Lords Sitting of 11 April 1951

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The Lord Chancellor on the Woolsack.
Prayers
The Lord Trefgarne—Took the Oath.
LORD HUNGARTON
Archibald Crawford, Esquire, having been created Baron Hungarton, of Hungarton in the County of Leicester—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.

THE COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
2.45 p.m.
LORD TREFGARNE: My Lords, I ask leave of the House to make a personal statement. The occasion arises out of certain untrue assertions which have been made and widely reported in the Press, including the Colonial Press, reflecting upon my conduct of certain affairs during the time when I was Chairman of the Colonial Development Corporation. The statements to which I desire to invite your Lordships' attention relate to the first undertaking launched by the Corporation early in 1948 in Gambia. Some of your Lordships no doubt remember that the undertaking was one for the clearance of 10.000 acres of bush in that Colony, in order to produce feeding stuffs for poultry. The total amount of expenditure involved was £850.000. The Corporation has recently decided to write off about half the capital involved and, I understand, to curtail the scheme.
The statements to which I desire to invite your Lordships' attention, and which have brought me here to-day, are that in pursuance of this scheme I, as Chairman of the Corporation, acted in an arbitrary and high-handed manner; overrode technical advice from within the Corporation; improperly made appointments without the approval of the Board; that I authorised unduly favourable announcements regarding the progress of the undertaking; and, lastly, that I withheld from the Board adverse reports about the scheme which might, if communicated to the Board, have brought into play remedial
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measures for its troubles. My Lords, political motives or no political motives, these are serious charges. Were they true, they would indicate a standard of conduct below that which would be expected from the Chairman of such a body, and certainly below that which your Lordships would expect from a member of this House occupying such a position. As I was abroad when those statements were made, I am taking the first opportunity after my return to deny them here.
Before doing so, I wish to make a few general observations about the undertaking. First, let me make it clear that I acknowledge the chief responsibility for its establishment. It was the first of a number of projects I proposed to the Board in the ordinary course of my duty as Chairman. This project made the greater call upon my own attention because, being the first operative undertaking of the Corporation, it naturally became the focal point for the discussion of questions of procedure with the Treasury and Government Departments. The fact that I myself had to take direct charge of these extrinsic aspects of the scheme has led to the fantastic suggestion that I had undertaken its commercial management at headquarters. The project was in fact shaped by a mission consisting of an American, Mr. Phillips, and an accountant in the employ of the Corporation, who together spent several weeks in the Colony. His Excellency the Governor, the Chief Agricultural Officer in the Colony and others were consulted, and the Gambia Government gave their strong support to the scheme. It was unanimously approved by the Board of the Corporation, including at every stage the late Sir Frank Stockdale, the senior full-time executive of the Corporation—I think universally acknowledged to be one of the world's greatest authorities on tropical agriculture. The project was launched with a capital of £500,000 in the spring of 1948.
It will not surprise those of your Lordships who are acquainted with such matters to hear that the undertaking, though not one of the largest of the Corporation's undertakings, was one of the most formidable; and it encountered, during the two and a half years of its life, a succession of four setbacks. The first three, namely, a shortage of timber production, infertility of hatching eggs, and a serious outbreak of fowl typhoid last July

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and August, were successfully overcome. The final reverse was the partial failure of the harvest last November and December; and I believe that this was the proximate cause of the Board's decision to curtail the Scheme.
I now make the considered statement that not one of the setbacks which occurred in my time was regarded by the Manager, by the headquarters officials concerned, by me, or by the Board, as destructive of the basis of the scheme. All was reported in writing by the officials direct to the Board. All the officials, including the Project Manager, the present Deputy Chairman and myself, and the Controller of Operations—the senior official of the Corporation—visited the undertaking during its course. My Lords, in looking back on these proceedings I own frankly that the judgment of the Board and the officials might have been affected by my own confidence, even optimism, about this undertaking. For that fault I have no defence. All the material information, however, was fully reported to the Board. Because Corporation documents alone can establish that fact conclusively, I am obliged to quote from them to the House.
One of the means by which the Board was informed was a quarterly report on every undertaking which gave a record of progress or setback. These reports were prepared by the Controller of Operations in consultation with the senior technical manager—the divisional manager— concerned. I do not propose to trouble your Lordships with the difficulties which arose during 1949, except, perhaps, to quote briefly from the last report of that year. The progress during that quarter was reported thus by the Controller in the quarterly report of December 1, 1949:
"The construction stage is now drawing to an end. This undertaking has been given a good start and there exists a sound basis for successful future operations."
It is when we come to the crucial documents and reports of March to October last year that I must earnestly beg for a measure of patience as I read to your Lordships. For brevity I will, without comment, read short material extracts from the relevant reports. In the report of March 2, 1950, it is stated:
"In the period under review "—
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that is, the quarterly period:
"a total of 118,175 eggs were laid, averaging 18 per bird per month …. The bulk of eggs were incubated, the remainder consumed locally …. Initial hatches gave fairly satisfactory results of approximately 50 per cent. of total eggs set but there was a progressive reduction in November and December …. Results began to improve from mid-January onwards and hatches of over 60 per cent. are once more being obtained."
In the summary the following statement was made:
"The shortfall in the target production of eggs for sale in 1950 may be of the order of 40 per cent.… Secondly, insufficient feeding stuffs have been produced to maintain the flock till next harvest."
The report of June 1, 1950, said:
"Except for the setback to hatching in November/December last, the poultry side of the undertaking continues to thrive. What is not so satisfactory is farming operations. Profitability depends on our growing enough food at a low price, and failure to reach the target of 10,000 acres mechanically sown by June, 1950, is a disappointment."
On June 15, 1950, there was a special report requesting board authority for a loan mainly for the purchase of feeding stuffs. It said:
"Provided the 1950 harvest reaches the manager's expectations, the revenue from January, 1951, will be more than sufficient to meet further expenditure. A permanent increase in the capital of the undertaking is not recommended. It is considered that the loan could be repaid by the end of 1952 partly from profits and partly by the sale of equipment not required when full development has been reached."
In July, 1950—that is last year—the divisional manager at my request paid a special visit to the undertaking. In the discussions which followed his return it was reported to me that adverse weather conditions had caused heavy mortality in the flock. It was provisionally decided that the management should be strengthened and that thereupon consideration should be given to some alterations in the physical layout of the flocks. It was thought that new management would make the changes more effective.
Now I am coming to perhaps the most crucial report of September 7 last. That report is noteworthy because it embodied the results of the Divisional Manager's visit as well as later information. In this paper the Board were specifically informed of the mortality of 29,000 out of a total of 127,000 chicks hatched, of the total egg sales and of timber production. As in all former reports, up-to-date figures were given of acreages tree-felled, acreages

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stumped and under crop. It was also reported that 1,161 acres had had to be replanted because of pest attack and other causes. But I wish to emphasise that even after this report, though we were all conscious of the difficulties, no doubt arose in our minds of our intention and ability to carry this undertaking through to success. To bear this out I will read from the Controller's summary of the report of last September:
"The Divisional Manager was favouably impressed by the drive shown by the project manager in launching the scheme. … He reported favourably on the types of soil and in his opinion the land should produce satisfactory crops with efficient farm management. … This project has had the great benefit of energetic drive and direction. It is difficult to underrate the great physical achievement that Mr. Phillips has gained for the Corporation. In all except the full target for agriculture the major portion of the tough pioneering stage of development is over. But the experience of two years would indicate that we have yet some distance to go before our methods and technique can be deemed fully adequate for all tropical hazards."
At the Board meeting on October 26, five days before I left the Corporation, it was the view of the Controller of Operations and the Divisional Manager, shared by me and reported to the Board, that the undertaking would now make better progress under new management and that with certain proposed modifications in the undertaking the original production aimed at could still, though perhaps with a little delay, be achieved. These proposals were recommended by the Divisional Manager in person to the Board, and accepted by them.
At this Board meeting, for the first and only time during my Chairmanship, two members of the Board recorded their dissent from the decisions taken. Since that date four members of the Board, including myself, have left the Corporation, and the views of the minority appear now to have been accepted. There remains one charge made in another place concerning the appointment of the American manager that I think can be conclusively dismissed by a recital of the facts. I myself visited the island of Eleuthera in January, 1948, and found Mr. Phillips successfully managing a large poultry farm of between 75,000 and 100,000 birds. He had resigned owing to some disagreement with his employer. On my return he cabled me saying he was free and could he come across for an interview.
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In consultations with the late Sir Frank Stockdale, we discussed at length with Mr. Phillips the possibilities of such a scheme in Gambia. On March 18, 1948, the Board authorised me to settle terms of employment with Mr. Phillips and to send him to Gambia with an accountant to investigate the proposal. There was never any question of my making appointments in the Corporation, other than to my personal staff, without the authority of the Board and the wise procedure of interview by an appointments committee, always provided, of course, that there is enough experience on the committee for the judgment of men.
If all this wearisome evidence has successfully engaged your Lordships' attention, you may feel that the charges which have been made are unjustified. There is something else I feel bound to say, and I will say it, I hope, in words of the utmost moderation. It will be for me a matter of enduring regret that my successor, the noble Lord, Lord Reith, heard these charges in my absence abroad and allowed them to go unanswered. He had only to press the bell and say: "What is the truth about this? "
There is something else I feel I should like to say in order to place this matter in its proper setting. It is a matter of my personal opinion which, frankly, at this difficult moment I cannot expect to carry conviction to your Lordships. I am of opinion that the problem of growing 5,000 or 6,000 tons of feeding stuffs for poultry or pigs on the 10,000 acres is not so insuperable. The native African obtains, year in, year out, average yields of ground-nuts of 1,200 lb. to the acre in Gambia, and a smaller but adequate yield of 600 lb. to the acre of sorghum and coarse grains. Two harvests on the Corporation farm partially failed, but the second deficiency was the result of conditions which plagued all agriculture in the Colony and which made the quality of the ground-nut yield from Gambia the worst in living memory. Incidentally, the British taxpayer, whose name is invoked in relation to this scheme and who so often gets the worst end of the stick, has for years received a large subsidy by the purchase below world price of 60,000 tons of ground-nuts from Gambia, and the resale to that Colony of British goods at full value. I will not labour that point.
If the Board have now decided not to persevere with this undertaking, I have

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one final plea to make. It is that the Gambia decision should not be allowed to destroy your Lordships' confidence in the great bulk of the Corporation's work. This undertaking, inspired by the dire need of the Colony, was one of the most hazardous of the Corporation's fifty undertakings. Of the remainder of public money involved, about £10,000,000 is in absolutely secure investment, such as an electricity undertaking, a building society, a large long-term forestry undertaking and other enterprises where the commercial risk is negligible. Most of the agricultural and other undertakings are planned in progressive stages which can, if necessary, be modified without loss to meet a changing ratio between costs and commodity prices. The proportion of the capital of £30,000,000 which is committed to unduly speculative operations apart from Gambia is less than 2 per cent, and is spread over four or five smaller undertakings.
It is my respectful advice and request to noble Lords to judge the Corporation's work by a study of its undertakings rather than by the sweeping criticisms which are heard to-day. Such an analysis would yield facts and figures which, in my judgment, would go far to renew your Lordships' confidence in a policy supported at its initiation by all Parties and which, unless the flag is hauled down or smeared with untrue criticism, will do much for the Empire. I am afraid I have made a heavy call on the patience of the House. I thank your Lordships for your tolerant attention.
3.7 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I would not seek to comment at this stage upon the statement which has been made by the noble Lord. It clearly deserves our careful study. In so far as it relates not to his personal honour but to the judgment of the Corporation, it might properly form the subject of a later debate in this House. I would ask the Leader of the House whether he would give us an assurance that, in accordance with the usual practice, the documents from which the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, has quoted, will be laid on the Table of the House.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (VISCOUNT ADDISON): My Lords. I have asked my noble friend
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about these reports. I understand that they were quarterly reports of the Board. The noble Lord assures me that he will provide us with all the documents in his possession. I shall be glad to lay them either on the Table of the House or anywhere else that is convenient to your Lordships.
Viscount SWINTON: My Lords, certain quotations were made by the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, in the course of his speech. He also referred to meetings of the Board and to discussions which took place there, and to certain reservations made by members of the Board which I believe he said they asked to have recorded. I am not sure whether the noble Lord read from these records, but since the noble Lord stated at considerable length the substance of the procedure at these Board meetings, I am sure the Leader of the House will agree that it would be appropriate, when the reports to which reference has been made are tabled, that the House should see also the minutes of the Board meetings.
VISCOUNT ADDISON: I will inquire into that point. I am afraid that I am not very well acquainted with the procedure in these matters, but I have impressed upon the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, and will do so again, the necessity for providing the House with every possible record that he can produce.
LORD TREFGARNE: May I say that I am not familiar with the proceedings of this House, and therefore I assumed that the documents in question would be made the subject of an Order by this House?
VISCOUNT SWINTON: With great respect, I should have thought not. The ordinary rule applying to Ministers is that if anybody quotes from a document, that document is laid. It does not require an Order of the House. That is done automatically.
LORD STRABOLGI: That is in the case of a Minister. My noble friend is not a Minister.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: I am well aware that the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, is not a Minister of the Crown. The Leader of the House has said that, in view of the rather exceptional character of the statement which has been made to

