HL Deb 30 March 1950 vol 166 cc697-722

6.23 p.m.

LORD MILVERTON rose to call attention to the handling by His Majesty's Government of questions before the Colombo Conference; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in rising to move the Motion which stands in my name may I say that I realise that the hour is late and it is necessary for me to be as brief as possible. I trust therefore that if, by reason of the brevity with which I treat this subject, I appear to be somewhat curt in some of the questions I ask, it will be understood that I am not treating either the subject or the Government with a discourtesy which is not merited.

I should like to start by saying that I have no wish to decry the value of the Colombo Conference or its achievements. But I suggest that its values have been distorted somewhat by the statements made by the right honourable gentlemen, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. If one observed merely what they have said about the results of the Conference one might carry away a false impression of the actual practical results achieved. I suggest that the great achievement of that Conference was the establishment of good will through the representatives of the various members of the Commonwealth talking to each other about the various problems confronting them. I further suggest that nothing practical resulted from the Conference in the way of action which is urgently needed.

I should like next to refer the subjects which, according to the Central Office of Information Commonwealth Survey, the Conference discussed. It is said that the Conference comprehensively reviewed the current economic and political problems of South-East Asia and developments in the Far East, and discussed future relations of Commonwealth countries with China, and the conditions of a peace settlement with Japan. No doubt those matters were discussed, and I should like to ask these questions. Why was it that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs recognised the Communist Government of China when he did, a few days before the opening of the Conference which was, presumably, to discuss that very subject? Is it a fact that the Canadian Government had requested deferment of recognition until after the Conference? Who advised the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to take this sudden step? Did the Colonial Office have the opportunity of offering their advice and, if so, did they support recognition of the Communist Government of China? Was Mr. Malcolm MacDonald consulted in the matter and, if so, did he support this move? After all, he is a person who is eminently qualified to offer opinions. What benefits were expected, and what have in fact accrued as a result of this recognition? Is it not a fact that, since the recognition, outrages in Malaya have increased and that apparently its effect on the falling morale of the Communist guerrillas has been to stimulate them into renewed action?

I do not wish to go into the detail which I would otherwise have done about discussions which took place at that Conference. I should like to say, however, with due respect, that although the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations has taken the trouble to inform the world that the great question is how to create better living conditions and raise the standard of living in Southern Asia, and by so doing lessen the appeal of Communism which chrives on distress, and to say that countries need help in their industries and so forth, he need not have gone to Colombo to find that out. It is a matter which has been known to all of us for a very long time. It is no new contribution to the subject to mention any of those things.

I should like to refer to the terms on which, as your Lordships are aware, the Government of India were asked to recognise the Communist Government at the beginning of October, 1949. They thought about the matter for three months, then decided to recognise that Government, and they recognised it on these terms—on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual interest and mutual respect for sovereign territorial rights. A similar assurance was given to Burma. Nothing was said of Thibet. Mao Tse-Tung has emphatically asserted his intention of rendering strong support to Russia's international policy, and the major plank in that policy is the aggressive infiltration of Communist influence in other countries. Two rival systems, as your Lordships will see, now face each other in Asia. If China, aided by Russia, Russian capital and technical skill and so forth, can show a higher rate of economic progress than countries which adhere to our side in Southern Asia, then the outlook is indeed very grim for us, because the example will be obvious. That is why it is no use talking about what we will do, or appointing consultative committees.

Those committees have been appointed one after the other for the last two or three years, but nothing in fact has been done. There is no time to appoint yet another consultative committee. Action is what is required. When the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations says that the only thing which matters is the improvement of economic standards of living, surely he is ignoring the fact that we cannot improve the economic standards of living until we have peace, law and order in a country. Therefore the first essential thing to do in, for instance, Malaya (and Malaya is not the only country where government is rocking to its foundations) is to restore stability. Most of South-East Asia is suffering from these conditions and it is futile to talk of improving the conditions of life until we have the basis on which we can improve them. Apparently it is overlooked by the two Secretaries of State that it is not a case of improving the standards of living in South-East Asia but of getting back to the standards which obtained before the war. In many cases they are four times as bad as they were then, and there is still a long way to go. From Indonesia to Siam, the whole position is prejudiced by that very fact.

I appreciate that the position of the Indian Government is also a difficult one. They have a severe internal problem of a similar kind, which is to make the resources of the country balance with the increasing population. That is a problem which is going to try them to the utmost without their being able to render assistance to anybody else. I should like to mention in passing the fact that political stability and economic activity go together, and at the present moment what deters the merchant in Malaya is insecurity and uncertainty and, may I say, the strong probability that if he does well he will be victimised either by taxation or by being taken over by the State. It is the existence of Socialist policies which is the main threat to prosperity in non-Communist South-East Asia, although the Socialists believe themselves to be the only bulwark against Communism. It is the presence of these policies which will serve to maintain the poverty which Communism exploits.

