HL Deb 04 December 1951 vol 174 cc779-96

3.41 p.m.

Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Ismay.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly:

[The EARL OF DROGHEDA in the Chair]

Clause 1 [Establishment and status of Home Guard]:

(2) Members of the Home Guard shall be members of the armed forces of the Crown; and every member of the Home Guard shall when on duty, and during any period during which the platoon or other part of the Home Guard to which be belongs is mustered, be subject to military law—

  1. (a) if serving on a commission in the Home Guard, as an officer; and
  2. (b) otherwise (and notwithstanding that he holds any rank or commission in any other of His Majesty's forces), as a soldier:

Provided that this subsection shall not render a member of the Home Guard liable to proceedings for an offence under section forty-one of the Army Act (which provides for the punishment under military law of civil offences).

VISCOUNT JOWITT moved, in the proviso to subsection (1) to leave out all words after "Guard" and to insert: subject to military law except at a time when a proclamation ordering the army reserve to be called out on permanent service is in force or men of the Territorial Army are called cut for actual military service in defence of the United Kingdom against actual or apprehended attack.

The noble Viscount said: This Amendment is put down to raise a matter to which I drew attention yesterday. I think it is a matter of some importance. This is the first Committee stage we have had on this sort of Bill since we resumed our discussions in this Chamber, and I think it is important that we should all realise that there is no Party question involved. The whole House decided, without a Division, to give a Second Reading to this Bill, and we all wish it well. It is true that there was some little difference of opinion, in that some noble Lords felt that the timing was unfortunate. It was not simply a question of the "wise and foolish virgins," as the noble Marquess the Leader of the House suggested yesterday, but of whether or not it was wise to start this scheme now, in view of the fact that there is nothing like an adequate recruitage for the Civil Defence, and of the fact that it is impossible at the present time to provide any uniform or anything of that sort. There is also the obvious danger that people may become disillusioned and weary before the scheme gets into its stride. However, that matter has been decided, and my desire is only to make this Bill work. I repeat that there is no Party question in this. I hope that in discussions of this sort we shall not work too closely on Party lines. If this House is to do a useful job as a Council of State we shall have to avoid that, and I hope that I shall receive support from all quarters in moving this Amendment, which I believe it to be a sensible one.

The problem is this. We have a proviso at the bottom of page 1 of this Bill. The first question is what that proviso means. I do not assert what the law is: I have often made the most glaring mistakes in the law. But at any rate I think I am more likely to be right on a legal than on a non-legal question—though, of course, I might be wrong on both. I ask, then, what this proposal means, so that I may be told whether I am right or wrong. Section 41 of the Army Act deals with offences punishable by the civil law. It provides that such offences, notwithstanding that they are punishable by the ordinary law of the land, will also come under military law, and it provides a catalogue of what are described as "civil offences". Therefore my understanding of the clause is this. When I see the proviso which reads: Provided that this subsection shall not render a member of the Home Guard liable to proceedings for an offence under section forty-one of the Army Act (which provides for the punishment under military law of civil offences) I read it as meaning that the subsection shall not render a member of the Home Guard liable to proceedings under military law for any offence punishable by the ordinary law. I want to be informed whether that is right.

Subsection (2) says that every member of the Home Guard shall, when on duty, be subject to military law. This proviso cuts that down by saying that he is not to be subject to punishment under military law for offences which are punishable by the ordinary law of the land. That is a novel procedure. There has never been in our history any precedent for it. The Army Act has been most carefully worked out over perhaps the last hundred years. Amendment and re-amendment are all published together. There has been nothing like this before. It is a complete, absolute, and novel departure—and I believe it to be a had departure. We ought either to have the Army Act applying or not have it applying. I believe that the wisdom of the past has worked out the whole code for the Army Act, and I believe this present proposal to be bad. I am not concerned with trying to score a Party point; as I say, I want this Bill to work. I gave the illustration yesterday of a man striking his superior officer. Obviously the gravamen of that offence is that he is subject to military law. His blow, if he strikes his superior officer, may be trivial, or it may be a serious one. But it is a serious offence anyhow, because it is subversive of military discipline. Also, it is subject to the ordinary law of the land; the man could be brought up before the magistrates and punished for assault and battery.

