Lords Sitting of 14 December 1950

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the
Woolsack.

Prayers

  SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932
  2,34 p.m.
  LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, there is nothing particular in this Order to which I need to call the attention of the House, as the provisions of the Sunday Entertainments Act have been complied with. Therefore, I beg to move that the Order be approved.
  Moved, That the Order made under the Act by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, for extending Section one of the Act to the Urban District of Withernsea, be approved. — (Lord Shepherd.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.
  LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the same conditions apply to this Motion as to the previous one. I beg to move that the Order be approved.
  Moved, That the Order made under the Act by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, for extending Section one of the Act to the County Borough of Swansea, be approved.—(Lord Shepherd.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

THE WASHINGTON TALKS
2.36 p.m.
EARL FORTESCUE EARL FORTESCUE rose to call attention to the communiqué issued from Washington at the close of the conversations between the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, and to the statement on this subject made by the Leader of the House on Tuesday last. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I will not delay the House by speaking to the Motion which stands in my name on the Order Paper. It is designed simply to give His Majesty's Government an opportunity of making an expanded statement on the important subjects dealt with in the communiqué issued from Washington, after the recent meeting of the
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President of the United States and the Prime Minister, and in the statement made by the noble Viscount, Lord Addison, in your Lordship's House on Tuesday last, both of which are now before the House in the convenient form of a White Paper.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD HFNDERSON): My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for providing the House with an opportunity to have this debate. The Motion which has just been moved by the noble Earl calls attention to the communiqué issued at the end of the Prime Minister's conversations with President Truman at Washington and to the statement on this subject made by my noble friend the Leader of the House on Tuesday last. This sets the general scope of the debate, and there is no need for me to repeat in detail the contents of those two statements, especially since, as the noble Earl has told the House, to meet the convenience of noble Lords here and of Members of another place the two statements have been published in the form of a White Paper. I propose, therefore, to confine my observations to some of the major issues which were dealt with. The communiqué was wide in its scope and informative in its treatment of the subjects discussed—more than usually so following intimate discussions of this sort, and noble Lords will realise that there is little room for amplification.
I think that we all agree that the Prime Minister rendered a great service by paying his visit to Washington. In the light of the world situation it was well timed, and I do not think it can be doubted that the visit and its results have had both an encouraging and a stabilising effect. We all recognise that it is of supreme importance to avoid Anglo-American misunderstanding or divergent attitudes developing under the impact of fast-moving international events or hostile pressures. We must beware of those of ill-will who seek to sow the seeds of discord and disunity between us. We must guard against those whose insidious propaganda is directed, for example, to persuade us that America is "dragging" Britain into support of "imperialist designs" and to persuade America that

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we are "appeasers." I believe it is recognised on both sides of the Atlantic that any possibility of danger of dissension or division arising, has been reduced to a minimum by the Truman/Attlee talks. That belief is supported by the statement that "the unity of objectives of our two countries underlay all the discussions."
Millions of ordinary men and women in many countries felt relief to their anxieties when it was announced that the Prime Minister was to pay this visit to Washington. The United Nations forces in Korea had suffered a heavy setback. No one knew how heavy that setback would prove to be. No one knew what the intentions of the Chinese Government were, nor what part Russia was playing behind the scenes. It was, I think, the feeling of the ordinary man that the time was ripe for a meeting between the heads of the Governments of the two great democracies, so that they might take counsel together and consider how the crisis could best be met and how what appeared to be the darkening clouds of war might be dispersed.
The atmosphere is considerably better to-day than it was a fortnight ago. On the military side, the reverses suffered by the United Nations forces in Korea are beginning to be seen in proper perspective. On the political side, the full and frank discussions which have taken place between the President and the Prime Minister have resulted in what the free world was above all hoping for— namely, a reaffirmation that these two great democracies stand side by side in their resistance to aggression and that they see the world as a whole and that there is no divergence of objectives. That, I think, was the biggest thing which came out of the Washington talks: the expressed agreement on basic objectives and basic principles of international conduct, because mutual trust, active co-operation and a common purpose between these two great Atlantic partners are indispensable to the security of the free Western world and to the maintenance of world peace. The second was the frank realisation of the importance of building up the strength of the whole free world. It is, I think, very important that these results of the Washington talks, which are of over-riding importance to our way of life and to our future, should not be overlooked in our natural anxiety to consider the
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present situation in the Far East and the crisis in Korea.
As regards Korea, the Washington talks revealed identity of view between our-selves and the United States on the major issues. It was agreed at Washington that every effort must be made to prevent the conflict in Korea spreading and becoming a conflict with China from which might flow a world war. Peace and the maintenance of the principles of the United Nations are still the overriding objectives of both Governments in their foreign policy.
Next, both the President and the Prime Minister declared their readiness to seek an end to the hostilities in Korea by means of negotiation. If the same willing-ness to negotiate is shown by the Chinese Government, then there is no doubt that a solution can be found and that a free, unified and independent Korea can be established, which will threaten the security of none and which will enable the sorely tried peoples of Korea to develop their own institutions and their own way of life in conformity with their own traditions. In these matters it is not possible to lay down a detailed blue-print covering every stage in the solution from the first to the last step. But at least the first step is perfectly clear.
The first step must be a cease-fire, which will open the way to negotiation, and I warmly commend the initiative taken by a number of nations of Asia and the Middle East to bring this about. A resolution has been tabled at the United Nations with the overwhelming support of the great majority of members, calling for a cease-fire. If, on the Chinese side, there is the same willingness to use the methods of peaceful negotiation as has been displayed by so many members of the United Nations, then we may have good hopes that we may proceed to the next step, which will be consideration of a settlement in Korea by peaceful means.
The principles on which such a settlement must be found are already known. They were first set out in the Cairo Declaration which referred to a free and independent Korea. They have subsequently been reaffirmed in a number of resolutions of the United Nations regarding the unification and rehabilitation of the country. In the view of His Majesty's Government, a free and independent Korea cannot be firmly established unless

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proper regard is paid to the development of good relations between Korea and its neighbours, and between Korea and the rest of the world. At the same time it is of first importance that the authority and prestige of the United Nations in Korea, as elsewhere in the world, should be maintained. Indeed, Korea is in a very special sense the responsibility of the United Nations. For over three years commissions of the United Nations were in Korea charged with the task of bringing about a unified, free and independent Korea. In the last six months the United Nations has exerted the greatest efforts on behalf of Korea. We must bend every effort to ensure that the objectives of the United Nations are achieved under the auspices of the United Nations.
If a solution to the Korean problem is to be reached under the auspices of the United Nations, on a basis of taking into account the interests of the neighbours of Korea, it would surely be better to ensure that Korea's neighbours are effectively represented in that Organisation. In the view of His Majesty's Government, developments in Korea confirm the sound-ness of our policy in regard to the representations of China at the United Nations. If the United Nations is to be a living institution, it must be what it purports to be—that is to say, it must effectively represent the Member States. Delegates to it must be the delegates of Governments which can effectively speak for these Member States. It is therefore still the view of His Majesty's Government that the delegates of the Central People's Government of China, which is the only effective Government of China, should occupy the Chinese seat in the United Nations. As your Lordships know, this was the only point of difference recorded in the communiqué.
I have referred earlier to the Cairo Declaration. That Declaration did not deal only with Korea, although the pas-sage relating to Korea is the most important of the passages still remaining unfulfilled. There is also in the Cairo Declaration a reference to Formosa. His Majesty's Government adhere to the principles of the Cairo Declaration. But Formosa offers several exceedingly difficult problems. In the first place the signatories to the Cairo Declaration are not agreed as to which is the legitimate Government of China. In our view, that Government is the Central People's Gov-
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ernment of China but this is not the view of all the signatories. In the second place, this Cairo Declaration sprang from the recognition of certain principles which are stated in the first paragraph of the Declaration. These principles are principles of universal validity. They are the principles of non-aggression and the renunciation of territorial ambitions.
In the third place, the Chinese Government is at present obstructing the fulfilment of the Cairo Declaration in regard to Korea by allowing so-called volunteers to intervene in Korea. It would be difficult to justify the immediate fulfilment of the passage in the Cairo Declaration relating to Formosa when the beneficiary of such a policy was a Government which was obstructing the execution of another passage in the same Declaration. I think that your Lordships will agree with the statement by the President and by the Prime Minister in their communiqué, that the Formosan issue must be settled by peaceful means, and that, in view of the difficulties to which I have referred above, consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute.
So far, I have spoken only of the problems which face us in the Far East. Not-withstanding events in that region, we have always felt that the focal point of our efforts must lie in the West. The Prime Minister was able to confirm in Washington that the United States Government take the same view, and complete agreement was reached there between our two countries on the principles of Atlantic defence. There was agreement, first, that an integrated force must be formed for the defence of Europe and a Supreme Commander for this force appointed without unnecessary delay; secondly, that the present defence effort of the West must be speeded up; and, thirdly, that Germany should make a contribution to the common defence of Western Europe.
These matters are now under discussion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and, as will have been seen from the Press to-day, the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers and the Military Committee met yesterday and reached agreement on recommendations to be submitted to the Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers of the North Atlantic countries who are meeting in Brussels early next week. I cannot anticipate

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their decisions, but I believe that final decisions will be taken there which will bring us nearer to our common aim, which is to ensure that the defences of the Western world are strong enough to deter aggression and thereby to ensure the preservation of peace and uphold the way of life in which we believe and for which we have already made so many sacrifices in the past.
I should also like briefly to mention the discussions on economic matters at Washington. The Prime Minister was most anxious to talk over with the President means of enabling us to bear the increasingly heavy burdens which our large defence programme is imposing on us. No effective defence effort is possible without a healthy economy, and one of the first essentials for this is an adequate supply of raw materials. The United Kingdom is being much hampered by a shortage of certain vital materials, notably zinc and sulphur. The United States, too, have their own difficulties, but the whole problem was fully discussed, and we are hopeful that arrangements resulting from these discussions will help us to get over the critical period.
But as well as remedying immediate shortages, it is vital to bring a lasting improvement in the raw material position. This is not a matter only for ourselves and the United States: every country in the world is affected by it. The fact must be faced that for some time to come there are going to be shortages, and we shall have to share supplies as evenly as possible. One of the first needs, clearly, is to increase supplies as and when we can. I am glad to say that agreement was reached at Washington that means of meeting this need should be fully examined, and the initial steps are already being taken to this end. It is hoped that as a result we shall be able to take speedy action in co-operation with the other countries concerned.
Then there is the question of the atomic weapon. As your Lordships will know, a partnership grew up during the war between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada on the development of the atomic weapon. By agreement between the Governments the exact nature of the arrangements has never been revealed. Your Lordships will also know that co-operation between the countries
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continues for certain purposes in the atomic energy field—for example, the results were recently made known of a Tripartite Conference on declassifying secret material relating to atomic energy. The position of the United States Government in many of these matters is now defined by legislation enacted in the United States since the war. But it was in the spirit of this partnership, and against that background, that the Prime Minister was able in Washington to raise the vital question of the use of the atomic weapon. As he said in another place, the Prime Minister is perfectly satisfied with the assurances which he received in that spirit and against that background.
I believe that your Lordships will wish me to say something about the attitude of His Majesty's Government to the Soviet proposal for a meeting of the four Powers. A meeting of the Ambassadors of the three Western Powers has recently been held in Paris, and they have drawn up a draft reply to the Soviet Government. This draft is now under final consideration. Beyond saying that it reflects the desire of all three Governments to consider all possibilities which might lead to a fruitful discussion with the Soviet Government, there is little that I can say at this stage about the contents of the draft. But I should like to assure your Lordships that the discussions in Paris revealed a general identity of view on this subject between the three Western Powers.
My Lords, in conclusion I will add only this. I am confident that this debate will demonstrate once again to the world the strength of our national unity; that it will show that both Parliament and people stand firmly with the Government in their determination to play their full part in building up the unity and strength of the peace-defending nations; and that this country is resolved to give continued loyal support to collective effort under the United Nations to deter aggression, to see the rule of law respected and to establish lasting conditions of peace and security.
2.57 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I should like first to thank the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, for the statement he has just made, with very much of which I imagine we shall all

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find ourselves in full agreement. As your Lordships know it is less than a month ago since we in this House held a debate on the foreign situation. But no one, I am sure, will regret that a further Motion has been put down on this subject, for during that month there have been two outstanding developments—one bad, and the other good—which have profoundly altered the position.
First, there has been the intervention on a massive scale by China in the Korean War. That, as I see it, is wholly bad, from a moral and from every other point of view. When we last debated these topics most of us—indeed, I think all of us—were uncertain what were China's intentions. We knew that they had large concentrations of troops on the Korean-Manchurian frontier, but we had no definite indications that they intended to use these in any warlike sense, unless the United Nations Forces showed signs either of carrying the war into Manchuria or of destroying the hydro-electric installations, which I understand are concentrated in that area. Now the Chinese plans have been more fully exposed. They were not defensive in character; they were offensive in the fullest sense of the word. China has entered the war on the side of North Korea. She has made her-self a party to the North Korean aggression. She has engaged, I do not say her whole strength, but certainly a vast amount of strength in an all-out effort to drive the forces of the United Nations at any rate beyond the 38th Parallel, and possibly out of the country altogether. That, I think we must all agree, is an event of a very formidable character. It has a profound bearing, not only upon the position in Korea itself but on the very existence of the United Nations. It has brought a general war appreciably nearer.
In such a situation as that, it seems to me that this duty of all of us, in what-ever part of this House we sit, is perfectly clear: it is to stand shoulder to shoulder in support of the world peace organisation. There has, I know, been a tendency in certain irresponsible quarters to try to unload responsibility for the present situation on somebody else—to blame General MacArthur; to blame the High Command in Korea; to try to find a scapegoat somewhere, any-where, for our recent setback. A deplorable example of this, I thought, was the
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speech of the Ministsr of Defence ten days ago which was so promptly and so rightly repudiated by his colleagues. The same, I think, is true of the speech last week-end of the Minister of Works, whose motto in future, if I may say so, might very properly be, "Works not words." If he took that as his guiding spirit, I think it would be a much happier position for us all. Indeed, one cannot help wondering why these Ministers, after such an exhibition as that, are allowed to continue to occupy, or indeed wish to retain, their present responsible positions in the Cabinet. They must have caused the greatest embarrassment to their own leader, the Prime Minister, in the delicate negotiations which he was conducting in Washington. Such effusions as theirs, and similar suggestions from some of the less responsible organs of the Press, can do nothing but harm to the cause of world peace, and I am sure that every one of us hopes that there will be no repetition of them. This is surely a time, if ever there was one, when each one of us, to whatever Party in the State he belongs, should do all in his power to avoid rocking the boat. And, so far as I can, I propose to try to follow that course to-day.
Happily, the recent reverses in Korea, however serious they may be in them-selves—and they are serious—have led to one good result, a result so important that it may well more than counterbalance our temporary setbacks. They have led to the visit of the Prime Minister to Washington, from which we are all happy to know that he has returned safely, and to his conversations with President Truman, of which he made a report in another place two days ago. None of us, I am sure, regrets that visit; indeed, if we have any regrets it is that it did not take place months ago, as many of us urged. The Government, I am sure, will forgive me if I say that I am afraid that time of supreme value has been lost by those months of delay. Although no doubt during this period extremely useful work has been done on the technical plane by Ministers and officials yet, when great decisions of policy have to be made, and above all when complete solidarity of view has to be proclaimed to the world, nothing can take the place of meetings of heads of Governments.
However, I do not want to indulge merely in carping criticism. The great