I can appreciate that in all probability the British Government were in a difficulty in having to discuss at Colombo the recognition of Communist China. They found themselves faced with an Australian Government which was pledged to strong anti-Communist action, and, seeing it was unlikely that there would be unanimity on the question, it is possible they realised that they would have to take unilateral action in any case, and so they took it at once. I do not know whether that is true or not. Coming back to the terms on which the Indian Government recognised the Communist Government of China, let us consider what they imply in regard to Malaya when the British Government do it. Can one conceive that the Chinese Government are now going to have the right to establish legations and consulates in British Malaya? It seems an impossible suggestion; but is it likely that Mao Tse-Tung is going to be fobbed off with anything less? What does recognition mean, and what is going to be the position of the authorities in Malaya? I need not go into details of what must inevitably happen. It is part of the main plank of Moscow policy, which Mao Tse-Tung has publicly said he follows.

At the end of the Conference, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said: The work of the conference will never be undone. It will go on until the last shreds of difference are dissipated and the links of unity are forged. I do not know what those words mean. It is a very tine sentiment, but I do not think it expresses in actual fact any practical achievement whatsoever. What were the achievements of the Conference? On our own statement, a consultative committee of representatives of the Commonwealth countries was to be appointed, to meet in Sydney. In 1947, six nations—Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, signed an agreement for the establishment of the South Pacific Commission. That has been done, and largely under the instigation of Australia the Commission has met. They have also set up two permanent auxiliary bodies, a research council and a South Pacific Conference. The South Pacific Conference is to include representatives of local inhabitants of the territories concerned; it is to have that democratic basis. And still another consultative committee is to be appointed, when it is not talk which is required, but action. If action is not taken at an early date, and action of a nature to restore law and order, then it will be no use to continue to talk.

Another achievement was the suggestion of a loan to Burma. I do not wish to say anything about that, except that I gather that it was also proposed that the British Government, naturally, should bear the greatest share and the others should pay their share out of sterling balances. Another decision was that it was desirable to conclude a peace with Japan. I do not think it was necessary to go to Colombo to come to that conclusion, and I do not think it is in Colombo or London that the final decision will be taken on that proposal, but in Washington. It was also decided that the problems of Asia had the sharpest urgency. I do not think it was necessary to go to Colombo to decide that. Anybody who had read the debates in your Lordships' House eighteen months ago could hardly have failed to gather that impression. And, meanwhile, the sands of time were running out. Nothing was done to deal with the problems which result from devaluation and on which there are differences of opinion in the Commonwealth.

I realise that this Conference did not deal with internal questions. They found them possibly too difficult, and it is so much easier to discuss big problems on a world basis when you have no power, as this Conference had not, to translate your talk, however beautiful that may be, into action. If the people of this area are to have the master plan of which we hear, they are entitled to know what it is. Is it to be a British plan, and, if so, what is it? If it is not to be a British plan, and it obviously could hardly he because it is only the United States which has the resources to give assistance on the scale which is required, then the United States presumably will have to be consulted. We have not got very much further with that. I think the people of South-East Asia have had their fill of blueprints and that kind of thing. What would appeal to them far more than blueprints from Whitehall, or Colombo, would he some Burma rice. I appreciate that the Conference met only to discuss and report to their respective Governments, but there was room, none the less, if only on the level of high international debate, for constructive leadership, and that constructive leadership did not come from where it should have come—from the representatives of the British Government.

During the last two or three years, we have had a large number of United Nations reports on economic conditions in South-East Asia. Those reports are merely the raw materials for Governments to work on and act on. That is what we are needing at the present moment. We have a vast mass of extremely ably collected material from the United Nations organisations, and nothing has happened in the way of action on it. The United Nations report on this subject is perfectly clear. It points out that at present all the countries of the region are interested in the possibility of restoring the flow of foreign investment, upon which their economic development has so greatly depended in the past, and in particular in the prospects of attracting dollar investments. Not only are the United States of America the only country who now have a large surplus to invest, but it is also evident that the balance of payments, the stability of the exchanges and the restoration of multilateral trade can hardly be achieved while the U.S.A. require no more than their present imports, unless there is an inward flow of dollars on capital account in that region.

These are the facts of the situation. The greatest difficulties in the way of such development are probably political. The countries have to make conditions of investment attractive, and to ensure the political, social and economic stability required for productive activity. That subject could be enlarged upon, but I will not enlarge upon it at the moment. I suggest once more—I want to underline it—that the very stability of government is shaken throughout that area, and we must be sure of our own policy and carry it into action. It is a policy of action that is required at the present moment. If we take the case of Malaya, once more we find that the Government there are being left to fight this menace. That is where I suggest the Colombo Conference might have turned its attention to some effect. Money which should be spent now on bettering conditions in Malaya is being poured out to fight a war which is not so much a Malayan war, but a British Empire war—it is the British Government's affair. Until some of that responsibility is taken from the Malayan Government, then social progress, and all the progress we want in improving conditions, cannot proceed.

