HL Deb 28 June 1950 vol 167 cc1131-46

2.47 p.m.

VISCOUNT SWINTON rose to call attention to Foreign Affairs, with particular reference to the Schuman Plan and to the action of His Majesty's Government in relation thereto; and to move for Papers. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, in the unavoidable continued absence of my noble friend, which I am sure we all deplore, I rise to move the Motion which stands in his name and which was tabled some time ago. We meet in circumstances which none of us had contemplated when that Motion was put down, and under the shadow of the grave events which the Prime Minister and the Leader of the House related to Parliament yesterday. On that issue we are all absolutely united, in Parliament and in the country. That unity of policy and determination in the face of aggression is absolute and transcends everything. Let me therefore make it plain beyond a peradventure that nothing that I or any noble Lords on these Benches may say in this debate to-day in criticism of the Government handling of the Schuman Plan in any way qualifies or detracts from our complete unity in support of the Government in their firm stand with the United States and the other free nations against aggression. Indeed, I think that in the light of these grave events this debate and the Schuman Plan take on a new significance, and every practical measure of co-operation a new urgency.

I feel that it is right that this House, with its wide experience in foreign and Commonwealth affairs, and in economic and industrial questions, and with its deep sense of responsibility, should debate this matter. I hope, too, that this debate will clarify and focus the real practical issues in their true perspective. I take it that everyone of us will agree that the supreme interest and purpose of all free nations, in Europe, in the Commonwealth and Empire, and in the United States, is the security of all those nations, the maintenance of their freedom and the establishment of lasting peace. But to do that we must be strong and we must be united, working together to promote what must be the common interests of all of us in defence and economic prosperity. That does not mean sealed pattern constitutions, political or economic. Those may or may not come in some regions, but common co-operation in practical matters—what I think Mr. Churchill has called functional co-operation—is indeed invaluable. Such co-operation does mean that all of us must do our best to help forward particular plans in defence and economies which will strengthen the individual countries, promote their co-operation and serve the common interest of all. I hope there is a chance to persuade the Government to consider this question afresh. They have had their vote in another place, but I cannot think that either they or anyone else can feel very happy about the situation.

The position would he much simpler if we had to deal only with the position as disclosed in the Government White Paper. I do not think it is difficult to prove that the Government have greatly exaggerated the commitments they were asked to undertake and that they have conjured up bogies or dragons which do not really stand in their path. I will return to that, and try to make my proof valid, a little later. Unhappily, the situation has been bedevilled by the policy statement of the National Executive of the Labour Party which was issued concurrently with the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament. It attracted. I regret to say, even more attention than the Prime Minister's statement, and was received with universal dismay. This document cannot be regarded as an abstract essay by the intelligentsia of the Party. The National Executive occupy a special position and authority in the hierarchy of the Socialist Party. It includes the Prime Minister and other important members of the Cabinet. I observe that in the Tribune of June 16, in an article which was obviously an inspired article, it was firmly pointed out that the formulation and pronouncement of policy did not rest with the Lord President of the Council (it did not add "nor with Mr. Bevan") but is a matter which is decided by the National Executive of the Party. In fact, the National Executive to use the new terminology—is a supra-Government authority. It is therefore essential that we should see what the policy enunciated really is and also that we should know whether that policy is the last word of the Government.

