Lords Sitting of 4 December 1951

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
Several Lords—Took the Oath.

DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES OF TASS AGENCY
2.36 p.m.
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order
Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether the diplomatic privileges enjoyed and exploited by the Tass Agency will now be terminated without further delay.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING): My Lords, the Tass Agency have not published any material in this country since October, but it may be of interest to the House if I outline, very briefly, the position as it has developed since the matter first arose in 1949. Twice during the last three years the Tass Agency have published in their daily news sheet. Soviet Monitor, prima facie libels upon distinguished refugees in this country. On the first occasion, in 1949, it was established that the English courts had no jurisdiction since Tass, as a department of the Soviet State, enjoyed immunity from suit, an immunity which is to be distinguished from diplomatic privilege. When, therefore, in June last, the Soviet Monitor published another statement which was clearly libellous, His Majesty's Government were unwilling to allow matters to remain in their present unsatisfactory state where, owing to the Agency's claim to immunity, private persons in the United Kingdom were debarred from securing redress for infringement of their legal rights. A Note was, accordingly, addressed to the Soviet Embassy requesting an assurance that if, in future, a dispute should arise between
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a private person in the United Kingdom and the Tass Agency concerning the alleged infringement of that person's legal rights as a result of any publication by the Agency, the latter would, as a condition of continuing to operate in this country, either waive their immunity from suit or submit to arbitration.
The Soviet Embassy replied rejecting our request. In the meantime, however, Tass suspended publication of the Soviet Monitor and are not at present disseminating any written material in this country. A further Note has, therefore, been sent to the Soviet Embassy which, while noting the fact that Tass have for the present suspended their publishing activities in this country, conveys a warning that, in the event of publication being resumed, we should require an assurance in the sense previously requested.
Meanwhile, as noble Lords are aware, the question of the immunity afforded by our law to organs of foreign States has been under study by an Inter-departmental Committee. This Committee has also been considering the question of diplomatic immunity, which concerns the privileges accorded to a diplomatic envoy and his staff. I am glad to inform the House that the Committee have now submitted a Final Report with regard to diplomatic immunity, which will be published shortly. On the question of State immunity, which involves more complex issues, the Committee have also prepared an Interim Report, which is now under consideration.
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, I thank the noble Marquess for his reply. If I rightly understood his words, it is no longer possible for Tass to behave in the same way as they behaved in 1949.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, the position at the moment—I hoped I had made it clear—is that the opportunity for Tass to behave in that way is not there at present, for the reason that they are publishing nothing in which they can make a defamatory statement. But they have been warned, in the terms I read out, of the possible consequences if they resume publication and therewith resume their defamatory action.
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, I thank the noble Marquess for his further reply, which satisfies me. I should like to ask whether both sections of this Report will be published. I believe that during the tenure of office of the previous Government there was some doubt whether that would be done.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I think I am right in saying that so far as the diplomatic immunity question is concerned, the Report will be published. As regards the other aspect I have no information at present, but I will inquire into the matter and let the noble Lord know.

MOTOR VEHICLES IN ROYAL PARKS
2.41 p.m.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order
Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government under what Statute or regulation a summons can be issued for infringement in the Royal Parks of:

(1) the speed limit of 20 miles per hour;

(2) any provision of the Road Traffic Acts or any regulation made thereunder or any provision of any other Act or regulation for which the driver of a vehicle on the public highway would be liable.]

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (THE EARL OF MUNSTER): My Lords, I will answer the noble Lord's question in two parts. First, a summons for infringement of the speed limit of 20 miles per hour in the Royal Parks can be issued under the Parks Regulation Acts of 1872 and 1926, by which the Minister of Works is empowered to make regulations for securing proper management of the parks. A regulation imposing a speed limit of 20 miles per hour on motor vehicles has been in force ever since 1930. As regards the second part of the noble Lord's question, I am advised that it raises a number of points of some difficulty, which need careful consideration, and upon which advice is now being taken. I regret that I am not yet in a
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position to give a full reply, but I will inform the noble Lord as soon as I am able to do so.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, while it may be difficult to extend the courtesy of thanking the noble Earl, at least I can offer him my complete and utter sympathy. I knew when I put the Question down that the whole subject bristles with difficulties. I must say that I am sorry the Department for whom the noble Earl is now speaking did not give the long and careful consideration that they now find it necessary to give before they prepared the answer given to the Question asked by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, some two or three weeks ago. I do not want to embarrass the noble Earl by pressing the subject now, but may I ask him whether, in the consideration which is going to be given and which it is necessary should be given to clarify this position, he will have reconsidered the whole question of pedestrian crossings in the Royal Parks, so that the King's subjects can have in the Royal Parks the same amount of protection which His Majesty's Government think it necessary for them to have on the highway and also, since the noble Earl who answered Lord Howe's Question said that one of the prime reasons for the Royal Parks was "for the rest of the populace," so that that rest will not be too permanent?
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: My Lords, I think I can give the noble Lord the assurance that the question of pedestrian crossings in the Royal Parks will certainly have to be considered.
EARL HOWE: My Lords, the answer previously given to my Question regarding pedestrian crossings in the Royal Parks said that the matter would be referred to the noble Earl who has just replied. May I ask whether he will bear in mind that, in such a drive as the East Carriage Drive in Hyde Park, or the Mall, there is a distance of about thirty to forty feet between the kerb and the few refuges that exist, and that motor vehicles can and sometimes do, come along three or four abreast? It is a matter of the gravest possible difficulty for pedestrians using those crossings to know when they can cross them with reasonable safety to themselves and to the motor traffic as well. Will the noble Earl see that, if it is at all possible, we have some pedestrian crossings and also a few more refuges?
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: My Lords, I think I can give the noble Earl the same assurance that I gave to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, that this matter will be considered afresh.

MITCHAM COMMON SPEED LIMIT
2.45 p.m.
EARL HOWE: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether it is intended to continue the speed limit restriction across Mitcham Common, on the Mitcham—Croydon road and on the Edinburgh—Queensferry road between Blackball and Cramond Bridge.]
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: My Lords, my honourable friend the Minister of Transport is of opinion that the 30 m.p.h. speed restriction on the Mitcham — Croydon road through Mitcham Common should be maintained. This Common is a recreation ground which attracts many cyclists and pedestrians; moreover, what is more important to my mind, it is also a playground for large numbers of children. With regard to the second part of the noble Earl's Question, my honourable friend is at the moment considering whether or not there is adequate justification for maintaining the speed limit now in force on the Edinburgh—Queensferry Road.
EARL HOWE: My Lords, while thank-the noble Earl for his answer with reference to the road in Scotland, I should like to ask him a further question concerning the road across Mitcham Common. Is the noble Earl aware that there is a length of about one and a half or two miles of this road that has only one road intersection, that there is only one house within a hundred yards of the road anywhere along its whole length, and that nobody can approach the road without being in full view of the traffic using it over a distance of 200 or 300 yards? I would also draw his attention to the Report of the London Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee which, at page 9, makes this statement:
"A speed limit should never be imposed unless there is clear justification for it. The effectiveness of a speed limit depends primarily
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on the willing co-operation of drivers. If a speed limit is imposed without justification drivers tend to disregard it and this brings the whole system of speed limits into disrepute."
May I ask the noble Earl whether he will reconsider the stretch of road referred to in the light of the London Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee's comment?
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: My Lords, I am well aware of the nature of this road, and I cannot say that I altogether agree with what has just fallen from the noble Earl. He has spoken, if I understood him aright, of the clear visibility on this road, but I have never noticed, in my experience of driving, that clear visibility has ever deterred pedestrians, motorists, cyclists or children from committing acts of suicidal folly. With regard to the quotation which the noble Earl has just read out, I am in full agreement him and, were I a motorist contemplating crossing this particular piece of road, I should willingly obey the speed limit—and I will tell him why. In the first place, the vehicular traffic which this road carries is extremely heavy. The rate is about 430 vehicles an hour, rising, I believe, to about 800 vehicles an hour in the peak period. The pedestrian and cycle traffic is also substantial, especially of course at weekends, at holiday times and in the summer evenings. As I said before—and this is one of my most important points—Mitcham Common serves as an open space and a recreation centre for the densely populated areas which surround it. Therefore, it has many features of a park in a residential area. It is true that this section of the road is in open country, and that there are no buildings, but because of the number of pedestrians, cyclists, vehicles and children using Mitcham Common, the traffic conditions are, in the opinion of my honourable friend, comparable to those in a built-up area. He has, therefore, decided that the speed limit is necessary.
There is perhaps one other point that I should add and that is that I am informed that the distance of road in question is slightly over one mile. If, as the police believe and as we believe, the lives of pedestrians, cyclists and, above all, of children can be saved, we do not think that to ask the motorist to throttle down to 30 m.p.h. for just over one mile