If I may, in conclusion, I would quote from a communication I received to show what I mean about the way in which the tropics seem to have affected our representatives in causing them to drip platitudes and exude the finest sentiments, but to do nothing more than that. This is one of many communications I received from Malaya. It says: Whatever theoretical value, exhortation or appeal by wireless by high Government officials in Malaya may have in relation to the more educated Chinese, it is of little value regarding the rest of the Chinese community unless backed up by strong military and police forces. It was the failure to realise these facts by the Colonial Office, when in March, 1946, the Government prematurely withdrew the military forces without either clearing the country of the potential bandits well known to be in hiding, or leaving an adequate police or other force to accomplish this task, that is largely responsible for present terrorist activities in Malaya. I suggest that that sums up the position. What is required is not conferences, resolutions and committees, but a policy of action. That is the lesson of Colombo: that sooner or later references to other Governments, and consultations with other Governments, fail to conceal the deficiencies of one's own. I beg to move for Papers.

6.45 p.m.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT ADDISON)

My Lords, I have listened to all except the opening sentences of the noble Lord's speech, and I have been asking myself most of the time when he was going to talk about the Motion on the Paper. Apparently we have committed great wrongs in the handling of matters connected with the Colombo Conference. The noble Lord was good enough to say that he would not go into details of the discussions. I wonder if he knows anything about them. How does the noble Lord know about the details of the discussions at Colombo? They have not been published in a White Paper, or otherwise. I suppose he has picked up a certain amount of gossip in club armchairs, which he now cites to us with a number of rather malicious innuendoes which can do no good to anybody and can only cause trouble between the different members of the Commonwealth. Personally, I do not think the noble Lord has been making proper use of his opportunities in this House, and I am bound to say so. He said over and over again that action is required—that was his theme. The noble Lord was extraordinarily careful not to tell us what action.

I do not myself feel any further forward in being able to answer his question by being entertained to a long string of platitudes on the facts relating to this region, which have been well known to everybody for many years. I do not think the noble Lord will have done any good by his disparagement of the action of our heroic fellow countrymen in Malaya, who are doing everything humanly possible to put down these bandits in a very difficult country, as the noble Lord knows. What more action he requires, the noble Lord failed to tell us. What he did say was that before we do anything else we must restore law and order. I entirely agree, and we are making great efforts to restore law and order there. Our heroic fellow countrymen, with the assistance of the Malay troops, are doing everything they possibly can to clear this jungle. It is an exceedingly difficult task, for many of these bandits are men who were taught by us to fight the Japanese, and they are well supplied with arms from dumps left over in the last war.

But all this has nothing to do with the Colombo Conference. In my opinion, the Colombo Conference was one of the most successful conferences in making arrangements for united action that our history has presented over a long period of time. Let me tell the House something about that Conference. I happen to know what the proceedings were, because I have had the advantage of seeing the report of the Conference which the noble Lord clearly has not. This Conference arose out of the discussions of the Prime Ministers' Conference in London. It was felt desirable that, instead of sporadic and irregular meetings, there should be some regular system of conferences on foreign affairs between the members of the Commonwealth. It was to meet that necessity, clearly expressed and focused at the Prime Ministers' Conference in 1948, that the Colombo Conference was arranged. It was agreed that the Conference should be limited, not to discussing ourselves but to discussing our various relations with other countries; and that it should be specifically a conference devoted to the discussion of foreign affairs between the different Ministers of the Commonwealth countries. That was the purpose of the discussion; not to roam over the wide, wide world, but to discuss these matters. Therefore, the Foreign Ministers of the different members of the Commonwealth assembled there.

The Conference would have come a little earlier because in 1948 it was hoped that there would be Conferences of this kind more or less every six months, but that was not possible, owing to the Conference called with regard to Indian affairs in April, 1949. Therefore, the first Conference was postponed until it was convenient to everybody concerned, and the date finally agreed upon was January of this year. As anybody who has had first-hand dealings with Commonwealth affairs knows, it is necessary to consult a large number of people in different parts of the world, having different Parliamentary Sessions and all the rest of it, and it is not an easy matter to arrange a date convenient to everybody. This date was fixed as soon as ever it could be.

There is one action of the Conference to which the noble Lord did not refer— namely, that it was felt very desirable that there should be a common agreement, so far as it could be reached, as to what were the basic requirements of a peace treaty with Japan, which of course it will not be for us finally to determine. We are just as well aware of the difficulties as the noble Lord is, but it is true to say that as a result of the discussions at Colombo.en this first topic there was a great measure of agreement. I should like to say that, so far from the misgivings and ill-feelings which the noble Lord seems to suggest ran through this effort, as a matter of fact it was characterised by extraordinary good will from start to finish, and was regarded by everybody as a very successful Conference. It was the first of its kind, and it was a united Commonwealth Conference, not in general terms but to deal with specific problems.

The second question to which the Conference addressed itself was the position in Burma. We did not need this speech to tell us that poverty end hunger are the most distressing features of large populations in South-East Asia, and it was in order to try to relieve, some of these hardships that these discussions were promoted. I need not go into the details in the case of Burma, for it is a long story and a very sad story. We have lost a good deal of money at different times in trying to help Burma but on agreed terms it was decided that there should be a loan to Burma. It was arranged that each member present should contribute her quota, and the total of the loan was to be about £6,000,000. The United Kingdom's quota was naturally the largest, and it was £3,750,000. India was the next, with £1,000,000; and the others, Pakistan, Australia, Ceylon and so on, each contributed their portion. That was an agreed contribution for a specified purpose, all the members of the Commonwealth uniting for this helpful effort. That is action—a very valuable action and a very humane action. It was agreed upon by the members of the Commonwealth at this meeting, and it was almost the first effort of that kind promoted in this way.

