Lords Sitting of 11 May 1949

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers

  AFRICAN FOOD SUPPLIES
  2.34 p.m.
  VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
  [The Question was as follows:
  To ask His Majesty's Government whether they are fully aware of the serious drought that has been prevalent during the early months of this year throughout Central and East Africa and whether there is any danger of there being a serious shortage of foodstuffs necessary for the Africans in our Colonies in these parts of Africa, especially near the big centres of population; and whether His Majesty's Government are taking all necessary steps to help mitigate the hardships that may arise in the near future.]
  THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COLONIAL AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL): My Lords, His Majesty's Government are aware of the drought to which the noble Viscount refers in his question. Present indications, however, are that the drought which affected certain parts of the territories of Central Africa during the early part of this year will not now prove as serious as was at first expected. The areas principally affected lie within the territories of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Governments concerned have co-operated in arranging a joint plan of grain imports, principally from the United States and the Union of South Africa, which it is hoped will be sufficient to relieve any hardships which may occur during the next twelve months. As regards East Africa, my right honourable friend is aware of reports of shortage of rainfall in parts of Tanganyika, but he has received no report from the Governor that food supplies for the local population have been adversely affected. He is, however, making inquiries.
  His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would like to take this
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  opportunity of expressing their appreciation of the action of the Government of the Union of South Africa in making available from their stocks considerable quantities of grain for the relief of their northern neighbours;. and also to the Government of Southern Rhodesia for the action they have taken in this matter. The Governments of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia are also entitled to recognition for the urgent and able manner in which they tackled the problem in their respective territories.
  VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for the answer, I would like to ask him whether the drought will have any serious effect on the Tanganyika ground-nuts scheme, as we have been given to understand that harvesting started a month earlier than usual. Can the noble Earl tell us what loss of tonnage of ground-nuts and sunflower seeds is expected owing to the drought?
  THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I am afraid that I cannot answer that question without notice, although I believe that my right honourable friend the Minister of Food answered a Question on this subject a few days ago in another place. However, I will certainly obtain the information and let the noble Viscount have it as soon as I can.

  LOSS OF GERMAN MUSEUM TREASURES
  2.36 p.m.
  LORD FARINGDON: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
  [The Question was as follows:
  To ask His Majesty's Government what has been the extent of loss of articles of artistic and historical value from among those stored at Fahloss Celle; what steps have been taken to trace such articles and to ascertain responsibility for their loss; whether a complete inventory of the remaining articles has been made and what progress has been made in discovering their provenance.]
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD HENDERSON): My Lords, I assume that the reference is to the respository at Schloss Celle, where collections of objects from

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  various German museums, which were concealed for safe custody in salt mines during the war, are now stored. I am aware that losses from this repository have been alleged, but it is almost impossible to estimate their extent because the inventories prepared at the beginning of the war are not complete and it is possible that some of the collections were rifled before they came to Celle.
  The alleged losses have, however, been the subject of prolonged investigations by the police, both British and German, who have interviewed many people and made inquiries at jewellers, pawnbrokers, bullion dealers and other likely places. These investigations, which have been undertaken in France and the United Kingdom, as well as in Germany, and which are still being pursued, have not yet resulted in any of the missing articles being traced or in establishing who was responsible for their loss. Nothing has come to light incriminating any British official.
  A full inventory of the contents of the repository is nearing completion. It has been delayed by the lack of suitably qualified experts. The packing cases in which the articles are stored have, so far as possible, been marked with the names of the museums to which they belong. The present arrangements for safeguarding the collections are satisfactory in all respects, and it is anticipated that the entire contents of the repository will be handed over to the German authorities at a fairly early date.
  LORD FARINGDON: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his reply. May I ask whether it is not the case that amongst the objects at Schloss Celle there are, or may be, objects which had been looted from German-occupied territory during the war, which had been removed from those territories into the German museums, thence into the salt mines and then into Schloss Celle? Has it been possible to trace this double transference back again?
  LORD HENDERSON: I have no information on that point, but I shall be glad to have it looked into. If I obtain any information I will let the noble Lord have it.

  GLASGOW FIRE TRAGEDY
  2.41 p.m.
  LORD CLYDESMUIR: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
  [The Question was as follows:
  To ask His Majesty's Government whether they have any statement to make on the disastrous fire in Glasgow on May 4, in which thirteen young girls lost their lives and many more were hurt.]
  THE PALIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF WORKS (LORD MORRISON): My Lords, may I, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, express the deepest sympathy with all who have suffered injury or bereavement through this disastrous fire? The fire originated on the ground floor near the lift. The flames spread up the open lift shaft with great speed, and entered all floors as they passed to the top of the building. The circumstances are being carefully investigated. I am very glad to have this opportunity of paying tribute to the courage and resourcefulness of the firemen, the police and those employed at the premises, and to the able co-operation of the other public services.
  LORD CLYDESMUIR: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for the answer, and associating myself in his expression of sympathy for the relatives of the deceased, does he not agree with me that it is an extraordinary and very distressing occurrence that so many lives were lost through people being trapped within a few feet of safety? Will the noble Lord ensure that a full inquiry is made to ascertain whether the safety precautions were adequate, and also satisfy himself that the fire brigades had full and adequate appliances for reaching high roofs?
  LORD MORRISON: My Lords, with regard to the last point, I have to-day read a full account of all the circumstances that are known of this disastrous fire, and I am satisfied that the fire brigades in Glasgow that were summoned to this fire are in possession of appliances which are probably as up-to-date as those of any fire brigade in this country. There was considerable difficulty about getting their ladders into operation, because of the overhead electric cables, which might

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  have caused an even greater disaster had they made contact with the firemen's ladders. I can assure the noble Lord that the fullest investigation will be made into all the circumstances, and I can only repeat that after a perusal of all the facts of this case I am greatly impressed with both the courage and efficiency of the firemen, the police and, indeed, all the public services concerned.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord who is to make this careful investigation into the disastrous fire which occurred—whether it is to be a court of inquiry set up by his Department, and whether he will be in a position to report back again to the House when this inquiry has been completed?
  LORD MORRISON: My Lords, I shall be pleased to report back again to the House, but I am not at the moment able to say exactly what form the inquiry will take. At the present time, the Scottish Government Department are making a full investigation into all the circumstances. Under Section 33 of the Fire Services Act, 1947, it would be possible for the Secretary of State to hold a public inquiry, if there were any suggestion that the Glasgow Fire Service had not properly carried out its duties under that Act. As there is no question but that the fire brigade acted in the most meritorious manner, there is no point in holding an inquiry under that section. The investigation is being held to inquire into all the facts of this disaster, and after the inquiry I shall be pleased to inform the noble Lord of the decision reached.
  LORD CLYDESMUIR: May we take it that there will be a further report? Shall I put down a question for that purpose, or will the noble Lord get in touch with me?
  LORD MORRISON: Perhaps the noble Lord will contact me when I am in a position to make a further statement.

  NAVAL ESTIMATES
  2.47 p.m.
  LORD TEYNHAM LORD TEYNHAM rose to call attention to the Memorandum on Naval Estimates recently presented, and to ask His Majesty's Government whether they are satisfied that the proposals therein con-
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  tained are adequate for the defence of the country; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, a few weeks ago your Lordships debated a Motion on Naval Policy, with special reference to personnel. Since that date we have had the signing of the Atlantic Pact, the Prime Ministers' Conference and also Conferences on the Western Union. I therefore suggest that it is now very appropriate that to-day we should debate the Memorandum on Naval Estimates as a whole. I understand that Naval representatives, not only from the British Commonwealth but also from America and the Benelux Countries, have been, and perhaps still are, in this country. I hope the First Lord of the Admiralty will be able to tell your Lordships to-day something of the plans for the co-ordination and co-operation of their respective naval forces. I understand that it is contemplated that the navies of the Western Union Countries—France, Belgium and the Netherlands—shall co-operate in combined exercises this summer, and I hope that we shall hear that similar arrangements are to be made for exercises with the American Fleet.
  I should now like to draw your Lordships' attention to the actual financial provisions for the Navy, as set out in the Estimates for this year. I suggest that it is well known in naval circles—and possibly to a number of your Lordships—that the Admiralty programme of new construction, conversion and reconditioning of the Fleet, is based on a period extending over a number of years. I should like to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is satisfied that the financial provision for the Naval Service this year is in every way sufficient to cover the first stages of this plan. I would suggest that the minimum figure required is not £189,000,000, as set out in the Estimates, but that it should be very much nearer the figure of £220,000,000 in order to enable the Admiralty effectively to carry out their plan. I think it is true to say that a very urgent reconstruction programme is necessary for most, if not all, of our aircraft carriers. That is because of the increase in weight and landing speed of the aircraft now to be used with them. Can the First Lord give an assurance that provision has in fact been made for

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  the strengthening and rebuilding of the flight decks of our fleet carriers, whether work will be undertaken on them this year and, also, what is the intention as regards our light fleet carriers?
  Since the war, of course, there has been a tremendous improvement and extension of radar, in fire control systems and in methods of anti-submarine warfare. I think it is true to say that in that respect almost all our ships are out of date and require modernisation. Supersonic targets will require the most advanced fire control equipment, and new radar equipment is also of vital importance. I should like to ask the First Lord whether he is satisfied that provision has been made for this vitally important modernisation of the ships of our Fleet. In another place recently, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty did his best to belittle the menace of the Russian submarine fleet. It may well be that the majority of the Russian submarines are not of the modern high-speed design, but in the event of war even a comparatively small number of such high-speed craft would place our convoys of merchant ships in deadly danger. I know that it has been argued from time to time that it would be possible to block the exits of the Baltic by mining and so on, but I think that scheme is a highly problematical one, and, in any case, in the event of war, enemy submarines would be at sea long before hostilities began.
  Has provision been made for dealing with this submarine menace?—because I think it is a menace, however much it may be discounted. I suggest that the provision made at the present time to cope with this menace, or even the provision likely in the near future, so far as we can see from the information given us by His Majesty's Government, is entirely inadequate. On page 6 of the Explanatory Statement on the Naval Estimates we find a table setting out the strength of the Fleet in classes, and your Lordships will note that it indicates that in the active Fleet we have only 33 destroyers and 25 frigates. It is true that there are 80 old destroyers and some 129 frigates in reserve, but the speed of these frigates is far too low to be of any use against the modern submarine. What is being done to overcome this deplorable
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  shortage in high-speed anti-submarine vessels?
  The Civil Lord in another place has gone a certain distance to supply the answer to this important question, but he has given us very little information. He stated that His Majesty's Government consider that the best plan for dealing with this shortage in the quickest way would be by conversion rather than by new construction. This plan may be a good one as a temporary measure, if real steps are being taken to get on with such conversion. But what do we find? We find from a statement by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty that we are making a prototype of two fast frigates and that these are being made from two old destroyers. We do not know when this work commenced or when it is likely to be completed. Can the First Lord inform us how far this work has progressed, whether he is satisfied that the type of propelling machinery designed for these frigates is in good and quick supply for any future conversions, and how many conversions it is proposed to carry out this year?
  I suggest that it is obvious to any student of naval warfare that what is required at the present time is a rapid modernisation of our anti-submarine craft. This is vitally important. It should also be combined with new construction. That programme I hope His Majesty's Government are now considering. I think it was the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, who recently suggested in your Lordships' House that what the Navy really wanted was 1,000 small antisubmarine craft. I imagine the noble Viscount must have had in mind quite small vessels of possibly 500 tons displacement and under; but I suggest that such vessels would be far too small for anti-submarine work except in the approaches to harbours and for coastal work. An anti-submarine vessel must have good sea-keeping qualities for convoy protection, and must also have a large radius of action. The minimum displacement for a high-speed antisubmarine vessel, capable of carrying all the modern anti-submarine gear, weapons for air defence and so on, is in the nature of 1,700 tons displacement—a figure which I feel sure the First Lord will not dispute.
  I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to certain naval developments in the United States—developments which have been made fully public to the people of that country. In the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy these words were used:
  "Developments in submarines have indicated that a 'true' submersible is not beyond the realms of practicability. With 70 per cent. of the earth covered by water and with the advantage of concealment and difficulty of detection, it is possible that a future conflict might involve as many battles under the sea as on the surface."
  How is America proposing to deal with this new development in submarine warfare? in the first place, she is converting two light fleet carriers especially for antisubmarine warfare, and she is also constructing three "killer" submarines for operations against enemy submarines. She certainly appears, therefore, to be very much alive to the submarine menace. When we turn to the Empire there is certainly a ray of hope. In the first week of April the Canadian House of Commons discussed a Supplementary Estimate for Defence, and great interest was shown in the question of the adequacy of their anti-submarine forces. The Canadian Government, I believe, are laying down this year three anti-submarine escort vessels of a new high-speed type, which I am sure will be a welcome addition to the Atlantic Pact forces. I hope the First Lord will be able to assure us that similar and equivalent developments are planned for our anti-submarine forces. We must not forget the story of the U-boats. The Germans began the last war with only fifty-seven submarines, but in spite of the most intense aerial bombardment they were able to step up their production; in fact, the production of new submarines was at the rate of one for every second day of the war.
  I would now ask your Lordships to turn to page 236 of the Naval Estimates, whereon it is indicated that three cruisers have been launched but not yet brought into service. You will notice from a footnote on this page—printed in perhaps the smallest type it is possible to read—that constructional work has been suspended on these cruisers and also that future armament is dependent on research now in progress. Can the First Lord indicate when work will be resumed on these cruisers and if the new armament, which I believe is under research, has yet been
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  determined? Ministerial statements have appeared in the past suggesting that our large modern destroyers are really equivalent to light cruisers. In a certain sense that may be true—but they must not be counted twice over, as has been done by His Majesty's Government in one or two cases.
  At one time it was considered that seventy cruisers was the minimum number necessary for the protection of our trade routes and to carry out the various calls on the naval services which arise from time to time. I am not suggesting that we should now have seventy cruisers because, admittedly, the aircraft carrier has to a certain extent modified the use of cruisers, but none the less I would suggest that fifteen cruisers in the active fleet and twelve in reserve is far too small a figure, especially as many of them are old ships. When we examine the number of aircraft carriers we find there is only one fleet carrier and four light fleet carriers in the active fleet and six fleet carriers and two light fleet carriers in reserve, with one fleet carrier and one light fleet carrier building. I should like to ask the First Lord whether he considers that a total of twenty-seven cruisers and twelve aircraft carriers is equivalent to seventy cruisers for the protection of our trade routes, and, if so, what are the reasons for coming to that conclusion.
  I now come to the type of vessel which is too often forgotten, but is none the less of the greatest importance and without which the Normandy landings could not have been attempted, much less carried out, and that is the minesweeper. It appears that only, fourteen minesweepers are with the active fleet, and that fifty sweepers, either fleet or auxiliary, are in reserve. During the last war we found it necessary to use some 400 vessels of this type. I do not suggest that we should have that number now, but I should like to ask the First Lord whether he proposes to increase the number of minesweepers in training and what steps are being taken to build up a really effective minesweeping force to cover all eventualities; otherwise at the outbreak of hostilities we might very well find our ports and approaches mined and with no suitable craft to deal with it. The old idea of a trawler and stout-hearted fishermen is no longer tenable. Ships for minesweeping

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  duties must be specially and scientifically built, and their crews be very highly trained indeed.
  In the past we have heard a great deal from the First Lord about balanced fleets; but what sort of balanced fleet does he propose to maintain in the Far East? Does he consider that the Far Eastern Fleet, without an aircraft carrier, is a balanced fleet? I do not propose to-day to enter into a lengthy discussion of the Yangtse disaster, except to say that had an aircraft carrier been attached to the Far Eastern Fleet it might not have been necessary to risk the loss of the cruiser "London" and the sloop "Black Swan." A great deal of nonsense has been written in the Press recently about air cover and air support, and I suggest that anyone who has actually carried out operations in confined waters, both with and without air support, is well aware of the difference and its value. I do not suggest that continuous air cover should, or could, have been provided during the passage of the "Amethyst"; but I do suggest that, when she was attacked, the whole position changed, and if air support had then been available, even for a short period, against the Communist batteries on the banks of the river, it might well have been possible to extricate the "Amethyst" from the position in which she now lies. I am sure there is no Admiral flying his flag who would not go to the rescue of one of his ships, whatever the circumstances, but he should not be driven to do so without there being available air support upon which he could call.
  In 1947 there were two light fleet carriers with the China Fleet, but these were withdrawn in October of that year, owing to measures taken by His Majesty's Government to accelerate naval demobilisation. I should like to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he has yet taken steps to provide the ships of the Far Eastern Fleet with an aircraft carrier and, if not, when it may be possible to do so. I know that there are certain schools of thought who maintain that we should spend far less money on the Navy and should vote our resources to the Air Force. I think it is also true to say that some people believe that sea power is almost obsolete, and that air power has entirely supplanted it.
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  I suggest that those two views are profoundly mistaken, and that what we really require for successful defensive and offensive operations is a close integration of sea power and air power.
  Quite rightly, the Air Force should be considered as a first line of defence and given top priority, but at the same time we must remember that this country will still have to be victualled by sea, since there is no prospect in the foreseeable future of aircraft taking the place of ships for carrying the vast quantities of food and stores required in war time. In that respect, therefore, we must still fall back on our merchant fleets, and concentrate our naval policy, in close association with the Air Force, on their protection. It may be true that air cover can largely protect our convoys in the future, but I think it will probably be a long time before they can do so without the aid of naval forces. It is therefore of vital importance that we should build up and train an effective anti-submarine fleet.
  We all realise, of course, that we can set aside for the Armed Forces only a proportion of our national finances, in order that we do not impede our national recovery in the economic field, but I am bound to say that the Naval Estimates for this year give little indication of what His Majesty's Government intend to be the broad strategical purpose of the Navy in the future. I beg to move for Papers.
  3.5 p.m.
  LORD WINSTER: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, has made a speech which, if he will allow me to say so, in every line reflected his great professional abilities and the thought which he devotes to the problems of his profession. I would particularly like to reinforce and emphasise the point which he made at the beginning of his remarks about the necessity for modernising and reconstructing our ships. In that respect, I wish to call your Lordships' attention to the sad and lamentable story of the sinking of the "Hood." From the time she was launched, the "Hood" was known by her constructors to have a defect. She had a weak spot, and for some reason—no doubt, the reasons were very strong at the time—she was never taken in hand to have the necessary reconstruction done. The result, as we all know, was that she was sunk by the "Bismarck"

