NAVAL ESTIMATES

HL Deb 11 April 1951 vol 171 cc253-88

3.54 p.m.

Debate resumed.

LORD WINSTER

My Lords, I followed with great interest the speech of the noble Lord in introducing the Motion which is before the House, and there are two points in it upon which I should like to make short comment. The first is with regard to the changes in uniform affecting the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and the Royal Naval Reserve. Of course, I cannot say anything about the questions of expense, or venture an opinion as to how the R.N.R. and the R.N.V.R. feel about these changes. I can only say for myself that I should like to see every distinction swept away in these uniforms. I hope that this decision not to distinguish the uniforms, except in regard to the letter "R," may be a step in the direction of removing all distinctions of any sort. Remembering the services rendered by the officers and men of those two Reserves, I am sure that the Royal Navy would feel that it did itself nothing but an honour in wearing a common uniform with them.

My other comment arises from the point which the noble Lord made about stockpiling with regard to the defensive equipment of merchant ships. I take great interest in that matter because, as it happens, in the course of two wars I served a short term of duty in fitting out merchant ships with defensive armaments. At the present time I have the honour to be the President of an Association which looks after the interests of the officers of the Mercantile Marine. Of course, in that position a great deal of information upon such subjects comes my way. I am happy to inform your Lordships that it is the considered opinion of that Association that the Admiralty are fully meeting requirements in that respect, and that the officers of the Merchant Navy are satisfied with what is being done in order to ensure that, should war break out again, their ships will immediately go to sea properly defensively equipped.

Now I turn to the terms of the Motion itself. The Motion asks His Majesty's Government whether they are satisfied that the proposals contained in the Memorandum on the Naval Estimates are adequate for the defence of the country. The noble Lord will not mind my saying that I think the wording is a little naive, because—whatever we may think about their preparations—we cannot expect the Government to admit any deficiency in those preparations. It is only within the past six months or so that there has been what I may call a certain noticeable movement up on the Catskill Mountains, and there are now evident signs that the Government fully appreciate the dangers with which we are faced. It must be remembered that since 1945 our Defence Ministers—there have been three—have had something like £4,000,000,000 to spend, and some people seem to think that we have very little indeed to show for it. They say that, like the Dutch, these Defence Ministers have been giving too little and are asking too much from the Treasury.

The run-down in our Naval strength has been really alarming. I should say that if, by any terrible tragedy, we were forced into war this year, we would go into it less favourably placed even than we were in 1939. The next war, if it comes, is not going to be one of those wars "to end war," of which we have had two examples, only to be seriously disappointed. It is going to be a war to decide whether civilisation is or is not going to be rubbed off the face of the earth. On that account I think we must try to be particularly ready. We hear a great deal about the number of ships in reserve or laid up in these cocoons— "mothballs" as our American friends call them. All that lay-up of ships is clever and excellent, but do not let us take too much comfort from it. In his speech, the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, referred to the question of personnel. Ships have to be manned, and officers and men must be trained. The manning position to-day is not too good. The noble Lord said (and I fully agree with him) that we have not enough of those staid men who have always been the backbone of the Navy. We want the best men, and we want long-service men. Instead of men who could join for twelve years, we have men who join for seven years and serve five years in Reserve. Of these men far too many do not reengage and qualify for pension.

As for training, seamen, to be efficient, must go to sea -and too few of them do so at present for long enough periods. There are too many ships in reserve, and too many officers and men in shore and harbour jobs. Senior officers have few chances of command at sea to-day, and become frustrated through looking at the mud up the creeks where their ships are lying. Successful strategy depends on ships' exercising and manœuvring at sea, practising going in and out of difficult harbours and anchorages at night and in all weathers. There is too little naval activity at sea at present. Surely, events in Korea ought to have stimulated the Government in this respect. We are proud of what the Fleet has done in Korean waters, but it seems to me that we had great difficulty in "scratching together" these forces to send to Korea. Suppose that another crisis had happened somewhere else, contemporaneously with events in Korea. It seems that we are too weak to begin with, and then suffer great losses while we are building up. It is an expensive system, and one which involves terrible shipping losses. It also involves holding up operations. It is, too, a system which causes great privation to civilians, and the war itself is lengthened —so seriously increasing its cost.

As regards the role of the Navy and the Air Force, the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb have not made navies obsolete. I quoted to your Lordships in a previous debate lessons which the Americans have learnt from certain combined operations they carried out. I pointed out that the first of those lessons was that the Navy still had a role of primary importance to play in any future hostilities. How quickly the truth of that lesson has been proved in Korea! Strong naval forces will be required in another world war. There may be other Koreas—Persia, Formosa, Burma, Turkey, Greece, the Adriatic, the Baltic, the Arctic. How do we know, with Russia in her present mood, that soon, in one of these places, we may not find ourselves confronted with another Korea? It is only types of ships and consequently strategy and tactics which change. The necessity to exercise sea power remains— because, although it is true that sea power will not win a war, it is sea power which enables wars to be won and which forms the essential link with the countries of the Commonwealth.

What are these commitments? It may be as well to recapitulate them in discussing Naval Estimates. First, there is the need to increase task forces so that they are able to deal with enemy concentrations or threats in any part of the world. We must be able to deal with raiders. Enormous concentrations of air and sea forces, let us remember, were necessary to deal with the "Bismarck." Minesweeping will be a tremendous task in the future. Air forces do not remove these responsibilities from our naval forces. I have left to the last our first and great commitment. That commitment is not to be reckoned in terms of enemy surface warships, but in the terms of the number of our own and Allied merchant ships which we have to protect. That is the first and greatest commitment of the Navy in time of war. It is to protect shipping over hundreds of thousands of miles of sea routes. To the problem of how to fulfil that commitment and responsibility there is only one answer—to get these merchant ships into convoy. Convoy depends upon having a sufficient number of adequately-trained surface and air escorts; and it is to that question that I wish particularly to address myself.

To agree that these Naval Estimates represent an adequate preparation for defence would be to agree that one is satisfied about the number and the efficiency of the escort craft at the disposal of the Navy at the present moment. I certainly cannot say that I, for one, am so satisfied. I think that in the Statement on the Navy Estimates the figure of sixty-one destroyers and frigates in active commission was quoted. But the question I ask about these destroyers and escort forces generally is this: Are they organised, distributed and trained as convoy escorts, or are they organised and trained for Fleet duties? I do not wish to be taken in the strict letter in what I am going to say, but what has happened in the past when war broke out has been that officers in command at sea, and officers directing affairs at the Admiralty, have wanted to get the ships to sea to meet the enemy's surface ships. Everyone has been burning and itching to get at them, with the result that the fleets and squadrons have gone off to make contact with the enemy ships, while the protection of merchant shipping, which I regard as the greatest commitment of all, has been left to be carried out by ships from the reserves manned in rather a scratch fashion.

Anti-submarine escorts, however, re-quire a very high degree of experience. They require experience, skill and co-operation which can be produced only by constant and systematic exercise with our own submarines. That, I feel, is the great task of our commanders-in-chief. For lack of that experience we had the heavy sinkings between 1939 and 1942, when hastily mobilised escorts had to under-take the job of convoy work without proper experience or training. And once they had been put on to that job it was never possible to take them off it for long enough to give them the training which was needed. They had to learn their job by the not very satisfactory process of being, as it were, trained while still learning how to swim; our mercantile marine had very heavy losses on account of this haphazard method. We shall need a minimum of 200 fully-commissioned escort ships, trained and organised solely for shipping protection. It is all very well for the Statement on the Estimates to stress scientific research and so on, but improved listening devices and higher speeds are no substitute for training and numbers of escort craft. For those 200, we shall want something in the nature of 30,000 officers and men, but a great number of them can be obtained by cutting out inessential and relatively unimportant services. I sincerely trust that we may hear something from the First Lord this afternoon to indicate that the escort craft which will have this task to perform in the future will be organised and trained in the manner which I have endeavoured to describe, in order that, should war break out, they can be put on to their escort duties from the very first hour.