I believe what I have said to be the meaning of this proviso, but I am asking for information. The Bill says, in effect, that, because that offence can be dealt with by the ordinary law of the land, therefore it cannot be dealt with by military law. I see that the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, who knows a great deal about this matter, shakes his head. I have a great regard for the noble Viscount's experience in practice, but on the legal side, on the construction of the words, I have not quite such a regard for him. I believe that the meaning I have suggested is the right meaning, and I hope that I shall be told whether or not it is. I believe that, as the Bill is now drafted, the words mean that if a soldier strikes his superior officer, then, because the offence can be dealt with by the magistrates, therefore it cannot be dealt with by military law. Frankly, that seems to me a wrong and undesirable state of affairs. If I am wrong, many noble Lords with experience—some with vast experience—of this matter from the point of view of military law will be able to put me right.

'The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, said yesterday that he thought the Home Guard liked being under military law in the last war. He may be right—he is much more likely to know that than I am—but be it observed that, if they liked being under military law, then they will not have what they like now, because they are under a strangely truncated and different type of military law altogether. The obscurity to which this provision will give rise is very great. Take the case of a man striking his superior officer. Suppose that it is a question of insulting words. Suppose that an irate private gets absolutely fed up with what he thinks is the incompetence of his superior officer, and that he uses harsh words towards him—I am not going to suggest what the harsh words might be. Suppose, for example, that he said: "You silly goose!" or something of that sort. Would he be dealt with under military law? Your Lordships see the uncertainty which is introduced into this matter. To use insulting words and behaviour likely to cause a breach of the peace is an offence with which the magistrates could deal, and the question of whether the offence was liable to be dealt with at military law would depend upon whether or not the precise words which were used, and the circumstances in which they were used, were such as would be likely to cause a breach of the peace. Because, if they were, it could be dealt with under the civil law, and therefore, thanks to the proviso, such an offence could not be dealt with under military law.

I am quite certain, I am afraid, that Party discipline will prevail here and that my Amendment will be turned down. I am equally relatively certain that, if those of your Lordships who have had military experience were completely free from Party discipline, you would agree with me that men should either be under military law or not under military law, and that being half under military law and half not under military law is a thoroughly bad thing. There is absolutely no precedent whatever for this. It is true that, in the case of Territorials, they are subject to military law as soldiers when they are on duty, and, as I said yesterday (everybody knows this; there will be no controversy about it), that situation gives rise to extremely difficult questions, because the problem of when a man's duty begins and when his duty ends is difficult to determine. However I pass that by. I stress to your Lordships seriously, because I want to make this Bill act, that there has never been a case yet of anything like this. The whole point of Section 41 of the Army Act is to provide that, notwithstanding that certain acts are an offence under the ordinary law of the land, yet they may be dealt with by military law. Striking an officer is the best illustration: that offence can be dealt with under military law. To say that it is an offence under civil law, and that therefore it should not be an offence under military law, is something which has not been said before, and I do not think that it makes good sense.

For that reason, I should very much prefer the Amendment which I am suggesting. I am proposing that in the early stages, dealing merely with training and the like—and bear in mind that women as well as men will now have to be dealt with—these people should not be subjected to military law at all. When the situation becomes critical, however—and I give the Government of the day complete authority to say when it does become critical—then these people should be made subject to military law altogether. If the situation becomes critical, I should make them turn up, if they are called, unless they have a valid reason, and see that they behave like a properly organised military force, with every aspect of military law attaching to them. I think that would be found a far better arrangement than what is now proposed. At present, the Government are saying: "When you are on duty you shall be subject to part of the military law, and only part of the military law"—a situation for which there is absolutely no precedent. Perhaps lawyers are too much inclined to hang on to precedents, but I have a good many years' experience and have come to the conclusion that our ancestors were pretty wise people. And these things have grown up slowly. I think that to try this experiment and have a now truncated form of military law is very rash indeed.