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us to-day, he considers that it would be entirely proper that all the relevant documents should be put at our disposal. I am perfectly content to accept that course. I share the view of the Leader of the House. I suggest that no formal Order is required, but that the reports will be laid as a matter of course.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, may I intervene for one moment? It seems to me that it may be a little difficult for some of these documents to be brought forward. I think in this case we must trust entirely to the Leader of the House.
LORD MILVERTON: My Lords, it is only by accident that I happen to be here this afternoon to hear the statement which the noble Lord has made. I am not unmindful of the agreement as to speaking by members of these Boards on subjects concerning the Boards. I do not wish to run counter to that agreement, but may I just say one thing which in fairness I think I ought to say, because otherwise silence might be taken as implying consent? It is no business of mine to defend the present Chairman of the Corporation, but the assumption which lies behind the complaint which has been made by the noble Lord against him is that everything that the noble Lord said is a correct representation of the facts. I can speak only as a part-time member of the Board concerned, and all I say at this stage is that I cannot endorse the accuracy of some of the statements which the noble Lord has made—I say that with the greatest regret. I feel that it is not reasonable to expect the present Chairman to go round making public statements in contradiction of Press reports, which perhaps would not be endorsed by the Board concerned.
LORD TREFGARNE: Everybody knows that the noble Lord feels strongly about all this, but I feel entitled to protest against his saying that he dissents from some of my statements, without indicating to the House which they are.
LORD MILVERTON: If I may say so, I thought that the whole discussion was rather an improper one to take place in this manner, and I curtailed my comments as much as I could. I do not pro-pose to be tempted into making any further statement.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
3.15 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I desire, with the permission of the House, to say that at 3.45 p.m. our proceedings this afternoon will be interrupted in order to enable my noble friend Lord Henderson to read a copy of a Statement to be made in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the conclusion of Questions. May I also say that it has been agreed through the usual channels that the Second Reading of the Supplies and Services (Defence Purposes) Bill, now on the Order Paper for tomorrow, April 12, shall be taken instead on April 17, and that the Second Reading of the Sea Fish Industry Bill, which is down on the Order Paper for the latter date, shall be postponed until Thursday, April 19.
THE EARL OF PERTH: Can the noble Lord inform us on what subject the Statement is to be made?
LORD SHEPHERD: I think it has regard to certain events that have occurred. I cannot give the details.
THE EARL OF PERTH: I do not ask for details, but just the general subject.
VISCOUNT ADDISON: It relates to matters arising in Korea, to General MacArthur's Command being given up, and matters related thereto.
LORD STRABOLGI: Before we initiate something of that sort, I should like here and now to inquire whether it is intended that this important Statement which my noble friend is to make shall be debated this afternoon. I very much hope that it will not be. It is a matter which should be carefully considered first. In view of recent experience in your Lordships' House, I think that if we are to have discussions initiated by the Leader of the Opposition and the noble Earl who speaks for the Liberal Party, we ought to know in advance, and try to keep at any rate to some Rules of Order on these matters.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I really do not know what the noble Lord's complaint is. I have not asked for this Statement, nor has the noble Earl, Lord Perth; we heard of it only this afternoon. It is the Government who are making the

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Statement, and on their own initiative. Therefore I do not think that the idea that we have asked for a Statement in order to initiate a debate without any previous warning to other noble Lords, has any substance whatever. Further, I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, that I entirely agree with him in saying that it would be most unsuitable for us to start on a debate without proper consideration of the Statement. At the same time, I hope that it will be possible for a debate to be initiated at an early date.
VISCOUNT ADDISON: Perhaps I, being the one responsible for the intrusion, may say a word. I understand that it is the wish of noble Lords that when an important Statement is made in another place this House shall be furnished by the appropriate Minister, at approximately the same time, with a copy of the Statement. It was only in fulfilment of that general understanding which is due to the House that this arrangement was made. I entirely agree with the noble Marquess and my noble friend behind me that it would be a great pity to spoil our other proceedings by debates on these Statements, and I sincerely hope that there will be no attempt at a debate to-day, because we shall be awaiting a Statement from my noble friend the First Lord of the Admiralty on the debate which is now before us. This arrangement is due entirely to the fact that I know the House like to have these Statements.
THE EARL OF PERTH: I hope the Leader of the House will remember that it has been the custom, when an important. Statement is made, that the Leaders of the Opposition and of the Liberal Party are permitted to make a very short comment, if it is thought necessary. I hope that procedure will be followed.

PROBLEM OF STOWAWAYS
3.20 p.m.
EARL HOWE: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they are aware that stowaways are arriving in this country at a rate of 600 per annum; whether any estimate has been made of the total stow-
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away population now in this country; whether the Government are taking any steps to stop or prevent the arrival of stowaways in this country and to return them to their country of origin.]
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VIS-COUNT JOWITT): My Lords, the average number of stowaways arriving at United Kingdom ports each year since 1945 is actually higher than the noble Earl has mentioned. It is about 750, of whom about 400 have claimed to be British. Alien stowaways are normally refused admission, and stowaways who claim to be British are admitted only if they can substantiate their claims. Of 708 stowaways who arrived at United Kingdom ports in 1950, 305 British subjects and 17 aliens were allowed to remain. No estimate can be made of the number of stowaways now in the United Kingdom. The Departments concerned have taken up with the shipping companies and with Colonial Governments the question of reducing the number of stowaways arriving at United Kingdom ports, and a number of measures, such as closer supervision at ports of embarkation, have been put into effect.
EARL HOWE: I thank the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor for the answer which he has given. It has been stated that the number of British subjects who have been stowaways and who are now in this country is something like 16,000, and that the traffic is to some extent organised. It is also said that there is a certain amount of evidence to show that it is organised. I hope that His Majesty's Government will be able to watch the position carefully.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: As I have said, it would be only a guess if I were to attempt to say how many stowaways there are in this country; no statistics are available. I agree with the noble Earl that the subject is one which needs watching.
LORD STRABOLGI: Does not all this show how very attractive this country is under the present Government? Everyone seems to be trying to get here.
3.22 p.m.

FALKIRK BURGH EXTENSION &C. ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.

NAVAL ESTIMATES
3.23 p.m.
LORD TEYNHAM LORD TEYNHAM rose to call attention to the Memorandum on the Naval Estimates recently presented, and to ask His Majesty's Government whether they are satisfied that the proposals therein contained are adequate for the defence of the country; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Motion has not been set down for the purpose of harassing or castigating His Majesty's Government in their efforts to rebuild the Fleet, but, on the contrary, in an attempt to extract from them a little more information as to what is being accomplished, and the extent of their plans for the future. It is true, I think, that in the presentation of the Naval Estimates for this year His Majesty's Government have endeavoured to provide far more information than usual. I suggest, however, that they have still not gone quite far enough, and that there remains a good deal more which might be disclosed without giving away any harmful secrets. We on this side of the House have frequently pressed His Majesty's Government for more information, because we feel that it is essential that the public should be kept as well informed of the rearmament programme as possible. I have little doubt that full information would go a long way towards heartening the country as a whole, and I believe that the people will be far more ready to find the necessary money if they know that something really effective is to be done and know how their money is going to be spent. I hope that to-day we shall hear from the noble Viscount, the First Lord of the Admiralty, a full account of the activities of his Department.
In another place, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty indicated that the major problem with which the Navy has to contend at the present time is the tremendous increase in the speed of attack—which means, of course, that we must have instruments to detect the attacker at the greatest possible distance. I understand that extensive research is being carried out in these matters, and that one or two prototype instruments have been produced to meet this great increase in speed of attack. I am sure we are all delighted to know that the Navy is well ahead in the design of such equipment, but I think there is a great
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danger that the completion of ships may be delayed until the scientists have perfected their equipment to their satisfaction. That danger has been repeatedly stressed in your Lordships' House, but none the less it still appears to be somewhat prevalent. I feel sure that the Admiralty are bearing this point in mind, but we are a little concerned that the three cruisers which, as your Lordships are aware, have been on the stocks for many years, are still to be delayed until new fire control instruments and guided missile weapons have been perfected. Surely it is now necessary to complete at least two of these ships at the earliest possible moment, rather than that delay should occur to all of them. Why not delay the completion of, shall we say, only the third cruiser until she can be fitted with the very latest equipment now under design and until experiments have been made? Perhaps the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Admiralty can give the House some indication as to when these ships are to be taken in hand again and completed. I understand that H.M.S. "Cumberland," has already been fitted out as an experimental ship for guided missiles, rocket propulsion and so on, and perhaps the noble Viscount, the First Lord of the Admiralty, can give your Lordships some information about this ship.
His Majesty's Government, I gather, are proposing to accelerate for the Navy a plan which, as many of your Lordships are aware, has been in existence for some time. I understand that the immediate effect of this acceleration will be to bring forward a further sixty ships from the Reserve Fleet, and to put them into the Active Fleet, and the conversion of some forty-five destroyers into antisubmarine frigates. The increase in the number of specialised ships for anti-submarine warfare is, of course, of the utmost importance, but by converting destroyers we are not thereby increasing the total number of anti-submarine vessels available. When we turn to new construction, we find that twenty-four frigates are to be laid down. That is a welcome improvement on last year's Estimates, but I should like to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty when it is proposed that these ships shall be completed. I think it was intimated in another place that these vessels might only be laid down during the next three years, and that no completion date has

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been fixed. If this is true, I consider that the position is most unsatisfactory. I suggest that considerable acceleration of this building programme is vitally necessary to bring our anti-submarine forces up to strength, and I hope that this acceleration is not being prevented by the usual bottleneck in engine production, which, as your Lordships are aware, occurred not only during the last war but also in the 1914–18 war, when we found it necessary to expand our light forces. We on this side of the House have frequently warned His Majesty's Government to make provision for engines suit-able for escort ships, and I hope that His Majesty's Government will be able to relieve our anxiety on this point.
Now I should like to turn for a few minutes to the question of naval personnel. As your Lordships are no doubt aware, those men on seven- and twelve-year engagements are being retained for service in the Fleet for some eighteen months, and there is no doubt that many of them are suffering considerable hardship. In my view a good deal of this hardship could have been avoided if His Majesty's Government had long ago taken steps to work out a proper manning policy. The fact is that the Navy is short of senior and experienced ratings, and has been so for some considerable time; and that is the real reason for the extension of the service of the seven-and twelve-year men. I am by no means convinced that the necessity for these retentions was due entirely to the war in Korea. During previous debates we on this side of the House have repeatedly warned His Majesty's Government that a difficult manning position would arise in the Fleet unless steps were taken to arrest the drain on experienced ratings from the Service. In fact, it was not until September of last year that a gratuity for men leaving after ten years was extended to include a bounty of £100 to men who re-engaged. I suggest that this might well have been carried out long ago, and we should not then have lost a very large percentage of ratings, who were in fact the backbone of the Fleet. I hope the First Lord is giving his full consideration to a properly thought out manning policy, so that we shall not again find ourselves in the difficulties in which we are at present and have been for a considerable period.
No doubt your Lordships have seen an announcement in the Press recently with regard to the change to be made in the uniform of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve officers and Royal Naval Reserve officers. I must say that it all seems rather complicated and unnecessary. I should like to ask the First Lord who is going to pay for this change, because gold stripes in these days are not by any means inexpensive. I understand that the idea behind this change is to remove the distinction in uniform between Reserve and Regular officers, but on the other hand certain distinctions are still to be made in certain categories—by leaving the letter "R" inside the curl and so on— and that the old type of buttons of the R.N.V.R. officers are to be reintroduced. At the present time, surely any unnecessary expense should be avoided. In any case, as distinctions are still to be retained, what is the reason for making any change at all? If a change is desirable—though I am assured that on this point there is a considerable difference of opinion among R.N.V.R. officers themselves—I should have thought it would be far better to remove all distinctions in uniform between Reserve and Regular officers, as is done in the American Navy, rather than make the proposed changes. I hope the traditions of the R.N.V.R. will not be changed in other respects. I seem to remember that frequently one of the distinguishing marks of the R.N.V.R. officers was their flowing and handsome beards. I sincerely trust that they will be in no way prevented from continuing this tradition, in spite of certain directions recently issued from the George Cross Island.
I hope that the First Lord will give consideration to the present conditions in which a Merchant Navy officer may fly the Blue Ensign. I believe I am right in saying that an officer holding the rank of Captain, R.N.R., who has on board his ship no fewer than four active service R.N.R. ratings, is entitled to fly the Blue Ensign. May I suggest to the First Lord that a Captain, R.N.R., in command of a Merchant Navy ship should be entitled to fly the Blue Ensign apart from any regulation as to the numbers of R.N.R. seamen on board his ship. I think that at one time the necessary qualification amounted to sixteen R.N.R. ratings, and this number has been gradually reduced to four. The number of qualified R.N.R.

