HL Deb 28 June 1950 vol 167 cc1147-75

3.39 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, in the first place, I should like to identify myself with the remarks which have already been made in regard to our deep regret at the temporary absence of the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition. In a debate such as this the noble Marquess can perhaps hardly be replaced by any other member of your Lordships' House, though certainly the noble Viscount who opened the debate does so as nearly as anyone. I hope the two noble Lords who have spoken will not mind my saying this: that I think the issue we are debating is much too important to make Party political speeches. We are confronted with a tremendous problem, to which we have to apply our minds carefully and considerately.

I readily admit that I thought the publication of what has been christened "Dr. Dalton's Brown Book" came at a most unhappy time, but having said that, and having read the pamphlet as a whole, I regard it as a careful and a balanced statement and not as in any way bearing the construction which has been put upon it by either of the noble Lords who have just spoken. Indeed, even as I listened to what Lord Swinton said, the fallacy of the thing was obvious. These are his words. He had stated the words of the pamphlet, "We are not prepared to submit to the authority of…" as meaning, "We are not prepared to co-operate with…"—a wholly different proposition. We are and have been for some time co-operating with the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation and a dozen other organisations. We are cooperating with other Governments and I hope we shall continue to co-operate with other Governments. I maintain that on a fair reading of the pamphlet there is nothing whatever in it to indicate that we are not prepared to co-operate, and that we do not want to co-operate. My Lords, we do want to co-operate.

That leads me to the next point. The noble Earl who last spoke said that we had rejected the chance of participation. We have done no such thing. We want to participate; we want to be there; we think we ought to be there. But we are not prepared to go into these consultations with our hands bound behind our backs; nor are we prepared to go into them stating that we believe something which we do not believe, as the children say, "holding our thumbs" when we make the statement, because I think (and I am sure the noble Earl will agree with me) that in the long run particularly in diplomacy, honesty is the best policy. I do not think that it would be a wise thing to do to stretch a point, and to try to say that you agree with a proposition when you do not, because sooner or later the day of reckoning will come; and when it does it will be much worse for you than if you are perfectly candid and say at the outset where you stand. If we could go into these discussions perfectly freely then I should most certainly welcome our going in. If at any future time we can go in, in no way bound, then I shall welcome our going in; but if we have to submit beforehand to some test or formula, and say that we accept some proposition which either we do not accept at all or could not accept without much greater discussion, then I for my part would rather not go in than go in and play a mere part pretending that I believe something which I do not believe.

One other matter about this controversy, my Lords. I deeply regretted to see the suggestion made by a very eminent person that M. Schuman in this matter had been actuated by a motive of petty revenge—because to put it plainly, that was what was said. It was said, that because he had been annoyed by not getting full information about our proposal to devalue—he received only forty-eight hours' notice—he put up against us the propositions which appear in this White Paper. Many of us in this House have the honour of M. Schuman's friendship or acquaintance. I believe that it is quite impossible that M. Schuman would have acted in any such way. I am perfectly confident that M. Schuman did what he did because he thought it was right, and in the interests of France and of Europe. I brush that aside (if I may say so with deepest respect to the person who made it) as a quite unworthy suggestion.

If M. Schuman can bring off something of this sort is it not worth a very great deal? I have always maintained, and I have often said to your Lordships, that a happy relationship between Germany and France is fundamental to the wellbeing of both countries, and to the wellbeing of Europe and of the world. I must say that if I were a Frenchman, if I reflected on what had happened to my country in 1870, in 1914, and in 1939, I should look anxiously for relief from the danger of that same sort of thing happening again. If we could divert German genius and German technique to peaceful and fruitful channels, if we could heal the difference between France and Germany, I know that we should indeed have done a most wonderful thing. Let us be under no misapprehension: the conception lying behind M. Schuman's Plan is a great conception.

On the other hand, let us look at it quite frankly. We are close to Europe but we have interests and friendships which extend beyond Europe. We find ourselves as the centre of a great free Commonwealth of peoples and of a great Colonial Empire; and we are closely hound up with the Atlantic community, the United States of America and Canada. I am one of those who believe that our position vis-à-vis the Commonwealth and our position vis-é-vis Europe can be reconciled. I believe that with cautious and careful statesmanship, and from time to time bold decisions, the two positions can be made complementary and not antagonistic to each other. But the real question we had to ask ourselves in these circumstances was this: Should we go into these discussions under the conditions upon which alone it was said that we could go in? Those conditions were quite plain. I will read through with you presently the documents set out in the White Paper—not as a Chancery lawyer—and I maintain that any fair per- son, having read them, is bound to say this. We had to state before we went into the Conference that, subject to details, which of course could be discussed., we accepted the broad principle that there should be a high authority not. responsible to any Parliament, which was to be able to give instructions to the various member States. There is all the world of difference, my Lords, between an international body in the ordinary sense and a body such as this. In an international body you have your delegate who is the link with your Parliament; he is under the control of Parliament and, therefore, of the people. This proposal, however, postulates an authority representing no one at all, and it becomes perfectly plain, from the later gloss on this document, that once you go in you cannot unilaterally walk out. In short it is a federal solution extending over a small sphere.

My Lords, how important is that sphere? So far as coal is concerned, we produce approximately one-half of the total quantities of coal which are here involved. So far as steel is concerned, we produce approximately one-third. Of course, dependent on our iron and coal industry are many other industries: our engineering industry is almost completely dependent upon it; such industries as shipbuilding are directly dependent upon it, as are many others. Let us face this squarely. Are we prepared to accept in advance the proposition that we hand over the control and development and investment programme of these industries to a high authority by whose decisions we have got to be bound? I have no doubt that that authority would administer the scheme fairly, but just suppose that it said (I will examine in a moment the documents and see how far these ideas are fanciful): "You must close down one of your steelworks at Sheffield, because we are going to extend at Dusseldorf where we think it is more convenient and where we can carry out cheaper production." Is there anybody in your Lordships' House who would be prepared in advance to accept such a proposition? And if your Lordships all agree that we cannot possibly accept such a proposition in advance of discussion, then I say that the only honest thing for the Government to do was to come out quite clearly and state the difficulty, and to say: "We will discuss this with you, but we will accept nothing in advance of discussions."