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is imposing upon him an intolerable hardship. With regard to the second part of the noble Earl's Question, that affecting the road in Scotland, I know the past history of the various experiments which were made in attempting to de-restrict this road, and I am also aware of the attitude adopted by the Edinburgh Council towards those experiments. But with the noble Earl's permission, I would much prefer not to delve too deeply into the details of the past, because, as I pointed out just now, the matter is again sub judice, and it may well be that this time the noble Earl will get what he wants. I therefore ask him, rather earnestly, to accept my assurance that my right honourable friend is at present considering whether or not it is justifiable to maintain a speed limit on this road, and I assure the noble Earl that, as soon as a decision is taken about the matter, the House will be informed.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, while we are deeply interested in the opinion on traffic questions of the noble Earl the Lord in Waiting, may I ask the acting Leader of the House why the Minister who is in charge of this Department is not present to answer such an important Question?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (VISCOUNT SWINTON): Because he is otherwise engaged and has a most admirable substitute. I well remember that when the noble Viscount was an Under-Secretary he was only too glad to show off his eloquence.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I am indebted to the noble Viscount for what we in this House call a tribute. But I am raising a Parliamentary point. The last time this Minister was required here he was dining with the Norwegian Ambassador, and this time he is what is called "otherwise engaged." I think the least that could be done, out of respect for your Lordships' House, is that Ministers who are responsible for these matters should come and answer Questions when they are put in your Lordships' House.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: It was once said to the noble Viscount in another place that he must not engender more heat than he can contain. He is well
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aware that it has been an invariable custom in this House, as in another place, that Under-Secretaries of State or their representatives here, those who stand in the same position in this House. Lords in Waiting, should from time to time answer Questions. The noble Lord, Lord Leathers, is offering no discourtesy to the House. I recollect that when a point was raised the other day the noble Lord, who has an enormous field of activity to cover (he has to deal with three industries), was here to answer, and he has been regularly present when matters arise in debate. I am sure the noble Viscount opposite will not wish to press his point unduly.

CONSOLIDATED FUND BILL
2.55 p.m.
Brought from the Commons, endorsed with the certificate from the Speaker that the Bill is a Money Bill within the meaning of the Parliament Act, 1911, and read 1ª.
Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of November 29), Bill read 2ª: Committee negatived; Bill read 3ª, and passed.

COTTON INDUSTRY DEVELOP- MENT COUNCIL (AMENDMENT) ORDER, 1951
2.56 p.m.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords, I should like to dispose of this matter with the same brevity and efficiency with which we dealt with the last, but as it is an Order of great importance to the whole cotton industry I think your Lordships would wish that I should explain its purpose. I am glad to say that in its main provisions the Order has the unanimous support of employers and employed in all sections of the industry. To anyone who has known this industry for many years this unity of purpose and action is significant and gratifying. I remember that thirty years ago when I first went to the Board of Trade there was very little of this unity. The structure of the cotton industry has always been horizontal and not vertical, and spinners, weavers and finishers were for the most part, and still are for the most part, I believe, separate entities, and certainly in the old days were very individualistic at that. Though all

765
these sections had a common interest in the sale of the finished goods in highly competitive markets, there was little cooperation towards that common end. But even in those days the need for closer union was beginning to be realised, and in 1925 the various sections established a Joint Committee of Cotton Trade Organisations, and as far back as that Sir Raymond Streat, the present Chairman of the Cotton Board, played an active part in bringing all the interests together.
The usefulness of this Joint Committee, and increasing competition in foreign markets, led in the 'thirties to a proposal to set up a statutory board with extensive functions to reorganise the industry, and an Act giving effect to this proposal was passed in 1939, but was never implemented because of the war. But in 1940, under a special war-time Act, a Cotton Board was set up under the chairmanship of Sir Raymond Streat. It did valuable work, not the least part of which was greatly to increase the spirit of co-operation in the industry; and the result was that when the Industrial Organisation and Development Act, 1947, came into operation, the Cotton Board was reconstituted on a permanent basis as a Development Council, with the support and full agreement of all sections of the industry. The present Cotton Board has been able to maintain this spirit of unity and has established for itself a secure place in the industry. Every appropriate organisation, trade union and trade association in the industry has been consulted, and they were all unanimous that the Cotton Board should continue in being and, in giving their support to the continued existence of the Cotton Board, every organisation has expressed most strongly its desire that the Board should continue under the Chairmanship of Sir Raymond Streat. Therefore your Lordships will see that the first provision of the Order continues the existence of the Cotton Board.
The next question was as to how, if at all, the Order of 1948 ought to be amended. I apologise for the fact that, inevitably, this Order has to be by reference, but I think I can make it plain to your Lordships by explaining what the old position was and how and why it is being amended. First of all, I will deal with the definition of the industry. The industry is defined in the 1948 Order as consisting of the activities of spinning, doubling, weaving, finishing, making-up
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and packing and converting in relation to cotton yarns and cotton cloth, and spun rayon yarns and rayon cloth. The cotton section of the industry, as distinct from rayon, is further defined as being concerned solely with yarn and fabrics containing 40 per cent. or more by weight of cotton. The existing constitution of the Board is laid down in Article 2 of the old Order. The Board consists of eleven members, four on the employers' side, representing spinners and doublers, weavers, finishers and converters, four on the employees' side, representing spinners and doublers, weavers and finishers, and three who are independent. So far as finance is concerned, the Board is financed by a levy on the industry, but at the present time, under the existing Order, that bears entirely on the spinners. In addition, all persons in the industry, who are required to register with the Cotton Board, are charged an annual fee of £1. The maximum amount which can be levied under they Order in any year is £250,000.
Then the existing functions are these—your Lordships will find them in the Second Schedule to the main Order. Part I is concerned with recruitment and labour utilisation, working conditions, advice to the Government, information and publicity services, and the collection of statistics. Those can be exercised in relation to the industry as a whole—which, of course, covers rayon as well as cotton. The functions in Part II which relate to scientific research, development in design, distribution, export promotion and promoting the use of cotton goods, can be exercised only in relation to the cotton industry. In the exercise of their functions, the Board have done—as I think anyone who knows Lancashire will agree—very valuable services in labour recruitment and re-deployment, and in maintaining a colour, design and style centre. It has also given great support to the Cotton Industry Research Association, which everyone in Lancashire knows so well—the Shirley Institute.
I come now to the recommendations for amending the Order. A great many of the organisations which were consulted certainly had recommendations to make for amendment of the Order. These have all been considered, and a number of them, the most important of which relate to the raising of the levy, have been