With the sole desire to try to make this Bill work happily and properly, I would address to your Lordships this simple principle: that if these people are to be subject to military law, let them be subject to military law, and not just to a bit of military law. Whatever else you do, let them not be put into the very difficult position of being subject to military law only where the offence is not susceptible of being dealt with under the ordinary civil law. I believe that principle to be bad, and I ask your Lordships to accept this Amendment, which is a serious Amendment, in an endeavour to put right what I believe to be an error. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 1, line 20, leave out from ("Guard") to end of line 22 and insert ("subject to military law except at a time when a proclamation ordering the army reserve to be called out on permanent service is in force or men of the Territorial Army are called out for actual military service in defence of the United Kingdom against actual or apprehended attack.").—(Viscount Jowitt.)

3.57 p.m.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (LORD ISMAY)

I am conscious that I am giving away a good deal of weight in trying to reply to the noble and learned Viscount. No one for a moment would suspect that any Party motive was behind this Amendment. The noble and learned Viscount has been good enough to speak to us about it in private, and it is clear that this is a genuine, earnest Amendment to try to help this Bill along. The objects of the noble and learned Viscount's Amendment, as I see them, are twofold. The first is to provide that the Home Guard shall not be subject to military law while on duty unless and until an emergency arises in which the Army Reserve or the Territorial Army are called up; and, secondly, to provide that, when such an emergency arises, the Home Guard shall be subject to military law in exactly the same way as any other members of the military forces, including liability to be proceeded against under Section 41 for a civil offence.

As regards the first point, those of my friends with whom I have consulted genuinely feel that it would be anomalous if the Home Guard, who are members of the Armed Forces, were not subject to military law as soldiers when on duty. I think there is a great deal of substance in what my noble and gallant friend Lord Bridgeman said yesterday. From my knowledge of soldiering, I should back him up every time when he says that the Home Guard themselves would not wish for anything else. They would regard exemption from military law as relegating them to an inferior status.

VISCOUNT JOWITT

But my grievance is that you are not making them subject to military law.

LORD ISMAY

Surely we are.

VISCOUNT JOWITT

No; the proviso prevents it.

LORD ISMAY

If the noble and learned Viscount will be patient with me, I am coming to that. I am dealing with the first point. They will be subject to military law on duty.

VISCOUNT JOWITT

Except for the proviso.

LORD ISMAY

I am coming to that. May I repeat that we feel strongly that the Home Guard themselves would resent not being subject to military law when they are on duty, because that would imply that they were relegated to an inferior status. Let me turn to the proviso to which the noble and learned Viscount objects. I may mention that this proviso was introduced in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for War, to reassure honourable Members on both sides of the House concerning doubts expressed about the liability of the Home Guard to military law. The object of the proviso is to ensure that no member of that force should be tried under military law for an offence which could conceivably come within the normal civil code. That Amendment was welcomed by the Opposition in another place; they said that it was clearly a very proper one. In practice, it is most unlikely that a Home Guard member would ever be tried by court-martial for a civil offence. I believe that there was only one such case in the whole of the last war. I would point out, too, that even in the case of Regular troops in this country, who are subject to military law, in the majority of cases the trial of civil offences is left to a civil court. Even if the proviso were omitted, it is most unlikely that it would make any real difference in practice, but the assurance would be taken out of the Bill. Therefore, with the deepest respect, and with gratitude to the noble and learned Viscount for the patience and eloquence with which he has put forward this Amendment, I very much regret that we are unable to accept it.