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  after being hit in that very spot that the constructors had known all along was a vital and dangerous spot. Therefore I reinforce what the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, has said about the necessity for looking at our ships and seeing what reconstruction or modernisation is necessary.
  Equally, I wish to reinforce what the noble Lord has said about the necessity for speed, which is all-important. I hope that he will not mind if I say that I do not think that on all points his speech was related to the facts of the world situation. I know that at one time seventy cruisers were considered to be necessary to protect our sea communications, but the position at sea was very different in those days. There were then potential enemies which do not exist today. As I shall say later on in my speech, when we are considering what is necessary for the Navy to-day we must not think in terms of the last war, or of the situation before the last war; we must think of the world situation, and of the situation at sea, as it actually exists to-day.
  I have some questions to put to the First Lord. I hope that he will not take them amiss, because I do not put them in any unfriendly or critical spirit. I believe that the country has great confidence in the Board of Admiralty as it exists to-day, and that that confidence is well placed. But there is a certain amount of public misapprehension on one or two points. If I put certain questions to the First Lord, I trust that he will recognise that I do so in the hope that he may give answers which will reassure public opinion upon those points. The noble Lord who opened this debate referred to the Yangtse disaster. We need not go into that matter again, but I thought that the word. "disaster" was perhaps a little strong and emphatic. There is a great deal about that affair that reflected immense credit upon the Navy. It is a very fine page in our naval history, and I would not go so far as to call what happened a disaster. But I do not propose to go into that to-day.
  I rejoiced the other day to see a statement that Hong Kong is to be defended, and that the Minister of Defence said that the Far Eastern Fleet will be reinforced by one cruiser and, if necessary, a carrier. I would ask the noble
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  Viscount whether, when he speaks this afternoon, he will make clear the difference between replacements and reinforcements, because it is possible to get the two confused. Perhaps what appear to some people to be reinforcements are in fact replacements. As I understand it, the "Jamaica" is due in the Far East on May 31, and the "Mauritius" is on her way to the Far Eastern Fleet with a destroyer and two frigates. But what we would like to know is exactly what naval forces will be available at Hong Kong by May 31—that is, by the end of this month; also, whether a carrier is to be made available. If she is to be made available, where is that carrier to come from? At the present moment, so far as I know, the nearest carrier to Hong Kong is 7,000 miles away. The Mediterranean and the Home Fleets have carriers. What other squadrons besides those two have carriers? If there are squadrons which are without carriers, what action could those squadrons take against any possible opponent which had the use of shore-based aircraft? I think that those are questions that it would be worth while answering to-day.
  There were two carriers in the Far East, the "Theseus" and the "Glory." They were both withdrawn, but at that time an undertaking—or, at any rate, an intimation—was given that they were to be replaced. That promise or that intimation has not been fulfilled. There is still no carrier with the Far Eastern Fleet. There is the "Terrible," on the Australian station, but the "Terrible," as I understand, is not yet operational, and will not be for some time. If there is need, as I believe there is, for a carrier for the Far Eastern Fleet, why cannot a carrier be detached from the Home or Mediterranean Fleets and sent out there? What is the strategical situation or what is the threat in Home or Mediterranean waters that would prevent a carrier being detached from one of those squadrons and sent out to the Far East?
  We are very short of carriers, and this question is an extremely important one. We have only twelve carriers. We have stopped building on three. We have eight in commission, and four in reserve. Would the First Lord tell us to-day how soon those four in reserve could be brought forward and made operational? Our reserve carriers present very considerable difficulties when it is desired to

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  bring them forward and make them operational. The question of equipment, the necessity for shore bases, the question of electrical personnel, all present the most formidable difficulties when carriers are being brought into commission. I think it would be of great interest to know how soon it is considered that those four carriers in reserve could be made operational if the need arose.
  My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, said that there are those to-day who are a little inclined to question the necessity for a large Navy, and who look rather askance at expenditure upon the Navy. As a matter of fact, there is a great deal of force in the arguments which those who hold those views bring forward. They deserve examination. With your Lordships' permission I will try to examine them this afternoon. To our country, which has a great Colonial Empire, overseas commitments and commitments under the Atlantic Pact, of course a Navy is essential. But it is the fact to-day that there are no other navies for us to fight. So while a Navy is essential, perhaps it need not be a very large Navy. To-day I think the composition of the Fleet is the all-important question—more important than the question of size.
  If any of your Lordships were to visit the Museum of the Royal United Services Institution in Whitehall you would see a wonderful model of the Grand Fleet at sea during the 1914–18 war—a very remarkable model indeed, with masses and masses of battleships. In these days, that exhibit reminds me of the models which may be seen in the South Kensington Museum—models of those extinct monsters which perished because they were all body and no head: they exhausted their functions, they became obsolete. And I am not at all sure that the same thing cannot be said of the battleship to-day. But I am quite sure about one thing—namely, that we have got to learn a lesson from those extinct monsters. We have got to use our heads, and must not rely upon size alone for safety in the future.
  In regard to our national necessities in armaments perhaps it may be the case that the Navy must yield pride of place to the Army and to the Air Force. If I may venture to say so, let us live in a world of reality about this matter. To-day
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  there is no potential enemy at sea, except possibly Russia. Russia has never been very distinguished for her fighting capacities at sea, and to-day the Russian surface fleet is completely obsolete, while the Russian submarine fleet, about which I know there is a great deal of talk, has not the officers and men with the capacities, the training or the experience which are so essential to make a submarine navy effective. The fact is that the Russian officers and men simply have not the "know-how" of submarine warfare. If we look at the formidable naval resources which Great Britain and America command to-day I do not think we need worry unduly about any possible Russian menace at sea. I saw, last year I think, a letter from an Admiral in which he referred again to those 70,000 miles of sea communications upon which we depend for our food and commerce. I am sure that numerically that is correct; but does it matter how long our sea communications are if there is no enemy to attack them? How is Russia to get out of the Baltic or out of the Black Sea to carry on a war against our overseas communications?
  This country has never begrudged money to the Navy. This country has always been a generous giver, a generous paymaster where the Navy has been concerned. But I think the country is now asking whether we really need spend as much on the Navy as we do at present, and whether other armament claims are not more deserving of attention. I hope the First Lord will not mind my saying that I think the Admiralty may fairly be called upon for vigorous and detailed justification before an impartial judge of every item of its expenditure. In my opinion, the function of the Minister of Defence should not be that of a conciliator, one who lets each Service have its cut at the cake. I think there may be cases where the Minister ought to harden his heart and say that there is no cake for some particular little boy. We do not want a Minister of Defence who says simply that everyone must have his cut at the cake. As an instance of this I would like to ask what we are spending at the present moment upon our five battleships, and exactly what value the country gets from those five battleships for the money which they cost us. What is the tactical role of the battleship to-day?

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  The First Lord has been at sea in a battleship, and if there is a case for the battleship why cannot it be made? And before what better audience could it be made than before your Lordships' House, which contains so many naval officers of great intellectual and professional experience and ability? If a case exists for the battleship, if it can be made, let the First Lord make it; and let him make it before the experienced and critical audience of your Lordships' House. But what is the tactical rôle of the battleship? I read that a battleship took part in the recent manœuvres off Gibraltar. I wonder what was her tactical rôle in those manœuvres. I read that she carried the umpire! Certainly one must have an umpire, but it seems to me that if that was her sole tactical rôle upon that occasion, it was rather an expensive form of transport for the umpire. What I would very much like to know is exactly what rôle the battleship maintains in the Mediterranean? There are submarines, destroyers and various other ships there, and there is one battleship. I suppose there are strategical, tactical plans for the use of these ships, but what rôle could a solitary battleship play in the Mediterranean Fleet? Three battleships are being used for training. I have no doubt they fulfil their function in that respect admirably, but I should have thought it a very expensive use to which to put battleships, and I should be surprised to hear that there were not cheaper methods of carrying out the training.
  The story of the battleship is a very old one. In 1920, or 1921, I assisted in preparing the brief for Admiral Beatty to take to the Cabinet to prove the necessity for the continued existence of battleships. Between the two wars, one expert after another threw doubts upon the value of the battleship, but their voices fell upon deaf ears. So what happened in the last war? We found battleships being employed for convoy duties. If anyone can tell me of a more unsuitable warship than a battleship to convoy merchant ships at sea, I would like to know what it is. When we were desperately short of fast frigates, corvettes and destroyers, we were using battleships on convoy duties, and great ships, like the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse," were sent to their doom upon a completely sleeveless errand. Really, has the time not come to announce that the battleship has
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  become obsolete? Even Hitler, who was always sick when he went to sea, knew it. At one time he gave an order to pay off every capital ship in the German Navy. He knew perfectly well that the battleship, as we have known it, was obsolete.
  I suggest to your Lordships that the time has come when we must think about the Navy in terms of quite another fleet than that which is based upon the battleship. Especially, we must think of the size of fleet that is necessary when there is no potential enemy at sea, and what should be the composition of our future fleet. If I had to give an opinion about that, my mind would be turning towards a fleet composed of such vessels as cruisers, destroyers, rocket ships, motor boats, carriers and submarines. I would not be thinking in terms of the very heavy, rather lumbering, cumbersome battleship. No, I would be thinking in terms of a fleet something like a cloud of gnats or a swarm of bees, something fast and mobile, versatile, ubiquitous and elastic in its operations. Looking at the future and at the trends of present developments in weapons, I feel it is in terms of that type of fleet that we should be thinking. Unless the noble Viscount, the First Lord of the Admiralty, can give your Lordships' House some information and make out a case for the battleship, proving its tactical value and the tactical necessity for it, I say that, whatever expenditure or apparent loss might be involved for the time being, let us have the courage to say that the day of the battleship is over and find some more profitable use for the money which we are spending to-day on five battleships which are employed in the manner I have described to your Lordships.
  3.23 p.m.
  EARL HOWE: My Lords, the noble Lord who has just sat down put some very pertinent questions to the First Lord in the first part of his speech—questions which, I entirely agree, certainly require an answer. Then, suddenly, something seemed to cause him to go on to a sidetrack as it were, and he began querying the need for the existence of a Navy composed as it is to-day, in spite of the fact that he told us he has every confidence in the Naval Staff. He wound up with a very eloquent discourse upon the merits or the demerits of the battleship.

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  I almost felt I was listening to the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, when I heard the noble Lord's attack.
  I approach this subject of the Navy as just an ordinary man in the street—as do most of your Lordships. I regard myself as just a man in the street who is profoundly anxious about the Navy at the present time. There are one or two things concerning it which have made a particularly strong impression upon me. First there is the extraordinary difficulty of getting any real information about the Fleet as it exists to-day. Secondly, there is the impossibility, as it seems to me, of getting any answer from the Government as to what is their long-term plan. With regard to the Navy, I submit that, above all things, we have to look ahead, plan for the future, take a long-term view. But we do not know what the Admiralty plan is; we have not the least idea of it. All we know is that since the war the Admiralty have done their best to please the noble Lord who spoke last by scrapping or disposing of ten battleships, one battle-cruiser, forty aircraft carriers, thirty cruisers and one hundred destroyers. Not very much has been said about this: in fact, no real explanation has been given to your Lordships' House, or to another place, for that matter, as to what was the governing policy which decided all this. No doubt it has been accepted so far as it goes. But during these last four years we have not laid down a single ship in any one of the classes that we have scrapped.
  We cannot maintain a Navy by a policy of scrapping. Such a policy must come to an end somewhere. So long as you carry on that policy you are only living on your fat. Therefore, I suggest that the country has a right to be told what sort of Navy we are to have; what is to be the governing plan. Before the last war, and for a long time back, Governments were able to take the country into their confidence and give reasonable explanations as to what their naval polices were. What stops His Majesty's present Government from telling us something about it? I would like the First Lord to give us a little more information, if he will be so good, in addition to that which I have managed to glean for myself. According to my information, the building of three fleet carriers of very large tonnage and size, grand ships, no doubt (two of
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  them were of 45,000 tons), two cruisers and forty destroyers has been cancelled. That is in addition to the ships scrapped. What has been the effect of this on the Fleet as a whole? We have at present, so far as my researches give me any guidance, five battleships, twelve aircraft carriers, one escort carrier, twenty-six cruisers, 113 destroyers (together with forty-five of the Hunt class), sixty-three submarines and 171 frigates and corvettes. Broadly speaking, the Fleet we have today almost exactly represents our losses during the late war. During that war we lost five battleships, eight aircraft carriers, twenty-eight cruisers, 139 destroyers, eighty-three submarines, fifty-two frigates and fifteen armed merchantmen.
  The point is surely that we ought to know a little more about policy. Take the matter of new construction. If your Lordships turn to page 235 of the Naval Estimates, you will see that the fleet carrier "Eagle" was launched on March 19, 1946. She was launched in 1946 and she is still not complete. Statements, whether inspired or not and whether on good foundation or not I cannot say, have appeared in the Press recently to the effect that she is not to be completed until next year. Now the "Eagle" had a sister ship, the "Ark Royal." On page 234 of the Estimates your Lordships will see details of fleet carriers being built but apparently not launched, and, so far as my information goes, one of those ships is the "Ark Royal," sister ship to the "Eagle."
  So here we are, after all these years, and the ship is still apparently building—heaven knows what state she is in ! Further down on page 235 your Lordships will see a list of light fleet carriers, including the "Hercules," the "Albion," the "Bulwark" and the "Centaur." Now one of the disadvantages of the light fleet carrier to-day is that she is only a 25-knot ship. The ships to which I have just referred are, I believe, 32-knot ships. Such vessels are probably of much greater use to the modern Fleet than light fleet carriers which are not capable of such speed.
  We come to the cruiser question. Your Lordships will see from page 236 of the Navy Estimates that we have three cruisers under construction. In what state are these cruisers? According to my information, no work whatever has

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  been carried out on them. What is the policy with regard to cruisers? How long are we going on with only twenty cruisers in our modern Fleet? Both of the previous speakers have stated that we ought to have seventy cruisers, which was the minimum Lord Jellicoe considered necessary I agree that circumstances to-day are very different, and no doubt Lord Jellicoe himself would review that figure in the light of the existence of the aircraft carrier. Probably, we do not need so many. But we must not forget the large number of cruisers required to hunt down hostile raiders. During the last war we had ample evidence of the harm that an armed merchant raider can do on a trade route. What is happening with regard to the "Plough," the "Defence" and the "Tiger"?
  In regard to destroyers, the "Decoy," the name ship of a new class, has been launched. Eight are being laid down altogether. How far has work proceeded on the other seven, and when will they be completed? No member of your Lordships' House, however powerfully he may try to pretend that battleships are no good, will argue against destroyers. I do not want to weary your Lordships with too many figures, but I may remind you that the Home Fleet to-day consists of three aircraft carriers, three cruisers and eighteen destroyers. In 1939, it consisted of seven battleships, two aircraft carriers, six cruisers and twenty-eight destroyers. The submarine menace has not decreased during the years, and it seems to me that, as always, we shall be short of destroyers. I wonder if a single one of the distinguished flag officers who are members of your Lordships' House would tell us that he has ever had under his command enough destroyers. I do not believe there is one.
  In the North American and West ladies Squadron before the war, we had five cruisers and two sloops. To-day we are supposed to have two cruisers and four frigates. Some months ago we were shown how dangerous Guatemala could be and we had further evidence of the danger to the Falkland Islands. Cruisers were summoned from all over the world, and hurried off to try and hold the fort, some even being turned into transports to convey troops. One of the two cruisers has already been taken away from the West Indies to hold the fort in China.
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  Why do we have to do all this? It seems to me evidence of the absence of careful thinking and a long-term plan. It seems to me that either we have not enough forces on the spot or we have not an adequate plan.
  Both the previous speakers pointed out, with truth, that we have not a single aircraft carrier east of Suez. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, amidst the applause of your Lordships, said that we all want to see Hong Kong defended. Every single soul in this country—with the exception, no doubt, of some "hard-boiled" Communists—is entirely behind the Government in their declared policy to defend Hong Kong. But how? At Hong Kong we have one air strip which lies on the edge of the mainland territory. It could be fairly easily put out of action by hostile artillery fire; and if that happened we should have nothing else.
  What are we going to do? It seems to me that a carrier is urgently required in that area—but not one carrier alone. It is unnecessary for me to point out to your Lordships that without aircraft an aircraft carrier is one of the most vulnerable and helpless ships afloat. This is a case for sending not one carrier, but certainly two, and perhaps three, to that disturbed area at the present time, because of the enormous distances to be, covered and impossibility of reinforcement at short notice. The noble Lord, who spoke last dealt with reinforcements. We have withdrawn the "Norfolk." The "London" is very severely damaged—four turrets are out of action, and no doubt she will have to go in for a long refit. Whether that can be done at Hong Kong or whether she will have to come home, perhaps the first Lord of the Admiralty will be able to tell us. I am told that the "Constance" is to come home; and of course there is the unfortunate "Amethyst," marooned up the Yangtse, and the "Black Swan" which has also been severely damaged. Two sloops are to be sent out to take their place. Any student of affairs understands that China is definitely a danger area to-day. What it may be to-morrow, who can say?
  In the Royal Navy to-day we have six fleet carriers and six light fleet carriers. I wonder if the Admiralty are entirely satisfied with the light fleet carrier from an all-round point of view. Maybe they