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thing is that the meeting has at last been held. I happen to have a family motto which reads: "Sero sed serio," which may be fairly, if somewhat freely, translated as meaning "Better late than never." That is certainly true in this case. Not only has the meeting been held, but it seems to have been followed by most fruitful results. In particular, as I see it, it has re-established three great principles as the basis of the joint policy of the two nations. These are stated in unequivocal terms in the communiqué which was issued after the meeting. I will quote the words of the communiqué. The first of these principles to which the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has already referred is this:
"The people of the United States and the United Kingdom will act together with resolution and unity to meet the challenge to peace."
The second is:
"The military capabilities of the United States and the United Kingdom should be increased as rapidly as possible."
And, to balance these two, there is a third principle:
"We shall do everything we can, through whatever channels are open to us, to seek a peaceful solution of existing issues."
If the United States and the United Kingdom live up to those principles, the way is now open to that balanced policy of firmness and conciliation which some of us advocated in the House a month ago.
I made bold to say on that occasion that I hoped that a not entirely negative reply would be sent to the Russian Note. I maintain that view most strongly. I still hope that in due course it may be possible to arrange a meeting with the Russian Government at the highest level, and however unpropitious the prospects may be—and I cannot say that I regard them as bright—I still feel that efforts should be made to see whether some basis of agreement can be discovered which might give a hope of relieving the present tension. But by an agreement I do not mean just any agreement, peace at any price; I mean a real, solid, enduring agreement, honourable to all concerned. An agreement that did not safeguard the vital principles and interests for which we stand would not be worth having; it would merely give to the British people an illusion of safety which would be more perilous than anything.
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But I would reemphasise that there are two essential prerequisites to that policy for breaking the present deadlock. The first is careful preparation. We, as well as the Russians, must have a world plan. We must know what we want, and have some idea of how it is to be achieved. Secondly, there must be complete unity between the Western Powers. And, finally, there must be intensified rebuilding of our defence forces, pending a successful outcome of negotiations. In short, we must be united and we must be strong; otherwise there is no possibility of talking to Russia on any basis of equality—and that is absolutely essential if fruitful results are to accrue. If any-one in this country thinks (and here I strongly agree with what has been said by Lord Henderson) that we shall increase the chances of an agreement with Russia by detaching ourselves from the United States, he is living in a world of illusion, and dangerous illusion at that. On the contrary, we should immediately bring war very near indeed. For that reason, I think we must all welcome the broad agreement of principles between Britain and the United States to which the Wash-ington talks have led, and the spirit of mutual confidence in which the conversations were conducted.
No doubt there were certain matters, matters very important in themselves, on which an identity of views was not attain-able. There are the twin questions to which Lord Henderson has referred—first the recognition of the Communist Government of China, and second, the admission of that Government to the Security Council, Your Lordships already know my views on this subject, and I have already said that I will try not to be controversial to-day, I know that I shall not convert the Government to my view, and they certainly will not convert me to theirs. But whatever views we may individually hold on this subject, I hope we shall all recognise that to take such steps at this very moment, when the Chinese are actually fighting United Nations, would be regarded, both in the United States and, I believe, throughout the Eastern world, as a flagrant example of appeasement out of weakness.
We have all welcomed the forthright declaration of the President and the Prime Minister that there "can be no thought

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of appeasement or of rewarding aggression." I can only hope that that declaration will guide the actions of His Majesty's Government on this and on other questions.
Apart from everything else, I would remind the Government that the strength of public opinion on this subject in the United States should alone make us pause in continuing to advocate a policy at this very juncture which is so abhorrent to them.
Lord STRABOLGI: There is public opinion here too.
The Marquess of SALISBURY: The noble Lord must face the fact, which I thought was universally recognised, that a united front between the United States and us is vital if war is to be avoided. That, to my mind, is the most important principle of British policy at the present moment. This danger of a split, or of a lack of sympathy leading to such a split, between English and American opinion was, as your Lordships will remember, my main preoccupation when the question of recognition was first discussed in this House. I agree that arguments can well be adduced in favour of de facto recognition of the Communist Government of China, even though I myself still hold the view, which may not be held by others, that there too it is vital to move step in step with the United States. I feel that if we had waited a little, and tried to get them to move along with us, our situation would be happier to-day. But in my belief, there is nothing to be said for having granted de jure recog-nition—and in spite of what the Minister of Works said in his speech last week-end, it was de jure recognition and not de facto recognition that His Majesty's Government granted to the Government of Mao Tse. As some of us warned the Government at that time, that act of de jure recognition was bound to mean the risk of driving a wedge between British and American opinions; and subsequent events. I would diffidently suggest to your Lordships, have tended only to confirm that view. The remark of the Prime Minister in the House two days ago, with reference to differences over China, that
"this point of difference only serves to emphasise the underlying unity of our objectives in world affairs as a whole,"
is, I am afraid, much too subtle for me.
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In these circumstances I would beg the Government, whatever their view—and I am not suggesting that they should alter their view in any way— to do nothing now, at this moment, when the United States are, after all, bearing the main burden of the fight in Korea, to increase the difficulties with which that country is faced. The same applies to Formosa, to which the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, also referred. I note that it was agreed at Washington that this matter should be referred to the United Nations. I am quite certain that is right. But it is equally vital that, when it comes up for discussion at the United Nations, as it must do at some time, we should not take up an attitude that is bound to cause friction between ourselves and our American Allies. I was not clear from the speech of the noble Lord exactly what the Government propose to do when this subject comes before the United Nations. I am not intending to press them to make a declaration to-day; but I would urge them to walk very carefully in this matter. I am sorry to continue to urge this point, but I feel that friendly relations between Britain and America are of such vital importance that they ought to take precedence over anything else. Moreover, in any case, of course, Formosa is only one facet of the whole Chinese problem. To deal only with Chinese admission to the Security Council or merely with Formosa might well be to pave the way to further difficulties later on.
I imagine that we all hope that the time will come, and will come soon, when more moderate counsels will prevail in China and Russia. Then a general settle-ment may become possible of all the outstanding issues between us and them, which might cover the question of entry into the United Nations, the Security Council and everything else. I am sure that is what we all want, and in my opinion, that should be the ultimate purpose of any cease-fire arrangement such as that to which the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, referred. But while the Chinese are actually in arms against us, to make concessions of this kind—and I would emphasise this in view of what the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has said— would be ultimately regarded as giving way to blackmail. That never pays anyone in the long run, and may go far to destroy the unity between ourselves and the United States.

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So much for the Far East; but, as the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, said, there are other matters of equal importance which were dealt with at the Washington meeting. There is the position in Europe. Here I think the references in the com-muniqué may fairly give solid ground for satisfaction. One might well have feared that the present preoccupations of the United States Government in the Far East would have diverted their eyes from the potentially greater perils on the European continent. Happily, it is now clear that that is not the case. The Government of the United States agree fully with us —and it is greatly to their credit, in my view, that they should do so—that Europe is the supreme danger spot. They have emphasised with us that every effort will be made to strengthen the forces of the Atlantic Treaty Powers in that area. I do not ask to-day for details which can-not be publicly given, but I think it is fairly evident that there was no difference at all between the two countries, at any rate on this aspect of world affairs. I hope that the machinery which is envisaged in the communiqué is already in operation to give effect to the conclusions which have been reached or, at any rate, very soon will be.
Arising out of these conclusions, it is evident that two matters came very much to the fore in the course of the discussions at Washington. First, there is the question, to which the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has already referred, of the fair allocation of raw materials upon which both the rebuilding of our defence forces and the provision of a healthy economy depend. With all deference to the noble Lord, I could not help feeling, as I listened to him, that in this particular sphere His Majesty's Government have been considerably at fault. I should have thought that they should have provided themselves with adequate supplies of these really vital materials long ago.
Lord STRABOLGI: By what means?
The Marquess of SALISBURY: By whatever means it could be done. I was in trouble with the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor in a recent debate over the question of one of the parables; but perhaps he would allow me to remind him of another, the Parable of the Wise and Foolish Virgins. The foolish virgins, I should have thought, might well
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have argued that the wise virgins had been (to use a fashionable phrase) stockpiling in oil, but I have never heard the wise virgins criticised by moralists on that account. No doubt it is very true that we and other European nations now find our-selves short of vital raw materials: but whose fault is that? If the Americans, with more foresight than we, have made better preparations than we have—
Lord CHORLEY: With more money than we have.
The Marquess of SALISBURY: It may be with more money, but we were taking quite a lot of money from them at the time and spending it on different objects. That is only evidence, in my view, that we started far too late to prepare ourselves for the present crisis. But, what-ever we may feel about that, it does not alter the fact that, if we are to rearm, we must have the means to do so. There-fore, I am extremely glad to know that steps are now being taken on an inter-national scale to increase the supply of, and I hope allocate, existing stocks of vital raw materials. No doubt, there are some of which there is a general world shortage. In other cases, it may be possible with existing stocks, to enable the whole of the Western World to play its part in the necessary steps to be taken. The communiqué does not say whether it is proposed to re-create the Joint Purchasing Board which did such good work during the war. I shall be glad of any information on that or any other machinery it is proposed to build up for this purpose.
Finally, there is the vexed question of the atom bomb, which is exercising the minds of so many of us at the present time. Here, if I may say so with all deference, I do not think the communiqué was quite so happy in its wording. The Prime Minister, with obvious gratification, said in his statement in another place two days ago that he was "completely satisfied" by his talk with the President on this subject. That in itself is very good, so far as it goes; but it is a statement of an extremely general character. I recognise that it is stated in the communiqué that the President will "inform" the Prime Minister of any changes in the situation which might call for the use of the atom bomb. That is, at any rate, something. But I confess that I should have greatly preferred that the word were not "inform" but "consult."

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After all, the atom bomb is different in one essential respect from any other weapon. Its use might entirely transform not only the military but the political situation. Its use, therefore, is not merely a military but a political act. If we in this country and the United States are to move together in a united foreign policy, I feel most strongly—and I speak as a wholehearted friend of the United States —that we should be taken into consultation before any decision is taken about actually dropping the bomb. I hope and believe—and I really do believe it from the Prime Minister's statement—that that, in fact, is what will happen. I believe that one must come to that conclusion from what the right honourable gentleman said in another place. In view of the obvious delicacy of this subject, I do not, therefore, intend to press the Government any further on this matter. But I wish that it had been more specifically dealt with in the communiqué.
My Lords, such, quite briefly, are the thoughts that arise to one's mind in considering this communiqué and the statement of the Prime Minister, which I will not say amplified it, but at any rate reaffirmed it. We all rejoice that the meeting has been held, and we all congratulate the Prime Minister on the part he has played. We are all glad that the meeting has led to such broad unity of view. The next step is to implement it. As I see it, nothing must stand in the way of this —no considerations on our side of the House of Party politics; no considerations on the part of the Government of their own popularity. Hard things will inevitably have to be done. New sacrifices will have to be imposed on all sections of our population. On their capacity to face facts, and not merely to do what is expedient in their own interests, both the Government and the Opposition will be judged. It is for us, on both sides of this House, to see that we do not fail.
3.24 p.m.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, I do not propose to attempt to cover so wide a ground as has been traversed either by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, or by the noble Marquess. I will limit myself to two matters, the events in Korea, and their consequences, and the question of the atom bomb. We all listened with great interest to the statement of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson. For my own
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part, I see nothing in it from which I should wish to dissent. I was proposing to make somewhat the same criticism as the noble Marquess—namely, that the visit of the Prime Minister has been so exceedingly useful that one regrets that it was not made earlier. It was rather a belated visit. Five years have passed since the two heads of Government met, and if it was possible to achieve so much so quickly might it not have been possible to avoid a good deal of harm by having the visit take place earlier? The noble Marquess quoted his family motto, "Better late than never." I was greatly interested in that. I presume that it is good Conservative doctrine to have just two alternatives in life: either you are late or else you do not start at all. One would have thought that there ought to be a third choice—to be in time. How-ever, it became evident that the British, and American efforts were a little out of gear at the highest level, and that difference has now teen put right. But there are some who think that there may be a case for an even better adjustment than there is to-day at the levels lower down. Whether that is so I cannot myself say, because I have no first-hand know-ledge in the matter. But I have been told that possibly in military, and almost certainly in economic, matters there is still room for an even closer adjustment, such as happily prevailed during the years of war.
The visit of the Prime Minister is another example of the great service to the world that is rendered by the very existence of the British Commonwealth, with its interests scattered all over the globe. The President and Pekin are wide asunder; but Mr. Truman can talk to Mr. Attlee; Mr. Attlee can talk to Mr. Nehru; and, in his turn, Mr. Nehru can talk to Pekin. And so we have that chain of communication which brings the whole world together and makes a general negotiation more possible. As the noble Marquess said, and as we all know and have emphasised again and again, it is vital that the United Kingdom and the United States should march together and should be in no way divided. At the same time, that does not imply that on no occasion should our own Government exercise an independent judgment on matters of policy. I do not think that the United States would wish that. Nor

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should we be so useful to the grand alliance if we did suppress our own clear conviction merely for the sake of avoiding any possible breach in unity.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I did not suggest that. What I said was that if we had not acted so precipitately there was a chance that we might have moved side by side with the United States possibly over de facto recognition, and that, I believe, would be more satisfactory.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: As has happened previously in our debates, I find to my regret that here I take a divergent view from that of the noble Marquess. I propose to deal with that point more fully. But we have to remember that, while on the one hand we are in the closest relation to the United States, on the other we are also in very close relation with India, and also with Australia, a country which at the moment is perhaps more vehemently anti-Communist than any other country in the Commonwealth. Yet Australia is most strong in favouring full recognition of China. Further, there are the interests of New Zealand and of Malaya, all of which have to be taken into account. As members together of the Commonwealth it would be most unfortunate if in the United Nations it were found that Great Britain took one course and India, Australia and most of the rest of the Commonwealth took the opposite course. That also is a factor not to be forgotten, and for my own part I believe that it is at all events possible—no one can speak with any assurance in hypothetical matters— that if China had been fully admitted to the comity of nations, and had been given a seat in the United Nations Security Council before any of these events occurred, very possibly there might have been no Korean affair at all. I say no more than that it is a possibility. But I go further, and say that on grounds of general principle it is essential for the successful working of the United Nations as an institution that its membership should be completed.
In his distinguished career the noble Marquess has rendered many useful ser-vices, but I think he will agree with me when I say that he has never rendered more useful service than in participating in the San Francisco Conference, which was the foundation of the United Nations.
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That was a great event in the history of the world. But would he have imagined at that time that if a great country like China was to be represented in the United Nations in the conditions that exist to-day, the Government of Chiang Kai-shek should have a seat and the Government of Pekin should be excluded—the Government of Chiang having no status except de facto occupation of Formosa? That in present circumstances is its only claim to sit in the Security Council and speak in the name of China. The Charter of the United Nations begins with words to this effect: "We, the representatives of the peoples of the world." Can the representative of the Chiang Government claim to fulfil that first requisite of a right to representation? At San Francisco the question arose whether it was better to have Russia a member, with a power of veto which she might exercise in her own interests, or whether it would be better to have the United Nations more homogeneous and to keep Russia out. The general consensus of public opinion there and throughout the world—certainly in this country—was that it was better that Russia should be in than aloof and apart. I do not believe at all in this principle of screened admission to the United Nations, as though we were choosing members for a select club. There are now fourteen countries which are not in the United Nations at all—
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble Viscount is moving now to another subject. Before he does so, I should like to ask him whether his argument is that China should have in the past been admitted to the United Nations and given a seat on the Security Council, or is it that at this moment she should be given a seat on the Security Council?
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My argument is purely general.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: It is entirely academic.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: It is not in the least academic, because it affects several other countries at the same time. They ought all to be dealt with, possibly simultaneously, and as a general rule. There ought to be no question of appeasing China, or of approving the Franco regime in Spain. There ought to be no question of Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania failing to shoulder their obligations with regard to