LORD WINSTER

I would certainly agree with the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Jowitt, that possibly the timing of this Bill is not well chosen, but I must confess that I feel some misgivings or doubts about the Amendment which he has proposed. First of all, may I say that I entirely agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman in what he said yesterday? I am quite sure that the Home Guard wish to be treated very seriously as men with military obligations; and in no other way. I am sure they do not want to be considered as a number of rather elderly and, possibly, senile gentlemen who, for fear of their arthritis, shelter in a public-house from a shower of rain and play darts. But with regard to the Amendment and the question which has been raised concerning the words "when on duty," I feel perfectly sure that the officers of the Home Guard, exercising the usual common sense which is found amongst officers of all Services, will be able to decide very easily and readily whether an offence has been committed when on duty or when not on duty.

In regard to the point of whether they are subject to military law or to civil law, surely the position is this: that if a man commits an offence which is clearly an offence under military law but not under civil law, then, of course, he is dealt with according to military law; but if he commits an offence which, as I understand it, is subject both to military law and to civil law, then, as it seems to me, we have here a wise concession to the fact that members of the Home Guard are mainly and essentially civilians, that the man can, if the offence is liable to civil law, be tried under civil law. I am not quite clear from what the noble Lord, Lord Ismay, said, whether a man has any option in this matter: whether it is the fact, if he is subject both to military and to civil law, that automatically he is handed over to the civil law, or whether he has the option of deciding whether he will be tried under military law or civil law. I think that is a point of some importance.

Otherwise, looking at the following Amendment, which stands in the name of Lord Ismay, providing that the Home Guard will be called up only when there is a state of emergency, it seems to me that the provisions of the Bill as it stands are sound. The members of the Home Guard, as they would wish, would in a state of emergency be treated as soldiers and would be subject to military law, although in an awkward or an obstinate case, if they were subject to both civil and military law, they would have the option of saying whether they would be tried by the civil or the military law. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Ismay, will be kind enough to clear up that point. In any case, I wish to say again that I wholeheartedly agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, that these men, who I am sure would welcome an expression of opinion from this House, do not want to be treated as a sort of "Fred Karno's army," as amateur soldiers or anything of that sort. They want to be treated as men who, recognising the emergency with which we stand confronted, desire to put their services at the disposal of their country, and to be subject to whatever particular treatment or, it may be said, disabilities that service exposes them.

4.6 p.m.

VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN

Perhaps I can be of some help if I follow the noble Lord, Lord Winster, in what he has just said over the question of Section 41 of the Army Act. I want to approach this matter in the same spirit as the noble and learned Viscount when he moved his Amendment—that is to say, not from the point of view of my Party loyalty, although that is considerable, but from the point of view of my experience in these matters in the last war. Leaving aside for the moment whether the clause is properly drafted, which I would not presume to discuss except on advice, I think the intention of this proviso was perfectly clear from what the Secretary of State said in another place. There he wanted to make it quite plain that if a man could be charged under the Army Act only under Section 41 (that is to say, for a civil offence) he was not to be charged at all but was to be brought before the civil court. What was not the intention was that, if a charge could be brought either under Section 41 or under one of the other sections, it should automatically be barred under this Bill because there was a choice. Let me put it round the other way. Suppose, as the noble and learned Viscount said, that a Home Guard struck another Home Guard, and suppose that there was a choice between charging him under Section 41 for assault or charging him under Section 8, or whatever section it may be, for striking a superior. The Bill, as it is drafted now, would not, I am advised, prevent the man from being charged under Section 8.

VISCOUNT JOWITT

This is of fundamental importance. I ask to be corrected if I am wrong in the law, but as I understand it—let me make it quite plain—if that man strikes his superior officer he can be dealt with either under the Army Act, Section 8 or Section 41, or under the civil law, because it is assault and battery for which he would appear before the magistrates. If I read this proviso aright, it says that that case must be dealt with under the civil law; it cannot be dealt with under the Army Act. Wherever you can deal with it under the civil law then you are precluded from dealing with it under the Army Act. It is on that basis that I am speaking. Am I wrong?

VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN

Speaking, as I say, on advice, and not attempting to give my own opinion on this matter, I understand that that is not the case. I am advised that if a man is liable to be charged for an offence under one of the military sections or under Section 41, then he can be proceeded against under the military section. The fact that he can be proceeded against equally well under civil law would not make it impossible for the man to be charged under the Army Act.

VISCOUNT JOWITT

I profoundly disagree with that. Ask Lord Reading. He knows all about that.

VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN

I am only saying what, on advice, I believe to be the situation. It is not for me to take the matter any further. But it is my belief that that was the intention of the clause as drafted. One should not be allowed to charge any Home Guard with an offence under military law, when what the Home Guard did constituted a civil offence and had nothing to do with his duty as a Home Guard. It should be entirely a matter for a civil court. It was in order to emphasise that the Army Act was to be used only for purely military offences that my right honourable friend undertook to move his Amendment in the other place. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, asked who could choose between one type of charge or another. The answer is—so I have understood from past experience—that the accused cannot choose. The man who decides is the man who places the accused under arrest. If the man is placed under arrest by his commanding officer, the charge has to be preferred under some section of the Army Act if he is to be tried under the Army Act at all.

If I may, I would leave that matter now and return to the main point, because the noble and learned Viscount really raised two points. One was whether the Bill is rightly drafted; and I have been attempting to answer that question. His other point was whether it is policy to do this at all. As to that, I do not think I need repeat what I said yesterday. I believe it is militarily necessary to have this power, because of duties, apart from training, which might have to be performed for some special reason. In any case the Bill, as drafted, is drafted rightly; it allows that to take place and power to make a charge is not vitiated by Section 41.

LORD SALTOUN

If a few words may be addressed to your Lordships from almost the bottom of the scale in the Home Guard, I should like to say to the noble and learned Viscount that I do not think his Amendment as it stands will do. We want something of this nature—and we are all agreed in the Home Guard on this—to protect us from the very occasional and rare acts of selfishness on the part of a few individuals which may be very persistent, although in my experience they are very rare, and which make all the rest of us uncomfortable and prevent us from carrying out our duties properly. It is the rank and file who suffer most from these things, and we need some means to deal with offenders.

4.14 p.m.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY)

Perhaps I may be allowed to say a few words upon this matter. It is undoubtedly a very difficult and technical question, and we ought to approach it with some trepidation. It is, equally undoubtedly, a valid point which has been raised by the noble and learned Viscount, and the Government ought to try, if we cannot accept the Amendment, to explain our reasons as clearly as possiblie. I would agree with what he has said to the effect that on questions of this kind we do not want to take a Party view. Quite apart from our being a Council of State, it would be utterly contrary to the traditions of this House as I have always understood them. I told the noble and learned Viscount yesterday that we would examine objectively the case which he made. We have done so. I have consulted expert opinion, so far as I could, in conjunction with my noble friend Lord Ismay, arid in the light of that I regret very much to say that, with every wish to meet the noble and learned Viscount if possible, we cannot see our way to accept this Amendment. All our advice is that the obscurities which the noble and learned Viscount finds in the present wording of the Bill are really illusory. In fact, in the practical interpretation of the law—which is what really matters—we are advised that doubtful cases such as he envisages would not arise. That is the view which, I may say in his absence, is shared by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, who would have been glad to express his views here to-day; but unfortunately, as noble Lords know, he is prevented from attending by a very important official engagement. That is the view, too, which has been supported by the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgman, and the noble Lord, Lord Winster.