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  are useful working with convoys, but with their slower speed they cannot be of the same tactical value as the fleet carrier, which can do her 32 knots. I hope the First Lord can reassure the House that it is the policy of the Admiralty to try to keep the Fleet's speed at a more or less uniform figure of 32 knots, which has been the rule up to now.
  I thought the noble Lord who spoke last was very optimistic in his remarks about the Russian submarine navy. I do not know anything about the Russian submarine navy, and I do not know whether the noble Lord has special channels of information. I had an opportunity of going aboard one or two Russian submarines during the war, however, and I agree with him that the Russian submarine, when officered and manned by Russians, is perhaps not the same menace as the same ship would be in the hands of Germans. At the same time, is the noble Lord quite sure that the Russian submarine navy has not an appreciable percentage of Germans helping them in running their navy? One has reason to think that they have. Again, how are we to meet that menace? Obviously, the only craft we have that can meet the modern submarine, which does 20 knots-plus submerged, are the 113 destroyers and the forty-five "Hunt" Class destroyers. The "Hunt" Class are all very well for fighting in the North Sea and the approaches, but they have not the radius of action to cover the broad ocean. Therefore the destroyer force that we possess to deal with fleet reconnaissance, and to act as an anti-submarine force in the Atlantic and elsewhere, is 113 all told.
  I submit that the destroyer force is not at all satisfactory. I suggest that the Fleet destroyer is not the ideal craft to hunt submarines. They are fairly large, and their turning circle is considerable. It sems to me that a new type of ship altogether is required. I have already ventured to submit this argument to your Lordships on a previous occasion, and I hope the House will forgive me if I return to the advocacy of the same idea. My submission to the House and to the Government is this. We want an entirely new type of anti-submarine vessel; a ship with tremendous endurance and with
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  the ability to accelerate to 35 or 40 knots, if required, for a longer or shorter period. There are people in this country who say that a combination of the diesel engine, plus the gas turbine and variable pitch propellers, will give us the ship we want. I do not know whether that is a revolutionary suggestion, but it has been adopted by the Admiralty in the past. When the Admiralty were considering the new destroyers in about 1936—it may have been a little earlier—they invited the shipbuilders to submit competitive designs. Out of those designs I believe the "Tribal" class of destroyer emerged. Why should not the Admiralty now call for designs? We are told that they are converting two older destroyers that means there will be only 111 destroyers to work with the Fleet instead of 113. But even if those ships are converted more or less satisfactorily, they will be only adaptations; they are not likely to be so satisfactory as ships designed ad hoc. I submit that if a ship such as I have described can be evolved, that is a type which is wanted for work with the Fleet.
  I am afraid I have taken up too much time already, but I would plead with the Admiralty to take the country into their confidence. It has been done in America, so why not here? Tell us what you are aiming at. Tell us what your overall plan is. I am certain that if you will do what the Labour Party pamphlets say and "Believe in Britain," you will then "get somewhere."
  3.42 p.m.
  VISCOUNT CALDECOTE: My Lords, so far in this debate two of the noble Lords who have spoken have pressed either for new types of ship construction or for better provisions to be made for ships to be brought forward from reserve. The noble Earl who has just spoken asked for an entirely new type of ship. All those requirements, with which I fully agree, will throw more work on those responsible for designing and building the ships. That brings me to the subject of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, on which, with your Lordships' permission, I would like to say a few words. I know that this subject was raised in your Lordships' House a comparatively short time ago but, so far as I can see, in spite of every promise from the First Lord that he would do all he

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  could, there has been no improvement in the situation since then. This subject has already been dealt with by such distinguished sailors that I feel that anything I may say is rather like a rifle used in a full-scale naval bombardment. My only excuse for dealing with this matter is that I have had an opportunity to view this lamentable situation from several points of view: first of all, from the naval side, then from the point of view of the constructors and now from one of the sources of recruitment. And, from every angle from which I have looked at the matter, the picture seems to get blacker.
  There are, it is true, one or two brighter aspects. First, there is the magnificent work that the Corps have done—that understaffed, underpaid and, very often, misunderstood body of men. I need not say any more about that, because eloquent tributes have already been paid to their work. The second bright spot was the Eastham Committee and the Report which they made over two and a half years ago. That body was a very strong, independent one. The Committee took evidence all over the country, at Royal Dockyards, from private shipbuilders and from the universities, and they produced a Report that was unanimous. But after two and a half years, that Report has still not been published. In spite of that, a good deal is known of the recommendations in the Report, particularly as they affect conditions of service in the Corps. Therefore, no good purpose can be served by ref using any longer to publish the Report.
  Already there is a widespread feeling of frustration throughout the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors; of resentment at the long delay in publishing the Report; of concern that the recommendations of that Report, which are known to be advantageous to the Corps, and the adoption of which would considerably improve conditions in the Corps, have not been implemented. The disastrous effects which this delay will have on recruitment for the Corps are obvious, and it is unnecessary for me to emphasise them. But far worse than that is the fact that already there is a drift from the Corps of fully-qualified young men. Out of thirty-two university entries to the Corps since 1936 ten have left; and a great majority of those ten have had to pay to the Admiralty a bond of £300 into which they were
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  required to enter before they joined the Corps.
  Those responsible at the universities for advising undergraduates as to their future careers when they are about to leave have done their best to help recruitment to the Corps. Not only that: they have done their best to persuade those who entered the Corps from the universities from leaving it in the hope that conditions would be bettered, as has been promised. I can testify to that from personal experience. In addition, every assistance has been given by the university authorities to help those responsible to plan conditions of service in the Royal Corps which will attract men of the highest calibre who are required in the Corps. In spite of all the advice and the help that has been given, and in spite of the unanimous decision of the very strong Eastham Committee, no decision has apparently yet been reached—at least, I can find no information at the Cambridge University Appointments Board—on new conditions of service which might attract the right type of men. That lack of information can only serve to make it quite impossible in the future for those advising the best engineering men to recommend the Corps as a first-class career. All who have the welfare of the Navy at heart, and who understand its problems, want to be able to recommend the Corps as a really first-class career for first-class men. Under present conditions, I could not do so with a clear conscience, and I do not feel that I shall be able to do so until the recommendations of the Eastham Committee, or something very like them, have been carried out.
  On the last occasion on which this subject was raised in your Lordships' House, the noble Viscount, Lord Cunningham, said that, whatever shape the Navy of the future may take, it must have a first-rate Constructor Corps, and one which the Navy recognises as being first-rate. Surely there can be no higher authority than that. If we are to achieve that, it is absolutely essential that careers offered in the Royal Corps should be of the same order of attractiveness as those offered in the engineering industry to-day. There is no other alternative.
  Now I wish to say a few words about the reply given by the First Lord two

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  and a half months ago. In his reply to that debate he said:
  "I want to say at once that we have come to certain conclusions in relation to the question of pay. I wish that this were a matter which the Admiralty could itself decide."
  Those words gave some hope to those of us who are interested in this question, but nothing has happened since then. The noble Viscount went on to say:
  "But new conditions cannot be settled except in proper relation to general Government policy on the post-war organisation of the Civil Service as a whole."
  Now that part of the statement fills me with despondency. If the Corps is not to be treated as something above the rest of the Civil Service—as a corps élite, as one noble Lord said—and if it is to be treated simply as a branch of the technical Civil Service, then I think all the discussions which have been going on about the future conditions in the Corps are unlikely to come to a satisfactory conclusion.
  The Corps is a very small body, and consequently the number of more highly-paid posts is small. It requires a very high standard of technical skill and administrative ability — administrative ability such as is required in the administrative Civil Service. Never before have the problems facing the Naval Constructors been so great and so difficult to solve. If the Corps is to be put on the same level as the scientific Civil Service, I am convinced that we shall not produce the Corps which the Navy deserves, and which the Navy must have if it is to be efficient in the future. I appreciate the difficulties in which the First Lord finds himself, and I am sure that he is as anxious as any of us to see the Navy properly served. But I implore him to raise this issue above the general reorganisation of the Civil Service, and to impress upon his colleagues the great urgency of coming to a decision now. To put it mildly, it is very unfair to those who have gone into the Corps, and to those who are remaining in the Corps, to hold out hopes of better conditions year after year, as has been done for the last two years. I know that the First Lord said in his reply that any increases in pay or improvement in conditions would be back-dated, I think, to January 1, 1946. That does not help a young
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  Constructor now; he may be married and have a family. I have even heard of young officers seeking permission to do extra work in other establishments during the evenings in order to make ends meet. Surely we shall not get the best out of them under those conditions.
  The first thing the First Lord can do—and surely this is within his power, without having to ask the views of the Treasury—is to publish the Eastham Report. If that Report were published, it would remove a tremendous amount of suspicion from the minds of the members of the Corps. Whether it is implemented or not, surely it is bound to come out one day, and in any case, as I have said, many of the recommendations are already fairly well known. The next step, I admit, is much more difficult—that is, to come to a decision. There are all sorts of conflicting requirements and conflicting claims in the rest of the Civil Service. I have already pointed out how unfair the present situation is, where hopes of improvement are held out to those already in the Corps. If the First Lord is not able to offer conditions of service which will attract new entrants or retain those already in the Corps, he must surely announce the fact, and give those young men a chance to make up their minds how they are to plan their career.
  As I say, I know it is not an easy decision, but I implore the First Lord to give some real encouragement this time. I think much the best way would be if he would say: "I will make a decision on this question by such-and-such a date"—and let it be a date not too far distant. It would be even better if he told us that the recommendations of the Eastham Report, or something like them, would be accepted. Once more, I implore the First Lord to give some more definite information than he did last time—some idea as to when an answer to this question may be expected.
  3.58 p.m.
  EARL BEATTY: My Lords, I am glad to follow the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, this afternoon, because with his experience in, and personal knowledge of, the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, I am sure that his expressions will command your Lordships' deepest attention. Unfortunately, when this was debated on February 23 I was unable to attend. Your Lordships will remember

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  that the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Cunningham, intervened for the first time and made a notable contribution and plea that sympathetic action should be taken towards the Corps. As the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, has said, it is now two and a half months since the First Lord assured the House that he had come to certain conclusions as regards pay. And yet we have heard nothing. He said at the time that he had tremendous regard and respect for Naval Constructors, but surely there must be something seriously wrong with the Admiralty organisation if decisions on the unanimous recommendations of such a strong Committee as the Eastham Committee can be delayed for two and a half years.
  The First Lord said that his aim was to be able to offer, as soon as possible, such revised conditions as would attract further recruits from the universities. But is he aware, as has just been said, that over 30 per cent. of the university graduates recruited since 1936 have left the Service, forfeiting their £300 bond, to seek careers in private industries? If that is so surely it only emphasises the necessity to come to a decision rapidly, before we lose any more men. There is no doubt that the Service has already lost numbers of promising and brilliant young men with high university and naval architectural qualifications, and that new entries are now non-existent from that source. It was made quite plain in the last debate that recruitment was falling off, and that there was widespread resentment in the Corps itself about the present conditions and the intolerable delay in putting them on a firm basis for the future. In spite of the First Lord's assurance in February, there is a deep suspicion in the Corps that attempts are being made to water down the unanimous recommendations of the Committee. I suggest that this Report should be made public, like the Inchcape Report and the Barlow Report, and, more recently, the Reports of Committees presided over by the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Oaksey, on other matters.
  If the Navy is to have the best ships in the future, I am quite certain that the pay and conditions must be such that first-class men will always enter the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors. That is of fundamental concern to the Navy, and
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  thus to the nation as a whole. I am sure that the First Lord views their claims with sympathy. The matter is not altogether in his hands, and no doubt he is having to fight about it. I am sure that it would be best for all concerned if he would publish the Eastham Committee's Report and tell us what he intends to do about it.
  The Naval Estimates and the First Lord's Explanatory Memorandum were so thoroughly discussed in another place, and in this House on March 23, that I do not intend to detain your Lordships long this afternoon. Since those debates, however, there has taken place the very serious incident in China, which underlines the necessity for us to maintain considerable naval forces all over the world to back up our interests. In the past eighteen months we have had examples of this requirement as the noble Earl, Lord Howe, pointed out, in places as far apart as the Falkland Island Dependencies, British Honduras, West Africa and now China. All these have shown that, without doubt, our cruiser and our aircraft carrier force is insufficient. Your Lordships will remember that in the case of the Antarctica quarrel a cruiser had to be sent from South Africa—showing that the West Indies Squadron was insufficient to deal with any trouble arising in its own sphere. In British Honduras it happened that a naval cadet training ship was the only ship in the vicinity, and this vessel was used. If trouble had really broken out, it would have been very improper to use an ill-armed training ship to represent the Navy.
  And now in China the Far Eastern Squadron has to be reinforced by vessels sent from here and from the West Indies. It is surely obvious to the public now that our foreign station fleets are purely token forces, and it is equally obvious that our chronic weakness all over the world has precipitated these incidents in the past. If our cruiser and carrier force is insufficient in peace, how utterly incapable it would be of performing its duties in war! It is, therefore, clearly necessary for us, even in peace time, to increase our cruiser and carrier force, for police purposes alone. There is no doubt that the accelerated reductions in the Navy in 1946 and 1947 have caused an acute shortage of trained personnel; and

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  it is because of this shortage that we are unable to put into commission more than fifteen cruisers. It seems to me very difficult to explain why our active fleet consists of such a small number when the Navy has never before in time of peace had a larger personnel. Even when we deduct from the total the personnel of the Fleet Air Arm, the only conclusion we can reach is that there are far too many men serving ashore. Surely the First Lord will agree it is time that the active fleet consisted of more ships in commission. After all, the business of the Navy is to keep the seas and not to serve ashore.
  Turning now from the more normal duties which will always fall on the Navy in peace, I would remind your Lordships that, as has been stressed this afternoon by the noble Lords, Lord Winster and Lord Teynham, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, the real danger from the naval point of view, should this cold war develop into a shooting war, is the Russian submarine. One has to keep a very level head about this question. Some people are apt to think that all the 250 submarines that Russia is said to possess are fast and capable of high submerged speeds, but of course they are not. No doubt, however, some have those qualities. I would not, as Lord Winster did, dismiss these submarines too lightly, for I feel sure that the Russians have a great many German sailors and technicians to help them in this sphere, and this would make their submarine force a very formidable one. But if we are to be told this afternoon that the conversion of existing destroyers is the Government's answer to the submarine danger, then I feel it is a totally inadequate answer. It is inadequate because it does not provide any total increase in the already wholly insufficient numbers of available vessels capable of coping with the high submerged speed of the modern submarine.
  Here I come to the question of new construction. In this year's White Paper on Defence, paragraph 49, it was stated that only token provision was made for new construction. The First Lord himself, in his explanatory Memorandum, says:
  "It is still necessary to proceed slowly with naval new construction.…"
  But the real answer to the Russian submarine menace is new construction for
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  sooner or later we must not only design but build a modern, faster and more economic type of anti-submarine vessel. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, has already touched on this subject, but I wish to emphasise it, because our frigates and our corvettes are out of date. Our destroyers are insufficient in numbers and, in any case, are far too expensive for us to contemplate laying down great numbers of them in future for the sole purpose of submarine hunting. Thus, if we take the long view, a new type of submarine killer must be evolved.
  No one can be complacent about the international situation; but at no time in our history have our dangers at sea been made clearer. We know who the only possible aggressor can be. We know the type of warship in which he specialises. Yet in four years not one single new fighting ship has been ordered by this Government to meet this requirement. Should war come, it will be a question of expansion, not of conversion. We shall need all the fast small ships we already possess. That being so, we must decide now on the vessel we require. We cannot put it off, year in and year out, because everyone does not entirely agree upon the ideal vessel. It takes years between design and completion, so I hope the First Lord can assure us this afternoon that a steady new construction programme of small ships will soon be commenced. No doubt we shall be told that these suggestions are desirable but prohibitive, because of financial restrictions. But when the outstanding danger of the Russian submarine is so evident, the importance of making a start towards laying down the right type of vessel is such that I feel that every effort should be bent towards that end.
  As the noble Earl, Lord Howe, has said, Canada has given us a lead. Surely we should not lag behind one of the Dominions in this respect. I understand—I know of it only from the Press—that she is going to lay down this year three fast anti-submarine escort vessels. If that is so, why cannot we do it also? As I have said, we shall probably be told that financial restrictions prohibit us from doing so. Well, I believe a right start has been made in the announcement that the "Duke of York" is to be placed in reserve. I do not go so far as the noble Lord, Lord Winster, but we have to be

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  realists in these days, and I believe that the day of keeping a number of battleships in full commission is over. By that do not mean in any shape or form that it is over for all time; we do not know, and we must keep these vessels in reserve. But I believe a right start has been made in placing the "Duke of York" in reserve. I hope it will mean that more smaller ships will be put in commission.
  But there is another field in which I believe much money could be saved, and that is by the ruthless pruning of shore establishments and civil staffs. Over a year ago I put to the First Lord a question which no doubt he will remember, asking him if he would give the comparative numbers of officers and ratings in the Royal Navy and in the Secretaries' Department at the Admiralty in one of the pre-war years and last year. The answer, in effect, was that whereas the numbers in uniform had increased by 50 per cent., the numbers in the Secretaries' Department had increased four or five times. In answer to a supplementary question, the First Lord showed he was aware of the urgency to reduce numbers in the civil staffs as quickly as possible, but I am bound to say that there is little evidence in the Naval Estimates of much reduction up to date. I see from Vote 12 in this year's Estimate that the Department in question has been reduced by only seventy-three out of a total of about 2,700. That is not ruthless pruning.
  That is only one small example. There must be many more, and I sincerely hope that the noble Viscount will apply his axe with renewed vigour in the forthcoming year. Our desire in these debates is to help the Navy for, whatever may be our political opinions, a Navy sufficient for our defence needs will ever remain of primary and vital importance to this island nation of ours. In many respects, if I may humbly say so, the First Lord has shown himself to be a friend, but I hope he will give even further indication in the forthcoming year of his strength and independence of mind, and put the Navy once more on a proper footing.
  4.16 p.m.
  LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, I propose to say a few words this afternoon about the aircraft carrier strength of the Royal Navy. This subject has already been touched on by many other speakers,
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  so I propose to be extremely brief. If we take the figures of our aircraft carriers in commission at the present time, they are three fleet carriers and five light fleet carriers. But, of those, two are used for training and one is being used for trials—so the number is small enough, in all conscience! Let us look a little more closely at these ships. The fleet carriers are all now very "long in the tooth"; and the light fleet carriers, as other speakers have mentioned, are capable of a speed of only 25 knots. This handicap has been mentioned from the point of view of manœuvrability with the fleet. There is another important point: 25 knots is a very low speed for the unfortunate pilot of a modern aircraft who has to try to get down upon the deck. Even in the old days of slower aircraft, 30 knots was considered a minimum for an aircraft carrier.
  Let us look at the history of these light fleet carriers. Indeed, I know it well, because I remember attending the very first conference when they were proposed. For what were they proposed? They were proposed as a quick job in the critical period of the war; to fulfil an urgent operational need when it was realised that the new fleet carriers (which of course are still not finished) were unlikely to materialise during hostilities. I remember that even the engines were a makeshift. I remember the question was asked, where could the engines be obtained quickly. The answer was, to divert some engines, or a proportion of the machinery set, from a cruiser. They did not even have a full machinery set from a cruiser. So that from the word "Go," those ships were definitely a war-time makeshift.
  Then there is a fact which has been a headache for the Admiralty, and particularly for the naval constructors, for many years. As the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, said, it is one of the many problems that have to be solved. That problem is this: that aircraft develop and become obsolete, at the present day, at any rate, very much more quickly than do ships. An aircraft may become obsolete in four or live years, whereas a carrier is expected to last twenty to twenty-five years. In consequence of this difference, points like the strength of the flight deck and the size of the lifts become important considerations. I remember that during the last war we had to alter