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embodied in the draft Order which is now before your Lordships. But the Board of Trade did not find it possible—or practicable, at any rate—to accept all the recommendations made to them. There has, however, been full discussion with the industry of all the points raised. The doublers and the waste spinners put in a strong plea for increased representation, but it was felt that that really could not be granted, because once you begin to interfere with the existing representation you are liable to upset the balance of the Board, and you might get it not only out of proportion but too large. This was carefully considered when the original Board was set up in 1948.
Then there was the matter of the position of the rayon industry in relation to the levy. It was represented that the functions of the Board, under Part I were equally available and of benefit to the rayon industry as well as to the cotton section of the industry, and it was suggested that the rayon industry should also be subject to the levy. But the greater part of the rayon section of the industry felt that they did not derive the same value from those functions as did the cotton section, and they objected, in principle, to a statutory payment. But they were not at all "dog in the manger" about this, and, while objecting to being subject to a compulsory levy, they immediately offered a substantial voluntary contribution—which offer was very reasonably considered. Lancashire folk, being good business people, do not reject a good voluntary offer, when it is made, and the cotton section were glad to take advantage of it. The amount of that contribution will be settled by agreement between the two organisations.
I think that I had now better come to the amendments. The title of the Council drops "1948". There was no great historic significance attaching, to "1948", as there might have been to, say, 1812, 1815 or 1945—with regard to the last year, I am, of course, referring to the end of the war and not to that disastrous occurrence the advent of the Labour Government. But "1948" figured in the title only because the previous Cotton Board was still in existence. So "1948" goes out of the title and the Board becomes "The cotton Board". Then as to the levy. I am clad to say that all sections have agreed that the levy should no longer fall
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on the spinners alone. I need not go into the rather technical reasons why, while there was control, the levy on the spinners could be passed on to all sections of the trade. Now we have returned to freer trade in cotton that is no longer possible, and it has been agreed that the levy shall fall upon all sections of the trade. When one looks at the Order and notes the way the levy is to be calculated, it does appear to be terribly complicated. It reminds me rather of the way in which, when I knew the mines pretty well, miners wages were calculated. That was the sort of formula which would appeal to higher mathematicians like the Paymaster General.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: He is here now.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: That is good. Now the noble Viscount will be happy—we can all be of one mind in the House. This extraordinarily complicated formula is one which has been devised by all sections of the industry. Therefore, it is not for a layman to criticise. I am assured that it will work all right. The collection of the levy will be made on a half-yearly basis from everyone except converters, from whom, for seasonal reasons, it is agreed that it is more convenient to collect the levy once a year. It is proposed to increase the total amount of the levy—that is, its ceiling—from £250,000 to £300,000 per annum. Costs have gone up in this business as in others, and also more money is required—and is certainly not grudged by the industry—for research. The Cotton Board's financial year runs from April 1 to March 31 of the following year. This Order does not come into operation until January 1 next, but provision is made for the collection as from January 1 to March 31, 1952, of a charge equivalent to a year's levy. That does not mean the industry has to pay a disproportionate amount in that year. Actually, because discussions and negotiations were going on, no levy has been collected at all during the current year. Therefore, all that that means is that the levy will be collected in a total sum in the last quarter.
Some definitions are given. The definition of "converting" has been changed. by agreement with the industry. There is only one other provision to which I need refer and that is the amendment to

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paragraph (4) of the Third Schedule, which allows for the payment of a pension to the Chairman of the Cotton Board, the amount of the pension to be approved by the President of the Board of Trade. I should like to make it clear that there is no question at all of a penny of charge falling on the public funds. This will come entirely out of the Cotton Board's own revenue. I think it is a great and well-deserved tribute to Sir Raymond Streat that it was the unanimous wish of employers and employed of all sections of the industry that this provision should be inserted, and I am sure your Lordships will gladly pass it. As briefly as I can, I have tried to explain this rather complex Order. I think it is splendid that it comes forward with such unanimous support, both from the whole of the cotton trade and from the rayon side as well. I am sure your Lordships will welcome the Order and will wish the Cotton Board well.
Moved, That the Cotton Industry Development Council (Amendment) Order, 1951, reported from the Special Orders Committee on Wednesday last, be approved.—(Viscount Swinton.)
3.12 p.m.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, I am glad the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, did not dismiss this Order "on the nod," because I think it is fitting that some tribute should be paid to the Cotton Board for the splendid work they have done. The Board is a counterpart of the development councils, and if we want an example of harmonious and constructive work for the good of an industry, we have only to look at the Cotton Board. It must have given the noble Viscount a great deal of satisfaction to stand at that Box and propose the adoption of this Order. Five times President of the Board of Trade, and now in the hierarchy of overlords, the noble Viscount once again comes to your Lordships' House as spokesman of the Board of Trade on a fitting subject. Noble Lords on this side do not propose to obstruct the passage of the Order in any way, but there are one or two questions I should like to ask the noble Viscount. The main object of the Order is to increase the levy from £250,000 to £300,000, and one of the main purposes of the increase, as the noble Viscount has said, is to pro-
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vide the Chairman of the Cotton Board with a pension.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: That will not take a big part of the levy. I think the largest part will go on research.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: No, but that is one of the main objects. Let me say straight away that I am in complete agreement with the development councils following industrial practice. I have always held the view that if we want first-class brains we have to pay first-class rates for them. If we are willing to pay only third-class rates. we shall get only third-class brains. That is equally true in regard to development councils, nationalised boards and private industry. I have no quarrel whatsoever with that provision. I do not want even to ask what the amount is. But there is one point that puzzles me. If the noble Viscount will turn to the new paragraph 4 of the Third Schedule he will see that:
"There shall be paid by the Board—
(a) to the independent members of the Board, or to any of them, such remuneration (whether by way of salaries or by way of fees) as may be determined by the Board of Trade, and on the retirement or death of the Chairman of the Board, such pension or gratuity to him or to others by reference to his service as may be so determined;"
That shows clearly that the responsibility for determining the amount of the pension and the terms—for example, whether it shall be contributory or not—falls upon the President of the Board of Trade. The President of the Board of Trade, like any other Minister, is responsible to Parliament for any ministerial action. I should like to ask the noble Viscount by what machinery Parliament, if it so desires, can have an overriding responsibility over the actions of the President of the Board of Trade. I am aware that no public funds are involved, but this is a statutory instrument and it places a responsibility on the President of the Board of Trade. If, in discharge of that responsibility, he is not going to be responsible to Parliament, then that is delegated legislation in its worst form. I hope the noble Viscount will be able to give us a satisfactory answer. I hope he will tell us whether it is by statutory instrument that can be prayed against, by Question, or by any other method, that Parliament can hold the President of the Board of Trade responsible for the proper

