§ 3.47 p.m.
§ LORD TEVIOT
had the following Motion on the Order Paper: Having regard to the cases in which valuable in-formation has been disclosed to foreign countries, to call attention to the need for all possible measures to be taken in the selection of persons engaged in secret work, in the terms of their employment, and in the security arrangements for safeguarding the secrecy of their work; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in thinking about this Motion which stands on the Paper in my name, I have been trying to face up to the realities of the present situation. The situation is unpleasant and dangerous, as has been shown to us in the course of the last few months. I know that in the past anyone who faced up to real dangers was always liable to be accused of "getting the wind up." I cannot help that. I have no doubt that at the end of this debate I shall be accused of being gloomy and panicky, but I will risk that, because I feel it my duty to put forward the ideas which I have in mind.
I do not think anybody can be satisfied with the present situation. I propose quite shortly to go back to the conditions which prevailed in this country, say, some fifty years ago. In those days, communications and transport were far more difficult than they are to-day. In consequence, espionage and sabotage activities were made more difficult. The weapons used in war were simple and, indeed, primitive. Com-pared with present-day weapons, the rifle, the cannon, the lance, the sword and the bayonet were just minor weapons. In those days scientific warfare was not adopted. Men fought against men. Civilians, women and children were not looked upon as legitimate targets. The limits of the battlefield to-day have been enlarged beyond anything that one could have imagined possible in a civilised world. Scientific and highly complicated mechanical warfare, the apparent elimination of chivalry, and the introduction of extreme brutality and cruelty, have altered the whole methods of war. Each nation is employing scientists to develop new and more fearsome weapons capable of mass destruction of material and life. These are facts that we cannot escape.
In consequence of all this, the spy has the greatest scope for finding out the most important secret information—far more 456 so than was the case in the old days, when rifles and bayonets were changed for the longer-ranged cannon. Since those days the world has seen two wars leaving bitter memories and revengeful thoughts. From a psychological point of view I am going to put this to your Lordships. I cannot believe that citizens of an erstwhile enemy country can be expected to be trustworthy when engaged in highly secret investigations of devastating war weapons, particularly since, alas! a number of our own nationals have been implicated in some of the episodes which have occurred during the last two years. To expect of ex-enemy aliens the type of loyalty that I feel we in this country require is, to my mind, asking too much of human nature. To employ them at all seems to me to be leading them into temptation; and there is a world organisation arranging all that everywhere. As we all know, within the last eighteen months there have been three instances of serious leakages, one concerning a British-born scientist, one German-born, and one Italian-born. We are apparently employing a considerable number of ex-enemy aliens in most confidential work.
Now I come to what I regard as the great difficulty, if not the impossibility, of preventing the passing to foreigners and foreign countries of valuable and dangerous information. Our seaboard is long, and it would be easy for any of your Lordships or for me this very evening to get into a motor car, drive down to an isolated part of the coast (having made all arrangements beforehand, about which there would be no difficulty), get on a small boat and then into a submarine; and one could then be in the Baltic in no time. Indeed, that would be doing it in a comparatively difficult way; it could be done much more easily. One could just go away for a holiday and quite easily find oneself in Moscow.
That being so, another question arises for consideration. This island is a small island near the Continent of Europe. Not far from where I live there is a most important atomic energy research station, with a great railway running straight through that part of the country. Not more than twenty-five miles off is another place to which I myself have been. How easy it would be for any nation that wanted to knock out those stations to turn 457 on them five hundred or a thousand reckless airmen, who would be able in no time to sweep the whole of them away.
Personally I should like to keep out of this country altogether the type of person I have in mind. Other countries would not tolerate our nationals in the same way, in any sense of the word. Of course we have no chance of getting through the Iron Curtain. Once it had been established that in regard to the safety of any other country we were not reliable, I do not believe for one moment that that country would permit us to enter its territory at all, let alone work in intimate and confidential government work in that country. As no doubt your Lordships will remember, our Government some time ago said that they were going to carry out a purge of Communists in certain governmental jobs. I do not know whether anything very much has been done in that direction, but I have not heard of any drastic action. I believe we are far too easy-going in this matter of the employment of foreigners and ex-enemy aliens in the conduct of our most confidential affairs. We now know and have definite evidence of the results of this policy— sabotage and espionage. There are many instances of it—far more than your Lordships know of, no doubt.