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seamen now available, however, is small and is likely to be reduced, because, in the event of war, in present conditions they would receive considerably more pay by remaining merchant seamen than by becoming R.N.R. seamen. Until this question of pay is settled on an equitable basis, there will be a continuance of this shortage of R.N.R. seamen. I suggest that the shortage of R.N.R. seamen is a very serious matter, and I hope that the First Lord will look into this matter as soon as possible, and, at the same time, will consider giving a Captain, R.N.R., the right to fly the Blue Ensign irrespective of the number of qualified R.N.R. seamen in his ship.
I should like to be assured, as I am sure would all your Lordships, that stock-piling of equipment for the rearmament of our Merchant Navy is being carried out. I refer, of course, to anti-submarine equipment and degaussing equipment, to protect them from magnetic mines, and also to the provision of guns of sufficient calibre to defend them against submarine attack on the surface. I hope the First Lord will be able to give your Lordships some information on this point. May I now refer for a few minutes to the pay and conditions in the Naval Ordnance Inspection Department? As your Lordships are aware, this matter has been frequently referred to in your Lordships' House, and I do not propose to go into the question in any detail to-day. I understand that there was a recent deputation to the noble Viscount, the First Lord, on this matter, and I hope that since the date of this deputation he has given favourable consideration to the views that were then put before him.
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (VISCOUNT HALL): My Lords, may I say that increases have been granted since the deputation was received?
LORD TEYNHAM: I am delighted to hear that. The officers serving in that branch felt they were having a raw deal, and I am delighted to know these increases have been made. I shall have great pleasure in looking into them. I understand also that little has been done in connection with the Royal Corps of Naval Instructors. I feel that they require better treatment than they are receiving at the present time.
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To turn for a few minutes to what one might call the application and definition of sea power, I think that in some quarters there is a certain amount of confusion as to its application in modern warfare. May I say at once that in spite of scientific developments, the task of the Navy has not really changed at all? That task is, of course, the control of sea communications. This cannot be carried out by the Navy alone. I would say that the correct definition of sea power is really nowadays sea-air power, and should always be considered in that light; and of course the Navy itself, with naval aviation, contributes in no small measure to this dual power. Naval aviation is now accepted as an integral part of our naval activity, and naval aircraft are in a similar category to guns, torpedoes, boats or any other manifestation of naval life. But this is nothing like sufficient to establish a sea-air power supremacy.
I would say that the establishment of sea-air power depends not only on naval shipboard aircraft, or even upon the co-operation of Coastal Command, but it may well depend on heavy attacks delivered by Bomber Command upon enemy submarine bases and upon enemy warships in harbour. The Navy certainly appreciated the great contribution to sea power which was made in the last war by the R.A.F., and the work which they carried out, such as extensive minelaying activities and the bombing of submarine bases. I have little doubt that the Navy is assured of the same full co-operation in the future. But we are much concerned about the position of Coastal Command, which is of vital importance in anti-submarine warfare. Can the noble Viscount the First Lord give us some information about Coastal Command, as to whether plans have been prepared to increase the number of aircraft and pilots for this important service? This information has been asked for repeatedly from His Majesty's Government, not only in Defence debates but in previous years when Naval Estimates have been presented, but little or no information has been forthcoming so far. I hope we shall also be told that a section of the R.A.F. are receiving specialised training in mine-laying so that we shall be ready to go into action at a moment's notice. There is no doubt that the secret of success in anti-submarine warfare is the complete linking together of all the methods of

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attack and defence—in the air, on the water and under the water. We are not satisfied yet that this link is complete and ready to operate as a whole. I hope the First Lord will be able to assure your Lordships on this important matter.
I do not propose to-day to enlarge on the question of the North Atlantic Supreme Command, in view of the Government's promised White Paper, but I should like to ask the noble Viscount when it is proposed to publish that White Paper. On the other hand, I feel that I must say that the proposed appointment is another manifestation that the Navy to-day is to some extent losing its influence in the world, as we have known it in the past. The Navy undoubtedly has had a strong cohesive effect on the British Empire. We must not forget that we are far more than an overcrowded island with only the Western Approaches to defend. We are the centre of a great, powerful and united British Commonwealth, which stretches around the world. It is this powerful group of nations which we must defend, and we must plan accordingly. If we fail to realise the significance of our sea power, we may well lose our position at the centre of this great group of nations, and perhaps sow the seeds of disintegration. I cannot help feeling that the proposed Supreme Command in the North Atlantic, coupled with other matters, indicates a policy which will have the effect of reducing the influence of our command at sea and transferring our efforts so that we become more and more a Continental Power. I have little doubt that we are face to face with an issue of policy of the greatest magnitude and, what is more, we appear to have drifted into decisions without the country realising what is happening. I feel that we should quickly review every aspect of our sea power to-day. I beg to move for Papers.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND KOREA
3.40 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD HENDERSON): My Lords, I am grateful to your Lordships for allowing me to intervene for a few moments to repeat a Statement which is at present being given in another
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place by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Statement is rather long, but I feel that your Lordships would like to have the text in full. It reads as follows:
"The House will have heard of the decisions taken by the President of the United States of America in regard to General MacArthur. In view, however, of the widespread interest and anxiety about the objectives and plans of the United Nations in Korea, I consider that it may be useful to deal with the various issues raised in the Questions on the Order Paper. Let me deal first with the question of aims in Korea. Consultations in which we are taking an active part are proceeding between Governments as to a possible statement of aims in Korea in the light of the general situation. If, as I hope, these consultations are shortly concluded, I shall then be able to give the House further information. All I wish to say now—so that there may be no possible doubt on the matter—is that our aims are unchanged. We stand for resistance to aggression, a free, independent and unified Korea, and no extension of the conflict.
"Great interest has been expressed in the machinery for consultation between the United Nations and their Commander in the field. The position is that the United States Government were invited by the Security Council of the United Nations to make pro-vision for a unified Command, and to designate a Commander for the United Nations forces in Korea. The President of the United States is the Chief Executive of the Unified Command, and he designated General MacArthur as Commander in Korea. The Unified Command is responsible for the implementation of United Nations Resolutions in regard to Korea and for issuing directives to the Commander of the United Nations forces.
"Apart from constant exchanges of views with Commonwealth and other friendly Governments through the diplomatic channels, there is continuous consultation in Washington between representatives of Governments contributing forces in Korea. The views of His Majesty's Government are and have been made known to the United States Government when-ever the need arises. Sometimes our

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views prevail, sometimes they do not. That is only natural in discussions of this kind involving a number of nations, and I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the way in which the United States Government, on whom the main burden rests, has at all times displayed its readiness to consult and discuss in regard to these difficult problems.
"The question of crossing the 38th Parallel cannot be treated apart from other matters concerning Korea. We were ready a few months ago to negotiate a cease-fire, and we are ready now. But it takes two to agree on a cease-fire, and so far the other side have shown no desire to stop hostilities in Korea. Consultations on crossing the Parallel began in February. I do not propose to reveal the nature of the discussions since the question of the extent of the advance of the United Nations forces has military as well as political aspects. But I would not have the House think that the crossing of the 38th Parallel (despite all the attention it has received) is the main issue in Korea. The real issue is whether the North Koreans and Chinese are willing to negotiate a settlement. If they are, the question of the Parallel will soon cease to have any political importance, and I would hope that the aims to which so many nations, including the Soviet Union, have been pledged for so long—a free, unified and independent Korea—could be achieved by negotiation.
"Let me now turn to the nature of the directives issued to the Commander of the United Nations forces in Korea since the establishment of the Unified Command. In the interests of the security and safety of the United Nations forces in Korea the House will not expect me to give precise details of these directives. I can, however, give an indication of their general con-tent. And I shall try to summarise the instructions issued over a period of many months. The Commander of the United Nations forces in Korea was instructed that the political aims of the United Nations called for resistance to aggression in Korea and included the longstanding aim of a free and independent Korea. He was told that these aims did not necessarily require the conquest of North Korea by force,
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though the disposition of troops and positions in the war of manoeuvre in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel should be appropriate to defence against possible impending offensives by the Chinese and North Koreans. He was told that operations should not be undertaken which extended the conflict beyond Korean territory, and that it was the intention of the United Nations to localise hostilities in Korea, and therefore that it was not their intention to become involved in general hostilities with China. And he was told that the powers of the Commander of the United Nations forces to conduct operations on behalf of the United Nations were limited to Korea, and were to be executed within the framework of declared United Nations policy.
"I have given a summary of the instructions issued to the Commander of the United Nations forces in Korea, and I take this opportunity to associate His Majesty's Government fully with them. They represent the policy of our country and of the other countries with forces in Korea. A number of questions on the Order Paper relate to the way in which General MacArthur has carried out his instructions. In view of the change of command, this episode is now closed, and I do not desire to say more than to draw the attention of the House to the traditional British interpretation of the relationship between a military com-mander in the field and the Government to whom he is responsible. On this matter successive British Governments have always consistently stood for the subordination of the military to the political. It is clear from the statement issued this morning by the President of the United States that under the American Constitution and practice the same interpretation is placed on this relationship, as indeed it must in any democratic country where the views of the people, expressed by their freely elected Governments, must be paramount.
"I should like, if I may, to turn for a moment from the issues raised in the Questions on the Order Paper. These issues which relate to Korea are of the highest importance, and I have tried to deal with them at some length in