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discharge of his functions as set out in the Schedule. This is the first time that a pension is being paid to the chairman of a development council—the noble Viscount will correct me if I am wrong. It will not end there, and it is quite right that it should not end there. The chairmen of all the other development councils will want the same pension rights, either now or in the future. Your Lordships will recall that these unfortunate gentlemen have a very insecure position. In some cases their security of tenure is for only five years. How can we expect the best men in any industry to give their services to a development council, unless they are treated in some way comparable with the practice of the industry?
There is one other question I should like to ask the noble Viscount. I believe nothing is laid down in the original Act to determine how the Chairman of the Cotton Board shall be elected. I think I am right in saying that up to date the chairmen have been elected from the independent members, but I do not think there is anything in the Act to say that that must be so. Therefore it puts an added responsibility upon the President of the Board of Trade to see that these pensions are not paid in future in any manner other than a correct and proper one. Those are the only observations I have to make. Noble Lords on this side view with the greatest pleasure this amended Order. In the original Act it was laid down that three years had to elapse before such an Order could be brought forward. This is the first of such Orders. It comes with the good wishes and blessing of the industry, and I hope it will have the blessing and good wishes of Parliament for its future success.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords the answer to the first question is quite simple. It is true that the President of the Board of Trade has to approve the amount of pension. Obviously that can be challenged. It can be challenged by Question to the President of the Board of Trade in another place; and if honourable Members do not like what he has done, then, when the Board of Trade vote comes forward, they can move to reduce his salary; and when you move to reduce
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the salary of a Minister you can discuss anything for which he is responsible. So far as this House is concerned, the noble Lord can put a Question to the Board of Trade—
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: And have it answered by a Lord in Waiting.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: —and a suitable representative of the Department will answer it. As regards other development councils, we are not concerned with them. This Order relates only to the cotton industry. I think I am right in saying that no pension could be paid to the Chairman of any other development council unless there were an Order that such a pension should be paid, or giving permission for it to be paid, approved by an affirmative Resolution of Parliament. The Chairman must be one of the independent members.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, I can speak again only by leave of the House. I should like to ask this question. The noble Viscount says that we can put down a Question. But we can put down a Question in the other place or in your Lordships' House only when we know the pension has been paid. That we can find out only by a perusal of the yearly accounts. There is a statutory obligation for a development council to lay its accounts before Parliament. I should like to ask whether any machinery could be set up that would enable us to learn what the proposals are before they are determined.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: No, I think that is most unreasonable. After all, any Minister of the Crown is responsible for the administration and executive acts of his Department. He cannot come for prior approval for everything he does in the course of his day-to-day business. I do not know what the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, would say if the Foreign Office had to do that. The matter must be challenged afterwards if it is wrong. As regards finding out this information. the noble Lord can put a Question at any time, asking: "Is it proposed to give a pension, and has the pension been settled?"
On Question, Motion agreed to.

RESERVE AND AUXILIARY FORCES (PROTECTION OF FRIENDLY SOCIETY LIFE POLICIES) REGULATIONS, 1951
3.23 p.m.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, I will deal with this Order and the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces (Protection of Industrial Assurance, etc.: Policies) Regulations, 1951, together. They look most complicated, but when they are translated into English, they are really quite simple. Your Lordships will remember that in the Auxiliary Forces (Protection of Civil Interests) Act the House approved certain safeguards for holders of assurance policies while they were on active Service—I think that is the correct expression. But what the Act did not lay down was the procedure by which those safeguards should be assured. That has to be done by regulation. The sole object of these two rather complicated looking Orders is to give practical effect to the intention of the main Act. The first Order provides, for exampe, how relief should be applied for; the information which has to be given; how applicants are to be notified; how appeals are to be lodged with the Commissioner; and applications for relief where an applicant has not made his application in due time.
The second is similar and deals with the case of Friendly Society life policies. It is again entirely procedural and covers the method of applying for reinstatement of life policies; the method of notifying applicants of grant or refusal of reinstatement how they are to lodge an appeal with the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies—who, by another name, is the distinguished gentleman to whom I have already referred: the Commissioner—and how application is to be made to the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies if the application for reinstatement has not been lodged in due time. In all these cases there has been the fullest discussion with the interests concerned. In the case of the first Order, they include the Industrial Life Offices Association, the Prudential Assurance Company, the Cooperative Insurance Company and the Association of Collecting Friendly Societies. In the case of the second Order, that applies to all the Friendly Societies' interests concerned. As I say
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the regulations are purely procedural, to give effect to an Act which your Lordship have already approved. Therefore I beg to move that the House do approve the first of these two Orders.
Moved, That the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces (Protection of Friendly Society Life Policies) Regulations, 1951. reported from the Special Orders Committee on Wednesday last, be approved. —(Viscount Swinton.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

RESERVE AND AUXILIARY FORCES (PROTECTION OF IN DUSTRIAL ASSURANCE, ETC.: POLICIES) REGULATIONS, 1951
VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords, I beg to move the second of the Orders.
Moved, That the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces (Protection of Industrial Assurance, etc.: Policies) Regulations, 1951, reported from the Special Orders Committee on Wednesday last, be approved.—(Viscount Swinton.)
On Question Motion agreed to.

MINERAL DEVELOPMENT CHARGE SET-OFF REGULA TIONS, 1951
3.27 p.m.
LORD LLOYD LORD LLOYD rose to move, That the Mineral Development Charge Set-Off Regulations, 1951, reported from the Special Orders Committee on Wednesday last, be approved. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I hope that I need not detain your Lordships long in moving these Regulations. In point of fact they give effect to a promise which was made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the late Government as long ago as 1949. Therefore, I hope that, as between the Government and noble Lords opposite, this may be regarded as a non-controversial matter.
The Regulations have been the subject of prolonged discussions between the Central Land Board, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Minerals Industry, represented by the Federation of British Industries, the owners in England, represented by the Country Landowners' Association, and the owners in Scotland, represented by the Scottish Landowners'

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Federation. I should like, on behalf of my right honourable friend, to take this opportunity in your Lordships' House of thanking those bodies for their co-operation over no less than three years of negotiation. Without that co-operation, I do not think these Regulations would have been possible. There were certain provisions which the industry would have liked to see included in the Regulation, but which it has not been found possible to include. Otherwise, apart from these omissions, everything which is included in the Regulations under discussion this afternoon has been agreed by all parties.
The Regulations were made by the late Minister of Local Government and Planning and were laid before the last Parliament. While the Mineral Workings Bill was under consideration last summer the Minister issued draft Regulations in a White Paper which also explained their purpose. In all the circumstances, I feel that perhaps it is not necessary for me to explain the Regulations in any detail.
Under Section 29 of the Mineral Workings Act, 1951, as your Lordships are aware, all claims in respect of what have come to be known, in the curious language which we associate with town and country planning, as "near-ripe" minerals qualified for compensation at their development value out of the £300,000,000 set aside for this purpose under the 1947 Act. These Regulations, first of all, give a general definition of minerals which are to qualify as being near-ripe, and they provide that no development charge in these cases is to be set off against the payment in respect of these minerals out of the £300,000,000 provided under the 1947 Act. As your Lordships will see, there are inevitably a certain number of exceptions, both to the general definition of near-ripe minerals and as to the provisions regarding the setoff of the development charge. But the broad purpose of the Regulations is to relieve mineral undertakers and mineral owners, so far as possible, from the financial provisions of Parts VI and VII of the 1947 Act. I think there is no doubt that when these Regulations come into force they will greatly simplify the operation of that Act. For that reason, I hope your Lordships will be prepared to approve them this afternoon. I beg to move that these Regulations be approved.
Moved, That the Mineral Development Charge Set-Off Regulations, 1951, reported from the Special Orders Committee on Wednesday last, be approved.—(Lord Lloyd.)
3.31 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I am happy to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, on his first appearance at the Box. He has moved this Motion with great statesmanlike qualities. He has explained it with clarity, and I think that he will have a very happy experience during his term of office. So far as these Regulations are concerned, I can assure him that he will have no trouble from this side of the House, though I do not promise that he will always have an equally pleasant passage.
The noble Lord is right in saying that these Regulations have been the subject of a considerable measure of agreement—as have all matters under the Town and Country Planning Act—between the Ministry and the various undertakers. If there were any criticism of these Regulations, it might be that the mineral undertakers have been rather too generously treated. But they will be the last to complain of that, and I do not suppose that this House will wish to complain that anybody is being too generously treated. The process of negotiation has been long and difficult. The noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, said in moving the last Order, that it was complicated in form but simple in substance. I would say that the same applies to these Regulations—they are inevitably complex, but they are designed to meet a very simple set of circumstances which have been the subject of general agreement throughout. I hope that the House will approve these Regulations without delay.
3.34 p.m.
VISCOUNT PORTMAN: My Lords, I do not wish to obstruct the passage of these Regulations, so ably put forward by the noble Lord, the Lord in Waiting, but I should like to ask him one or two questions. I shall not press for an answer this afternoon, but I would ask for an assurance that he will endeavour to give the House the information at the earliest possible date. The first question which is worrying many of us on these Regulations—in fact, on the whole development charge question—is what is likely to be the sum required to pay off these mineral