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  the size of the lifts of a carrier before she was even launched, because of her having to operate newer and larger aircraft. Thus I come to the question I want to ask: In the light of the larger and faster aircraft which are now being provided, what is being done to modernise our carriers?
  I do not want to quote him in his presence, but during a recent inspection the First Sea Lord encouraged the pilots by telling them that they would shortly receive the latest and most up-to-date types of aircraft. But he sounded a note of warning, that the use of these aircraft would mean that we should have to modernise our carriers. In fact he went so far as to say that these aircraft would make some of the carriers obsolete, and that they must be modernised to allow them to operate these new aircraft. I think we ought to know what is being done in regard to this very urgent matter. My Lords, having shown that our present aircraft carrier fleet, quite apart from its size, is certainly not the most up-to-date, I think it is pertinent to ask what is being done to push on with the construction of the "Eagle" and the other new fleet carriers which quite obviously are needed by the Fleet at the earliest possible time.
  Now, my Lords, I think I must say one word about China. I served as a pilot in a naval squadron of the Fleet nearly twenty-five years ago, when there were in existence in the Royal Navy only three aircraft carriers. Let us look where those three aircraft carriers were stationed. One was training at home, one was in the Mediterranean and the third was in China. I think it is true to say that we have had an aircraft carrier in China continuously up to the beginning of the recent war. Of course, after the fall of Hong Kong they could not be kept there but after the re-occupation we had carriers there until they were withdrawn in 1947. I feel that it is absolutely essential that we should have an aircraft carrier in these waters as soon as possible. It is well known that Kaitak, the only airfield at Hong Kong, is, as the noble Lord, Lord Douglas, told us, completely inadequate for modern requirements. To increase our air strength it is essential, to my mind, that we should have an aircraft carrier there, as this is the only way it can be done. I agree with other noble Lords that although nobody would
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  seriously suggest there should be continuous air cover over those vessels in the Yangtse, if an aircraft carrier had been available it could have operated in the mouth of the Yangtse and could have provided a striking force after the attack took place.
  There is one encouraging feature with regard to the Far East—namely, that, as we are all delighted to hear, the Royal Australian Navy is pushing on so energetically with its air arm. H.M.A.S. "Sydney," the Royal Australian Navy's first carrier, has now gone out to Australia. Of course it will be some little time before she is operational, but it is a great help to feel that that great Dominion has realised the necessity for an air arm. I might add, in passing, that when the British Pacific Fleet was based on Australia, we took on a number of first-class pilots from the Royal Australian Air Force who at that time, with very very short training did splendid work in our carriers, and filled a gap, especially in fighter pilots, when we had the greatest difficulty in getting enough trained men from this country. My Lords, that is all I have to say this afternoon. I think most of what I have said has been covered before, but those points which I have raised, and to which I have asked the First Lord to give an answer, are most pertinent—particularly the question of the reconstruction and modernising of our carriers.
  4.25 p.m.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: My Lords, I think it is well that we are holding this debate and that noble Lords should have the advantage of hearing answers from the head of the Department to 'the points they have raised. It is a good thing to have a debate with the First Lord in his place to give the necessary answers to Parliament. This afternoon I want to raise quite a different point, and not in any way to cover the ground which has previously been traversed by noble Lords. My point in rising to-day is to say a word or two about the department of the Civil Engineer in Chief. That department serves directly under the Civil Lord, as the First Lord will know; it served directly under him when he was Civil Lord, and directly under me when I had the honour to hold that office for two years.

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  In March, 1938, when I was Civil Lord, the Professional Officers' Association submitted a claim on behalf of the higher directing staff of the department to which I am alluding. Their basic salary had not then been altered for thirty years, but they had to bear great responsibilities. Noble Lords will perhaps know that their activities extend from building such things as the great graving dock at Singapore, a vast number of ammunition depôts, a new cordite factory (which was done in my time), barracks, docks and storehouses, and indeed every kind of shore establishment. They put forward their claim on the ground of the vast amount of knowledge they had to possess, on a comparison of salaries outside the Service, and on the relative pay of the civil engineers to that of the naval constructors on whose behalf we heard such an eloquent plea by the noble Lord, Lord Cunningham, during the last debate.
  On May 1, 1939, ten years ago, I received a deputation from them and recommended that something should be done. I am told that after the war started, in July, 1940, the Association was told by the Board of Admiralty that a general review of such salaries was going to take place but it was impossible during the years of the war; that as it would be invidious to single out special classes for particular treatment, nothing could then be done, but that a general review would take place immediately after the war ceased. Meanwhile, it is fair to say that an extra £150 was given as a bonus to the Civil Engineer in Chief, and £100 to each of the higher grades. It is now some four years after V.E.-Day, and although I am not suggesting that anything could have been done immediately after the conclusion of hostilities, I think the review could have been started, at any rate, a year after the war, and that after three years we might have seen some result.
  It is not as though the Government have not been prompted. In October, 1945, the Association of Professional Officers called attention to this outstanding claim and requested that, the war being over, the review might take place promptly and favourable consideration he given to their claims. In March, 1946, they again returned to the charge, and I believe that in October. 1946, the
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  Treasury issued a new salary structure whereby the salaries of the heads of major professional departments were to go up to £2,000 a year while those of directing and other grades were to go up to £1,800 and £1,520 respectively. In November, 1948—that is, two years after this Treasury announcement—this salary structure had not been applied to the men for whom I am speaking, and in February of this year the matter was taken up again. Although I am told that the staff it question are not satisfied with the work-groups salaries, they, at any rate, would have liked them applied rather than that they should remain as they had been for forty years.
  I think that their view was, to a certain extent, endorsed by a Committee over which, I believe, the noble Lord, Lord Charley, presided. Although this Committee did not recommend specific salaries, it recommended that the salaries of people of this kind should remain relative to those of the administrative grades. The administrative grades were fairly well satisfied before the war, whereas these civil engineers were not. The administrative grades have received a rise, but still the civil engineers are left behind. Not only that, but scientific and legal classes have, similarly, had a rise since the war. As I say, the men of whom I am speaking, have been on the same basic salary for the past forty years, and the value of the pound has certainly altered considerably during that time. You will not get the best work unless you employ the best people, and you will not get the best people if you continue to pay them, or try to get them at, salaries which were thought to be right forty years ago. These men have vast works schemes going through their hands, and if they are efficient they can save the Admiralty and the country a great deal of money by their proper supervision of those schemes. I am told that in this department they are getting rather despondent, and I think I am right in speaking for them, for they gave me very good service while I Was their immediate chief. I am also informed that there have been resignations because of the lowness of the salaries, and that a number of good men who came in temporarily during the war were offered establishment but, finding that conditions had not been improved, they refused.

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  Further, I am told, that recruitment of new staff is far from easy and that the standard of the department is falling.
  I want the First Lord of the Admiralty to make this what I may term a "yellow jacket" matter. He knows what a "yellow jacket" at the Admiralty denotes: it means a matter which has to be dealt with promptly. Certainly these men have waited far too long for something to be done about their case. I would like the First Lord to tell me today that he will, himself, go into this matter; that, if necessary, he will send for the Civil Engineer in Chief and verify whether what I have been saying is right. Thereafter, if he is convinced, as I was ten years ago, that something ought to be done, I ask him to do it, so that justice can be meted out to this very efficient and loyal body of servants who do such good work for the Royal Navy.
  4.36 p.m.
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (VISCOUNT HALL): My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, that the debate to which we have listened this afternoon has been well worth while. It was introduced in his usual courteous and, indeed, able manner by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, and he and other noble Lords have raised a number of interesting and important matters. I hope that I shall be able to deal with the major points which have been raised, and I will certainly refer to the matters which have been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, and the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote. I think the debate can be said to have focused itself on four or five of the principal matters with which the Royal Navy must concern itself, and especially, as the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, rightly said, plans for co-operation and co-ordination. The noble Lord must know well that co-ordination and co-operation are matters of vital importance now, in view of the various new Pacts which have been agreed, notably between this country and the Benelux countries and between the signatories to the Atlantic Pact.
  It was to me most interesting that the noble Lord should deal with the question of finance. I suppose that if I answered the question which appears in the Motion on the Order Paper in the
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  usual Parliamentary manner by saying "No," that would satisfy Lord Teynham; and if I said "Yes" to my noble friend, Lord Winster, he would be satisfied. As your Lordships know, provision amounting to £189,250,000 is provided in this year's Budget for the Royal Navy. Lord Teynham would like to see the amount increased to £220,000,000. I do not know how far he is expressing his own views, or the views of the Party with which he is associated, because there was no Amendment on the Order Paper in another place suggesting that there should be any increase in the global sum of £760,000,000 which was being set aside for the three Defence Services, including research. I think that that is a record figure for peace time. Indeed it represents little short of 25 per cent. of the total national expenditure.
  I read the report of the debate on defence which took place in your Lordships' House on March 23. One noble Lord, referring to this global sum, mentioned that it was equal to the actual amount which was spent on tobacco—namely, £760,000,000. I assume that he had in mind that if the nation can afford to pay £760,000,000 for tobacco, it can afford to pay that amount for defence. The figure to which I have referred£189,250,000—is equal to the provision made for the Royal Navy in the three years after the First World War—1922, 1923 and 1924. This can be said to be a colossal sum, but after all the value of money is the value one can receive for money. The increase in costs has almost corresponded to the increase in the amount of money voted for the Royal Navy. Both the costs for personnel and material have increased considerably as compared with pre-1939. It costs £290 a year to pay, feed and clothe a naval rating. This includes marriage allowance and national insurance, and compares with the corresponding figure of £160 per annum in 1938. On the material side, costs have increased from two to three times, as compared with 1938. I will not trouble your Lordships with many examples, but the cost of installing communication equipment, radio and radar, in a modern cruiser or destroyer has gone up something like twenty times as compared with 1938—though then, of course, there was no radar. The naval aircraft to-day is a vastly more complex and efficient piece of mechanism than its

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  counterpart of 1938. In short, the application to all naval ships and aircraft of our advancing scientific knowledge means a considerable increase in costs.
  All the noble Lords who have taken part in the debate referred to the question of new construction. The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, referred to one fleet carrier which is building, and the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, asked when the two fleet carriers under construction would be completed. We hope that H.M.S. "Eagle" will be completed by the end of 1950 and H.M.S. "Ark Royal" by the end of 1952. We have eight light fleet carriers at various stages of construction. Noble Lords will realise that a considerable amount of scientific knowledge has been acquired during and since the war, and we are anxious that all this knowledge, so far as possible, may be applied and adapted to the aircraft carriers now being constructed. In addition to H.M.S. "Sydney," which has recently been sold to Australia, one other of the "Majestic" class is to be completed, again for Australia. One of our problems is the modernisation of our existing carriers. This has been referred to by noble Lords this afternoon, and it will be seen in the Explanatory Memorandum issued with the Estimates that the first of the fleet carriers is to be taken in hand for complete modernisation this year. Unless the work of modernisation is carried out speedily, the carriers will not be able to operate the new type of naval jet aircraft which are now in the course of development. This is an urgent problem with which the Admiralty are fully engaged.
  I might mention here, in regard to the point raised by noble Lords about aircraft carriers in the Far East, a point which was particularly emphasised by my noble friend Lord Winster, that the buildup of naval aviation in the Far East was designed in face of the Japanese operations in that area. The end of the Japanese war removed the naval threat, and at the present time there are no foreign naval forces in the Pacific or in Far Eastern waters, apart from the United States Navy, which compare in any way with those of the Commonwealth. At the time of the run-down of man-power it was decided, for reasons of economy, to withdraw our carriers from areas eastwards of the Mediterranean, to close down naval air stations
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  and to withdraw stores and supplies. While it is true that the aircraft carrier can often help in a time of emergency, its main purpose is to work with the Fleet to protect His Majesty's ships, and generally to take part in naval operations. It is considered that the Royal Air Force, which already has bases in the Far East, can best meet the requirements in that area at the present time. However, as announced recently in another place by my right honourable friend the Minister of Defence, should circumstances arise in the Far East in which the assistance of an aircraft carrier would be valuable, one would be sent.
  To return to new construction, research and design, I may say that work on the equipment, particularly the armament, for the three cruisers laid down is proceeding, and we are anxious that the ships should be equipped with the most modern gear when they are completed. So far as we can we are embodying all the modern knowledge which has been acquired, and the assembly of the equipment will take some time. I should say, however, that I do not expect the research work on the armament intended for these ships will be sufficiently advanced to justify a restart of structural work during the course of the next two years. Of the "Daring" class destroyers we are expecting that the eight wall be completed during 1950–51. Two new "Bay" frigates are approaching completion. I would like here to recall that no battleships are laid down or included in new naval construction programmes. I was very interested in the remarks made by my noble friend Lord Winster. He pointed out very forcibly what he thought would or would not be the rôle of the battleship in the future, and asked what was the Admiralty's intention in relation to the battleship. I think it will be said of the present Board of Admiralty, when history comes to be written, that no Board of Admiralty in this country scrapped as many battleships as has the present one. As the noble Earl, Lord Howe, rightly said, in the last two years no fewer than ten battleships and one battle cruiser have been scrapped. I well remember the look of consternation on the faces of some of my noble friends in your Lordships' House when I announced the scrapping of a large number of these ships.
  It is difficult to say what the rôle of the battleship is likely to be in future.

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  It is easy for my noble friend to adopt the attitude he does. But if other nations have battleships, is the Royal Navy to scrap the remaining battleships which it has? The battleships which we still have are among the most modern in the world. But they are not the only battleships. Is there any noble Lord present who will say, here and now, that these five battleships should be scrapped?
  EARL HOWE: May I ask the noble Viscount whether he has any information as to exactly what capital ship construction is going on in the Baltic?
  VISCOUNT HALL: So far as I know, there is little or no battleship construction going on in the Baltic. But I do want to deal with this point. It is so easy to say that the battleship should be scrapped or put into reserve. I can say quite definitely that it is not the intention to scrap any one of the present five battleships. Whether they will be put into reserve, or used for training purposes, is another question. Noble Lords must realise, however, that if a battleship, or indeed any ship, is put into reserve, it costs a considerable amount of money to keep that ship in anything like order, and to prevent serious deterioration setting in. It cannot be said that a battleship, or a warship of any kind, placed into reserve, under any of the categories of reserve, does not deteriorate without some personnel being kept to look after that ship. My noble friend said that Hitler knew all about this, and had ideas of scrapping all his capital ships. But did he win or lose the war? That is the real point. Indeed, noble Lords will realise that two of the battleships were used in convoy work because there were unknown enemy cruisers and raiders. I am not going to attempt this afternoon to prove to your Lordships that the Admiralty's view as to the rôle of the battleship in future is the right one, but I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Winster, that the Admiralty have this matter very much in mind, and are considering what is likely to be the rôle, not only of battleships but also of cruisers, carriers and every other class of warship.
  One of the Admiralty's problems has been to overcome arrears of refitting and repairs. The position has now greatly improved, particularly in the smaller class of ships, escorts and minesweepers, to
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  which the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, particularly referred. Noble Lords will be interested to know that the programme which was completed during the last financial year numbered some 500 ships, mainly of the destroyer, frigate and minesweeper classes, including 200 ships for the Reserve Fleet. By the beginning of the present financial year, the number of ships overdue for refit will be reduced in the more important classes, such as fleet carriers, light fleets and cruisers.
  The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, asked whether the present number of cruisers, taken in conjunction with the number of aircraft carriers, could be regarded as equivalent to the seventy cruisers regarded as necessary before the war. I think my noble friend Lord Winster replied effectively to that point. World conditions to-day are entirely different from what they were when the target of seventy cruisers was fixed. Before the war, Germany, Italy and Japan had large fleets of major surface ships, and it was necessary for us to have efficient major vessels of war to protect our trade against the combined efforts of all three of these countries. We are not likely in the foreseeable future to be opposed by a fleet containing a substantial number of such surface vessels, widely dispersed all over the world, and therefore our requirements now are quite different and in no way related to pre-war assessments. The present cruiser strength of the Commonwealth is larger than that of the known cruiser strength of other nations, excluding, of course, the United States of America. As your Lordships know, the navies of the Commonwealth are not in competition with the United States Navy, but are complementary to it.
  I agree that in the future one of the greatest menaces at sea will be the submarine with a high underwater speed. While I do not minimise the danger of this weapon, I think it would be wrong to over-estimate the number of such submarines which are now being operated by any country. I saw in the debate on Defence that reference was made to a submarine with a speed of 20 knots. I do not know of any submarine which can do a submerged speed of 20 knots. As the noble Lord, Lord Winster, said, the number of submarines now operating anywhere with a speed in excess of 12 knots under the surface is small. There

