Lords Sitting of 12 April 1951

Preamble
The House met at four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers

  PETROL-DRIVEN AGRICULTURAL MACHINES (GRANTS) REVOCATION SCHEME, 1951
  4.5 p.m.
  THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL): My Lords, in moving the approval of this Order, I feel that I ought to apologise to the House for the fact that less time than usual has been given for its consideration. The reason for this somewhat hasty procedure is this. I understand that unless this Order is approved by Parliament by Tuesday next, April 17, the existing petrol scheme will continue and not lapse, which would involve the expenditure of public money and a great deal of administrative work. The Order was taken on Monday last in another place; it was considered and approved yesterday by the Special Orders Committee of your Lordships' House; and, as your Lordships do not meet tomorrow or on Monday of next week, this was the only opportunity for submitting it to the House for approval. I apologise for this haste, and I beg to move.
  Moved, That the Petrol-driven Agricultural Machines (Grants) Revocation Scheme, 1951, reported from the Special Orders Committee yesterday be approved.—(The Earl of Listowel.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONWEALTH FORCES IN KOREA
  4.7 p.m.
  LORD MANCROFT LORD MANCROFT rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether consideration has yet been given to the amalgamation of the British Commonwealth Forces in Korea into a Commonwealth Division under its own commander. The noble Lord said: My Lords, it may be for the convenience of your Lordships if I recall briefly how our present forces in Korea
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  are organised. The first British formation to go to Korea was the 27th Infantry Brigade, which came from Hong Kong and which reached Korea towards the end of August. That brigade consisted of a brigade headquarters and two battalions—namely, the 1st Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the 1st Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment. They were joined later by an Australian infantry battalion and one field regiment of the Royal New Zealand Artillery. Those two infantry battalions were under-equipped, lacking in transport, and forced to rely largely upon the Americans for their supplies. They nevertheless gave a magnificent account of themselves, and I think it is no exaggeration to say that the reputation and good name of the British Army have never been in safer hands than in those of the Middlesex and Argylls in Korea. It is perhaps some measure of the success of that brigade's activities that their commander, Brigadier Coad, has now been promoted to the rank of Major-General, and has been given command of the 2nd Infantry Division in Germany. That brigade is now about to be relieved and the headquarters and the two British battalions are to be replaced by the 28th Infantry Brigade, consisting of the King's Shropshire Light Infantry and the King's Own Scottish Borderers.
  The next formation to arrive was the 29th Infantry Brigade Group from the United Kingdom. That was a complete formation of all arms, consisting of the tanks of the 8th Hussars, three infantry battalions—the Gloucesters, the Royal Ulster Rifles and the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers—and the 47th Field Regiment. The third formation we received news of in The Times newspaper this morning, which stated that advanced elements of the 25th Canadian infantry brigade are now arriving in Korea. That brigade consists of the Princess Pat's, the Royal 22nd Canadian Infantry and the Royal Canadian Dragoons, but no artillery. It is perhaps worth noting that this brigade, unlike the rest of the Canadian Army, is organised on the British and not the American pattern. In addition to these formations there are the 41st Royal Marine Commando and various corps of line of communications troops, amounting altogether, on paper at least, to about 20,000 men, which is a fairly formidable force. It is not, of course