The manifesto, then, is strictly relevant. It sets out—or purports to set out—the attitude of the Party to co-operation in Europe. And observe, my Lords, that it was deliberately issued to coincide with the Prime Minister's statement and the White Paper. I say "deliberately," because it is no good saying that these things "just happen." It was not as if some publisher had published the thing on an inconvenient day. After all, in order to make sure that it received its due meed of publicity this document was presented to the Press and the world by the Minister of Town and Country Planning—one of the leading members of the Government—and it cannot for a moment be suggested that this eminent or prominent Cabinet Minister did not know that a statement, which must have been most fully discussed in the Cabinet, and whose contents were known to him, was going to be presented by the Prime Minister to Parliament the same day or the next day, and that the White Paper was going to be issued. The manifesto comes to this: that a Socialist Government would co-operate over basic industries or economic joint operation only with other Socialist Governments. What other construction can he placed on such passages as this: No Socialist Government in Europe could submit to the authority of a body whose policies were decided by an anti-Socialist majority. Again, it says: Joint planning, means nothing unless the [basic] industries in each country are required to fit their investment programmes into a European plan. The Labour Party is convinced that nothing less than public ownership can ensure this fully. Control without ownership can only be effective for negative purposes. It really is the counterpart of the well-known dictum of the early 19th century isolationist, which might be paraphrased: I hate all non-Socialists. And non-Socialists begin when you leave Dover. If it should be thought that I am giving an unfair interpretation of this, let me quote your Lordships the impression made on M. Herriot—a very good friend of England and a mart with a lifelong and almost unrivalled experience in politics and public life. M. Herriot writes of this document: Britain thinks that if we are to have international planning, we must first have national planning; that is to say, a universal Socialist régime. No other impression could he made upon any unprejudiced reader.

Not content with enunciating this policy of non-co-operation With non-Socialists, the pamphlet goes on, in what I must say is the most priggish manner, to lecture foreign countries on the way they ought to go. I wonder whether noble Lords Opposite and the gentlemen who were responsible for this document realise how irritating that is to our friends on the Continent. And I observe that it is all based on the extraordinary assumption that full employment, in which we all believe in this country—and, indeed, not only we in this country but those in other countries as well—depends on Socialism, and that Socialism, as they point out, depends upon nationalisation. If they were to consult the London School of Economics, I think the most elementary economist there would point out that full employment depends on capacity to export enough to pay for our essential raw materials and for the food we have to eat. And even the Government returns will show that our expert success has been almost entirely the effort of the non-nationalised industries—not infrequently handicapped by Government action and slanged by Government spokesmen.

But, apart from the effort of non-nationalised industries, full employment has depended on two things: on the sellers' market and on the generous American and Canadian aid, without which, as Ministers themselves have admitted, there would have been two million people unemployed. It is fortunate that this boycott of non-Socialists does not extend to defence. It is also fortunate and noticeable that the Socialists do not hesitate to take aid from non-Socialist Governments. That is a form of co-operation which can be accepted. I would venture to ask them —because the Empire figures in this document—how, under this limitation of co-operation only with Socialists, we are to co-operate with a Commonwealth in which they are the only Socialist Government? Really, the Government must say definitely and finally where they stand on this manifesto. Dr. Dalton and the Prime Minister cannot maintain their Jekyll and Hyde attitude over this business—Jekyll in another place and, I presume, in the Cabinet, and Hyde in what is for members of this Administration the even more important Executive of the National Labour Party. We all recall in the story how in that schizophrenic existence it was Hyde and not Jekyll who ultimately prevailed, to the great discomfort of Dr. Jekyll.

Everybody would have understood if the Government had said plainly: "Our first duty and interest is to the Commonwealth and Empire. We must be free to develop our mutual trade relations there. That will not hurt you; it will help you. The stronger and more united the Empire is in trade and in defence, the more it will trade with the rest of the world, and the greater the part it can play in common defence. That Commonwealth partnership is not an exclusive but a complementary effort. Subject to that Empire co-operation, and indeed fortified by it, we will co-operate in every practical way. We wish you well and will do our best to encourage and help your endeavours." If only that were the policy of the Government it would be a policy in which we could all join in supporting. We have been keen to be able to support and sustain the Government in matters of foreign policy. We could all support them if that were the policy. And if that be the policy there is certainly no reason why the Government should not enter this Conference, the door of which still stands open.

