort, by all means let us avoid it.
  I rarely find myself disagreeing much with the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, when he speaks on Foreign Affairs; indeed, I have learned a great deal from listening to him. But I remember that the last time he addressed your Lordships on this subject he made an appeal for talks with Russia; and he said that, after all, this was a good time to negotiate—I am giving only the sense of his words as I recollect them. What he said, in effect, was that we should negotiate now, because of our possession of the atom bomb, an advantage which we might lose. I deprecate that sort of talk. I warmly support the noble Marquess in what he said on the subject of having talks, but in proposing negotiations with someone it is, I think, rather a mistake to say: "Remember that we have the atom bomb." It is putting the other side in the position of negotiating under duress; it has a certain smack of the saying: "Be my brother, or I slay you."
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I did not in the least mean to give that impression. I was merely stating the fact that if we had not go: the atom bomb, I do not believe there would be the slightest chance of negotiating with Russia.
  LORD WINSTER: I agree with the noble Marquess on that point, but he knows how everything that is said over here is misrepresented in Russia. He seems to me to be giving Russia a golden opportunity of saying: "See what these people are like. Here is this British speaker saying. 'We have got the atom bomb; look out! If negotiations do not go the way we want, you may get that bomb on you.'" That is what I fear. Now that we are progressing towards talks, the time has come to avoid answering back or recrimination of any sort. I do not think that: "Answer a fool

  687
  according to his folly," is one of the wisest of Solomon's proverbs. I think there are better proverbs than that.
  Now I would say a few words on the subjects of German rearmament and Japan. This question of German rearmament is a very vexed one. I feel that General Eisenhower has perhaps given us the wisest line in his recent address to Congress. With your Lordships' permission, perhaps I may recall what he said:
  "I think there has to be a political platform achieved, an understanding that will contemplate an eventual and an earned equality on the part of that nation "—
  that is a reference to Germany—
  "before we should start to talk about including units of Germans in any kind of army. Certainly I want no unwilling contingents in any army of my command. It would only be a source of weakness."
  Therefore, he will wait until the political leaders, the diplomats and the statesmen find a proper answer to that problem. That, I think, is wisdom on that subject. First of all, the civil authorities must work out their intentions about Germany. Then, and then only, will it be time for them to go to General Eisenhower to ask him to discuss and make plans for the inclusion or non-inclusion of German contingents in that army.
  The last word that I want to say is on the subject of Japan. The visit of Mr. Dulles to Tokyo and Canberra has been referred to. Perhaps I may recall to your Lordships what Mr. Dulles has said on the nature of the peace which America hopes to conclude with Japan. If, as I am sure we all wish, we are to keep in step with America, we have the Commonwealth to consider in this matter, and I think it is as well that we should have clearly in our minds what America is contemplating in regard to peace with Japan. Mr. Dulles said:
  "We seek a peace which will afford Japan opportunity to protect by her own efforts the integrity of the full sovereignty which peace will have restored, opportunity to share in collective security against direct aggression, opportunity to raise her standard of living by the inventiveness and industry of her people, and opportunity to achieve moral stature and respected leadership through the force of good example."
  Those are very generous proposals indeed, and I am offering no further opinion upon them, but if we are hoping to keep in
  688
  step with America in this matter of peace with Japan it is better that we should recognise from the outset how very generous is the attitude of mind in which America aproaches the question of that peace.
  These are indeed most anxious times. The war in Korea has got to be cleared up, and there is the matter of the FourPower talks, German rearmament and so on. I wonder whether we, or the Foreign Office, have ever passed through more anxious times. I wonder whether (to use a colloquialism) they have ever "had more on their plate" than they have at the present time. That, of course, lends force to the words of the noble Marquess as to how gladly we shall see the restoration of the Foreign Secretary to full health, able to take charge of these many anxious negotiations with the vigour which he displayed until he unfortunately suffered so many illnesses. If he is not restored to health, there must be another Foreign Secretary appointed, of course, because it is impossible for the Government to carry on our affairs with an absentee Foreign Secretary. But the most welcome solution of all would be to see Mr. Bevin restored to full health, once again conducting affairs at the Foreign Office with his old vigour and determination.
  5.40 p.m.
  LORD BRABAZON OF TARA: My Lords, in a debate on foreign affairs the canvas is so great and the situation is so gloomy and complex that, especially in your Lordships' House, one can discuss any subject one wishes; but I did not think that the question of the appointment of admirals would come up in this debate. I refuse to get excited about that particular problem. I am going to leave it to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chichester, who has command of the areas concerned, to deal with the appointment of admirals. Frankly, I have every confidence in the commanders of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy in America. The only arm in which I have little confidence is their Intelligence. When they did not know that North Korea was about to invade the South, and when they did not know that a huge army of Chinese was behind North Korea, it is about time they handed their Intelligence over to the British.
  I do not suppose there has been anything more sad in foreign policy over the

  689
  last few years than the degeneration that has taken place in the relations between Russia and ourselves. People of my age. were brought up with the idea that Russia was the bogy who was going to invade India, and that sort of thing; but after her remarkable fight against the Nazis there was never before in history more good will towards another country than there was in this country towards Russia. We would have done anything for her— anything in the world. She was our hero, and when we think of the advantages that could have accrued to both countries had that situation developed, it is indeed a tragedy that our relations degenerated so soon. It was not our fault. Why it was is one of those many mysteries which I suppose will remain forever locked in the Kremlin. But that is the situation to-day. Two good Allies are very nearly springing at each other. Dixon, in his book The Human Situation, made a good remark when he said:
  "It is not the sails that move the ship, it is the invisible wind."
  It is not the great leaders of the world who will decide these matters; it is the tremendous force of public opinion in different countries which finally causes the rapid cataclysm which we fear. Here we have to remember that America is a country which has never been criticised until lately. Ten years ago if you said anything against America, there was an outcry. Now, day after day, we see her abused by Russia until she is at boiling point. She is not in a state where she is quite responsible for what she might or might not do relative to Russia. That is a state of affairs we have to watch very carefully.
  In our debates on foreign affairs I never hear enough weight given to the situation of Turkey. We always say we have no armies in Europe—I think it is right to say that the Swiss Army is the biggest in Europe to-day—but nothing is said about Turkey, which has an army of over 500,000 men. She starves herself and lives very poorly by reason of the enormous army she maintains. I think the situation there is worth remembering. She sits on what used to be fashionably called the "under-belly" of Russia. Her soldiers recently have shown their great bravery and power in Korea. We in this country know the Turks very well. We
  690
  have fought with them and found them trusty allies; and we have fought against them and found them stout opponents. One curious thing about the Turks is that though they are of a different race and of a different religion, somehow there is-an understanding between the Englishman and the Turk. Few people can sit in the same room for ten minutes and not say a word—the Turk can, with an Englishman. That always means that you understand each other and are friends. It seems to me that of all the armies in Europe, or just outside Europe, this is the one which ought to be helped as much as we possibly can.
  Do not let us forget that Turkey is situated where she can be easily attacked. Two or three airborne divisions in Turkey would not be a nice thing for Turkey; but if we equipped her as well as we should, one or two Turkish airborne divisions in the Ukraine would not be very nice for Russia. While we are on the subject of Turkey, let us remember that we tried during the war to get Turkey to join us. How wise she was not to do so! If she had joined us as we wished, she would have been overrun by the Russians, and to-day the Dardanelles would have been in the hands of Russia and Turkey would never have got them out of Russian hands. Turkey understands Russia. They have no Communists in Turkey. They have shown for years that they understand the Russians, and it is from Turkey that we can get real intelligence about Russia out of Russia. The Turks have an army which is competent and which I think should be encouraged in every way by this country and America.
  The second point to which I want to draw attention, although I am not going to blame anybody, is this. It is really a singular thing about the superiority of Russian foreign policy that they have got the Chinese to fight us, whereas we have two countries, Germany and Japan, great warlike countries, who are not raising one finger on our behalf against Russia. I think that is an extraordinary thing and does not gives us great cause for congratulation on our sagacity. How Russia must laugh to think she is using the resources of China to inflict losses on our people!