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  to be compared with the overwhelmingly larger forces of the Americans in Korea, the extent of that superiority in numbers being borne out, I think, by the fact that until the beginning of last week the Americans had sustained no fewer than 57,000 casualties in Korea.
  In raising this matter I would say firmly that I imply no criticism whatever of American generalship in Korea. The reports reaching us from our own troops speak of nothing but the kindness and consideration which British troops have received at American hands in Korea— the relations have been of the best. The two reasons why I suggest that it is time for these British and Commonwealth forces to be amalgamated into a division, under a British or Commonwealth general, are as follows. The first is purely military. When General Montgomery (as he then was) first arrived in the Western Desert to take over command of the Eighth Army, he found that Army largely made up of bits and pieces with few proper formations: there were few divisions, but plenty of infantry brigades, Brigade groups, armoured brigades, even battalion groups, and several ad hoc formations. The Army was at that time going through a particularly bad patch of the prevalent Army disease of "ad hoc-ery." The first thing which General Montgomery did was to reorganise the whole of the Eighth Army back on to its proper divisional basis, because a division is the proper formation with which an army should fight. It is the smallest force of all arms which can be employed to derive the best advantage, tactically and administratively, from the troops which it contains. It is extremely extravagant for an army to operate in brigades and brigade groups.
  The second reason is psychological. In my view we have not been very clever psychologically with our troops in Korea. I feel that, psychologically, it might have been wise to consider well before now, for instance, the issue of a Korean campaign medal to all the troops fighting in Korea. A great many people outside Great Britain do not know that there are any British or Commonwealth troops in Korea; a great many people in America do not know—and, after reading the tone of some of the American papers this morning, I think it may be that a lot of people in America do not want to
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  know. I feel that from the point of view of morale, both of the troops and of this country, it would be a great advantage for these formations in Korea to be amalgamated into one division. A division can speak much more strongly for our national prestige than can odds and ends, brigades or smaller units. Furthermore, when dealing with the Americans there is a great advantage in the senior commander being a General and not merely a Brigadier. That, I think, is a point which the Americans themselves fully appreciate. It is perfectly clear that the troops in Korea want this amalgamation; and, what is more, the Americans want it.
  May I conclude by saying this? I am given to understand that His Majesty's Government would have preferred this matter to be postponed. I should be very unhappy if the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, thought that I was guilty of any discourtesy to him, and I have already apologised for the fact that we have been unable to postpone this Question. I feel especially sorry for him, because it was no responsibility of his, and in this in-stance he merely speaks on behalf of the War Office. I would, with great respect, point out that this matter has been on the Order Paper since the Easter Recess, and it can hardly have taken the War Office by surprise. It has been on the cards for some considerable time longer, because some weeks ago, in an interview given to the Press, Sir Richard Gale, the Director-General of Military Training, expressed a view on the same lines as that which I have ventured to offer to your Lordships this afternoon. I do not think that the War Office, if they have thought about this matter at all in the last few weeks and months, can have disguised from themselves the fact that somebody was bound to ask this question in due course. I appreciate, however, that the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, may not be able to give us a very lengthy or full reply this afternoon. Speaking for myself, I shall be content with a perfectly short answer—an answer of one word—merely the name of the general officer who is to command the division. That would suffice, and I hope that that is what the noble Lord will be able to give us.
  4.15 p.m.
  VISCOUNT MERSEY: My Lords, I should like to intervene for a moment, because I believe that I am probably the

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  only member of your Lordships' House who has ridden right through Korea. I should preface my remarks by saying that I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, in being sorry for Lord Pakenham. I am never sorry for Lord Pakenham, because I know that he is always completely competent to answer any Question which is put to him.
  It is many years since I rode through Korea, right across from Vladivostok in the North East. I still remember it—a nightmare of cold, discomfort and penury. The first Korean word I ever learnt was "Opuso," which means "There is not"—and there never was. Korea is extremely hilly country, very much cut up, and I should have thought, speaking as a humble soldier, that it was ideal for ambushes. There are no communications, and transport is entirely by horse or some sort of pony. The Korean horse is not a horse as we know it; it is a sort of equine devil. It spends its time biting other horses, the hand which feeds it or the leg which endeavours to mount it. At night these animals have to be slung up in the stables by a girth under the belly, and they spend the night squealing and savaging their companions. They are very difficult animals with which to deal. If we have to depend upon them for transport it will not help us much to rely upon large formations, and I should hesitate greatly before trusting them to do what is desired. That, how-ever, is a matter which seems to depend upon the commander on the spot. We have to remember that nowadays we have entirely dispensed with the two oldest elements of war, the horse and the sword. They no longer exist. We have instead the tank and the 'plane. Whether they are better it is not for us to say; the commanders on the spot have to say that. I shall be most interested to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, has to say.
  4.18 p.m.
  THE MINISTER OF CIVIL AVIATION (LORD PAKENHAM): My Lords, I am sure that your Lordships are glad that the noble Viscount, Lord Mersey, has intervened and followed the very courteous remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft. The noble Lord has
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  said that he would be content with a single word of reply, if it were a suitable word. In reply to his question as to whether an answer is available to-day, I can only offer a single word: Opuso—"there is not"—which I believe is the correct idiom in this discussion. I am in a difficulty, and whether anybody wishes to be sorry for me or not is something which he must decide for himself. I hold out the hope to the noble Lord that a definitive answer on this question will be available very soon. For various reasons (which I fully appreciate and about which I do not at all complain) he found himself compelled to insist upon a discussion this afternoon.
  I am afraid that I am not to-day in a position to make a statement on Government policy on this matter. I hesitate to say "the question is under consideration," because that introduces an element of farce into a serious discussion. But in fact it is under very active examination at the present time, and the deliberations are at an advanced stage. I hope that it will be possible to announce the outcome very soon, and I hope that when the outcome is announced the noble Lord wall forgive me for being so brief this afternoon. Unless the noble Lord and the House wish, I will not canvass the pros and cons of this question; nor (again, if the House and the noble Lord permit me) will I join issue with him on all his statements, including the alleged deficiency of psychological insight. I will close by simply repeating that I hope to make an announcement very soon, and that I entirely join with the noble Lord—and I am sure I speak on behalf of the whole House—in paying a tribute to the work and gallantry of our troops in Korea.
  4.21 p.m.
  LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, the noble Lord has given a very sympathetic answer. We hope that it means "Yes," and that the necessary administrative formalities are being completed. Does the noble Lord think that if the Question is put down in three or four weeks' time he will then be able to give a definite reply? I am sure we all agree that this is not a matter for this country only: it is a matter in which the Dominions must be consulted and give their agreement. In fact, it would not be a British decision but a British Commonwealth decision, in which we