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compensation claims. I have heard mentioned a sum in the region of £40,000,000 or £50,000,000. That is a very large slice off the total sum reserved by the last Government for compensation of all claims under the Town and Country Planning Act. I feel that it is not quite fair, in view of the fact that the moratorium has been allowed to run for three years, that we are still no nearer actuality of figures than a few suppositions.
The next point I wish to raise is how the mineral compensation claims will affect people concerned in the development of property under the Town and Country Planning Act. I can assure your Lordships that at the moment the feeling, both in town and country, is bad enough. There is a feeling—which I think most people share—that the Act is not working as it should, and that it is not being helped by the fact that the mineral compensation will have to be paid out of the £300,000,000 fund. When the Act was originally debated, the late Government were warned by the Conservative Party that minerals should not be mixed up with development of property. I have notes here to show that that was agreed to. I feel that an assurance from my noble friend this afternoon that the whole Act will be reviewed, and that The total global sum will be reconsidered, either with a view to increasing it or finding some other method of dealing with this problem, would be helpful to the people concerned in these matters.
3.37 p.m.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, I should like to take this opportunity of thanking the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, for his kind references to myself, and I should also like to try to help my noble friend Lord Portman, so far as I can. I sympathise with his anxiety, which is mainly due, I think, to the fear that the global sum of £300,000,000 will not be adequate to satisfy all the claims likely to be made upon it. That is an anxiety which has been expressed in your Lordships' House before to-day. But we cannot tell as yet how we stand on this question of the £300,000,000. We cannot even tell yet how much the mineral claims will amount to. After all, this is a long process. All these claims have to be valued and gone into carefully, and therefore it is quite impossible at this stage to say how much the mineral claims will absorb and whether it will be possible, out of the
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£300,000,000, to satisfy all the claims made upon it.
This I can say, however. I think I need only quote what was said by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government in another place yesterday, when he stated quite clearly that the Ministry has under review the whole working of the Town and Country Planning Act. He said (OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 494, Col. 2178):
"… my right honourable friend has under anxious and careful consideration the question of compensation under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947."
May I give the noble Viscount this further assurance? The fact that these Regulations are passed to-day will in no way compromise the Government's future action in regard to the Town and Country Planning Act. I hope that, with that assurance, the noble Viscount, Lord Portman, will be prepared to support these Regulations this afternoon.
VISCOUNT PORTMAN: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for the assurances he has given.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

MINERAL DEVELOPMENT CHARGE SET-OFF (SCOTLAND) REGULATIONS, 1951
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, these Regulations are on all fours with the Regulations which your Lordships have just been discussing, with the exception of a few minor matters and differences made necessary to adapt the Regulations to Scotland. I do not think I need say any more. I beg to move that these Regulations be approved.
Moved, That the Mineral Development Charge Set-Off (Scotland) Regulations, 1951, reported from the Special Orders Committee on Wednesday last, be approved.—(Lord Lloyd.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

JAPANESE TREATY OF PEACE BILL
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.
Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of November 29), Bill read 3ª, and passed.

HOME GUARD BILL
3.41 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Ismay.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
[The EARL OF DROGHEDA in the Chair]
Clause 1 [Establishment and status of Home Guard]:
(2) Members of the Home Guard shall be members of the armed forces of the Crown; and every member of the Home Guard shall when on duty, and during any period during which the platoon or other part of the Home Guard to which be belongs is mustered, be subject to military law—

(a) if serving on a commission in the Home Guard, as an officer; and

(b) otherwise (and notwithstanding that he holds any rank or commission in any other of His Majesty's forces), as a soldier:

Provided that this subsection shall not render a member of the Home Guard liable to proceedings for an offence under section forty-one of the Army Act (which provides for the punishment under military law of civil offences).
VISCOUNT JOWITT VISCOUNT JOWITT moved, in the proviso to subsection (1) to leave out all words after "Guard" and to insert:
"subject to military law except at a time when a proclamation ordering the army reserve to be called out on permanent service is in force or men of the Territorial Army are called cut for actual military service in defence of the United Kingdom against actual or apprehended attack."
The noble Viscount said: This Amendment is put down to raise a matter to which I drew attention yesterday. I think it is a matter of some importance. This is the first Committee stage we have had on this sort of Bill since we resumed our discussions in this Chamber, and I think it is important that we should all realise that there is no Party question involved. The whole House decided, without a Division, to give a Second Reading to this Bill, and we all wish it well. It is true that there was some little difference of opinion, in that some noble Lords felt that the timing was unfortunate. It was not simply a question of the "wise and foolish virgins," as the noble Marquess the Leader of the House suggested yesterday, but of whether or not
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it was wise to start this scheme now, in view of the fact that there is nothing like an adequate recruitage for the Civil Defence, and of the fact that it is impossible at the present time to provide any uniform or anything of that sort. There is also the obvious danger that people may become disillusioned and weary before the scheme gets into its stride. However, that matter has been decided, and my desire is only to make this Bill work. I repeat that there is no Party question in this. I hope that in discussions of this sort we shall not work too closely on Party lines. If this House is to do a useful job as a Council of State we shall have to avoid that, and I hope that I shall receive support from all quarters in moving this Amendment, which I believe it to be a sensible one.
The problem is this. We have a proviso at the bottom of page 1 of this Bill. The first question is what that proviso means. I do not assert what the law is: I have often made the most glaring mistakes in the law. But at any rate I think I am more likely to be right on a legal than on a non-legal question—though, of course, I might be wrong on both. I ask, then, what this proposal means, so that I may be told whether I am right or wrong. Section 41 of the Army Act deals with offences punishable by the civil law. It provides that such offences, notwithstanding that they are punishable by the ordinary law of the land, will also come under military law, and it provides a catalogue of what are described as "civil offences". Therefore my understanding of the clause is this. When I see the proviso which reads:
"Provided that this subsection shall not render a member of the Home Guard liable to proceedings for an offence under section forty-one of the Army Act (which provides for the punishment under military law of civil offences)"
I read it as meaning that the subsection shall not render a member of the Home Guard liable to proceedings under military law for any offence punishable by the ordinary law. I want to be informed whether that is right.
Subsection (2) says that every member of the Home Guard shall, when on duty, be subject to military law. This proviso cuts that down by saying that he is not to be subject to punishment under military law for offences which are punishable by the ordinary law of the land. That is a