The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Jowitt, quoted a particular case. It involves a question of legal interpretation, and I feel great trepidation in attempting to deal with it. He said: "What would be the position of a man who struck his superior officer? That might be said to be a military offence and it might equally be said to be a civil offence. Would it, under the proviso, be necessary that that offence should be tried by a civil court?" That, as I understood it, was the case which the noble arid learned Viscount made. With all deference, the position as I see it in that case is this: it would depend entirely on the circumstances in which the offence was committed. If the man struck his superior officer during his duty, he would come under Section 8 of the Army Act, which reads as follows: (1) every person subject to military law who commits any of the following offences; that is to say, Strikes or uses or offers any violence to his superior officer, being in the execution of his office,.. In that case he would presumably be court-martialled. If, on the other hand, the parade being over, the pair had adjourned to a neighbouring public house— that was the case mentioned by the noble and learned Viscount—and in the course of a conversation which began on a friendly note but later ceased to be friendly, the man struck his fellow member of the Home Guard—a man who had been acting as his superior officer—they would not be on duty. In those circumstances, the man who struck the blow would clearly come under the civil law. The noble and learned Viscount may say that there might be border-line cases.

VISCOUNT JOWITT

That is not my point at all. I am sorry that I have failed to make myself clear. To illustrate my point, I cited the example of a man striking his superior officer. You might proceed under Section 8 or under Section 41, in either case by court-martial, if the man is subject to the Army Act and Army discipline. The whole question here is a point on the proviso. My contention is—and I am astounded to hear that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor does not agree—that, by reason of this proviso, you are asserting that wherever the case is one which can be dealt with under the civil law, it cannot be dealt with under any section of the Army Act—under Section 8 or Section 41 or any other section.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My answer to that would be—rightly or wrongly—that to strike a superior officer in the execution of his duty is a completely different offence from striking a superior officer in a public house. One act is subversive of discipline and the other is not.

VISCOUNT JOWITT

Both could be dealt with civilly.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

The fact remains that they are not the same offence. One is what I would call an entirely military offence. It is not a civil offence to strike a superior officer in the execution of his duty; it is much more serious. In that case, undoubtedly, I should think a man would be court-martialled. In the other case, he would be subject to the civil law. That is the interpretation which I put on the case which the noble and learned Viscount cited. I put that in support of the Government's view rather than of my view alone. There is not the obscurity which the noble and learned Viscount thinks there is in the position created by the present Bill, which is, after all, very much the same position as existed in the last war. I would remind the noble and learned Viscount that out of all the hundreds and thousands of men who served in the Home Guard during the last war—in fact, I believe the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, spoke of millions—only seventy cases were tried by court-martial for various offences, and out of those cases only in one single case was a man convicted under Section 41. The conclusion one must draw is that in practice it is perfectly simple to differentiate between military and civil offences; and though, from a purely legal—I prefer not to say legalistic—point of view, there may appear to be force behind the noble and learned Viscount's contention, in practice the situation will not arise. If we insert the noble Viscount's Amendment, we shall be altering completely the concession which was given by the Government in another place on the earnest request of Members in all parts of the House, who are perfectly satisfied—I would remind the noble Viscount—with the concession which has been made. We do not feel justified in doing what he suggests, and have no option but to resist the noble Viscount's Amendment. I can assure him that I say that, not from any Party point of view, but on careful weighing of the merits of the case.

VISCOUNT JOWITT

I shall not trouble to divide the House on this matter, but I am bound to say that I remain completely dissatisfied. I think the answers of both noble Lords have shown that they really do not understand the point I am raising. I am going to put it once again that the blood is on your own heads. These cases do arise. That they arise infrequently, I agree; and that is because we are dealing here with a very well-behaved set of men. But if such a case did arise, this is what would happen. I take the illustration with which we are all familiar. If a man were to strike his superior officer, as things are at present he could be proceeded against in three ways: first, under military law, under Section 8 of the Army Act secondly, under military law under Section 41 of the Army Act; and thirdly, under civil law, he could be had up before the magistrates and tried for assault and battery. That would be a stupid thing to do, of course, because the whole gravamen of the offence is that he is a soldier and the other man is his superior officer, and the sensible thing to do would be to try him under one or other section of the Army Act. I have the greatest respect for the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, and I have the most profound regard for his opinion, and if he were here I am sure he would say that that statement is right. Anybody who says to the contrary, I think, would be quite unable to pass his first Bar examination. I believe that to be an elementary fact.

