HL Deb 11 April 1951 vol 171 cc241-7

3.23 p.m.

LORD TEYNHAM rose to call attention to the Memorandum on the Naval Estimates recently presented, and to ask His Majesty's Government whether they are satisfied that the proposals therein contained are adequate for the defence of the country; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Motion has not been set down for the purpose of harassing or castigating His Majesty's Government in their efforts to rebuild the Fleet, but, on the contrary, in an attempt to extract from them a little more information as to what is being accomplished, and the extent of their plans for the future. It is true, I think, that in the presentation of the Naval Estimates for this year His Majesty's Government have endeavoured to provide far more information than usual. I suggest, however, that they have still not gone quite far enough, and that there remains a good deal more which might be disclosed without giving away any harmful secrets. We on this side of the House have frequently pressed His Majesty's Government for more information, because we feel that it is essential that the public should be kept as well informed of the rearmament programme as possible. I have little doubt that full information would go a long way towards heartening the country as a whole, and I believe that the people will be far more ready to find the necessary money if they know that something really effective is to be done and know how their money is going to be spent. I hope that to-day we shall hear from the noble Viscount, the First Lord of the Admiralty, a full account of the activities of his Department.

In another place, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty indicated that the major problem with which the Navy has to contend at the present time is the tremendous increase in the speed of attack—which means, of course, that we must have instruments to detect the attacker at the greatest possible distance. I understand that extensive research is being carried out in these matters, and that one or two prototype instruments have been produced to meet this great increase in speed of attack. I am sure we are all delighted to know that the Navy is well ahead in the design of such equipment, but I think there is a great danger that the completion of ships may be delayed until the scientists have perfected their equipment to their satisfaction. That danger has been repeatedly stressed in your Lordships' House, but none the less it still appears to be somewhat prevalent. I feel sure that the Admiralty are bearing this point in mind, but we are a little concerned that the three cruisers which, as your Lordships are aware, have been on the stocks for many years, are still to be delayed until new fire control instruments and guided missile weapons have been perfected. Surely it is now necessary to complete at least two of these ships at the earliest possible moment, rather than that delay should occur to all of them. Why not delay the completion of, shall we say, only the third cruiser until she can be fitted with the very latest equipment now under design and until experiments have been made? Perhaps the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Admiralty can give the House some indication as to when these ships are to be taken in hand again and completed. I understand that H.M.S. "Cumberland," has already been fitted out as an experimental ship for guided missiles, rocket propulsion and so on, and perhaps the noble Viscount, the First Lord of the Admiralty, can give your Lordships some information about this ship.

His Majesty's Government, I gather, are proposing to accelerate for the Navy a plan which, as many of your Lordships are aware, has been in existence for some time. I understand that the immediate effect of this acceleration will be to bring forward a further sixty ships from the Reserve Fleet, and to put them into the Active Fleet, and the conversion of some forty-five destroyers into antisubmarine frigates. The increase in the number of specialised ships for anti-submarine warfare is, of course, of the utmost importance, but by converting destroyers we are not thereby increasing the total number of anti-submarine vessels available. When we turn to new construction, we find that twenty-four frigates are to be laid down. That is a welcome improvement on last year's Estimates, but I should like to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty when it is proposed that these ships shall be completed. I think it was intimated in another place that these vessels might only be laid down during the next three years, and that no completion date has been fixed. If this is true, I consider that the position is most unsatisfactory. I suggest that considerable acceleration of this building programme is vitally necessary to bring our anti-submarine forces up to strength, and I hope that this acceleration is not being prevented by the usual bottleneck in engine production, which, as your Lordships are aware, occurred not only during the last war but also in the 1914–18 war, when we found it necessary to expand our light forces. We on this side of the House have frequently warned His Majesty's Government to make provision for engines suit-able for escort ships, and I hope that His Majesty's Government will be able to relieve our anxiety on this point.