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novel procedure. There has never been in our history any precedent for it. The Army Act has been most carefully worked out over perhaps the last hundred years. Amendment and re-amendment are all published together. There has been nothing like this before. It is a complete, absolute, and novel departure—and I believe it to be a had departure. We ought either to have the Army Act applying or not have it applying. I believe that the wisdom of the past has worked out the whole code for the Army Act, and I believe this present proposal to be bad. I am not concerned with trying to score a Party point; as I say, I want this Bill to work. I gave the illustration yesterday of a man striking his superior officer. Obviously the gravamen of that offence is that he is subject to military law. His blow, if he strikes his superior officer, may be trivial, or it may be a serious one. But it is a serious offence anyhow, because it is subversive of military discipline. Also, it is subject to the ordinary law of the land; the man could be brought up before the magistrates and punished for assault and battery.
I believe what I have said to be the meaning of this proviso, but I am asking for information. The Bill says, in effect, that, because that offence can be dealt with by the ordinary law of the land, therefore it cannot be dealt with by military law. I see that the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, who knows a great deal about this matter, shakes his head. I have a great regard for the noble Viscount's experience in practice, but on the legal side, on the construction of the words, I have not quite such a regard for him. I believe that the meaning I have suggested is the right meaning, and I hope that I shall be told whether or not it is. I believe that, as the Bill is now drafted, the words mean that if a soldier strikes his superior officer, then, because the offence can be dealt with by the magistrates, therefore it cannot be dealt with by military law. Frankly, that seems to me a wrong and undesirable state of affairs. If I am wrong, many noble Lords with experience—some with vast experience—of this matter from the point of view of military law will be able to put me right.
'The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, said yesterday that he thought the Home Guard liked being under military law in the last war. He may be right—he is
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much more likely to know that than I am—but be it observed that, if they liked being under military law, then they will not have what they like now, because they are under a strangely truncated and different type of military law altogether. The obscurity to which this provision will give rise is very great. Take the case of a man striking his superior officer. Suppose that it is a question of insulting words. Suppose that an irate private gets absolutely fed up with what he thinks is the incompetence of his superior officer, and that he uses harsh words towards him—I am not going to suggest what the harsh words might be. Suppose, for example, that he said: "You silly goose!" or something of that sort. Would he be dealt with under military law? Your Lordships see the uncertainty which is introduced into this matter. To use insulting words and behaviour likely to cause a breach of the peace is an offence with which the magistrates could deal, and the question of whether the offence was liable to be dealt with at military law would depend upon whether or not the precise words which were used, and the circumstances in which they were used, were such as would be likely to cause a breach of the peace. Because, if they were, it could be dealt with under the civil law, and therefore, thanks to the proviso, such an offence could not be dealt with under military law.
I am quite certain, I am afraid, that Party discipline will prevail here and that my Amendment will be turned down. I am equally relatively certain that, if those of your Lordships who have had military experience were completely free from Party discipline, you would agree with me that men should either be under military law or not under military law, and that being half under military law and half not under military law is a thoroughly bad thing. There is absolutely no precedent whatever for this. It is true that, in the case of Territorials, they are subject to military law as soldiers when they are on duty, and, as I said yesterday (everybody knows this; there will be no controversy about it), that situation gives rise to extremely difficult questions, because the problem of when a man's duty begins and when his duty ends is difficult to determine. However I pass that by. I stress to your Lordships seriously, because I want to make this Bill act, that there has never been

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a case yet of anything like this. The whole point of Section 41 of the Army Act is to provide that, notwithstanding that certain acts are an offence under the ordinary law of the land, yet they may be dealt with by military law. Striking an officer is the best illustration: that offence can be dealt with under military law. To say that it is an offence under civil law, and that therefore it should not be an offence under military law, is something which has not been said before, and I do not think that it makes good sense.
For that reason, I should very much prefer the Amendment which I am suggesting. I am proposing that in the early stages, dealing merely with training and the like—and bear in mind that women as well as men will now have to be dealt with—these people should not be subjected to military law at all. When the situation becomes critical, however—and I give the Government of the day complete authority to say when it does become critical—then these people should be made subject to military law altogether. If the situation becomes critical, I should make them turn up, if they are called, unless they have a valid reason, and see that they behave like a properly organised military force, with every aspect of military law attaching to them. I think that would be found a far better arrangement than what is now proposed. At present, the Government are saying: "When you are on duty you shall be subject to part of the military law, and only part of the military law"—a situation for which there is absolutely no precedent. Perhaps lawyers are too much inclined to hang on to precedents, but I have a good many years' experience and have come to the conclusion that our ancestors were pretty wise people. And these things have grown up slowly. I think that to try this experiment and have a now truncated form of military law is very rash indeed.
With the sole desire to try to make this Bill work happily and properly, I would address to your Lordships this simple principle: that if these people are to be subject to military law, let them be subject to military law, and not just to a bit of military law. Whatever else you do, let them not be put into the very difficult position of being subject to military law only where the offence is not susceptible of being dealt with under the ordinary
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civil law. I believe that principle to be bad, and I ask your Lordships to accept this Amendment, which is a serious Amendment, in an endeavour to put right what I believe to be an error. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 20, leave out from ("Guard") to end of line 22 and insert ("subject to military law except at a time when a proclamation ordering the army reserve to be called out on permanent service is in force or men of the Territorial Army are called out for actual military service in defence of the United Kingdom against actual or apprehended attack.").—(Viscount Jowitt.)
3.57 p.m.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (LORD ISMAY): I am conscious that I am giving away a good deal of weight in trying to reply to the noble and learned Viscount. No one for a moment would suspect that any Party motive was behind this Amendment. The noble and learned Viscount has been good enough to speak to us about it in private, and it is clear that this is a genuine, earnest Amendment to try to help this Bill along. The objects of the noble and learned Viscount's Amendment, as I see them, are twofold. The first is to provide that the Home Guard shall not be subject to military law while on duty unless and until an emergency arises in which the Army Reserve or the Territorial Army are called up; and, secondly, to provide that, when such an emergency arises, the Home Guard shall be subject to military law in exactly the same way as any other members of the military forces, including liability to be proceeded against under Section 41 for a civil offence.
As regards the first point, those of my friends with whom I have consulted genuinely feel that it would be anomalous if the Home Guard, who are members of the Armed Forces, were not subject to military law as soldiers when on duty. I think there is a great deal of substance in what my noble and gallant friend Lord Bridgeman said yesterday. From my knowledge of soldiering, I should back him up every time when he says that the Home Guard themselves would not wish for anything else. They would regard exemption from military law as relegating them to an inferior status.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: But my grievance is that you are not making them subject to military law.
LORD ISMAY: Surely we are.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: No; the proviso prevents it.
LORD ISMAY: If the noble and learned Viscount will be patient with me, I am coming to that. I am dealing with the first point. They will be subject to military law on duty.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: Except for the proviso.
LORD ISMAY: I am coming to that. May I repeat that we feel strongly that the Home Guard themselves would resent not being subject to military law when they are on duty, because that would imply that they were relegated to an inferior status. Let me turn to the proviso to which the noble and learned Viscount objects. I may mention that this proviso was introduced in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for War, to reassure honourable Members on both sides of the House concerning doubts expressed about the liability of the Home Guard to military law. The object of the proviso is to ensure that no member of that force should be tried under military law for an offence which could conceivably come within the normal civil code. That Amendment was welcomed by the Opposition in another place; they said that it was clearly a very proper one. In practice, it is most unlikely that a Home Guard member would ever be tried by court-martial for a civil offence. I believe that there was only one such case in the whole of the last war. I would point out, too, that even in the case of Regular troops in this country, who are subject to military law, in the majority of cases the trial of civil offences is left to a civil court. Even if the proviso were omitted, it is most unlikely that it would make any real difference in practice, but the assurance would be taken out of the Bill. Therefore, with the deepest respect, and with gratitude to the noble and learned Viscount for the patience and eloquence with which he has put forward this Amendment, I very much regret that we are unable to accept it.
LORD WINSTER: I would certainly agree with the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Jowitt, that possibly the timing of this Bill is not well chosen, but I must confess that I feel some misgivings
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or doubts about the Amendment which he has proposed. First of all, may I say that I entirely agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman in what he said yesterday? I am quite sure that the Home Guard wish to be treated very seriously as men with military obligations; and in no other way. I am sure they do not want to be considered as a number of rather elderly and, possibly, senile gentlemen who, for fear of their arthritis, shelter in a public-house from a shower of rain and play darts. But with regard to the Amendment and the question which has been raised concerning the words "when on duty," I feel perfectly sure that the officers of the Home Guard, exercising the usual common sense which is found amongst officers of all Services, will be able to decide very easily and readily whether an offence has been committed when on duty or when not on duty.
In regard to the point of whether they are subject to military law or to civil law, surely the position is this: that if a man commits an offence which is clearly an offence under military law but not under civil law, then, of course, he is dealt with according to military law; but if he commits an offence which, as I understand it, is subject both to military law and to civil law, then, as it seems to me, we have here a wise concession to the fact that members of the Home Guard are mainly and essentially civilians, that the man can, if the offence is liable to civil law, be tried under civil law. I am not quite clear from what the noble Lord, Lord Ismay, said, whether a man has any option in this matter: whether it is the fact, if he is subject both to military and to civil law, that automatically he is handed over to the civil law, or whether he has the option of deciding whether he will be tried under military law or civil law. I think that is a point of some importance.
Otherwise, looking at the following Amendment, which stands in the name of Lord Ismay, providing that the Home Guard will be called up only when there is a state of emergency, it seems to me that the provisions of the Bill as it stands are sound. The members of the Home Guard, as they would wish, would in a state of emergency be treated as soldiers and would be subject to military law, although in an awkward or an obstinate case, if they were subject to both civil