The next main topic was the position in South-East Asia, both economic and political. It is true that we did not need to go to Ceylon in order to know what the conditions were. The noble Lord need not be under any misapprehension about that. It is only too sad a story, and we knew it perfectly well before we went there. The world knows what the position is with regard to many of the inhabitants of these countries. What the Conference set itself to do was to consider: How can we be helpful in these matters? This consultative committee which was finally focused by Mr. Spender, the Australian representative, was given terms of reference—with which I will acquaint the House in a moment—by which it was to set to work, not simply to talk, but to devise ways and means which we could adopt in unison of giving assistance in Burma. That is surely a sensible method of approach. I cannot imagine what in the world the noble Lord is complaining about. It seems to me to be the only way to tackle the problem, if we are to tackle it unitedly.

Let me here and now remind the House of the business of this consultative committee, and the work for which it was established. The working parties are already at work, and they are to meet in Australia on May 15. Our colleague here, my noble friend Lord Macdonald, will represent the Government, and I hope that Mr. Malcolm MacDonald from Singapore—the region in which he has authority—will also be there. It will be a very representative committee for the purpose of devising useful action. They are to receive an indication of actions which Governments outside the Commonwealth consider it feasible to take in response to the recommendation of the Colombo Conference. Other terms of reference of the committee are: To examine the methods of co-ordinating development councils in South and South-East Asia, in association with international and regional organisations concerned with the object of raising the level of production and the standard of living in the area; to examine the desirability of promoting international commodity agreements for basic products, which would benefit the area and could be recommended for consideration under the Havana Charter; to consider whether the economic development of under-developed countries of the area would be assisted by the drawing up of a co-ordinated plan of development and by the establishment of special machinery; to make recommendations to Governments. Those are extraordinarily business-like terms of reference. That is not action taken in isolation by cables between London and Sydney, or wherever it is, but by the different members of the Commonwealth sitting round a table devising what they can do. I myself have had some experience of Commonwealth matters, as has the noble Marquess opposite. I do not know what his view may be about this effort, but it seems to me one of the most promising and useful efforts which has been undertaken for a long time, ensuring practical Commonwealth co-operation for a beneficial purpose. I am not going to enlarge upon the troubles of that region—they are only too painfully obvious to each one of us, and they are not included in the terms of the Motion.

I should like now to say a word about what the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, said on the recognition of Communist China. That had been under discussion for many months. I listened anxiously to learn what the noble Lord wanted us to do, and I did not receive any guidance, because the solid fact is—and there is no getting away from it—that the Communists are in control of China: they are the Government of China. I want to know what the noble Lord would have wished us to do about it, other than what we have done. I gather that he did not want us to do anything. That does not seem to me to be very good sense. We have enormous commercial and other interests in that part of the world, and we anxiously discussed this matter with the members of the Commonwealth and with other countries.

There were discussions or conversations going on over several months. It was clear that it was not possible that all could act in the same way on the same day. The noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor explained this to your Lordships on a previous occasion. India was very anxious that we should recognise the facts of the situation. They themselves did so recognise them—before we did. It is true that this country had to take its own decision in the light of such advice and guidance as we could get. What we have done is to effect an entirely businesslike recognition of the facts of the case in that region. I can see no advantage in playing the game of the ostrich, burying our heads in the sand and trying to persuade ourselves that things are not what, in fact, they are. It was an inevitable decision.

It is true that we had no particular affection for that system of government, any more than the noble Lord has; but that has never been a reason for not recognising other Governments. I can well remember—as no doubt the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, can—the cries that were raised a long time ago about the recognition of the Sultan of Turkey. We recognised the Sultan of Turkey and we had dealings with him. We did not like it, but we did it. And we have had dealings, as people who recognise realities, with Governments in Moscow and other places. It is not the colour of the Government concerned which is in question; it is entirely a matter of considering British interests. So far as Canada is concerned, she did not ask us to withhold recognition. We know that Canada wishes to delay recognition for good reasons; but Canada never raised any objection at Colombo to our action, and she quite appreciated that we had acted as we did for the purpose of safeguarding British interests.

I was very much struck with one of the noble Lord's plaintive thrusts. He said that all these troubles were due to Socialist policy in this country. Well my Lords, why in the world did Lord Milverton ever join the Socialist Party? Has he discovered since the days when he sat on this side that all the troubles and hunger and misery in South-East Asia existed because of the wicked men who occupy these Benches? These are old, old miseries, I am sorry to say, going back for generations—almost for centuries. But it was quaint, having regard to the permutations of the noble Lord in political affinities, that he should put down these troubles to Socialist policy, which he says is a threat to the prosperity of these areas. I do not agrees with him in the least. There are many causes for the misery of those areas other than the Government of the United Kingdom. These miseries have not begun since 1946, when the noble Lord professed his adherence to the Socialist Party. He may derive some consolation from these aspersions on his former colleagues and, if so, he is welcome to it, so far as I am concerned; but they leave me completely unconvinced.

7.4 p.m.