Now I should like to turn for a few minutes to the question of naval personnel. As your Lordships are no doubt aware, those men on seven- and twelve-year engagements are being retained for service in the Fleet for some eighteen months, and there is no doubt that many of them are suffering considerable hardship. In my view a good deal of this hardship could have been avoided if His Majesty's Government had long ago taken steps to work out a proper manning policy. The fact is that the Navy is short of senior and experienced ratings, and has been so for some considerable time; and that is the real reason for the extension of the service of the seven-and twelve-year men. I am by no means convinced that the necessity for these retentions was due entirely to the war in Korea. During previous debates we on this side of the House have repeatedly warned His Majesty's Government that a difficult manning position would arise in the Fleet unless steps were taken to arrest the drain on experienced ratings from the Service. In fact, it was not until September of last year that a gratuity for men leaving after ten years was extended to include a bounty of £100 to men who re-engaged. I suggest that this might well have been carried out long ago, and we should not then have lost a very large percentage of ratings, who were in fact the backbone of the Fleet. I hope the First Lord is giving his full consideration to a properly thought out manning policy, so that we shall not again find ourselves in the difficulties in which we are at present and have been for a considerable period.

No doubt your Lordships have seen an announcement in the Press recently with regard to the change to be made in the uniform of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve officers and Royal Naval Reserve officers. I must say that it all seems rather complicated and unnecessary. I should like to ask the First Lord who is going to pay for this change, because gold stripes in these days are not by any means inexpensive. I understand that the idea behind this change is to remove the distinction in uniform between Reserve and Regular officers, but on the other hand certain distinctions are still to be made in certain categories—by leaving the letter "R" inside the curl and so on— and that the old type of buttons of the R.N.V.R. officers are to be reintroduced. At the present time, surely any unnecessary expense should be avoided. In any case, as distinctions are still to be retained, what is the reason for making any change at all? If a change is desirable—though I am assured that on this point there is a considerable difference of opinion among R.N.V.R. officers themselves—I should have thought it would be far better to remove all distinctions in uniform between Reserve and Regular officers, as is done in the American Navy, rather than make the proposed changes. I hope the traditions of the R.N.V.R. will not be changed in other respects. I seem to remember that frequently one of the distinguishing marks of the R.N.V.R. officers was their flowing and handsome beards. I sincerely trust that they will be in no way prevented from continuing this tradition, in spite of certain directions recently issued from the George Cross Island.

I hope that the First Lord will give consideration to the present conditions in which a Merchant Navy officer may fly the Blue Ensign. I believe I am right in saying that an officer holding the rank of Captain, R.N.R., who has on board his ship no fewer than four active service R.N.R. ratings, is entitled to fly the Blue Ensign. May I suggest to the First Lord that a Captain, R.N.R., in command of a Merchant Navy ship should be entitled to fly the Blue Ensign apart from any regulation as to the numbers of R.N.R. seamen on board his ship. I think that at one time the necessary qualification amounted to sixteen R.N.R. ratings, and this number has been gradually reduced to four. The number of qualified R.N.R. seamen now available, however, is small and is likely to be reduced, because, in the event of war, in present conditions they would receive considerably more pay by remaining merchant seamen than by becoming R.N.R. seamen. Until this question of pay is settled on an equitable basis, there will be a continuance of this shortage of R.N.R. seamen. I suggest that the shortage of R.N.R. seamen is a very serious matter, and I hope that the First Lord will look into this matter as soon as possible, and, at the same time, will consider giving a Captain, R.N.R., the right to fly the Blue Ensign irrespective of the number of qualified R.N.R. seamen in his ship.