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order to remove any doubt and misunderstanding. The record of General MacArthur is, however, not to be judged solely by some of his recent public utterances. He was a great servant of the Allies during the war in the Pacific, and he has proved himself a brilliant soldier. He has displayed qualities of the highest order in his conduct of the occupation in Japan. These are achievements which will be remembered long after the immediate controversy has been forgotten.
"I hope that the House will bear with me if, in view of the announcement this morning in Washington, I do not deal with all the detailed points raised in the Questions. This is not the time to look back but to look forward, and I take this opportunity of expressing the confidence of His Majesty's Government in General Ridgway, the new United Nations Commander in Korea, who has already shown such brilliant qualities in the field.
"I, like my right honourable friend my predecessor, am anxious to see whether we can bring about a negotiated settlement and, as I said at the beginning of this Statement, consultations have been and still are proceeding between the Governments. I hope shortly to be able to say something further on where we stand in Korea, and on what should be our policy for the future."
That is the full Statement, my Lords, and I am grateful for the opportunity of being able to repeat it to your Lordships.
3.50 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords. I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, for the full Statement which he has made on behalf of the Foreign Secretary, giving the aims of His Majesty's Government and the other Allied Governments in the Korean war. I believe that this should prove very valuable in clarifying the position. I am sure that noble Lords in all parts of the House will wish to study and consider what he has said. I hope that an early opportunity may afford itself for debating recent developments in the Far East, though I do not wish to ask the Government for a day immediately.
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With regard to General MacArthur, the news of whose retirement we have heard to-day, I will say only this. It is not for me, nor is it, I think, for any of us, to go into the controversies in which the General has been involved during recent months. I do not think any good at all can come from that. I should like, however, with Lord Henderson, to pay a most sincere tribute to him for the debt that we all owe him for his many out-standing services in the World War. He was a brave and resolute man, and a great military commander. He has never flinched or failed, however dark the situation may have been, and with others I think that the free world will be eternally his debtor. I would also agree with the noble Lord that we are extremely fortunate in having as his successor General Ridgway, who has made already so glowing a reputation as a fighting soldier in the Korean war. I am sure that we shall all wish him every success in his arduous and vitally important task.
3.52 p.m.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I too, should like to express gratitude for the full Statement which has been made. Clearly it requires careful study, and it is more than likely that your Lordships' House will wish to debate it later in full. I should also like to associate myself with the tribute paid in the Statement, and also by the noble Marquess, the Leader of the Opposition, to the brilliant strategic qualities of General MacArthur. As has been said, we owe him a deep debt of gratitude. Meanwhile, may I make one observation? I sincerely hope that His Majesty's Government will do their utmost to establish some form of contact with the Chinese Government, because the war is going on and men and women are losing their lives every day. I can-not believe that it is not the wish of the Chinese Government, as it is certainly the wish of the vast majority of the United Nations, to bring this conflict to an honourable conclusion—honourable on all sides. I feel sure that that is the aim of His Majesty's Government. I feel equally certain that they will agree with me that no question of prestige should be allowed to stand in the way of a settlement.

NAVAL ESTIMATES
3.54 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, I followed with great interest the speech of the noble Lord in introducing the Motion which is before the House, and there are two points in it upon which I should like to make short comment. The first is with regard to the changes in uniform affecting the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and the Royal Naval Reserve. Of course, I cannot say anything about the questions of expense, or venture an opinion as to how the R.N.R. and the R.N.V.R. feel about these changes. I can only say for myself that I should like to see every distinction swept away in these uniforms. I hope that this decision not to distinguish the uniforms, except in regard to the letter "R," may be a step in the direction of removing all distinctions of any sort. Remembering the services rendered by the officers and men of those two Reserves, I am sure that the Royal Navy would feel that it did itself nothing but an honour in wearing a common uniform with them.
My other comment arises from the point which the noble Lord made about stockpiling with regard to the defensive equipment of merchant ships. I take great interest in that matter because, as it happens, in the course of two wars I served a short term of duty in fitting out merchant ships with defensive armaments. At the present time I have the honour to be the President of an Association which looks after the interests of the officers of the Mercantile Marine. Of course, in that position a great deal of information upon such subjects comes my way. I am happy to inform your Lordships that it is the considered opinion of that Association that the Admiralty are fully meeting requirements in that respect, and that the officers of the Merchant Navy are satisfied with what is being done in order to ensure that, should war break out again, their ships will immediately go to sea properly defensively equipped.
Now I turn to the terms of the Motion itself. The Motion asks His Majesty's Government whether they are satisfied that the proposals contained in the Memorandum on the Naval Estimates are adequate for the defence of the country. The
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noble Lord will not mind my saying that I think the wording is a little naive, because—whatever we may think about their preparations—we cannot expect the Government to admit any deficiency in those preparations. It is only within the past six months or so that there has been what I may call a certain noticeable movement up on the Catskill Mountains, and there are now evident signs that the Government fully appreciate the dangers with which we are faced. It must be remembered that since 1945 our Defence Ministers—there have been three—have had something like £4,000,000,000 to spend, and some people seem to think that we have very little indeed to show for it. They say that, like the Dutch, these Defence Ministers have been giving too little and are asking too much from the Treasury.
The run-down in our Naval strength has been really alarming. I should say that if, by any terrible tragedy, we were forced into war this year, we would go into it less favourably placed even than we were in 1939. The next war, if it comes, is not going to be one of those wars "to end war," of which we have had two examples, only to be seriously disappointed. It is going to be a war to decide whether civilisation is or is not going to be rubbed off the face of the earth. On that account I think we must try to be particularly ready. We hear a great deal about the number of ships in reserve or laid up in these cocoons— "mothballs" as our American friends call them. All that lay-up of ships is clever and excellent, but do not let us take too much comfort from it. In his speech, the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, referred to the question of personnel. Ships have to be manned, and officers and men must be trained. The manning position to-day is not too good. The noble Lord said (and I fully agree with him) that we have not enough of those staid men who have always been the backbone of the Navy. We want the best men, and we want long-service men. Instead of men who could join for twelve years, we have men who join for seven years and serve five years in Reserve. Of these men far too many do not reengage and qualify for pension.
As for training, seamen, to be efficient, must go to sea -and too few of them do so at present for long enough periods.

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There are too many ships in reserve, and too many officers and men in shore and harbour jobs. Senior officers have few chances of command at sea to-day, and become frustrated through looking at the mud up the creeks where their ships are lying. Successful strategy depends on ships' exercising and manœuvring at sea, practising going in and out of difficult harbours and anchorages at night and in all weathers. There is too little naval activity at sea at present. Surely, events in Korea ought to have stimulated the Government in this respect. We are proud of what the Fleet has done in Korean waters, but it seems to me that we had great difficulty in "scratching together" these forces to send to Korea. Suppose that another crisis had happened somewhere else, contemporaneously with events in Korea. It seems that we are too weak to begin with, and then suffer great losses while we are building up. It is an expensive system, and one which involves terrible shipping losses. It also involves holding up operations. It is, too, a system which causes great privation to civilians, and the war itself is lengthened —so seriously increasing its cost.
As regards the role of the Navy and the Air Force, the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb have not made navies obsolete. I quoted to your Lordships in a previous debate lessons which the Americans have learnt from certain combined operations they carried out. I pointed out that the first of those lessons was that the Navy still had a role of primary importance to play in any future hostilities. How quickly the truth of that lesson has been proved in Korea! Strong naval forces will be required in another world war. There may be other Koreas—Persia, Formosa, Burma, Turkey, Greece, the Adriatic, the Baltic, the Arctic. How do we know, with Russia in her present mood, that soon, in one of these places, we may not find ourselves confronted with another Korea? It is only types of ships and consequently strategy and tactics which change. The necessity to exercise sea power remains— because, although it is true that sea power will not win a war, it is sea power which enables wars to be won and which forms the essential link with the countries of the Commonwealth.
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What are these commitments? It may be as well to recapitulate them in discussing Naval Estimates. First, there is the need to increase task forces so that they are able to deal with enemy concentrations or threats in any part of the world. We must be able to deal with raiders. Enormous concentrations of air and sea forces, let us remember, were necessary to deal with the "Bismarck." Minesweeping will be a tremendous task in the future. Air forces do not remove these responsibilities from our naval forces. I have left to the last our first and great commitment. That commitment is not to be reckoned in terms of enemy surface warships, but in the terms of the number of our own and Allied merchant ships which we have to protect. That is the first and greatest commitment of the Navy in time of war. It is to protect shipping over hundreds of thousands of miles of sea routes. To the problem of how to fulfil that commitment and responsibility there is only one answer—to get these merchant ships into convoy. Convoy depends upon having a sufficient number of adequately-trained surface and air escorts; and it is to that question that I wish particularly to address myself.
To agree that these Naval Estimates represent an adequate preparation for defence would be to agree that one is satisfied about the number and the efficiency of the escort craft at the disposal of the Navy at the present moment. I certainly cannot say that I, for one, am so satisfied. I think that in the Statement on the Navy Estimates the figure of sixty-one destroyers and frigates in active commission was quoted. But the question I ask about these destroyers and escort forces generally is this: Are they organised, distributed and trained as convoy escorts, or are they organised and trained for Fleet duties? I do not wish to be taken in the strict letter in what I am going to say, but what has happened in the past when war broke out has been that officers in command at sea, and officers directing affairs at the Admiralty, have wanted to get the ships to sea to meet the enemy's surface ships. Everyone has been burning and itching to get at them, with the result that the fleets and squadrons have gone off to make contact with the enemy ships, while the protection of merchant shipping, which I regard as the greatest commitment of all, has been left to be

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carried out by ships from the reserves manned in rather a scratch fashion.
Anti-submarine escorts, however, re-quire a very high degree of experience. They require experience, skill and co-operation which can be produced only by constant and systematic exercise with our own submarines. That, I feel, is the great task of our commanders-in-chief. For lack of that experience we had the heavy sinkings between 1939 and 1942, when hastily mobilised escorts had to under-take the job of convoy work without proper experience or training. And once they had been put on to that job it was never possible to take them off it for long enough to give them the training which was needed. They had to learn their job by the not very satisfactory process of being, as it were, trained while still learning how to swim; our mercantile marine had very heavy losses on account of this haphazard method. We shall need a minimum of 200 fully-commissioned escort ships, trained and organised solely for shipping protection. It is all very well for the Statement on the Estimates to stress scientific research and so on, but improved listening devices and higher speeds are no substitute for training and numbers of escort craft. For those 200, we shall want something in the nature of 30,000 officers and men, but a great number of them can be obtained by cutting out inessential and relatively unimportant services. I sincerely trust that we may hear something from the First Lord this afternoon to indicate that the escort craft which will have this task to perform in the future will be organised and trained in the manner which I have endeavoured to describe, in order that, should war break out, they can be put on to their escort duties from the very first hour.
The submarine is indeed a menace which is growing every year. Submarines already do short bursts of twenty knots. They can navigate indefinitely at periscope depth, thanks to the Schnorkel, which, I may mention, it is very difficult for radar to detect. Radar is an uncertain defence against the Schnorkel submarine. At the start of the last war, in 1939, Germany had fifty-four submarines, and she used very few aircraft indeed in attacks upon our merchant shipping; but in that year she sank 361 ships and about 1,250,000 gross tons of shipping. I will
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not commit myself to a figure, but we have had several figures quoted to us about the number of submarines in the possession of the Russians. If Germany, with fifty-four submarines, could inflict those losses upon us, what are we to expect from the very much larger number of submarines that we hear of as being at the disposal of the Russians, even allowing for a slightly lower efficiency amongst the Russian officers and men than we found amongst the Germans? That emphasises What is my strong point of view: that unless our anti-submarine forces are as numerous and trained in the manner I have described, once again we may find ourselves suffering the most crippling shipping losses.
I should like to say a few words about what are, to my mind, some rather new ideas, which were put forward in another place by the Minister who was introducing the Naval Estimates. He emphasised the fact that our Navy and the navies of the Atlantic Pact countries were being welded into what he called a "standardised pattern." There was to be interchange of officers, ability to switch equipment and weapons, and a common code of signals, and the new anti-submarine frigates were going to be put to common use and in a common pool. But what did, I confess, disturb me was the new doctrine which he enunciated, that no longer can the British Isles be defended by the Navy alone, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is a recognition of this changed strategy, and that the Organisation strengthens us very substantially at sea. Alliances are necessary and effective instruments for combating a particular crisis, but I think it is permissible to have some doubts about them as a permanent state of affairs. After all, since 1914, the Italians have fought both with us and against us, and now we are friendly with them once again. The Japanese have fought both with us and against us, and now we hear of a peace treaty with Japan which may provide for a considerable degree of rearmament. Alliances tend to be transient affairs, and we should be careful before we commit ourselves lock, stock and barrel to hand-ling our own armed forces on the basis of a belief that an existing set-up in international relations will endure for all time. To my mind, it means that we are relying upon an Organisation—Heaven knows, I