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human rights. These fourteen countries are now outside the United Nations. Three of them—Hungary, Bulgaria and Roumania, have been black-balled by us. Others have been black-balled in reprisal by Russia, among them such important countries as Italy, Eire and Switzerland, and everyone has black-balled Spain. That is really the principle of the one-Party Legislature—"Unless you agree with us in general, you shall not come into our Parliament at all." It is the totalitarian principle that everyone must conform to certain principles and that no one else should be allowed even to stand for election. It is not democratic. The democratic principle is that everyone should have equal rights, whether you agree with them or whether you do not.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I really cannot accept that. What the noble Viscount is saying is that it does not matter whether a nation sub-scribes to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or not; it ought in any case to be a member of the United Nations. I cannot agree to that. It is not a question of totalitarianism at all. It is a question whether a nation accepts certain basic standards of conduct for international behaviour.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: It is laid down in the Charter that the nations should be peace-loving.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: That does not apply to China.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: There is nothing even in the Charter about freedom-loving nations. The Russians would certainly claim to be in favour of what is their idea of democracy. If you say "Nothing of the sort," you are assuming a right to declare whether people should be allowed to consult with you. I think that the noble Marquess's principle is wrong from the very foundation. It is not our business to try to determine the character of the policies of all the countries of the world. Each one of us finds it hard enough to manage our own policies. If we say that we will not allow A, B, C, D, E, and F, to sit, that means that Russia will say: "In that case we will not allow H, I, J, K, L and M, to sit." This sort of thing has brought the United Nations into an impossible position. China is only one case among others. If China had at an earlier stage been given her rightful place
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—the present Government of China represents some 500,000,000 or 600,000,000 people—many of these difficulties would never have arisen. The question is, in fact, is the United Nations to be an alliance of anti-Communist States, or is it to be a Parliament of Man. That is the vital question. The danger would really come if Russia were formally to withdraw now from the United Nations and China were to refuse to join. That would be a great danger to the world. So far from China refusing to join, her exclusion is against her vehement protest, and it has been effected by the Western nations, principally by the United States. It is of vital importance that all should be got together for discussion in one room and round one table, in the full blaze of world publicity; and that they should there defend their causes at the table in a single organisation responsible to mankind as a whole. That, and that alone, is the general principle to be applied.
It is assumed, of course, that China, because she is Communist and Russia is Communist, will be a satellite of Russia in the United Nations, in the same way as the countries on the perimeter of Russia in Europe have proved to be very docile satellites. Those who know the Chinese people well do not believe that. The Chinese are a very proud people with an ancient civilisation; they had a high standard of culture when Russia was still in the depths of barbarism and Western Europe was not very much better.
A NOBLE LORD: And we also.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: I had the pleasure last year of taking part in the celebration, under the auspices of the Chinese Embassy and the Chinese Institute in London, of the 2,500th anniversary of the birth of Confucius. Confucius still remains, with his ethics, which include the Golden Rule, the author of one of the wisest of the ethical codes of mankind. If the Chinese are Communist to-day it is because they have been engaged in an agrarian revolution; in freeing the peasants of China from the misery, oppression and neglect which they have suffered for generations. In fighting that, they think that they are fighting for a holy cause, and I do not know that anybody is entitled to say they are wrong.
The Chinese also are lighting against foreign control. For generations their great country has suffered the indignity

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of continuous interference from Europe and of her people being regarded as mere barbarians. Therefore they are deter-mined to free themselves. After years of warfare, immense sacrifices and heavy casualties, this Party and these Armies have won their war and have established themselves. They are giving China probably a better administration than she has had for long years past. Then they find that when the destinies of States on their immediate border, such as Korea, are being settled, it is all to be done with-out taking any notice of them. They are not even to be invited to sit at the table on equal terms with others in order to decide these questions. Is it to be wondered at that they are indignant? The Chinese gave notice quite publicly to all the world that if the Forces of the United Nations advanced to the frontier of Manchuria, they would not be indifferent and would not stand aside. This was publicly proclaimed weeks ago. No notice was taken of that. So far as one can imagine, those responsible for the United Nations campaign regarded it as mere bluff and as a means of bringing diplomatic pressure to bear. It was nothing of the kind. The Chinese meant what they said, and they did what they had announced they would do. There is this to the good: they have informed the Indian Government that their wish is to stop fighting. They do not want a war à outrance, which is very wise.
As for the rather absurd fiction that their great armies, with all their organisation and equipment, are composed of volun-teers—which is a transparent figment— that also may be a good sign, because it seems to be implied that the Government of China do not want to be committed irretrievably to an international war, an official war against the Forces of the United Nations. They do not want to engage their prestige. They do not want to send the United Nations an ultimatum or almost to compel the United Nations to send them an ultimatum. They want to keep the situation fluid; and surely that is an excellent thing. Why should we not lend ourselves to this fiction, although we know that these people are not volunteers at all, and the Chinese know it, and know that we know it? There is a Chinese maxim—and many Chinese proverbs are exceedingly pithy and cogent, and some of them humorous—which says:
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"When a neighbour is in your fruit garden, inattention is the truest politeness."
So when we denounce this invasion from Manchuria into North Korea, they say with a bland smile, "Oh please, do not think we are so rude and unneighbourly as to invade North Korea, but the feelings of our people are so strong that we could not possibly restrain them from doing this. If you have something better to propose, then we will willingly consider it." Very well, if that is the way they want to approach the question, then let them approach it in that way: I do not think it will do any harm. The important thing is that the situation should be kept fluid and the clash between us not made so definite and obvious that it would be impossible for us to extricate ourselves from the situation without loss of prestige, either on one side or the other.
I have one other observation about these events, and it is this—and again I am speaking not necessarily of the single instance only but of this instance as one of the rules one can draw from the experience of history—it is very unfortunate when generals in the field assume the duty of making political pronouncements. The whole world is exceedingly grateful to the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the United Nations in Korea for the promptitude, the energy and, up to a point, the success with which he retrieved the situation at the beginning, before it became desperate; and no one would wish for a single moment to make him a scapegoat for the untoward events that have since occurred. But it is a sound rule that strategy and tactics require the military mind, and statesmanship requires statesmen. Our difficulties might have been less than they have been if there had not been some impulsive pronouncements which received world-wide attention and which did not, I think, command the assent of the United Nations as a whole, and certainly not of public opinion in this country. It should be remembered that it is legitimate for us to make these comments, if we believe them sincerely, because the Commander-in-Chief in Korea is not only the servant of his own Government and responsible to his own President, but is also the agent of all the nations of the United Nations, under whose flag he and his Forces are fighting.

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I turn now to my last point, which relates to the atomic bomb. This matter has been referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, and by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury; it has been included in their survey. I do not think the atomic bomb would have received so much attention at this juncture had it not been for an unfortunate observation by the President when he was undergoing that strange practice by which the head of the Government is submitted to cross-examination by newspaper reporters. A statement "slipped out," as The Times put it, which led the world to think that President Truman regarded the use of the atomic bomb as his personal responsibility, although he would be guided by the advice of the Commander-in-Chief. That probably was not his intention, but the thought that it was caused intense alarm and, I think one might say, justifiable alarm in this country, and no doubt elsewhere, because people thought that possibly next week, or possibly to-morrow, they would read that the United States had used the atomic bomb in the Korean campaign in order to get out of their grave difficulties there. The responsibility is not that only of the Com-mander-in-Chief; it is not that only of the President; it is not that only of the United Nations: it is the responsibility of the Parliaments of all Member States. And what is the responsibility of the Parliaments is the responsibility of the individual citizen. So every man's conscience is engaged, if the bomb is unleashed in this campaign.
The Prime Minister said that he is completely satisfied with the results of his conversations, and I accept that statement without hesitation. I do not agree with the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, that we should have wished him to say something more specific, because if he had done so it might have given rise to great political complications and difficulties, especially within the United States. Anything he might have said of a more definite character might have caused great controversy. For my own part, I feel certain that the Prime Minister would not have said, not only that he was satisfied, but that he was completely satisfied, with the assurance given to him, unless we could all feel at ease on that point.
With regard to the use of the atomic bomb at any time, and the policy to be
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pursued, there are many who think that there is nothing to be done; that wars are inevitable; that there always have been wars and always will be—we all know that miserable catch-phrase—and that the wickedness of man is such that no rules are of any use, no assurances are valid. It is said that once a war is started, all restrictions are laid aside and war becomes total war. Well, that is not true. It is not the case. We have had two great wars and that has not happened. The Geneva Convention of the International Red Cross has, on the whole, been observed. There have been many infractions but in the main it has been observed in both wars. In ancient times all prisoners were massacred almost as a matter of course. Read Thucydides, and the Old Testament, where it some-times say; "Put every man, woman and child to the sword." Look at the. Egyptian memorials and. you will see depicted upon them the piles of massacred soldiers conquered by the Pharaoh. But now that is not so; it was not even in Japan in the last war. I have a son who was a prisoner of war in Japan for nearly four years and he has no complaints to make, although we know that in other places in the Japanese theatre of war the grossest mismanagement and cruelty occurred. International Red Cross parcels were received by our prisoners in Germany. Many young men obtained university degrees because they had their books and were able to pass examinations while prisoners of war.
Taken as a whole, the Geneva Convention was observed. Prisoners had the help of the Red Cross everywhere. Hospital ships, brilliantly lit at night; travelled over all the seas of the world: a few were attacked, but an exceedingly small proportion. And when there were real crimes, when there were massacres, for the first time in history we had an international tribunal established, and this country had the honour of having one of our own Judges, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Oaksey, appointed as Chair-man, in which post ho rendered a most distasteful service most admirably and to the credit of us all. These men who were guilty—not only the lower agents, but those at the top—were sentenced to death and "hanged by the neck till they were dead." That is proof that the world will not tolerate unrestricted war. Therefore, I say that if the world wishes to prevent

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the use of the atomic bomb, it can do so, and I believe it will do so.
Let me take another example—namely, the use of gas. In the First World War poison gas was used. There was an Inter-national Convention at Geneva in 1925 which forbade the use of poison gas, and forty-five nations signed it, including all the great Powers except Russia. In the Second World War gas, for various reasons, was not used. The belligerents may have thought it was strategically useless, or they may have been afraid of reprisals—and probably were. But, also, the obligation was there. If there had not been that Convention, then on the first day of the war someone might have started using poison gas. So we may believe with regard to the atom bomb that there can be, and to my mind there should be, international control. I had a Resolution to put forward to your Lordships making that proposal. I did not bring it forward for debate because I found that there was a difference of opinion in the House, and it was evident that a declaration of difference of opinion here might do more harm than good. But certainly now that this matter is to be brought forward we ought to resume discussion of this problem, which has been before the United Nations for three years, and come to a solution.
Nobel, the fiftieth anniversary of whose death was being commemorated lately, wrote, as was quoted recently in The Times:
"I wish I could produce a material or a machine so terrifyingly destructive on a large scale that war would become completely impossible."
It may be that there is some force in that observation, so long as we do not hasten to use that terrible weapon. If Hitler had succeeded in discovering the principle of the atomic bomb and making that appliance; if he had been able to use it in 1942, 1943 or 1944 when he was hot on the track; if those bombs had been dropped here in London, and this precinct, the Abbey, Westminster Hall and St. Pauls had been levelled to the around and per-haps 500,000 or 1,000,000 killed; and if the same had happened in Paris and New York, I am not so sure that those of us (if any) who had survived or our successors, if we were now meeting in some other place, would discuss the ethics, the strategic value or the political usefulness
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of the atomic bomb with quite the same calm detachment, weighing all the pros and cons, which we find in this House to-day. It is said that the atom bomb must be used as the only effective defence of Western civilisation. I am profoundly convinced that if the atom bomb is used it is more likely to lead to the disintegration and destruction of Western civilisation than any other one thing could do. It might conceivably win a speedy victory for one party in a war. But what would happen in the war of revenge that would come afterwards?
What is now the course that we should desire to see taken in these matters? I feel that we should probably agree that what has to be done should be done by stages, as in the case of Germany in 1945 and the following years. First, if we can, we should get an immediate cease-fire, in order to save life. Then we should start negotiating, and not wait to negotiate until the other party has agreed beforehand to our main terms. That is what either party is frequently tempted to do: to say, "We will talk to you, but of course, it is to be understood as a preliminary that you must agree with us in this, that and the other." Such a course is almost impossible, and makes it unlikely that negotiations can even be begun. As for the atom bomb, that should be included in the discussions, but, to my mind, no pledge of any kind that we would surrender the use of the atom bomb should be given unless there was a general international under-standing. I do not think we should take action unilaterally. I am not one of those who think that our scientists are doing a wicked thing in continuing the production of atom bombs. On the contrary, they are doing their patriotic duty and enabling us to stand up against aggression if it should come to an actual conflict.
Formosa should also be included, not perhaps in the first negotiation, but with a view to later settlement. We ought not to pledge ourselves to return Formosa to China at once until we are assured that she will no longer be aggressive. On the other hand, we should not pro-claim our intention to sustain the Government of Chiang Kai-shek at all costs and indefinitely. In the statement that has been made by the Prime Minister and the President it says that they think the question of Formosa should be dealt with by the United Nations. To that we should all subscribe. Indeed, it is

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in the United Nations that our hopes must rest. If there had been no United Nations, now and before now there would have been open, widespread war in the Balkans, in Indonesia, in the Middle East and perhaps elsewhere. The very pivot of the policy of Britain and the Commonwealth is still to lend their utmost support to the peacemaking efforts of the United Nations.
3.59 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: My Lords, it is always a pleasure to listen to the wise and persuasive words of the noble Viscount who has just spoken, and the present occasion has been no exception. The Prime Minister's visit to America and his talks with President Truman have underlined the crucial importance of the partnership of the United Kingdom and the United States within the framework of the United Nations. Together we must stand, but it must be within the framework of the United Nations. At the same time, Britain's responsibilities for leadership side by side with the United States are beyond doubt. What Britain can give in wisdom, experience and frankness to the common cause is of inestimable worth.
As Chairman of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches, I have during the last two weeks been in close touch with representatives of Churches in the United States. Their attitude and that of Churches in Great Britain to this intervention of China is once again very similar. It is also clear that the influence of the Churches on political leadership in the United States is an influence for moderation and restraint. Like us, they are seized of the importance of building up the strength of the whole free world, as the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, put it; and they are also convinced that, grave as the position is, a Third World War is not an inevitable event. At the same time, as the communique itself says, we must not expect any easy or quick solution to the crisis, and we are obliged to anticipate that the struggle, in one form or another, is likely to be prolonged. If we are bent upon creating a world atmosphere in which conflicting ideologies can compete peacefully, we cannot expect a speedy conclusion. We must guard against impatience. It is largely because of this lack of patience that some contend that Communism can be successfully
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fought by military power alone. If there were to be a global war, the result of such a war, even if we were victorious, would probably be to spread Communism far more quickly and more widely than has been possible hitherto through the Soviet tactics of infiltration and deception.
One of the wisest courses for which American churchmen are contending with their own political leaders is an avoidance of unilateral action which rejects a moral judgment as reflected by the majority opinion in the United Nations. All the members of the United Nations, small and great, are involved in the conflict and the responsibility. The United States undoubtedly possesses vastly preponderant power, but its leadership in a United Nations undertaking of such vast significance should cause it to submit its actions to full international consultation and decision. The day when one member nation, however powerful, true to the principles of the United Nations, has the right by itself to declare war on another is past.
Again, it seems to me that we must guard against the prejudice which refuses to see evil wherever it exists, whether on the side for which the United Nations is engaged or on the side of the enemy. Distinctions of this kind whether between good and bad in the enemy, or between unjust actions and just actions on the side on which we are engaged, are proverbially hard to make. But let me give an illustration. The United Nations action in promptly resisting North Korea's aggression was plainly right. But approval of that action cannot be taken to cover also subsequent mistakes or injustices. An humane and un-prejudiced public opinion is bound to be shocked by atrocities committed by South Koreans no less than those perpetrated by North Koreans, and it is our duty to insist that our principles of law and justice are applied equally in both North and South Korea. I think it should be plain, too, that approval of United Nations' action does not carry approval of the total programme of the South Korean leader, Syngman Rhee; care will have to be taken to secure, for example, that the benefits of land reform effected in North Korea should be considered in the end, though the injustices in the process of instituting those reforms are not to be passed over. Also, pro-