The submarine is indeed a menace which is growing every year. Submarines already do short bursts of twenty knots. They can navigate indefinitely at periscope depth, thanks to the Schnorkel, which, I may mention, it is very difficult for radar to detect. Radar is an uncertain defence against the Schnorkel submarine. At the start of the last war, in 1939, Germany had fifty-four submarines, and she used very few aircraft indeed in attacks upon our merchant shipping; but in that year she sank 361 ships and about 1,250,000 gross tons of shipping. I will not commit myself to a figure, but we have had several figures quoted to us about the number of submarines in the possession of the Russians. If Germany, with fifty-four submarines, could inflict those losses upon us, what are we to expect from the very much larger number of submarines that we hear of as being at the disposal of the Russians, even allowing for a slightly lower efficiency amongst the Russian officers and men than we found amongst the Germans? That emphasises What is my strong point of view: that unless our anti-submarine forces are as numerous and trained in the manner I have described, once again we may find ourselves suffering the most crippling shipping losses.

I should like to say a few words about what are, to my mind, some rather new ideas, which were put forward in another place by the Minister who was introducing the Naval Estimates. He emphasised the fact that our Navy and the navies of the Atlantic Pact countries were being welded into what he called a "standardised pattern." There was to be interchange of officers, ability to switch equipment and weapons, and a common code of signals, and the new anti-submarine frigates were going to be put to common use and in a common pool. But what did, I confess, disturb me was the new doctrine which he enunciated, that no longer can the British Isles be defended by the Navy alone, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is a recognition of this changed strategy, and that the Organisation strengthens us very substantially at sea. Alliances are necessary and effective instruments for combating a particular crisis, but I think it is permissible to have some doubts about them as a permanent state of affairs. After all, since 1914, the Italians have fought both with us and against us, and now we are friendly with them once again. The Japanese have fought both with us and against us, and now we hear of a peace treaty with Japan which may provide for a considerable degree of rearmament. Alliances tend to be transient affairs, and we should be careful before we commit ourselves lock, stock and barrel to hand-ling our own armed forces on the basis of a belief that an existing set-up in international relations will endure for all time. To my mind, it means that we are relying upon an Organisation—Heaven knows, I hope it may not be so!—which might let us down if one or two countries failed entirely to come up to their obligations.

"Standardisation" sounds a very fine word; it is a blessed word like "Mesopotamia." It corresponds to "egalitarianism" in politics. But I cannot help feeling that, so far as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is concerned, standardisation may be at a level lower than our best. After all, our Navy is unique. It stands unparalleled in its efficiency as a sea force. This standardisation may tend to be at a lower level than our best has been proved to be so often. In regard to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, I hope that no one will doubt how deeply I feel about the maintenance of good Anglo-American relations, and how fully I realise the great debt that we have been under in two wars to that great country. But I do deprecate the habit which seems to be growing up of always turning to the United States for help. It is becoming almost a habit that, in any crisis or jam, or OH any question, automatically we turn to the United States and expect them to help. We may not be able to rival the navy of the United States in size, and I say that the run-down of our Navy has been too great. Had that not been so, we could have occupied a position of much greater status and prestige in the deliberations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation than perhaps we have. I want to see this country remain a volunteer unit of that Organisation, and not a standardised link, remembering, as I have said, that no international relationships are for all time, and that a lasting community of interest in inter-national affairs is a very rare thing indeed.

I have spoken about the run-down in the Navy. The Estimates provide for thirteen carriers to protect shipping against submarine and aircraft. It does not seem to me a large number. Then there are to be twenty-six cruisers: I should have thought that a very inadequate number of cruisers. We had forty-one at the beginning of the last war, and we found those too few. There are to be 113 destroyers, 165 escort frigates and 66 submarines. The First Lord says that these figures are satisfactory. How deeply I trust that the First Lord is right, and that, if war does come upon us, those numbers will be found to be satisfactory! Meanwhile, the United States is launching the largest building programme since her expansion after the events of Pearl Harbour. It is a pro-gramme running into 2,000,000,000 dollars, a perfectly gigantic programme of new construction and of modernisation of older ships.

As the noble Lord in moving his Motion said something about the air, I will not traverse the ground which he covered so completely and effectively, except to say that it would be interesting to hear what is going to be done about fitting merchant ships with helicopters, because I think some of your Lordships will have noticed the trials carried out in February with helicopters from Fort Duquesne. They were very interesting and were carried out in heavy seas and high winds. It would be interesting to hear what is thought of the possibility of fitting some of our merchant ships to use helicopters. There is a serious shortage of pilots and observers, a matter to which I think the First Lord referred on one occasion. The truth is that the Fleet Air Arm was cold-shouldered at a very critical moment, and even after that the policy pursued in regard to the Fleet Air Arm was unimaginative. Look at the carriers which the Fleet Air Arm had at their disposal in the last war. We had to turn to America to get suitable aircraft for our Fleet Air Arm.

My Lords, there are no other points which I wish to mention, except this. As the noble Lord said, a White Paper will be issued about the command in the North Atlantic, and that will be the proper moment at which to debate that question. I trust it will be debated from the point of view of whether it is the most effective system of command for the objective that we have in mind in the North Atlantic. I hope that now we shall regard as a settled matter the fact that an American Admiral has been appointed to that command, and that aspect of the question need not be reopened again. I do not know whether it is too early to-day to ask for news about the Mediterranean command. I appreciate it may be too soon, and per-haps it would be fair to have all these commands announced at one and the same time. I noticed with great surprise that the French were not invited to the conference at Malta. I am bound to say that I think it was a mistake not to invite them there. The important question about the Mediterranean command is whether it is going to be independent of General Eisenhower, as is the Atlantic command, because at any rate no one can deny our predominant interest in the Mediterranean. No one can deny our predominant interest in Gibraltar, Malta and Suez—our gateway to the East—and I trust that that fact will be borne in mind and recognised when the question of the command in the Mediterranean comes to be decided. I trust I have not detained your Lordships at too great length, but in conclusion may I say that I think the most important matter we have to consider in connection with the Navy at the present moment is the question of providing and training personnel for the escort ships? That is the first and foremost duty of the Admiralty to-day.

4.24 p.m.

LORD STRABOLGI

My Lords, I am sure the House is grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, for bringing forward this Motion. I believe that my noble friend the First Lord will share my satisfaction in the very moderate and, if I may say so, balanced statement that he made. I should also like to commiserate with him in that some unexpected events took place before he opened this debate, and also interrupted the proceedings during the debate. But Parliament is a strange place: these sort of things happen, and we must be prepared for the unexpected. I should also like to congratulate the noble Lord upon his brief but effective homily on the real meaning of sea power, and perhaps I may be so bold as to expand his words in the few remarks which I address to your Lordships.