I am sure the Government have misunderstood or greatly exaggerated the commitments which they are asked to make. One eminent lawyer expounded this in another place yesterday. Another, more eminent, will answer here today. If I may respectfully say so, I hope that the Lord Chancellor will not treat this, as it seemed to me the Chancellor of the Exchequer did in another place, as if he were arguing the construction of a strict deed of settlement in a Chancery court, where the intention of the parties and the surrounding circumstances are wholly excluded from consideration. Things do not work like that, thank goodness, in real life. But, even on the documents, surely the fears of the Government are greatly exaggerated. Let us look at what are, perhaps, the two most important passages in the White Paper and which appear quite early in the interchanges—I am now referring to paragraphs 3 and 4 of Document 10, which is the Memorandum of May 30 from the French Government: The special position in these negotiations which the British Government wishes to preserve is justified in their Memorandum by the intention, said to be held by the French Government, of asking, as a prior condition, for full participation in the discussions, for an undertaking to pool coal and steel resources, and to set up an authority with certain sovereign powers. The Document goes on: As their representatives"— that is, the French representatives— have informed the British representatives orally, the French Government wish particularly to confirm once more that these are not their intentions. As has already been made clear in the French Memorandum of May 9, there will be no commitment except by the signature of a treaty between the States concerned and its parliamentary ratification.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT ADDISON)

If I may interrupt the noble Viscount, will be continue by reading the first sentence on the top of page 11?

VISCOUNT SWINTON

Certainly: But in order that its work may serve to develop a European community, it is essential that such an authority should be independent both of Governments and of individual interests. I will go on, if the noble Viscount wishes, and read—for I am going to develop this—the last Document I have seen emanating from the French Government, which is the sketch plan, if I may so call it, put out by M. Monnet. It says: In studying the summary now published it should be constantly borne in mind that the French delegation intends itself to make substantial modifications and additions to this working document in the course of the general proceedings. The reservations which the Netherlands Government made are, I think, implicit in those sentences. Just look at the reality of the situation. I cannot believe that any Government taking part in these negotiations would take a different view. Can anyone really suppose that any of the Governments will agree to a treaty which they do not regard as both fair to their own country, workable in practice and in the common interest of all? Before any country makes a treaty, it will have to be satisfied as to its terms —what the plan is, how it will work, what are to be the powers of the central authority, flow that authority is to be constituted and to whom it is to be responsible. We are invited to go in and see if together we cart hammer out a workable plan.

To all that I am sure we can make a great contribution. Our steel industry is the most efficient Europe. It is co-operative in itself; it is admirable in its labour relations, and it has a wide experience of production and marketing. All this knowledge and experience should be available in the discussions. It seems to me of vital importance that we should he in those negotiations from the start. Consider the alternative if we do not go in. Industrially and politically, the discussions will be out of balance. But what is the resulting alternative? The discussions will go on and no doubt a plan will be made in which our interests will not 'be considered because we are not there. But yet that plan will inevitably affect us at every point. An organisation will be created to which we are not a party but with which we shall have to deal. It is reasonable to assume—indeed, I think it is reinforced by M. Monnet's publication yesterday—that principles of mutual conduct will be agreed between the participants: for example, that there shall be no dumping, no concealed subsidies and very likely an abolition of duties on iron and steel between the participating countries. But, if we stand outside, we shall have none of those benefits.

On the contrary, these practices could be used individually or collectively against us. My Lords, how much more sensible and practicable to be in at the moulding stage! All our influence would be used to make the scheme sound. Our whole aim would be expansionist in promoting the maximum use of steel. That was a condition on which in any conversations our own steel industry was insistent, even before the war. It has always been the essence of any plan that I have ever hoard discussed.

Observe, too, my Lords, that this may be a long business. It may well be that it will start with an agreement on a limited field of activities, and grow as experience and co-operation gather momentum. That is often the surest and in the end the quickest way in these matters. So it is all the more important that it should start right, and that we should he in the discussions from the start. My experience of schemes of this kind is that to be effective they must cover a wide area. America has been deeply interested in and deeply sympathetic to the conception of the Plan. It may well be that as a scheme develops it will be found to the mutual advantage of Europe and America that on some aspects the industries of both hemispheres should be associated. Surely our spirit of approach should be essentially Practical. Our aim should be a fair, sound, and workable plan. But the one thins, that it should not be devilled with is a doctrinaire, political ideology.

I would beg the Government to consider this situation afresh. If hopes were dupes, fears may be liars. By entering these discussions I am firmly convinced that we are not committed to any industrial or economic plan in advance. We are certainly in no way committed to any sort of political federation. But in those discussions I am sure we have a great practical contribution to make. And it may well be that our presence, our experience, indeed, if I may say so without impertinence, our guidance, would lead to agreement on a sound and workable scheme of equal material advantage to ourselves and others, and of lasting benefit to the cause of cooperation in Europe. I beg to move for Papers.