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vision should be made for North Koreans freely to exercise their electoral right in determining the Government of a free and unified Korea.
This leads on to the duty, where just cause is shown, of our own Government and that of the United States, and also of the United Nations, to review their policy, especially as that policy may apply to particular situations. On our side, we should always show ourselves ready for open-minded and effective negotiations. No doubt the conditions upon which such negotiations could commence are of first importance, but we should leave no doubt in the Com-munists' minds as to our readiness to enter into negotiations, as to the character of our conditions and our awareness of the need of moderation. Surely, we must keep in the very forefront of our consideration the suffering Asiatic countries themselves—the desolation of Korea, and the future of Korea and its neighbours. I personally am very glad that the Prime Minister made so plain the British view about the Pekin Government's member-ship of the United Nations. I do not wish to involve myself in the controversy between the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, and the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. I will content myself by saying that I am wholeheartedly on the noble Viscount's side, and I hope that the United States will be able in the end to agree to the persuasion of our Prime Minister.
Further, it seems to me that we ought to review again the implications of resistance to North Korean aggression—how far resistance ought to go or to have gone—and we ought to be willing to consider some alternative method such as —as a temporary measure, and until complete unification is possible—the creation of a neutral strip under the United Nations. We ought also, as fair-minded and wise people, to be ready to give full consideration when offers are made by the smaller member nations— Asiatic and Arab—to negotiate differences between the greater Powers, and to show our readiness also to respond to proposals by Soviet Russia which may hold promise of an effective solution. Above all, it is necessary to keep a firm hold on moral perspective and political wisdom. When imminent danger faces them, people
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quickly cast reason and judgment to the winds. We have to take long-term views, build for the distant future; and we must take warning from the immensely in-creased difficulties confronting the Allies, arising, as many feel, from the demand for unconditional surrender in the Second World War and the policy of obliteration bombing—a policy which, whatever else may be said about it, is the subject of continual controversy and doubt among historians and students of war at the pre-sent time.
This question of moral perspective is acutely raised by the atomic bomb. No paragraph in the communique was more closely scrutinised than that which said:
"The President slated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb."
The communique went on to speak of the President's desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed. Atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs involve force and destruction of life on so terrible a scale as to imperil the very basis on which law and civilisation can exist. It is imperative that atomic energy should be controlled by an international agreement, and that the use of atomic bombs should be forbidden, but at present the efforts of the United Nations Commission to find a way are opposed by Soviet Russia, while the proposals of Soviet Russia are opposed by other members of the United Nations. As these are the two parties most involved, agreement seems far off.
There arises, therefore, the question referred to by the noble Viscount at the end of his speech—namely, what is the right policy for people to take before international agreement? In a situation which is so deeply beset with difficulties, every man's conscience, as the noble Viscount said, is engaged. The Prime Minister asks that, if it is used, the atomic bomb should be used only with the agreement of the United Kingdom. On any reasoning, unilateral action by the United States Government in so tremendous a choice cannot be right. But a further question lies behind: can it be right in any circumstances to use the atomic bomb against people who have not used it against us? War generally has developed rapidly in the direction of total war, but there are two meanings to the term "total war," and these can be distinguished. The

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first meaning of total war is that all human and material resources are mobilised when hostilities break out. The whole nation, both military and civilian, is involved in this kind of total war, and that cannot be avoided if we have war at all. But total war also has a second meaning. In this meaning, total war is a war in which all moral restraints are thrown aside and all purposes of the community are fully controlled by sheer military expediency. We must recognise that the greater the threat to national existence the greater will be the temptation to subordinate everything, all civil rights, belief of con-science, all moral judgments regarding means to be used and all consideration of post-war international relations, to the single aim of military victory. It is, I believe, impossible for the humane-minded man to consent to total war in this sense.
The only justification that war has is that it offers a possibility of achieving a moral result (however imperfect) to pre-vent an overwhelming moral evil, and to offer a new opportunity for men to live in freedom and decency, and in just and merciful relationships. The way we fight and the means we use are of crucial importance. The dilemma, then, with which our statesmen are faced is very grave. Is the atomic weapon not to be used, as a preventive of further evil, against nations who have immense military power and use it to the full, but who have not used the atomic bomb against us? The argument is that our use of the atomic bomb is the only means of preventing the imposition of world tyranny, but it is not a foregone conclusion that it is the only means. Its first use by us, involving a counter-use by our enemy, would be be-yond all doubt a signal for a holocaust of destruction, desolation and horror be-yond the grasp of our imagination.
The atomic bomb may or may not be different in kind from other weapons of mass destruction, but the difference in scale is vast, and recourse to the atomic bomb may properly be described as an immeasurable sacrilege against nature and against the human personality. It is not only the physical but the psycho-logical and the moral consequences of its use that are unpredictable. The moral revulsions which its first use on United Nations initiative—I stress the words "first use" and "initiative"—would create in the minds of those most deeply
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devoted to the cause of freedom and justice would far outweigh the immediate apparent military gain. We ought to consider the Asiatic countries, India and the rest. A great deal of Asia is on our side. The attitude of many countries in Asia to the first use of the atomic bomb by the United Nations would be an attitude of deep disapproval, melancholy and despair. We cannot afford to take an action which would so deeply repel them.
I am not claiming that Britain and America should refrain from making or possessing atomic bombs so long as hostile Powers make and possess them. Although I would urge that one of the most important elements in an overall settlement of outstanding international problems is an international agreement for the control of atomic energy, and the prohibition of atomic bombs and the inspection of atomic plant, what I am claiming is that in no circumstances should the British and the Americans, and their associates in the United Nations, take the initiative in using the atomic bomb against people who have not used it against them.
4.20 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, like other noble Lords who have spoken, I should like to express a universal gratitude to the Prime Minister for the visit he has made to the United States of America and for the general agreement which he has been able to achieve with the President. I do not agree with the noble Marquess or the noble Viscount that this visit should have taken place earlier. I think it took place at the right psychological moment, and if it had taken place earlier it might very well have misfired. I feel that most of us would like to examine what was the purpose of the Prime Minister's visit and see the extent to which he has succeeded. I hope that if in these very critical times some of us speak fearlessly and frankly, and not in terms of complete agreement with everything that has been said or done, we shall not be accused by the noble Marquess of "rocking the boat." I can assure the noble Marquess that my ultimate objectives are very much the same as his; and even if I do not agree with the methods by which we are going to try to attain those objectives. I am not rocking the boat.
What were the purposes of the meeting, so far as most of us who were anxious

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that the meeting should take place are concerned? I think it was largely two-fold. We hoped that the Prime Minister and the President would arrive at an understanding as to how we could cut across the international difficulties which had over-set us. The easy way, of course, is to make war, but nobody wants that. What alternatives were open to us? How could we approach the Soviet Union or China and get some form of discussion? I think most people who welcomed the Prime Minister's visit to America hoped that somehow a discussion between the Prime Minister and the President would provide an answer to that question. Secondly, a great many people felt that it was necessary to exercise some restraining influence over the hysteria, in the case of a great many people in the United States, which was making itself felt throughout that country and endangering the peace of the world.
I feel that it is necessary to judge the joint statement in the light of the success with which it has met in dealing with those two objectives. I personally can-not help feeling a sense of some disappointment at the joint statement, not so much in its recital of objectives as in its general tone, spirit and emphasis. It strikes me as being much more devoted to steps for increasing and coordinating our arms and our weapons of war than to steps for securing some kind of negotiation. It gives me the impression that the Prime Minister and the President have reconciled themselves more or less to the position that negotiations are hopeless and that war is inevitable. It also accepts the view, by implication, that in such a war we must inevitably fight both the Soviet Union and China. On this latter point I agree very much with the noble Viscount, that it is by no means certain that the Soviet Union and China are inextricably united.
The noble Viscount has dealt with the matter from the cultural point of view, but there is the point of view of self-interest. There are a great many points of potential conflict between China and the Soviet Union. I need only mention a few—Port Arthur, Dairen, the China-Changchun Railway, Tsing-kiang, where there is a common frontier of over 1,000 miles, the question of Manchurian equipment and a great many other problems of that kind
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which, in spite of the Treaty which was made last February, still remain unsolved in their essential details. The Treaty pro-vides, for instance, that Port Arthur and Dairen are to be surrendered to China by 1952, but it leaves open the terms upon which that surrender is to take place. There are many other questions of that kind which remain unsettled between China and the Soviet Union. In my judgment, we make a very great mistake in assuming that inevitably China and the Soviet Union must fight together.
We also appear to be ignoring the fact of China's present economic position. She is desperately short of practically every kind of raw material and of food, especially rice. Her production in the industrial area of Manchuria is only about 30 per cent. of what it was before the war. She has sought help from Russia and, under a treaty which was made last February, China is being provided with a credit of 300,000,000 dollars over a period of five years, which is really a drop in the ocean compared with China's requirements. Apparently that is the utmost help she can expect from the Soviet Union. It represents in terms of money less than the amount of Marshall Aid which we have received from the United States in the past six months. Therefore, there are immense possibilities of creating good will between ourselves and China through her normal necessities of life and through her requirements of raw materials. I very much fear that the attitude which is being taken—and with which, I am happy to say, we do not altogether agree—is likely to throw China into the arms of the Soviet Union, whether or not she wants to go.
I should like to make one or two comments in detail on the statement which has been published. I do not want to read the statement as a legal document, but one must assume that it has been carefully prepared and that it means what it says. One of the objectives stated in this document is that "it is intended to advance the democratic way of life." If it had said "to protect our democratic way of life," it would have been perfectly correct and could not possibly be criticised; but to "advance it" sounds as if we were presuming to dictate to other countries what should be their way of life. How are we proposing to advance our democratic way of life? Is it by propaganda?

1017
This document is not a statement of the propaganda principles that we and the United States should follow. As I read it, it assumes that, if necessary, these objectives will be carried out by all the means open to us. Surely, the very thing that we are criticising the Soviet Union for is endeavouring to spread their way of life; yet here we ourselves are saying that it is our objective to spread our democratic way of life. If we do not mean that, then in is a pity that the document has been phrased in that way. Does my noble friend wish to say something on that point?
LORD STRABOLGI: I did not mean to interrupt the noble Lord; I was speaking to my noble friend beside me. But as the noble Lord has given way, I said that it could also mean that we meant to improve our own way of life.
LORD SILKIN: I doubt whether it was necessary for the Prime Minister to go to the United States for that purpose. It did seem to me that it could be interpreted by the Soviet Union, who are already in a sufficiently suspicious frame of mind, as meaning that we are proposing to endeavour to impose upon them our conception of democracy.
The other question is Formosa. In this respect the joint statement seems to me to be quite inconclusive. After all, we and the Americans have twice declared, at Cairo and at Potsdam, that Formosa is to form part of China. We ourselves have recognised the present Chinese Government. On what ground, then, do we suggest that this is a matter which should be left to the United Nations? It seems to me inexplicable. Obviously, we cannot dictate to the United States what their action should be, but surely we ought to have the courage of our own convictions, and be prepared to carry out our own principles and what we believe to be right. It seems to me to be running away from the issue to suggest that, in spite of the recognition of China, and in spite of these statements twice made, at two separate Allied conferences, we are not expressing our opinion but are proposing to leave this question to the United Nations.
I do not propose to follow the right reverend Prelate or the noble Viscount in their statements about the atomic bomb. The paragraph in the joint statement is a little vague and inconclusive but, like the
1018
noble Viscount, I am prepared to accept that as being, perhaps, a diplomatic way of suggesting that it is impossible to be more definite about it; and if the Prime Minister really is satisfied, in spite of the way in which it is put, that there is no question of using the atomic bomb on the authority of one member of the United Nations only, and that we shall be fully consulted before any question of using it arises, then I am satisfied. What is the policy that we ought to adopt? I feel that there ought to be greater readiness to negotiate without any preliminary conditions at all. I know how difficult that is. I noticed that the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, said that, and then proceeded to set out a number of conditions upon which we should insist before negotiating.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: I think I mentioned only conditions which we should abstain from urging.
LORD SILKIN: I think that when the noble Viscount comes to read his speech he will find that it set out certain things upon which we ought to insist before we negotiate. I do not wish to misconstrue the noble Viscount, but that is how I understood him. I feel that the only hope-ful way in which we can really get down to negotiations with the Soviet Union or China, is to enter into these discussions without any conditions at all. I noticed that some weeks ago the Foreign Secretary made a statement that he would require some evidence of the sincerity of the Soviet Union before he was prepared to negotiate —for instance, that they should sign the Treaty with Austria. We must always bear in mind that this suspicion, this doubt, is not unilateral, but that, rightly or wrongly (I am sure wrongly, but at any rate quite definitely), the Soviet Union and China are as suspicious of us—and perhaps even more of the United States—as we are of them. In those circumstances, if we really desire to negotiate it is absurd to ask them to give us evidence of their sincerity, and to assume that there is no obligation upon us to give evidence of ours. I think it is much wiser to leave this evidence alone, to let the negotiations take place and let them speak for themselves as to whether or not there is sincerity.
Moreover, my Lords. I am afraid that we are getting somewhat intimidated by the use of the word "appeasement." Appeasement has a definite significance. Of course it is appeasement to give away

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another country in order to secure temporary peace; but it is not appeasement to be ready in the interest of peace to make concessions without sacrificing one's principles. If I may say so, there is a good deal of nonsense spoken about appeasement—as if any offer or any con-cession that we may make is to be regarded as appeasement. In the interests of peace we may well have to make con-cessions. If you consult the people of this country I can assure you that they would feel it well worth while in the interests of peace to make a great many concessions, so long as they are not con-cessions of principle. I feel that we are much too modest in regard to this question. We are hopelessly underestimating our own influence—I do not know whether it is the effect of having had to accept help from the United States of America for some years. We still have a great influence throughout the world, even in some of the Eastern countries that are regarded as satellites of the Soviet Union. They still pay very great attention to what we say and what we think. And if we are prepared to take the lead, do what we think is right, and do not necessarily act as if we were in the wagon behind the United States; if we have a mind and a will of our own, and a policy of our own, we shall find that we shall meet with a great deal of support throughout the world, and that we shall be able to exercise a great deal of influence. I do not mean by that, necessarily, that we should act as a bridge between the Soviet Union and the United States. I feel, by and large, that our interests do lie with the United States, and that we have got to try to carry them with us and agree with them all along the line. But it is not necessary for us to agree with them automatically; and it is not, as the noble Marquess said, "rocking the boat" if one expresses disagreement even in the strongest possible terms.
I believe that true responsibility for the peace of the world to-day rests on us and on the British Commonwealth. I think that we alone can preserve it. We certainly must try, and we have to be willing, if necessary, to make concessions. It may be that, in the last resort, we shall have to fight, and we must be ready for that. In any case, we seem to be in for a long period of rearmament. I wish to stress to your Lordships the
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fact that we have to pay great attention to the morale of our people. They have had eleven and a half years' experience of shortages, deprivations and high cost of living. Some people are already saying that these burdens are almost unbearable to-day, and we are told in all quarters that we are in for even more difficult times. I believe that our people will, nevertheless, be prepared to face these greater difficulties if they are satisfied we are not standing on our dignity, and that everything possible has been done by us to prevent this catastrophe which is threatening the world. In these circumstances, I beg His Majesty's Government to be courageous, to be fear-less. I beg them not to be afraid to express their own opinions, not to be afraid at times even to disagree with the United States of America, and, if necessary, to take the lead in trying—possibly for the last time—to hold out the hand of friendship and fellowship to those who are at the moment our opponents. Let us not forget the Chinese maxim which enjoins us to behave to our enemies as if one day they will be our friends.
4.43 p.m.
VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: My Lords, like the noble Lord who has just spoken, and, indeed, like every noble Lord who has taken part in this debate, I begin what I have to say by admitting unreservedly the value of the Prime Minister's journey. It is a definite gain to have it categorically stated by the Prime Minister and by the President of the United States that the Western front is a decisive front, that the President and the Prime Minister agree over the use of the atom bomb, and that, whilst there is to be no surrender in Korea, both the United States and the United Kingdom are ready for any negotiation that is likely to lead to good results. But behind this considerable field of agreement there are, obviously, certain very important differences not yet harmonised.
There is the question—to which attention has already been given this afternoon —of the recognition of the Pekin Government, and of its entry into the United Nations; and there are certain other questions connected with the future of China. The fact that these very substantial difficulties still exist make it very important that we here in the United Kingdom, to whatever Party we belong,