First, however, may I ask my noble friend the First Lord two questions which he and I have been discussing, and upon which he might find it convenient to make a statement. Can my noble friend say anything as to the progress of the new entry into Dartmouth? Perhaps he may be able to say how many entrants are being taken in, and how many applications for entry have been received. When I entered as a cadet, 600 applicants were passed for medical examination, and only sixty were finally taken, so competition was rather stiff. The com-parable figures for to-day would be interesting. Another matter of perennial interest is the question: what progress is being made with promotion from the lower deck, and how many instances of promotion of this kind are there during a year in the various branches? I believe that good progress is being made there, and my noble friend might like to make a statement about that matter. I have one more comment on Lord Teynham's observations. I should like to support him in regard to altering the regulations concerning the flying of the Blue Ensign when the commanding officer of the ship is an R.N.R. officer. There is a great deal to be said for that change, and we should give all the encouragement we can to the Royal Naval Reserve.

I entirely agree with what Lord Teynham said about the unchanging fundamental foundations of sea power. They do not alter. But the danger that I see to-day (I am going to be perfectly frank with my noble friend) is of too much emphasis, and therefore too much money, effort and man-power, being expended on a Continental army and too little on the Fleet. I think we shall make a great mistake if we allow the Fleet and its component air arm to be starved for the sake of maintaining a great Continental army which may never be needed. My noble friend will remember the protests of the German generals to the Kaiser, in the years before 1914, about the rapid building up of the German fleet, as they said, at the expense of the army. They pointed out that the only result would be to provoke the British, and eventually the Americans, and that, after all, Germany depended for her strength on her army and not on sea power. In saying that they were completely right. If the Kaiser had not had this infatuation to call himself the Admiral of the Atlantic, there would have been no need for the First World War at all. I can see exactly the same situation arising with regard to ourselves, but in reverse. I can see us building a great army, and in consequence being forced—I do not say to starve, but to keep the Navy down to limits which are really insufficient for our world-wide and multitudinous commitments.

I hope that I carry Lord Teynham with me in saying that I think it would be a mistake to build a Fleet that is designed only for meeting a threat from one potential enemy. Apparently at present the potential enemy is Russia, which does not disturb me because, as the noble Lord who has just preceded me has said, in our lifetime we have seen a number of changes in regard to potential enemies. A Fleet designed for this one purpose will consist of small types of aircraft carrier, anti-submarine craft of various kinds, escort vessels and minesweepers. That would be an unbalanced fleet, unsuitable for our world-wide commitments. After all, it takes a long time to build up a modern navy, to train its officers and men and to maintain its efficiency. It is a long process upon which one cannot improvise. In my lifetime I have seen many changes in our potential enemies and allies. When I joined the Navy as a cadet our potential enemy was France, and her ally was Russia. Then came the Russo-Japanese war, and the destruction of the Russian fleet. Then we had the rise of the Germany navy, to which I have referred, and we concluded an entente, first with France and then with Russia, and we forgot all about the sup-posed Russian threat to the North-West frontier of India. Then we regarded the Germans as our potential enemy, and we were in alliance with Japan. After the First World War the alliance with Japan was abrogated, largely at the behest of America, and the Japanese began to expand their naval power and to embark on aggression. Yet beforehand they had been our allies. The argument that I am trying to adduce is that, while alliances can quickly change into enmities, and enmities into alliances, it takes a long time to build up an efficient Navy. Therefore, I suggest that we have to design our Fleet and build it accordingly; that is to say we must use a necessarily limited amount of money to the best advantage to build a Fleet which will perform the tasks which it has to meet. A purely anti-submarine force would be insufficient in view of our world-wide commitments.

The point I have been leading up to is that I must renew to my noble friend the First Lord of the Admiralty my doubts about our numbers of cruisers. I still feel dubiety about our cruiser building programme. I trust that we shall not remain satisfied with the very small number of cruisers now on the Navy List, and I hope it is to be increased. We need a cruiser force because the cruiser can maintain herself on a foreign station for a long time, and she can make long voyages without a mother ship. A frigate or a destroyer cannot do these things so well, despite the growth in size —and cost—of destroyers to-day. The cruiser is the only vessel which can be used to represent British interests in the various parts of the world where there may be trouble, and where we may have commitments to meet. The battleship, I suppose, is too costly to-day (I think that is generally recognised), and too vulnerable to air attack. I do not think that many navies can afford to build a large fleet of battleships. The cruiser has now become a vessel of considerable size. The later American cruisers are of somewhere about 16,000 tons, which was the size of a battleship when I first went to sea. Furthermore, the modern cruiser costs a good deal more than the battleship did at the time when I first went to sea. Aircraft carriers are necessary, but they are extremely costly. I think they supply that striking force that we used to look for from the battleship. I hope that your Lordships will forgive me for making this addition to the homily which has been so ably delivered by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham. I am really only expanding his arguments, which I think were well-nigh unassailable.

With regard to the actual needs of special vessels for meeting submarines, I have been greatly interested to see reports from America of the tremendous increase in speed of the American submarines of the future that are now being designed. No less a person than the Chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Forces Committee—who is presumably a responsible individual—has told us that in about a year's time the Americans will have at sea an atomic-powered sub-marine. I take all this with great reserve, but the newspaper report which I saw declared that this new American submarine will be capable of submerged speeds up to what the newspaper described as "sixty miles an hour." Think of that!—a submerged speed of sixty miles an hour, which works out at more than fifty-two knots. I have never heard of any ship that could attain a speed of fifty knots, either on the surface, under the water or anywhere else—except, of course, in the air. I therefore treat these reports with considerable reserve. Still, as I have indicated, the statements were said to have been made by such an important personage as this American Chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Forces Committee. But even ignoring that report, there is no doubt that the speed of future submarines will increase very greatly if atomic power can be used. I presume that we also are experimenting along those lines, though for obvious reasons I will not ask my noble friend the First Lord of the Admiralty for any details in this connection. Clearly, with this greatly increased speed the submarine must become an even greater menace to the shipping of the world than heretofore, and very fast ships will be required to combat it.

A powerful air force with the necessary carrier vessels is undoubtedly required also. The air arm must be adequate and efficient. With regard to the present air arm, from the information which reaches me, and from information given to us generally, I gather that great advances have been made by the Royal Navy, and that to-day the Fleet Air Arm is very powerful and highly efficient. I congratulate my noble friend on that fact. Furthermore, on the published figures the number of aircraft carriers which we possess, or are building, seems to me to be satisfactory. There is no doubt that the air side of the Royal Navy is by no means neglected. That is all very satisfactory, and I consider that the Board of Admiralty, and particularly my noble friend, are entitled to support and praise. I regret that we are not yet able, apparently, to make a Return of Fleets. That most useful publication was initiated by the late Sir Charles Dilke, who, many years ago, I believe, was a contemporary of a noble Lord who is sitting at this moment on the Liberal Benches. The "Dilke Return," as we used to call it, was a very valuable publication indeed. We give a great deal of information about our own Fleet now in the Navy Estimates and in the Navy List, and I do not see why the Return of Fleets should not be published with such information as we have. I understand that certain Powers are opposed to it, but nevertheless I think that a similar Return, with the information which we have about the fleets of the world, would be very valuable for Members of Parliament in both Houses.