  691
  In conclusion, I should like to make a further point which I think of great importance. Our foreign policy must depend upon our power. We cannot dictate this or demand that unless we know how strong we are. I do not believe we have assessed the situation between the two arms of Russia and ourselves. The situation is this. In the ordinary weapons of war, tanks and guns, and so on, Russia is very much ahead of us. There is no doubt about that. On the other hand, we have the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb is not one of those secrets which everybody thinks can be conveyed on a piece of paper by a spy; it is an industrial effort of enormous proportions: huge works are wanted, great technicians and very complicated machinery. That exists in America to-day, and the production of atomic bombs (I do not know how many are made) is quite a considerable endeavour. What is the present situation? Russia has the ordinary arms of war, and we have the atomic bombs. What will be the situation in four years' time? Shall we have caught up with Russia on the ordinary arms of war; and will she have caught up with us on atomic bombs? We are under the impression that we shall be stronger in four years' time than we are now. That matter wants looking into most carefully. I imagine that we may be rather stronger at present than we shall be in four years' time. Mark you, the atomic bomb is not a weapon against people, but a weapon against physical assets. The threat of an atomic bomb on Baku, after giving due notice for the evacuation of the people, would be most unpleasant; it would mean no loss of life, but it would mean almost starvation in future years. There is no doubt that the reason why Russia does not advance further at the present moment is her fear of the effects of the atomic bomb, not, I believe, on people, but on physical assets, such as her oil wells, and that sort of thing.
  In striving for peace, I believe that nothing is more important than that you should know and say where you stand in every matter. There was an excellent article written by Sir Duff Cooper about what happened in the last war. He was telling the story of Hitler, and he said that when Hitler invaded Austria nobody, made much fuss; when he went into Czechoslovakia nobody was very much
  692
  disturbed; but suddenly, when he went into Poland, there was war, and he could not understand it. He had done it twice: why should he not do it a third time? It seems to me that nothing could be better than to make absolutely clear what we will and will not tolerate. Will we tolerate another closing of Berlin, or an invasion of Greece or Yugoslavia? Let it be known to Russia that if she indulges in any of these adventures, then it is a casus belli. That should be made perfectly clear. I believe that along those lines there will be understanding, because it is only through slipshod methods and through not being perfectly clear, one with another, that, as the noble Marquess said this afternoon, one often drifts into war. In foreign policy you have to grasp the nettles, unpleasant though they may be; and this country of all countries must speak to the world and lead foreign policy towards understanding and peace. From the point of view of war, there is nothing more dangerous than being uncertain what you have in your own mind; in other words, drift is the most dangerous thing from which we are suffering at the present time.
  5.54 p.m.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: My Lords, I wish to refer to certain aspects of the general international situation, particularly in the light of the most recent communication between the British Government and Soviet Russia on the prospect of a meeting of representatives of the four Powers. I welcome what the noble Marquess who opened the debate said about meeting on the highest possible level. Next week, at any rate, a beginning is being made, through contacts with officials representative of the four Powers. The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, said that we should enter into those preliminary discussions in no mood of appeasement, but ready to listen to what might be presented. But something more than readiness to listen is required. It seems to me that we ourselves ought to have something to propose. As an illustration, I want to speak of two subjects of outstanding importance —first, the place of Germany in Europe, and, second, world peace, with due regard to what Lord Brabazon has just said about the great danger of drift.

  693
  It seems to me that the British Government have a special rôle here, and that these new conditions give us an opportunity, if we are prepared to make positive proposals, to recover the initiative Which has faded away from our hands over so many post-war years. No doubt when the agenda is being drawn up other items must find their place, amongst them Austria; but I would plead for every sort of reason that Germany should have a high place on that agenda. All German people desire that Germany should be reunited. So far, only one concrete proposal has been made, and, it comes, no doubt with all its illusions and causes of suspicion, from the Communist side. The Communists say that they are prepared to concede to all Germans, in the East and in the West, free elections. I know that there are certain things bound up with that offer, but for Russia to propose to concede free elections in East Germany, which is their responsibility, is a very remarkable proposal; for they know that the result of a free election will be antiCommunist. Communism has failed to get hold of the Germans in the East, and the Russians know that as a result of a free election they will go out of power in East Germany. But they make this supposed sacrifice—a true sacrifice if the offer is accepted—for this reason; that they feel it necessary to get Western Germany out of control of the Western Powers.
  As has been indicated, however, Herr Adenauer, and the Federal Government of Western Germany, at present refuse to talk with the East. This attitude is not very agreeable to the ordinary German in the street. It arises out of the policy of the Western Powers (I am not going to be provocative, and, if your Lordships will follow my reasoning, I hope you will see that I have a really constructive proposal to make, which is very much in line with the West), which is, understandably: "You in Western Germany must decide between the East and the West."
  This policy of the Western Powers, disregardirg apparently the passionate desire for a united Germany—and I know what I am talking about—is profoundly unsatisfactory to Germans, both in the East and in the West. I suggest that the right policy for the West to advance, and in which the British Government should take a lead, is this. We should offer
  694
  Germany free and secret elections. We should offer such a free election at a precise date—perhaps some time before Christmas—and say that we will abide by the vote of all Germany. We should say that as a result of the free election there will be a Government for the whole of Germany, a Government with real power, with which we wish to conclude a treaty of peace immediately after the election. We should also recommend at the Conference of Foreign Ministers insistence upon safeguards for real freedom of elections in the East, with no terrorist background. Of course, there must be security during the elections. It has been suggested that United Nations Forces should be in control, but that is a matter for discussion. More important, in many ways, than security during the election is security when the new Government has been set up, and when Germany has been unified under a new Government. As the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, said, the existence of a new German Government, with all the foreign forces out of the country, without provision for order, without an army, and without the police, would create a helpless territory and would invite trouble in Germany on the largest scale.
  LORD HENDERSON: I was quoting Dr. Adenauer.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: I understand that it was Herr Adenauer's attitude, but I mentioned it because I thought the noble Lord was not unsympathetic to this point of view. Of course, it is Herr Adenauer's attitude which is the relevant attitude at the moment. As we all know, it is so easy, without there being Soviet forces in any country, for Soviet-trained nationals—in this case Germans—to become a new form of S.S., and for a new type of gangster, trained by Soviet arms, to seize control, despite the verdict of the election, and to place the territory under Soviet dictatorship. It has happened in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania, and it could also happen in Germany.
  It is in this context that the defence of Germany, and Germany's share in the defence of the West, have to be considered. There has been an improvement of late in the way in which the rearmament of Germany has been discussed, but