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should approach these questions with the greatest caution, with the greatest prudence and with the greatest reticence. There is still, even after the Prime Minister's visit, much inflammable material left upon the ground, and it might well be that a spark irresponsibly thrown into the arena might break the unity of the Anglo-American front and play the game of the Soviet and our opponents in the United Nations. On that account, I do most heartily support what my noble friend Lord Salisbury said at the beginning of this debate, that Ministers must be extremely cautious in their public statements. I am not going to repeat what he said about certain recent speeches—the speeches, for instance, of the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Works—but I would commend to Lord Henderson and to the Lord Chancellor the plan that was adopted before the war, which I believe worked very well, that when Ministers who were not connected with the Foreign Office wished to make speeches about foreign affairs they should send the script of their speeches to the Foreign Secretary and so make certain that what they were proposing to say did not cut across his policy. I say no more than that upon this point to-day. I emphasise only in a sentence the need for the greatest caution in view of the fact that the international atmosphere is extremely sensitive and extremely inflammable.
That being so, I would venture to approach some of these questions that we have been discussing this afternoon not upon the lines of the greatest resistance but upon the lines of the least resistance. I would avoid for the time being questions that are likely to divide the Americans and ourselves. I may be pessimistic, but I take the view that negotiation over the entry of the Pekin Government into the United Nations at this moment is not going to succeed—I say that frankly. I hope that I am wrong, but I believe that it will not succeed. If this is so, I would not concentrate our attention upon that matter; I would concentrate our attention on certain other aspects of the problem upon which, it seems to me, there is more likely to be general agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom. In particular, I would begin at this moment at the military end in Korea.
1022
Listening to the debate this afternoon, it seemed to me that some of the observations which have been made have been made almost in vacuo, and their speakers have not realised the fact that in Korea we, the Americans and the United Nations are involved in a very grim military operation, an operation in which our American friends have suffered very heavy casualties. We are profoundly thankful that the situation at present does not look so desperate as it appeared a fortnight or three weeks ago. None the less, it is still filled with great danger. To my mind, the first need at this moment is to make certain, whatever may be the eventual end of military operations in Korea, that they do not end in disgrace or disaster for the United Nations. Let us remember that we still have great military advantages. I feel that perhaps in recent weeks we have been apt to underrate them. We have the undisputed command of the sea, and we still have the undisputed command of the air. Further than that, we still possess, in the areas of the United States and the Commonwealth, great resources of which China is in urgent need. Let us not forget these great advantages, and let us make certain that, whatever may happen with any negotiation, we make sure of the military situation.
At the same time, let us look with great sympathy at the efforts of the Government of India and of the Asian States. Even though, as I believe, their efforts may not end in immediate success, I take the view that it is a gain of great value that this group in Asia and the Middle East is making its influence felt, and is showing for the first time in the Continent of Asia that there is a third force besides the forces of the Europeans and the Soviet. I hope that I have said enough to make the point I am trying to emphasise—namely, that if I am right in thinking that in present circumstances negotiation is not going to succeed, that is no reason why we should not concentrate on the points upon which we are agreed and make certain at least that the first stage, success in the military operations, is not endangered.
I take much the same view with the many problems connected with the future of Germany. I imagine that the Prime Minister and the President discussed at some length the future of Germany, and

1023
particularly the question of German re-armament. I have noticed, and I suppose other noble Lords have noticed, with satisfaction that in the discussions among officials that have recently taken place a certain measure of agreement seems to have been reached upon the question of German rearmament. I hope that upon a higher stage they may also succeed; but there, too (and again I am afraid noble Lords will feel that I am approaching all these questions from a pessimistic angle), I am doubtful whether in present conditions, and in the immediate future, they will succeed. I well remember—as, no doubt, do many other noble Lords— the years between the two wars, when successive British Governments made effort after effort to reconcile the French demand for security with the German demand for equality. We made these efforts year after year, and in the end what really happened was that we embroiled ourselves with both France and Germany, and we gave the impression to our potential enemies of a disunited front.
Looking at these German proposals without any official knowledge and simply as a spectator, it seems to me that France and Germany are a long way from agreeing to anything we could call a settlement. The Powers of the Brussels Union and the Atlantic Pact have agreed upon certain proposals for a limited Ger-man contingent for a Western Army. And we shall see whether the Germans regard that as a proposal which they can accept. I am afraid that, if they do accept it, they will merely take it as a palliative for the moment on which to base some further proposal. Looking back at the experience before the war, I am inclined to think that the wise course is not to press questions of this kind, when it is unlikely that a fundamental settlement will be reached, but to leave them for the moment, hoping for a better atmosphere in the future, rather than to press constant irritants between the countries of the Western Union.
Meanwhile, our duty is obvious: to press on upon the points of agreement, and to press particularly the need for much more extensive and swift Anglo-American rearmament. If the Anglo-American forces could to-day be much stronger in Europe than they are, a great
1024
deal of the fears and suspicions now excited by German and French policies would be removed. One of the troubles of the past was that we were not strong enough, and therefore the French were all the more nervous of Germany. The same kind of situation exists to-day. Perhaps to-day the French are more nervous of Russia than they are of Ger-many. The Germans are asking them-selves whether it is to their advantage to come into a system that cannot give them any reasonable guarantee of security. The answer to these suspicions and hesitations is an Anglo-American force in Europe so strong that it will give a confidence in France and Germany which at present does not exist.
That brings me to a theme that I have pressed time after time in this House— namely, the need for a much more vigorous programme of rearmament than we have had hitherto. It may be that my information is now out of date; it may be that in recent months we have made considerable progress. In any case, I have expressed the urgency time after time. Our difficulty is that we know nothing about what is happening. We do not know to what extent the increases foreshadowed by the Minister of De-fence in the debate in the House of Commons in September are being carried into effect. We do not know whether the programme that he foreshadowed for the early months of next year will be fulfilled. We know a little about the small number of divisions that are being formed, the almost negligible reinforcement that we are making to the armies in Germany; we know one or two things about ships that are building, but we know nothing about what I believe to be the predominant arm in Western Europe, the air arm. I do not intend to turn this debate into a rearmament debate; I merely say that it is rearmament swift and sufficient which is the answer, at any rate at the present moment, to many of these questions that are otherwise discussed in vacua. I say to the representatives of the Government to-night that, whilst we cannot press them upon this point further in this debate, I hope very much that this House will have an early opportunity after Christmas of having a full debate upon this question, and will then be able to obtain at any rate some of the information that is at present lacking, without which it is impossible for

1025
the Government, or anyone else, to raise a great national movement behind the rearmament programme.
5.3 p.m.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, be-fore I make the comment or two which I will eventually make on the interesting speech of the noble Viscount, I want particularly to hank the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition. Whenever we have a Foreign Affairs debate in this House and the noble Marquess leads off, as he speaks I feel the years falling off my shoulders; I get younger and more combative in spirit, and when he has finished I feel thirty years younger and full of fight. I feel like that to-day. I am glad he is here on this occasion so that I can make a comment about his speech. I agree very much with the noble Viscount's remarks about German rearmament, and one or two other matters, and I want to support his plea for a full dress debate in the House on the question of arms. The noble Marquess also delighted me by his extraordinary remarks in criticising His Majesty's Government for lack of foresight in stockpiling raw materials. We have been hearing for months from his Leader and his colleagues, and I presume from himself, though I have not followed closely his speeches outside this House, about the iniquities of hampering trade and putting shackles and unnecessary controls on private enterprise. Stockpiling means the control of all raw materials from the beginning. This is a case of "Satan rebuking sin." The noble Marquess cannot have it both ways. He can-not demand, "Set the people free "—and I suppose he supports his Leader in an-other place in that parrot cry—and, at the same time, suggest that this most stringent of all controls, stockpiling and Government bulk purchase and accumulation of raw materials, should have taken place.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am glad to hear that the noble Lord agrees with me to-day but I am sorry that his own Party have not lived up to that.
LORD STRABOLGI: I do not agree with the noble Marquess. I think His Majesty's Government were right in the first place. We had not the necessary free currency, and dollars particularly, to stockpile, and, for another thing, we should have stimulated this artificial boom in the price of raw materials which is hampering manufacturers and mercantile
1026
operations all over the world. The Government were right and the noble Marquess is wrong both ways. There is another comment I think it desirable to make on the noble Marquess's speech. I am touched by his solicitude for American public opinion. I am not sure it would not be a good thing to send the noble Marquess on a lecture tour through the Middle West of the United States. But there is such a thing as British public opinion as well, and. on this particular matter of China, public opinion in Britain, I can assure him, if he does not know it already, is very strong indeed. The democracies have tremendous ad-vantages. They always begin badly in war but they last longer in spirit and they win in the end. But you have to carry your democracies with you, especially if you are going into total war; and you have to pay attention 10 public opinion in this country. I think if we show a little healthy independence, as Lord Silkin suggested, it may not be misunderstood in America and may do a great deal of good.
I am sorry that Lord Samuel has been called out of the House. I am sure many of your Lordships were delighted with his speech, and I should have liked to congratulate him on making it when he was obviously suffering from a bad cold. I hope the noble Earl, Lord Perth, has counselled him to go home early: he cannot afford to play any tricks with his health In this uncertain weather. I find myself agreeing with several of the sentiments expressed by the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, who describes the international situation as sensitive and inflammable. I think that is perfectly true. We have been hearing a great deal about a cease-fire in Korea. I wish there could be a truce to abuse between nations on both sides. The continual abusing and insulting that goes on is, I am certain, doing nothing but harm. A plea has been made by Premier Nehru for some sort of "cease-fire" of the insults and abuse. I wish we could have that and I wish it could start in your Lord ships' House. A good deal of harm has been done by insulting speeches from he other side of the House abusing friendly Powers. Until recently the Chinese were apparently friendly to us. It will be agreed, I think, that there is no evidence that there were any hostilities last summer or when we recognised the new Government in Pekin.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: They actually shelled the "Amethyst" all the way down the Yangtse.
LORD STRABOLGI: They were not a Government then but one side in a civil war. They were holding one side of the river and the Nationalists the other. We made a great mistake there by not notifying them—because we refused to recognise them at that time as belligerents —that the "Amethyst" was making a perfectly legitimate passage. Of course, there was trouble; the whole thing was a blunder. It was redeemed by the magnificent conduct and bearing of the "Amethyst's" captain and crew. But, fortunately, the Foreign Office found its feet and it did one of the few sensible things I have known it do in my lifetime; it recognised the new Pekin Government. I am sure we are perfectly right in that recognition.
I do not want to appear unreasonable. I agree with what the noble Marquess said about General MacArthur. I do not think it is correct conduct to look for a scapegoat in General MacArthur in the trouble in which we find ourselves. We had little criticism of him when he retrieved what looked like a disaster at the beginning of the Korean business, and carried out some brilliant strategical moves which, but for other circumstances, into which I will not go at the moment, might have cleared the whole country. He is undoubtedly a remarkable leader of men and a very fine soldier. The responsibility lies much higher up than General MacArthur. He is carrying out the orders of his President and through the President, I presume, the orders of the United Nations.
I venture to mention this matter of General MacArthur as I feel that tribute should be paid—it has been paid before by other noble Lords and by me—to the magnificent valour in most difficult circumstances of the United Nations Forces in Korea. When the full story comes to be told of that retreat in Northern Korea from the Chiang-yen reservoir, in which I am glad to say the Royal Marines played a very noble part, it will be one of the great military sagas of all times. It is a most remarkable example of endurance and courage under terrible difficulties. Your Lordships will have noticed the casualties. The United States Marines, a remarkably fine force, with a great history behind them, had 30 per cent, casualties
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in that ghastly retreat: the Royal Marines —and I am sure it will be one of their proudest battle honours in future— suffered 50 per cent, casualties. There have been tributes to their high morale at the end of that extraordinary military episode.
Having said that, I must repeat that I believe there has been a woeful lack of what I may call political warfare in Korea. I cannot help returning to this theme, upon which I engaged last summer when we first discussed this matter. The political blunders have been appalling. I am not blaming General MacArthur now; I am blaming whoever was responsible for the whole conduct of the campaign on its political side. I am not criticising at this moment the decision to cross the 38th Parallel—there may have been strong and compelling military reasons for that—but the stupid blunder was to set up the Syghman Rhee regime north of the 38th Parallel. That was the one way to rouse up in arms against us, at any rate, the more popular as well as the Communist elements in Korea. We should at all costs have kept the administration above the 38th Parallel in the hands of the United Nations Commission there, instead of, apperently for convenience, allowing the Syngman Rhee regime, discredited, as I fear it is, to appoint its governors and officials.
The other political blunder, which still persists, was in not making clear to the people of Korea—indeed, to the people of all Asia—why we were there and what we were doing. There have been declarations at Lake Success, in London and in Washington, but that is not the same thing as leaflet propaganda and using every other means to reach the people and show them why we are there: that we are there not to restore a corrupt and oppressive regime, but to liberate the people and allow them to choose their own destiny. In this connection also—and here I speak with great diffidence, because I believe I am right in saying that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Ismay, is to speak later—I notice a lack of understanding in all these arrangements, in the comings and goings and negotiations and even in de-bates in both Houses of Parliament, of what we were taught when I was made to study military and naval strategy—namely, the difference between what we used to call limited and unlimited warfare.

1029
I was made to read, as no doubt were many of your Lordships, the ponderous but valuable works of the Prussian General, General von Clausewitz. His masterpiece, Vom Krieg, is no doubt known to those of your Lordships who had to begin your lives with a military or naval career. He, for the first time, I think, drew a clear distinction between the limited war for limited objectives and the unlimited war. The Crimean War is one of the clearest examples of a limited war which, incidentally, was a rudimentary attempt to resist aggression. On that occasion Britain and France went to the rescue of Turkey, to prevent Russian aggression in the particular area, but without any intention of carrying the war into the heart of Russia or bringing down the Russian Government—or, in other words, of waging unlimited war. This Korean campaign is also an example— a much more highly-developed example— of resisting aggression, and should have again been a limited campaign, with limited objectives, That should have been made clear.
That distinction is most important, and I believe it has a bearing on the controversy on the use of the atom bomb, in regard to which I should like very much to support what has been said by the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel. The atom bomb is obviously a weapon of un-limited warfare. Once an atom bomb has been dropped, the Third World War has begun, and atom bombs will be dropped on this country almost for certain. It would be very optimistic to presume that your potential enemies have not possession of the atom bomb, or, indeed, have not manufactured a stock-pile, though perhaps not as large as that of the United States. The obvious target is this country. Therefore, the use of the atom bomb is of direct interest, to every man, woman and child in this country; and we, as Members of Parliament, have a direct responsibility. I must confess that, in company with my noble friend Lord Silkin. I am not at all satisfied with the statement we have had on this particular point. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister is stated to be in complete agreement with the President. In complete agreement on what—on whether to use the atom bomb, or not? Obviously the policy here is that if the atom bomb is to be used, it must be with the con-
1030
currence of those States Members of the United Nations who are supporting the campaign of resisting aggression. I do not think it is politic to invite our people to support a policy which, without the consent of their chosen representatives, can land us in a Third World War, with all that that would mean.
I hope that my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack, when he comes to reply, will be able to give us some clarification on this point. I am not at all interested in arguments about the delicate diplomatic situation, and of not annoying American public opinion. If things go badly again, this may be a question which in a matter of days or hours will decide the future of civilisation, and particularly the future of our country. We have a responsibility, and we cannot slough off that responsibility by taking refuge in the need to treat the Americans gently, to be diplomatic, and so on. If American opinion has gone hysterical on this Korean matter, and if, as I hear is the case, there is heavy pressure to use the atom bomb, not only on China proper but on Russia proper, then I believe the sooner the Americans know what is the real opinion of the people of this country (I am sure the right reverend Prelate had every right to express it) the better. The best way to cure hysteria is a good douche of cold water, and a good douche of British cold water might do good here. When I speak of hysteria, I do not in any way refer to the responsible leaders of American opinion; I refer to the irresponsible leaders and demagogues in the United States who, I believe, are the greatest danger to the world to-day. I believe they are a minority in that country, and I hope that they will remain so.
I venture to make a further remark on what fell from the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, with regard to the rearming of Western Germany—I think I understood him here—when he advocated caution and pause. If we really begin upon the rearmament of Western Germany, it will make it much more difficult to come to a general agreement between the four leading Powers con-cerned—I do not mean Germany; I mean between the three Western Powers and Russia.
VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: My argument was slightly different. It was merely