Now I ask this question: Why is it necessary to employ ex-enemy scientists in any capacity when the safety of the country is at stake? I have been told that the reason is that we have not enough brains and experience here. My immediate answer to that is that the atomic bomb, which is, after all, the super war weapon to-day, was conceived and brought to perfection by British and United States scientists. That was done without the assistance of any alien scientists. The enemy, luckily for us, were lagging behind all the time in this research. They were trying it, as we now well know, and there was in Germany— I do not know about Italy—a good deal of investigation into the atomic bomb. Yet the British and the United States scientists managed to produce it before the enemy—thank goodness! Now it appears that some of those very scientists whom we have managed to beat in the past in producing this weapon are thought to be necessary to ourselves. I cannot see where that argument comes in.
458 What are we going to do about it? Atomic research is, as we know, most dangerous. However, it is vital to our existence, and I am or opinion—and here I must make it plan that this is my personal view and I am speaking for myself alone—that we should at once enter into conference with the United States and Canada, as we did in the war, with a view to having the whole of the investigation on this subject in a country which is not so vulnerable as our own. I make that suggestion to the Government. Then, as a result of that, whenever there is any new development of commercial or industrial value, or of value in regard to the making of weapons, it could be passed on to us here in a practical way. To my mind that is the safest thing to do. If my first suggestion is not agreed to, I have an alternative— namely, to keep the whole of the work British; to dispense with the services of those scientists, whether they are naturalised or not, who are of ex-enemy origin. Let us do this, or get rid of the whole thing into another country.
As I see it, the present position is completely unsatisfactory, and I do beg of your Lordships and of the Government not to ignore the writing on the wall. There is plenty of evidence that our situation is extremely dangerous. I may be accused of panic, but I can assure your Lordships that the issue stares us hard in the face. We have been amply warned by experience. In my opinion it is our duty to take notice of what we have seen and what we know, and I most seriously ask the Government to consider the points I have put forward. I can assure them that this is not a question of politics or anything of that sort on my part; it is pure concern at our dangerous situation I beg to move for Papers.
§ 4.2 p.m.
§ VISCOUNT SWINTON
My Lords, we must all share the very natural anxiety expressed by my noble: friend Lord Teviot over the difficulties of the situation he has been discussing, and over events which have taken place. We have had these very serious leakages, and I am sure that that anxiety is fully shared by the Government, who must be equally concerned to prevent a recurrence. But, with great respect to my noble friend who moved the Motion, although the issue is serious it is not, I think, nearly so simple as he 459 has presented it to us. He said that the atom bomb was produced by British and American scientists in America. My Lords, with great respect, that is a very inadequate, and indeed almost inaccurate, statement of the case. The American and British scientists who worked on this project in America would be the first to tell my noble friend what an enormous amount they owe to emigrants from other countries who took a tremendous part in their work. I will mention only one name, that of Niels Bohr, a great Danish physicist. I suppose if you asked other great physicists to name one man who was perhaps the greatest of all in a team that worked together wonderfully well, I think probably they would name him—as, in-deed, some of them have done.
§ VISCOUNT SWINTON
I am coming to that point: I hope my noble friend will allow me to speak with a deep sense of responsibility in this matter. I will really try to face the issues. The great scientist to whom I have referred is a Dane, but without doubt there were emigræs from Germany and from Austria who made great contributions to this work. I think I am right in saying that the original patent from which the atom bomb was ultimately developed was the invention of an Austrian who is now a citizen of an Allied country. We did beat the Germans, but if Hitler had not turned so many non-Nazi scientists out of Germany, I am not sure that Germany would not have beaten us.
I dare say the noble Lord knows some-thing of what I had to do in the war in regard to security and intelligence, and other matters, and he certainly will not accuse me of underrating the importance of every security measure. The more I had to deal with the co-ordination of security in the war, and with counter-measures against threats to security—as Mr. Churchill defined it, anything that the enemy could do anywhere in the world against the Allied cause, except by the direct intervention of his Armed Forces— the more I learned, working with every Department, that we have got to be very sure of what our problem is before we seek the solution to it. Therefore, with great respect to my noble friend, it would 460 not be an answer to the problem to say "We will have only Englishmen or Americans engaged in this enterprise." By doing that, we should certainly lose a great deal.