  695
  I believe that that very improvement recognises the fact that the method originally adopted, by inadvertence, of presenting to the Germans the policy of the rearmament of Germany was extraordinarily forgetful of events since the war, and extraordinarily regardless of the attitude of Germans. If we look back over the past five and a half years, to the time immediately following the war, we should remember—though we so easily forget— that their economic life was lived under the shadow of a reparations policy and of a general devastation of the country. We shall recollect the wide divergence between the Powers—the Four-Power Agreement on the future level of German industry in March, 1946, which soon proved as unworkable as the Potsdam Agreement. We shall recollect the drastic dismantling and the blowing up of shipyards and great war factories, and even the shelters at Kiel. We shall recollect— some of us have seen it with our own eyes —the miserable conditions in which they lived.
  By the end of 1946, de-militarisation and disarmament had been complete. In 1947, the food situation was uniformly bad in the British and the American Zones, and there was continued dismantling, in spite of the need for increased production. The year ended with a breakdown of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in December, 1947. The following year, through the fault of Soviet Russia, there was a collapse of the whole apparatus of Four-Power relations. In Western Germany, also, the Western Allies were unable to agree on a definition of the occupation statute; on the cost of occupation and on the composition of an arbitration court, while the setting up of the Ruhr authority caused a violent outburst in Germany. In 1949 the Council of Foreign Ministers met and broke down, again with Russia's rejection of the Allied proposals.
  We have to try to put ourselves in the place of the Germans who have lived through these years, and we have to recognise the doubts and hesitations which are in their minds as to the ability, agreement and foresight of the Western Allies. It is necessary to remember this background if we want to understand the point of view of Germans. When we hear famous speakers who year after year,
  696
  after the war as well as during it, were foremost in pitching into the black record of the German nation, surprisingly making a public confession that they were entirely mistaken in what they said or wrote, that they can only laugh when they read their speeches, when those gentlemen are asking Germans to supply military forces for the defence of the West —perhaps by means of partisans—can you wonder at the Germans' scepticism? Can you wonder that 75 per cent. of the Germans are against rearmament? Can you wonder that there is no will at present to offer themselves as victims in a war which, if it were to break out, would be fought in large measure on German soil? Germany must be defended and Germans must make their own substantial contribution to defence. But they must be willing, as General Eisenhower has recognised. And this is perhaps a partial answer to what the noble Marquess said about the connection of our militarisation of Germany with the four-Power talks. Is not all that to be part of a total international agreement on the whole large issues of peace and war?
  Therefore, with regard to the place of Germany in Europe, I would say: of course we wish Germany to play its right and strong part in the defence of the West; but we wish it to be a united Germany. We say that our policy is for free elections at a particular date, with proper security. Details would have to be worked out. There are differences, for example, as to the qualifying age of the elector: in Eastern Germany the age is eighteen and in Western Germany it is twenty-one. Then, after the new Government had been elected, would come a treaty of peace, with Germany as a full partner in the family of Europe and in membership of the United Nations. I emphasise that point. I know perfectly well, as do your Lordships—and I believe that the remainder of the Western Defence Organisation would not disagree—that Germany's whole outlook, in the East and the West, is toward the West. Its life is bound up with the West. It must depend upon, trade and live with the West. I believe that such a proposal as that which I have put forward is a sound, practical and wise policy.
  I turn now to world peace. The whole world longs for peace, but its achievement is a very complicated business. Russia

  697
  has seized the initiative there. Even in the Daily Worker to-day (of which I am not a reader; I saw this passage by accident) a new set of resolutions, sent by a curious group of people, British and French, including Professor Joliot Curie and the Dean of Canterbury, has appeared. But, of course, they are tendentious, misleading and treacherous, as are the resolutions of the Stockholm Conference from which they sprang. Nevertheless, the Western Powers mast have their counter-proposals. Russia's policy of expansion by force and threats of force has long been permitted to go uncurbed. And now the policy is really seen for what it is— namely, militant, imperialist Communism, which stops at nothing. Hence we are now engaging in rearmament on a large scale, gradually and increasingly, in Britain, in the United States and in other countries who are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty—and that is right.
  But soon there will be an arraying of vast armed forces in the West against vast armed forces in the East; and here there is the danger of a great explosion. As the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon, said, we must know where we stand. We must have a proper understanding of peace and war, and we must beware lest we drift into war. Now Russia is no blind country. Russia began all these mounting armaments; she has these 175 divisions— contrasted with which we possess what the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, described very guardedly as "a fraction." But it is possible that Russia may notice this mounting rearmament and may, as other totalitarian Powers have done in the past, even feel a genuine fear of the threat of encirclement.
  If, therefore, we go on rearming, it is essential that the defensive character of the rearmament must be recognised. Up to a point, this rearming is no danger: up to a point we are secured from war and making for peace. But somewhere there is a danger point, when perhaps the Western divisions have reached a particular level—whether or not in those divisions are included ten German divisions and ten, twenty, thirty or more divisions from other countries in Europe. Can we be sure that Russia will sit quietly looking or until she is surpassed? Can we gamble on Russia doing nothing? I have no doubt at all about the necessity
  698
  of our rearmament; but there is a tendency that increasing strength may lead us to avoid negotiation. I am glad that both the noble Marquess and the most reverend Primate spoke of the need of keeping our eyes open to chances of negotiation. It is essential, at any conference that the four Powers have, that we should make it plain that our arms are for defence and not for aggression. As we have been reminded, if war should break out the catastrophe would be one which would certainly sink us all. It is well, therefore, if such a conference can be held, to guarantee to the Russians that we have a limit and that we do not desire preponderance. I think we should state our readiness to prove by deeds what we say.
  Therefore—and this is my positive proposal—I should like the British Government to recommend as part of our policy at a Foreign Ministers' Conference, or at whatever level the representatives of the four Powers meet, that there should be at a particular date, perhaps next October, a conference between the four Powers for the limitation of armaments— land, sea, air and atomic. It might well be that the naval treaties for the limitation of naval power which were not uncommon before the war would prove a suitable precedent. Of course, such negotiations must be Completely real. We must go into them with our eyes open, not credulous, not listening as though we could be deceived, but bringing proposals of a concrete kind, showing in this way our definite concern for peace, gaining the initiative in that real fashion in a concrete form, letting the Russians and the world see that we are sincerely—not, like them, insincerely—patiently, industriously and unendingly determined to do our best to end this international tension.
  Once again I would call attention to the importance of the Four Power negotiations. As has been said so eloquently already, much depends on agreement between the United States and ourselves. I hope that the British Government will be willing to claim the initiative, will make a sincere effort for a united and secure Germany, will negotiate for a treaty of peace in a practical way, and will work also in a practical way for a conference on the limitation of armaments. Nor must we forget in this total general context that we are living in the midst of world revolution in which the groups and the