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  is no doubt that all countries who have naval forces are concentrating on increasing the submerged speed of their submarines, but I think it fair to say that in no country is greater attention being paid to this problem than it is here.
  EARL HOWE: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Viscount, but do I understand him to say that there is no submarine capable of 20 knots under water? Has the noble Viscount noticed the allusion to submarine Type 21 in the Führer Conferences?
  VISCOUNT HALL: I did say that I knew of no submarine in existence which can do a speed of 20 knots submerged. That is the information which I have had and I checked it up only yesterday. I repeat that the submarine with a fast underwater speed is the menace of the future, but we are confident that we could deal with any threat which might develop at the present time, and that the plans we have for the future will enable us to cope with any of the types of fast submarine which are likely to come into existence in the future.
  Before I leave this subject, perhaps I should refer to statements which have been made in your Lordships' House and elsewhere, both in this country and in the United States of America, that one particular Power, the U.S.S R., has about 250 submarines. Indeed, in one of the speeches made during the debate on Defence, it was said that they had 250 "modern submarines." This statement is, I believe, numerically true, but we should remember that the great majority of those submarines are of a pre-war design and, although their numbers are obviously formidable, their capabilities represent no advance on the submarines employed by the Germans during the war. The U.S.S.R. obtained a few more modern types similar to those handed over to the United Kingdom and the United States of America as reparations from the Germans, but it must be emphasised that in every new type there are bound to be teething troubles, and the other countries will be no more able to overcome those than will our own nation. I assure your Lordships that the many frigates which we have are capable of dealing with any but the most modern existing type of submarine of which, as I have said, there are few.
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  Reference has been made to the question of a faster frigate. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, suggested a diesel-driven ship with supplementary e as turbine power, and this has already been investigated by the Admiralty design staffs. It seems clear, however, that considerable development in the marine gas turbine, and in other technical matters, will be necessary before a proposal on these lines can be a practicable proposition. The scheme will continue to be considered by the Admiralty as technical development proceeds. In the meantime, naval research and development in all aspects of antisubmarine warfare have the highest priority. I cannot, of course, reveal details, but I can go so far as to say that the prospects are reasonably encouraging. It is true, as noble Lords have said, that two destroyers are being converted into fast frigates, and work on them has already begun. These are regarded as prototypes, and the future conversion programme will depend upon their success. In the meantime, the design of a new anti-submarine frigate has been completed, and I am hoping that it will be possible to include one of these ships in the 1949–50 new construction programme.
  The noble Earl, Lord Howe, asked me several questions about ships. In particular, he asked whether we had a sufficient number of destroyers, whether we had enough aircraft carriers, whether we had sufficient aircraft for those carriers in service, and whether the light fleet carriers possess sufficient speed. Broadly speaking, the Admiralty consider we have sufficient destroyers for fleet work and sufficient aircraft carriers. I have already dealt with the provision which we are making to counter the submarine menace by new construction and conversion. I may say that our present light fleet carriers are fast enough to operate the aircraft likely to be in service for some time to come, and that we have sufficient aircraft reserves to support fully the peace-time complements of carriers at present in commission.
  I think the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, together with other noble Lords, is somewhat premature in asking whether any new co-ordination in naval forces has been decided upon as a result of the signing of the North Atlantic Pact, for the Pact itself has not yet been ratified by all the countries concerned. I need

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  not, however, remind your Lordships that the Admiralty has maintained—and, indeed, the Government, in relation to all the other Services—very close and friendly association, not only with the naval forces of the Commonwealth but also with those of the Powers who were our Allies during the war and who are now associated with us in the Atlantic Pact.
  We have been able to give each other much mutual assistance during recent years, and thus in the naval sphere much of the framework of the Atlantic Pact is already in existence. Moreover, within the Western Union, the French, Dutch and Belgian navies are to a large extent equipped with British ships and material. The Naval Advisory Committee, set up last year as part of the Western Union organisation, is proving a most valuable forum for the exchange of information on all subjects relating to the common naval defence of the five Powers. The Committee is paying particular attention to standardisation of material and practice, and to the co-ordination of naval forces, building upon the experience gained in these directions during the war. I might here emphasise that it is the Admiralty's aim to promote the maximum degree of standardisation, not only with the navies of the Western Union Powers but with those of the Commonwealth and the United States. The field covered is very wide and embraces not only equipment but also operational matters and communications. Inter-service standardisation in all our Services is, of course, the accepted policy. Your Lordships may be interested to know that, within the Admiralty, a special high-level committee and a new division of the Naval Staff are being set up to progress standardisation in all its aspects. The combined exercises, in which the French, Dutch and Belgian navies will take part with the Home Fleet at the beginning of July, are an indication of the extent to which Western Union co-operation has progressed. These exercises will be under the overall command of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor.
  In the course of his speech, the noble Lord, Lord Winster, asked whether the ships which have been sent to the Far East are replacements, or whether they are to build up the strength in the Far
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  East. I can assure him that it is the intention that they should help to build up the naval strength in the Far East. It is true, as he said, that some ships were damaged during the Yangtse incident, but there are facilities in the dockyards in the Far East which will enable those ships to be repaired and refitted on the station. So it will not be a replacement; it will be a kind of building up of the naval strength in the Far East.
  The noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, referred to the question of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors. It is true that this matter was raised in the course of the naval debate some two and a half months ago, and at that time I promised that I would give my personal attention to it. During the intervening period I have attempted to bring about a settlement of this question. Unfortunately, there is some little difficulty, but I am hoping that that will be resolved, and that quite soon, at any rate within the course of three or four weeks, some offer will be made to the Corps. Whether the offer will be an acceptable one or not is a matter which, of course, will be decided by the Royal Corps itself. But I can assure the noble Lord that after the debate in which the noble Viscount, Lord Cunningham, took part, together with a number of other very distinguished naval officers, the matter has been looked into carefully, and I am hoping that it will result in a statement in the near future. The noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, who served part of his happy ministerial life at the Admiralty as Civil Lord, asked me about the new salary scales for the Admiralty Civil Engineers. This is rather a technical question which I shall be quite ready to discuss with the noble Lord, for I do not wish to take up too much of your Lordships' time this afternoon. It is a matter which, I think, can be fully explained to him. I certainly will carry out the suggestion which he made that I should see the Civil Engineer-in-Chief with a view to seeing whether anything can be done to resolve the difficulties which have arisen in connection with salary scales.
  In conclusion I would say that the morale, discipline, and prestige of the Royal Navy are in every way satisfactory. This is very pleasing when it is remembered that almost all the manpower of the pre-war fleet has now disappeared. The number of Regulars with

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  war-time service is exceptionally small, and the present naval strength has largely been built up during the past few years. The miscellaneous duties which fall on the Fleet in all corners of the globe have been performed at the highest level of naval tradition, and great credit must be given to the officers and senior ratings for the continuance of the grand traditions of a grand Service.
  EARL HOWE: May I point out that I pleaded with the noble Viscount that we should have some statement of naval policy, of what we are really aiming at? Before the war we had standards—one-power and two-power standards, and so forth. Is the First Lord able to give us some sort of idea of what standards we are aiming at now? Is the present composition of the Fleets abroad to be considered as the sort of Navy we are to have in the future?
  VISCOUNT HALL: My Lords, I can speak again only by leave of the House. The noble Earl must realise that the Navy has been and is still in the course of reconstruction. The run-down which has taken place, not only in ships but also in men, does cause some little difficulty, especially in view of the training question. Regular recruitment still continues to be very satisfactory, but there are certain man-power features which are causing us some concern; and until we can see where we are in relation to man-power we are not able to man-up ships at the various stations to the strength which the Board of Admiralty would wish.
  EARL HOWE: I thank the noble Viscount very much.
  5.15 p.m.
  LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, I am sure we are all grateful to the noble Viscount for the efforts he has made to answer the questions—some of them very difficult—which have been put to him. At the same lime it is disquieting to hear that no further work is to be done on the three cruisers until after the lapse of two years. It is true that Russia has a very small surface fleet, but she has a few cruisers; and other countries who may not necessarily be on our side in the event of another war also have cruisers. I entirely agree with what the noble Viscount said about battleships. We must retain ours, since other countries have them; but they need not necessarily
  546
  be kept in commission, and the money which would be spent on building battleships would probably be better spent in other directions. I was glad to hear that a new design for anti-submarine frigates has been produced. But I wish the noble Viscount could have told us something more about the two conversions which are going on—when they are likely to be completed and whether any more conversions are proposed. However, in view of the assurances that the noble Viscount has given, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
  Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

  TANGANYIKA: U.N. MISSION'S REPORT
  5.17 p.m.
  LORD FARINGDON LORD FARINGDON rose to call the attention of His Majesty's Government to the Report on Tanganyika of the Visiting Commission of the United Nations Trusteeship Council; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, Colonial debates seem to me to have one major defect, and that is that they tend to range rather wide. I am afraid the debate this afternoon could easily lead to that defect; we might well have a useful, and indeed protracted, discussion on any single one of the headings under which the affairs of Tanganyika can be grouped. I shall restrain myself, however, and keep strictly to the terms of my Motion, drawing the attention of His Majesty's Government to the contents of the Commission's Report. I shall take the items in the Report in the order in which they are set down by the Commission, and I shall then ask for information under various headings. What we should like this afternoon is a statement by His Majesty's Government on their reactions to this Report.
  I should like to say first that I welcome this Report. It is a commonplace for people to say that they welcome criticism. Of course they always go on to say that they welcome it, on condition that it is well-informed and constructive. But when the point at which the criticism is made is reached, I have yet to meet anyone who found criticism of himself well-informed or constructive. I hope that in the case of this Commission's Report, which does contain criticisms, by implication if not directly—though some

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  of them, I think, are fairly direct—His Majesty's Government will prove an exception to this rule. I think it is fair to say that this Report is couched in a thoroughly friendly tone. I think all of us, for example, would welcome the sincere and, as we all know, well-deserved tributes which are paid by the members of the Commission to the members of the administrative and technical services in Tanganyika. As I say, the tone of the Report seems to me a friendly one. That, of course, is not unexpected.
  I would remind your Lordships of the composition of the Commission: it consisted of an Australian, a Frenchman, a Costa Rican and a Chinese. Of those four, two might be expected to have perhaps slightly anti-Imperialist outlooks, but none of them comes from a country from which we here would expect factious or gratuitously unfavourable attacks or criticisms. I think that some of the Commission's remarks are due to a lack of appreciation, if I may put it in that way, of the position 6f this country vis-à-vis not only Tanganyika but its other Colonies. Of course, the Commission's members will have regarded themselves, in so far as they represented the Trusteeship Council, as the guardians of the people of Tanganyika. It is natural for them to try to obtain for their wards as much as possible; we cannot reproach them for that. But they should remember that this country has many Colonial responsibilities beyond its trusteeship territories. Even if this country's resources were considerably less limited than in fact they are, we should still not be in a position to give to all our Colonies the services on the scale which the Commission think desirable, and which we should think desirable in the case of Tanganyika. Not only do the Commission sometimes show themselves a little too parochial-minded, but sometimes they do not seem to recognise the shortages of this post-war world.
  I make these remarks now because they will enable me to say very little indeed, or nothing at all, on certain other headings. The Commission seem to be somewhat unappreciative of the shortages in the world to-day. There are shortages of materials, and there are shortages which at the present time are even more
  548
  serious and more difficult to overcome—namely, shortages of personnel. I think it is not fully appreciated by the Commission that for educational and for medical services the fields of recruitment have been much limited by the war-time years during which the men who could have been recruited for these services—and, of course, for technical services as well—and who would have been going through their periods of training, were not in fact having that training and therefore are not available. The Commission also recognise that previous to the war and, indeed, in the inter-war years, this particular Trust Territory was, as they themselves express it, on a "care and maintenance basis." That is a phrase which I, when I was in the Territory, frequently had employed to me by members of the Administration, and it appears to have been used to the Commission.
  The Commission, I may say, do not show themselves critical of that fact. They recognise that in the unsettled period, when there was much doubt as to whether or not this Territory might be handed back to Germany, it was inevitable that such a policy should be the policy of the Administration in Tanganyika. They recognise that this "care and maintenance" policy has inevitably been a brake upon progress, and that there are arrears to be made up. But it seems to me that perhaps these considerations have not weighed enough, or at any rate have not been made sufficiently apparent, in the Report of the Commission. The Commission deal first with the political advancement of Africans in the Territory, and they remark at once on the small number of Africans on the Legislative Council of the Territory. They remark, too, on the fact that there are no elected Africans on that Council. Of course, we should all desire—I am certain that it is the desire of His Majesty's Government—that there should be elected Africans on the Governor's Legislative Council—and, indeed, on the Executive Council too. I am quite certain that it is the policy of His Majesty's Government to arrange for the election of such Africans as soon as they are available and as soon as an electorate adequately informed is available to elect them. I would say that, if there is any weight in this attitude—it is

  549
  hardly a criticism—on the part of the Commission to this particular matter, it is rather a question of the amount of emphasis placed by the Administration on this particular development.
  The Commission go on to discuss the setting up of district and provincial councils. They remark on the successful setting up of the Chagga Council and also of the Sekumaland Federation. The Sekumaland Federation was being set up at the time that I was in Tanganyika, and I saw something of the discussions which were then going on. These two amalgamations are, in some ways, extremely hopeful and encouraging, but of course they do not cover a very large amount of the Territory. I should be the last to underrate the difficulties of setting up anything like a representative council at district or provincial levels. On the other hand, I think that the setting up of such councils must depend very largely on the enthusiasm of the Administration for such a cause. Much pressure can be brought to bear, and I think it is worth trying experiments, even at the risk of disappointments. I would commend to the East African department of the Colonial Office the extremely progressive and, indeed, adventurous policy that is being pursued in West Africa at the present time. I realise that in many ways the problem is greater, but in Nigeria there are native areas which are as backward as those in East Africa.
  I have found one thing in the Commission's Report which has, I confess, caused me a certain amount of despondency. It is a suggestion by the Administration that provincial councils, when they are set up, should all apparently contain representation for all the communities in Tanganyika—Europeans, Indians and Africans. It is true that in many of those provinces, or at any rate in some of them, there is justification for representation of the minority groups. But there is no justification for representation on all provincial councils of those minority groups, since they do not exist in all the provinces. I should deeply deplore the setting up of communal representation in any of our territories. One would have thought that by now the Colonial Office had had sufficiently bitter experience of communal representation and would have striven to avoid it at all costs. It would seem to me that a reservation of seats, or even nomi-
  550
  nation, is preferable to the division of the population into communities by the setting up of communal electorates.
  The Commission go on to suggest the setting up of a Territorial Council. Here, frankly, I do not follow them. I would be interested to know whether His Majesty's Government have any such idea. I should have thought that, having set up district and provincial councils, the top level would have been the Legislative Council, to which representatives could be sent from the provisional councils I cannot see why you want an African Territorial Council—indeed, it would not be African, according to this suggestion that there should be a communal representative on the councils at lower levels. A Territorial Council of all the communities is proposed, but if there is a Legislative Council, I cannot see why there should be a Territorial Council at all. That was a suggestion which seemed a little difficult to understand.
  The next item on the Commission's Report is the question of inter-territorial organisation, on which the Commission clearly have considerable doubts. They admit that for administrative reasons, at any rate for some of these services, there is a good case for such inter-territorial organisation. They remark, however, on the intense dislike of Africans and also of Indians for this inter-territorialism. They remark, too, that there is a possible danger to the prospects of development in Tanganyika. They report a fear which was expressed to them that Mombasa would draw away traffic from Dar-es-Salaam and that certain industries which are already more developed in Kenya might, under a Customs Union, tend to prevent the development of similar industries in Tanganyika. It would be interesting if His Majesty's Government could, in this connection, give us some information about the policy of the industrial council which authorises the setting up of additional industries. Particularly alarming is the remark of the Central Development Commission of the Tanganyika Government quoted on page 65 of the Report—namely, that the existence of the customs agreements has seriously undermined Tanganyika enterprise and Tanganyika revenue, and that without these agreements Tanganyika could be a flourishing country.
  I would make it clear that this is not a criticism with which I wish in any way to associate myself. I am very conscious of the advantages of inter-territorial organisation, but it is natural, I think, that the United Nations Trusteeship Council, who have a particular responsibility for the trust territories, should be anxious that nothing in such an organisation should have a detrimental effect on any trust territory involved in such an arrangement. It also seems to me, and to the Commission, in some ways unfortunate (though of course I can see practical reasons why it should be so) that the headquarters and all the inter-territorial organisations should be at Nairobi. The Commission Report next passes to the economic advancement. They treat agriculture rather tenderly. We in this House know how injudicious it is for the inexpert to deal with, agricultural matters, and the caution of the Commission seems to me to be well placed. Here again, however (and I come back to my opening remarks), they suggest that while it is emerging from the doldrums additional technicians should be employed for the improvement of African agriculture. I will not repeat myself, except to say that again this question of technicians is not so simple as it sounds; there is not the apparently unending supply which the Commission seems to believe exists from which technicians can be obtained.
  Then we come to what is perhaps the most controversial part of the Report—namely, the land problem, and in particular the questions of non-native land settlement and the alienation or re-alienation of ex-enemy estates. My Lords, I found in the Report two figures which I confess were a complete surprise to me. They say that to non-natives there has been alienated 1,846,278 acres out of a productive area of 6,334,000 acres. That is a very high percentage indeed, and one of which, frankly, I was unaware. It is a percentage which, I think, goes a long way to justify the recommendations of the Commission. These recommendations, since they are brief, I will read to you. They are very clear and they seem to have been well considered:

  "(a) All Mission lands not now directly required for churches, hospitals, schools or other necessary social or religious centres should be returned to the Africans.

  (b) European colonisation should be curtailed and the strictest control exercised to keep
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  it at the barest minimum consistent with the development of the Territory and the present and long-range needs and interests of the African inhabitants.

  (c) As a general policy, all ex-German estates should come under African ownership, preferably on a co-operative basis. Appreciating the importance of continuing production on such estates, and particularly sisal estates, the Commission suggests that in those instances where Africans are not immediately capable of operating such schemes, the Administering Authority should consider schemes whereby such estates under African ownership might temporarily continue under non-African management until such time as the Africans are trained to assume full management."