Lastly, I should like to support what has been said—and I am sure this is very much in the mind of my noble friend the first Lord of the Admiralty— about the great need for as much sea time as is practicable for the Fleet and its personnel. You cannot make sailors on shore. I am sure that at long last that fact is realised. The more time that is spent at sea, the more efficient will be the Fleet. I know the difficulties about oil fuel and its cost, and all that sort of thing. Nevertheless, I stress that nothing can take the place of sea training. I am sure that my noble friend will support that. All the accounts I get of of the Royal Navy of to-day go to show that it is not only highly efficient but that our men are contented—at any rate they have no burning grievances, which is something unique in the history of the Royal Navy. I believe that the officers are of the highest standard to-day, and that they will worthily carry on the traditions of that great Service.

4.38 p.m.

VISCOUNT CALDECOTE

My Lords, there is no need for me to stress again the vital importance of anti-submarine de-fence and the provision of suitable vessels, training and equipment. As I read the Explanatory Statement of the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Admiralty, the scheme is that the need for anti-submarine defence should in the main be met by the conversion of fleet destroyers. I am glad that Lord Teynham drew attention to the fact that every time we convert a fleet destroyer into an anti-submarine vessel we lose a fleet destroyer, which in itself is an anti-sub-marine vessel. It may look very good that we have made or have in hand so many conversions into anti-submarine frigates, but it is sometimes forgotten that that does not mean a net addition to the Fleet. On the whole, I think the programme of conversion is satisfactory, but in my view the programme of new construction leaves a great deal to be desired. It does not seem to me to be taken seriously enough. In the first place, two destroyers were launched in 1949—one in March and one in August. Neither has yet joined the Fleet. This means that two years have elapsed. That is too long from the launching of a destroyer to completion. They are both in good yards, and I suspect that the reason of their non-completion is that those in charge have not been pressed for a finishing date and have therefore allowed other work to have preference. I hope that the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Admiralty will give us some assurance as to the date when those two ships will be completed.

It is not very satisfactory that last year not a single anti-submarine frigate was launched and not a single frigate or destroyer was accepted into service. The only ship accepted into service was a survey ship—total number of guns, none. There are two prototype frigates which have just been started—I suspect only just. Certainly they will not be in service until 1953, and if they are really prototypes it means we shall not start building others until we have seen how they get on. I do not consider that in any way satisfactory. It is true that there are two other frigates in the programme of new construction: are these the same as the prototypes, or are they what might be called production models? I hope the noble Viscount will tell us. Further down the Explanatory Statement we find that as many frigates are being ordered as machinery can be provided for. It has already been said in this debate that machinery is the bottleneck. It used to be the bottleneck and it is going to be more of a bottleneck. I have mentioned to your Lordships before that nowadays equipment is much more complex and there are fewer firms who can undertake the manufacture of modern, high-powered, lightweight turbines. They can-not be turned out as the reciprocating engine used to be turned out.

It seems to me that the statement that the number of frigates is limited by the machinery which can be provided demonstrates a grave lack of flexibility in the arrangement which now exists for ordering new ships and their equipment. I know what the trouble is. In one year the Treasury allow only so much money to be expended on orders for new machinery for ships that will not be ordered until next year's Estimates or the Estimates for the year after. The trouble probably is that insufficient notice is taken of those who know about production problems, the technical officers in the Admiralty and the Navy, and too much notice is taken of Treasury officials and of the administrative and secretarial staff in the Admiralty. I do not believe that people who know nothing about technology understand how long it takes to produce a piece of complicated modern machinery, and I wish the noble Viscount would give technologists a little more administrative authority and not make them so hidebound by the secretarial staff. The other day I heard of a paper on a technical subject which had no fewer than sixty minutes on it from the secretarial branch before it ever reached a technical officer.

I should like to ask the noble Viscount what has happened to the hulls of the "Battle" Class destroyers we had at the end of the war and which were never completed. I know that some of them have been used for destruction tests, but there are some left. Are we not going to use them by putting engines in them? They are good hulls, well designed and well built. I hope we are not going to waste them. The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, has mentioned the cruisers on which work has been suspended. I see there are also three light fleet cruisers on which work has been suspended. I hope the noble Viscount will tell us what is going to happen to them and what has happened to them now. One of them was being built at a yard of which I have some knowledge, and it certainly is not there now. I hope they will not be left too long before they are completed.

In the paragraph headed "Works Programme," a great deal is said about improved married quarters, living conditions and working conditions, but there is not a word about providing protected workshops and stores. We all know that that is a big job, but it should be remembered that during the war the underground workshops in Malta did a fine job when the dockyard was completely out of action. Ships could go in and get urgent jobs carried out in a short time because there was machinery underground which could not be damaged by bombs. In any future war attacks on dockyards are bound to be severe. If the dockyards are completely smashed up and no machine tools are left to carry out the necessary repairs, our anti-submarine ships will soon come to a stop and the flow of supplies to this country will cease. It is no good planning for a limited war or for only one aspect of war. I heard of a plan during the war for making provision for safe storage in some dockyards, and I hope the noble Viscount will be able to give us some assurance about that matter.

We have heard something about the importance of training facilities. There is nothing in the Explanatory Statement about the training facilities and the equipment that are being provided. The scientists are developing very complex and probably highly efficient weapons of defence and attack, but all that work and ingenuity will be completely wasted if the men do not know how to use them. During the last war equipment was often not used as well as it might have been because training facilities were not available, largely because the money was not pro-vided in peace time. I hope that that sort of economy is not being made now. That particularly applies to the provision of anti-submarine equipment and training. I hope the provision of training facilities is going on alongside development of the weapons themselves.

I was very interested to hear the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, asking about the success of the Dartmouth entry, and I hope the noble Viscount will tell us something about that matter. From present and past naval officers I have heard a good deal of criticism of the new entry at sixteen. There is one point, which may or may not be true but which is widely believed, that at any entry the orders are that 50 per cent. is to come from Government-controlled schools. Is that true or not? If it is true, it seems to me that officers are being selected on the basis that it is a fine career and everybody ought to have an opportunity of going into it, and not on the basis of providing the best officer.

Lastly I come to a subject which I have raised before in your Lordships' House—namely, the question of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, which has already been touched upon. Before this rearmament programme started, the Corps was seriously undermanned. Plans for arming Merchant Navy ships in time of war and for doing fundamental research by members of the Corps could not go forward. Now, with the new rearmament programme, the situation is disastrous and becoming more and more disastrous every year as the programme develops. The Eastham Committee recommended a figure of 300 as the number of the Corps. The Admiralty have not accepted that Report, but have never produced any other figure. The number of men in the Corps last autumn was 175. Last year there were three dockyard entrants; no university entrants; three retirements, because the officers could no longer stand the conditions; and five retirements due to age—a net wastage of five. It takes a minimum of five years to train a Naval Constructor, so that we cannot solve the problem of the lack of numbers by bringing people in from merchant ship work. Building a warship is quite different from building a merchant ship. Constructors must have experience of warship design and construction before they are much use for naval designing. There is a serious danger of overworking the present staff, and we had one or two examples in the last war of what happens when that occurs. I understand that officers are already being withdrawn from sea appointments because there is insufficient staff in the design department. That was a point on which the commanders-in-chief in the last war were all agreed: that there should be more seagoing experience for the constructor officers.