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and military law, they would have the option of saying whether they would be tried by the civil or the military law. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Ismay, will be kind enough to clear up that point. In any case, I wish to say again that I wholeheartedly agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, that these men, who I am sure would welcome an expression of opinion from this House, do not want to be treated as a sort of "Fred Karno's army," as amateur soldiers or anything of that sort. They want to be treated as men who, recognising the emergency with which we stand confronted, desire to put their services at the disposal of their country, and to be subject to whatever particular treatment or, it may be said, disabilities that service exposes them.
4.6 p.m.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: Perhaps I can be of some help if I follow the noble Lord, Lord Winster, in what he has just said over the question of Section 41 of the Army Act. I want to approach this matter in the same spirit as the noble and learned Viscount when he moved his Amendment—that is to say, not from the point of view of my Party loyalty, although that is considerable, but from the point of view of my experience in these matters in the last war. Leaving aside for the moment whether the clause is properly drafted, which I would not presume to discuss except on advice, I think the intention of this proviso was perfectly clear from what the Secretary of State said in another place. There he wanted to make it quite plain that if a man could be charged under the Army Act only under Section 41 (that is to say, for a civil offence) he was not to be charged at all but was to be brought before the civil court. What was not the intention was that, if a charge could be brought either under Section 41 or under one of the other sections, it should automatically be barred under this Bill because there was a choice. Let me put it round the other way. Suppose, as the noble and learned Viscount said, that a Home Guard struck another Home Guard, and suppose that there was a choice between charging him under Section 41 for assault or charging him under Section 8, or whatever section it may be, for striking a superior. The Bill, as it is drafted now, would not, I am advised,
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prevent the man from being charged under Section 8.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: This is of fundamental importance. I ask to be corrected if I am wrong in the law, but as I understand it—let me make it quite plain—if that man strikes his superior officer he can be dealt with either under the Army Act, Section 8 or Section 41, or under the civil law, because it is assault and battery for which he would appear before the magistrates. If I read this proviso aright, it says that that case must be dealt with under the civil law; it cannot be dealt with under the Army Act. Wherever you can deal with it under the civil law then you are precluded from dealing with it under the Army Act. It is on that basis that I am speaking. Am I wrong?
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: Speaking, as I say, on advice, and not attempting to give my own opinion on this matter, I understand that that is not the case. I am advised that if a man is liable to be charged for an offence under one of the military sections or under Section 41, then he can be proceeded against under the military section. The fact that he can be proceeded against equally well under civil law would not make it impossible for the man to be charged under the Army Act.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: I profoundly disagree with that. Ask Lord Reading. He knows all about that.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: I am only saying what, on advice, I believe to be the situation. It is not for me to take the matter any further. But it is my belief that that was the intention of the clause as drafted. One should not be allowed to charge any Home Guard with an offence under military law, when what the Home Guard did constituted a civil offence and had nothing to do with his duty as a Home Guard. It should be entirely a matter for a civil court. It was in order to emphasise that the Army Act was to be used only for purely military offences that my right honourable friend undertook to move his Amendment in the other place. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, asked who could choose between one type of charge or another. The answer is—so I have understood from past experience—that the accused cannot choose. The man who decides is

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the man who places the accused under arrest. If the man is placed under arrest by his commanding officer, the charge has to be preferred under some section of the Army Act if he is to be tried under the Army Act at all.
If I may, I would leave that matter now and return to the main point, because the noble and learned Viscount really raised two points. One was whether the Bill is rightly drafted; and I have been attempting to answer that question. His other point was whether it is policy to do this at all. As to that, I do not think I need repeat what I said yesterday. I believe it is militarily necessary to have this power, because of duties, apart from training, which might have to be performed for some special reason. In any case the Bill, as drafted, is drafted rightly; it allows that to take place and power to make a charge is not vitiated by Section 41.
LORD SALTOUN: If a few words may be addressed to your Lordships from almost the bottom of the scale in the Home Guard, I should like to say to the noble and learned Viscount that I do not think his Amendment as it stands will do. We want something of this nature—and we are all agreed in the Home Guard on this—to protect us from the very occasional and rare acts of selfishness on the part of a few individuals which may be very persistent, although in my experience they are very rare, and which make all the rest of us uncomfortable and prevent us from carrying out our duties properly. It is the rank and file who suffer most from these things, and we need some means to deal with offenders.
4.14 p.m.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): Perhaps I may be allowed to say a few words upon this matter. It is undoubtedly a very difficult and technical question, and we ought to approach it with some trepidation. It is, equally undoubtedly, a valid point which has been raised by the noble and learned Viscount, and the Government ought to try, if we cannot accept the Amendment, to explain our reasons as clearly as possiblie. I would agree with what he has said to the effect that on questions of this kind we do not want to take a Party view. Quite apart from our being a Council of State, it would
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be utterly contrary to the traditions of this House as I have always understood them. I told the noble and learned Viscount yesterday that we would examine objectively the case which he made. We have done so. I have consulted expert opinion, so far as I could, in conjunction with my noble friend Lord Ismay, arid in the light of that I regret very much to say that, with every wish to meet the noble and learned Viscount if possible, we cannot see our way to accept this Amendment. All our advice is that the obscurities which the noble and learned Viscount finds in the present wording of the Bill are really illusory. In fact, in the practical interpretation of the law—which is what really matters—we are advised that doubtful cases such as he envisages would not arise. That is the view which, I may say in his absence, is shared by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, who would have been glad to express his views here to-day; but unfortunately, as noble Lords know, he is prevented from attending by a very important official engagement. That is the view, too, which has been supported by the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgman, and the noble Lord, Lord Winster.
The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Jowitt, quoted a particular case. It involves a question of legal interpretation, and I feel great trepidation in attempting to deal with it. He said: "What would be the position of a man who struck his superior officer? That might be said to be a military offence and it might equally be said to be a civil offence. Would it, under the proviso, be necessary that that offence should be tried by a civil court?" That, as I understood it, was the case which the noble arid learned Viscount made. With all deference, the position as I see it in that case is this: it would depend entirely on the circumstances in which the offence was committed. If the man struck his superior officer during his duty, he would come under Section 8 of the Army Act, which reads as follows:
"(1) every person subject to military law who commits any of the following offences; that is to say,
"Strikes or uses or offers any violence to his superior officer, being in the execution of his office,.."
In that case he would presumably be court-martialled. If, on the other hand, the parade being over, the pair had adjourned to a neighbouring public house—