Of course, every security measure has to be taken, but it must be remembered that the Communist menace is not a question of nationality alone. Some of the most dangerous Communists are nationals of their own country. The most dangerous people are not those who can be hired as spies to take a motor car down to the coast and get on a motor boat and meet a submarine (incidentally, there are far simpler ways than that of passing on information); they are natives of their country. The most dangerous are not the hirelings but those extraordinary people who, in some strange way, believe that by betraying the most vital interests of their own country they are doing what I suppose to them would be the equivalent of doing God's service. That is what makes this such a very difficult problem with which to deal. My Lords, I have said that to show that, while sharing all my noble friend's anxieties, I do not think that his is really a solution at all.
I am not going to discuss in public security precautions or security arrangements. I should render no service if I did that. I am sure that this matter does greatly exercise the attention of the Government. But I think this is an occasion when we can usefully discuss the organisation of the body which is charged, in this country, with atomic development. May I also say, in passing, that I should not be at all happy to accept my noble friend's suggestion that atomic research should be stopped in this country and should be transferred to the other side? From the point of view of security—by which I mean internal security—while I am sure that our relations with America are extremely cordial, I think we must recognise that they have the same problems that we have, and certainly not on a lesser scale. As to the risk of the atomic research station having an atomic bomb, or some other type of bomb, dropped on it, if we carry that argument to its logical conclusion we shall not produce anything of crucial importance in this country, for fear that the production establishment might be bombed. So I do not think that that suggestion is practicable. But I do want to discuss the organisation of 461 the body which conducts this development, because I think it may well be that therein lies part of the trouble and the difficulty.
Let me say at once that I think it is wholly right that this atomic development should be financed by the Government and be under Government control. That control, however, can be exercised in one of two ways. It can be exercised by putting the organisation directly under a Government Department and, in effect, making it part of the Civil Service machine. That is what the Government have done. Alternatively, control can be exercised by the establishment of a corporation created by the Government and under its general direction, but largely autonomous in the engagement of staff and the way it does its work. That is the way it is being done in the United States of America. It is a method that is familiar to and popular with our own Government in less novel and less difficult enterprises, such as coal, trans-port, gas and electricity. I should have thought they might well consider whether another corporation could not be set up. Generally speaking, I do not want to see such bodies multiplied, but I suggest that the Government might well give attention to the question of whether it would not be advisable to set one up for this purpose.
The development and production of atomic weapons is a totally new technical problem. It is an industrial under-taking so novel and on such a large scale that it would tax the capacity of the greatest firms here or in the United States. Again, in making ordinary weapons, the Government can, at Farn-borough or in some research establishment, do the preparatory research and development, produce the prototype and hand that prototype over to industry for quantity production. But in making fissionable material and atomic weapons this is not possible. Research and production have to march hand in hand. Therefore, I think the Government were perfectly right in deciding that development and manufacture must be conducted in one organisation. But I suggest they have the wrong sort of organisation. The Civil Service machine is not really designed to deal with a task of this sort. Only men who are used to tackling large industrial developments can handle opera- 462 tions of this nature. Such men, accustomed to take decisions and to shoulder responsibility, do not fit easily or well into the ordinary Civil Service machine. Many of the best engineers and scientists dislike joining the Civil Service, in which, rightly or wrongly, they feel that their status is lower than that of administrative civil servants. I do not know whether or not that is true. I have heard it argued one way and another. How-ever, there is no doubt at all that these men do think and feel in that way. One great Judge. I believe—I forget who it was—said that the state of a man's mind was as much a matter of fact as the state of his digestion. Certainly, the feeling which I have mentioned is a feeling which these people have.
And there is more in it than that. In the Civil Service, they find that their work is prescribed for them, and they are much less independent than they are in industry or in the universities. And even when men of the right type are willing to consider appointments, it is necessary, as I understand it, to get Treasury approval for each post, and the Civil Service Com-mission have to be satisfied. That means, inevitably, delays and red tape, and I understand that more than once it has resulted in very suitable men being snapped up by other employers. Then, again, special terms cannot be arranged in the Civil Service hierarchy to meet special cases. For example, a man in charge of the building of a tremendous plant—I understand that figures for plants of £10,000,000 and even double that sum are not out of the picture—can barely be paid £3,000 a year in the Civil Service, whereas outside he would certainly get at least twice that amount. I know that there cannot be all sorts of special fees, special scales and special payments in the Civil Service.