Are these the facts revealed in the White Paper? I am not going to read it as though I were now presiding in a Court of Chancery (though even a Chancery lawyer may have a certain amount of common sense in looking at these documents) but I am going to ask your Lordships to look at extracts from it with me, quite impartially, and see whether what I have said is not plainly right. It is because I believe that what I have said is right, that I maintain (and I feel strongly on this) that His Majesty's Government have taken the only course which they could properly take. The matter is so important that, at the risk of being wearisome or troublesome, I am going to ask your Lordships to look with me at certain of these documents—I hope your Lordships have the White Paper.

The communiqué starts with the Document from the French Ambassador, containing an enclosure which is on page 4. I propose to read part of the fourth paragraph on page 4, and of course I will read any other passage which ought to be read in this context. There your Lordships will see: By pooling basic production and by instituting a new higher authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, these proposals will build the first concrete foundation of the European federation which is indispensable to the preservation of peace. When we received that enclosure there followed the Prime Minister's statement at the bottom of page 5 and, with the greatest respect to the noble Earl, Lord Perth, I see nothing lukewarm about that. The next Document I want to read is Document 4, at the top of page 6. M. Jean Monnet was here and discussed this matter with our officials. This is the note: It became clear in the course of these talks that the French Government felt it desirable that the acceptance by other Governments of the principles set out in the French communiqué of 9th May"— that is the principle I read out— should precede any working out of the practical application of their proposals. The acceptance of principle had to precede any working out of the practical application of their proposals. His Majesty's Government's answer is contained in Document 6, and the passage I quote is four lines down on page 7: His Majesty's Government would like to participate in these"— that is the discussions— from the outset, with the hope that by obtaining a clearer picture of how the proposals would operate in detail, they would be able to join the scheme. Then comes the French Memorandum, and I read from the second paragraph: With the primary object of assuring peace, European solidarity and economic social progress the French Government have proposed action in a limited and decisive field. This action consists of ensuring the pooling of European coal and steel production and the institution of a new high authority whose decisions would bind all countries which joined it. On May 27, Document 8, His Majesty's Government wrote the Memorandum which contains this passage in paragraph 2: It should, however, be realised that if the French Government intend to insist on a commitment to pool resources and set up an authority with certain sovereign powers as a prior condition to joining in the talks, His Majesty's Government would reluctantly be unable to accept such a condition. Then came the important Document, Document 10.

THE EARL OF PERTH

Would the noble and learned Viscount read Document 9?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Certainly. Is there any particular passage the noble Earl would like read?

THE EARL OF PERTH

If I may say so, on Document 9 it seems to me that an agreement had almost been reached. What I should like to know is why it failed. It there says: He said he found my explanation reassuring since it seemed to him that our reservations would not in any way limit our effective participation in the discussions.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I will gladly read that. I am anxious not to leave out anything. Document 9 is a note of the discussion between the French Ambassador and the Minister of State. The fourth paragraph says: He"— that is the French Ambassador— said he found my explanation reassuring, since it seemed to him that our reservations would not in any way limit our effective participation in the discussions. So we come to Document 10, which is the French Government's reply. Document 10, en the face of it, as I read it, is quite ambiguous. It contains one passage which it is very difficult to reconcile with another. The first passage is contained in paragraphs 3 and 4, which the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, read. If your Lordships desire it, I will read it again, but perhaps for this purpose I may take it as read. The effect of these Documents is that the French Government are pointing out that there will be no commitment except by signature to a treaty. They then to on to say, in a passage of the same document which the noble Viscount. Lord Addison, asked the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, to read: But in order that its work may serve to develop a European community, it is essential that such an authority should be independent both of Governments and of individual interests. This partial fusion of sovereignty is the contribution which the French proposal makes to the solution of European problems. Public opinion has recognised its importance and its novelty. There is a story of a postman going to a house, looking at the dog, which was growling at one end and wagging its tail at the other, and saying that he did not know which end to believe. Anybody faced with that Document would have done what we did—namely, try to clear up the matter. We did try to clear up the matter, in Document 11. We make a suggestion at the top of page 12, that this may be added to the communiqué: The Government of the United Kingdom will participate in the proposed conversation in a constructive spirit and in the hope that, as a result of the discussions, there will emerge a scheme which they will be able to join. But they cannot this stage enter into any more precise commitment. They recognise the important and far-reaching character, of the French proposal, and are in complete accord with the objective of pursuing a common policy aiming at peace, European solidarity and economic and social progress. Now I ask this specific question. I hope that before the end of this debate we shall have some answer from your Lordships as to whether or not there is anything the matter, with that statement. Does that represent what you all desire? Be it remembered that it is that statement which the French statement turned down and said was not enough.

In Document 12 they sent us their Memorandum, the translation of which at the bottom is as follows: The Governments of"— here, of course, you fill in the names— in their determination to pursue a common action for peace, European solidarity and economic social progress have assigned to themselves as their immediate objective the pooling of coal and steel production and the institution of a new high authority whose decisions will bind… That is the communiqué they want. It is being said that we are not taking part in these discussions, as though we had done something wrong. In Document 13 we said: If His 'Majesty's Government accepted the revised wording they would feel committed in principle to pool their coal and steel resources and to set up a new high authority, whose decisions would bind the Governments concerned, possibilities which they do not exclude but could not accept without full knowledge of their political and economic implications. We suggest that we call achieve all the requirements if only we could have a meeting of Ministers of the countries concerned, at which the question of the most effective and expeditious method of discussing the problems at issue could be examined and settled.