  My Lords, I saw something of this problem, and when I came back to this country before the end of the war I was certainly very hopeful that the ex-enemy lands would be used to satisfy a pressing African need. For example, the Chagga, perhaps the most progressive and active tribe in the territory, who live and cultivate coffee on the slopes of Kilimanjaro, are very short of land. When I was there, attempts were being made to settle them in the valley, where the land was not so suitable and the climate was not suitable, either to themselves, not being accustomed to it, or to the production of coffee. I am not aware what is the decision of His Majesty's Government in this matter. I hope they will be able to say that all land at Kilimanjaro above 3,500 feet and up to the forest line will be used for African settlement and development. Again, there are the estates of Oldeani. When I was in Tanganyika this was explained to me as a particularly delicate matter, because these lands which were alienated were recommended by the Bagshaw Report for African occupation, and the Bagshaw Report was taken by the Mbulu tribe as a guarantee by the British Government that these lands would be given to them. I hope very much that His Majesty's Government will now be prepared to say that they are to implement the Bagshaw Report.
  This question of white settlement is one which I am not going to discuss in detail to-day. It is a very wide question. There is a great deal to be said on all sides; it has more than two sides. However, in this particular connection I would suggest that His Majesty's Government should be extremely cautious in their alienation of any further lands in Tanganyika. Alienation of arid, unproductive land, like that which is being

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  developed more or less successfully by the ground-nuts scheme, is clearly to the advantage of the territory, and even though the development is unsuccessful may not be to its disadvantage. However, such alienation would clearly come within the terms of the despatch of the noble Lord, Lord Hall, in which he laid down that no land that was required for African occupation, nor any land likely to be required by Africans in the foreseeable future, should be alienated. We are all aware that there is in Tanganyika a serious shortage of land into which Africans can be moved. Such movement is necessary if erosion is to be stopped in the areas already occupied. It seems to me, on reading this Report, that it is very improbable that there is much land which is neither needed for African occupation nor likely to be needed in the foreseeable future.
  The Commission then deal with the question of mines and mining royalties. They point out that royalties seem to them to be very small. It must be remembered that we desire the development of the wealth of this territory. As the Commission point out, such wealth constitutes the capital of the territory and its development must redound to the advantage of the territory. On the other hand, if we desire this development, clearly conditions under which foreign capital can be induced to undertake it must be sufficiently attractive. The Government's memorandum on Colonial mining policy appears to be one which would commend itself—certainly it would commend itself to me; but one is sometimes a little doubtful whether it is completely understood and operated in the Colonies themselves.
  The Commission deal with the question of industries, and, in particular, with that of textile industries. All of us, I think, are aware of the extreme importance to all Colonial territories of the development of the secondary industries. This particular development in Tanganyika refers back again to the disadvantage of inter-territorial organisation. The Commission point out that so far as the ground-nuts scheme is concerned, the advantage of the scheme to the territory must depend on three things: the eventual transfer of the enterprise to the people of the territory, an increase in revenue and the establishment of model communities. I think we all would agree that those are the three principal desiderata.
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  However, at the present moment and in the present state of development of the scheme, it is clearly impossible to outline the best method, means and procedure for handing over this scheme to African administration, even when Africans are competent to take it over, which will be clearly in the distant future. An increase in revenue may be looked for if the scheme is successful and if the groundnuts (this was clearly one of the Commissions anxieties) are sold at a reasonable price. If the ground-nuts scheme of the Overseas Food Corporation makes a profit, there will be an increase in revenue. However, the Commission express some anxiety, which I am sure His Majesty's Government can set at rest, lest ground-outs should be sold at cost price to the Ministry of Food. As for the setting up of model communities, as your Lordships are aware, that has always been one part of the policy of the Overseas Food Corporation, and ore which I think all of us have considered to be amongst the most important. But at the present stage of development it could hardly be expected that such communities would be fully established and under way.
  The Commission then turn to the question of labour. They point out that, as has constantly been said, labour in Africa is extremely inefficient. They attribute such inefficiency to lack of medical, educational, and public health facilities. The Commission deal later on with the question of educational and medical facilities. These, again, are services which are cramped at the present time by reason of the under-developed situation which existed at the end if the war and the same shortage of personnel which I have just mentioned. They also attribute much of the inefficiency of labour to low wages; they express the opinion that wages in Tanganyika are much too low. That is a question about which I could not find it possible to differ. They say, and I think with reason, that were wages higher, there would be more encouragement to the employers of labour to improve the efficiency of labour by training and instruction. They express the desire that a minimum wages ordinance should be introduced, that trade unions should be encouraged and that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be implemented. They also express sonic anxiety lest a stem of insurance should be held up indefinitely, as it is apparently being

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  held up at the present time by reason of the lack of progress of a similar scheme in Kenya.
  Further, they express anxiety about the continuation of penal sanctions for non-fulfilment of contract. Incidentally, I was glad to observe from a question which was answered in another place that one of the two grounds for penal sanctions—the use of abusive language—has now been abolished. I hope His Majesty's Government may find it possible to state that they expect shortly to abolish penal sanctions for breach of contract. I know it is said that employers spend a great deal of money bringing African labour long distances to work on sisal or other estates, and that if the contracted man breaks his contract it means that they have been involved in that expense to no purpose. That is true. But if conditions of labour are, in fact, made sufficiently attractive, I cannot believe that there will be breaches of contract.
  Moreover, complaints are constantly being made by Africans that recruiting is, perhaps, over-compulsory; that is to say, men are driven to leave their homes for work owing to the need to earn money to meet taxation, and that undue influence is sometimes exercised by a recruiter through the chief. It is alleged, rightly or wrongly, that the chief sometimes receives payment. Were there no penal sanctions and were a man free to quit should the conditions of labour which he found when he reached his place of prospective employment be so unsatisfactory that he desired to leave it, that particular complaint, I believe, would no longer carry any weight. I hope very much that His Majesty's Government will be able to say not only that they will abolish this last penal sanction but also that they will, to the best of their ability, discourage the continuation of contract labour, which is one of the major curses of Africa.
  Another of the curses of Africa is migrant labour. There can be no doubt that it is largely responsible for the high incidence of venereal disease, on which the Mission remark. The labourer should be encouraged to take his family with him and settle in his place of work. I have found in this section something of which I was unaware and which, I confess, filled me with definite alarm—
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  namely, the account of the Supply and Utilisation of Labour Bill. This seems to me a fantastic ordinance to be brought in by my noble friends. This Bill is going to direct labour—it sounds highly practical and sensible—to places where it is most needed.
  EARL DE LA WARR: Shame! That is what we do here!
  LORD HAILEY: Horrible!
  LORD FARINGDON: Horrible: I agree. It is said that there is no intention of forcing any man to go to any place to work, but where there is already the situation that he is obliged to leave home to pay taxes—
  VISCOUNT SWINTON: Just like here.
  LORD FARINGDON: The noble Viscount has my condolences.
  VISCOUNT SWINTON: I go abroad sometimes.
  LORD FARINGDON: I hope the noble Viscount's journeys are wholly profitable, not only to himself but also to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If the amount of labour which every industry is to be allowed to engage is fixed, it seems to me that there is very little difference between directing a man to work at a particular employment and leaving him no choice. The Committee which are to operate this Bill consist almost entirely of representatives of employers of labour, and employers of labour in Tanganyika are not without blemish. The Commission report on their visit to sisal estates. They saw admirable labour lines on certain estates to which their visits were arranged by the Sisal Growers' Association. On the other hand, they admit that on visiting another estate, to which their visit had not been arranged, they found labour conditions deplorable. I myself saw the labour conditions on sisal estates and some of them were worse than deplorable; they were scandalous. The Commission very fairly point out that these conditions on some of the estates might have been due to the fact that the estates were ex-enemy property to which the companies operating them were uncertain they would have eventual title.
  I have taken rather more time than I would have wished at this late hour, and I will say no more about the medical services. The major criticism of the

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  Report—if one can call it criticism, because it is couched in friendly terms—has been of lack of a sufficiently wide and thorough development. I have already said why, in my view, such a development is not feasible at the rate and on a scale which the Visiting Commission, and no doubt the Government and the Administration, would desire. The Commission make rather similar remarks about education, but they do not say anything about mass education, where, in my opinion, a far more deserved criticism might be aimed at the Administration. When in the Territory I had the impression that mass education was regarded by the Department as an amiable but not practicable notion held by many visitors which it was necessary to humour.
  In conclusion, I would say that I welcome this Report. I believe that the Administration and the Government have nothing of which to be ashamed. I think that in having our defects and shortcomings and even the unattainable ideal pointed out to us, no harm is done. I hope that this Report will be the first of many from the Trusteeship Council, from which we ourselves shall be able to see, and the world will be able to see, the really great work which I believe British administration has done, can do and will do in the British Colonies and the territories entrusted to our care. I beg to move for Papers.
  5.55 p.m.
  LORD HAILEY: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, has asked the Government to give their reactions to the Report of the Visiting Commission, and I am venturing to trouble you with some reactions of my own before His Majesty's Government do so. I fear that I approach the subject from a somewhat different angle from that of the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, because I do not belong to the school to which I know he will agree he at one time belonged, which was in favour of a large measure of international administration of Colonial areas, apart from international supervision. I will not go into the reasons why so many of us disliked that principle. But when the whole question came to be discussed at San Francisco, we were obliged to accept the fact that His Majesty's Government were constrained at that time to agree that the former Mandated Territories should become
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  Trust Territories. They were not in the position of the Union of South Africa, which refused to make their previous Mandated Territories into Trust Territories on grounds which, fortunately for themselves, they could urge with some local justification.
  But though we all accepted the fact that the former Mandated Territories would have to become Trust Territories, we viewed with a great deal of apprehension the constitution of the Trusteeship Council. It is not a body of men appointed on account of their knowledge or interest or experience of Colonial affairs; it consists of nation members. There was every reason to suppose, as many of us said at the time, that the representatives of these constituent nations would reproduce in the Trustee Council some of the national prejudices, dislikes and enmities which have found so large a place in the discussions of the United Nations Organisation itself. Therefore, it may well be imagined that some of us viewed with considerable anxiety the first Report of a Visiting Commission in regard to Tanganyika. The noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, has said that he found it in places parochial and inappreciative of some of the difficulties of obtaining men and material, but on the whole he welcomes its criticism and regards it as friendly, I cannot go so far as that. I would go so far as to say—and I think I shall have many with me—that, though we cannot regard it with satisfaction, we can at all events regard it with some measure of relief, for it is something, if I may put it in that way, far better than we at one time might have anticipated.
  I am discussing here, of course, merely the Report of the Visiting Commission, which has not yet been the subject of a full discussion in the Trusteeship Council; we still have to await what the Trusteeship Council may say on it. But, taking the Report of the Visiting Commission as it stands, I find, in addition to the parochialism to which Lord Faringdon pointed, in the first place, a singular inability on the part of the Mission to recognise the great change that has been effected in Tanganyika since we took over the Mandate in about 1920. Remember that the years that have passed have been difficult years, first, as the result of the

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  First World War, and secondly, owing to the retardation of all our efforts during the recent war. I find, in the second place, many mistakes of fact, on which I will not dwell, because I have no doubt that the Colonial Office will take the opportunity of having them corrected. But there is very noticeably a failure to assess the character of the Associations or other sources from which the Commission received representations. It appears to be unaware, for instance, when it repeats some remarks of a Clerks' Association in Arusha on the subject of recruiting, that there is no recruiting in Arusha; and when it quotes the Sakumaland Chiefs on the subject of alienation of land, it is apparently unaware that no land has ever been alienated in Sakumaland.
  There is, again, reason to conclude that some of the members of the Visiting Commission did interest themselves in seeing that what were merely put forward as explanatory memoranda, and the like, on the part of certain bodies they consulted, such as the Chagga Council, should take the form of a direct memorial to the Trusteeship Council. In that, I think, they went well beyond their functions. Finally, everyone who reads these papers must be struck by the fact (it is a fact, I admit, which tells against the Trusteeship Council itself rather than against the Visiting Commission) that the Council permitted itself to discuss a number of these memorials, and, indeed, to begin taking into discussion the Report of the Visiting Commission itself, before it had the opinion of the Administering Authority on those memorials. That, I think, was not only injudicious, but showed an entire lack of a judicial sense, for by doing so it gave publicity to a large number of memorials on which there is much for the Administering Authority to comment—memorials, moreover, couched very often, as memorials of that nature are apt to be in India or Africa, in exaggerated language. I need not remind your Lordships that in so many of those quarters statements that are made are not meant to be evidential, but are meant merely to be illustrative.
  I have stated what from my point of view are some of the defects in this Report. Having done so, I will agree that there is much in it that deserves our attention, much that is not unfriendly and
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  much, indeed, which shows some appreciation of what the Services themselves in the territory have done, or are trying to do. There is a tribute paid to the difficulties and complexities of administration, and to the spirit shown by our administrative and technical officers. On the whole, I think it is fair to say that there is not in the Report quite so much evidence of that somewhat unrealistic idealism, or of that deep seated prejudice, that some people show when dealing with Colonial affairs. Indeed, if I might read between the lines, it seems to me that this Report is in itself something of a compromise between the French and Australian members, on the one side, and the Chinese and Costa Rica members, on the other.
  I will proceed further to illustrate my own feelings on the subject of the Report by taking two points which have attracted attention already in Tanganyika, which will, I have no doubt, attract attention here, and with which the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, has dealt: one is land and the other is labour. As regards land, Lord Faringdon pointed to a figure in the Report which he said caused him some discomfort and, indeed, amazement. I will give the House a certain small range of figures which I think will show the whole subject of alienation of land in Tanganyika in a somewhat better proportion than does the Report of the Commission. There are in Tanganyika as a whole 220,000,000 acres, from which we must deduct 97,000,000 as forest reserves, or urban or mining areas and the like. Therefore, there remain approximately 123,500,000 acres which can be regarded as available for use by cultivation and by other means, such as pasturage. It is true that out of that only 6,250,000 acres—a figure to which Lord Faringdon referred—are cultivated.
  But that does not by any means represent what the Visiting Commission refers to as the productive area. The fact that you have under shifting cultivation at one time 6,250,000 acres does not mean to say that that is the limit of the productive area. As everyone who has travelled in Tanganyika or studied its conditions knows, there are vast areas there which are still untouched, which could be just as productive as many of the areas that have been brought under cultivation. It is a mistake to suggest as the Mission suggests that the

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  total productive area is only 6,250,000 acres. But the Mission have mentioned this fact in order to draw certain conclusions from the amount of alienated land. Let me give the correct figures now. The land that has been alienated to non-natives amounts to 1,846,000 acres. That, of course, would be a high proportion of 6,250,000 acres, but it is not so high a proportion of 123,000,000 acres. It is less than 2 per cent. of the whole area available for cultivation and similar uses.
  I note another fact: that in German times an area of 1,993,000 acres was alienated to non-Europeans. Therefore, the area as it stands to-day is actually less than that which was alienated before we took over the Mandate. There is one other point with regard to land. There is only a very restricted area which is useful for European farming or settlement. Actually, there are only about three areas—almost pockets in view of the large areas available—in the whole of Tanganyika. The greatest difficulty has always occurred in regard to certain lands in the neighbourhood of Kilimanjaro, such as Arusha and Moshi. It is those lands which attracted most of the attention of the Visiting Commission. German alienation there did put a ring fence round some of those lands, and left very little for the expansion of what is one of the most active peoples in Tanganyika. But the whole of that problem is an exceedingly difficult and complicated one, and if your Lordships are interested in the matter I would commend to you the Report of Mr. Justice Mark Wilson dealing with those lands and suggesting a future line of treatment for them.
  The Mission was well aware of the difficulties of this particular problem in that particular area, but it has committed itself to a general statement of principle: that European settlement should be curtailed and kept at the bare minimum consistent with the development of the territory. I myself regret any such broad statement of principle relating to a question which is essentially a series of local problems. I see the matter as follows. There are a few areas, notably in the two districts named, in which the extension of European settlement might be a real injury to African interests. Undoubtedly settlement there should be curtailed, unless fresh areas can be made
  562
  available in the vicinity by the extension of water facilities and the like, as has been suggested in Mr. Justice Mark Wilson's Report. Secondly, there are some areas, though by no means large, where European settlement can be extended, and no one can have any serious doubt as to the benefit which would result, not only to the resources of the territory as a whole, but to the natives in the neighbourhood, by the extension of European settlement in that limited area. But, thirdly, there are vast areas where there never has been European settlement, and where it would be unproductive and inadvisable to extend it.
  I believe that this is the right way of looking at the matter and not a generalisation so wide as that of the Mission. I believe also that this is a better statement of the case than will be found in the generalisations which we get from some quarters in Tanganyika itself—generalisations to the effect that the future of Tanganyika rests entirely on a great expansion of European settlement. I think myself that that is an exaggeration. I attach great value to European settlement. The value which European settlement can have, not only materially but in other ways, to the natives in the neighbourhood, has been amply proved in East Africa. But, as I have said, the field for such settlement is very small in proportion to the total area. Any artificial stimulation of settlement in the larger field in which it is not really suitable, would mean only a loss of capital and a wastage of energy.
  I turn now to the question of labour. May I say that if the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, will look at the revised version of the Ordinance for Labour Supply and Organisation, he will find reason to modify some of his criticisms. I would also like to put to the House, in view of what the noble Lord said about recruiting, that recruiting in Tanganyika supplies a very small proportion of the labour forces as a whole—perhaps less than 10 per cent. of the total labour force. I pass to the main conclusion of the Mission: that African labour is underpaid and that an all-round increase is necessary. In saying that, the Mission is only repeating what has been said by some Governors and other authorities in Tanganyika itself, particularly in regard to labour in the sisal industry as it was some years ago. As a general proposition I think we must

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  all accept it, though I do not consider it should be stated in that summary form and without its qualifications. In the first place, I think you have to look at the proportion of the wage-earning population to that of the population which lives on a subsistence economy. The wage earners number only some 340,000 out of 6,000,000. The present wages may look small, but it must be remembered that they are accompanied by rations. I notice that the scale of rations laid down by the Government provides for something like 3,500 calories, which I think is more than I have myself enjoyed at times in this country. I should like here to pay a tribute to what I know has been done, not only in some of the newer sisal plantations, but also in some of the mines, for improving the conditions of African labour and their accommodation, and, after all, conditions of labour are more important than the actual wage. But as regards wages, I think there is no advantage in pushing wages up out of all proportion to the costs of subsistence, because if that is done, as all experience has shown in Africa and elsewhere, the only result is absenteeism, irregular working and inefficiency. Further, though we would all agree that wages must be raised, this must be accompanied by measures which will bring to African labour some sense of discipline and responsibility—two things in which it is greatly lacking. That is not only a task for the employers by raising wages; it must be the gradual result of other social advances, in the nature of education and the like.
  LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I regret to interrupt the noble Lord's speech, but as he will no doubt remember we are awaiting a Royal Commission. Therefore, if we can resume afterwards we should be pleased to listen to what he has to say.
  House adjourned during pleasure.
  House resumed.

  ROYAL COMMISSION
  6.30 p.m.
  The following Bills received the Royal Assent:

  Water (Scotland).

  Special Roads.

  House adjourned during pleasure.
  House resumed.

  TANGANYIKA: U.N. MISSION'S REPORT
  6.38 p.m.
  Debate resumed.
  LORD HAILEY: My Lords, I regret that I did not notice that the time for the Royal Commission had drawn so near. I should not have ventured to give my own reactions on this Report to the House at such length were it not for the fact that I myself only last year made a somewhat extended study of the conditions in Tanganyika, district by district. I have only one word to add in reference to what the Report has said, and to what the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, has said on the subject of the inter-territorial organisation. The Report speaks with two minds on that subject. The recommendations of the Mission are by no means clear, although it has repeated some of the fears expressed to it by Indians and by Africans as to the possible result of this measure. I myself do not share those fears. Indeed, I look forward to the time when the High Commission organisation will result in a much closer integration of the territories, and in a form which will make the High Commission itself a more effective institution than it can hope to be at present.
  6.40 p.m.
  LORD TWEEDSMUIR: My Lords, I have listened with great interest to the two previous speakers on this Report, and I will not detain your Lordships for long. The noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, started his speech by saying that he did not doubt for a moment the sincerity of the people who compiled this lengthy Report, but that perhaps they overestimated our resources. I quite agree. The noble Lord, Lord Hailey, who speaks with enormous authority on any problem concerned with the African Continent, where his vast experience has given him the opportunity of comparative study, rather took the line that we all regard this Report not with satisfaction but with a certain measure of relief. My Lords, this bulky volume was compiled after six weeks' visit to Tanganyika by the Commission of the United Nations. It is proverbially said that spectators see most of the game. Six weeks is not very long to study the problems of 6,000,000 people living in 36,000 square miles.