  699
  nations are upsurging and are penetrated with a knowledge of the deprivations from which so many millions, especially in Asia, suffer. We do not forget that three out of every five human beings live very near subsistence level. We are concerned, as we have shown by the Colombo Plan, as America has so generously shown by the Marshall Plan, and her aid to India has shown, with a recognition of this demand for social justice.
  Finally, what we are engaged in everywhere is a battle of faiths. On the one hand, there is the Communist faith—intense, enthusiastic, fanatically held, claiming to be a true doctrine of life. It can be overcome only by a faith that is stronger and truer. The Communist faith, in spite of the enthusiasm and the poetry with which it is sometimes clothed, is a retrograde faith. It goes back to barbaric days and barbaric peoples. It has two dominant themes: the fatality of environment and the omnipotence of the State, spiritually and temporally, as a source of all meaning. The faith that we need to overcome that faith is very different. We have fallen far short of its demands. Our own civilisation fails in many ways to live up to it, and there are only too many amongst us who have no faith but live in a vacuum. But the faith which is really behind the West is one with deep foundations in classical and Christian antiquity. It is a revolutionary faith if held with the devotion that it claims of its followers. That faith is the acceptance of the rational and spiritual nature of man, a nature possessed of immortal rights, not only human but divine—the right to justice and the right to freedom.
  6.25 p.m.
  THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: My Lords, I have been staggered by some of the observations which have been made in your Lordships' House this afternoon, but at least I think that we can all congratulate the noble Marquess on bringing Foreign Affairs once again to your Lordships' attention at this crucial moment. I do not see him in his place now, but I thought that his speech was a model of lucidity and common sense. It appears to me that we are now dealing with time and not eternity; and the sooner we grasp that elementary fact, the better it will be for all of us—for this reason. I feel that
  700
  the recent statement which was made in another place by the Prime Minister was most welcome. It did a great deal to clear the air, but some of us think that in view of the present tension, and the appalling inequalities of armaments, the British public should have been warned more strongly and far earlier of the urgent danger in which they are now standing. I am certain that there is not a single member of this House who doubts for one second the virile response of the British people, once the stark truth about their position has been honestly revealed to them.
  After all, we have only to cast back our minds to that horrible year of 1940 when, with that right degree of genius and leadership, the English people went steadily on their way. But it appears to be one of the inescapable malaises of democracy that, before we decide to go through the fire in final unity, we have to approach the very verge of the abyss before taking the obvious remedial measures. That appears to be inescapable. At the moment I think it is impossible to discuss foreign affairs without referring to Western Germany, which is obviously an acute pointe neuralgique in Europe. Here I feel strongly that the recent speech made by Mr. Eden in another place was the voice of sanity. None the less (and the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, will appreciate this), I feel a strong sympathy in this matter with thrice-violated France, living, as it appears now, in uneasy proximity to her great predatory neighbour, and with a declining birthrate and an indefensible frontier.
  I, for one, find it difficult to forgive the Germans for what they did in the last war, the villainies, the mere recital of which exhausts the very resources of the language. Nevertheless, I feel that we must keep our heads, in face of the immediate menace which is, alas! all too obvious. It must obviously go against the grain to rearm a country which in the past has consistently abused its periods of strength, but I believe that the threat of German remilitarism at the present time is very much less than one fears, now that she has at last had the salutary experience of the severity of war upon her own soil. It is to me verging upon nightmare that the same old catchphrases of abuse are still pulling their

  701
  weight in these days. Now it is Mr. Attlee who is being castigated by Stalin as a warmonger. It seems only the other day that his predecessor, Mr. Chamberlain, was being described in precisely similar terms by Hitler. One really hardly knows which of the two accusations is the more fatuous, because surely there can never have been two milder "warmongers." What they appear to me to indicate is the hopeless sterility of any form of totalitarianism—it does not matter in the least whether it is Left or Right or centre, because it is always the same. Every time we see culture withered at the roots by its disgusting conformity. Under its regime, as under the beech tree, nothing can grow.
  Speaking quite frankly, what is the prospect for our country at the moment? I have recently been reading many articles by discerning Continental experts, telling us that we are now confronted with the greatest crisis in our history. With the utmost humility, and probably quite wrongly, I do not believe that to be true. I see Communism spreading in a rather different way from the spreading of the Nazi threat to the world. I see it as more cautious, more crafty, more oriental, and less finally committed. Hitler was a conqueror. Ho was rather in descent from Genghis Khan. He created those delectable toys, eighteen armoured divisions, and could no more easily be prevented from playing with them than a child with a Meccano set.
  I do not myself believe—I hope I am right—that the pattern of Communist aggression is quite the same as that of Nazi aggression. I believe that it might be contained and deterred by our resolution as, after a certain point of hopeless obsession, Hitler could never have been. I believe that the Kremlin is more cautious of ultimate fatal decisions. One can make a deal with these Communists. I have done one or two with them. It was not a difficult process, and it is not a very long-term job. But I very much doubt whether you could do so with the Nazis. On the other hand, to attempt to alter the opinions of the Communists is a waste of time, because these opinions proceed from accepted dogma. Any pathetic little improvements that we may make in our relations with them will stem entirely from technical considerations on their
  702
  part, which will have no effect whatever on their long-term master plan.
  I have another unpleasant factor to raise in speaking in your Lordships House on Foreign Affairs. I am rather worried about the disunity in the Party opposite. Naturally, I do not refer to your Lordships. I was thinking more of that rather sordid little rump in another place, which apparently can always now be relied upon in the Lobbies to place political survival before abstract principles and idealism. Really, I do not know what the Government would do at the present moment without the Opposition. We are all agreed that every single civilised person detests the idea of war. We have even passed the point of saying that nations which are not periodically engaged in war are liable to forfeit their virility. Indeed, the splendid social progress of Scandinavia (to mention only one country) is an abiding reproach to this theory. But the Party opposite has for years been bedevilled by pacifism. It is, I suppose, to the emotional credit of the English people that they are the eternal "mugs" in this direction, because it means that presumably their hearts are in the right place, even if their brains might be subject to a more searching examination. To my mind, one of the worst things about my noble friends opposite is this acquiescence in passive resistance. I cannot believe that that is the right way to deal with an oriental despotism.
  Now we see the Prime Minister, whom we all admire, trying to engage in the most hopeless task of duplicating his roles, slipping into the Foreign Office in odd moments, in the intervals between abortive attempts to soothe the Birkenhead dockers, while the public reads in the Press, from a "hand-out" from the Foreign Office, how amused Mr. Bevin was at the suggestion that he might resign. One can only comment that he is very easily amused. Furthermore, while all of us naturally would have liked to see Mr. Bevin's complete and speedy restoration to health, we none the less reserve the right to say that in a moment like this we should like to have a Foreign Secretary.
  It is a long haul for the Party opposite to rearm, because it is the negation of a great many things for which they