Finally, in Document 14—the last one I want to read, though I will read any others desired—the French reply to that is as follows: The British suggestion to hold a meeting of Ministers of the interested countries has been most carefully considered by the French Government. The French Government believe that the attitude of the two Governments has been defined without ambiguity in the course of the recent exchange of notes and they do not see how the proposed meeting could bring any further clarification. Such a meeting moreover would have the effect of delaying the opening of the negotiations without offering any real possibility of reconciling divergent points. I claim that there is only one possible construction you can put upon these documents and that this construction is quite plain. The French, for perfectly legitimate reasons which can well understand, were asking us to agree in advance to accept the broad general principle that we would set up a high authority whose decisions should be binding on all the member States. If there is the slightest room for doubt—and I do not think there is—that that is a fair construction of these documents, one's doubt is altogether dispelled when one looks at the Draft French Plan handed out by M. Monnet, with the authority of M. Schuman, to the Press in English. According to the Daily Telegraph of yesterday, and I will quote from the actual Draft Plan in a moment, M.Monnet in handing out the Plan said that: He emphasised the fundamental difference between the conception of the high authority which would administer the steel pool and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation. 'I have followed the methods of the O.E.E.C.' he said. 'These start from the point of view of adding up of national interests and finding a compromise between them and national antagonisms. They have nothing in common with the conception of the high authority. This is the gulf which we hope to bridge. The O.E.E.C., being an addition of national interests, is the absolute opposite of a fusion of national interests'. When I look at the Draft Plan itself I find the paragraphs which high-light the position of this higher authority. No member is to be appointed by participating Governments, and it is to have the most complete powers. For the first time it says that an international assembly will be more than a consultative organ: Parliaments are to surrender some of their sovereignty. And then I find this passage: Withdrawal of a Member State should not be possible unless all of the other Members agree to the withdrawal and on its conditions. This rule in itself sums up the fundamental transformation which is basic to the French proposal. Looking beyond coal and steel it would lay the first foundation of a European community. In a Federation a secession is not possible by unilateral decision.

VISCOUNT SWINTON

May I ask the noble and learned Viscount one question? Does he say that it is a condition binding on any nation which goes into this Conference that they have to accept every word M. Monnet puts in a Press communiqué or even, indeed, in the document which is circulated to the Conference, when M. Monnet himself says that the French Government may have many alterations and modifications to make in it and when the whole object of the meeting is to discuss them?

THE EARL OF PERTH

Is not this document simply a draft, to be discussed by the participating countries but not binding in any way?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I should have thought that the answer to that was perfectly obvious and was a distinction with which we are well acquainted in this House. It is the distinction between a Second Reading point and a Committee point. When you accept a Bill on the Second Reading you accept the general broad principles of the Bill, and on Committee you can alter it. The general broad principle of this proposal, which we are asked to accept in advance, is that there shall be this high authority. That is a basic condition of the whole thing. This high authority is to bind all its member States, and once in it you can never get out again. Of course, you can discuss details; you can discuss whether there are to be three, four or five members; but you are asked to accept the principle in advance—and the passage which I have read from the document which was handed out to the Press I quote merely as emphasising what is already in the White Paper. It high-lights it and makes it plain that that is basic. Now what should we have done?

LORD STRABOLGI

May I interrupt the Lord Chancellor for a moment? Is it not obvious that if there is to be this amalgamation of these heavy industries it can be done in no other way? You can alter to some extent, or modify here and there, but if you are to have this pooling you must have some authority of this kind.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I do not see why. This is not a laughing matter; it is of vital concern to the future of our industry.

VISCOUNT SWINTON

I was not laughing at that. I was slightly entertained by the efforts of the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, to rescue the noble and learned Viscount, and by the Lord Chancellor's riposte.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I welcome being rescued by anybody; but I want to make it plain that we have carried on in the past in many directions without such an authority as this. What about our British Commonwealth of Nations? What is the high authority there that can issue edicts? There is not one; and, just because there is not one, we get on very happily together. What about the O.E.E.C.? We worked very happily and well there, and there was no one to issue edicts. And what about the European Payments Union? Nobody is there as a high authority. In fact, I believe that at the bottom of this there is the distinction between the democratic point of view and the rival point of view. The rival point of view is that if you get someone in an authoritative position the can come and rule. On the other hand, if you get a democratic assembly you get full discussion and argument. I believe that in the long run the democratic method is the better method. I would rather not have conditions imposed. I would rather get all the countries to agree. Faced as we are with obvious and very grave perils which concern us all, I believe that it is better to get people to agree, without any high authority to issue edicts.

THE EARL OF PERTH

If I may interrupt the noble and learned Viscount, that may be perfectly true, but I do not think it is a complete answer. En the case of France and Germany, if you do not have a high authority you will have continual antagonism and the nationalist point of view. In this particular instance I believe a high authority to be absolutely essential.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

It may be so. I am not saying that it is not possible that we should agree to a high authority. What I am saying is that if I am asked to go into a discussion, as we have been, accepting the principle of a high authority before I have had a chance to discuss it, then will not go. And I believe that everybody in a responsible position having to take this vital decision would come to the same conclusion. I am perfectly certain that the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, would do so. He has had great experience of business which I have not had—though up to 1938 business men used to come to me not infrequently with their troubles. If a business man were to come to me and tell me that in the course of discussions concerning a proposed amalgamation of his business he had been told he would have to accept certain basic principles before entering any discussion at all I should tell him that no business man worth the name would agree—unless, of course, he were to give a pledge with his tongue in his cheek. It is true that the Dutch said they would accept the principle unless it proved to be impossible in practice. If they think that in practice the scheme is bad, or if they think there is a better scheme, then presumably they will change their decision and get out; but so long as the scheme is possible to practice they are committed by their statement. I should not be prepared to give any such qualified acceptance.