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hope it may not be so!—which might let us down if one or two countries failed entirely to come up to their obligations.
"Standardisation" sounds a very fine word; it is a blessed word like "Mesopotamia." It corresponds to "egalitarianism" in politics. But I cannot help feeling that, so far as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is concerned, standardisation may be at a level lower than our best. After all, our Navy is unique. It stands unparalleled in its efficiency as a sea force. This standardisation may tend to be at a lower level than our best has been proved to be so often. In regard to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, I hope that no one will doubt how deeply I feel about the maintenance of good Anglo-American relations, and how fully I realise the great debt that we have been under in two wars to that great country. But I do deprecate the habit which seems to be growing up of always turning to the United States for help. It is becoming almost a habit that, in any crisis or jam, or OH any question, automatically we turn to the United States and expect them to help. We may not be able to rival the navy of the United States in size, and I say that the run-down of our Navy has been too great. Had that not been so, we could have occupied a position of much greater status and prestige in the deliberations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation than perhaps we have. I want to see this country remain a volunteer unit of that Organisation, and not a standardised link, remembering, as I have said, that no international relationships are for all time, and that a lasting community of interest in inter-national affairs is a very rare thing indeed.
I have spoken about the run-down in the Navy. The Estimates provide for thirteen carriers to protect shipping against submarine and aircraft. It does not seem to me a large number. Then there are to be twenty-six cruisers: I should have thought that a very inadequate number of cruisers. We had forty-one at the beginning of the last war, and we found those too few. There are to be 113 destroyers, 165 escort frigates and 66 submarines. The First Lord says that these figures are satisfactory. How deeply I trust that the First Lord
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is right, and that, if war does come upon us, those numbers will be found to be satisfactory! Meanwhile, the United States is launching the largest building programme since her expansion after the events of Pearl Harbour. It is a pro-gramme running into 2,000,000,000 dollars, a perfectly gigantic programme of new construction and of modernisation of older ships.
As the noble Lord in moving his Motion said something about the air, I will not traverse the ground which he covered so completely and effectively, except to say that it would be interesting to hear what is going to be done about fitting merchant ships with helicopters, because I think some of your Lordships will have noticed the trials carried out in February with helicopters from Fort Duquesne. They were very interesting and were carried out in heavy seas and high winds. It would be interesting to hear what is thought of the possibility of fitting some of our merchant ships to use helicopters. There is a serious shortage of pilots and observers, a matter to which I think the First Lord referred on one occasion. The truth is that the Fleet Air Arm was cold-shouldered at a very critical moment, and even after that the policy pursued in regard to the Fleet Air Arm was unimaginative. Look at the carriers which the Fleet Air Arm had at their disposal in the last war. We had to turn to America to get suitable aircraft for our Fleet Air Arm.
My Lords, there are no other points which I wish to mention, except this. As the noble Lord said, a White Paper will be issued about the command in the North Atlantic, and that will be the proper moment at which to debate that question. I trust it will be debated from the point of view of whether it is the most effective system of command for the objective that we have in mind in the North Atlantic. I hope that now we shall regard as a settled matter the fact that an American Admiral has been appointed to that command, and that aspect of the question need not be reopened again. I do not know whether it is too early to-day to ask for news about the Mediterranean command. I appreciate it may be too soon, and per-haps it would be fair to have all these commands announced at one and the same time. I noticed with great surprise that the French were not invited to the conference at Malta. I am bound

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to say that I think it was a mistake not to invite them there. The important question about the Mediterranean command is whether it is going to be independent of General Eisenhower, as is the Atlantic command, because at any rate no one can deny our predominant interest in the Mediterranean. No one can deny our predominant interest in Gibraltar, Malta and Suez—our gateway to the East—and I trust that that fact will be borne in mind and recognised when the question of the command in the Mediterranean comes to be decided. I trust I have not detained your Lordships at too great length, but in conclusion may I say that I think the most important matter we have to consider in connection with the Navy at the present moment is the question of providing and training personnel for the escort ships? That is the first and foremost duty of the Admiralty to-day.
4.24 p.m.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I am sure the House is grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, for bringing forward this Motion. I believe that my noble friend the First Lord will share my satisfaction in the very moderate and, if I may say so, balanced statement that he made. I should also like to commiserate with him in that some unexpected events took place before he opened this debate, and also interrupted the proceedings during the debate. But Parliament is a strange place: these sort of things happen, and we must be prepared for the unexpected. I should also like to congratulate the noble Lord upon his brief but effective homily on the real meaning of sea power, and perhaps I may be so bold as to expand his words in the few remarks which I address to your Lordships.
First, however, may I ask my noble friend the First Lord two questions which he and I have been discussing, and upon which he might find it convenient to make a statement. Can my noble friend say anything as to the progress of the new entry into Dartmouth? Perhaps he may be able to say how many entrants are being taken in, and how many applications for entry have been received. When I entered as a cadet, 600 applicants were passed for medical examination, and only sixty were finally taken, so competition was rather stiff. The com-parable figures for to-day would be
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interesting. Another matter of perennial interest is the question: what progress is being made with promotion from the lower deck, and how many instances of promotion of this kind are there during a year in the various branches? I believe that good progress is being made there, and my noble friend might like to make a statement about that matter. I have one more comment on Lord Teynham's observations. I should like to support him in regard to altering the regulations concerning the flying of the Blue Ensign when the commanding officer of the ship is an R.N.R. officer. There is a great deal to be said for that change, and we should give all the encouragement we can to the Royal Naval Reserve.
I entirely agree with what Lord Teynham said about the unchanging fundamental foundations of sea power. They do not alter. But the danger that I see to-day (I am going to be perfectly frank with my noble friend) is of too much emphasis, and therefore too much money, effort and man-power, being expended on a Continental army and too little on the Fleet. I think we shall make a great mistake if we allow the Fleet and its component air arm to be starved for the sake of maintaining a great Continental army which may never be needed. My noble friend will remember the protests of the German generals to the Kaiser, in the years before 1914, about the rapid building up of the German fleet, as they said, at the expense of the army. They pointed out that the only result would be to provoke the British, and eventually the Americans, and that, after all, Germany depended for her strength on her army and not on sea power. In saying that they were completely right. If the Kaiser had not had this infatuation to call himself the Admiral of the Atlantic, there would have been no need for the First World War at all. I can see exactly the same situation arising with regard to ourselves, but in reverse. I can see us building a great army, and in consequence being forced—I do not say to starve, but to keep the Navy down to limits which are really insufficient for our world-wide and multitudinous commitments.
I hope that I carry Lord Teynham with me in saying that I think it would be a mistake to build a Fleet that is designed only for meeting a threat from one

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potential enemy. Apparently at present the potential enemy is Russia, which does not disturb me because, as the noble Lord who has just preceded me has said, in our lifetime we have seen a number of changes in regard to potential enemies. A Fleet designed for this one purpose will consist of small types of aircraft carrier, anti-submarine craft of various kinds, escort vessels and minesweepers. That would be an unbalanced fleet, unsuitable for our world-wide commitments. After all, it takes a long time to build up a modern navy, to train its officers and men and to maintain its efficiency. It is a long process upon which one cannot improvise. In my lifetime I have seen many changes in our potential enemies and allies. When I joined the Navy as a cadet our potential enemy was France, and her ally was Russia. Then came the Russo-Japanese war, and the destruction of the Russian fleet. Then we had the rise of the Germany navy, to which I have referred, and we concluded an entente, first with France and then with Russia, and we forgot all about the sup-posed Russian threat to the North-West frontier of India. Then we regarded the Germans as our potential enemy, and we were in alliance with Japan. After the First World War the alliance with Japan was abrogated, largely at the behest of America, and the Japanese began to expand their naval power and to embark on aggression. Yet beforehand they had been our allies. The argument that I am trying to adduce is that, while alliances can quickly change into enmities, and enmities into alliances, it takes a long time to build up an efficient Navy. Therefore, I suggest that we have to design our Fleet and build it accordingly; that is to say we must use a necessarily limited amount of money to the best advantage to build a Fleet which will perform the tasks which it has to meet. A purely anti-submarine force would be insufficient in view of our world-wide commitments.
The point I have been leading up to is that I must renew to my noble friend the First Lord of the Admiralty my doubts about our numbers of cruisers. I still feel dubiety about our cruiser building programme. I trust that we shall not remain satisfied with the very small number of cruisers now on the Navy
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List, and I hope it is to be increased. We need a cruiser force because the cruiser can maintain herself on a foreign station for a long time, and she can make long voyages without a mother ship. A frigate or a destroyer cannot do these things so well, despite the growth in size —and cost—of destroyers to-day. The cruiser is the only vessel which can be used to represent British interests in the various parts of the world where there may be trouble, and where we may have commitments to meet. The battleship, I suppose, is too costly to-day (I think that is generally recognised), and too vulnerable to air attack. I do not think that many navies can afford to build a large fleet of battleships. The cruiser has now become a vessel of considerable size. The later American cruisers are of somewhere about 16,000 tons, which was the size of a battleship when I first went to sea. Furthermore, the modern cruiser costs a good deal more than the battleship did at the time when I first went to sea. Aircraft carriers are necessary, but they are extremely costly. I think they supply that striking force that we used to look for from the battleship. I hope that your Lordships will forgive me for making this addition to the homily which has been so ably delivered by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham. I am really only expanding his arguments, which I think were well-nigh unassailable.
With regard to the actual needs of special vessels for meeting submarines, I have been greatly interested to see reports from America of the tremendous increase in speed of the American submarines of the future that are now being designed. No less a person than the Chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Forces Committee—who is presumably a responsible individual—has told us that in about a year's time the Americans will have at sea an atomic-powered sub-marine. I take all this with great reserve, but the newspaper report which I saw declared that this new American submarine will be capable of submerged speeds up to what the newspaper described as "sixty miles an hour." Think of that!—a submerged speed of sixty miles an hour, which works out at more than fifty-two knots. I have never heard of any ship that could attain a speed of fifty knots, either on the surface, under the water or anywhere else—except, of course, in the air. I therefore treat these

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reports with considerable reserve. Still, as I have indicated, the statements were said to have been made by such an important personage as this American Chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Forces Committee. But even ignoring that report, there is no doubt that the speed of future submarines will increase very greatly if atomic power can be used. I presume that we also are experimenting along those lines, though for obvious reasons I will not ask my noble friend the First Lord of the Admiralty for any details in this connection. Clearly, with this greatly increased speed the submarine must become an even greater menace to the shipping of the world than heretofore, and very fast ships will be required to combat it.
A powerful air force with the necessary carrier vessels is undoubtedly required also. The air arm must be adequate and efficient. With regard to the present air arm, from the information which reaches me, and from information given to us generally, I gather that great advances have been made by the Royal Navy, and that to-day the Fleet Air Arm is very powerful and highly efficient. I congratulate my noble friend on that fact. Furthermore, on the published figures the number of aircraft carriers which we possess, or are building, seems to me to be satisfactory. There is no doubt that the air side of the Royal Navy is by no means neglected. That is all very satisfactory, and I consider that the Board of Admiralty, and particularly my noble friend, are entitled to support and praise. I regret that we are not yet able, apparently, to make a Return of Fleets. That most useful publication was initiated by the late Sir Charles Dilke, who, many years ago, I believe, was a contemporary of a noble Lord who is sitting at this moment on the Liberal Benches. The "Dilke Return," as we used to call it, was a very valuable publication indeed. We give a great deal of information about our own Fleet now in the Navy Estimates and in the Navy List, and I do not see why the Return of Fleets should not be published with such information as we have. I understand that certain Powers are opposed to it, but nevertheless I think that a similar Return, with the information which we have about the fleets of the world, would be very valuable for Members of Parliament in both Houses.
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Lastly, I should like to support what has been said—and I am sure this is very much in the mind of my noble friend the first Lord of the Admiralty— about the great need for as much sea time as is practicable for the Fleet and its personnel. You cannot make sailors on shore. I am sure that at long last that fact is realised. The more time that is spent at sea, the more efficient will be the Fleet. I know the difficulties about oil fuel and its cost, and all that sort of thing. Nevertheless, I stress that nothing can take the place of sea training. I am sure that my noble friend will support that. All the accounts I get of of the Royal Navy of to-day go to show that it is not only highly efficient but that our men are contented—at any rate they have no burning grievances, which is something unique in the history of the Royal Navy. I believe that the officers are of the highest standard to-day, and that they will worthily carry on the traditions of that great Service.
4.38 p.m.
VISCOUNT CALDECOTE: My Lords, there is no need for me to stress again the vital importance of anti-submarine de-fence and the provision of suitable vessels, training and equipment. As I read the Explanatory Statement of the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Admiralty, the scheme is that the need for anti-submarine defence should in the main be met by the conversion of fleet destroyers. I am glad that Lord Teynham drew attention to the fact that every time we convert a fleet destroyer into an anti-submarine vessel we lose a fleet destroyer, which in itself is an anti-sub-marine vessel. It may look very good that we have made or have in hand so many conversions into anti-submarine frigates, but it is sometimes forgotten that that does not mean a net addition to the Fleet. On the whole, I think the programme of conversion is satisfactory, but in my view the programme of new construction leaves a great deal to be desired. It does not seem to me to be taken seriously enough. In the first place, two destroyers were launched in 1949—one in March and one in August. Neither has yet joined the Fleet. This means that two years have elapsed. That is too long from the launching of a destroyer to completion. They are both in good yards, and I suspect that the reason of their non-completion is that those in charge