3.13 p.m.

THE EARL OF PERTH

My Lords, we all deeply regret the absence of the Leader of the Opposition, but I think both the Opposition and he can congratulate themselves on having such an able deputy to put forward this Motion. The Daily Express announced this morning that so far as this country was concerned the Schuman Plan was dead. Whatever we may think of the handling of the Plan by His Majesty's Government, one thing that is certain is that the Schuman Plan is very much alive. I need only quote in this connection a passage from the speech made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in another place. I do so because there is a slight danger that in the strain of Party controversy it may have been overlooked. He said: We regard the French objective of the elimination of the age-long feud between France and Germany as being so important that we are prepared to do our utmost either to join in or to associate ourselves with any scheme that meets with the approval of the six countries now meeting in Paris. That does not at all look to me as if the Schuman Plan was either dead or buried.

One clear and happy result has arisen out of the discussions which took place in another place about this Plan. I hope it will also manifest itself today in your Lordships' House. It is that members of all Parties welcome M. Schuman's initiative and are prepared to do whatever is practicable to make it a success. I am very glad that that is so, because if those proposals are carried into the realm of accomplishment a great advance will have been made towards European unity and the preservation of European and world peace. I think it would be fitting that we should pay tribute to the vision of the authors of the Schuman Plan. As Lord Strabolgi said the other day, they saw that the age-long feud between France and Germany, dating from 1870, had bedevilled European relations, and they therefore seized this opportunity to put forward proposals of a limited but concrete nature which would make war between France and Germany materially impossible in the future. I think it probably is true that had a Schuman Plan existed before 1914, that war would have been averted; and certainly had it existed before the last war equally that war would not have taken place. It may be that the time then was not ripe, but it certainly is ripe today. My Lords, proposals of this character, if they were to be successful, could emanate only from the French Government, but we ought also to pay a tribute to the wisdom of Dr. Adenauer who at once saw how important such a plan was for European prosperity and peace and gave it his fullest approval and support.

What has been and what is the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Plan and the present conversations? The Prime Minister made a short statement in another place on May 11, and a further statement was made in your Lordships' House by the Leader of the House, Viscount Addison, on June 13. Certainly both those statements were favourable to the French initiative, but, as I said at the time, they seemed to me to lack warmth. They reminded me of the Laodicean Church, which was neither hot nor cold but lukewarm. I am glad to see that the Government are perhaps moving towards more warmth. I do not think they then expressed adequate appreciation of the proposals. Lord Strabolgi described the statement on June 11 as hard and businesslike. I accept that; but in dealing with a question of this magnitude we want something more than a hard businesslike attitude.

I turn for a moment to the White Paper, which I suppose all your Lordships have read. It is an extremely interesting document. After the conversations of May 28 between the Minister of State and the French Ambassador here, it looked as if an agreed solution would be found to the difficulties which had arisen about our participation in the forthcoming conversations; but it gradually became clear that there was a real divergence of views between the two Governments as to the meaning and scope of the commitments involved. I think that, given time, a satisfactory arrangement might have been reached. But the French Government (and I cannot blame them) thought it essential that the conversations between those countries which accepted the two underlying principles—namely, the pooling of iron and steel resources and a common high authority—should begin at once. They thought it necessary to strike while the iron was hot.

I am not going to trouble your Lordships with any analysis of that White Paper. I will add only that perhaps the French Government have been over-logical while our Government, on the other hand, were certainly over-cautious. It is the future, however, that interests your Lordships today. In view of the expressed good will of His Majesty's Government towards the proposals, and the desire of the French Government that we should be kept fully informed about the conversations now proceeding, so that we can at any time express our views on any specific points which we think are of particular concern, I think we can on the whole be optimistic about the future. I do not know whether the French attitude is likely to change, and whether they would wish to-clay for our full participation in the conversations while we aye still unwilling to accept those two underlying principles to which I have referred. These two principles are essential to any Franco-German arrangement, and I can well understand the reluctance of the French Government to modify them, though, of course, there should and must he great flexibility in their application.