There was a debate in another place yesterday and the day before, and I am conscious of the fact that this is a rehash, and an indifferent rehash, of what very eminent persons said there. I am sorry that this scheme has been drawn into the vortex of Party politics. I think that ever if there was a decision which needed cool heads and stout hearts this was the decision. But it has been brought into the vortex, and it is idle to pretend that at the next Election—which will come sooner or later—this will not be a topic which, whether either aide likes it or not, will be debated at all the hustings. The question will be asked: "How comes it that you resisted so violently any nationalisation of iron and steel and yet you ran half-way to meet internationalization, of iron and steel, to be controlled by someone about whom you know nothing." That is the point; and if some noble Lords have been in the 'position in which this Government found themselves they would have followed the course which we have followed. The only possible course was to say that if we could go into the discussions completely untrammelled we would go; otherwise we could not. We are ready to go in at any time immediately it becomes plain that we shall not be trammelled or tied, because we believe that we have a part to play and a contribution to make in the endeavour to make this scheme a fruitful and a happy one.

4.18 p.m.

THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER

My.Lords, I should like first to say that I am grateful to the foible and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, not only for the way in which he has expounded some very important sections of the White Paper, but for the recognition he has given in such an emphatic way to the tremendous character of the problem with which we are confronted; and also for the clear way in which he has expressed the desire of the Government to co-operate and to participate in the Schuman Plan. I have several arguments to advance and I shall use "general words," to quote the noble and learned Viscount's expression.

I am not a Party man, but I would say that in my opinion—and the view has already been expressed in this House this afternoon—Korea has high-lighted the danger in Western Europe; and it makes the necessity of co-operation and, if possible, of agreement between the Western European Powers a matter of much greater urgency than when M. Schuman first outlined his plan. If the conception lying behind the Schuman Plan is a great conception, and if, as the Prime Minister said, it is a notable contribution towards the solution of major European problems. I maintain that it is the duty of His Majesty's Government at least to show their hand in a positive way at the earliest juncture, and not to be too cool. The Lord Chancellor spoke of the necessity for cool heads and stout hearts; and I would add, the necessity of warm hearts, for it is warm-heartedness more than anything else that touches the French and touches our neighbours on the Continent. I cannot help thinking that His Majesty's Government under-estimate our weight in the councils of Europe and the greatness of the influence which this country is hound to exercise over the course of the discussions if it comes in at the start.

Let me speak of the political aspect. Nothing has vet been said in this debate—and I did not notice that anything on this point was said in the debate in another place—of the extraordinary difference between the state of other countries in Europe and our own state. Most other countries in Western Europe—indeed, in all Europe—are unstable and unsure of the future. France itself is in the middle of a political crisis. Western Germany has still largely to find its feet. It is by no means certain that Italy, Greece or Belgium are very secure. As for the Eastern countries, they are the offspring of a revolution. Britain alone is stable, intact, firm and soundly democratic. Britain for that very reason is the envy and admiration of other countries. It has great experience. It has stood the tests of the war and the postwar years. It is rich in experiments in social organisation. It is noted for its wisdom in adapting institutions to the needs of the age. M. Schuman says that this is the time for the pooling of ideas. Britain is the natural centre for European thought.

Next let me speak of the economic aspect. It is a material fact, as the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack pointed out, that we produce one-half of the total coal and one-third of the total steel of Western Europe. This, in itself, is bound to give the British negotiators, if they are in, great authority on the manner of the pooling of coal and steel production and in the shaping of the new high authority. In another place, it was pointed out that there was a real danger in Franco-German co-operation without Britain; that France would very likely be an extremely weak partner; and great fear was expressed of a treaty between those two nations which would exclude us for ever. I believe it is right that a great Power like Great Britain should say what it means, and not more than what it means, at the outset. In reply to the Lord Chancellor's question asking for an answer from this House (of which I know I am a very weak and unimportant member) as to what this House thinks of the Annex to Document 11 which he read, I will say that it is a perfect illustration of the inadequacy of the Government's attitude. It speaks of a theme. It recognises the importance and far-reaching character of the French proposal and is in complete accord with the objective of pursuing a common policy aimed at peace, European solidarity and economic and social progress. What it fails to do is to give any indication to the readers that here is something new and challenging, something which goes further than the ordinary words about the desirability of economic solidarity, progress and peace.

We are at a very grave moment in international affairs. I believe that the crisis is not really in Korea or in Asia; the crisis is in Western Europe. Here is a critical situation. If times were normal, one could understand this great attention to detail, this careful scrutinising of every word; but we can be too studious of detail when the highroads are broken up, when the waters are out and when there is a new and troubled scene. At such a time the real mischief consists in not having large and liberal ideas in the management of great affairs. With respect, I maintain that the coolness of language used with great politeness by His Majesty's Government in response to the French Government's communiqués is unfortunate and is doing less than the duty of living up to the prestige of a great power.

M. Schuman—and this is my second point—emphasises that the plan is of European scope, its first concern being a settlement of the age-long opposition of France and Germany. The settling of that opposition is to be the first concrete achievement on the road to the gathering together of all the nations of Europe. Such a gathering together must include Britain. Britain has a double rôle. First, it is a part of Europe. Burke, in a former dangerous epoch of European History, used these words, which I think I may venture to quote to-day: The great resource of Europe was in England. Not in a sort of England detached from the rest of the world and amusing herself with the puppet show of a naval power (it can he no better, whilst al the resources of that power and of every sort of power are precarious), but in that sort of England who considers herself as embodied with Europe; in that sort of England who, sympathetic with the adversity or the happiness of mankind, felt that nothing in human affairs was foreign to her. That is the position which Britain ought to assume to-day in Europe.