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have not been pressed for a finishing date and have therefore allowed other work to have preference. I hope that the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Admiralty will give us some assurance as to the date when those two ships will be completed.
It is not very satisfactory that last year not a single anti-submarine frigate was launched and not a single frigate or destroyer was accepted into service. The only ship accepted into service was a survey ship—total number of guns, none. There are two prototype frigates which have just been started—I suspect only just. Certainly they will not be in service until 1953, and if they are really prototypes it means we shall not start building others until we have seen how they get on. I do not consider that in any way satisfactory. It is true that there are two other frigates in the programme of new construction: are these the same as the prototypes, or are they what might be called production models? I hope the noble Viscount will tell us. Further down the Explanatory Statement we find that as many frigates are being ordered as machinery can be provided for. It has already been said in this debate that machinery is the bottleneck. It used to be the bottleneck and it is going to be more of a bottleneck. I have mentioned to your Lordships before that nowadays equipment is much more complex and there are fewer firms who can undertake the manufacture of modern, high-powered, lightweight turbines. They can-not be turned out as the reciprocating engine used to be turned out.
It seems to me that the statement that the number of frigates is limited by the machinery which can be provided demonstrates a grave lack of flexibility in the arrangement which now exists for ordering new ships and their equipment. I know what the trouble is. In one year the Treasury allow only so much money to be expended on orders for new machinery for ships that will not be ordered until next year's Estimates or the Estimates for the year after. The trouble probably is that insufficient notice is taken of those who know about production problems, the technical officers in the Admiralty and the Navy, and too much notice is taken of Treasury officials and of the administrative and secretarial
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staff in the Admiralty. I do not believe that people who know nothing about technology understand how long it takes to produce a piece of complicated modern machinery, and I wish the noble Viscount would give technologists a little more administrative authority and not make them so hidebound by the secretarial staff. The other day I heard of a paper on a technical subject which had no fewer than sixty minutes on it from the secretarial branch before it ever reached a technical officer.
I should like to ask the noble Viscount what has happened to the hulls of the "Battle" Class destroyers we had at the end of the war and which were never completed. I know that some of them have been used for destruction tests, but there are some left. Are we not going to use them by putting engines in them? They are good hulls, well designed and well built. I hope we are not going to waste them. The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, has mentioned the cruisers on which work has been suspended. I see there are also three light fleet cruisers on which work has been suspended. I hope the noble Viscount will tell us what is going to happen to them and what has happened to them now. One of them was being built at a yard of which I have some knowledge, and it certainly is not there now. I hope they will not be left too long before they are completed.
In the paragraph headed "Works Programme," a great deal is said about improved married quarters, living conditions and working conditions, but there is not a word about providing protected workshops and stores. We all know that that is a big job, but it should be remembered that during the war the underground workshops in Malta did a fine job when the dockyard was completely out of action. Ships could go in and get urgent jobs carried out in a short time because there was machinery underground which could not be damaged by bombs. In any future war attacks on dockyards are bound to be severe. If the dockyards are completely smashed up and no machine tools are left to carry out the necessary repairs, our anti-submarine ships will soon come to a stop and the flow of supplies to this country will cease. It is no good planning for a limited war or for only one aspect of war. I heard of a plan during the war for making provision for safe

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storage in some dockyards, and I hope the noble Viscount will be able to give us some assurance about that matter.
We have heard something about the importance of training facilities. There is nothing in the Explanatory Statement about the training facilities and the equipment that are being provided. The scientists are developing very complex and probably highly efficient weapons of defence and attack, but all that work and ingenuity will be completely wasted if the men do not know how to use them. During the last war equipment was often not used as well as it might have been because training facilities were not available, largely because the money was not pro-vided in peace time. I hope that that sort of economy is not being made now. That particularly applies to the provision of anti-submarine equipment and training. I hope the provision of training facilities is going on alongside development of the weapons themselves.
I was very interested to hear the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, asking about the success of the Dartmouth entry, and I hope the noble Viscount will tell us something about that matter. From present and past naval officers I have heard a good deal of criticism of the new entry at sixteen. There is one point, which may or may not be true but which is widely believed, that at any entry the orders are that 50 per cent. is to come from Government-controlled schools. Is that true or not? If it is true, it seems to me that officers are being selected on the basis that it is a fine career and everybody ought to have an opportunity of going into it, and not on the basis of providing the best officer.
Lastly I come to a subject which I have raised before in your Lordships' House—namely, the question of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, which has already been touched upon. Before this rearmament programme started, the Corps was seriously undermanned. Plans for arming Merchant Navy ships in time of war and for doing fundamental research by members of the Corps could not go forward. Now, with the new rearmament programme, the situation is disastrous and becoming more and more disastrous every year as the programme develops. The Eastham Committee recommended a figure of 300 as the number of the Corps. The Admiralty have not
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accepted that Report, but have never produced any other figure. The number of men in the Corps last autumn was 175. Last year there were three dockyard entrants; no university entrants; three retirements, because the officers could no longer stand the conditions; and five retirements due to age—a net wastage of five. It takes a minimum of five years to train a Naval Constructor, so that we cannot solve the problem of the lack of numbers by bringing people in from merchant ship work. Building a warship is quite different from building a merchant ship. Constructors must have experience of warship design and construction before they are much use for naval designing. There is a serious danger of overworking the present staff, and we had one or two examples in the last war of what happens when that occurs. I understand that officers are already being withdrawn from sea appointments because there is insufficient staff in the design department. That was a point on which the commanders-in-chief in the last war were all agreed: that there should be more seagoing experience for the constructor officers.
It was in 1946 that the Eastham Committee first reported, and a year ago some rather niggardly pay increases were granted. Over a year ago we were promised that the new arrangements of pay for constructors under training would be announced soon; and again last December we were promised that there would be an announcement almost at once. As has already been stated in another place, constructors under training at Greenwich receive 16s. 6d. a day, and they wear lieutenants' uniform; but sub-lieutenants, R.N., receive 17s. 6d. a day, and lieutenants 21s. 6d. a day, with 8s. 6d. marriage allowance, if they are married. Many of the constructors of twenty-four and twenty-five years of age are not too young to get married in these enlightened days. The constructors have to live on 16s. 6d. a day, when their brother officers at Greenwich, with whom they are supposed to make friends, are getting 17s. 6d. and 21s. 6d. a day. Words fail me to describe the injustice and incredible stupidity of that from the point of view of the Navy. It would not be so bad if a definite announcement were made, instead of this continued delay, month after month and year after year.
I believe that it has been suggested that they shall be given an increase in

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pay, but that they will have to pay for their accommodation. Words fail me to describe the crass stupidity of all the delay that has gone on over the Royal Corps: it is unjust to the men, and unfair to the Navy and the country. In all fairness to the First Lord, I do not think it is his fault. I believe the blame can be put fairly and squarely on the Treasury—people who do not know how long it takes to train a constructor. They believe that if we are short in wartime we can bring them in from outside. But that is not so. I hope that the First Lord will take the strongest possible line he can to persuade the people at the Treasury to appreciate that something must be done now, this month, about these men. It is not only for the men at Greenwich themselves that I am speaking, but because those men have the greatest influence on new men coming into the Corps, from the universities or elsewhere. How can we expect to get recruits when the men already in the Corps are dissatisfied and thinking of coming out? We shall not get them, as experience has shown. We shall not get recruits until we make those conditions, and all the conditions, suitable for the high training and great responsibilities which the members of the Corps have.
The amount required to place the constructor lieutenants on the same basis as naval officers is of the order of £2,500 or £3,000 a year. Is that really more than we can afford in Naval Estimates involving tens of millions of pounds? I know what the answer is. It is that if that were done it would mean putting the whole scientific Civil Service on the same basis; and the Treasury are scared stiff that if they put up the pay of these new constructors, men who are vital to the naval service, they will have to put up the pay of hundreds of men in the scientific Civil Service. If they have courage, they will not have to do that. The men of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors have far more responsibility, both administrative and technical. There is no possibility of their moving about from one department to another when promotion is bad. They cannot go to an academic job in a university or a technical college, as men in the scientific Civil Service have been doing. Very few jobs are open to them, and promotion is not nearly so easy or so good as in the scientific Civil Service.
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It is time that this situation was cleared up: it has gone on far too long. If a constructor is lost by retirement through dissatisfaction, it takes five years to get back to the position obtaining before he retired. In a few years' time the situation will be desperate. It is already so desperate that the other day, when the Admiralty advertised all over the country for naval architects from private yards, they got only eight, in spite of all they could do. I hope the noble Viscount will take that to heart, and will see what he can do with his friends at the Treasury. I know that he has done all he can, but for the sake of the Service in the future he must try again. I am sorry to have laboured that point, but I do not think its importance can be overstated.
I hope that in the future we shall see a little more flexibility in the ordering of ships. Let us have more responsibility given to the people who really know what they are about. Let them not be overridden all the time by secretaries, principal secretaries and undersecretaries saying that they cannot do this or that. The Government have been saying that we want to raise the standard of technologists. Let them start by raising their status in the Admiralty service and per-haps other people will follow suit.
4.57 p.m.
VISCOUNT HALL: My Lords, I desire to join with those of your Lordships who have expressed gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, for initiating this debate. It has now become a practice year by year to follow the Estimates debate in another place with one in your Lordships' House. I do not complain about that; I feel that it is as well that we should have a debate on naval questions in this House from time to time. The value of that principle has been displayed by the number of questions which have been put to me this afternoon. The terms of the Motion moved by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, this afternoon are to ask His Majesty's Government whether they are satisfied that the proposals contained in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Navy Estimates are adequate for the defence of the country. I can go further and assure the noble Lord that His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the Estimates, with any Supplementary Estimates that may be required during the course of the financial year,