  703
  have stood in the past. One of the principal arguments that I make against them as that for years they have confounded strength with aggression, and preparedness with provocation. My Lords, by this statement I will stand or fall. I do not believe that there is anything inherently evil in strength. I believe that anybody who is sufficiently retrograde to think so might usefully spend five minutes on the empirical method of comparison. Any such theory makes complete nonsense of the whole of the Pax Brilannica, which, after all, we know did happen, when this country straddled the oceans of the world, and the mere deterrent presence of a couple of British cruisers in a troublesome port was sufficient to birth-strangle insurrection, without even taking the canvas from the guns.
  The other difficulty for the Party of noble Lords opposite is their belief that rearmament will mean vitiating the social improvements for which the Labour Party have always very honourably and very strongly stood—ideals which are embalmed in the writings of such noble partnerships as the Hammonds and the Webbs. But in our present dilemma the answer to this problem appears to me to be simple. It is this: that while all civilised persons would wish to have the utmost improvements in their social life, they really must remember that every single thought for the embellishment of life has to be paid for by ten thoughts for its actual preservation. Of little avail would it be to the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, for example, if, when he had launched the Beveridge Report (which all of your Lordships will remember as one of the most able pieces of work of recent years), the hammer and sickle had been run up over Westminster, and a taciturn Russian general had assumed the noble Lord's functions at the Ministry of Civil Aviation. It really would not have been any good at all.
  Before I close, I want to say one word about the various countries which I think the Russians may attack. This is a particularly unpleasant part of my speech. I should say that for some reason aggression nearly always happens in the springtime. No doubt the delightful advent of spring will encounter its seasonal routine pollution this year, as always. I wish
  704
  particularly to refer to Yugoslavia, because it happens to be a country that I know better than any other, although others may be equally in danger. I was greatly encouraged by the remarks which were made on this subject by Mr. Aneurin Bevan in another place the other day, but I should like to hear a little more from him. The suggestion was made and then rather dropped. Unpleasant as it is to have to face up to it, I believe that we in Europe are now arriving at a time for greatness. Any weakness or equivocation whatever will be fatal to our interests. We must be objective and, if necessary, self-seeking. Take the case of Yugoslavia, which is one of the countries that we have to consider in this connection. What we may think about Tito is neither here nor there. I was with his armies for a while in the war, and I was frequently repelled by the behaviour of his followers. He regards himself as the pure fruit of the Marxist tree, and Stalin as a heretic. The school textbooks for children which I saw being produced on hand presses in the forests of Croatia were repulsive in their emphasis on war and suffering. The simplest mathematical problem could not be enunciated without dragging in hand grenades, phosgene and death.
  None the less, I still believe that we have to support these regimes. If we were unwise enough to abandon the Yugoslavs, or, it may be, the Persians or the Turks, I believe that we should encounter an indescribable loss of prestige, and of vital strategic areas; and, once again, the small uneasy peoples would be driven to conclude that, although they admired us, and would rather live within our orbit than that of any other Power, we could do nothing for them, and they would have to make what accommodation they could with the paramount Power. I suggest, finally, that we and our Allies should tell the Russians that any attempt at "a Korea" against Yugoslavia, or other countries of equal strategic importance—which we should, of course, have to name—which was carried out by proxy by the satellites in an attempt to avoid the appearance of direct aggression, would be regarded by the West as an act of aggression by Russia and would automatically constitute a casus belli. I believe it is just possible that that might deter them. If it does

  705
  not, and if they do invade one of those places which I have mentioned, then we must be prepared to fight, accepting, I suppose, as a consequence of our past weakness, heavy initial reverses. But there is no doubt whatever that right will prevail in the end.
  6.44 p.m.
  LORD TOVEY: My Lords, I propose to touch upon only one point, and that very briefly. Before I start on that, however, I should like to express my great admiration for the American Navy and for the officers and men who man it. During the war I had the privilege of having an American squadron attached to my Fleet, and no one could have given more loyal or efficient service than they did. But to place the Commander-in-Chief of our Home Fleet under the command of an admiral of another nation, however friendly, however strong, and however much we may admire them, can but, at the first bump at least, seem a great slight both on our Navy and upon our nation. It is not, to my mind, comparable in any way to putting our Eastern Fleet in the last war under the American Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific; that was an area of war which was essentially American. The arrangement was obviously necessary, and it was comparable to the placing of the squadron which I have mentioned under my command up North. But the Home Fleet is the force, under our own Admiralty, which is, above all others, responsible for the safeguarding of our communications at the most dangerous focal point. Even in the East Indies during the last war, where the naval forces were put under the Supreme Commander, and in the Mediterranean, where the Fleet was put under General Eisenhower, the security of the sea communications was reserved as the responsibility of the naval Commander-in-Chief.
  So far as I know, the safety of our communications is a definite responsibility of the Admiralty and is, I understand, vested in the First Sea Lord personally; and it is a responsibility, I feel, that cannot be delegated to anyone. From what information we have, it appears fairly certain that the attack on our communications will come almost entirely from submarines, possibly supported in some areas by air forces and commerce raiders. We do not know how
  706
  our naval commands are to be arranged in the next war, but, from what has been said in another place, it seems likely that. the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, in addition to the duties which he had in the last war and in previous wars, will carry out also the duties discharged in the last war by the Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches, and be responsible for all anti-submarine warfare in home waters and half way across the Atlantic.
  I am prepared to admit that in the last war the Americans had in some particular directions much greater experience than we had. Out in the Pacific they maintained their ships away from bases and dockyards for far longer periods than we had ever done. They used seaborne air forces on a far greater scale than we had ever had available. In my opinion, much of their material was better than ours. We learnt a great deal from them. But in anti-submarine warfare we have had far greater experience than they have ever had, and several of our admirals who are now available had at least three years' or more experience in antisubmarine work. This comparison of the merits of the admirals of the two nations must be as distasteful to the Americans as it is to ourselves, and, as has been pointed out by one or two previous speakers, the great pity of it is that the occasion for bringing this question up should ever arise. Had the matter been introduced or announced in some different way the whole position would have been entirely different. But that you should simply get a slap in the face when you open your morning paper and find that that is what has happened, strikes me as unfair.
  I should like to add that in my opinion and, what is far more important, in that of Admiral of the Flee;, Lord Cunningham, the account of the difficulties in the last war of the two Commands—that is to say, the East and the West Atlantic Commands—has been much exaggerated. We both feel that the appointment of a Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic is entirely unnecessary. In the last war there was no unnecessary delay in arriving at decisions between the two Admiralties; if there was delay in implementing decisions, that was due almost entirely to shortage of forces. I suggest that the area of the whole Atlantic is too large for one command. The command

  707
  on the Eastern side is going to be even larger than before, because we shall have our Allies in the Scandinavian countries and Allies further south, for whose coastline, presumably, we shall be responsible. To carry that area of responsibility well out into mid-Atlantic, I should have thought, would mean having as large an area as is suitable to be placed under one commander. The East and the West Atlantic are two completely distinct areas. I can see no necessity at all for their being placed under one command. I hesitate to express the opinions of people who are not here, but I can say, from what 1 have been told by officers and ratings, both serving and retired, whom I have met since the announcement was made, that they feel very strongly about it. I beg the Government to think again and see if they cannot find a more satisfactory solution. As the noble Lord, Lord Winster, suggested, to cancel the appointment of the American admiral and to substitute for him a British admiral would be extremely unfortunate. I suggest that, from everyone's point of view, a more satisfactory solution would be to decide that the area is too large for one command, and accordingly to divide it.
  6.51 p.m.
  LORD CHORLEY: My Lords, the observations I intended to put before your Lordships in this interesting and important discussion were directed chiefly to the Korean war and our relations with China. As so frequently happens to anyone speaking from the remote Back Bench, the time is late and I am afraid I shall have to break into bits the observations which I had so carefully worked out. I hope your Lordships will excuse me if my remarks appear somewhat broken, as, in addition, I should like to comment on one or two speeches which have been made during this afternoon's discussion. In dealing with the Korean war and our general relations with China, it is impossible for me to avoid a certain amount of criticism of United States policy, because from the point of view from which I approach this subject that is very much in the centre of the picture. I appreciate what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, and by the most reverend Primate on the essential need for maintaining our close friendship with the United States. It is only with con-
  708
  siderable reluctance that one criticises the actions and policy of a friend, but I think one can have some confidence, if it is done in a reasonable spirit, that the friend will take it in good part and as a counsel of friendship.
  I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart about the antagonism in this country towards the United States: it is growing in volume and intensity. I find it very worrying. I have been speaking recently at many public meetings on the question of China, and if your Lordships will forgive my mentioning some personal experiences I can illustrate that antagonism from what has happened during the last weeks. I do not know whether it is because between leaving school and leaving the Foreign Office eminent servants of the Crown have to keep their mouths closed, but they seem to develop an extreme point of view when they finally emerge into the freedom of discussion. Only within the last few days I heard an eminent former member of the Foreign Office staff on a public platform describe the action of the British Government in dealing with the United States over China and Korea as "crawling on their hands and knees to America." When at a subsequent stage of the meeting I reminded the audience of the astonishing support and friendship and generosity of the American people and their Government to this country, both during the years of the war and after the war, when only that help kept us from starvation, I met with a hostile reception from the audience. If the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart were here, I have no doubt that he would say it was my own fault, that I have sown the wind and must reap the whirlwind. I cannot agree with him about that.
  I feel that this antagonism, which is so real and which is undoubtedly growing, is much more due to the fact that there has been an attempt to prevent reasonable discussion of those difficulties which have grown up between the two countries over the last months. In your Lordships' House I myself have been taken to task by the noble Lords opposite. I remember that on the theme to which the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, adverted in his speech, I said there was a danger to the new United Nations that America appeared to wish to dominate it. The noble Lord, Lord Hawke, challenged me stiffly on that point. Yet only a short