The other part of this dual rôle is as a partner of the British Commonwealth, and, indeed, of the Anglo-American community. The noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack spoke of Britain as the centre of a great colonial Empire. But that fact is no handicap in entering into negotiations with Western European powers. On the contrary, it is quite clear that Britain, through having this extra, most powerful association, brings great advantage to Europe, and this second part of the dual rôle is fully appreciated by European Powers. Other European nations expect it to make a difference. They expect us to say such things as this: "We, His Majesty's Government, think that this way of M. Schuman is a good way as a European plan. Perhaps we are not able to go so far as you, but we want to tell you how far we can go." As to this institution of a new high authority, it is said in M. Monnet's Memorandum—a sentence which was not quoted by the noble and learned Viscount— The treaty will be concluded for an indefinite period and any country is free to join on conditions to be defied. I doubt whether His Majesty's Government has sufficiently considered the variety of membership—the possibilities of an associate membership as well as a full membership; the possibilities of a membership which does justice to the European side of the dual rôle and also to the Commonwealth side. There are all sorts of possibilities to be envisaged which can be treated only if Britain is one of the participating Powers from the start. The Continent recognises that Britain has much experience—I do not think we give ourselves enough credit for this—in the formation of corporations, boards and authorities; but our experience can he decisive only if we are inside from the start.

I cannot help thinking that a careful reacting of the White Paper will show, not only an increasing reluctance on the part of His Majesty's Government to commit themselves, but an increasing relaxation of the severity of the outline which was first expressed in the first large Document at the beginning of the White Paper. More and more it becomes clear, as one reads the White Paper and the commentaries upon it by French writers, that M. Schuman's Plan is only in embryo at present. The fundamental objectives are really stated in paragraph 6 of Document 10, and I think it is by no means to be overlooked that when the French Government recognise our Government's natural pre-occupation with economic expansion, full employment and a rising standard of living for the workers, it also points out that the proposed scheme is calculated to avoid a danger which may suddenly obstruct its course. Co-operation, concerted action by agreement among, all the producers of steel and coal in Western Europe, is surely the right road. The alternative is very dangerous: dividing the production into two, for that is what will come about. If it is true, that His Majesty's Government really regard this as a notable contribution to European peace and solidarity, then they must surely want it to succeed. But there is a real danger of the Schuman Plan collapsing altogether if Britain remains outside.

My last point follows what I have just said. The surpreme need of the present day is to band all free countries together. The test is not whether the Government of a country is Socialist or Conservative, but whether a country itself is free and is able to hold both kinds of political standpoints. There is a raison d'etat in history, and to-day that compels all non-totalitarian States of Europe to form a union transcending all differences of passions or interests, giving up a part of their political and economic sovereignty. One member of His Majesty's Government, Lord Pakenham, gave his own interpretation of the Schuman Plan in excellent words when he described it as "a sublime example of Christian statesmanship." We live in times of greatdanger—wars and rumours of wars. It is necessary that all the countries of Western Europe should not only declare their friendship but express it in deeds.

The countries of Western Europe are bound to one another, first by a common outlook, democracy, belief in justice, law and freedom; and secondly, in my opinion, by a greater recognition than in former years of their community in the possession of Christian foundations. I do not say that the Churches have more influence, though their co-operation increases; but I do say that there is more deference to Christian principles amongst the nations of the West. And amongst Christian principles are a conviction of the difference between right and wrong as something rooted in the Divine and not the State; the rights of man founded in the eternal order; the sacredness of individual personality; the design that mankind should be a brotherhood; and belief in charity, mercy and forgiveness. National sovereignty is not itself a Christian principle. The partial fusion of sovereignty is in accordance with Christian principles, if it is in the pursuit of noble ends and justice and peace. All countries declare their friendship according to these principles, and the Western European countries are expressing it in O.E.E.C. and the Atlantic Treaty, which are consistent with the united Nations. Now the Schuman Plan gives an opportunity, which must be taken up by all if it is to succeed, to prove it in the field in which it is most influential, for making war or peace. M. Schuman says, kindly and hopefully, to Germany, France, Britain and the other countries of the West, The friends thou hast, and their adoption tried. Grapple them to thy soul with hoops of steel. For these reasons—namely, the great weight that Britain could have in the determination of the whole character of the Plan, the European scope of the Plan (which Britain can fortify just because of its dual rôle), and the compelling need of a union of all non-totalitarian Powers as a matter of urgency—I hope with all my heart that His Majesty's Government may still see their way to full participation in the discussions to which M. Schuman has called all free nations.

4.39 p.m.

LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH

My Lords, it is with diffidence that I speak in your Lordships' House for the first time, and upon a subject of so grave and far-reaching implications. My excuse for so doing is that I feel that, despite all the discussion of the last few days, too much attention has been focused upon the political aspect of this proposal, upon the proposed high authority or super-national authority, and not upon the purposes which that authority is intended to serve; because it is only those which can justify its ever being called into existence. I know that constitutional discussions are perennially fascinating to politicians and to lawyers, but so far as possible I want to avoid that aspect of the matter and to concentrate on the purposes for which it is suggested the high authority should be created. It is intended to be a means to an end, and it can be justified only if that end is in itself a necessary and desirable one, and if the high authority is the most suitable and proper means of attaining that end.

As I understand the documents which have been issued by the French Government, particularly the declaration of May 9, the object which they have in view in proposing the establishment of the high authority is to secure the pooling of the coal and steel production of all the countries which accede to the Plan. They go on to say that that production would he offered to the world without distinction or exception. However, in a later passage of the same declaration, that phrase appears to be somewhat modified because it there uses the words: …on identical terms to the French and to the German markets, as well as to the markets of other member countries. Therefore, if that is the intention, the products will not go on identical terms to the world but to those who participate in this undertaking. It is proposed also that measures should be taken for the equalisation and improvement of the living conditions of the workers engaged in the industry.