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will make the necessary provision for man-power, money, ships and equipment.
It is not easy to follow without a certain amount of repetition a debate which has so recently taken place in another place dealing with this same subject. I am fortunate, however in having in another place two competent colleagues, in the persons of the Parliamentary Secretary and the Civil Lord, who in the course of the debate on the Navy Estimates explained in broad outline Naval policy and the reason for the increased expenditure as compared with the last financial year—namely, an increase of about 40 per cent. They also explained the technical needs of the Royal Navy in man-power and equipment. The Parliamentary Secretary dealt fully, too, with the work of the Fleet during last year, and called particular attention to those units which since July last have been called upon to fight with the United Nations forces in the Korean war. Your Lordships will agree that I should say a few words of appreciation of the way in which the Services have conducted themselves during those operations. They had to fight in very bad conditions, particularly during the winter, yet the standard maintained has been very high, and the number of casualties has, fortunately, been very low. His Majesty's ships, together with those of the Commonwealth, have worked in close and ever increasing co-operation with the United States Navy and the fighting men of all the United Nations. The morale of our forces has been excellent. Acts of gallantry have been numerous, and great tributes have been paid to the outstanding service given.
In Malaya, too, the Royal Navy has played a full part, for throughout the year frigates and motor launches have maintained constant patrols over the coast to prevent arms and reinforcements reaching the bandits by sea, while since July last the 3rd Royal Naval Commando Brigade has been engaged in anti-bandit operations, a duty which is hazardous and unspectacular but of great and supreme importance. Apart from these activities, the work of the Royal Navy during the year has been concentrated on training and exercises. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, raised that point. I will endeavour to deal with sea-time later in my speech, but I should like to assure the noble Lord that a good deal of attention
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is being paid to exercises of all kinds. Exercises have been conducted with representative ships from North Atlantic Treaty countries, and from the Commonwealth. Indeed, no fewer than twenty of these exercises were carried out during last year. There have been many operational exchanges of ships between ourselves and other Commonwealth countries, while units of the Royal Canadian and Royal Australian Navies, and of the Royal Dutch Navy, have visited Londonderry for anti-submarine exercises and, later, exercises with the Fleet. It can be said that, whatever criticism there is as to the adequacy of our own Fleet, among the Commonwealth countries as a whole we now possess a substantial number of naval ships and forces of all kinds which are a great addition to our potential naval strength.
I should like to deal briefly with the question of naval rearmament, because it has been much criticised here to-day. It is true that it consists to a considerable degree of the acceleration of a carefully thought out plan. It may have taken too long to think out that plan, but it is intended for the development of a well-balanced Navy, capable of carrying out the tasks assigned to it, both in peace and in war. The cost of this accelerated programme for production and research during this financial year is about double the amount spent last year. The full programme, together with current construction when completed, will add no fewer than 232 new ships to our existing naval strength. These will include the powerful Fleet carriers such as the "Eagle," which is now taking her trials, the "Ark Royal" and carriers of the "Hermes" class, and eight destroyers of the "Daring" class. The noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, referred to the delay from the time of launching to the time of delivery of these ships to the Fleet. I can assure him that six of these eight new destroyers will take their trials before the end of this year, and we are hoping that the other two will do so early next year. This programme also provides for twenty-four frigates. The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, was anxious to know when these frigates will be completed. There is the accelerated plan which was announced in the latter part of last year, but that does not mean that all the ships will be constructed during that period.

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We are hoping to accelerate and complete the work within the next three financial years.
LORD TEYNHAM: Can the noble Lord indicate when one, two or perhaps three of the ships will be completed?
VISCOUNT HALL: We are hoping that some of the frigates will be completed next year. Indeed, seventeen of them are already ordered. It must be remembered that there has been a considerable amount of scientific research carried out in order to meet the menace of the submarine, with which I shall deal later. We are putting into these ships, as we are putting into those which are being modernised and reconverted, all the scientific knowledge which has been obtained as a result of information received during and since the last war. Here again, I think we are meeting the point which was made by the noble Lord, Lord Winster. The number of ships being brought into service with the Fleet from the Reserve will be sixty. They will be added to the ships which are operational and under training at the present time. We are hoping from time to time to bring other ships from the Reserve as trained man-power becomes available.
The noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, referred to the training of men. I can assure him that we are getting a very intelligent recruit, one who is able to absorb the training which is provided for him to use all this new scientific equipment which is being provided in the ships now under construction and in those being modernised and reconverted at the present time. The figure of refits of the Reserve Fleet has already been given. There are no fewer than 450 refits of the Reserve Fleet, some of which have come round for the second time within the last two and a half years. In addition to refitting, we are storing many more Reserve Fleet ships, and we are building up stocks which will greatly assist naval preparedness. We have a very large programme of complete modernisation and conversions. We are modernising fleet carriers, cruisers, twenty-five fleet destroyers and about eighty frigates.
I wish to assure the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, and the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, that the question of the con-version of the forty-five fleet destroyers
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into anti-submarine frigates is a decision which was taken after great consideration; and it will be a great advantage to have these destroyers-cum-frigates doing the work which they will be called upon to do. There again, the equipment which was used during the War became obsolete at the end of the War; and instead of putting obsolete or even some of the more modern equipment into the destroyer as a destroyer, we wanted to put into the destroyer all the known equipment to meet the menace of the submarine. There is another aspect which is of great importance. We can convert three of these destroyers for the cost of one frigate. In addition to that, we can convert them far more quickly than we can construct a frigate. So for every reason I think it can be said that these frigates or destroyer-cum-frigates will be some of the most useful of the anti-submarine ships which we shall have.
Questions have been raised about the completion of the "Tiger" class cruisers. I know that this question has arisen year after year, and I want to tell noble Lords that we are not yet ready to proceed with the completion of these cruisers. Further research work is required with their fire control and gunnery, and we are satisfied that it is better for the three of them to wait, rather than that two of them should be fitted with some equipment which is not as good as that with which we hope, in the course of the next two or three years, to equip these ships, to make them the most powerful cruisers of their kind in the world. The noble Lord also raised the question of H.M.S. "Cumberland." Her work is an entirely new departure, for she has been fitted out as a floating laboratory for sea-going trials of equipment. It has been discovered that operational ships cannot be made available for such trials for sufficiently long periods, and the use of H.M.S. "Cumberland" would prevent the otherwise inevitable delays in bringing to fruition much valuable work. This year's trials will include ship's stabilisers which, if successful, will effect considerable saving in equipment, power, and weight by reducing the rolling and yawing motion. Two gunnery systems, together with their associated radar equipment, will also be investigated. When these have been completed, further gunnery systems are waiting for tests, and later H.M.S. "Cumberland" may be used for trials of guided missiles.

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The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, referred to the fact that the number of cruisers we have is very small, and that we should increase the numbers. We must, whatever is said, build and prepare to meet the menace with which we are con-fronted at present—and as the noble Lord, Lord Winster, rightly said, the menace, so far as Russia is concerned, is not that of surface ships: it is the submarine; and without consideration of the strength of the forces which are allied with us at present, we cannot but add our quota to the Allies' pool to deal with this menace. The strongest arm of the Soviet Navy is not surface ships, not battleships or carriers, but submarines. I am not suggesting that they are not building cruisers —they are doing so: but not at the same speed as they are building submarines, which are, after all, the greatest threat to us in the event of total war. To prevent any underestimation or exaggeration of this threat, it should be generally known that I would not disagree with the figure of the total submarine strength of the Soviet fleet as being about 360— which figure is frequently quoted. Compared with the total submarine strength of the German Navy at the beginning of the last war that is a large figure, but it should be remembered that these sub-marines are dispersed over a wide area. Some are in the White Sea, some in the Baltic, some in the Black Sea; and, of course, some are in the Far East. I should say that a large proportion of them would be on the Western rather than on the Far Eastern side.
The Soviet submarine potential is made up of several types, varying from the large "K" class, an extremely powerful submarine, capable of operating over great distances, and able to remain and patrol for considerable periods—the number of these submarines is not very large—to the medium submarine called the SHCH, which is also an effective and dangerous class of about 600 tons, and the smaller coastal type submarine of about 200 tons. The number also includes some ex-German battery-propelled types. These ex-German sub-marines are a type with which we know the Russians have been experimenting. We have them; the Americans have them. They are a type which will spurt at a speed, not of twenty knots—I repeat what I said some two years ago, that we do not know of a submarine which has
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as great a submerged speed as twenty knots or over—but, for a period at any rate, of about sixteen and a half to seventeen knots.
There was another aspect of naval war-fare which was not mentioned during the course of the debate, and your Lordships will, I am sure, excuse me if I deal with it. I refer to the menace of the mine. The Soviet navy is powerfully equipped for mining both by sea and by air; and it is expected that in a future war we shall be faced with an even greater sea-mining threat than that which arose in the last war, for we have ample evidence that there will be a large-scale mining campaign. In addition, the Soviet Government is in possession of all types of mines known to the Western Powers at the end of the last war. Virtually all Russian surface ships are fitted for mine-laying. They also have well-developed mines suitable for laying from the torpedo tubes of all submarines; and, in addition, bomber aircraft can be used for this purpose. It is against the background of these threats that naval research has been conducted, and is now being applied to ships and to aircraft.
At the risk of taking up some time, I should like to deal with some of the scientific research which is going on at the present time. My honourable friend the Parliamentary Secretary in another place outlined much of the research and development problems arising from speed of attack both in the air and under water. I must add to his remarks that, in addition to meeting this particular problem, we have to ensure that the size and weight of our weapons are held within reasonable limits if they are to be fitted in ships of suitable size, ships which must themselves be propelled at greater speeds and with a longer range than previously. Much of our research effort is, therefore, devoted to making substantial reductions in the size of such articles as electronic components and to obtaining greatly improved performance from a given weight in the use of new materials and techniques. The need to save seconds and to conserve man-power has led to a far greater degree of automatic control in our equipment, but this has been done only where the price paid in size and complexity has not been too high. In this connection a fundamental consideration in the design of all equipment is not only

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its performance but also its ease of manufacture, operation and maintenance.
The design of our ships is continually being improved, partly as the result of the knowledge acquired from a long series of experiments on old ships. In the field of marine propulsion it has long been known that we cannot be content with anti-submarine escorts of moderate speed, but must give them a good margin of speed over any submarine with which they may be called upon to deal. This entails in the larger ships steam turbine machinery working at far higher temperatures and pressures than any hitherto used in the Royal Navy. In smaller ships, where diesel machinery is more appropriate, effort is directed towards obtaining a large horse-power from a small lightweight engine. The gas turbine offers this in certain classes of ships, and more than one model is being developed at the present time. The first fruits of other post-war research on marine propulsion have already enabled us to pass from the development to the production phase of a first-class small engine which takes up a very small space and which can produce a great speed. This knowledge is now being applied and used, and ships will soon be fitted with this type of engine. This knowledge can in future benefit the Mercantile Marine as well as the Royal Navy. We are also still studying systems using oxygen-bearing fuels and nuclear energy for submarines. These studies offer promise and all are the subject of further research.
I will not proceed to deal with the question of radar. It was fully dealt with. But I want to assure your Lordships that our scientists, engineers and naval officers are not controlled by the Secretaries or Under-Secretaries. They are men of an independent mind, with a good knowledge, and are sufficiently assertive to get their own way. I must say that not only the Royal Navy but also those navies which are allied with us are benefiting from our research, as we are benefiting from the research of other North Atlantic Treaty Powers. Indeed, our scientists, engineers and naval officers are constantly exchanging knowledge through reciprocal visits, and a Mission is maintained in Washington to facilitate this. As a result of these efforts, we are seeking a fusion of our production which will enable both countries to achieve much quicker results.
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I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, referred to naval aviation. Good progress is being made in this branch of the naval service, and it is intended that the front line strength shall be substantially increased by this new accelerated programme. It has been equipped with the most modern machines designed and built specially for naval air. Some are at present being delivered, whilst several new types will come into operation during the next two years. They will consist of fighters, day and night, interception planes, anti-submarine strikes, reconnaissance, search and rescue. We are also proceeding with the use of the helicopter for anti-submarine work, search and rescue. The experiment to which he referred was, of course, a success.
LORD WINSTER: A great success.
VISCOUNT HALL: The difficulty is that unless there is a little more space than at present exists on the decks of some merchant ships, it is rather difficult to use even a helicopter. But the noble Lord can be assured that we are ordering helicopters with a view to carrying out further research and are using them for the purposes for which we know they are so well suited. The present trend of naval aircraft development is to produce still faster and heavier planes to provide for increased range, heavier offensive loads and higher performances generally. A governing factor in such development is, however, the ability of carriers to operate aircraft, and for this reason fleet carriers are being modernised to enable them to operate the latest types of aircraft. They are becoming still heavier and heavier. When we think of the lightweight aircraft which were used at the beginning of the last war and compare them with the huge aircraft which are being used now, it is really frightening, and one questions how far we are going in the building of these huge, heavy planes. The result is the need for the modernisation of aircraft carriers, which were constructed originally for the use of much lighter and slower planes.
We are still carrying out experiments with the flexible form of deck landing. The deck would consist of pneumatic cells, joined together to form a carpet to absorb the shock of landing. That will