In a corporation, however, extraordinary emoluments create no precedent at all, nor do special conditions which are attached to a man's employment. In the Civil Service any employee whose reliability is suspect cannot be discharged or even moved without going through an elaborate "purge" procedure—I am not complaining of that—and, of course, if that fails, he can stay as long as he likes. Nor in the Civil Service can we place any restriction on his movements. That may be perfectly satisfactory in a great 463 established organisation like the Civil Service, but it may be entirely unsuitable when we are dealing with this unique and very specialised activity. If the under-taking were in the hands of a corporation, special contracts could be made with employees, terminable at, say, six months' notice, and these could include any restrictions which we thought it right to impose. For example, we could say to a man that it was a condition of his employment over a period of years that he must surrender his passport and must not go abroad without approval. Obviously this would entail paying higher rates than are paid in the Civil Service, but I see no objection at all to that.
I think this analogy of the Civil Service is wrong. I do not think this employment ought to be in any way part of the Civil Service. As compared with the total annual expenditure, such increases of salary would be negligible and certainly would be well worth while if security could be improved in that way and if, as I am certain would also happen, production could be accelerated. Moreover, if we had a corporation, it would be un-necessary to obtain Treasury approval for every development and for every person taken on. I am not suggesting that such a corporation should have a completely free hand and should be able to spend anything it likes, any more than the British Electricity Authority or the B.B.C. can; but I think it would be easy to work out methods of exercising what I may call reasonable strategic financial control, without having to refer every appointment and every detail to the Treasury. The American Congress have handed over far larger sums to the Atomic Energy Commission in the United States. I can see no reason why some such arrangement could not be made to work here. I have tried to be constructive in what I have said and I hope that the Government will reconsider this matter very carefully. It would not be at all difficult to make the change, and I believe it would be wholly beneficial. I believe that both efficiency and security point the same road, and that is not the road which the Government have taken heretofore.
§ 4.24 p.m.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VIS-COUNT JOWITT)
My Lords, the noble Lord. Lord Teviot, who moved this 464 Motion seemed to anticipate that I should accuse him of being gloomy and panicky. I am afraid that before now I have accused the noble Lord of erring slightly on the gloomy side of things, but I do not think I have ever accused him of being panicky. The noble Lord has to-day discussed a very serious matter with a due sense of what is involved, and I thank him for the discretion with which he has discussed it. I can assure him that here we have no Party issue at all. This is a matter which must concern any Government of this country and it concerns all of us as good citizens. In his Motion the noble Lord calls attentionto the need for all possible measures to be taken in the selection of persons engaged in secret work, in the terms of their employment, and in the security arrangements for safeguarding the secrecy of their work ….These are all obvious points. The noble Lord is right on all three of them and therefore I have no hesitation whatever in accepting this Motion on behalf of the Government.
I am bound to say that I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, that I should completely reject the two solutions of the problem which the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, offered to us. I think he has unduly simplified the matter. First of all, the idea that we should surrender all our atomic research and allow it to be moved across the Atlantic to a greater distance from danger, seems to be a counsel of despair. I think it would be a most lamentable thing if we were to abandon all atomic research, with the possible benefits that may come from it and with all the knowledge we may derive from it. I should reject that out of hand. Secondly, the noble Lord suggests that we should keep it all British. Being rather a John Bull, I like to keep things in British hands—that is not to be used against me hereafter—but it is really a question of what benefit we can derive from people who have not what I think is the great advantage which the noble Lord and I have of being British by birth and in our whole outlook and surroundings. There is no shadow of doubt that we have de-rived the greatest benefit, not only from foreigners but also from ex-enemies; there is no doubt about that at all.