  709
  time later I saw that Mr. Walter Lippmann, who is perhaps the ablest and best-known of American commentators, was making exactly the same point in one of the American newspapers. He said that the danger was that the United States were insisting
  "that the United Nations must accept American policy without question, or dissolve."
  That was putting it much more strongly than I did. I have taken that quotation from The Times of January 15 of this year. It is essential that these matters should be reasonably discussed, and that we should not fall in with the view which I associate with Mr. Churchill, of 100 per cent. Americanism.
  The slogan, "America right or wrong," will simply not do. If the attempt is made, as the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, was suggesting, that we should look only at the points on which we agree with them, and never at the points on which we disagree, then this antagonism to the United States will continue to grow and will be:ome more intense. We are with the Americans "through thick and thin" when we are actually in the field of battle, but that is altogether different from "Amenca right or wrong." We all know that during the war Mr. Churchill fought the Americans for years on an essential point of military strategy— namely, as to when the invasion of France should take place. The Americans wanted to have it as early as 1942. I think that all military opinion is now satisfied that, if we had attempted to carry it out before we did, it would almost inevitably have met with disaster. Mr. Churchill was right, and if he had not risked a considerable amount of difficulty with America and insisted on his point of view, the war might well have gone very differently. It seems to me unfortunate that Mr. Churchill did not take up so strong an attitude over the question of unconditional surrender, which again was an American idea; which, in the view of many of us, was a completely wrong policy, and led to the protraction of the war longer than was necessary; and which kept Hitler in power a great deal longer than he would have been had that policy not been adopted.
  In this connection, a most useful service has been performed by the B.B.C. over the last months, and, indeed, the last years, by the admirable broadcasts which
  710
  they give from American commentators in which the American point of view is explained. The noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, referred to a broadcast and television talk by General Eisenhower which, he said, had a tremendous effect on the American people. I wonder whether the B.B.C. would consider inviting General Eisenhower to give a similar talk over our wireless to the people of this country; I feel sure that it would be most valuable. I wonder also whether the leaders of American public opinion, and the leaders of the American Government, would be a little more ready to appreciate the point of view of people of this country. I do not propose to follow the excellent speech of the noble Lord, Lord Tovey, who has just spoken, but if they would adopt his suggestion I am sure that the American Government could do a great deal to arouse the appreciation of people in this country, and to make everybody realise the absolutely essential need for the continuance of friendship between the two countries.
  Reference has been made to the question of Formosa. The noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, seemed to regard Formosa as some piece of territory which had been conquered by the Chinese and then conquered by the Japanese; as a place that was not really part of China at all. And he seemed to consider that the Chinese altitude in wishing to have it incorporated back into China was a thoroughly unreasonable one. Surely, if he put himself into the shoes of the Chinese people, part of whose national territory Formosa was for so many centuries, being taken from them in the first of the Japanese wars of aggression, some fifty years ago, he could hardly take up an attitude of that kind. Suppose that we had been beaten by Germany in a war, and they said that they were going to cut off Kent and Essex because they were the parts of the country nearest to the Continent, and were the areas from which we could most easily invade the Continent. And suppose, further, that after a successful war the Germans had been beaten by a coalition of. say, French and Americans. Does the noble Lord imagine that it would not be an absolutely cardinal point of British policy that that territory which had been cut off from our homeland should be restored, or that we should consent to a plebiscite carried out under

  711
  the superintendence of a foreign Power as to whether we should get it back? Of course we should not.
  This matter of Formosa is obviously the acid test with the Chinese people. Moreover, it is not generally known to the people of our own country that Formosa is at the present time being used by the forces of the Kuomintang to blockade the principal ports of China, and that our own trade with China is being seriously interfered with by that blockade. The noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, would no doubt say that we ought not to be trading with Communists at all; that they are enemies of the human race; and that it is a good thing we are blockaded. But I do not think that that sort of extreme point of view is accepted by the general mass of the people of this country. We have got to trade with people of all kinds if we are to maintain our position as a great trading and industrial nation.
  I should like to refer to one or two of the observations made by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, in his opening speech. I endorse what he said about the importance of opening up negotiations at the highest level. In every speech I have made on this subject in your Lordships' House over the last months I have tried to emphasise this point. The suggestion which the noble Marquess made about a meeting between the Prime Minister, M. Stalin and the President I made in my speech in December, and I am very glad indeed to find that the noble Marquess agrees with me. Unless the world is to remain indefinitely as two armed camps, it is essential that we should discover some method of "growing together," as Mr. Bevin in a striking phrase described it in another place some years ago. I feel that it is essential that we should have a great deal more accurate information about many of the matters involved in these disputes.
  The noble Marquess said that we must start rearming Germany immediately, and not wait for the Conference to take place; and, as I understood it, he put that on the ground that Eastern Germany was already being rearmed. I wish we knew more as to what the facts really are. Within the last few days Pastor Niemoller
  712
  has been in this country, and he lives in Eastern Germany. I understand that in addressing a meeting of Members of another place he stated categorically that there were no large forces of this kind in Eastern Germany at all. I do not know whether that is true or not, but the sincerity of Pastor Niemoller is beyond dispute, and he lives in Eastern Germany. We are told now that the Russians have 175 divisions on a war footing; not very long ago we were told that they had 150 divisions. I always wonder where these figures come from— the Russians certainly do not publish them. We conduct our debates on the basis that statements of this kind are true, with little real evidence as to whether they are so or not.
  The noble Marquess made some criticisms of the foreign policy of this country being conducted by a Foreign Secretary who is a sick man, who for long periods is unable to be at the Foreign Office. The noble Viscount who leads the Liberal Party has endorsed that view. On looking at my speech to your Lordships' House in July of last year. I find that I then said:
  "There can seldom have been a period of such critical importance in the history of our country when the Foreign Office has been without its Minister."
  It was without its Minister in July of last year, as it is to-day. I can assure the noble Marquess that the feeling of distress which he has is widely shared in the Party of which I have the honour to be a member. It has been suggested to me by quite a number of responsible people in the Labour Party over the last weeks that the Prime Minister himself should become Foreign Secretary, if there is nobody else with the knowledge and standing to do the job, and that somebody else should be Prime Minister. Certainly in one of the most critical periods of the history of this country it is not right that the Foreign Office should be without a responsible Minister, one who is in good health and able to have a full grasp of the foreign affairs of the country. I say that with great reluctance. I am not one of those Labour members who have been severe critics of Mr. Bevin's foreign policy—in fact, I think I have agreed with it, quite as much as has the noble Marquess, and when I have not agreed with