In the document from which the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor read, the working document, as it is called, Which has been issued by the French Government, it is reiterated that the purposes of the high authority are as set out in the original declaration of May 9. They are slightly amplified by the statement that it is intended that there shall be price protection of consumers without discrimination. But again it does not say in the document that that will apply, except to consumers in the member countries. It is said that there will be elimination of unfair trade practices and expansion of production and markets. In one of these documents it is also stated that there must be abolition of customs duties, of quotas, of differential transport rates and, in fact, of all the methods which have been so commonly adopted in the past as a means of discrimination between the nationals of one country and those of another.

I agree that it is very necessary that something should be done in order to eliminate these discriminatory and unfair practices. The Economic Commission for Europe recently published a survey of the steel industries of Europe in which it was pointed out that at the time (in the last few months) the prices of coal for export were in many cases 50 per cent. above the internal price and that in some cases the price of iron ore for export was nearly double the internal price. I agree that it is highly desirable that these trade discriminations should be eliminated and that some steps should be taken towards placing the trade of Europe upon a fair and equal basis. It is no doubt especially important for the French, who are dependent to a very great extent upon the importation of coking coal in order to utilise their resources of iron ore, that these discriminatory practices should cease. It is, I dare say, important also for the Germans that they should be able to get any iron ore which they require to import at a fair and equal price, and that they should not be subjected to price discrimination or to the other devices by which the equality of trade is interfered with.

But is it true that in order to secure these ends it is necessary to create this super-national authority? I should have thought that the abolition of customs duties, quotas, differential transport charges and other interferences with trade in these basic materials of coal and iron ore, could easily have been secured by treaty and agreement between the participating countries, without the creation of any super-national authority whatsoever. To take that step would, in itself, lead automatically to uniformity of prices, equal conditions for the purchasers of the products of this industry, again without the necessity of introducing into the matter any super-national authority. I am, indeed, alarmed at the idea that in order to obtain these comparatively easy and simple objectives—simple in principle at any rate, not always simple in practice because there are many divergent interests at work who have a stake in the system of discrimination and of inequality—it is necessary to create this authority. If Governments are prepared to attain these ends by creating a super-national authority, I should have thought it would be equally easy for them to attain them by the mere creation of binding treaties between them which prevented the exercise of these discriminatory and restrictive practices. It is said also that one of the objects is to secure a greater production of steel and iron products. That again, it seems to me, can be obtained without recourse to this device of a super-national authority. It is proposed that the authority should draw up programmes of development and modernisation and should provide funds by way of loans. Such programmes could be drawn up by other bodies not possessing such drastic powers. Funds can be and have been provided for many such purposes without the creation of any super-national authority.

Then we come to a matter in which I hope that we all take a very deep interest, also, and that is the condition of the workers Who are engaged in producing these basic raw materials. It is said to be an object of the Plan that there shall be equalisation and improvement of the living conditions of the workers. If it is desired to secure that, I should have thought that one of the first steps to be taken was to allow workers to migrate with freedom from one country to another in order to take up employment in those countries in which the efficiency of production and the level of wages were highest. But I have yet to learn that there is any proposal of that kind afoot, though that again is a simple solution. If it is desired to equalise the rates of earnings of the workers who are concerned in the industry throughout Europe, again no super-national authority is needed. This I say in all seriousness, without questioning the good spirit and the high intentions which have animated the French Government in making the proposals which they have made. I feel that the creation of a super-national authority of this kind is in effect the creation of a gigantic cartel which will be beyond the control of any Government and which it appears can never be got rid of because no Government are to be allowed to recede from the undertakings which they are asked to enter into in creating it.

I feel, therefore, that His Majesty's Government were wise, while expressing sympathy with the ideals which underlie the French proposal of bringing to an end one of the basic sources of conflict between themselves and the Germans, to exercise caution and to seek for greater clarification of what the basic immediate purposes of this proposal are and how they can best be achieved. The idea of a European community is a grand and noble one. This country should take part in fostering such proposals as such, and not as an indirect means towards doing something entirely different. In fostering such proposals we have to be mindful of our position as a member of the Commonwealth and of the Atlantic community, and any such proposals must be framed in a way which will combine all these obligations and so make for the greater unity and coherence of a free world.

4.54 p.m.

THE EARL OF HALIFAX

My Lords, the noble Lord who has just addressed your Lordships may he a novice in this House, but he is certainly no novice in political work and political argumentation any more than he is in public service. Whether we agree with the argument that he has just laid before your Lordships or not, I am sure that all noble Lords have appreciated the closely knit character of the argument he has submitted, and will hope that our debates will frequently be assisted and illumined by his wisdom.

During the last few years the general value of the debates on foreign affairs in your Lordships' House has been to mark the substantial unanimity with which all Parties viewed and appreciated the large questions of foreign affairs. Even in this debate, where necessarily there is a strong current of criticism, all your Lordships will be happy to note that my noble friend who opened the debate and the noble Earl, Lord Perth, who spoke for the Liberal Party, were particularly careful to emphasise the complete agreement of all Parties in the face of the grave events in the Far East to-day. I think the implication of their speeches was that sharp as might be the difference of judgment upon the methods of handling the Schuman business, there was no lack of a wide measure of agreement as to the large principles we all alike seek to pursue in Europe and elsewhere. I think the speech of the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor showed the same implication.