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  This book is rather like one volume of the London Telephone Directory; but it is not so strictly factual. It contains some warm praise for what we have done and what we are doing, some criticism to which I will address myself briefly, and some mistakes of fact which Lord Hailey has mentioned; and it reproduces a number of factors to which we, the administering authority have had no opportunity of making any rejoinder, so they stand as indictments which as yet are undefended. In our Colonial Empire one thing never changes: there is always something to praise, there is always something to alter. As Lord Faringdon has said, we are not afraid of criticism. I was glad to hear him say that we have had nothing to be ashamed of in the past and nothing to be ashamed of now. I think perhaps that shows some slight change of heart.
  As regards the past, the Report pays a warm tribute to our administrators and our technical officers, a tribute with which we on this side of the House will mostly warmly wish to associate ourselves. I would particularly like to add my good wishes to the new Governor of Tanganyika, Sir Edward Twining. I had the great honour some fourteen years ago of working in a junior capacity under him in the Uganda Protectorate, and if His Majesty's Colonial Service possesses a more competent officer than he is they are indeed lucky. I would also pay a tribute not only to those who are there now, but to the hundreds of men and women who in the past, by years of unselfish effort, have built the Tanganyika we know to-day. The Report pays tribute to the freedom of political expression which the Commission encountered. That is no inconsiderable tribute in these days, for while political expression is greatly valued here, there are only too many countries in the world where it has vanished for a long time to come. I fully agree with what has been said, I think, by both noble Lords, that this Report takes no account of the progress that has been made already, no account of what has happened since we first came to Tanganyika round about the year 1920. Looking back from where we are now it is a long way to the point at which we started.
  Now, my Lords, I will address myself as briefly as I may to the criticisms, not
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  in detail as the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, has done, but to one or two criticisms which I believe have been directed at fundamental principles. Much has been said about political development, and I should like to read these words from page 33 of the Report, which says on the matter of political development, that
  "there is a degree of definiteness about very immediate next steps, far less assurance concerning the steps to follow, and an apparent void beyond that to the ultimate goal."
  Later, it says:
  "This lack of political planning cannot but have an adverse effect on the rate of progress."
  Our long Colonial experience in this country is that you cannot have a blue print for political development, nor can you have a time-schedule which will tell you when a country is going to reach complete political independence. A German observer said More the war, very acutely, that the secret of the strength and maintenance of the British Empire was that we always refused to adopt any overall paper plan, however attractive that plan might appear at the time. If we were to comply with what is obviously wanted in that sentence of the Report, and had planned and carefully dated the plan which would show when political development would one day become absolute, that document would be at the best a sham and at the worst a deception.
  I think the people of Ceylon, who have paid tribute to our stewardship when they were our wards and we looked after them, would all agree that we would have done a most monstrous disservice to them if we had tried to hurry that process twenty years ago and perhaps rush them through by strokes of the pen to the status they now enjoy. When people ask for self-government in the Colonies what they ask for is really responsible government. That is something that we in these Islands invented. It depends on one thing—toleration. It is, in fact, government by toleration. In countries where you have very dissimilar tribes and small nations, each inheriting ancestral feuds and hatreds and different religions, you cannot offer completely responsible government until these antagonisms have been so ironed out that government by toleration can be assured.
  I come now to the subject of inter-territorial organisation, with which the

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  noble Lord, Lord Hailey, wound up his admirable speech. It is said in the Report which has been quoted on this point, that it is much disliked by Africans as well as Indians. The Report spends 32 pages on the point of inter-territorial organisation. It quotes both African and Indian opinion; it even quotes a single opinion, gleaned from a single non-official European whom the Commission encountered at some stage. As has been said, the Report speaks very much with two minds, and I think that the chapter on inter-territorial organisation is to a great extent invalidated by the phrase that appears on page 4, where it says that the Commission found it impossible completely to study the subject. Either you study this subject completely, or you do not study it at all. The trend to-day is towards larger and larger groupings. U.N.O. is, I suppose, the consummation of that. Between the historical grouping of the British Commonwealth and Empire and the Western Union of Nations we are trying to reach some kind of inter-territorial organisation. I believe that inter-territorial organisation in Africa is on its way, and must come at no distant date. I believe that it will be for the benefit of everybody. After all, famine and pestilence know no frontiers. There are enormous savings and enormous strength in grouping these territories together. If we have them, then indeed we shall have an approach to partnership on a continental scale.
  Now for the very important matter of agriculture. In this regard I think we find the most important words in the Report. I will refer to them very briefly, because Lord Hailey has already quoted them:
  "European colonisation should be curtailed, and the strictest control envisaged to keep it to the barest minimum, consistent with the development of the territory."
  My Lords, it goes on from there. I may be doing the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, an injustice—I hope that I do not—but while he was speaking I could not escape the impression that he believed that the white man had no real right in Tanganyika, other than for a short time as technical adviser. That is a point to which I will return later.
  In the rest of this Report—I will not go into further details, for they have
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  been fully discussed already—problems of labour are dealt with. Lord Faringdon was very much upset at the idea that direction of labour takes place in Tanganyika—as indeed it does here. He referred to the ground-nuts scheme which I shall leave the noble Earl to tell us about when he replies on behalf of the Government. He will, doubtless, inform us what measure of success it is achieving. I do not think that anyone who knows the country can agree with the recommendation in the Report that all the different and diverse problems of African labour can be settled by the simple expedient of raising wages. The Report goes on to deal with the provision of schools, hospitals and public health facilities generally. After all, in many ways educational facilities and hospitals in this country leave a lot to be desired. We continue to try to improve them, for it is a continuous process. We have gone a long way in these matters in Tanganyika, and we hope to go very much further—and that in a not very long time. I do not think that anyone who has studied the problem would deny that welfare waits on development. We might plan thousands of schools and thousands of hospitals to-morrow, only to find them closed within a short time for lack of revenue to maintain them. In fact, social services and the high level of employment which obtains in this country would come down like a house of cards unless based on solid economic prosperity.
  I will take two further excerpts from the Report and then I will quote no more from it. It says two things which, as I believe, are very true. The crucial problem for Tanganyika, it states, is to find the financial resources. On a previous page, dealing with the inter-war years, the Report points out that political uncertainty discourages the investment of private capital. That is a good thing to have in mind as a background when we are considering this matter, and when we are thinking over the meaning of that word "curtail," as it is used in the phrase "curtailing European colonisation." Lord Faringdon said that the Commission, not unnaturally, regard themselves as trustees for the people of Tanganyika. Who are the people of Tanganyika? They are the African population, the Indian community and the European community. The European community have carried out a vast proportion of the development of that country

  569
  on which its welfare rests. That is an unchallengeable fact. And development must continue to rest to an enormous degree on their leadership, their technical skill and their investment.
  As Lord Hailey has said, we should not encourage a flood of European settlement that would push the African population back and hack, from the better to the worse lands. There is a balance there, and finding that balance is a challenge to us. This is a design for a great partnership, a partnership which a great African once described as "the harmony of the black and white keys." if European colonisation is curtailed, I believe that it will also curtail that leadership and that technical assistance which the African so badly needs. If you allow Europeans only thirty-three years tenure of their land, they will be tempted to extract as much as they can from it in that short time, then to lay it waste and leave it, at the end of the period, a blowing desert. If you create for the European a climate of insecurity, you will discourage all further enterprise and investment, and destroy that good will upon which all development must rest. This is a matter of particular importance in a country like Tanganyika whose principal asset is its mining, which requires high technical skill, high enterprise and considerable investment.
  I would like to draw the attention of your Lordships to a concept which I think is not clearly understood by the compilers of this Report. The Council which they represent did not invent either the word or the idea of "trusteeship." It was first used in a House of Commons Committee nearly 110 years ago in just that sense; but we in the British Colonial Empire have been moving, over the last few decades, away from the idea of trusteeship, pure and simple, and towards the idea of partnership, the partnership of the two races, the greatest partnership the world has ever seen. The Trusteeship Council of U.N.O., as an experiment, sent this Commission—the first which they have ever sent out, I understand—to study conditions on the spot. It must be remembered that we in this country, and in fact the people of every country of the Commonwealth, have done our best to make the United Nations Organisation a success. We have put up with a great deal of what I might term interference with our own concerns, which other great
  570
  Powers, such as Russia and the United States, would not have considered.
  Just imagine for one moment what would have happened if this Commission, with all their good will, had come to Britain for the same period—a period of six weeks—and had moved rapidly about these Islands conversing with miners, shopkeepers, housewives and so on. They might well have come to the awkward conclusion that His Majesty's Government were not a to rule. That, of course, would not absolve His Majesty's Government from their responsibility for continuing to rule until constitutionally relieved of their task by another Government at the next General Election. I am sure that all reasonable men will be prepared to harken most carefully to the advice and the recommendations of such a Commission as have drawn up this Report. But ours is the responsibility for the future of the people of Tanganyika. It is a responsibility of the Government, through Parliament, to the taxpayers and voters of this country, and nothing can relieve us of that responsibility for the future wellbeing of more than 6,000,000 Africans.
  My Lords, I will end on this note. The Commission's Report draws attention to the allegedly pedestrian rate of progress between the wars which they ascribe to a feeling of political insecurity. If, in spite of all their good will and all their good intentions, the Trusteeship Council inadvertently created a feeling of insecurity by well-intended recommendations at the wrong moment, that indeed would be a most tragic thing.
  7.0 p.m.
  LORD RENNELL: My Lords, there is not much I wish to add, especially to what Lord Hailey has said, but I would like to say that Lord Faringdon's appreciation of the quality of the Report seems to me entirely fair. It is a not unfriendly document. But however favourably disposed one may be to the tone of the document, one still cannot get away from the fact, which I think was underlying what Lord Hailey said, that it is really a very irresponsible document. Frankly, it surprised me that the chairman of the Commission, with the administrative experience which he has, should have lent his signature to a document of this sort. I think it is irresponsible because I do not believe that any

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  four persons, however well-intentioned, however hard-working, however knowledgeable of the country they might be, could within the measure of time they spent in the country draw up a really competent Report going into such detailed subjects as they have in this document.
  When one also read:, in the introduction to the Report that they were unable to examine the problem of closer territorial association, and then, on page 4, that the Commission visited only six of the eight provinces in Tanganyika and were not able to extend their itinerary southernwards, it does seem a little ambitious to make recommendations of the sort contained in the Report. That is why I think it is fair to criticise it as light-hearted and rather irresponsible.
  Furthermore, in the presentation of certain facts in the Report, I think the Commission have been guilty, I am sure quite unconsciously, of misrepresentation. I refer to the point mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hailey, which was also mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon—namely, the alienation of land. The statement on page 102, as presented, is misleading. It clearly suggests that there are only 6,000,000 acres of land under cultivation. Any unqualified person would suppose that there were only 6,000,000 acres that could be cultivated, and out of that 2,000,000 odd had been alienated. It may be true that 2,500,000 acres have been alienated, but of that a very large part has been taken over by the Overseas Food Corporation.
  LORD HAILEY: That is in addition.
  LORD RENNELL: The point I am making does not depend on figures. If the activities of the Overseas Food Corporation in developing Tanganyika were cut out and put in a separate compartment, the proportion of alienated land to the total amount of cultivable land would be much lower. This brings me to the question of the use of the land, to which I have referred more than once. In this scheme—and whether it be a failure or a success is immaterial—we have the background of what I might call the plantation development of Africa. It is not the development of agriculture by Africans in their own form. In its present form the scheme is in marked
  572
  contrast to the type of development in the cotton-growing area of the Sudan. In the Sudan a corporation was formed with the ultimate object of seeing that the land should be farmed by natives and not by a European corporation. This object has now been achieved and the concession of the corporation has been terminated. We have an example there of development in which the native is cultivating the land for himself.
  The principle behind the Overseas Food Corporation development seems to me one which is open to criticism, especially as the acreage involved is very large. Therefore, baldly stated as it is here, it gives an impression, which ought to be corrected by His Majesty's Government, that a vast amount of alienation for white settlers has been taking place and is still taking place. Of course, that is not so. This is not going to be a white settler's area, although it is going to be an area of plantation development. Personally, I do not think that that is the right kind of development for that part of Tanganyika, any more than I should think it the right kind of development in any other part of Africa. The Commission's Report is misleading, and I hope the noble Earl who is to reply will correct the impression it certainly would leave.
  When some weeks ago the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, put down his Motion to draw His Majesty's Government's attention to this Report, I think only two copies of the Report were available in this country, one of which luckily I was able to secure. It is only because the noble Lord's Motion was postponed that other members of your Lordships' House have had an opportunity of seeing the Report. If these Reports are to be taken seriously in this country—and, after all, they are directed at the administration of the Government—it is only reasonable that the document should be circulated in sufficient numbers and in such a form that it becomes accessible to the public, so that the public may themselves have a view of the subject. It is neither fair to the public nor to your Lordships' House to have to debate a document which is so extremely difficult to obtain. Indeed, had the noble Lord's Motion been taken when originally put down, I should have been obliged to protest that it was not a subject which could properly

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  be debated, because nobody had been able to see the document. That is not the fair and proper way to deal with this matter. I am not imputing blame to the Government, but the machinery for making this Report available is obviously much at fault and needs correcting.
  The third point in the Report which I wish to raise is one touched on by the last two speakers. It is the question of inter-territorial organisation. It seems to me peculiar that a large portion of the Report should be devoted to this extremely complicated and important subject and that the Commission, after reproducing a number of views, which I do not think are serious or important, add without comment a summary of the statements in the paragraph above. This is a matter of great importance, and if the Commission are going to deal with it and give views, they must not just leave the views of other people to speak for them. If this, as has been suggested, is a compromise between divergent views which may be held by two different bodies of opinion in the Commission, then it would seem to me appropriate for the different views to be expressed in a Minority Report or a Report with which the chairman could disagree. But an expression of view on that subject, as on other subjects, seems to be called for, and not to express a view at all is, at the lowest, to run away from the question altogether, and, at best, to advertise the views of people whose views had very much better not be advertised.
  Your Lordships are well aware that, for historical reasons, the whole of Africa has been carved up into administrative areas which bear virtually no relation to geography, to ethnic divisions or to economic units. One of the most ridiculous divisions is the division between Tanganyika and Kenya which, among other things, cuts the Massai in two pieces, for no other reason than that it was the line drawn on the map when the Germans and ourselves, knowing little about either country, decided in Europe that that should be the line, without going to look at it on the spot. There is no doubt that we ought to re-draw a great many of these boundaries in the state of the world to-day, and make them more logical. The world is far from perfect, and that possibly is an entirely Utopian suggestion, whether applied in East or West Africa. But there is one way round
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  these difficulties—namely, to group smaller territories into larger units. By doing so, you automatically attenuate or even abolish the boundaries, quite apart from the merits of developing territories as larger units. I do not necessarily refer here only to British administrative territories, but to territories of Africa generally which may be administered by more than one European Power, and which really require to be developed as units of more than one territory. A fortiori it seems to be essential that these territories under British administration should be developed as larger rather than smaller units, if for no other reason than to get over the difficulty of these ridiculous boundaries that have grown up in history.
  That aspect of the inter-territorial organisation, and criticisms of it, has been too much neglected, both by the Mission and by other critics of inter-territorial organisation and closer union. It is one that I think needs bringing out whenever the subject of closer union, or whatever it may be called, is discussed. In the case of the East African grouping, it seems to me, whatever may be the criticisms and fears—and no doubt some are justifiable fears—it is inescapable that that territory must be developed as a whole. There we are obviously up against a very great difficulty which is well known to your Lordships—namely, that we have what was a mandated area in Tanganyika, another type of administration in Kenya and a third type in Uganda. It has been held that these different statuses of territories are incompatible with the conception of a whole. I do not believe that is so, because, as I understand from what the Secretary of State for the Colonies was reported as having said (with which, if the published version of what he said is even remotely correct, I am in agreement), it must be remembered that Tanganyika, who her it was a mandated area or not, and whether it is now subject to the attentions of the Trusteeship Council or not, is a British territory administered by His Majesty's Government. That is an inescapable fact, just as it is a fact that the Belgian Congo is administered by the Belgian Government.
  If His Majesty's Government are administering Tanganyika, and are also administering Kenya and Uganda, they have a duty to administer as a whole, and provided that they follow the