  713
  it, I am sure that I have usually been wrong.
  I should like to make one or two remarks specifically about this question of China and the Korean war. I was sorry that the noble Marquess—with so much of whose speech I agreed—maintained his King Charles's head attitude towards China. He does not seem to have given way in that respect at all. That attitude is based on the view that the Chinese People's Government is a mere catspaw of Communist Russia; that it will do whatever Communist Russia orders it to do, and that it has no real existence of its own. It is a tenable point of view, although I do not think it is right. The noble Marquess and others who think with him on this matter fail to pursue the argument to the last analysis, because where does it lead? If it is right, we are up against an exceedingly grim situation, and we can only solve it either by embarking upon the conquest of China, which, I think the noble Marquess would agree, is an impracticable proposition- certainly it would leave us very weak in Europe—
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I do not think that follows at all. I think that China is closely allied to Russia at the present time. That does not necessarily mean that it is the right thing for us to embark upon the conquest of China. What we have to do is whatever is most suitable for ourselves and our Allies in given circumstances.
  LORD CHORLEY: If China is a mere catspaw of Russia, the Russians will obviously use China to their own advantage. A war is going on which is absorbing the great majority of the trained groups of the United States Army and some of our most valuable divisions. If, in fact, China is a catspaw of Russia, that war will be maintained and can be brought to an end only by conquering the Chinese armies or perhaps by evacuating Korea—and it might well be that in those circumstances that would be the most sensible thing to do. We ought to, face up to this situation, because to keep the war in Korea going must be the very thing the Russians want us to do, if this is, in fact, the Russian policy, and China, as the noble Marquess suggests, is a catspaw of Russia.
  714
  I do not think his diagnosis is a correct one. I do not think—and I have said this before in your Lordships' House— that China is a mere catspaw of Russia. China is a much older country, with a longer and greater civilisation than Russia. It is one of the proudest countries in the world, and I would remind the noble Marquess that one of the last things that Sun yat Sen did was to bring in the Communists. Borodin was brought in, and for some time rather dominated the situation in China; but the Chinese became so heartily sick of him and the other Russians who came with him that they threw them out. I suggest. to the noble Marquess that if we do not push the Chinese into the hands of the Russians, that is the sort of thing which will happen again. I believe that there is a close parallel between China and Yugoslavia. I know that when this is suggested people say it is nonsense, but I wonder whether your Lordships have thought that Yugoslavia and China are the only two Communist countries which have in effect liberated themselves. Places like Czechoslovakia and Roumania were liberated by the Russian armies. They had not the strong, virile, insurgent movement which existed both in China and in Yugoslavia. I suggest: hat just as Tito was not prepared to sit clown and become a catspaw of Moscow—
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: When they adopt the attitude of Tito, we can adopt the same attitude towards them.
  LORD CHORLEY: We are not encouraging them; we are doing exactly the opposite, and that is what I am complaining about. Branding them as an aggressor is a very obvious example. The noble Marquess supported it. Before that occurred there was quite a chance of peace negotiations being opened up. The noble Marquess will remember that when, through Pandit Nehru—of whom he disapproves—pourparlers were started, at first the Chinese said No, but afterwards they delivered a note which went a long way towards agreeing to a cease fire and entering into negotiations, If they were a catspaw of Russia, they would never have delivered a note of that kind. It was a remarkable note because it was delivered at a time when it appeared that, from a military point of view, the Chinese were completely dominant. Even people

  715
  who ought to have known better in this country and America were talking about retreat to Pusan and leaving Korea, although our forces had never actually been defeated on the field of battle at all; they had simply been outmanoeuvred. It is unique in that at a time when they appeared to be winning hands down the Chinese said that, provided they could be safeguarded against the United Nations using the period of truce to build up their forces, they were prepared to agree upon a cease fire and embark upon negotiations. That was also the time when the United States appeared to be prepared to go further towards compromise than they had been before or have been since.
  Your Lordships will remember that it was announced that the United States would be prepared to consider Pekin China coining into the United Nations and having a seat on the Security Council provided the Korean war could be effectively cleared up. That was an act of great moral courage on the part of the State Department, because for a proud country of the strength of the United States to be prepared to give way like that at a time when they appeared to be beaten in the field requires great moral courage. Given the moral intelligence which the Chinese then showed and the moral courage shown by the United States, then I think there is quite a good chance of successful negotiations being started. But it was all spoiled by the aggressor motion. As Sir Benegal Rau pointed out at the time when this motion was tabled, it inevitably brought the possibility of these peace negotiations to an end.
  I was much struck with the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, put the case for negotiations being reopened. He pointed out how much it was to the advantage of the Chinese People's Government to agree to open them at the present time. I believe that that is so. It must now be clear to them that the military situation is not so good as they had thought. We are reaching a stage which is something like one of deadlock in the field. The Chinese are a highly intelligent people and must realise that the military situation is a difficult one. I suggest that this is a time when, if the right moves are made at the right place by the right people, it may
  716
  well be that negotiations will be started again. I believe every member of your Lordships' House will agree that we should try and solve this exceedingly difficult dispute in the Far East by negotiation, so that we can get Korea on to its feet once more and, what is most important to us, so that we can get those divisions, which are vital to the defence of Europe, out of Korea and bring them back where they are most needed, instead of frittering away their strength in that distant country. Therefore I heard with enthusiasm the suggestions made by the noble Lord when he said that negotiations could be opened up again. I hope that that may be so and that they will be successful.
  7.10 p.m.
  LORD WILMOT OF SELMESTON: My Lords, at this late hour I will not venture to detain your Lordships very long, and my noble friend will forgive me if I do not follow him far except to say that his closing remarks justified the whole policy in the Chinese situation, both of the British and of the Americans, which is to keep the door open as far as possible to negotiations, with due regard to our obligations under the United Nations Charier. On that we must stand firmly, whatever happens. I would commend to his attention one remark which fell from the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, which seemed to me in a way more important than anything else that has been said: that it is of overriding importance to all of us at this time to tell ourselves every day that our best duty to all that we believe valuable and sacred is to emphasise the unities, which are vast and wide. They tend to be forgotten in the small disunities which always disturb and excite people more than the big things. I think it can be said of this debate that in the main that is what we have done: we have emphasised the unity. I was struck by the fact that the noble Marquess, in opening the debate, evidently felt the call of that duty more strongly than that of Party interest in this matter, and I am sure we were all grateful and appreciative accordingly.
  I would express my appreciation of the admirable statement made by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, which clarified and carried further the Statement made by the Prime Minister in another place