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that I do not think any agreement is likely until the Americans and ourselves are very much stronger. I think that would have the effect of lessening French suspicions and making Germany see that it is with the West that her future lies.
LORD STRABOLGI: I have no doubt that the noble Viscount is right there, but I dare say that restraint is required. At the same time, there is this difficulty, and that is that the Lett Wing elements in Germany—I do not mean the Communists, but the Liberal elements— appear to be bitterly opposed to the re-armament of Western Germany, and the Right Wing elements—what we used to call the reactionary elements—will agree only upon what they call terms of equality, which means Army Corps and a General Staff. That would certainly alarm our friends on the Continent, and it would certainly draw still closer into the Russian grip the little countries round the borders of Russia. The noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, said that the French are more alarmed by the Russians than by the Germans. I doubt even that, but I will give the noble Viscount that point. But certainly the Czechs and the Poles are much more frightened of a rearmed Germany than they are of Russia—I do not think there is any doubt about that—and it will only draw them still closer into the Moscow system. If we can secure a general all-round settlement, this problem will really solve itself. I think the noble Viscount made that argument, and I venture to support it.
In that connection, I wish that some means could be found—and here I address myself particularly to my noble friend Lord Henderson, as representing the Foreign Office—of speeding up the machinery of diplomacy. We are not living in the days when the post-chaise was the only way of communicating with countries in Europe. We have the inter-national telephone, aeroplanes and air-mails, and rapid means of travel and communication of all kinds. Why does it take so long, for example, to answer the' Russian Note on this very question of Germany about which the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, was speaking, and about which I am speaking now? There were only three Governments concerned—the United States.
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France and ourselves. In those three Governments there are not many men who have to take the decisions. It is now a month since the Note was received, and their deputies have only just drawn up a plan, which is to be considered next week. How long will it be before the reply goes? I think some means must be found. I do not put the blame upon Downing Street. I dare say they move as quickly as the Quai d'Orsay, but I do wish some means could be found of speeding up the machinery of diplomacy in these difficult times, because the machinery of diplomacy is peace-making and now moves very slowly, while the war-makers can act very swiftly, with terrible results to the world.
If I may say so, I think that the debate which we have had this afternoon has served a good purpose. I think that it has shown that there is an underlying unity of feeling in your Lordships' House. We do wish to find a way of solving these troubles. We do wish to find a way of agreeing with our present enemies and perhaps of making them our friends. I do not think there will be dissent from that. There may be differences of opinion about methods, but of the general desire of your Lordships' House, as expressed so far in this debate, for a peace by negotiation arising out of the Korean troubles, and also the even more important West European troubles, I think there can be no doubt.
5.25 p.m.
LORD ISMAY: My Lords, the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has already given expression, far more effectively than I could, to the views which I thought of venturing to put before your Lordships if opportunity arose. Therefore, it remains for me only to add a few commentaries. The noble Marquess said, and your Lord-ships agreed, that we could not hope to negotiate with our potential enemies un-less we were strong. Now that is profoundly true. But it is equally true that we cannot expect to have a decisive or even a very big say in the counsels of our friends unless we develop the greatest possible strength commensurate with our resources. That was proved time and time again during the last war. In the twilight war, there were many of us who did not agree with General Gamelin's plan that we should leave our fixed defences and march forward into Belgium if Germany attacked the Low Countries. But who

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were we, with a paltry handful of divisions, to argue with the great French General Stiff?
Again, there were a number of natural but very fundamental arguments with our American friends. They wanted to go across the Channel very much earlier than we did—in 1943. We pressed hard for North Africa, and at that time we were certainly pegging more than level with them in the forces that we had deployed against the enemy. We had no hesitation in pushing our arguments to the limit, and beyond; and we won our case. The same thing happened after North Africa had been cleared. The Americans wanted to bring all the troops back to Europe for the invasion of the Continent. We wanted to take Sicily, cross over into Italy and fight it out there, thus containing German divisions which would otherwise have opposed our landing in Normandy. We were still pegging level. We still had a mighty contribution to make. Again we had no hesitation in pressing our argument to the limit, and again our view prevailed. But mark what happened later. The Americans wanted a landing in the South of France- at Marseilles and Toulon. That meant denuding General Alexander of troops. We wanted General Alexander to press forward right-handed to Vienna. What was the military position? We had our fifteen divisions with which we started, and it was all that we could do to maintain those. The Americans had their original fifteen divisions, and were being reinforced at the rate of five divisiors a month. We no longer felt that we could press our arguments beyond a certain limit, and the American view prevailed.
I am not attempting to argue which was right and which was wrong. I am only repeating that if we are to have a decisive voice in the counsels of our friends we must dispose of the greatest possible strength militarily. What that strength should be must be decided by His Majesty's Government, on the advice of their experts, but I do hope that we shall not work out the sum the wrong way. I hope that we shall not say. "What can we afford?" and then "Let us buy just that amount." I hope that we shall say:" What should our contribution be? Let us provide it, whatever the sacrifice."
May I say just one word with regard to the atom bomb? I happened to be present
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at a Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting in Potsdam when a telegram was brought in and handed to General Marshall. He read it and put it down. When the subject under discussion had been finished he asked for the room to be cleared, and we went into secret session. He told us that the experiment of the atom bomb had been completely successful. I will admit that my own feelings were of horror, amounting almost to revulsion, and certainly not of exaltation. I had always had a sneaking hope that nobody would solve the problem of atomic energy, but I admit to a considerable relief that the enemy had not done it first. The fact remains, however, that the atom bomb is here, and it has come to stay as a weapon of war. possibly decisive. It is scarcely arguable that it is the only thing that stands between the Soviet forces and the Channel and Biscay ports.
Therefore, do not let us tie ourselves down. Do not let us enter into any agreement never to use it in the ultimate resort —I repeat in the ultimate resort. To put it at the very lowest level, the atomic bomb costs a lot of money, and if we are not going to use it we had much better try to put all that money into a particularly novel form of bow and arrow, or some-thing like that. But, seriously, does any-one really believe that whatever agreement was reached, Russia would refrain from using that bomb, if she had it, when-ever it suited her? If we remain united amongst ourselves, if the British Commonwealth remains united, and if, above all, we stick close to America, if we do not tie our hands by agreements that bear no relation to reality, then I am convinced that this twilight war will not end in the black darkness of unlimited war.
5.32 p.m.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord, with his immense expert knowledge and his high professional standing, has stirred very deep waters. I shall refer to that aspect later in my speech, but in the meantime I want to make one or two observations, more on the political level, dealing with the subject before us to-day. First of all, we rejoice at, and we are grateful to the Prime Minister for, his courage in the middle of winter in taking a journey to the United States for the purposes in view. I should also like to say how very much

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we admire the pluck and devotion of his wife in letting him make those perilous journeys, after ten years of holding office and five years of being Prime Minister of this country.
I understand that his purpose was to inform the United States as to the feeling in this country. It is not necessary for us to tell the United States how much we admire the devotion of their Armed Forces in Korea, because they know quite well that for one and a half years we ourselves carried alone the burden of the last war, and for six months with no assistance but that of the Russians. Therefore, we should in no way hang our heads when we go to the United States to speak about military sacrifices. The second reason is this. His purpose was to inform the United States that public opinion in this country must be taken into account. We have learnt— in fact we know—that the policy of the President is very much governed by the conflicting or competing pressure from different groups in the United States— an election here, a return of someone there, a move by the Republican Party, and American policy, which is the most vital thing in the world, is changed, altered or deflected. At least we in the British Commonwealth of Nations can let the President know that the British Commonwealth must also count as a pressure group, although to listen to the speech of the noble Marquess one would imagine that we were entitled to do nothing but tail in behind the United States, not fully as a forty-ninth State, but as a new territory. We do count because of our own record. We count because of our own public opinion, which is an experienced public opinion.
But there is another reason, and it is this. This war—or this, I might almost say, imminent war is being fought, or will be fought, in Asia. What has been most striking about the debate to-day has been that few noble Lords have spoken about this subject as primarily an Asian affair. The noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, to whose speech I would pay a tribute, stirred almost a wistful feeling in the heart of a renegade. It seems to us that the fewer his numbers, the greater his strength: and We wish a long life to the octogenarian Gideon who leads the Liberal Party. I say that we are in a special position. The noble
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and gallant Lord, Lord Ismay, who spoke, spoke purely as a soldier about the value of weapons. You must use weapons, but there are other forces in the world besides weapons. Weapons and material forces are not the only things that count in the world. There are the influence of peoples and the mass of public opinion; there are the moral forces that underlie movement in the world.
In Asia a remarkable thing has occurred. Nearly all the Asian countries, and most of the Middle Eastern countries, have united in an initiative which is independent of the initiative which was taken by the great Western Powers of the Atlantic Pact. There is Indonesia, with its 80,000,000. There are India and Pakistan, with their 400,000,000 people — the total is beginning to mount up. There is China, with its 400,000,000. One would say that one should count a little on the beliefs and opinions and proposals of these people. Our own position in this is remarkable. The greatest triumph of this Government or of this country—I will not say of this Government because everyone joined in it—was the settlement in India. That is a most remarkable thing. The position in which it has put us, between Europe and India is—I will not say a bridge (all this jargon had better be discarded, because it merely confuses thought), but a position of extraordinary importance. It is a remarkable thing that while we have heard a great deal about what the Middle East thinks we have heard little about what Pandit Nehru thinks. Yet Pandit Nehru is one of the key men in the whole business. I say that one of the most gratifying experiences one could have (and for various reasons I have had a good deal of experience of it) is the touching and also the humble discipleship under which they are willing to follow our advice. That is a very great force when dealing with this dreadful question which affects the Asian Continent.
Also, I think there has to be remem-bered—I have often been told about it by my Indian friends—that the Asian bears in mind the long history of Western domination of the Pacific; and in this debate to-day some noble Lords have been speaking as if we were about to put down the Boxer rising or assault the Taku forts. The noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, in his

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brilliant speech said that was one of the reasons for the revolt in China. Why should China accept this foreign domination? Attention is paid when an American senator speaks, yet when Pandit Nehru ex-presses an opinion we think little of it. In our position we can mobilise incomparable strength and influence.
This has been a most interesting and, in many ways, a very refreshing debate. It has shown—I say this with the greatest respect—a great independence of thought. It has been the House of Lords at its best. The fact is that we may be standing on the verge of a world war. I do not know now what the noble Marquess means about the position in China. Does he or does he not want China in the United Nations? So far as I remember, in a letter to The Times, and afterwards in this House, he denounced the recognition of China. This is a denial of what she considers to be her rights. That produced a stale of mind in China which was one of the elements—I do not say more than that—which conditioned this Korean disaster. When that had happened, the noble Marquess came forward and said he deplored the Chinese aggression, which destroyed the chance of putting China where she should be and where her presence would be very useful indeed. I do not know much about China; I went there and met the Nationalists years ago. But again I was very impressed by the scholarly way in which Lord Samuel treated this subject.
Take a Chinese of fifty years of age. His recollection of his dealings with the West is something as follows. He was an ally in the First World War. But so were the Japanese. He remembers that in 1921 the Japanese put their claws into Shangtung and made the Twenty-One Demands which were intended to begin the Japanese infiltration into China. He then remembers that in 1931 there was what was called the Manchurian "incident," and he remembers that he received no help at all from the West. The League of Nations examined the question and did nothing about it. He remembers that in 1937 the Japanese opened a full-out war; and from 1937 until practically this day China has been engaged in war. Then with regard to the help from America which was given, and which was most welcome to the then Government of China, as the situation developed inside the country—as hap-
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pened in many other countries—there came about a revolutionary, as well as an external movement, and he found that American arms were being used to resist the popular movement. And, finally, he found what he refers to as a renegade clique sheltered in an Island protected by the American fleet.
Then General Wu comes to Lake Success and says that 1,000 aircraft have violated the Manchurian frontier on 200 occasions. Is that true or not? I do not know. He says that the Chinese were willing to have a neutral zone, but that the unfortunate offensive was precipitated so that there was no chance of this neutral zone being established. Is that true or is it not? If these things are true—and we should know—then what becomes of the noble Marquess's plea that China is an aggressor? What does the noble Marquess mean? Does he want to go to war with China? Does he think we should meet Chinese aggression by force?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am sorry that I was not here before, but I take it that all Parties in this House agree that the United Nations were right to oppose the aggression of North Korea against South Korea. I do not know whether the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, shares that view, but that is the view held generally by the Government, as well as by the Opposition. In fact we never crossed the Manchurian frontier. It is a matter of opinion whether we should have stopped there. I have my doubts whether it was right to go so far. But we never did cross the Manchurian frontier, and the Chinese have in fact come in in support of the North Koreans. They are therefore coming in against the United Nations whom we are obliged to support. I regard them, therefore, as having become a party to North Korean aggression. I think that is undeniable.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Then may I ask the noble Marquoss a plain question —namely, does he wish war declared on China?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: That is not the point. China intervened in a war in which we were already taking part. It is not a question of whether or not we declare war; the fact remains that at this moment the Chinese are attacking our men.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I do not think the noble Marquess fully realises that if war is declared between this country and China the military treaty between China and Russia becomes operative, and a world war has begun. All that I am suggesting is that we should examine the circumstances, and see what this so-called head-on aggression of China amounts to, and how far there are other causes, including the refusal of the noble Marquess and his friends to recognise China for a seat in the Security Council.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble Viscount has asked me a question. Whether or not we should have recognised the Communist Government of China is a matter of policy and of opinion, and I should have thought the noble Viscount would be the last person in this House to say that people should not state their honest opinions upon important matters of policy.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: All that is extremely interesting. Of course we should all express our opinions. But the point is this: Does not the issue of peace and war depend upon the inclusion of China on the Security Council? I think it does. That is what the Chinese say, and I am asking the noble Marquess whether he is prepared to face a war with China which, by military treaty, involves a war with Russia. There are many interesting speculations, but we are on the verge of great dangers. General Wu has been asked to come and represent probably the best Government that China has had for many years, and a united China, and he has to sit like a prisoner in the dock of a police court whilst the President's seat is occupied by a person, Dr. Tsiang, who, in General Wu's judgment, is merely a renegade Chinese protected by American arms. I say that that is trying China too highly. I say that the first step towards peace should be some move by the Government. I applaud the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, in this matter, not only for the way in which he made his speech but for making it clear that one of the terms of British co-operation in this matter is that China should receive her rights.
Finally, my Lords, I come to the question of the atom bomb. Bombing is a horrible business. In the old days I believe there were certain protests when
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the arquebus was introduced as a weapon instead of the bow and arrow. But there have always been agreements about undefended towns. As I see it, the distinction is between what is and what is not a target. In bombing you get stages. You attack a definite military target with a bomb or a gun. You get the munition factory. You get the workman who is working at the munition factory or dump, or who lives in a house near it. You may consider those are military targets. But atom bombing affects places which may contain no targets. The atom bomb is a weapon of terror, and is meant to spread terror. No one can say that an atom bomb is directed at any target. It is a weapon of terror, and it is going to leave thousands of people, if they are not exterminated, writhing in poisoned areas. I say with respect to my noble friend Lord Trenchard, who has been a champion of military bombing, that there is all the difference in the world between aimed weapons and a weapon which, because of its nature, is not a weapon of war at all, but something which will spread terror amongst men, women and children.
That is the crux of the matter. I do not blame the Prime Minister and the President in not wishing to commit them-selves. The Prime Minister says he is certain that Mr. Truman is all right. Lord Henderson says that he is certain that the Prime Ministers knows that Mr. Truman is all right. The noble Marquess said that he knows that Lord Henderson knows that the Prime Minister knows that the President is all right. Therefore, for reasons of high policy, that is the way we get out of deep water and a delicate situation. We say no more. But that does not absolve any individual from making up his own mind on this matter. I say that it is a farce to have Nuremburg trials. Suppose that 10,000 people were sent into the gas chamber. What then? This atom bomb obliterates the whole countryside. The war crimes trials at least gave a hope that there would be some moral principle introduced into warfare instead of the view of the military man that what he has to do is to destroy the enemy and win. When the enemy has been destroyed it will still not solve the problems; it will probably only lay the seed for another war. Therefore, I would venture to put a few questions to the Government.