VISCOUNT BRUCE OF MELBOURNE

My Lords, I am sure we all owe a great debt of gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, for having raised this subject. It is almost tragic that this question should have come up at so late an hour that Lord Milverton should feel it necessary to cut down his observations. I am convinced that the questions that have been raised to-day and touched upon briefly are questions that well merit the fullest discussion in your Lordships' House at a convenient hour when full expressions of opinion can be given. I venture to suggest that the time has arrived when it is very necessary that this matter should be considered and discussed in another place.

I have listened to what Lord Milverton said and to what the noble Viscount the Leader of the House has said; and I have a deep feeling of regret. I have listened to many speeches from Lord Addison. They have been dignified and completely fair. But the speech he made this evening struck me as being in tone and method of expression not of the standard which I have observed in my short time here is usually maintained in your Lordships' House. The speech had a sort of peevish ring which, on an issue of the transcendent importance of this one, seem to me to be extremely unfortunate.

As the hour is late I will not detain your Lordships for long, but there are one or two remarks I wish to make. Lord Milverton's main point, as I understood it, was that peace, law and order and an established Government in these countries are essential before there can be any hope of success in economic endeavours to raise the standard of living of these unfortunate people. To-day, when we all clearly appreciate that South-East Asia is one of the great danger spots of the world, we recognise that those things are essential. But I agree with Lord Milverton that this issue has not yet been faced. It seems to me it goes far beyond our activities—that is, the activities of the British Commonwealth: I believe that there should be discussions with the United States with the object of co-ordinating the responsibilities in that area between the British Commonwealth and the United States, and of determining what action we are prepared to take.

It may be that the decision would be that the British Commonwealth in its present position has all it can do to handle the situation in the British Possessions in that area. Take the case of Malaya. We have had a Conference at Colombo, and Lord Milverton has said that there might have been a little more leadership there. I am in complete and absolute agreement with him. On this issue of Malaya I most certainly think that the whole problem should have been faced boldly. Leadership should have come from the United Kingdom Government, who should have told all the British nations there that the situation in Malaya had to be drastically handled and that the burden was too great for Great Britain in her present circumstances to undertake. The other countries should have been asked whether they were prepared to come in. I have a strong conviction that my own country, Australia, would have been prepared to come in if the whole of the situation and its gravity had been sufficiently emphasised at the Colombo Conference, and if the leadership and action for which Lord Milverton pleaded had been in evidence.

I know I shall be told that discussions are now proceeding on all these matters and that the Government have fully considered these problems. But I believe the present situation is very dangerous and that, as the noble Lord said, this is no longer a time for consultation but a time for specific action. I, at least, can plead, for I have had as much experience in regard to Commonwealth relations as probably anybody; and my conclusion over the years is that we have failed time and time again because we have never been bold enough. I am not making any charge against the present Government, but every United Kingdom Government has been just as afraid to tackle the Dominions, face them up with the issue and give them the direct leadership as to what action should be taken. I believe that in the past we could have done much better if the United Kingdom Governments had done that. I am convinced that times are so serious to-day that it must be done.

In regard to the Colombo Conference, I slightly part company with the noble Lord who moved this Motion. I think it was a most valuable meeting. It suffered from the same thing that every Imperial Conference, every meeting between the United Kingdom and the Dominions has suffered from for the last thirty years—there was nothing like enough drive and force behind it. But on this occasion, quite frankly, I think the Government had a much more delicate and difficult task. We now have three new Dominions in the Commonwealth—India, Pakistan and Ceylon. I am throwing no half-bricks at the general principle of the Government that they found that they could not do all the things they wanted to. But the Conference has done this. It has afforded the first opportunity of getting all these Governments together and trying to obtain some basis of co-operation in order to get somewhere.

The one particular point to which I want to address myself is the economic situation in South-East Asia. Up to a point I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, that the setting up of this Committee seems to be just another stage of "Cannot we do something?" instead of considering what we are going to do. However, I have every hope that all that will be cured when the meeting takes place in Australia. I read the Press reports of what took place in Colombo. I thought: "Well, I suppose some of the gentlemen who went to the Colombo Conference have heard a few of the things that are going on in the world with regard to economic aid and technical assistance," but there was nothing in the Press which created the impression that any of them had ever heard what was going on. Fortunately, I was able to get a little more information. I have had an opportunity of talking to both the former Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and his successor. Of course, Mr. Noel-Baker was at Colombo, and the thinking was not quite so confused as I thought, but there is still the criticism there that they did not know very much. One of the burdens of my complaint about a lot of these things is that, if you cross-examine the Ministers in His Majesty's Government here, and if you cross-examine the Ministers in His Majesty's Government in Australia, and ask what is the situation in regard to technical aid and exactly what has taken place, practically none of them can stand up to cross-examination for five minutes.

I am not throwing that out as an insult to the intelligence of Ministers. It is inevitable that Ministers are pre-occupied with their own particular tasks and cannot follow and be fully informed about everything that is going on in the international field. I believe it would be well worth while if there were a Minister whose job was to keep in touch with everything of that sort and keep the Cabinet informed about it. It is true that Ministers go to various conferences. At my Food and Agriculture Conference we have had the Minister of Agriculture present. We have had Mr. Harold Wilson, the President of the Board of Trade. They drop in for a number of days, but they are pro-occupied with other things. Mr. Harold Wilson is very pre-occupied with his great problems in the film industry. There is no getting to grips with these things. That is the cause of many of the troubles.