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that was the case mentioned by the noble and learned Viscount—and in the course of a conversation which began on a friendly note but later ceased to be friendly, the man struck his fellow member of the Home Guard—a man who had been acting as his superior officer—they would not be on duty. In those circumstances, the man who struck the blow would clearly come under the civil law. The noble and learned Viscount may say that there might be border-line cases.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: That is not my point at all. I am sorry that I have failed to make myself clear. To illustrate my point, I cited the example of a man striking his superior officer. You might proceed under Section 8 or under Section 41, in either case by court-martial, if the man is subject to the Army Act and Army discipline. The whole question here is a point on the proviso. My contention is—and I am astounded to hear that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor does not agree—that, by reason of this proviso, you are asserting that wherever the case is one which can be dealt with under the civil law, it cannot be dealt with under any section of the Army Act—under Section 8 or Section 41 or any other section.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My answer to that would be—rightly or wrongly—that to strike a superior officer in the execution of his duty is a completely different offence from striking a superior officer in a public house. One act is subversive of discipline and the other is not.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: Both could be dealt with civilly.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The fact remains that they are not the same offence. One is what I would call an entirely military offence. It is not a civil offence to strike a superior officer in the execution of his duty; it is much more serious. In that case, undoubtedly, I should think a man would be court-martialled. In the other case, he would be subject to the civil law. That is the interpretation which I put on the case which the noble and learned Viscount cited. I put that in support of the Government's view rather than of my view alone. There is not the obscurity which the noble and learned Viscount
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thinks there is in the position created by the present Bill, which is, after all, very much the same position as existed in the last war. I would remind the noble and learned Viscount that out of all the hundreds and thousands of men who served in the Home Guard during the last war—in fact, I believe the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, spoke of millions—only seventy cases were tried by court-martial for various offences, and out of those cases only in one single case was a man convicted under Section 41. The conclusion one must draw is that in practice it is perfectly simple to differentiate between military and civil offences; and though, from a purely legal—I prefer not to say legalistic—point of view, there may appear to be force behind the noble and learned Viscount's contention, in practice the situation will not arise. If we insert the noble Viscount's Amendment, we shall be altering completely the concession which was given by the Government in another place on the earnest request of Members in all parts of the House, who are perfectly satisfied—I would remind the noble Viscount—with the concession which has been made. We do not feel justified in doing what he suggests, and have no option but to resist the noble Viscount's Amendment. I can assure him that I say that, not from any Party point of view, but on careful weighing of the merits of the case.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: I shall not trouble to divide the House on this matter, but I am bound to say that I remain completely dissatisfied. I think the answers of both noble Lords have shown that they really do not understand the point I am raising. I am going to put it once again that the blood is on your own heads. These cases do arise. That they arise infrequently, I agree; and that is because we are dealing here with a very well-behaved set of men. But if such a case did arise, this is what would happen. I take the illustration with which we are all familiar. If a man were to strike his superior officer, as things are at present he could be proceeded against in three ways: first, under military law, under Section 8 of the Army Act secondly, under military law under Section 41 of the Army Act; and thirdly, under civil law, he could be had up before the magistrates and tried for assault and battery. That would be a stupid thing to do, of course, because the

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whole gravamen of the offence is that he is a soldier and the other man is his superior officer, and the sensible thing to do would be to try him under one or other section of the Army Act. I have the greatest respect for the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, and I have the most profound regard for his opinion, and if he were here I am sure he would say that that statement is right. Anybody who says to the contrary, I think, would be quite unable to pass his first Bar examination. I believe that to be an elementary fact.
I would ask your Lordships to look at this proviso once again with me. We see in subsection (2) that
"every member of the Home Guard shall when on duty"—
I am not drawing limits to duty. Let us assume that can be clearly assessed—
"… be subject to military law"—
Then there is the proviso—which must mean the cutting down of the generality of the previous statement—
"that this subsection shall not render a member of the Home Guard liable to proceedings for an offence under section forty-one of the Army Act. …"
What are the offences under Section 41 of the Army Act? They are any offence which is suitable for trial by ordinary civil law. Therefore, I may substitute for any reference to Section 41 of the Army Act in the proviso these words: "any offence punishable by the ordinary law." Let me now read the proviso as it would then appear—and I think every step in my argument is quite clear. Every member shall be subject to military law
"provided that this subsection shall not render a member of the Home Guard liable to proceedings"—
that is, of course, proceedings under military law—
"for any offence punishable by the ordinary law."
I absolutely fail to understand which of the limbs of that argument is controverted. I assert, therefore, that if a man strikes his superior officer, in that that is something which can be dealt with by the ordinary law of the land he is not liable to proceedings under the Army Act under Section 8 or any other section.
I have taken only one illustration, but there are hundreds of others one could take. I very much wish the noble and
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learned Lord the Lord Chancellor had been here to tell me why I am wrong. if I am wrong. When I saw this point, I took the trouble to see the noble Marquess the Leader of the House and talk to him about it, and I should go away at least happier if I had some sort of conception in my mind of what the answer is—because I have not the least conception of what the answer is supposed to be. But I hope the answer is all right, and that your Lordships are doing the right thing. It is a little unlucky that I cannot be told in language which is plain to my mind what the answer is, but if your Lordships want this strange provision, then so far as I am concerned I shall withdraw my Amendment. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I only wish, if I may, to correct a misstatement in my remarks. I said that there were 70 cases in the whole of the Home Guard during the course of the last war. That figure refers to 1943 and 1944, and the total figure was 200. But I understand that the figure of one for those who fell within the ambit of Section 41 still remains.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: I very much doubt that figure. For a time I was a Law Officer, and I had something to do with these matters. They were an extra-ordinarily well-behaved set of men and gave very little trouble, but I do not for a moment think there was only one case which was susceptible of being dealt with by the civil law. I should think that a large number of the 200 were cases which could have been brought under the ordinary law of the land. But the point is not of the greatest importance, just because we are dealing with such a well-behaved set of men.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 1 agreed to.
4.29 p.m.
LORD ISMAY LORD ISMAY moved, after Clause 1 to insert the following new clause:
Time for mustering Home Guard.
"2. An order for the mustering of the Home Guard or any part thereof shall not be given except at a time when a proclamation ordering the army reserve to be called out on permanent service is in force or men of the Territorial Army are called out for actual military service in defence of the United Kingdom against actual or apprehended attack."
The noble Lord said: The object of this new clause is to give effect to an undertaking given by my noble friend the Under-Secretary of State for War in another place to meet an Amendment put down by the former Minister of Defence, Mr. Shinwell. The Amendment makes clear in what circumstances mustering can be ordered. I beg to move.
VISCOUNT JOWITT: We have no objection to this Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 36, at end insert the said new clause.—(Lord Ismay.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Clause 3 [Short title, interpretation and commencement]:
LORD ISMAY: I beg to move the next Amendment standing in my name on the Marshalled List, which is purely a drafting Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 9, after ("In") insert ("section one of").—(Lord Ismay.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD ISMAY: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 11, after ("and") insert ("in this Act").—(Lord Ismay.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 3, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule agreed to.
House resumed.
Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of November 29), the Amendments reported; Bill read 3ª, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
House adjourned at twenty-eight minutes before five o'clock.