Lords Sitting of 28 July 1949

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers

  MESSAGE FROM THE KING
  3.5 p.m.
  THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, I have the honour to present a Message from the King signed with his own hand. His Majesty's Message is as follows:
  "I have received your Address praying that the National Service (Adaptation of Enactments) (Naval and Marine Forces) Order, 1949, and the National Service (Adaptation of Enactments) (Military and Air Forces) Order, 1949, be made in the form of the drafts laid before Parliament. I will comply with your request."

  IRON AND STEEL BILL
  3.6 p.m.
  Order of the Day read for the consideration of the Commons Amendment in lieu of one of the Lords Amendments, and the Commons Reasons for disagreeing to certain of the Lords Amendments.
  THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT ADDISON): My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons Amendment and the Commons Reasons be now considered.
  Moved, That the Commons Amendment in lieu of one of the Lords Amendments, and the Commons Reasons for disagreeing to certain of the Lords Amendments be now considered.—(Viscount Addison.)
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, perhaps it may be for the convenience of your Lordships' House if, on this general Motion, I take the opportunity of stating the general position of the Conservative Opposition with regard to the Amendments which were sent down by your Lordships to another place and which have now returned to us. I must confess that we have been deeply disappointed at the attitude taken in another place by the Government and their supporters with regard to these Amend-
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  ments. One could well understand that not all of them would be found acceptable: that would have been too much to hope for. But to reject so large a proportion, including all those of real substance, shows both an innate contempt for this House and, in our view, a general irresponsibility which I feel sure will not commend itself to the country. After all, these were not frivolous Amendments. They were put forward with a due sense of responsibility, on the recommendation of noble Lords with life-long experience of the industry, and they surely deserve a better fate than they have had.
  I sometimes wonder whether in fact the Labour Party, in spite of all their protestations, really believe in the Second Chamber at all. That hardly seems credible if they expect this House, with all its talent and experience, to sit long hours over Bills with the object of making them more workable and then, without even the façade of really serious consideration, reject all the more important Amendments that have been made, apparently just because they have emanated from the House of Lords. It is not as if we, from any general dislike of the underlying principles of this Bill—and we do dislike them—had tried to wreck it, or even to hold it up. We have never lent ourselves to obstructionist tactics of that kind. If I may use a phrase which is now popular in industrial circles, there has been no "go slow movement" on the part of your Lord-sips. We have dealt with this Bill, like other measures, expeditiously and efficiently; we have done our best to improve it and make it more workable. In such circumstances, I feel that we are entitled to protest against the cavalier treatment to which we have been subjected.
  We have considered carefully and, I can assure the Government, with a due sense of responsibility what course we should now adopt towards these Amendments which have been rejected. We do not recede in any way from the view that all the Amendments which we inserted in the Bill were serious contributions, aimed at increasing the efficiency of the Government scheme. We are utterly unconvinced, for instance, by the arguments of Ministers against the Prices Board. We do not believe that the existing machinery in the Bill is adequate and,