At the risk of detaining your Lordships for a few minutes, I want to say this with regard to the position of technical aid, because it links up completely with the instructions to the consultative committee as to what they have to do. Technical aid, of course, has made great strides since President Truman enunciated in his inaugural address his fourth point. It was followed up by action by the Economic and Social Council. All the specialised agencies of the United Nations were brought together and formed into a committee. Each of the agencies was asked to formulate not mere advice but specific plans involving what action it proposed to take, what expense in respect of each individual action would be involved, and the number of specialists and technicians required to afford the technical aid.

I went over to Washington on the Food and Agriculture Organisation simply for the purpose of presiding over a committee of all the chairmen of the different expert committees drawn from every nation of the world. We went into the question of technicians, and we came to the conclusion that for the first set of plans it would be possible to get them, but that if this first move—I will tell you the extent of what is contemplated—was successful, there would be an insistent demand to follow it up. That follow-up would mean that there would not be available the technicians and people to supply the help and aid to the backward countries. The first step, therefore, was to approach all universities and technical bodies in all countries in order to encourage them to build up a reservoir of those people. The extent of the first year's proposal for which all the plans have been prepared is 20,000,000 dollars. That may seem very moderate, but in the case of my Food and Agriculture Organisation it means exactly doubling our annual income. We have an income of only 5,000,000 dollars, which is a scandal; but that cannot be helped. We shall have to make all our plans to go ahead with it.

This work is all being done on the basis of regions, and all the countries in the regions are being brought together. All countries in South-East Asia are already meeting together on agriculture and food production. The whole scheme is in train. I believe that a reasonable amount of money is assured because, while Congress is being very coy in getting to the point of taking action at President Truman's request, I am assured from America that there is not a shadow of doubt that they will carry it on. The whole project ought to be launched by this July.

If these representatives are going to meet in Canberra, it is perfectly wild and absurd that they should aim to go off on a leg of their own. What the Canberra Conference will be doing is to recognise the fact that aid to these backward nations, whether it conies from the United States or from some of the richer countries of the British Commonwealth, will not help us to get any distance along that path—for the simple reason that all those backward countries are terrified of Great Power domination. Underneath it is a revolt against the Colonial system. This action has got to be taken through the United Nations and its agencies. President Truman stressed that point when he made his proposal in his inaugural Address. The matter is all in train to be done on the best basis possible. But where I think these conferences can do something is by getting all the Commonwealth nations at least to understand the position. I do not want to be offensive, but I am absolutely certain that they do not know how far all these things have gone. For my sins, I have had to live with this problem. Because of my particular job, I have had to know it backwards, but I should be amazed if any Minister really knew it, because it is something outside his ordinary sphere.

I believe that at Canberra they will wake up to what the problem means, and if we can get a concerted policy by all the Commonwealth nations coming in to reinforce the action that is being taken—everybody seeing eye to eye on what is the best way to tackle this question—we shall obtain the co-operation of the United States of America, and they will be prepared to render aid to the "nth" degree. Then, instead of there being a number of vague gentlemen who obviously have no instructions from their Government and do not know what line they ought to take, there will be people present who really know the subject; and if we get all the British nations in line on this problem of economic aid, and America is also in the picture, there is every hope that success may be achieved.

My final word is this. The Colombo Conference is regarded as something good, and I share that view, because it has brought all these nations together, including the new Dominions. There are thousands of questions about which you can squabble and brawl to your heart's content at these meetings, but this is one subject upon which you will get complete agreement and co-operation. I have had the people of India, of Pakistan and of Ceylon at my meetings at the United Nations organisation. They play a most active part. There is one point there upon which I have not the time to dwell—namely, the fourth point in the instructions to the Conference at Canberra about commodity agreements, which should support prices and give some reasonable basis to the farmer. At the present time there is a committee sitting on that particular subject, It was appointed at a moment when we had grown a little tired of international committees which were set up to shelve such matters. The Government of the United Kingdom gave its full assent and they and the United States Government said that there had to be an answer. With a view to trying to arrive at a solution to the problem, it was decided to appoint a full-time working chairman for that committee, and the gentleman appointed is an Indian, Mr. Abhyankar. I stress that point, because I believe that if we get the whole Commonwealth working together on this economic question, we can make great strides towards the solution of the problem and, at the same time, make an invaluable contribution towards laying the foundations for real Commonwealth co-operation.

7.24 p.m.

LORD SEMPILL

My Lords, I join with the noble Viscount who has just sat down in congratulating the noble Lord who initiated this Motion. The subject under discussion is very much in my mind, since your Lordships will remember that on four occasions during the last Session of Parliament I tried to initiate such a debate on South-East Asia. Other business, however, crowded out that debate and it never took place, although for the fourth attempt I flew back from Colombo the day before in the hope of submitting my ideas to your Lordships, only to find that the debate could not have taken place before midnight—not a very appropriate time.