I should like to be assured, as I am sure would all your Lordships, that stock-piling of equipment for the rearmament of our Merchant Navy is being carried out. I refer, of course, to anti-submarine equipment and degaussing equipment, to protect them from magnetic mines, and also to the provision of guns of sufficient calibre to defend them against submarine attack on the surface. I hope the First Lord will be able to give your Lordships some information on this point. May I now refer for a few minutes to the pay and conditions in the Naval Ordnance Inspection Department? As your Lordships are aware, this matter has been frequently referred to in your Lordships' House, and I do not propose to go into the question in any detail to-day. I understand that there was a recent deputation to the noble Viscount, the First Lord, on this matter, and I hope that since the date of this deputation he has given favourable consideration to the views that were then put before him.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (VISCOUNT HALL)

My Lords, may I say that increases have been granted since the deputation was received?

LORD TEYNHAM

I am delighted to hear that. The officers serving in that branch felt they were having a raw deal, and I am delighted to know these increases have been made. I shall have great pleasure in looking into them. I understand also that little has been done in connection with the Royal Corps of Naval Instructors. I feel that they require better treatment than they are receiving at the present time.

To turn for a few minutes to what one might call the application and definition of sea power, I think that in some quarters there is a certain amount of confusion as to its application in modern warfare. May I say at once that in spite of scientific developments, the task of the Navy has not really changed at all? That task is, of course, the control of sea communications. This cannot be carried out by the Navy alone. I would say that the correct definition of sea power is really nowadays sea-air power, and should always be considered in that light; and of course the Navy itself, with naval aviation, contributes in no small measure to this dual power. Naval aviation is now accepted as an integral part of our naval activity, and naval aircraft are in a similar category to guns, torpedoes, boats or any other manifestation of naval life. But this is nothing like sufficient to establish a sea-air power supremacy.

I would say that the establishment of sea-air power depends not only on naval shipboard aircraft, or even upon the co-operation of Coastal Command, but it may well depend on heavy attacks delivered by Bomber Command upon enemy submarine bases and upon enemy warships in harbour. The Navy certainly appreciated the great contribution to sea power which was made in the last war by the R.A.F., and the work which they carried out, such as extensive minelaying activities and the bombing of submarine bases. I have little doubt that the Navy is assured of the same full co-operation in the future. But we are much concerned about the position of Coastal Command, which is of vital importance in anti-submarine warfare. Can the noble Viscount the First Lord give us some information about Coastal Command, as to whether plans have been prepared to increase the number of aircraft and pilots for this important service? This information has been asked for repeatedly from His Majesty's Government, not only in Defence debates but in previous years when Naval Estimates have been presented, but little or no information has been forthcoming so far. I hope we shall also be told that a section of the R.A.F. are receiving specialised training in mine-laying so that we shall be ready to go into action at a moment's notice. There is no doubt that the secret of success in anti-submarine warfare is the complete linking together of all the methods of attack and defence—in the air, on the water and under the water. We are not satisfied yet that this link is complete and ready to operate as a whole. I hope the First Lord will be able to assure your Lordships on this important matter.

I do not propose to-day to enlarge on the question of the North Atlantic Supreme Command, in view of the Government's promised White Paper, but I should like to ask the noble Viscount when it is proposed to publish that White Paper. On the other hand, I feel that I must say that the proposed appointment is another manifestation that the Navy to-day is to some extent losing its influence in the world, as we have known it in the past. The Navy undoubtedly has had a strong cohesive effect on the British Empire. We must not forget that we are far more than an overcrowded island with only the Western Approaches to defend. We are the centre of a great, powerful and united British Commonwealth, which stretches around the world. It is this powerful group of nations which we must defend, and we must plan accordingly. If we fail to realise the significance of our sea power, we may well lose our position at the centre of this great group of nations, and perhaps sow the seeds of disintegration. I cannot help feeling that the proposed Supreme Command in the North Atlantic, coupled with other matters, indicates a policy which will have the effect of reducing the influence of our command at sea and transferring our efforts so that we become more and more a Continental Power. I have little doubt that we are face to face with an issue of policy of the greatest magnitude and, what is more, we appear to have drifted into decisions without the country realising what is happening. I feel that we should quickly review every aspect of our sea power to-day. I beg to move for Papers.