It was in 1946 that the Eastham Committee first reported, and a year ago some rather niggardly pay increases were granted. Over a year ago we were promised that the new arrangements of pay for constructors under training would be announced soon; and again last December we were promised that there would be an announcement almost at once. As has already been stated in another place, constructors under training at Greenwich receive 16s. 6d. a day, and they wear lieutenants' uniform; but sub-lieutenants, R.N., receive 17s. 6d. a day, and lieutenants 21s. 6d. a day, with 8s. 6d. marriage allowance, if they are married. Many of the constructors of twenty-four and twenty-five years of age are not too young to get married in these enlightened days. The constructors have to live on 16s. 6d. a day, when their brother officers at Greenwich, with whom they are supposed to make friends, are getting 17s. 6d. and 21s. 6d. a day. Words fail me to describe the injustice and incredible stupidity of that from the point of view of the Navy. It would not be so bad if a definite announcement were made, instead of this continued delay, month after month and year after year.

I believe that it has been suggested that they shall be given an increase in pay, but that they will have to pay for their accommodation. Words fail me to describe the crass stupidity of all the delay that has gone on over the Royal Corps: it is unjust to the men, and unfair to the Navy and the country. In all fairness to the First Lord, I do not think it is his fault. I believe the blame can be put fairly and squarely on the Treasury—people who do not know how long it takes to train a constructor. They believe that if we are short in wartime we can bring them in from outside. But that is not so. I hope that the First Lord will take the strongest possible line he can to persuade the people at the Treasury to appreciate that something must be done now, this month, about these men. It is not only for the men at Greenwich themselves that I am speaking, but because those men have the greatest influence on new men coming into the Corps, from the universities or elsewhere. How can we expect to get recruits when the men already in the Corps are dissatisfied and thinking of coming out? We shall not get them, as experience has shown. We shall not get recruits until we make those conditions, and all the conditions, suitable for the high training and great responsibilities which the members of the Corps have.

The amount required to place the constructor lieutenants on the same basis as naval officers is of the order of £2,500 or £3,000 a year. Is that really more than we can afford in Naval Estimates involving tens of millions of pounds? I know what the answer is. It is that if that were done it would mean putting the whole scientific Civil Service on the same basis; and the Treasury are scared stiff that if they put up the pay of these new constructors, men who are vital to the naval service, they will have to put up the pay of hundreds of men in the scientific Civil Service. If they have courage, they will not have to do that. The men of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors have far more responsibility, both administrative and technical. There is no possibility of their moving about from one department to another when promotion is bad. They cannot go to an academic job in a university or a technical college, as men in the scientific Civil Service have been doing. Very few jobs are open to them, and promotion is not nearly so easy or so good as in the scientific Civil Service. It is time that this situation was cleared up: it has gone on far too long. If a constructor is lost by retirement through dissatisfaction, it takes five years to get back to the position obtaining before he retired. In a few years' time the situation will be desperate. It is already so desperate that the other day, when the Admiralty advertised all over the country for naval architects from private yards, they got only eight, in spite of all they could do. I hope the noble Viscount will take that to heart, and will see what he can do with his friends at the Treasury. I know that he has done all he can, but for the sake of the Service in the future he must try again. I am sorry to have laboured that point, but I do not think its importance can be overstated.

I hope that in the future we shall see a little more flexibility in the ordering of ships. Let us have more responsibility given to the people who really know what they are about. Let them not be overridden all the time by secretaries, principal secretaries and undersecretaries saying that they cannot do this or that. The Government have been saying that we want to raise the standard of technologists. Let them start by raising their status in the Admiralty service and per-haps other people will follow suit.

4.57 p.m.

VISCOUNT HALL

My Lords, I desire to join with those of your Lordships who have expressed gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, for initiating this debate. It has now become a practice year by year to follow the Estimates debate in another place with one in your Lordships' House. I do not complain about that; I feel that it is as well that we should have a debate on naval questions in this House from time to time. The value of that principle has been displayed by the number of questions which have been put to me this afternoon. The terms of the Motion moved by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, this afternoon are to ask His Majesty's Government whether they are satisfied that the proposals contained in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Navy Estimates are adequate for the defence of the country. I can go further and assure the noble Lord that His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the Estimates, with any Supplementary Estimates that may be required during the course of the financial year, will make the necessary provision for man-power, money, ships and equipment.

It is not easy to follow without a certain amount of repetition a debate which has so recently taken place in another place dealing with this same subject. I am fortunate, however in having in another place two competent colleagues, in the persons of the Parliamentary Secretary and the Civil Lord, who in the course of the debate on the Navy Estimates explained in broad outline Naval policy and the reason for the increased expenditure as compared with the last financial year—namely, an increase of about 40 per cent. They also explained the technical needs of the Royal Navy in man-power and equipment. The Parliamentary Secretary dealt fully, too, with the work of the Fleet during last year, and called particular attention to those units which since July last have been called upon to fight with the United Nations forces in the Korean war. Your Lordships will agree that I should say a few words of appreciation of the way in which the Services have conducted themselves during those operations. They had to fight in very bad conditions, particularly during the winter, yet the standard maintained has been very high, and the number of casualties has, fortunately, been very low. His Majesty's ships, together with those of the Commonwealth, have worked in close and ever increasing co-operation with the United States Navy and the fighting men of all the United Nations. The morale of our forces has been excellent. Acts of gallantry have been numerous, and great tributes have been paid to the outstanding service given.

In Malaya, too, the Royal Navy has played a full part, for throughout the year frigates and motor launches have maintained constant patrols over the coast to prevent arms and reinforcements reaching the bandits by sea, while since July last the 3rd Royal Naval Commando Brigade has been engaged in anti-bandit operations, a duty which is hazardous and unspectacular but of great and supreme importance. Apart from these activities, the work of the Royal Navy during the year has been concentrated on training and exercises. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, raised that point. I will endeavour to deal with sea-time later in my speech, but I should like to assure the noble Lord that a good deal of attention is being paid to exercises of all kinds. Exercises have been conducted with representative ships from North Atlantic Treaty countries, and from the Commonwealth. Indeed, no fewer than twenty of these exercises were carried out during last year. There have been many operational exchanges of ships between ourselves and other Commonwealth countries, while units of the Royal Canadian and Royal Australian Navies, and of the Royal Dutch Navy, have visited Londonderry for anti-submarine exercises and, later, exercises with the Fleet. It can be said that, whatever criticism there is as to the adequacy of our own Fleet, among the Commonwealth countries as a whole we now possess a substantial number of naval ships and forces of all kinds which are a great addition to our potential naval strength.

I should like to deal briefly with the question of naval rearmament, because it has been much criticised here to-day. It is true that it consists to a considerable degree of the acceleration of a carefully thought out plan. It may have taken too long to think out that plan, but it is intended for the development of a well-balanced Navy, capable of carrying out the tasks assigned to it, both in peace and in war. The cost of this accelerated programme for production and research during this financial year is about double the amount spent last year. The full programme, together with current construction when completed, will add no fewer than 232 new ships to our existing naval strength. These will include the powerful Fleet carriers such as the "Eagle," which is now taking her trials, the "Ark Royal" and carriers of the "Hermes" class, and eight destroyers of the "Daring" class. The noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, referred to the delay from the time of launching to the time of delivery of these ships to the Fleet. I can assure him that six of these eight new destroyers will take their trials before the end of this year, and we are hoping that the other two will do so early next year. This programme also provides for twenty-four frigates. The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, was anxious to know when these frigates will be completed. There is the accelerated plan which was announced in the latter part of last year, but that does not mean that all the ships will be constructed during that period. We are hoping to accelerate and complete the work within the next three financial years.

LORD TEYNHAM

Can the noble Lord indicate when one, two or perhaps three of the ships will be completed?