Foreign policy and the problems of foreign policy, as the right reverend Prelate implied, are essentially one. Difficulty may arise in one part of the world or another, but in these days there is overwhelming unity in the whole foreign problem. It is not at all unnatural that many people, surveying the foreign scene, from time to time feel sharp frustration as they see, or think they see, progress in the large causes to which they are attached perpetually obstructed and blocked. Time was when many of our good friends in the United States were tempted to think that if everybody were only clever enough or industrious enough or good enough, there was a solution waiting round the corner by Tuesday morning for every problem that might arise. They do not think that any longer. I do not think we ever thought that, because our opportunities and experience have been somewhat different. Consequently, there is the recognition by sober minds in all countries that this state of affairs, of malaise and unrest, is likely to go on for a very long time indeed, unless, indeed, it ends at any time in catastrophe and cataclysm.

There is a curious but very plain paradox in the field of German policy to which the right reverend Prelate addressed some of his observations, and which I entirely agree is one of the most important considerations affecting Europe and the world. I suppose the purpose which policy is designed to pursue in Germany is, first of all to bring Germany back into the comity of nations on terms and under conditions that represent no menace to anybody else, and, in the second place, to look forward at some elate to the restoration of German unity—for the reason, I imagine, that anything other than that imagine, be so contrary to nature as to offer no prospect either of permanence or of peace.

My Lords, it is almost always difficult to do two things at once. The paradox is that in present conditions the more successful you are with the task of leading Germany back into the comity of Europe the deeper inevitably do you dig the gulf between East and West Germany, and the more difficult apparently do you make the restoration of German unity. Out of that, there is no short cut. What is often (not very happily) termed the cold war is, as we have all said to each other over and over again, a test of endurance between two rival philosophies translated into the hard terms of practical life. The essential elements of what we have to try to do in that contest seem to me to be sufficiently plain, and as no doubt they are in the minds of all your Lordships I merely mention them in passing.

They are, first, fie diplomatic effort constantly to make our object crystal clear and understood to the world; secondly, a military organisation of defensive strength by union of all those who look for ordered society and security; thirdly (an economic point), to deny to our opponents the opportunity that naturally flows out of material misery and want; lastly (a political point), the need for the closest possible understanding, frequently referred to this afternoon, between the United States, the Commonwealth, ourselves and all those who feel at one about the deep values of human life that are now under challenge. In a single sentence, all that, I think, may he summed up as the necessity for convincing Soviet Russia that Western civilisation is not going to collapse and that Western Europe can recover and is recovering its ancient stature and independence. In all that, it is impossible to exaggerate the responsibility which has rested on the United States and which, under the Marshall Plan, with so much imagination, the United States has done so much to discharge. The co- operation of the United States, as my noble friend who opened and other noble Lords have said, is, indeed, the lynchpin of all this European effort; and the European effort is itself in turn, as I see it, the primary condition of peace.

That brings me to what I want to say about the Schuman Plan. I listened, as we all listened, with the utmost attention to the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack in the reasoned defence that he made of lie action of His Majesty's Government in not going into the French Conference. I am certainly not going to cross swords with him upon the technical readings of the White Paper. I do, however, permit myself two observations on his speech which from my point of view appear fairly safe. The first is this. The Lord Chancellor devoted a great part: of his argument, as others have done, to showing that it was impossible for anyone to accept a high authority without knowing to what by that acceptance, lie was committing himself. I do not disagree with the noble and learned Viscount, and I hardly suppose that any of my noble friends would disagree with him. But the question that presented itself to my mind was this: Was it not possible, however the Plan might have been worded, to assent in principle to the establishment of a high authority, provided that the Government were satisfied in discussion as to the powers which that high authority was to possess and as to the control (or whatever you may like to call it) which it was going to exercise over the member States. Nothing will ever convince me that, if that kind of statement had been made, in suitable language at a suitable time, it would not have been possible to reach agreement with the French Government about it.

The other observation that I permit myself is one of a rather lighter kind. The Lord Chancellor allowed his imagination to run ahead, with a note of rather nostalgic regret, on to what might happen at the next Election when this great problem had been plunged so wantonly and so unhappily, as perhaps he thought, into the arena of Party politics. He said that the question would be asked (and I suppose from the nature of the question it would be asked at a Labour meeting): How comes it that the Con- servative Party were so strong against steel nationalisation and yet (if I remember his words correctly) were prepared to run half across Europe in order to place the steel industry under the control of someone of whom they had never heard and of whom they knew nothing? I wondered, in my simplicity, whether at a Conservative meeting a similar question might not be asked: How comes it that the Labour Party were so madly bent upon the rash scheme of steel nationalisation at home and yet were so blindly hostile to the value of international co-operation or anything resembling internationalisation of steel control abroad? I do not think that either question would he very profitable but I think ours is at least as good as the Lord Chancellor's.

However, in all seriousness, I do not believe that it is very profitable, certainly for me, to discuss very much further on which side the balance of weight may rightly lie. I am entirely free to admit that there may be held to be a very nicely balanced argument whether it was better to wait and see what the discussions brought forth or whether it was better, as Mr. Churchill said yesterday, to be there to give the answers. I hold very strongly that it would have been better to be there to give the answers, and I think probably the greater number of your Lordships feel the same. I admit, however, that there is a great deal to he said on the other side. Yet when all that has been said, I cannot myself resist the kind of feeling—if I may use a slang word it is perhaps not much more than a hunch—that in taking their decision, which they must have felt was a difficult and a balanced one, the Government somewhat underestimated the deplorable impression that was bound to be caused in the world by what looked like the obstruction of a big idea.

But even if a defence can be made, as it has been and obviously can be made, for all that side of it, I do not think any defence at all can be made, certainly for the publication or (as I would also say) for the form of the Labour Party policy document to which much reference has been made. If I may say so with great respect to those distinguished men, the publication of that document seems to have been a piece of inept bungling for which there can be no justification. The damage it did was to suggest that the policy of the Labour Party was more important to them than what was judged to be a great contribution towards making the dream of European unity come true. By creating that impression throughout the world something has been let loose that it will be difficult to overtake. A distinguished American said to me the other day: "It is as well that you should know what many of your best friends are saying in America. We say that two big things have been done since the war: one is the Marshall Plan, and the other the Schuman Plan. You obviously jumped at the first with both hands, and you now obstruct the second." That is, of course, quite unjust to His Majesty's Government. However, I do not think the fact that it is unjust wholly acquits them of blame for having permitted such an impression to take root in the world, resulting in great aggravation of the difficulties of those in the United States who are perpetually concerned to work for purposes which we also wish to see worked for and fought for.