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  should be the leaders and initiators. I imagine, from the tone and tenor of Lord Pakenham's remarks, that the noble Lord who put this Question must feel very hopeful that the answer will be a favourable one. Knowing how Governments work, one feels that a Minister who goes as far as the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, has gone to-day may well be able to give a favourable answer in, perhaps, two or three weeks' time.
  LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords—if I have the leave of the House to say one more word—I should not like to tie myself to a time limit; but I should be unpleasantly surprised if I were not able to give an answer within the kind of period which the noble Lord has in mind.

  DEVELOPMENT CHARGES
  4.23 p.m.
  LORD MESTON LORD MESTON rose to ask His Majesty's Government what is the practice and policy of the Central Land Board in determining the amount of a development charge where planning permission is given for only a limited period. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to ask His Majesty's Government the Question standing in my name. The point is a small one, but I hope that it will not be thought entirely unimportant. It sometimes happens" that planning permission is given for only a limited period of time—it may be, for example, a period of five years. In those circumstances, it would be interesting to know, in cases where development charge is leviable, upon what basis the Central Land Board assess the development charge. I have in mind a specific case. I am afraid I have been remiss in not giving the Government details of what I am actually asking, but I believe that such a thing has happened before, and it is likely to happen again. A man is desirous of erecting a factory in Brighton, and he has obtained limited planning permission for a period of five years. Notwithstanding his protest, the district valuer, supported by the Central Land Board, has insisted on assessing the development charge on the basis that the factory has a physical life period of fifty years. That strikes me as being unfair, and that, among other considerations, has prompted me to ask this Question.
  4.24 p.m.
  THE PAYMASTER-GENERAL (LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR): My Lords, the Central Land Board, in accordance with the requirements of the Act, normally determine the development charge as the difference between the value of the land with the limited planning permission and its value without that permission. This produces a low charge in respect of the limited period. But if permission is granted for a further period a higher charge will be payable. This may cause hardship. The Board, therefore, offer developers the choice of an alternative assessment under which the charge is calculated on the rent that would be payable for the land by anyone contemplating erecting the building thereon. This method produces the same charge for the initial permission as for any further permission of the same duration, and many developers prefer it.
  With regard to the specific case referred to by the noble Lord, as he has said, he has not apprised me of it earlier. But I have come across a case not unlike the one to which the noble Lord has referred, and perhaps I may supplement the official reply I have given by referring to this other case. The Central Land Board's practice can best be illustrated by it. A developer is granted a planning permission to erect a factory on an undeveloped plot of land, and to use it for five years, on condition that at the end of the five years the factory is pulled down. If the factory is really going to be pulled down at the end of the five years it is obvious that this planning permission has a relatively small value. The Board, in assessing the charge, have to ascertain the difference between the value of the undeveloped land with the planning permission and its value without that permission. In view of the cost of the erection of the building, and of its destruction at the end of five years, the value of the land with permission cannot be high, and the development charge assessed on this basis is accordingly low. If, however, at the end of the period—and this may interest the noble Lord—the factory is not pulled down, but planning permission is obtained to retain it for a further five years, then the further development charge is the difference between the value of the land with a factory on it, with permission to use the factory for five years, less the value of the land with a factory

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  on it which cannot be used for any purpose. It follows, accordingly, that the development charge is relatively high. A low charge followed by a high charge in this manner may well cause hardship. Accordingly, the Board offer developers who obtain planning permission for a limited period the choice of an alternative assessment. I think that that is all I
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  can say to the noble Lord on this Question.
  LORD MESTON: I am very much obliged to the noble Lord for the answer he has given. I am afraid that I did not follow it all in detail, but that is my fault and not his.
  House adjourned at twenty-seven minutes past four o'clock.