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enable aircraft without undercarriages to be operated from carriers. Trials afloat have shown that undercarriage-less jets can be landed on deck in fair weather with little difficulty. As the next step, it is planned to progress this development ashore in association with the Ministry of Supply. This will be done by using equipment similar to that needed in a carrier. These developments hold out good possibilities which, if fully successful, will be a great boon.
The noble Lords, Lord Winster and Lord Teynham, referred to the utilisation of man-power. It is true that we have a large amount of man-power, but we also have commitments. The naval air arm requires almost one-third of naval personnel. A large proportion of naval air arm work is done at air stations. Taking into consideration the naval air arm, Marines, W.R.N.S. and others, who make up Vote A of 143,000, no less than something like 45 per cent. of the total are having sea service at the present time. By the end of the year, and as a result of this accelerated programme, we are hoping that Vote A will be increased to 152,000, which will enable us to bring the ships to which I have referred from reserve into service with the Fleet, and provide the sea time which I entirely agree is so necessary. A sailor is a sailor, and his work is mainly at sea, and we want our sailors to get as much sea time as possible.
The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, referred to what might be regarded as time-expired men—men who have reached the end of their seven or twelve years' service and have been retained for another eighteen months. That applies not only to the Royal Navy but also to the other two Services. The decision was taken because this extension of time was essential to assist in bringing the Far Eastern Fleet up to its war strength, to meet the demands made as a result of the Korean conflict, and, at the same time, to man the ships which are coming into commission. I have already pointed out that we are hoping that the "Eagle" will commission in the course of a very short time. As regards the "Darings," four may be commissioned before the end of this year and the other four during the course of next year. This extension of service was essential, and, on the whole, whilst there has been criticism from some ships' companies, I think the situation has been
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accepted by most of them. In dealing with personnel, I can say that, on the whole, recruitment is satisfactory, but we do want additional recruits for air crews. The one shortage which concerns the Board of Admiralty at the present time is the limited number who are offering themselves as air crew. Whilst there has been some slight improvement, there is still an urgent need. We also want recruits for short-service periods, with a possibility of being taken into the permanent Service during the period of eight years if they are suitable. If they are unsuitable, there is a substantial gratuity paid to them at the end of their period.
We also require a number of volunteers from National Service men to train as pilots and observers. We would welcome a number of applications for this work. There is still a shortage of higher and experienced ratings, and this continues to concern us. I thought the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, was a little critical in this regard. He must realise that one of the great difficulties in the matter of the scarcity of experienced ratings was the lack of recruitment during the war period. Indeed, there was no regular recruitment apart from boy recruits, and the long-service senior ratings who are required at the present time are men who joined the Navy in the early 'thirties, have done their twelve years and have also had a very hard war. It has been very difficult to keep them. It is true that there was some delay in agreeing to the payment of the bounty, but that has now been paid and we are hoping that we shall get still more than has been promised. But without these people we just cannot carry on as we should like.
To back up our Regular Forces we have a steadily increasing body of Reserves which number more than 50,000 of all types. But our Reserves are now benefiting by a growing number of National Service men. Since January, 1949, 10,000 of these men have either passed through the Navy and gone on to the Reserve, or are still serving. There will be greater additions during this year.
LORD STRABOLGI: Does that include Marines as well?
VISCOUNT HALL: Yes, it does. I should like to say a word about the R.N.V.R. air branch, which has been maintained at almost full air crew

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strength during the last year and has accomplished a total of 7,000 flying hours during that period. The standard achieved during the annual periods of continuous training compares favourably with that of the first-line squadrons. We intend to form a fifth R.N.V.R. air squadron at Ford, in Southern England. This will meet the many applications for R.N.V.R. air crews in that area.
The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, and the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, asked about officer recruitment. I assure them that officer recruitment generally is quite satisfactory. The first two 16-age entries have now passed out of the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, and have gone to the training cruiser. Reports indicate that these cadets will maintain the high standard of the naval officer entry under the earlier system. The standard of entry is good—about 200 for each entry —and the intake into the Navy at each entry is about thirty. We expect much larger numbers at the next entry. The noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, asked whether it was true that there was a stipulation that 50 per cent. of the new entry should come from State schools. There is no stipulation of that kind. Boys from any school, whether it is a secondary, grammar or public school, can apply, and, of course, there is keen competition for the places which are available. I think it can be said that, on the whole, the standard of naval officer under the sixteen entry is as good as it was under the thirteen-and-a-half entry. The special entry is maintaining its standard.
The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, asked about the promotion of officers from the lower deck. During last year no fewer than thirty-eight C.W. candidates were promoted to acting sub-lieutenant, and altogether, including promotions to branch rank, 23 per cent. of the total number of promotions last year came from the lower deck, which I think is a very good record. I have been asked about the change in the uniforms of the R.N.V.R. and the R.N.R. The arguments for the change were well put by Lord Winster—namely, that there should be no distinction between officers in the R.N.V.R. and R.N.R. and officers in the Regular Navy. That is what we are aiming at, and at last we have done something towards it by doing away with the wavy stripe. But it must
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be remembered that there are many Reserve officers who were very proud of their wavy stripe. In deciding whether or not to proceed with the change we had to consider carefully the sentimental attachment of so many officers to that stripe. After approaching official organisations representative of the various classes of Reserve officers, we discovered that in the main they were in favour of the change. Indeed, so far I have not had any representation, with the exception of that made by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, in respect of this change.
LORD TEYNHAM: Perhaps the noble Viscount will allow me to intervene for a moment. My suggestion was that if it is desirable to make any change at all, the change should be to sweep away all distinction between the various types of officers. That was my main point.
VISCOUNT HALL: That is the difference between myself and the noble Lord: he has always been a young man in a hurry, but we think we ought to go by stages. I feel that stage one, more distinctive than anything else, was the question of the stripe, and that matter is now being dealt with. Questions have also been raised in relation to the flying of the Blue Ensign by British merchant officers who served in the Reserve. As Lord Teynham rightly stated, we have reduced the numbers of Reserve personnel serving in a ship from sixteen to four. If the captain has been an officer in one of the Reserve branches he can fly the Blue Ensign. I will certainly take note of what the noble Lord said about leaving it to the officer himself, if there is just one Reserve officer—namely, the commanding officer—in the ship, and whether that can be done. It is cutting it rather fine, I think, to do it in that way, but I will certainly look at this point to see whether something can be done.
Before I conclude, I must make some reference to the Merchant Navy, upon which this nation so much depends during war and peace, and without which the nation could not hope to survive. The Admiralty, in their preparedness programme, are making provision (this matter was referred to by Lord Winster) for the protection of merchant ships during war, for we have been storing materials for degaussing for a long time, and large orders have been placed

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recently, as part of the accelerated defence programme. I am hoping that this work will be proceeded with as soon as possible, with the full consent and co-operation of the ship owners. Sufficient stocks of dual-purpose weapons for arming the entire Merchant Navy in an emergency have already been accumulated, and are suitably distributed throughout the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, together with large quantities of auxiliary equipment. Ship strengthening for guns was included in the construction of all ships in the Service at the end of the war, and with but a few exceptions almost all ships which have been built since the beginning of 1947 have been so constructed. We are hoping to deal with the few which have not had this operation carried out.
A system of improved sub-division of ships proposed by the Board has recently been incorporated in a very satisfactory proportion of newly constructed ships. The question of extending the bulkheads and improving the sub-division of ships already in the Service is also under consideration at the Admiralty. We have reconstituted the Merchant Navy defence courses, similar to those which were held before and during the last war. These courses have commenced in London, Liverpool. Glasgow and Newcastle-on-Tyne. Their object is to familiarise Merchant Navy personnel with the measures which would be taken by the Royal Navy for the protection of the Mercantile Marine in time of war, and the part which they will be expected to play in an emergency. They also include gunnery instruction, of which sufficient is taught to enable naval officers to become armament officers on defensively equipped merchant ships and men to become members of their gun crews. Officers of the Royal Navy are attached for short periods in merchant ships, to enable them to achieve a better understanding of the problems of the Merchant Navy officers and of the capabilities of their ships. These arrangements will, I have no doubt, preserve and foster the good relationship which has always existed between these two Services, particularly in war time. In connection with the matter of merchant shipping it is interesting to note the flood of orders which has flowed into shipbuilding yards during the last year or so, and which are still accumulating. In
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1949, the total number of orders placed in shipbuilding yards in this country were for less than 400,000 tons. In 1950—last year—the figure was 1,570,000 tons. From January 1 to March 30 this year—three months—the total number of orders placed amounted to 1,466,000 tons. It might be asked what is the position with regard to the placing of orders for naval ships. We have already discussed this matter with warship builders, and berths are already being kept in some of the larger yards for the purpose of dealing with any naval orders which are forthcoming.
Both the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, and the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, asked me questions with regard to the improved conditions of service and pay in the Naval Ordnance Inspector's Department. I interrupted Lord Teynham, and reminded him that after the deputation had waited upon me some increase of pay was made. I should not like him to think that the naval ordnance inspectors were satisfied with the increases which they received—it would be misleading to say that. Nevertheless, some increase was made. Then there was a question as to the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, and I can understand the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, feeling so strongly about this matter. I have always maintained that the Corps is one of the most important branches of the Admiralty Service. It cannot be said that nothing has been done to improve conditions. In fact, much has been done, particularly in relation to the Director and some of the Deputy Directors. To-day I have been informed that an increase has been given to the constructors. It is not large—an increase of £50 a year on the minimum and of £125 a year on the maximum salaries. The noble Viscount may regard it as a little cynical for me to say that we are still dealing with the question of students. I promise him that I will press for the settlement of this matter as soon as possible. I appreciate their difficulties, but we have our difficulties as well. It is one of those things with which, un-fortunately, we have not been able to get to grips, but I hope that we shall do so in the very near future.
LORD TEYNHAM: Does the noble Viscount intend to make clear that this increase to the Royal Corps of Naval

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Constructors has been made since the deputation, of which I was a member, saw the noble Viscount?
VISCOUNT HALL: With regard to the increases to the Director and Deputy Directors I think that these have been made since the noble Lord saw me, but I should not like to be sure about that. So far as the constructors are concerned, the news came through to-day.
I am afraid that I have kept your Lordships and tried your patience. I entirely agree with what noble Lords have said: that, with all the scientific and mechanical changes which are taking place in the Royal Navy, its role remains the same—that is, to keep the sea roads open, to prevent any interruption in sea traffic, and to deny the seas to the ships of the enemy. This can be done only by maintaining an adequate well-balanced Navy, including all types of the best-equipped ships, to protect our Commonwealth and world-wide commitments, and to make our proper contribution to the Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This powerful group of twelve nations, every one making its full contribution to the Defence services—sea, air and land—set up, not for the purpose of aggression but to ensure world peace, should, in the event of peace being broken, be sufficiently strong to overcome the enemy, whoever that enemy may be. That is still the purpose of the Royal Navy, and it is for that purpose that we require the money which is contained in the Estimates.
5.52 p.m.
LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, I am sure your Lordships will agree that we have had an interesting debate this afternoon, and have covered a large field. We are indebted to the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Admiralty for giving us so much information. We all join with the noble Viscount in our appreciation of the great work done by the Royal Navy in Korea and Malaya. I was a little disappointed in his statement with reference to the construction of new frigates and the dates of their completion. I hope that their construction will be accelerated as much as possible. I was somewhat surprised to hear that the three cruisers in question are not yet to be proceeded with, and are to await further
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experiments. I suggest that the three cruisers should be completed and three more laid down. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, said that we had only twenty-six cruisers, which is a quite inadequate number for the work they have to carry out. The noble Viscount, Lord Hall, made reference, and rightly so, to the menace of minelaying by Russia, and said that a great deal of scientific research was being done by this country. But what he failed to tell us was about the minesweepers that are to be constructed to deal with this potential heavy attack by mines. I know that a number of these ships are to be laid down, but we know very little about the completion dates. Are all the materials for building these ships available? Can the noble Viscount assure us that we shall have a large number of minesweepers, say 50 per cent., laid down in the next twelve months? These are the important points we ought to know. Again, I was somewhat disappointed that the noble Viscount said nothing about Coastal Command. We have pressed on numerous occasions the question of Coastal Command, and I feel that I must reserve the right to put down at some future date a Motion to call special attention to Coastal Command. I do not want to press these points this afternoon, how-ever, and I beg leave of the House to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.