VISCOUNT HALL

We are hoping that some of the frigates will be completed next year. Indeed, seventeen of them are already ordered. It must be remembered that there has been a considerable amount of scientific research carried out in order to meet the menace of the submarine, with which I shall deal later. We are putting into these ships, as we are putting into those which are being modernised and reconverted, all the scientific knowledge which has been obtained as a result of information received during and since the last war. Here again, I think we are meeting the point which was made by the noble Lord, Lord Winster. The number of ships being brought into service with the Fleet from the Reserve will be sixty. They will be added to the ships which are operational and under training at the present time. We are hoping from time to time to bring other ships from the Reserve as trained man-power becomes available.

The noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, referred to the training of men. I can assure him that we are getting a very intelligent recruit, one who is able to absorb the training which is provided for him to use all this new scientific equipment which is being provided in the ships now under construction and in those being modernised and reconverted at the present time. The figure of refits of the Reserve Fleet has already been given. There are no fewer than 450 refits of the Reserve Fleet, some of which have come round for the second time within the last two and a half years. In addition to refitting, we are storing many more Reserve Fleet ships, and we are building up stocks which will greatly assist naval preparedness. We have a very large programme of complete modernisation and conversions. We are modernising fleet carriers, cruisers, twenty-five fleet destroyers and about eighty frigates.

I wish to assure the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, and the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, that the question of the con-version of the forty-five fleet destroyers into anti-submarine frigates is a decision which was taken after great consideration; and it will be a great advantage to have these destroyers-cum-frigates doing the work which they will be called upon to do. There again, the equipment which was used during the War became obsolete at the end of the War; and instead of putting obsolete or even some of the more modern equipment into the destroyer as a destroyer, we wanted to put into the destroyer all the known equipment to meet the menace of the submarine. There is another aspect which is of great importance. We can convert three of these destroyers for the cost of one frigate. In addition to that, we can convert them far more quickly than we can construct a frigate. So for every reason I think it can be said that these frigates or destroyer-cum-frigates will be some of the most useful of the anti-submarine ships which we shall have.

Questions have been raised about the completion of the "Tiger" class cruisers. I know that this question has arisen year after year, and I want to tell noble Lords that we are not yet ready to proceed with the completion of these cruisers. Further research work is required with their fire control and gunnery, and we are satisfied that it is better for the three of them to wait, rather than that two of them should be fitted with some equipment which is not as good as that with which we hope, in the course of the next two or three years, to equip these ships, to make them the most powerful cruisers of their kind in the world. The noble Lord also raised the question of H.M.S. "Cumberland." Her work is an entirely new departure, for she has been fitted out as a floating laboratory for sea-going trials of equipment. It has been discovered that operational ships cannot be made available for such trials for sufficiently long periods, and the use of H.M.S. "Cumberland" would prevent the otherwise inevitable delays in bringing to fruition much valuable work. This year's trials will include ship's stabilisers which, if successful, will effect considerable saving in equipment, power, and weight by reducing the rolling and yawing motion. Two gunnery systems, together with their associated radar equipment, will also be investigated. When these have been completed, further gunnery systems are waiting for tests, and later H.M.S. "Cumberland" may be used for trials of guided missiles.

The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, referred to the fact that the number of cruisers we have is very small, and that we should increase the numbers. We must, whatever is said, build and prepare to meet the menace with which we are con-fronted at present—and as the noble Lord, Lord Winster, rightly said, the menace, so far as Russia is concerned, is not that of surface ships: it is the submarine; and without consideration of the strength of the forces which are allied with us at present, we cannot but add our quota to the Allies' pool to deal with this menace. The strongest arm of the Soviet Navy is not surface ships, not battleships or carriers, but submarines. I am not suggesting that they are not building cruisers —they are doing so: but not at the same speed as they are building submarines, which are, after all, the greatest threat to us in the event of total war. To prevent any underestimation or exaggeration of this threat, it should be generally known that I would not disagree with the figure of the total submarine strength of the Soviet fleet as being about 360— which figure is frequently quoted. Compared with the total submarine strength of the German Navy at the beginning of the last war that is a large figure, but it should be remembered that these sub-marines are dispersed over a wide area. Some are in the White Sea, some in the Baltic, some in the Black Sea; and, of course, some are in the Far East. I should say that a large proportion of them would be on the Western rather than on the Far Eastern side.

The Soviet submarine potential is made up of several types, varying from the large "K" class, an extremely powerful submarine, capable of operating over great distances, and able to remain and patrol for considerable periods—the number of these submarines is not very large—to the medium submarine called the SHCH, which is also an effective and dangerous class of about 600 tons, and the smaller coastal type submarine of about 200 tons. The number also includes some ex-German battery-propelled types. These ex-German sub-marines are a type with which we know the Russians have been experimenting. We have them; the Americans have them. They are a type which will spurt at a speed, not of twenty knots—I repeat what I said some two years ago, that we do not know of a submarine which has as great a submerged speed as twenty knots or over—but, for a period at any rate, of about sixteen and a half to seventeen knots.

There was another aspect of naval war-fare which was not mentioned during the course of the debate, and your Lordships will, I am sure, excuse me if I deal with it. I refer to the menace of the mine. The Soviet navy is powerfully equipped for mining both by sea and by air; and it is expected that in a future war we shall be faced with an even greater sea-mining threat than that which arose in the last war, for we have ample evidence that there will be a large-scale mining campaign. In addition, the Soviet Government is in possession of all types of mines known to the Western Powers at the end of the last war. Virtually all Russian surface ships are fitted for mine-laying. They also have well-developed mines suitable for laying from the torpedo tubes of all submarines; and, in addition, bomber aircraft can be used for this purpose. It is against the background of these threats that naval research has been conducted, and is now being applied to ships and to aircraft.

At the risk of taking up some time, I should like to deal with some of the scientific research which is going on at the present time. My honourable friend the Parliamentary Secretary in another place outlined much of the research and development problems arising from speed of attack both in the air and under water. I must add to his remarks that, in addition to meeting this particular problem, we have to ensure that the size and weight of our weapons are held within reasonable limits if they are to be fitted in ships of suitable size, ships which must themselves be propelled at greater speeds and with a longer range than previously. Much of our research effort is, therefore, devoted to making substantial reductions in the size of such articles as electronic components and to obtaining greatly improved performance from a given weight in the use of new materials and techniques. The need to save seconds and to conserve man-power has led to a far greater degree of automatic control in our equipment, but this has been done only where the price paid in size and complexity has not been too high. In this connection a fundamental consideration in the design of all equipment is not only its performance but also its ease of manufacture, operation and maintenance.

The design of our ships is continually being improved, partly as the result of the knowledge acquired from a long series of experiments on old ships. In the field of marine propulsion it has long been known that we cannot be content with anti-submarine escorts of moderate speed, but must give them a good margin of speed over any submarine with which they may be called upon to deal. This entails in the larger ships steam turbine machinery working at far higher temperatures and pressures than any hitherto used in the Royal Navy. In smaller ships, where diesel machinery is more appropriate, effort is directed towards obtaining a large horse-power from a small lightweight engine. The gas turbine offers this in certain classes of ships, and more than one model is being developed at the present time. The first fruits of other post-war research on marine propulsion have already enabled us to pass from the development to the production phase of a first-class small engine which takes up a very small space and which can produce a great speed. This knowledge is now being applied and used, and ships will soon be fitted with this type of engine. This knowledge can in future benefit the Mercantile Marine as well as the Royal Navy. We are also still studying systems using oxygen-bearing fuels and nuclear energy for submarines. These studies offer promise and all are the subject of further research.