Having been concerned with the Far East for some thirty years, and having worked there for several of those years, I find myself from practical experience in agreement with what has been said by my noble friend Lord Milverton. The situation in South-East Asia is deteriorating. This I can confirm from information gained very recently in that part of the world. Having worked there for several months, I can appreciate what the situation is, and I agree with my noble friend that, whereas the rule of law must be maintained by far more vigorous methods, such action has to be taken in parallel with immediate steps to raise the standard of life in South-East Asia. It is along those lines that we shall find the real answer to this problem. Therefore, as I see it, we from the West must make available, far more readily and rapidly, our scientific and technical knowledge and also the necessary capital equipment to translate that knowledge into effect. I personally am in entire agreement with what my noble friend has said with regard to China.

I spent several months in Ceylon last year, and it was a great experience to see this vitally placed new Dominion in action. The Government of Ceylon, with the active support of the Ceylonese peoples, are using to the full the scientific and technical experience of the West—from our own country as well as from others—to raise the standard of life, whilst using all scientific and practical methods to keep out and also to weed out the Communists. In conclusion, I should tell your Lordships—and I know you will be very proud to hear it—of the distinguished rôle that is being played in Ceylon by His Excellency the Governor-General, the noble Lord, Lord Soulbury. Having travelled over all Ceylon in the last few months, I have seen how tremendously his Excellency's leadership is appreciated by the people in general and the Government in particular, led by that outstanding figure, the Right Honourable D. S. Senanayake, the Prime Minister. The development of Ceylon is going forward successfully. As your Lordships know, the Governor-General has very high academic qualifications. His Excellency is the only personal representative of His Majesty The King, in any century, who addresses the Ceylonese people in their own language.

7.28 p.m.

LORD TWEEDSMUIR

My Lords, I shall be very brief in what I have to say, and I should like to start by saying how sorry my noble friend Lord Swinton is that urgent public affairs at the other end of the country have prevented his being here tonight. I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Bruce, and the noble Lord, Lord Sempill, that my noble friend Lord Milverton has done a great service in raising this issue. I was frankly astonished by the attitude of the Leader of the House towards the speech of the noble Lord who introduced the Motion. I thought the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, approached the subject with great and praiseworthy moderation. I could not see why the noble Viscount, Lord Addison, should treat him as if he had made some mischievous onslaught. I cannot agree with that.

Every Conference that takes place between Dominion Prime Ministers strikes the public afterwards as having had something of a paucity of concrete results, and I was very grateful to-night, to hear what we already knew about those results expanded by the Leader of the House. A fierce limelight falls on Asia at this moment. China has been engulfed by Communism. I doubt whether any event having one tenth part of the significance of that has ever gone so little noticed among the people of the democratic countries. As we on this side of the House feared might happen, Burma has become gripped by poverty and hunger, and torn by strife. We have our troubles in Malaya. I could not see that my noble friend Lord Milverton had any blame for, or laid any aspersion upon, the authorities in Malaya who are dealing so heroically with those troubles at this moment. And the other nations in that part of the world are watching; watching to see which way the cat will jump.

South-East Asia has become a cant phrase. It has an exact meaning only if used to describe that part of the world which lies between Burma and Singapore. Southern Asia brings in India, Pakistan and Ceylon. India and Pakistan depend on South-East Asia for their rice. As the House knows, the rice bowl lies outside the orbit of the Commonwealth countries there. If for any reason that rice is diverted to China, away from India and Pakistan, the famine which we heard about in China would be as nothing to what our two fellow members of the Commonwealth would suffer. Therefore, we cannot see India and Pakistan as something separate from that problem. This is round two of the cold war. Is it then surprising that we, on this side, and indeed noble Lords on all sides of the House, as well as people in this country generally, should hunger for any crumb of information that we can get about the steps we are taking to fight it to-day.

We hear a lot about the standard of living which, as my noble friends Lord Milverton and Lord Bruce have said, depends on that framework of political stability which rests on economic stability, and is the principal darn against the flood of Communism. Communism is the enemy, and nothing that happens in the manœuvres of the Communists anywhere can be seen in any unrelated context. Therefore, it is idle to speak, as Mr. Dugdale spoke on March 15 in another place, suggesting that what goes on in Communist China can be separated from what is going on in Malaya. I do not think that anyone will disagree that phase one of the cold war was in Europe. We held them there, but that phase is not over. Phase two is in China, and we are fighting it now. Phase three will be in Africa. But there may not be a phase three if we win phase two.

Since the Colombo Conference Marshal Pibul of Siam has taken the same attitude towards events in Indo-China as have His Majesty's Government. That is one more to our side. The noble Viscount, Lord Bruce, spoke of the new Commonwealth's pattern, and he also spoke of the delicate task which the Colombo Conference faced, as opposed to the problems faced by its predecessors. It brought these new nations together for the first time. What a tremendous change has taken place in the pattern of the Commonwealth! Only a matter of three or four years ago to every single one of the Dominions, Europe or England was the Homeland. Now such a change has taken place that for those Commonwealth nations of whom that is true, there are now four of whom it is not. We have now what we have never had before—two Dominions facing each other over a land frontier. Europe is no longer the sole maker and unmaker of human destiny. That has been pretty heavily underlined by the last war. New forms bring with them a new challenge, and call for new methods. We must make a success on this new slant of our evolution. We on this side of the House have nothing but constructive criticism to offer.