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The first question is: What is the Government's policy for getting China into the United Nations? How are we going to do it? Are we going to take some definite action; or are we going to be content to leave the matter and to say: "These differences show only greater unity." In one thing I agree cordially with the noble Marquess—he said he did not know what that means at all. Surely that is the first question: Is China to be put on to the Security Council or not? If she is not, are we going to chance a war in which the atom bomb will be used? It is no good saying of the atom bomb that it is a thing at large. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, told us not to rock the boat. I ask him not to sink the ship. This is not a matter which is just a consideration at large.
Did any of your Lordships read the account of that interview with Mr. Stassen? It occupied a column in The Times. Mr. Stassen is not an un-important person. He has been a Presidential candidate. It was stated in the interview (which expressed directly the views of General MacArthur, and General MacArthur is a brilliant journalist) that it was the view of the General that the thing to do was to evacuate the land forces from Korea, then get other forces together and go up and down the China coast for a year, bombarding military and industrial objectives. Someone asked: "With what weapons?" He said: "I mean with all weapons." Can you imagine what the effect of a statement of that sort is likely to be on the public of countries in Asia? Can you wonder that people fighting against the United Nations in Korea are suspicious and nervous when you ask them to cease fire? One can imagine them saying: "Cease fire!—look at that interview."
Therefore, I would ask the Government first to tell us whether they intend to make it clear to the United States that opinion in this country is determined that the price of co-operation shall be fair treatment of China. We are determined to pursue a policy which we believe to be right. The second request I make of His Majesty's Government is that we should make up our minds on this great moral issue, especially in the case of people like the Chinese and Koreans, now hastening over the hillsides with few or no aircraft to support them (they have no aircraft at all
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and we have been area bombing). Is it proposed to take the vast expanse of China and subject the people therein to a process of chemical extermination? I say that the moral wickedness of carrying out such a plan, whatever the military advantage it might give us, would immediately bring us to shame and would divide Asia and the West for ever. Nothing is clearer than that.
LORD ISMAY: The noble Lord seems, to think that I have been advocating dropping the atom bomb on the Chinese. I have done no such thing. All I said was, "Do not tie your hands, because you might have to use it in the ultimate resort."
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: If, owing to my natural hesitation and the embarrassment of making a speech in your Lordships' House, my glance fell in the direction of the noble Lord, it was not meant to indicate that I was directing any attack to him. I am sure he will under-stand that. I say that so long as the people of Asia hear of views such as those I have mentioned, they will remain apprehensive. Read what the Indian newspapers say; see what Lester Pearson says. So long as they are told that "We must not tie our hands," and that the bomb may be used, they will be likely to think that they are the people on whom the bomb will be dropped. It is difficult enough to live down a century of Colonial exploitation of Asia—bat that is a matter into which we need not go just now; I think we shall be getting deep into historical matters if we do, and the Opium Wars will suffice for the present. I say it would be fatal to let this idea get abroad. It would divide us from the people of Asia, many of whom are now beginning to respect us and even to have some affection for us.
Then there is the reverse side of the shield. If you alienate the good will of these people, where would they go? If they are driven away, then, indeed, you create a very great bloc. You would certainly answer Mr. Bevin's doubt. He said he did not know whether there was a Russo-Chinese combination. There would certainly be such a combination then. Therefore I urge the noble Viscount the Leader of the House to make it clear that we are determined to press for a seat for China on the Security Council. I also

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ask him to say on behalf of the Government that we will use the atom bomb only if it is used first by someone else; that we will not initiate a war in which it is to be a weapon. I plead for some statement of that kind, which will re-assure the consciences of the people of this country and allay the fears of the people of the Far East.
5.56 p.m.
LORD CHORLEY: I follow the impassioned and eloquent speech of my noble friend Viscount Stansgate with a great deal of trepidation. With regard to that speech I make only two points. It should, I think, have been obvious to the noble Lord, Lord Ismay, that the attack which Viscount Stansgate was making was directed to Mr. Stassen. That was a terrible interview, and the reading of it certainly sent a shock through the great majority of English people who saw it. One other thing I would add to what my noble friend said. Among great masses of people in Asia, not only the ordinary, plain people, but educated and leading people—certainly in India—the view is held that the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki be-cause the people in those towns were yellow-skinned; they were Asiatics; and the bomb would not have been dropped in Europe. That is the sort of feeling which I have heard expressed by Indians of very high standing. It shows that we have to try to understand and to put our-selves into the skins of these people if we are to deal with the situation which exists in the Far East and to deal with it in any sort of way which can show a prospect of success.
A month ago we had in this House a most interesting and, I thought, useful discussion upon this problem, which was marked particularly by a speech by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. That speech, and two points in particular, made a great impression on those of us who sit on these Benches. The noble Marquess advocated a policy of conciliation and firmness, which, as I said, seemed to be a sort of leit motif running through his speech. I regret very much that conciliation seems to have been dropped out of the noble Marquess's speech to-day and to have been superseded by a degree of firmness which seemed to me to be getting
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near to fierceness. Perhaps I am a little unfair to him, because there was in what he said plenty of conciliation for the more reactionary sections of American public opinion. I am very sorry indeed, be-cause, on the occasion of which I have spoken, the noble Marquess made an appeal to the Government which I hoped the Government would accept—as indeed they did—that negotiations should be started at the highest level.
I have read the noble Marquess's speech more than once since he made it, because it impressed me so much. On no fewer than three occasions did he ex-press anxiety that discussions at the highest level should take place, and it is clear, particularly, perhaps, from the passage at column 284 of Hansard, that he felt the need for such discussions to be urgent. I should like to read it to your Lordships. It runs thus:
"I believe, too, that the time has now arrived when another effort might well be made at the highest level—it must be at the highest level, no other level is any good—to reach a settlement."
Following him later in the debate, I said that I was very glad that Lord Henderson had, in fact, agreed that the Government were anxious that such discussions should take place, and I urged that there should be a little more urgency about them. That was a month ago but, apart from the fact that the Ambassadors have met in Paris, nothing seems to have happened. I entirely agree with what was said by my noble friend, Lord Strabolgi. The situation is urgent, and when the world is on the eve of war it is absurd that it should take weeks for Ambassadors to meet in Paris. What I should like to see is the Prime Minister, whose imaginative flight to Washington has seized the admiration and the affection of the whole of the people in this country, and of Western Europe and indeed of the world, make a similar demarche towards getting a similar discussion at the very high level to which the noble Marquess referred in his speech.
It is no good, after weeks of preparation, to have a meeting of Foreign Secretaries who have been meeting each other continuously over recent years, glaring at each other across tables and making distinctly impolite remarks about each other. They are not on the highest level. The highest level is that of Prime Ministers and Presidents. I should like to see

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the Prime Minister propose a meeting with President Truman and Marshal Stalin, say, at Delhi, or, if they wished to be on completely neutral ground, at Teheran, where these matters can be discussed face to face by the only people who can really come to decisions about them. I agree that some preparation is necessary, but it seems to me that over-preparation is as dangerous, if not more dangerous, than absence of preparation, and it should not be difficult to sort out in a very short time the essential problems which need to be discussed at a meeting of this kind. I do not propose to discuss the question of what proposals should be included in the agenda of such a meeting, and whether it should be con-fined to European problems. It might be difficult to bring in the Far East, be-cause that would mean that Mao Tsetung would have to be invited to the meeting. We should have no objection to that, I am sure, but it would obviously give rise to difficulty with America and, therefore, is probably not practical politics.
I do not wish to discuss any of the thorny problems which arise in Europe, except one. I should like to say some-thing about the proposal which has been referred to in more than one speech this afternoon, and particularly by the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood—that is, the question of German rearmament. I noticed not very long ago that an American film magnate described the atom bomb as "just dynamite"—an under-statement which is perhaps among the most magnificent which have ever been made. I certainly do not think that the importance of this problem of German rearmament is capable of over-statement. In a number of remarkable articles published a week or so ago in the New York Herald Tribune, Walter Lipmann, one of the shrewdest and most capable of American commentators, drew attention to the fact that in the Soviet Note of last October they used a very strong expression in regard to the rearmament of Wes-tern Germany. They said that it would not be "tolerated." The noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, has drawn attention to the fact that the Foreign Minister of the present Chinese Government used a similar expression at the time the United Nations Forces were on the point of crossing the 38th Parallel, and, as he
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pointed out, that was in effect disregarded, or taken as mere bluff or something of the kind. Is it not possible that in using that similar expression the Soviet Government had something similar in mind? At any rate, it is a matter to which very careful attention should be given.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: In saying what he has been saying about the Russians and German rearmament, has the noble Lord not forgotten that the Russians have reorganised a large police force and organised and equipped it as field formations in Eastern Germany?
LORD CHORLEY: I have not for-gotten that. It is obviously one of the matters which would inevitably be discussed at the sort of meeting I have in mind. What these forces are like is obviously a matter of differing opinions. An interesting article in the Manchester Guardian recently threw a great deal of doubt on the value of these forces and indicated that the Russians themselves do not regard them as very formidable. However that may be, that is the type of proposal which obviously should be threshed out at the proposed high level.
I should like to say a further word about the question of German rearmament. This was an American proposal which it seems to me our own Government have supported much too easily. One would have expected that before a proposal for the re-militarisation of Wes-tern Germany was made, some sort of effort would have been made to discover what the Germans themselves thought about it, not only the Government of Western Germany but also the common people of Germany. Is it proposed that the people of Western Germany should be conscripted into this new army? What would be the use of a conscript army in Germany in a war this year, next year or the year after? A volunteer army, I submit, would be the only army of any value whatever. What do the German people, who would become the cadres of that army, think about it? When we were discussing this matter on the last occasion I ventured to make some observations founded on materials which came to me from people who know a great deal about Germany. I said then:
"Knowledgeable and acute observers of the German situation who have been spending much time there in recent months, tell me that

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the feeling in Germany is that she is not pre-pared to be a bastion for Western European defence against the East on the basis of being a bastion to be abandoned when the time is thought fit by dominant Powers further West. It is very natural that the Germans should not wish to have their country fought over just, so to speak, as a delaying action. On the other hand, if Germany is brought genuinely into a Western European defence scheme, as an integral part of it, that is an-other proposition. I have been told that Germans would not be prepared to volunteer, and might even resist conscription in a German Army of the old type …"
That observation has been borne out in a remarkable way since that time. Probably your Lordships saw an article in the Observer last Sunday exactly to the same effect. So were the articles by Walter Lipmann to which I have referred. Then in the current number of the Economist there is an interesting and revealing letter from a Mr. Walter Fliess of Frankfurt, referring to a poll taken by the non-partisan Frankfurter Abendspost. The figures were: against any form of rearmament, 68.25 per cent.; for remili-tarisation on principle, only 3.36 per cent.; for German units within a European Army, 17.37 per cent.; for an independent German Wehrmacht, only 8.26 per cent. These figures are most significant. Mr. Fliess also refers to a meeting of a large number of young people held in Frankfurt, where the greatest applause went to a speaker who said that "all young men of his age had made a vow never to take up a gun again. "That may be a temporary feeling, but it is obviously not possible to conduct a re-armament of Western Germany while that type of feeling is widespread throughout the country. Is it not absurd to give what is possibly a casus belli to Russia for the purpose of obtaining military assistance which is as valueless as this would obviously be? This is perhaps a stronger statement of the point of view which the noble Viscount, Lord Temple-wood, put forward in his speech. To build on that sort of basis is to build without foundations, to build castles in the air.
I should like to turn now to the question of Korea, which has been so much debated this afternoon. On the last occasion that I addressed your Lordships on this problem I had occasion to make some rather drastic criticisms of American
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policy. I shall have to do so again this afternoon. I cannot accept the view which has been advanced by the noble Marquess that we must not in any sort of circumstances criticise what is done in America because that would, in effect, be to sow dissension between the two countries. I do not believe that that is so at all, and I have been glad to find that on this side of the House, at any rate, I am supported by a number of other speakers who feel the same way. Americans themselves will always tell you that they prefer complete frankness, and if there is one thing to which they object it is that one should have an arrière pensée —a reservation at the back of one's mind —and not tell them exactly what one is thinking. I am sure that if we tell them clearly, and with complete frankness, they will respect us much more than if we pretend we are 100 per cent. in agreement when we are obviously nothing of the kind. We must not forget that in America itself there is a large body of public opinion which is exactly in line with the opinion of our Government, and what I believe to be the opinion of the great mass of the people in this country. At the moment this body of opinion in America is to some extent submerged under an hysterical mass feeling which has been deliberately worked up over the last months and years. It is waiting for a lead, and it is looking with anxiety to what is happening in this country and the lead which will be given from here.
It seems to me that American policy in the Far East is quite clearly calculated —though not deliberately, of course—to weld Communist China and Communist Russia indissolubly together, and that if it is not changed before very long that will happen. And the result of that for the world will be fraught with the most terrible disaster. Only a few weeks ago, as it appeared from the speeches of Secretary of State Mr. Acheson, there was a chance that the American policy towards the recognition of China was to be changed. Unfortunately, there was then the advance beyond the 38th Parallel and the very natural reaction of China to that event. I am not going to repeat the criticisms that I made on the last occasion of General MacArthur. I should like noble Lords to realise that they were made before these disasters. It is inconceivable that the decision to move across

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the 38th Parallel was reached by the United Nations without consultation, and without the advice of General MacArthur. Although it may well be that, technically, the United Nations is responsible for that movement, I am sure that in the pages of history General MacArthur will bear a considerable degree of responsibility. However, I do not wish to go further into that matter. The point is that this chance of a rapprochement between the United States and China, which was obviously a real one, was lost, but it does not mean that it cannot be regained.
I entirely agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, that this is the burning point in the East at the present time; and therefore it seems to me that we must concentrate all our efforts on trying to get American public opinion, and the views of the American Government, changed in respect of this particular matter. The old League of Nations was wrecked very largely because the United States refused to corns into it. There seems to me to be a very grave danger of the present United Nations Organisation being equally wrecked be-cause the United States is not only in it but, being in it, is attempting to dominate it. That is the impression one gets at the present time. She controls an enormous block of votes in South America in the Assembly, and seems to be ready to refuse everything unless she gets her own way. I hope that is only a passing phase, because if it goes on I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, that it will mean that all sorts of nations who cannot be relied upon to vote the right way will not be accepted into the United Nations Organisation, which is entirely wrong.
LORD HAWKE: I think the noble Lord ought not to make these accusations against South American countries, because it will cause exceedingly bad blood if his remarks are reported in South America.
LORD CHORLEY: I am not the first to make this observation.
LORD HAWKE: But it has not been made before in your Lordships' House.
LORD CHORLEY: It is an observation which anybody who studies what hap-pens at the Assembly is perfectly entitled to make. At any rate, what has in fact
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happened has been that the United Nations Organisation has tended to get itself divided into two antagonistic sections, and the result of that has been that the work which it ought to be doing is being completely prevented.
If this problem in the Far East is to be solved it can be solved only by negotiation. The Americans themselves have taken the view that that negotiation must take place through the United Nations Organisation, and yet they will not have in the United Nations Organisation the people with whom they ought to negotiate. They establish a dilemma which, on the face of it, is insoluble. Surely there must be negotiations with China, and to adopt the sort of ideological point of view that you will not negotiate is really quite contrary to the ordinary hard-headed attitude of American businessmen. If American businessmen were handling this problem as a matter of business, in-stead of politicians handling it as a matter of politics, there would be no difficulty in getting them round a table, and there would probably be no difficulty in hammering out some sort of reasonable solution to the problem.
As it appears to me, there are three points which are worrying the present Chinese Government. One is the problem of Korea, which has been sufficiently de-bated this afternoon, and I will not refer to it further. Another is that of Chinese entry to the United Nations, which has also been discussed sufficiently. And the third is the problem of Formosa, which has also been referred to to some extent, and which it is quite clear is, from the Chinese point of view, absolutely in the centre of the picture. Formosa is regarded by the Chinese as just as much a part of China as the Isle of Wight or the Isle of Man is regarded as part of this country. That Chinese claim was admitted by all the other nations, and was put into the Declaration of Cairo, and I suggest that there might be some sort of a declaration that the Cairo decision stands. It may not be possible to implement it at the moment, but it might be a good thing if the United States were prepared to make the declaration that the Cairo decision stands; that, as soon as the general problem of who is to be recognised as the Government of China has been satisfactorily dealt with, Formosa will be handed over; that there is no