The problem is surely this—and I think the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, will agree with me here. Let it be granted that there is a greater element of security risk 465 in employing somebody who is not British; but let it also be remembered that one of the offenders was as British as the noble Lord and I are. Surely it is a question then of balancing these considerations: the advantage we can obtain from the services of a man on the one hand as compared with the security risk on the other. That is a matter which we have to consider in every particular case. We are fully alive to the necessity for taking all possible measures we can to safeguard the security of secret work. Your Lordships may remember that during a debate raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart on March 29, 1950, I referred in detail to the steps we were then taking. Your Lordships will find it reported in columns 653 and 654 of the Hansard of that date. I emphasised then that all possible measures—and your Lordships will appreciate that some measures are not possible in time of peace— are in fact taken for the purposes which the noble Lord has in mind. I say at once that we or any other Government would be failing in our duty if it were otherwise. Obviously, it would defeat the very object which the noble Lord and I have at heart if I were to go into great detail in describing these matters. I therefore ask your Lordships to forgive me if I discuss this matter in somewhat general terms.
The Motion recognises that the maintenance of security about secret work falls under two heads—namely, the selection and the employment of staff, and the physical security measures. So far as the selection and employment of the staff is concerned, the policy of the Government in connection with secret work was laid down in a statement made by the Prime Minister in another place on March 15, 1948. Put briefly, this policy seeks to ensure that no civil servant, industrial or non-industrial, who is known to be a member of either the Communist or Fascist Party, or to be associated with one of them in such a way as to raise legitimate doubts about his or her reliability, is employed in connection with work the nature of which is vital to the security of the State. This procedure is working smoothly, and the number of cases handled under it suggest that there is little evidence of any widespread infiltration into the public service of persons anxious to get information in order to 466 pass it on elsewhere. Noble Lords will find that I gave the actual figures on the occasion of the debate to which I have just referred.
It is equally important to prevent unreliable persons from gaining access to secret work. This is a matter of wise and careful selection. Before any person, whether already employed in the public service or not, can engage in secret work, every possible step is taken by means of inquiries to check his bona fides. Once again I emphasise the word "possible." We could pay too high a price for security. We are sure the noble Lord will agree that these inquiries cannot in this country be carried to the lengths which would be tolerated in a Police State. I am not quite sure what the noble Lord has in mind when he refers in his Motion to terms of employment. Civil servants, whether engaged on secret work or not, are subject to the traditions and discipline of the public service. They are, moreover, subject to the Official Secrets Acts, which fact is specially brought to the attention of those who are appointed to posts involving secret work.
§ VISCOUNT SWINTON
Perhaps I might interrupt the noble and learned Viscount. I should not presume to explain the terms of my noble friend's Motion, but what I have in mind in connection with terms of employment is precisely what I stated in my speech. I appreciate that it is necessary to have certain terms of employment if a man is a civil servant, but it is possible to have quite different, and as I think more secure, terms of employment if a man is not a civil servant but an employee of a corporation.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR
I am afraid that I did not come prepared to answer that question, and this is a matter upon which one is anxious not to give a "snap" answer. But I do know that the matter has been considered, and that there are certain obvious advantages in the course which the noble Viscount has suggested. I also know that there are certain disadvantages. I do not think the matter must be regarded as in any sense closed, and I will certainly convey to the proper quarters the observations which the noble Viscount has made—and he speaks on this matter with considerable authority. I cannot say more than that, because on the terms of this Motion I was not aware that this point would be raised. 467 If I had been, I would have found out whether there was more that I could say on the point.
Let me now say a word or two about the physical security arrangements. I was about to point out thatStone walls do not a prison make,Nor iron bars a cage.In the end, the maintenance of security is a matter for the discretion and con-science of those to whom secrets are en-trusted. Nevertheless, physical security measures do have great value. All members of the Civil Service engaged on secret work are instructed in the best methods of ensuring safe custody of secret documents. In the more important offices and the various secret establishments there are security officers, and security guards or police, systems of pass checking, and so on; and these arrangements are constantly under review, both departmentally and inter-departmentally. But everything turns in the end on maintaining a vigilant attitude towards security —what is known as "security-minded-ness." No amount of screening, no expenditure, however lavish, on safes and sentries, can be a substitute for this attitude of vigilance on the part of those who are in charge of these secret matters.