I believe that ultimately we shall be compelled, both on political and economic grounds, to associate ourselves in some way or other with any scheme which the conversations may bring to fruition. This Government, whether rightly or wrongly, have, up to now, rejected the chance of participating in the conversations and, through participation, of trying to shape the proposals on lines acceptable to ourselves. I think it may now be too late to do so. But I would plead with the Government to take no narrow view of this great issue. We should be prepared to make sacrifices, even great sacrifices, in the cause of real friendship between France and Germany. I would beg the Government to remember that peace is more important even than full employment. Let me add that I believe that if the aim of the French and German Governments is attained, we shall have established a formidable barrier in Europe to Communism. It is not for nothing that the Communist Parties and the Communist Press have so violently assailed the Schuman Plan. It must greatly diminish their hopes and their influence.

Apart from the Communists there are some who for quite different reasons oppose our full or part association in the Schuman Plan. Their reasons are quite respectable but I believe them to be totally invalid. One reason which has been put forward is that our participation might have the effect of upsetting our present happy position of full employment. Is there any reality in that anticipation? I fail to see it. I will return to that subject later; here I would remark only that I do not believe there is a single Government in the whole of Western Europe which does not desire full employment for its citizens. Remember that by Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations, every nation in the United Nations has pledged itself to promote full employment. The second source of apprehension is that the standard of living of our steel and coal workers may be lowered through the application of the Plan. Here, again, I would say that surely that fear is quite groundless. The original French Memorandum states that one of the main objects of the scheme is the equalisation, as well as the improvement, of living conditions of the workers in the steel and coal industries. Surely that contains no suggestion of a lowering of standard, either here or elsewhere.

The last objection relates to our position as a leading member of the Commonwealth. I completely fail to follow the argument that our association with the Plan can affect our Commonwealth relations. Those who are hostile to our participation on that ground seem to think that association with the Plan must ultimately involve full membership of a European Federation. The Plan may be a first step towards such a Federation, but it is only a first step, and the actual objective is strictly limited to a functional purpose. I am convinced that our special position as regards the Commonwealth is fully realised by Western European countries and by America, and those countries will never expect that we should accept proposals which would endanger it. Those who, like the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, are opposed to any participation because of our Commonwealth position have, I feel, conjured up fears which are unreal.

LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE

I thank the noble Earl for allowing me to intervene. I suppose that he makes that sweeping statement on the basis of an article expressing my own views which I wrote for the Evening Standard and which was published in that paper on June 9. In that article I expressed fears which I think one is justified in holding, and which indeed have been widely shared, owing to the French statement on May 9 that this was intended as "a first step in the federation of Europe," and "the first concrete foundation of the European federation which is indispensable to the preservation of peace ". I expressed fears that it would lead to European federation. I am quite satisfied, from what has been said by Mr. Churchill in another place and my noble friend to-day, that if we go in on the same basis as the Dutch we are free from any such entanglement and that any arrangement must first come back to the British Parliament for approval.

THE EARL OF PERTH

I thank the noble Lord for his intervention. It is quite clear that the Commonwealth must come first but, after all, we have certain definite obligations in Western Europe, and there should, I think, be no irreconcilable antagonism between the two. The position of this country in the Commonwealth and as the banker for the sterling area is so well understood abroad that our cautious approach to the Schuman Plan, though regretted, did not cause any very great surprise or dismay in Western Europe or in America. Unfortunately, at this critical juncture the pamphlet entitled European Unity, a Statement by the National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party was published, and this pamphlet set fully alight the smouldering embers. I have read the document—to which the noble Viscount has already referred—very carefully. There are certainly very good points in it. particularly when it deals with what is known as a third force and neutrality, but the general impression after reading it is the extraordinary—what shall I say?—smug complacency displayed by the authors of the pamphlet.