  717
  last week. That Statement leaves no room for doubt as to where British policy lies. It seems to provide a substantial answer to the one or two criticisms which the noble Marquess made. There was one thing which I regretted in what the noble Marquess said. I thought it a pity that he used the words he did with reference to the China Resolution in the United Nations. He understands, as I think all thoughtful students of this problem understand, the American attitude and what it flows from. In fact, the noble Marquess and other noble Lords have described the background of that feeling. And as we do understand the strength of that feeling, I think it was a pity that the noble Marquess made it appear as though His Majesty's Government were hesitant about supporting the American Resolution in the form in which it was drafted. I happened to be in America at the time and I certainly did not feel that there was any hesitation. As soon as it was drafted it appeared to meet two requirements: the upholding of the principle upon which we and the Americans and other nations resisted aggression in Korea; and the avoidance of unnecessary provocation towards spreading the war. As soon as that was achieved, we wholeheartedly supported it. I think it is important to make this clear, in view of the necessity for silencing mischief-makers of whatever kind and in whatever place who try to sow disunity between us on this matter.
  The same remarks apply to another point which the noble Marquess made. There really was no boggling about the 38th Parallel question. The Prime Minister made the British attitude very clear in his Statement in another place. That Statement seemed to me to express the common sense attitude of a partner very heavily committed in the Korea affair. He said, and he was entitled to say, that:
  "In our view the 38th Parallel ought not to be crossed again until there have been full consultations with the United Nations, and, in particular, with those Member States who are contributing Forces towards the United Nations' Forces in Korea."
  That is not boggling; that is a clear statement of a point of view which is shared by large numbers in America and, indeed, by the State Department. And it seems to me that the noble Marquess's remarks slightly misrepresented at a most undesirable time the attitude of His Majesty's Government on two very crucial
  718
  points. We immediately supported the American Resolution. We have a very clear view on the question of the 38th Parallel. We cannot over-emphasise the importance of the duty that lies upon us all not to encourage the mischief-makers by some chance remark or thoughtless word. The mischief-makers are to be found in many places; their actions proceed from all sorts of different reasons and stimuli. Some are wicked, some foolish, and the majority just muddle-headed. But they make mischief just the same, and we must be on our guard against them.
  I felt that the statement which my noble friend Lord Henderson made was also a complete answer to those thoughtless people whose foolishness is fanned by every kind of subtle Communist propaganda. By no means is it confined to the extreme Left Wing, either in this country or elsewhere. There is a widespread belief among foolish people that the United States uses its immense economic strength to bludgeon other nations into acceptance of its political opinions. I am sure that nothing could be further from the truth. I have spent a great deal of time in my life in the United States; I have come from there only recently, and I am sure that there is no substance whatever in that charge. In fact, the contrary is plainly true.
  Mention was made of the grant of 2,000,000 tons of wheat to India. This is one of the most unselfish acts of generosity that any nation has ever done in the world's history. Marshall Aid has involved very heavy burdens on American taxpayers, most of whom are poor people; and this tremendous contribution to the rebuilding of civilisation has been administered with no political strings of any kind. Some of the views held by right honourable gentlemen in this country are not exactly popular with all Americans, but this has made no difference to the generous help we have received—and the same truth applies to France and Italy and other countries of Europe. We are able now to say that through our own efforts we have achieved a situation in which we no longer depend upon Marshall Aid. But the Americans have come to the aid of the Indians, with this tremendous grant of food—and at the very time when the spokesman of the Indian Government is actively pursuing a policy which is abhorrent to the

  719
  majority of Americans. This seems to me to dispose absolutely of the charge that American largesse and American economic strength have been used to foist and force political opinions on other people. I think the sooner we make it understood that there is no truth in that, and that honest men will not recognise it, the better it will be.
  I must not detain your Lordships much longer. This great partnership, a marriage more than a partnership, can succeed and fructify only if the partners dwell more upon what they can give than upon what they can get, which is true of all marriages. Whatever their political Party, and however strong their desire to win Parliamentary Elections—which is commendable and understandable—I think at this time it is a great disservice to the cause of peace for people to belittle the achievements of Great Britain since the last war. In my view, these achievements have been assisted and helped by the policy of His Majesty's Government. I do not ask everybody to agree with that view, but at least I think we should blazon forth the astonishing virility and toughness of the British people after all that they have been through, the appalling conditions and hard work due to the war.
  After the weariness, exhaustion and frustrations which have been experienced by many of them, to have performed a miracle of industrial recovery in the last five years is something which we ought to tell people about every day, because it is the basis of our contribution to the common task of resisting aggression. Without that industrial revival, it could not have been done. To have increased our industrial output, with a broken economy and shattered tools at the beginning, by 40 per cent. in five years, is an incredible achievement. To have done without and gone without for another five years, in order to build up the exports to 70 per cent. above the all-time"high,"is something which you cannot tell people about too often. It is because of that astonishing industrial achievement of the British people that we have been able to make a contribution to the defence against the common enemy which is unparalleled by any nation in the free world.
  I should like some noble Lord opposite to get up and tell people one day
  720
  what we have done: how we have had conscription now for ten solid years; how every man between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six now serves three years in the armed Forces, afterwards spending a time in the Reserve; how by those means, in spite of our industrial effort we were able, before the Korean war began, to make a contribution to the common defence of a fighting force of 700,000 men which, if translated into terms of the proportion of the American population serving in their armed forces, would mean an American force of nearly 3,000,000— which is the target figure they hope to achieve by next June. We were in the very van in the provision of this defence. We have made a financial contribution which per head of the population is unequalled in the whole of the free world at any time. I think that it is of no service to the cause of peace and unity to belittle in any way the industrial achievements of our people, or the astonishing amount which we have been willing to set aside, in spite of all our obvious hardships, to the common defence of civilisation.
  I find it impossible to command words capable of expressing the overwhelming importance of what seems to me to be nothing less than the beginning of a new chapter of history—that is, the acceptance by the American nation of that great share of responsibility in world leadership which is thrust upon her by her geographical position, her vast natural resources and her unparalleled productive capacity. It is not easy for the American people to accept that role. It runs contrary to the old habits of mind. It runs contrary to things rooted deeply in the past. The vast majority of the American people have come out of Europe because Europe to them was a hateful place. They came from persecution; they came from hardship; they came from wickedness; and they came into the light of the freedom which they tried to make for themselves. The hatred of getting entangled in Europe again is something which is still rooted deep down in the soul of the American people. The whole history of the American people is based upon the belief that the right thing for them to do is to keep free of foreign entanglements.
  Twice in one generation they have been involved; and for tens of thousands of homes who have never seen Europe, to

  721
  whom the sea is something they have never beheld, these foreign entanglements have meant nothing but death and disaster, and no return for the loved ones who went off to fight a war. To get out of holding that attitude, to embrace this responsibility and. to take this leadership is a tremendous thing. Whether or not they do it, it seems to me, will make all the difference between hope and despair, survival and destruction. Compared with this vast opportunity, this enormous unfolding of something the breadth and depth of which we cannot measure, the nationality of an admiral who is chosen for an appointment seems to me a comparatively small matter, viewed in this perspective. I believe, as fervently as I believe in any sign or portent that I can see, that unless the Americans accept their share of world leadership it will pass into evil hands. With that concentration of power in evil hands, over our bright history, over the great achievements of Western civilisation and over all our hopes and aspirations, night must fall.
  7.38 p.m.
  EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Templewood, I beg to move that the debate be now adjourned.
  Moved, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Earl Fortescue.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to, and debate adjourned accordingly.

  ALKALI &C. WORKS REGULATION (SCOTLAND) BILL
  Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and to be printed.

  EXPORT GUARANTEES BILL
  Brought from the Commons; read la; and to be printed.
  House adjourned at twentyone minutes before eight o'clock.