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intention that Formosa should go to Japan—which is the thing the Chinese fear—and that there is no intention of setting it up as some kind of independent republic to be dominated by America and used as an American base.
Before the situation had become so difficult President Truman himself issued a statement to the effect that the Americans would not use it in that way. I think it would go a long way towards pouring oil on troubled waters if it could be stated that the Cairo Declaration still stands. I am sure that in these ways it should be possible to establish an atmosphere in which negotiations could take place and take place successfully. Un-less and until these negotiations do take place, the prospects will remain terribly black, and at any moment we may be confronted with the outbreak of war.
6.20 p.m.
LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY: My Lords, we have had a long, interesting and animated debate. I, for my part, do not intend to follow some noble Lords into their interpretation of the views of Communist China. To my mind, as I look upon the international scene, since the war there have been two outstanding features: first, the Communist expansion under Russian leader-ship, and secondly, the strengthening of the Anglo-United States friendship which was begun in the struggle against Germany. I should like to join noble Lords on both sides of the House in welcoming the Prime Minister's visit to Washington, and I must say that I share my noble Leader's regret that it did not come about earlier—I believe I said so in support of the noble Lord, Lord Ismay, in July, so that I can claim not to have been wise after the event. I believe that some of the fears that were expressed on that occasion have been justified by the joint Truman-Attlee declaration. Noble Lords will recall the remarkable speech made in July by the noble Lord, Lord Ismay, which I think the noble Viscount the Leader of the House welcomed. Lord Ismay called for an over-all strategic concept.
Like some noble Lords on the other side of the House, I believe that Great Britain and the Commonwealth have an immense contribution to make to the
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defence and peace of the free world. I do not under-estimate in the least the part that has been, and is being, played both by Great Britain and by the Dominions. I believe, too, that besides our great combined man-power and resources, we have both knowledge and experience to offer; but I do most wholeheartedly agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Ismay, said about putting our actual contribution in men and materials first, and on that basis being able to offer our contribution in advice and experience. There is no limited liability in this struggle. Those of us— and I think on the whole we are in the majority in this House—who regard Anglo-United States friendship, solid and indivisible, as the sole hope of peace, order and freedom in the world, must be careful of the slightest assumption of superior wisdom in our dealings with that great country.
In spite of remarks that have fallen from some noble Lords, I believe, too, that we must be realists about Formosa. I was particularly interested to hear the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, about the Cairo declaration. Although I am no lawyer, and certainly no international lawyer, I think it worth while putting on record that at that declaration those taking part—namely. President Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek and Mr. Churchill—explicitly declared that they coveted no gain for themselves and had no thought of territorial expansion. In the present circumstances, with the Chinese forces, whether "volunteer" or otherwise, in Korea, I cannot but think that the terms of that declaration have not been fulfilled. I said, "Let us be realists." We must realise that we ourselves have our interests in the Far East. The Chinese have already declared their intention of "liberating" Tibet—in fact, they are already in the process of doing it—and one day they may have similar ideas about Hong Kong.
My noble Leader, Lord Salisbury, has already referred to the remarks of two colleagues of noble Lords opposite, and I do not intend to refer to them again, but because of those remarks I think it is most essential that the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Wool-sack should take this opportunity of once more stressing that our Government and people do support the United States and other nations in the part they have played

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in carrying out the task of the United Nations in Korea. Another reason why this is necessary is the attitude, as expressed in some periodicals, and one in particular, of some who are at least nominal supporters of the present Government. I refer to an article in last week's New Statesman and Nation. It is headed "Positions of Strength?" This is what it says:
"The military containment of National Socialist Germany was physically possible, first, because the non-Nazi world was amply strong enough to build an iron girdle round Germany, and, secondly, because National Socialism was not a liberative or revolutionary force in any part of the world."
I hold that those who regard Communism as a liberative as well as a revolutionary cause are really ranging themselves with the opponents of our free society, a free society which at least a majority of noble Lords in this House support. We on these Benches, and noble Lords on other Benches, abhor not only the methods but the ends of Communists.
But the article to which I have referred is right in one respect: we are fighting a movement. So we find at one moment that China declares herself to be a free, independent sovereign State, and to be the heir to the rights of her predecessor, the Republic of China, but at the same time she is the protector of that dogmatic secular religion, Communism. Who can doubt that it is with her connivance and help that the present anti-French movement in Indo-China is being reinforced? You cannot claim the rights and privileges of a sovereign State and yet, by covert action, deny them to other States. That is what I see as the heart of the matter. It is useless for us to put ourselves in the shoes of China in her relation to Formosa and in the invasion of Korea, unless we are at the same time going to uphold all her actions in the East. The cease-fire in Korea could—and, indeed, we hope it would—save lives in that country, but it certainly would not put an end to the great struggle which has been waged ever since the war. It is not just Asia where the war is being waged; the struggle is going on throughout the world.
It seems to me that some noble Lords speaking today were most unrealistic. I felt that they forgot that the Minister of Defence last May (I think it was) told us that the Russians had 175 divisions, a great many of them within the borders
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of Poland. They seemed to forget that Western Europe, as the Prime Minister and the President so rightly said, is a vital area, and that that area is gravely threatened. They seemed to forget that the strategy of Russia and her satellites, as is now generally admitted, has been to spread our forces over the Far East. To regard that as one theatre set apart and unrelated to the rest of the world is un-realistic and will give a completely false picture. The noble Lord, Lord Silk in, talked of negotiations How can you have a conference which has no agenda? How can you have a conference with people who are admittedly in wrongful occupation of territory? How can you have a conference unless these matters are to be discussed and are on the agenda? I wholeheartedly support the attitude of the Government in this matter. We must pray God that in this struggle Europe will not again become a battleground. But it will certainly require on our part great sacrifices, great courage and great persistence. I believe that if we combine our resources and the resources of our great Commonwealth with those of the United States, not only will our strength be greater, but our sacrifices will be less.
There is a great struggle in the world. I think there is a great struggle and difference of opinion within our own country, and the difference is between those who pursue the free way of life: and those who look to Communism as the salvation of the world. If we believe and have faith in our way of life, we must be prepared to give sacrifices equal to those given by people who believe in Marxist doctrine. Therefore, we support the Government in the declaration which has been made, although we may criticise it in detail and in certain important exceptions. We hope that they will give that leadership for which we are all looking. We hope that they will look upon the whole free world as a unity and base their resources and strategy upon that unified conception.
6.32 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT JOWITT): My Lords, I am sure that this has been an interesting and useful debate—useful, because, after all, what is the function of this House? It is that members of this House, frequently speaking from a ripe experience, can fearlessly put forward views which they

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believe to be right, in order that they may lead and guide opinion. It always seems to me a pity that to-day, owing perhaps to the shortage of newsprint, or for some other reason, our debates are not so widely reported as they should be, so as to have their full effect upon public opinion.
Nevertheless, I believe that debates in your Lordships' House do have a profound effect on the formulation of opinion in the country. Those who are concerned in matters such as those which we have been discussing to-day certainly read our debates, take notice of them, and understand the various points of view that have been put forward. Indeed, the usefulness of the debate would be complete if it stopped at this moment and did not receive any answer from me at all. In regard to giving an answer, I find myself in a position of slight embarrassment. The noble Marquess, and the noble Viscount, Lord Templewood, have both enunciated a rule which I think a very sound rule—namely, that any Minister who is going to speak on the difficult matter of foreign affairs, even if he does not actually submit his speech in writing to the Foreign Secretary, should at any rate ascertain whether the Foreign Secretary is entirely at one with the statements he proposes to make. I shall bear that suggestion in mind. I have not submitted this speech to the Foreign Secretary because I am not quite sure what this speech is going to be. But I have a bump of caution, highly developed, and I am bound to say that if ever there was an occasion when it was desirable to give full scope to a bump of caution I think it is the present.
It is idle to deny that the situation which confronts us to-day is a very grave one, and it is essential that we should think out clearly where we are going and what is going to happen. For my own part, however, I should like to start by saying this. In view of some of the things which have been said about the United States of America one might hardly realise that through these last years they have been our firm friends; that we owe to them more than we can readily express, and that in our opinion (I believe both sides of the House will agree with me here) the future prospects of this world depend upon a happy collaboration between the United States of America, on the one hand, and
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the States forming the British Commonwealth, on the other. That is the great ideal which we must keep before us—not as an exclusive ideal; it is not that we want to dominate the world, any more than I believe the United States wants to dominate the United Nations, but that we want at all costs, and in spite of all difficulties, to steer through to a peaceful world.
Of course, in the material sense we in this little island cannot make so great a contribution as the United States can make in material forces—obviously not. When Lord Ismay suggests that we must not trouble in the least what rearmament costs, he will forgive me for saying that we have to support the economy of this country. It is no good our not being able to get the food or the raw material or the clothing for our people, even if this country is bulging with bombs. Obviously we must have regard to the whole position in seeing what we can do. But clearly we must make as great a contribution as we can to the strength of this country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations; and I quite agree with what Lord Stansgate said in his eloquent speech, that we must not for one moment think we are going to get out of the troubles of the day merely by material strength, disregarding altogether moral issues.
What does friendship with the United States involve? The Russian papers always refer to us as "the lackeys of the United States." That means that in various spheres we are not allowed to express any opinion of our own, or are not allowed to differ from the United States. Surely, this White Paper shows that, whatever else we are, we are not the lackeys of the United States. We are perfectly free to express our opinion, and we shall continue to do so. That, surely, is the real test of friendship. If you have a friend who is such a half-friend that you have to pretend you agree with him when you do not, then his friendship is not worth very much. But if you know him well enough to be able to stand up and state clearly what you think, then such a man is probably a good friend. Surely, it is in that sense that one must read the passage which gave trouble to the noble Marquess and, I think, to Lord Silkin that
"this point of difference only serves to emphasise the underlying unity of our objectives."

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When we say that we agree on various matters it shows that we really are agreeing and expressing truth, because when we differ, we do not hesitate to say so. In that sense, I think the point of difference does emphasise our underlying unity.
Before I leave this topic I should like to say this. Reference has been made to the work done by Mr. Nehru and the Asian countries. I should like to express our very warm appreciation, I am sure on behalf of all Parties in this House, of the efforts which Mr. Nehru has made in the cause of peace.
That, then, is our relationship with the United States. Do let us remember that we have gone into this war in Korea as a constituent member of the United Nations. We are doing our part there as a member of the United Nations, but in conjunction with the United States who are also acting as a member of the United Nations, and, of course, making a far greater contribution than we have been making. Other countries are sending their contingents there, too. We have an expression in this country about a man whom you do not quite trust. You say he is "not a good fellow to go tiger shooting with." By that you mean he is likely to run out on you in times of danger or difficulty. What we must above all make plain to the world is that we are not going to run out on the United States because of such a difference. I am sure your Lordships will agree that that is absolutely fundamental.
The next point I want to make is in saying that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, rather distressed me—for I have a great opinion of his judgment—when he said that on reading the White Paper he found too little emphasis on negotiation, and a point of view which he described as being to the effect that war is inevitable and negotiation is no longer any good. With the greatest respect to him, if language means anything to-day I should have thought that the White Paper emphasised the exact contrary. Throughout the whole of the White Paper it states that the ideal is to maintain world peace and respect for the rights, freedoms and interests of all peoples. The noble Lord's opinion is based apparently upon the use of the one word "advance," because the sentence concludes:
"to eliminate the causes of fear, want, and discontent, and to advance the democratic way of life."
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Does not the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and the Party to which he and I have the honour to belong stand to advance the democratic way of life? Do we not all hope and believe in the ideal of progress, however difficult it may be to attain it? Do we not all hope that in years to come everyone in this country will have an easier time than those who are here to-day? Of course we do. That is what I understand by advancing the democratic way of life. Surely, in the context from which the noble Lord took it, it does not mean advancing it at the expense of some other country. We all recognise that we have the right to live our lives in our own way and, just as we do not want anybody to interfere with us, neither do we want to interfere with anybody else. Throughout this White Paper we emphasise our determination to do every-thing we can by negotiation to solve these problems.
That leads me to say something more about Korea. We may have been right or we may have been wrong in our views, but we advanced beyond the 38th Parallel, we advanced beyond the neck and we went further north. Then came the Chinese answer and the setback to our Forces, which are now obviously more happily placed than they were a short time ago. China is both a young and an old country with a great history and great traditions. She has been through an ordeal and is emerging with the enthusiasm of youth. As a great nation she is now openly taking her place in the world. Surely we wish her well. In view of her history and the contribution which she has made to history, a place cannot be denied to her. There is a long-standing friendship between this country and China. We want, and our Allies the United States also want, to do everything we can to make it possible to bring about the termination of these hostilities by friendly negotiation, always provided that we do not have to indulge in—I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that the word is loosely used— appeasement, in the way in which we used to speak of it, when it conveyed the idea of something which was discreditable or the idea of running away and giving way on essential points. But negotiation, yes. Therefore that wise man Mr. Nehru, because foreign affairs depend so much upon timing and going step by step, thought to himself: "Well,

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the first thing to do is to try to get a cease-fire and, when you have got a cease-fire, these other things may be added thereto." That most certainly represents what we desire. Do not try to take all your fences at once. Take the first fence first, and then very often you find the second fence much easier. The first fence is to try to bring about a cease-fire. We are very ready to try to bring about that cease-fire and will do everything we can to achieve that end. Here let me say, in parenthesis, that I agree with the observations of several noble Lords: I see no reason to suppose that China is necessarily committed to the policy of Moscow.
So much for Korea. Let all of us be realistic about the question. Korea is not the main point of trouble. The centre, the seat, the real source of anxiety, of course, rests in Europe. It is idle to pretend that the situation there is easy. Your Lordships will see in the very near future the reply which we are sending to Russia about the meeting. I hope it will make plain that, no matter how many times we have tried and failed in the past, we are prepared once more to try to bring about a settlement of the problems. I really cannot see why, given good will, it should be impossible. The consequences of war would be frightful to everybody. Why should we not come to an agreement? Why is it impossible? It is the fact, and we all know it to be the fact, that we do not want to interfere with the Russian way of life. It may be difficult to convince them of that if they are in doubt about it—I do not know—but we all know it is the fact. If they do not want to interfere with our way of life, then surely we can settle this problem by negotiation, because ultimately, at long last, it has to be settled by negotiation, even if there has been a war or two or three wars in the meantime. Therefore we are very ready to try to see what we can do. Here, again, I agree that there is always a danger of giving the impression that we are negotiating from weakness, and so it is plain that we must do what we can to make ourselves strong.
My Lords, on the question of German rearmament I have listened with very great interest to what your Lordships "have said, and I think I should be wiser
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if on this particular matter I said nothing at the present time. I am afraid that I have said nothing about the atom bomb. I think perhaps I had better not. Of course, the responsibility of anybody who contemplates in any circumstances the use of that frightful weapon is very great, but I am not prepared at the present time, and I have no authority, to go beyond what the Prime Minister said in another place and what appeared in the White Paper. Your Lordships will see that he expressed his satisfaction at the statement which President Truman made to him, and I am afraid that I must leave it there, telling your Lord-ships that from what I have heard from the Prime Minister I can well understand that he was satisfied. My Lords, I thank you for the encouragement, help and criticism which you have given in this debate, and I will certainly see that the suggestions which have been made are passed on to my right honourable friend.

REINSTATEMENT IN CIVIL EMPLOYMENT BILL
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.
RESTORATION OF PREWAR PRACTICES BILL
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.

ADJOURNMENT MOTION: PERSONAL STATEMENT BY LORD MERTHYR
6.55 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, in moving that the House do now adjourn, may I remind your Lordships that to-morrow we meet at eleven o'clock, and not at twelve o'clock, as previously-announced? I beg to move that the House do now adjourn.
Moved, That the House do now adjourn.—(Lord Shepherd.)
LORD MERTHYR: My Lords, before the House adjourns, may I have the leave of the House to make a personal statement? My attention has been drawn to a sentence in the speech I made last evening during the debate on yacht facilities in the Thames and other water-

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ways. In the course of that debate I am reported in column 970 of Hansard as saying:
"I have seen a letter written this year by the Port of London Authority to a well-known yachting organisation, saying in effect: 'Please do not encourage foreigners to come to London in 1951, because we have no facilities for them'."
My Lords, I admit quite readily that those words were spoken without my having the letter in hand. They were uttered from memory, and it was taken from a very brief précis of a letter which I had seen. In order to shorten any discussion as to whether or not I misinterpreted the letter, and with your Lordships' per-mission, I think the only proper thing to do is to read the letter, which is not very long. It is dated October 17, 1950, and is from the Port of London Authority to The Cruising Association. It is as follows:
"Your letter of October 10 has been considered and I have to inform you that owing to the heavy demand in all the Port Authority's Docks for normal traffic it will not be possible to accept any yachts in connection with the Festival of Britain.
There will be some accommodation for cabin cruisers in ranks alongside each other at St. Thomas' Hospital Barge Roads but only for short periods and providing their
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masts lower and they draw less than six feet. Longer yachts could anchor for short periods off Greenwich or Gravesend but you will realise that if the demand is large it may be necessary to divert them still further down river.
If you could give me some idea as to the probable number of yachts that intend coming or wish to come to the Thames it would be most helpful if I knew the proportion of various sizes.
In any correspondence you have with foreign yacht clubs I think it would be better if you sounded a distinct note of warning that the Thames is a highly commercialised river and that even with the best will in the world it is impossible to make it a really pleasant river for yachts, or in fact render many sites available for their exclusive use."
My Lords, that is the letter. If in any way I have misinterpreted that letter I apologise to the Port of London Authority. As I said before, I gave a very brief précis, spoken from memory, without having the letter in my hand. If that was a wrong thing to do, I again apologise. I thought it only right to read the letter. I am sorry to have taken up so much time.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned accordingly at five minutes before seven o'clock.