I would ask your Lordships to look at this proviso once again with me. We see in subsection (2) that every member of the Home Guard shall when on duty"— I am not drawing limits to duty. Let us assume that can be clearly assessed— … be subject to military law"— Then there is the proviso—which must mean the cutting down of the generality of the previous statement— that this subsection shall not render a member of the Home Guard liable to proceedings for an offence under section forty-one of the Army Act. … What are the offences under Section 41 of the Army Act? They are any offence which is suitable for trial by ordinary civil law. Therefore, I may substitute for any reference to Section 41 of the Army Act in the proviso these words: "any offence punishable by the ordinary law." Let me now read the proviso as it would then appear—and I think every step in my argument is quite clear. Every member shall be subject to military law provided that this subsection shall not render a member of the Home Guard liable to proceedings"— that is, of course, proceedings under military law— for any offence punishable by the ordinary law. I absolutely fail to understand which of the limbs of that argument is controverted. I assert, therefore, that if a man strikes his superior officer, in that that is something which can be dealt with by the ordinary law of the land he is not liable to proceedings under the Army Act under Section 8 or any other section.

I have taken only one illustration, but there are hundreds of others one could take. I very much wish the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor had been here to tell me why I am wrong. if I am wrong. When I saw this point, I took the trouble to see the noble Marquess the Leader of the House and talk to him about it, and I should go away at least happier if I had some sort of conception in my mind of what the answer is—because I have not the least conception of what the answer is supposed to be. But I hope the answer is all right, and that your Lordships are doing the right thing. It is a little unlucky that I cannot be told in language which is plain to my mind what the answer is, but if your Lordships want this strange provision, then so far as I am concerned I shall withdraw my Amendment. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I only wish, if I may, to correct a misstatement in my remarks. I said that there were 70 cases in the whole of the Home Guard during the course of the last war. That figure refers to 1943 and 1944, and the total figure was 200. But I understand that the figure of one for those who fell within the ambit of Section 41 still remains.

VISCOUNT JOWITT

I very much doubt that figure. For a time I was a Law Officer, and I had something to do with these matters. They were an extra-ordinarily well-behaved set of men and gave very little trouble, but I do not for a moment think there was only one case which was susceptible of being dealt with by the civil law. I should think that a large number of the 200 were cases which could have been brought under the ordinary law of the land. But the point is not of the greatest importance, just because we are dealing with such a well-behaved set of men.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1 agreed to.

4.29 p.m.

LORD ISMAY moved, after Clause 1 to insert the following new clause:

Time for mustering Home Guard.

"2. An order for the mustering of the Home Guard or any part thereof shall not be given except at a time when a proclamation ordering the army reserve to be called out on permanent service is in force or men of the Territorial Army are called out for actual military service in defence of the United Kingdom against actual or apprehended attack."

The noble Lord said: The object of this new clause is to give effect to an undertaking given by my noble friend the Under-Secretary of State for War in another place to meet an Amendment put down by the former Minister of Defence, Mr. Shinwell. The Amendment makes clear in what circumstances mustering can be ordered. I beg to move.

VISCOUNT JOWITT

We have no objection to this Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 2, line 36, at end insert the said new clause.—(Lord Ismay.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 2 agreed to.

Clause 3 [Short title, interpretation and commencement]:

LORD ISMAY

I beg to move the next Amendment standing in my name on the Marshalled List, which is purely a drafting Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 3, line 9, after ("In") insert ("section one of").—(Lord Ismay.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD ISMAY

This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 3, line 11, after ("and") insert ("in this Act").—(Lord Ismay.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 3, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule agreed to.

House resumed.

Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of November 29), the Amendments reported; Bill read 3ª, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

House adjourned at twenty-eight minutes before five o'clock.