Lord Calverley, in the debate in your Lordships' House on June 20, said—and I fully agree with him: If there is one thing of which we have to fight shy it is that either the Americans or the Russians should think that we are a self-righteous nation—a 'more holy than thou' class of people. The authors of the pamphlet are certainly conveying that impression, not only to Russians and Americans but to the whole world. I wonder what Lord Calverley's reactions are to that document. The pamphlet talks about the extraordinary success which Britain, under the auspices of a Labour Government, has had in solving its post-war economic problems. As the noble Viscount pointed out, there is no mention of Marshall Aid, or of the sellers' market, those two factors which almost gave us automatically our full employment.

The pamphlet urges the Governments of other countries to follow the example and policies of the Labour Government, and asks them to plan for full employment and social justice. I repeat my question: Is there any Government in Western Europe which does not want full employment and social justice? Those objectives have been in the forefront of the programmes of the Christian Democratic Parties of these countries for a very long time. To suggest otherwise is both dishonest and wrong. It is true that these Governments do not believe that the best method of securing these two great aims is by sweeping measures of nationalisation. Surely, however, a responsible Government is much more likely to be aware of the best interests of the people than the Labour Party Executive sitting here.

The pamphlet then goes on to compare full employment in this country with unemployment in Italy and Western Germany. That is a totally unfair comparison. Italy is a country with little raw material and a large and increasing population. If it had powerful capital resources, the Government there might do a great deal to-day to relieve unemployment. It is doing much as regards land reform and cultivation. It is a question of capabilities rather than of that planning which is so dear to the hearts of the noble Lords opposite. The problem caused by the enormous influx of refugees into Western Germany makes any comparison with that country impossible. I know that Socialist speakers constantly repeat the unemployment figures in Western European countries to show how wonderfully the Government have succeeded in comparison with these other countries. In a broadcast the other day, Mr. Morgan Phillips strongly stressed that point. But I say that that is quite dishonest, and I hope that his hearers realised that it was not accurate and understood the real background.

Nor is this all. The worst feature of the pamphlet is that the authors propose to introduce a totally new principle in regard to the conduct of foreign affairs—namely, that the Socialist Government, which after all is the Government of this country, cannot co-operate in a joint European plan except with Governments who share the same economic views. That is a position which the late Mr. Arthur Henderson, an eminent Foreign Secretary, would have repudiated completely. He regarded himself as the Foreign Secretary entrusted with the interests of the whole country and not as the Foreign Secretary only of a particular Party. If Mr. Bevin is of the stature which I believe he is, he also will repudiate that doctrine. I have often urged that foreign affairs should be taken out of the scope of Party politics and sometimes, though not often, I have received encouraging replies from the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor and other Government spokesmen. I wish there had been such consultations about the Schuman Plan, as much trouble might have been avoided.

I would remind your Lordships that Sir Brian Robertson said to the Germans the other day: In Great Britain it is generally agreed that the Opposition Parties are entitled to receive essential information on national questions, and that their co-operation in such matters depends upon appropriate consultation. He added that in America the process had been placed on an even more precise footing. That used to be the case in this country, but I fear that the practice has greatly diminished here while it has increased in America. The present Government, although they do not represent the majority of electors, have chosen the policy of isolation and keep the Opposition Parties ill-informed. I agree that if the principle laid down in the pamphlet is to prevail, then consultation is of little use.

I have been connected with international affairs now for almost fifty years and, curiously enough, the basis of British policy during the whole of that period has altered but little. The underlying principles are these: First, intimate collaboration and consultation with the countries of the Commonwealth; secondly, warm friendship and close ties with the United States of America; thirdly, co-operation with France and her friends; and, lastly, and probably primarily, the preservation of peace. To those were added, in 1919, support of the League of Nations—support which has now been transferred to the United Nations. In the present grave circumstances we all have the United. Nations very much in mind. It is receiving far greater support than was ever given to the League of Nations. I am glad that that is so, far it shows that at last we have realised that unprovoked aggression must be chocked at its onset unless all our hopes of a world governed by law rather than by force are to vanish. It is for this reason that I and those who sit on these Benches so cordially welcome and approve the support given by the Government to the resolution proposed in the Security Council by the United States resolutely to oppose aggression. We must earnestly hope and pray that the steps which are being taken or will be taken by the members of the United Nations will prove successful.