I would add just this. I feel that too great an emphasis on security and security measures can be self-defeating. Not long ago, I was reading a book by a distinguished American professor who reminds his readers that the object of security measures is to maintain scientific supremacy. He suggests that this object may well be lost if the best men and the keenest brains are kept out of the service by conditions which only the second best would find to be tolerable. I do not know whether he is right in concluding that this is a real risk in the United States, but I have no doubt that it is the effect in the Police States, where security, as well as orthodoxy, is maintained by threats of forced labour or the firing squad—and at what cost in original thought and fundamental research no one can tell. I believe that in this country, with its tradition of ordered freedom, we have found the right balance. I do not ask your Lordships to believe that everything is perfect. If anybody thinks the organisation for which he is responsible is perfect, it is time he went away 468 for a change. The situation no doubt must be watched, and can be improved; and no doubt from the faults and failures of the past we can learn to do better in the future. But I believe that the organisation is good, and that, so far as is possible in an imperfect world, the principles which I have enunciated are being faith-fully put into practice.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for having raised this matter. Perhaps the only definite satisfaction he will take away from our discussion to-day is this: that we are fully aware of the necessity for perfecting all the arrangements, so far as we can. We realise with him the dangers and the difficulties. We certainly do not consider that any form of organisation which we have adopted is necessarily to persist for all time. Let us go forward with the work we are doing, in the hope that by studying the lessons of the past we may devise some system—and there is no doctrinal business about this—which will give us the best results and, at the same time, the greatest safeguard in all security measures. In accepting this Motion I do not want to undertake to produce Papers. Obviously that is the very last thing which the noble Lord and I desire. It is suggested to me that, if the noble Lord is agreeable, his Motion might be moved in this form:Moved to resolve, That having regard to the cases in which valuable information has been disclosed to foreign countries, all possible measures be taken in the selection of persons engaged in secret work, in the terms of their employment, and in the security arrangements for safeguarding the secrecy of their work.That wording is substantially the same as that of the noble Lord's Motion, but it would avoid the production of Papers. If the noble Lord would withdraw his Motion for Papers and move a Resolution in that form, it would make the matter easier.
§ 4.42 p.m.
§ LORD TEVIOT
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Viscount very much for his speech, although to me it is not altogether reassuring, because the remarks which fell from my noble friend Lord Swinton show that there are many easier ways of getting information out of the country than the boat method I mentioned. It shows how vulnerable we are, which is the point that I tried to drive 469 home. The remarks which fell from the noble and learned Viscount on the Wool-sack also show how terribly difficult the situation is. Of course, the question of a passport does not matter two hoots. The man gets away from the coast in other ways than by the regular boat, and every-thing is arranged beforehand, as in the case, no doubt, of the particular gentle-man, Pontecorvo. It did not matter what arrangements we had made; he meant to get away, and he got away to Moscow. I hear a lot of people say about that gentleman: "He was not a Communist; he was kidnapped in Rome or somewhere or other." I think that is a little too much to believe. The matter is quite simple. He just wont away and carried with him, either in his head or on his person, a great deal of information. I saw it reported that he had twelve suitcases with him, and there was apparently no supervision as to how many suitcases he took. There might have been many blueprints and other useful documents therein. It shows that this country, as I have already said, is in a very vulnerable position—far more vulnerable than if the whole thing was removed into the wilds of America. Admittedly they must have difficulties with regard to espionage, but nothing like the dangers we have here.
In regard to our own scientists, do not let us blink the fact that we have led science in every way. Who was it who first started wireless? It was not Marconi, it was Sir Oliver Lodge. Marconi took it up afterwards. Who was it who discovered penicillin? It was Sir Alexander Fleming. So far as I can remember, we have always taken the lead in all these highly scientific matters, and I do not believe that we cannot do what is necessary with our own scientists. Therefore, I feel—not that it matters very much, being, as I am, a humble member of your Lordships' House—that this debate, particularly having regard to what the Lord Chancellor and my noble friend Lord Swinton have said, has instructed us a great deal. Therefore, I accept with gratitude the Lord Chancellor's reassuring 470 statement that everything is being done to put us in as great a position of security as possible.
In view of what the Lord Chancellor has said, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion for Papers, and to move to resolve. That having regard to the cases in which valuable information has been disclosed to foreign countries, all possible measures be taken in the selection of per-sons engaged in secret work, in the terms of their employment, and in the security arrangements for safeguarding the secrecy of their work.
§ Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Moved to resolve, That having regard to the cases in which valuable information has been disclosed to foreign countries, all possible measures be taken in the selection of persons engaged in secret work, in the terms of their employment and in the security arrangements for safeguarding the secrecy of their work.—(Lord Teviot.)
§ On Question, Motion agreed to.