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  principles which they themselves laid down in agreeing to the Mandate in the first place, and that they accept the responsibilities involved under it, no one has the right to say that they shall do this or do that. None of those things is incompatible with closer union in East Africa. I hope the noble Earl who is to reply will have something to say on that point, and notably on the subject of what the Secretary of State for the Colonies is reported to have said within the last few days in regard to Tanganyika. I know one has to take newspaper reports and statements made overseas with some care and prudence, but evidently the Secretary of State said something which I think noble Lords in your Lordships' House will be glad to have repeated here.
  The point that emerges from this difficulty of a different status for Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda leads me to the last point I want to make. It is rather a difficult point, and I do not want to be misinterpreted. The idea of trusteeship for African and other undeveloped territories is, as Lord Tweedsmuir said, a very old-established principle in our British conception. It was not invented by the League of Nations; it was not invented in 1918 or 1919. We have always regarded ourselves as trustees for the development of backward and primitive territories. The formalisation of this trustee principle in the Mandate which was given to us, and which we accepted at the end of the First World War, however right it was in theoretical conception—and I personally think it was right, and I do not in the least regret that the idea was put forward—has, in the case of Tanganyika, produced some rather strange and rather undesirable consequences.
  If we had just announced publicly to the world that we were going to administer Tanganyika under that Mandate as trustees for the people there, I do not believe that we should have encountered the same difficulties as we have encountered by having it a formally mandated territory. It is that formalisation which allowed a lot of well-meaning but not always very wise people to come and look round, and advise us on what we ought to do. It also created that feeling of uncertainty to which Lord Tweedsmuir, Lord Faringdon and others
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  have referred, about investing in the development of the country. If the idea gets abroad that our administration of a certain territory, which does not belong to the Crown but to somebody else, can be terminated by a third party (which, as a matter of fact, the League of Nations always held it could not be), it is perfectly reasonable and understandable that people should be diffident about investing their money or investing their lives there. There is no shadow of doubt that in the thirty years that have elapsed since the Mandate was granted, one of the reasons why Tanganyika has not developed so quickly as it might have done—and I agree that it has not—has been the fear that the Mandate would come to an end; and no one knew what would happen after that.
  It is an unfortunate thing that this very well-meaning conception of trusteeship formalisation under a Mandate should have had the effect of a brake, a dragging effect, on the development of the country, instead of being a stimulus. Had that trusteeship not been formalised as a Mandate, I do not believe that brake, that dragging effect, would have been felt, and I think Tanganyika would have developed possibly with the same speed as certain other territories in Africa. The noble Lord, Lord Hailey, will bear with me if I refer to the very happy times that he and I spent together in the Belgian Congo in the early part of the war. I, knowing very little about it but under the guidance of the noble Lord, saw in a short space of time the immense progress that had been made by the Belgian Administration there, unfettered and unhampered by inspecting committees—missions who go out to advise people on how to administer things they are quite incapable of administering themselves.
  Relatively there is no doubt, from the state in which the Belgian Congo was thirty years ago, and the state in which Tanganyika was thirty years ago, that development in the Belgian Congo has been more rapid than in Tanganyika. I attribute that to the hampering effect of uncertainty; of well-meaning people butting in on things they know very little about—of which it may be said that certain parts of this Report are the logical conclusion—of people coming out for five

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  or six weeks to tour round a territory of the size of Tanganyika, without even taking the trouble, as a Commission, to visit all the provinces in the country. That they should then proffer advice, is not helpful either to the administrators in Tanganyika or to His Majesty's Government who are trying to develop Tanganyika. Both the Government and the administrators have my sympathies over the treatment they have received at the hands of an itinerant Commission of this sort, which is the direct consequence of the formalisation of a great and noble ideal which never ought to be formalised. That ideal ought to have been applied by practice, habit and custom, and not formalised under the League of Nations or U.N.O. into a Trusteeship Council or a Council on Mandates which tied the hands and created the uncertainty from which we have suffered there, and for which we are now criticised. From that point of view, I regret the Report which has been the subject of this debate. Although not unfriendly, the Report is still very injurious.
  7.21 p.m.
  THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Faringdon for the thoughtful speech with which he opened this discussion, and for his special solicitude for the Africans in Tanganyika. I congratulate him on evoking the interesting and uniformly helpful speeches to which we have listened from the Benches opposite. I think we are indebted particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Hailey, for his contribution, which was outstanding, both for the range and accuracy of its information about conditions in Tanganyika, and for the sagacity of its advice on matters of policy. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Tweedsmuir, is not here at the moment, but I know that he had a pressing engagement elsewhere. I should like to say that I appreciate his reference to the new Governor, Sir Edward Twining. I agree that he has high qualities, and I am sure that we all wish him the utmost success in his new appointment.
  In reply to the request made by the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, for information about a recent statement of policy, made by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State, I would say this. The gist of what my right honourable friend said was that the United Kingdom is the
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  administering Power in Tanganyika under our trusteeship agreement, and that there will be no weakening of our position in respect of these administrative responsibilities. I am glad the noble Lord agrees that it is the right policy, and I am sure that his view will be shared by all members of the House.
  Much of what has been said this afternoon by way of criticism and comment on our administration in Tanganyika has been based on the Report of the Visiting Mission sent to this Territory by the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. This Mission addressed itself with the utmost good will to its task, but they laboured under one great and inevitable disadvantage. The Mission consisted of people who, whatever the excellence of their other qualifications may have been, had no first-hand knowledge or experience of Tanganyika. Its members were able to spend only a period of six weeks in a Territory of some 360,000 square miles—which is considerably larger than many European countries—where communications by road, rail or air are, in many parts, extremely limited, and where social conditions and political organisation vary enormously from one tribal group to another among the 120 tribes that constitute the bulk of a widely scattered population.
  It is, therefore, not surprising that those who have had longer and more direct experience of Tanganyika should find that some of the conclusions reached by the visitors after their brief stay in the Territory have fallen wide of the mark. The Mission included members with such a distinguished record in the Colonial field as its Chairman, M. Laurenti, an elder statesman of the French African administration, and Mr. Chinnery, the Australian representative with a wide knowledge of primitive peoples in the Southern Hemisphere. The key to the association of experts of this calibre, with some of the more doubtful conclusions and recommendations in the Report, no doubt lies in the following passage at the end of the introduction. With your Lordships' permission I will quote this passage:
  "The observations and conclusions do not necessarily reflect the precise views of each member of the Mission. The desirability of submitting a unanimous Report to the Council may have resulted in the formulation

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  of an average opinion on particular points to which the Commission as a whole finally subscribed. It has appeared to the Commission that this method is more in keeping with the aims of the Trusteeship System than would have been the case if more or less divergent shades of opinion had been repeatedly stated."
  We should all, I think, agree that the Mission did their best to discharge the responsibility with which they had been entrusted, and that their members had consistently in the forefront of their minds the interests of the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory.
  That is also our primary responsibility as a Trustee Authority, and we welcome the opportunity provided by such studies as the Mission has made of focusing world opinion on our conduct of the affairs of Tanganyika. If our common aim of contributing the utmost we can to the social improvement and political advance of the indigenous inhabitants is to be carried out in practice, it is of course essential that we, as the Administering Authority, should not only be willing to accept valid criticism of our work, and if necessary to alter our methods and amend our ways, but also that we should refute criticism based on a superficial knowledge of fact, or on failure to grasp the practical difficulties in the way of social reforms or constitutional developments desired by everyone. This is the spirit in which we and the Administration of Tanganyika have studied the Report of the Visiting Mission, and in which I shall reply to the strictures of the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon. I have no doubt that some of your Lordships will wish to draw your own conclusions, and to examine for this purpose both the Report of the Visiting Mission and the observations made in reply by the Administering Authority. The latter document has been published to-day, and copies of this document, and of the Commission's Report, have been placed at your Lordships' disposal in the Library.
  I should like now to pass on to deal with some aspects of criticism. I will start by a brief and summary outline of our policy and practice in relation to land settlement in Tanganyika. The policy governing land settlement in this Territory has been clearly and recently stated as follows by the Governor—and I do not think it would be challenged by the noble
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  Lord, Lord Faringdon, or by the members of the Visiting Commission:
  "The needs of the African inhabitants of Tanganyika must have priority, and land should not be allocated to non-native settlement, whether from enemy estates or other areas, unless it can be shown that the land in question is not required for native occupation and is not likely to be required in the foreseeable future."
  I think it will found that the allocation of land in Tanganyika has conformed to this principle of giving proper priority to the requirements of the indigenous inhabitants.
  The Mission said in their Report that there were 1,800,000 acres under non-indigenous cultivation, leaving 4,500,000 acres under African cultivation. It might be thought from these figures that a few thousand Europeans and Indians farm one-third of the total cultivable area, leaving the balance of two-thirds for the use of the whole African population of approximately 7,000,000 persons. But this would be a dangerously false conclusion. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hailey, for the figures he quoted, and I would like to reinforce his argument. Whereas the figure of land farmed by non-indigenous land holders cannot be increased, the figure for African cultivation can be increased, and the area of cultivable land available to the indigenous inhabitants is vastly greater than 4,500,000 acres. After taking into account the area of forest reserve, and other areas in the Territory not suitable for agriculture, there are some 40,000,000 acres used only by the indigenous population for cattle pasture. The African farmers break new ground each year for the cultivation of their annual crops, and allow the land which they have used in the preceding year to revert to pasture. The African still goes in for shifting cultivation, and he could easily take more land for his crops if he wanted to. In fact, it is only in very limited areas that it would be in the least accurate to speak of land shortage.
  In the course of their recommendations on land settlement the Mission recorded their view that all ex-German estates should come under African ownership, preferably on a co-operative basis. But in our view the best way of relieving the pressure of population in this part of the country is by opening up new areas for African cultivation, which will be larger in size than all the ex-enemy estates

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  added together. To make effective this policy of opening up new areas for Africans, 155,000 acres of land lying immediately below the present area of native occupation on the lower slopes of Kilimanjaro are to be developed at Government expense for tribal expansion. It should also be remembered that a considerable area of the ex-German estates lies in the north and north-west of Kilimanjaro, well away from the populated part of the district, and is not suitable for occupation by any agricultural tribe. A much smaller area is already used for growing coffee, tea, and sisal, and is elaborately equipped with factories and plant in accordance with the latest and the most scientific methods of cultivating and processing these products.
  These estates can be run only under expert non-African management, and their transfer to tribal occupation would obviously impoverish the country. It is not a practical suggestion at this stage to put ex-enemy estates under co-operative African ownership. Co-operative principles and modern farming methods are not yet sufficiently understood by the Africans themselves for sucessful application to estate ownership and management. In the Moshi and Arusha districts about 14,000 acres of ex-German land will, however, be made available to the African population. Most of this land, I understand, will go to the Chagga, who were referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon.
  LORD FARINGDON: Can the noble Earl say what proportion of ex-German land that would be?
  THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: I think they are getting roughly 13,000 acres of this part of the ex-German estates.
  LORD FARINGDON: I meant, how much of that particular neighbourhood?
  THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: It is in the Moshi and Arusha districts, but I cannot give details of that particular neighbourhood now. I shall be very glad to ascertain the particulars.
  The Mission seem to have taken the view that the Government should forthwith formulate a plan for the transfer to African farmers of the area now under cultivation by the Overseas Food Corporation for ground—nuts and sunflower crops. But although we agree that ownership and control should ultimately pass
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  to African hands and that it may well be exercised on a co-operative basis, it seems likely that the transfer would be a gradual process, and there can be no question of handing over this undertaking at an early stage—even if the present Government were anxious to disclaim a project in which they take considerable pride and before its economic success had been assured. There must necessarily be a lengthy period of preparation and instruction before the indigenous inhabitants can hope to make a business success of such a vast and complex agricultural experiment.
  In examining the political advice tendered by the Visiting Mission, we of course agree with them that the object of policy must always remain the preparation of the inhabitants for self-government, and that consideration should be given to every practicable measure for accelerating their advance towards this goal. Where I think we disagree with the Report and with the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, is about the pace at which advance towards a representative system of government in a tribal society can be made, and the time required before the indigenous population can contribute to the provision of an efficient and responsible administration. In our view, a too rapid movement towards these objectives, by failing to take into account the political immaturity of the rural African population, would imperil the standard of living and the steady political progress of the Territory as a whole.
  We regard the introduction of a representative and popular system of local government as a necessary foundation for representative government at the provincial level and ultimately at the centre. Once we have established representative elements and tribal councils we can then proceed to build up a chain of representation through district and provincial councils to the membership of the Legislative Assembly. The first stage in the development of representative institutions must necessarily involve the gradual adaptation of tribal traditions and authority to modern political requirements. Not until this first step in the evolution of African democracy has been taken will it be possible to secure popular representation at higher levels, and to avoid the abuse of some extensive

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  powers at these levels by sectional interests.
  The noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, has complained that there is insufficient African representation on the Legislative Council. He admits, of course, that there are already four African members and that Canon Gibbons, who was originally appointed to look after African interests, has remained among the European unofficials on the Council. It is the function of the fifteen official members of the Council to watch over the interests of the African majority of the population. Moreover, it would be quite unwarranted to assume that all the European members of the Council, excluding Canon Gibbons, regard themselves merely as representatives of purely sectional interests and are indifferent to African interests.
  Nevertheless, we hope in the not distant future to increase the present African membership and to draw on Africans from the different Provinces. It is, however, extremely difficult at the present stage of African political development to find Africans who are both able to play a useful part in the work of the Council and are recognised by the mass of the African population as speaking in a representative capacity for them. The danger of forcing on Africans representation by Africans at a hot pace is that it will result in practice in the representation of sectional interests which often run counter to the interests of the rural communities which form the bulk of the population. Before the mass of the people can safeguard their own interests it will be necessary, as I have already said in referring to the method of developing self-government in Tanganyika, to build up a system of representation by popular choice at the tribal or local government level.
  The Mission refer in their Report to the inadequacy of the social services provided by the Administration for the local inhabitants, particularly in the field of education. But they fail to suggest how the poorest of the three British-administered territories in East Africa is to pay out of its limited resources for improvements everyone would like to see. Pointing out the inadequacy of the ten-year plan for the expansion of the African education services, the Mission
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  press for gradually extended facilities but do not attempt to say how those facilities are to be paid for or how the teachers are to be provided. We agree, of course, from every point of view, about the importance of the expansion of education services for Africans, but unfortunately lack of funds and trained personnel prevents at present a more ambitious programme of development. The criticism of the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, in this regard seemed to me to be extremely sound. On the other hand, considerable progress has been made in recent years. The total appropriations for education in the Territory's budget for 1948 amounted to just under 10 per cent. of the Government's total expenditure for the year, as compared with just over 5 per cent. in 1938. It therefore doubled in ten years. The war made it impossible to carry out plans for further improvements in the social services, but what is now being done for education illustrates the importance attached to such post war measures by the Government of the Territory.
  Local revenues are being supplemented for the financing of the ten-year plan for education by a grant of £1,250,000 from the United Kingdom Government under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. It would, however, be unwise to provide more outside financial assistance than the Territory can expect to furnish from its own resources in time to come, and to build up education services to a scale which would be beyond the capacity of the local revenues ultimately to support. In the field of technical and vocational training for Africans the Government training school for ex-Service men near Dar es Salaam turned out 1,606 African craftsmen by the end of 1948, and there are still 300 men in training. There are five Government schools and ten mission schools in the Territory, the curricula of which include technical and vocational training. Pupils at these schools numbered 526 at the end of 1948, as compared with 301 in 1947. In addition, the Overseas Food Corporation's technical training centre at Ifunda, in the Southern Highlands Province, is turning out trained Africans for the ground-nuts scheme at the rate of about 1,000 per annum, so that this technical and vocational training is going forward at a rate certainly not

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  equalled in the history of our responsibility for this Territory.
  The noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, expressed serious misgivings about the effect of the Labour Supply and Utilisation Ordinance. I do not know whether he is clear about the legal position. This is an Ordinance which has been passed but which has not come into administrative operation. I hope that I can convince him that these misgivings, which were shared to some degree by the Visiting Commission, are unjustified, because they are based on an understandable misconception of an enactment which aims merely at relating the limited labour supply to urgent and essential occupations. This Ordinance will not in any way interfere with the rights or the freedom of African workers. It contains no element of compulsion. The noble Lord spoke of direction. We do not attempt to direct African labour, and Africans will be as free to offer or refuse their services as they have been in time past. Nor will it restrict the workers' right to organise and engage in collective bargaining; indeed, the Administration does everything possible to encourage trade unionism among African workers. It will not discriminate in favour of the Government and large employers in the Territory, for small employers were consulted and their views were fully considered before this legislation was enacted. This Ordinance deals only with recruitment, and I think it should be made quite clear that it will not restrict or interfere with the right of the African to seek employment for himself. The employment figures for 1948 show that no more than 28,000 out of a total labour force of 327,000 persons at work in the Territory were recruited. That gives an indication of the probable distribution of the labour force if and when the Ordinance becomes effective. Its provisions would thus not affect more than about 8 per cent. of the total labour force of the Territory.
  The noble Lord also took exception to the use of penal sanctions in labour contracts. We have_ of course, agreed to the International Labour Convention dealing with penal sanctions in dependent territories, and this Agreement includes an undertaking to abolish such sanctions progressively and as soon as possible. I
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  would like to stress the words "progressively and as soon as possible," because they imply that we are unable in all cases to terminate these penalties immediately, and that we ourselves are to judge how soon and at what moment it will be practicable to do away with those that remain operative. I need hardly add, however, that we share to the full the noble Lord's desire that this practice should cease in all our Colonies and Trust Territories at the earliest possible moment. The only one of these breaches of contract for which there is now provision for a penal sanction in the labour laws, of Tanganyika is desertion.
  I would remind the House that the effect of desertion on food supplies in this Territory, where labour is often irreplaceable and comes from great distances, would be much more serious than would be the case in a highly developed European country. The object of this penalty is to protect the Africans themselves from the disastrous results of an interruption of essential work. Nevertheless, we are anxious to find, and we are constantly seeking, other inducements for the maintenance of contractual obligations; and the possibility of withdrawing the penal sanction for desertion is constantly in the minds both of the local Administration and of those who serve at the Colonial Office.
  On the subject of the inter-territorial organisation, a subject which has been referred to by several noble Lords and which has received some adverse criticism in the Report, I would say only this. It should surely be perfectly clear to everyone that this inter-territorial organisation is purely administrative, and that it was set up to work certain common services for the benefit of the inhabitants of all these territories; it does not interfere with the political independence of Tanganyika or its continued administration by us as a Trust Territory. If that position were clearer to the minds of some of our critics, I think they would admit that this inter-territorial organisation could only redound to the benefit of those for whom they have a responsibility. I ought to add this in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, who asked me a question about the position of the Chagga. Two-thirds of the former German estates in the Arusha district will go to the Chagga tribe. I am grateful to those noble Lords who have taken part

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  in this debate for a uniformly constructive and helpful contribution to the subject. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, having been given the opportunity for this valuable discussion, will be prepared to withdraw his Motion.
  7.49 p.m.
  LORD FARINGDON: My Lords, at this late hour you will naturally not wish that I should follow up any points. I would, however, say that in the figures he produced—I say this with the greatest respect, and with some diffidence and trepidation—the noble Lord, Lord Hailey, did not actually give a fairer picture than did the Visiting Mission. His figure of 123,000,000 acres, I thought, was also a little misguiding. I was not wholly satisfied with what the noble Earl said on this
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  question of land; nor was I happy about what he said with regard to the Labour Supply and Utilisation Ordinance. As I said, it did not seem to me to matter very much whether or not you called it direction of labour, if in fact you gave the man no option where he could go. I thought the noble Earl's defence of penal sanctions as a protection for the African was a little far-fetched. I may have misunderstood him. I thank him very much indeed for his full and, on the whole, satisfactory reply. With your Lordships' permission, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
  Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.
  House adjourned at ten minutes before eight o'clock.