VISCOUNT ADDISON

There was not a word of it to-night.

LORD TWEEDSMUIR

I cannot agree with the noble Viscount when he says that, and I do not think that in the rest of the House there are many noble Lords who agree with him either. It is a different angle with which we have to compete. If you see the same problem as one of the countries washed by the North Atlantic, it is natural that you see it differently from the way it is seen from a country washed by the South Pacific. We must understand our evolution, so that we can make a real success of it. I think that here lies the danger—I do not say that it is happening, but it is a danger which I envisage, and I think that perhaps many noble Lords will agree. The unity of the Commonwealth is very real. It is an anvil that has worn out many hammers, and it may well wear out many more. But the authority of the Commonwealth is always greater when that unity is apparent to the rest of the world. I feel that some slight danger exists of confusing the absence of disagreement with real positive dynamic agreement. The two are not the same thing.

I pass briefly over the Colombo Conference. I have little more to say. I listened with the greatest interest to the noble Viscount, Lord Addison, when he spoke about recognition of Communist China. He asked the House—are we to be ostriches and not recognise the state of affairs as it is in China? The whole of the argument which he put forward was an argument for de facto recognition. Yet the recognition given was de jure. De jure recognition of China before the Conference sat, was followed a little later by recognition in theory of Bao Dai and Indo-China. With that, any exact meaning in diplomatic recognition fades into the mists. The trouble about that recognition was that it was quite apparent to the rest of the world—or certainly a strong presumption was created—that unconcerted action of the greatest interest to all countries of the Commonwealth had taken place. It is claimed that it may give us greater stability there, and protect our trade and other interests. Has that been the fact? I do not think so. I am thankful to the noble Viscount, Lord Addison, for the information which he gave us. One thing to which I listened with the greatest interest was when he assured us that the Spender Committee was not only a consultative committee, but was a committee of specific action. I do not think that I misunderstood him. I hope that that is correct.

VISCOUNT ADDISON

I do not say that it is an executive instrument in itself. It is for recommending specific action.

LORD TWEEDSMUIR

I am grateful to the noble Viscount for that information. At the moment it exists only on a piece of paper. It meets in May. One could almost hope that it had met in March. It is going to fight, as I see it, the battle of consumer goods against Communism. It has got a very big battle on its hands. Surely that battle will require the co-operation of a very large part of the world; if not the whole of the free world. Look at the difficulties. There is the ruin left by the war and the phobia of the West on the part of the Japanese, who overran so much of Southern Asia. There is the poison of Communism; there is shortage of food; there is hunger and famine; and there are other difficulties. There are advantages also, as I know. There are great quantities of raw materials. There are by no means inconsiderable numbers of semiskilled workers. Surely the answer is going to lie something like this: that those resources will be found, in the first part, inside those countries we seek to help, and, in the second part, in the countries covered by the Spender Plan.

But there will be a further part, as the noble Viscount, Lord Bruce, said, for which we shall have to go wider for help and co-operation and bring in our allies and friends the United States. A great sum of money is being devoted to helping Burma extricate herself from her troubles. Burma has gone through many difficulties. She is going through them now. She is riven by strife. Why talk about it? The noble Viscount, Lord Addison, asked why. We all know the picture. But in the case of the Burma Joan, and those resources which we shall make available to the countries to benefit under the Spender Plan, surely we must strive towards providing some kind of joint committee where providers and receivers can both forge a plan for the application of these resources. If that is envisaged, I should be grateful if we could have some enlightenment on it.

Last of all, within the purview of this Parliament there lies action only over the field in which we have complete power. Let us do our level best to make this plan a success. We must send out the best men. I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of Gwaenysgor, has been selected. He is no stranger to Commonwealth problems, and is a man of great energy. I hope he is backed by a really suitable team. Let us make it clear to our colleagues and friends in the Commonwealth that the whole of our vast experience in this field is at the disposal of this or any other committee which may be set up to tackle this work. Let us always be a party to urging speed, because these matters press on us and I do not think that the loser will ever get a second chance.

7.41 p.m.

LORD MILVERTON

My Lords, I do not wish to detain the House longer than to say one thing. I thank the noble Viscount the Leader of the House for the information which he has given us. I remain of the opinion that this debate has served a useful purpose. Before I ask leave to withdraw my Motion I should like to correct three misapprehensions. The first is that I have ever, either here to-night or at any time in my life, disparaged those working in Malaya. It is quite unthinkable that I, of all people, should ever have done such a thing. The only thing of which I can think is that it was the speed at which I spoke that left such a misapprehension in the mind of the noble Viscount. The second misapprehension I wish to remove is that I have disparaged the good will induced by the Colombo Conference. I thought I had specifically stated that good will was the one result which could be claimed for it. The third misapprehension again must have been due to the speed at which spoke. I certainly did not say, or intend to say, that the ills of South-East Asia were due to Socialist policies. But I did say, and shall be prepared always to say, that recovery from those ills will be hampered by the carrying out in full of Socialist policies. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.