I will not proceed to deal with the question of radar. It was fully dealt with. But I want to assure your Lordships that our scientists, engineers and naval officers are not controlled by the Secretaries or Under-Secretaries. They are men of an independent mind, with a good knowledge, and are sufficiently assertive to get their own way. I must say that not only the Royal Navy but also those navies which are allied with us are benefiting from our research, as we are benefiting from the research of other North Atlantic Treaty Powers. Indeed, our scientists, engineers and naval officers are constantly exchanging knowledge through reciprocal visits, and a Mission is maintained in Washington to facilitate this. As a result of these efforts, we are seeking a fusion of our production which will enable both countries to achieve much quicker results.

I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, referred to naval aviation. Good progress is being made in this branch of the naval service, and it is intended that the front line strength shall be substantially increased by this new accelerated programme. It has been equipped with the most modern machines designed and built specially for naval air. Some are at present being delivered, whilst several new types will come into operation during the next two years. They will consist of fighters, day and night, interception planes, anti-submarine strikes, reconnaissance, search and rescue. We are also proceeding with the use of the helicopter for anti-submarine work, search and rescue. The experiment to which he referred was, of course, a success.

LORD WINSTER

A great success.

VISCOUNT HALL

The difficulty is that unless there is a little more space than at present exists on the decks of some merchant ships, it is rather difficult to use even a helicopter. But the noble Lord can be assured that we are ordering helicopters with a view to carrying out further research and are using them for the purposes for which we know they are so well suited. The present trend of naval aircraft development is to produce still faster and heavier planes to provide for increased range, heavier offensive loads and higher performances generally. A governing factor in such development is, however, the ability of carriers to operate aircraft, and for this reason fleet carriers are being modernised to enable them to operate the latest types of aircraft. They are becoming still heavier and heavier. When we think of the lightweight aircraft which were used at the beginning of the last war and compare them with the huge aircraft which are being used now, it is really frightening, and one questions how far we are going in the building of these huge, heavy planes. The result is the need for the modernisation of aircraft carriers, which were constructed originally for the use of much lighter and slower planes.

We are still carrying out experiments with the flexible form of deck landing. The deck would consist of pneumatic cells, joined together to form a carpet to absorb the shock of landing. That will enable aircraft without undercarriages to be operated from carriers. Trials afloat have shown that undercarriage-less jets can be landed on deck in fair weather with little difficulty. As the next step, it is planned to progress this development ashore in association with the Ministry of Supply. This will be done by using equipment similar to that needed in a carrier. These developments hold out good possibilities which, if fully successful, will be a great boon.

The noble Lords, Lord Winster and Lord Teynham, referred to the utilisation of man-power. It is true that we have a large amount of man-power, but we also have commitments. The naval air arm requires almost one-third of naval personnel. A large proportion of naval air arm work is done at air stations. Taking into consideration the naval air arm, Marines, W.R.N.S. and others, who make up Vote A of 143,000, no less than something like 45 per cent. of the total are having sea service at the present time. By the end of the year, and as a result of this accelerated programme, we are hoping that Vote A will be increased to 152,000, which will enable us to bring the ships to which I have referred from reserve into service with the Fleet, and provide the sea time which I entirely agree is so necessary. A sailor is a sailor, and his work is mainly at sea, and we want our sailors to get as much sea time as possible.

The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, referred to what might be regarded as time-expired men—men who have reached the end of their seven or twelve years' service and have been retained for another eighteen months. That applies not only to the Royal Navy but also to the other two Services. The decision was taken because this extension of time was essential to assist in bringing the Far Eastern Fleet up to its war strength, to meet the demands made as a result of the Korean conflict, and, at the same time, to man the ships which are coming into commission. I have already pointed out that we are hoping that the "Eagle" will commission in the course of a very short time. As regards the "Darings," four may be commissioned before the end of this year and the other four during the course of next year. This extension of service was essential, and, on the whole, whilst there has been criticism from some ships' companies, I think the situation has been accepted by most of them. In dealing with personnel, I can say that, on the whole, recruitment is satisfactory, but we do want additional recruits for air crews. The one shortage which concerns the Board of Admiralty at the present time is the limited number who are offering themselves as air crew. Whilst there has been some slight improvement, there is still an urgent need. We also want recruits for short-service periods, with a possibility of being taken into the permanent Service during the period of eight years if they are suitable. If they are unsuitable, there is a substantial gratuity paid to them at the end of their period.

We also require a number of volunteers from National Service men to train as pilots and observers. We would welcome a number of applications for this work. There is still a shortage of higher and experienced ratings, and this continues to concern us. I thought the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, was a little critical in this regard. He must realise that one of the great difficulties in the matter of the scarcity of experienced ratings was the lack of recruitment during the war period. Indeed, there was no regular recruitment apart from boy recruits, and the long-service senior ratings who are required at the present time are men who joined the Navy in the early 'thirties, have done their twelve years and have also had a very hard war. It has been very difficult to keep them. It is true that there was some delay in agreeing to the payment of the bounty, but that has now been paid and we are hoping that we shall get still more than has been promised. But without these people we just cannot carry on as we should like.

To back up our Regular Forces we have a steadily increasing body of Reserves which number more than 50,000 of all types. But our Reserves are now benefiting by a growing number of National Service men. Since January, 1949, 10,000 of these men have either passed through the Navy and gone on to the Reserve, or are still serving. There will be greater additions during this year.

LORD STRABOLGI

Does that include Marines as well?

VISCOUNT HALL

Yes, it does. I should like to say a word about the R.N.V.R. air branch, which has been maintained at almost full air crew strength during the last year and has accomplished a total of 7,000 flying hours during that period. The standard achieved during the annual periods of continuous training compares favourably with that of the first-line squadrons. We intend to form a fifth R.N.V.R. air squadron at Ford, in Southern England. This will meet the many applications for R.N.V.R. air crews in that area.

The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, and the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, asked about officer recruitment. I assure them that officer recruitment generally is quite satisfactory. The first two 16-age entries have now passed out of the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, and have gone to the training cruiser. Reports indicate that these cadets will maintain the high standard of the naval officer entry under the earlier system. The standard of entry is good—about 200 for each entry —and the intake into the Navy at each entry is about thirty. We expect much larger numbers at the next entry. The noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, asked whether it was true that there was a stipulation that 50 per cent. of the new entry should come from State schools. There is no stipulation of that kind. Boys from any school, whether it is a secondary, grammar or public school, can apply, and, of course, there is keen competition for the places which are available. I think it can be said that, on the whole, the standard of naval officer under the sixteen entry is as good as it was under the thirteen-and-a-half entry. The special entry is maintaining its standard.

The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, asked about the promotion of officers from the lower deck. During last year no fewer than thirty-eight C.W. candidates were promoted to acting sub-lieutenant, and altogether, including promotions to branch rank, 23 per cent. of the total number of promotions last year came from the lower deck, which I think is a very good record. I have been asked about the change in the uniforms of the R.N.V.R. and the R.N.R. The arguments for the change were well put by Lord Winster—namely, that there should be no distinction between officers in the R.N.V.R. and R.N.R. and officers in the Regular Navy. That is what we are aiming at, and at last we have done something towards it by doing away with the wavy stripe. But it must be remembered that there are many Reserve officers who were very proud of their wavy stripe. In deciding whether or not to proceed with the change we had to consider carefully the sentimental attachment of so many officers to that stripe. After approaching official organisations representative of the various classes of Reserve officers, we discovered that in the main they were in favour of the change. Indeed, so far I have not had any representation, with the exception of that made by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, in respect of this change.