I have only two further things to say. It is useful to remind ourselves what has in the past been at the root of American isolationism with regard to European complications that have arisen from time to time. It is not, I think, a dislike of war, because that is an emotion common to all people: that probably has its part, but it is not the fundamental reason. The fundamental reason has always seemed to me to be a conviction that European nations were so hopelessly steeped in outworn nationalisms, and had such an inveterate habit of quarrelling among themselves, that they were better left to "stew in their own juice." From that false over -simplification the American people have been largely extricated by great men, and not less—possibly even more—by great events. But we should deceive ourselves if we did not remember that there is always likely to be a good deal of that feeling abroad which can be brought forward at the appropriate times. It is from that point of view, with great respect, knowing how easy it is for anyone to criticise when one has no responsibility, and yet with a feeling that it would be less than frank not to state the feeling one has in one's mind, that I feel the Government have been unfortunate in the impression they have created by their handling of this situation. It is all very well making warm speeches emphasising the importance of co-operation with the United States—and, as I said just now, we all believe that that is the linchpin of everything we are trying to do—but it is no good doing that if at the same time, by either careless or unimaginative presentation of a case that may in itself be good, you go some way towards defeating the cause that you so loudly proclaim.

5.15 p.m.

LORD LAWSON

My Lords, the noble Earl who has just addressed your Lordships does so with unrivalled authority. As a new member of your Lordships' House, I follow him with a certain amount of trepidation—indeed, had I been able to contract out I should probably have done so when I knew the position. No one who has lived amid the great and tragic events of recent years could have failed to be moved when he first read of the proposal of M. Schuman. However, I confess that I was staggered when I read the condition that was laid down under which potential members of this authority would be accepted. In addition to what I read before, I have read and re-read the White Paper; and if any doubts about the conditions of membership still remained in my mind, the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor completely settled them to-day.

I know full well that statesmen have to face great questions and accept the responsibilities for matters which affect their respective nations. But, so far as I can gather, in these two great industries there has been no contact either with the employers' side or with the workmen's side in any of the countries concerned. That is a serious matter. Great communities in this and in other countries are engaged in these two industries which are practically the basis of the world's modern industry. The members of those communities have great experience and skill and are greatly affected by decisions taken concerning their industries. The issues involved in this matter are so vital that they may touch the nerve centre of these communities in the respective countries to such an extent that, in actual practice, those upon whom this scheme chiefly depends will find it impossible to carry out the conditions imposed upon them.

I should like to remind your Lordships of what is involved in the industry with which I have been connected all my life, and then to deal with the question of steel. There are statisticians who sometimes try to give us an idea of the extent of the coal measures in this country. They give us colossal figures. I am a humble man who has followed the industry and its science, and I say that their figures are only very approximate to the value of the great coal measures of this country. We are a very fortunate country. These measures reach from Scotland, through the North of England, through Yorkshire and through Lincolnshire. Those who have followed the geological conditions have hazarded the opinion that they are almost continuous right down to this great city. This country is established on coal. I sometimes say that the seams are so numerous, that when you think they are exhausted coal turns up somewhere else. In fact, I sometimes say that the coal "grows" again, Coal is only one of the many commodities which are going to be placed under the authority of this new body. There is also the skill of the management and craftsmen in both industries. For generation upon generation families have handed on their skill,,and I should question whether anywhere in Europe, considering the time that these industries have been in operation in this country, there is such skill as there is in these two great industries. I must tell your Lordships that I am astonished at the line which has been taken about this. I think that where great fundamental industries are concerned they should not be made the battledore and shuttlecock of Party politics. I am even more astonished because one criticism which has repeatedly been made, both in another place and in the country, by the representative members of the Opposition, is that since the nationalisation of mines the seat of authority has been too far removed from the workman. I have been concerned about that proposition. If it were true it would be a serious matter, and I have sometimes wished that there could be an investigation of that statement. The people who have criticised the running of the coal industry because the seat of authority has been moved, are now advising that the seat of authority should be taken on to the Continent and put into the hands of other nationals. That seems to me a very strange proposition, and a contradiction to the point of view to which I have just referred.

I may be wrong, but in the summary which has been put out by the French Minister—I read it in The Times—there is a very clear statement to the effect that it has been practically agreed that export prices should be the same as home prices. Now I do not know how that would work, and I draw attention to the point only because of the fact that it means, of course, that a far wider range of industry than coal or steel will be affected. If this body can fix high or low prices—and they are a price-fixing body—for the home industries of this country then, of course, that will have a profound effect upon the whole range of industry affected by steel and coal. I may be wrong, but that is the plain statement, and I have taken it as it is set out in the summary.

I have put the two points as shortly as I can, and I want to conclude with this. So vast are the implications of this scheme that, even if there were no barrier to it, I think it is one upon which the peoples of each country should have an opportunity of deciding, because once in this organisation we cannot come out. I frankly confess that I doubt whether a coal and steel organisation is the right way to get international unity. I think the noble Earl who preceded me will probably agree with this. Those of us who have seen conditions in other parts of the world know that peoples do not respond in the main to material offerings —they respond to finer and nobler conceptions. If the people of this country agreed, I would not hesitate to take the risk, because the reward would be so great. But I doubt whether, in a great material combination of this kind, it would achieve the notable object which was set out by M. Schuman.