LORD TEYNHAM

Perhaps the noble Viscount will allow me to intervene for a moment. My suggestion was that if it is desirable to make any change at all, the change should be to sweep away all distinction between the various types of officers. That was my main point.

VISCOUNT HALL

That is the difference between myself and the noble Lord: he has always been a young man in a hurry, but we think we ought to go by stages. I feel that stage one, more distinctive than anything else, was the question of the stripe, and that matter is now being dealt with. Questions have also been raised in relation to the flying of the Blue Ensign by British merchant officers who served in the Reserve. As Lord Teynham rightly stated, we have reduced the numbers of Reserve personnel serving in a ship from sixteen to four. If the captain has been an officer in one of the Reserve branches he can fly the Blue Ensign. I will certainly take note of what the noble Lord said about leaving it to the officer himself, if there is just one Reserve officer—namely, the commanding officer—in the ship, and whether that can be done. It is cutting it rather fine, I think, to do it in that way, but I will certainly look at this point to see whether something can be done.

Before I conclude, I must make some reference to the Merchant Navy, upon which this nation so much depends during war and peace, and without which the nation could not hope to survive. The Admiralty, in their preparedness programme, are making provision (this matter was referred to by Lord Winster) for the protection of merchant ships during war, for we have been storing materials for degaussing for a long time, and large orders have been placed recently, as part of the accelerated defence programme. I am hoping that this work will be proceeded with as soon as possible, with the full consent and co-operation of the ship owners. Sufficient stocks of dual-purpose weapons for arming the entire Merchant Navy in an emergency have already been accumulated, and are suitably distributed throughout the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, together with large quantities of auxiliary equipment. Ship strengthening for guns was included in the construction of all ships in the Service at the end of the war, and with but a few exceptions almost all ships which have been built since the beginning of 1947 have been so constructed. We are hoping to deal with the few which have not had this operation carried out.

A system of improved sub-division of ships proposed by the Board has recently been incorporated in a very satisfactory proportion of newly constructed ships. The question of extending the bulkheads and improving the sub-division of ships already in the Service is also under consideration at the Admiralty. We have reconstituted the Merchant Navy defence courses, similar to those which were held before and during the last war. These courses have commenced in London, Liverpool. Glasgow and Newcastle-on-Tyne. Their object is to familiarise Merchant Navy personnel with the measures which would be taken by the Royal Navy for the protection of the Mercantile Marine in time of war, and the part which they will be expected to play in an emergency. They also include gunnery instruction, of which sufficient is taught to enable naval officers to become armament officers on defensively equipped merchant ships and men to become members of their gun crews. Officers of the Royal Navy are attached for short periods in merchant ships, to enable them to achieve a better understanding of the problems of the Merchant Navy officers and of the capabilities of their ships. These arrangements will, I have no doubt, preserve and foster the good relationship which has always existed between these two Services, particularly in war time. In connection with the matter of merchant shipping it is interesting to note the flood of orders which has flowed into shipbuilding yards during the last year or so, and which are still accumulating. In 1949, the total number of orders placed in shipbuilding yards in this country were for less than 400,000 tons. In 1950—last year—the figure was 1,570,000 tons. From January 1 to March 30 this year—three months—the total number of orders placed amounted to 1,466,000 tons. It might be asked what is the position with regard to the placing of orders for naval ships. We have already discussed this matter with warship builders, and berths are already being kept in some of the larger yards for the purpose of dealing with any naval orders which are forthcoming.

Both the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, and the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, asked me questions with regard to the improved conditions of service and pay in the Naval Ordnance Inspector's Department. I interrupted Lord Teynham, and reminded him that after the deputation had waited upon me some increase of pay was made. I should not like him to think that the naval ordnance inspectors were satisfied with the increases which they received—it would be misleading to say that. Nevertheless, some increase was made. Then there was a question as to the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, and I can understand the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, feeling so strongly about this matter. I have always maintained that the Corps is one of the most important branches of the Admiralty Service. It cannot be said that nothing has been done to improve conditions. In fact, much has been done, particularly in relation to the Director and some of the Deputy Directors. To-day I have been informed that an increase has been given to the constructors. It is not large—an increase of £50 a year on the minimum and of £125 a year on the maximum salaries. The noble Viscount may regard it as a little cynical for me to say that we are still dealing with the question of students. I promise him that I will press for the settlement of this matter as soon as possible. I appreciate their difficulties, but we have our difficulties as well. It is one of those things with which, un-fortunately, we have not been able to get to grips, but I hope that we shall do so in the very near future.

LORD TEYNHAM

Does the noble Viscount intend to make clear that this increase to the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors has been made since the deputation, of which I was a member, saw the noble Viscount?

VISCOUNT HALL

With regard to the increases to the Director and Deputy Directors I think that these have been made since the noble Lord saw me, but I should not like to be sure about that. So far as the constructors are concerned, the news came through to-day.

I am afraid that I have kept your Lordships and tried your patience. I entirely agree with what noble Lords have said: that, with all the scientific and mechanical changes which are taking place in the Royal Navy, its role remains the same—that is, to keep the sea roads open, to prevent any interruption in sea traffic, and to deny the seas to the ships of the enemy. This can be done only by maintaining an adequate well-balanced Navy, including all types of the best-equipped ships, to protect our Commonwealth and world-wide commitments, and to make our proper contribution to the Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This powerful group of twelve nations, every one making its full contribution to the Defence services—sea, air and land—set up, not for the purpose of aggression but to ensure world peace, should, in the event of peace being broken, be sufficiently strong to overcome the enemy, whoever that enemy may be. That is still the purpose of the Royal Navy, and it is for that purpose that we require the money which is contained in the Estimates.

5.52 p.m.

LORD TEYNHAM

My Lords, I am sure your Lordships will agree that we have had an interesting debate this afternoon, and have covered a large field. We are indebted to the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Admiralty for giving us so much information. We all join with the noble Viscount in our appreciation of the great work done by the Royal Navy in Korea and Malaya. I was a little disappointed in his statement with reference to the construction of new frigates and the dates of their completion. I hope that their construction will be accelerated as much as possible. I was somewhat surprised to hear that the three cruisers in question are not yet to be proceeded with, and are to await further experiments. I suggest that the three cruisers should be completed and three more laid down. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, said that we had only twenty-six cruisers, which is a quite inadequate number for the work they have to carry out. The noble Viscount, Lord Hall, made reference, and rightly so, to the menace of minelaying by Russia, and said that a great deal of scientific research was being done by this country. But what he failed to tell us was about the minesweepers that are to be constructed to deal with this potential heavy attack by mines. I know that a number of these ships are to be laid down, but we know very little about the completion dates. Are all the materials for building these ships available? Can the noble Viscount assure us that we shall have a large number of minesweepers, say 50 per cent., laid down in the next twelve months? These are the important points we ought to know. Again, I was somewhat disappointed that the noble Viscount said nothing about Coastal Command. We have pressed on numerous occasions the question of Coastal Command, and I feel that I must reserve the right to put down at some future date a Motion to call special attention to Coastal Command. I do not want to press these points this afternoon, how-ever, and I beg leave of the House to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.