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  in our view, it is quite senseless to say that the Prices Board would not work, when in fact an exactly similar body has operated with complete success throughout the difficult war and post-war years. We believe that the real reason for the Government's opposition to this Board is that they are afraid of anything which might in any way interfere with the absolute dictatorship of the Minister. He does not want advice from experts or from anybody else. Nor are we any more impressed by the arguments adduced against the other Amendments. If, on these, we do not carry our opposition any further, it is not because we accept the Government view—and I want to make that abundantly clear.
  There is, however, one Amendment on which I am afraid we must continue to insist. It is that which relates to the postponement of the bringing into operation of the whole scheme of nationalisation of the industry until after the General Election. On that we intend to stand absolutely firm. Of this particular Amendment I shall say no more at this stage, though I shall have some further comments to make when we come to discuss it. With regard to the others we accept the decision which has been reached in another place. We accept it reluctantly; we accept it under protest. We believe the excision of these Amendments to be totally unjustified and calculated only to impair the smooth working of the scheme. But we shall not carry our opposition to a Division. We have done our best to improve this Bill in these respects. If we have failed, that is not our fault; the Government must bear the responsibility.
  I would now say, in conclusion, one word as to the actual procedure which we shall adopt to-day. I suggest that, in view of the fact that we are not going to vote on the earlier Amendments, it will probably be convenient that Amendments up to Clause 11, on which we do not intend to insist, should be moved en bloc—with the exception of the Amendment in lieu which the other place has offered. That no doubt will require separate treatment. When we reach Clause 11 and the group of Amendments which hangs with it, then no doubt we shall have a further debate and a Division.
  3.14 p.m.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: My Lords, I recognise that the procedure suggested by the noble Marquess is in accord with the general conduct of proceedings in this House, and perhaps I may make one or two observations on what the noble Marquess has said about taking the Amendments as a group. If your Lordships will study the Paper it will be seen that the suggested first group embraces the Amendments up to and including the second Amendment to page 5, line 13. The next Amendment will be the Amendment in lieu, to which the noble Marquess referred.
  I should like, if I may, with perfect good faith, to make a brief comment on what the noble Marquess has said with regard to what happened in another place. I think he omitted to take note of the fact that a very considerable number of Amendments which your Lordships inserted have been accepted by the other place; and with regard to those with which they disagreed, I am quite sure the noble Marquess will not accuse noble Lords on this side of the House of any disposition to conceal our views. I think the views of the Government, including my own and those of my colleagues, were fully and adequately expressed. I assure the noble Marquess that there was no sense of irresponsibility in connection with this Bill in another place, and there was nothing to justify the noble Marquess's description "not even a facade of consideration." I would remind your Lordships that the Amendments which this House inserted in the Bill were subjected to full consideration; the discussion in the other place lasted all through one night and until mid-day the following day on the first occasion, and again for a considerable time on the second occasion.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: But would the noble Viscount say what proportion of that time was taken up by the Opposition and what proportion by the Government, and what was the average length of the speeches of Ministers? They were very brief and very inadequate.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: I am afraid I have not had notice of that question.
  VISCOUNT SWINTON: But you read the debate.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: I have not turned my reading into an arithmetical calculation which would enable me to give a proper reply to the noble Marquess. I quite understand the spirit in which the noble Marquess made his interjection, but at the same time that does not alter the solid fact that the other place sat all through the night until midday the following day, and again a considerable time on the next day to consider these Amendments. I should not describe that as "not even a facade of consideration." However, I will carry the matter further, and express my appreciation of the suggestion of the noble Marquess, which is quite in accord with the procedure of this House. When we come to the Amendments to Clause 11, there will no doubt be some discussion both by the noble Marquess and others, and I myself may haw a word to say.
  3.20 p.m.
  LORD RENNELL: Before the Motion is put I should like to say that, so far as I and noble Lords on these Benches are concerned, we also regret the decisions taken in another place on these Amendments. In the case of many of those Amendments, where your Lordships' House has done its best to improve what in my opinion is a Bill which, even with those Amendments, would be unworkable and unsatisfactory, they have found fit to say that they do not agree. I am referring especially to the Amendments in the earlier part of the Bill. The Government rather take the line that the Amendments are unnecessary because it is said (and this view has been expressed frequently by noble Lords opposite), the Minister would not do such a thing, and in any case he does not wish to be told not to do so.
  The reasons for rejecting the Amendments which have been moved in this House—again I speak of the earlier ones —seem to me rather to partake of the case of the young man who says: "Perhaps I will do what you want me to do. but I am not going to be told to do it." That attitude of mind, which I find reflected in much of what was said during the debates in another place, makes the rejection of these Amendments all the more regrettable. If your Lordships do not divide on these earlier Amendments, and divide only on the issue to which the noble Marquess has referred, it will
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  not be because we on these Benches do not consider that the Amendments would improve what is, to us, an unsatisfactory Bill. Rather do we desire to clarify the issue—namely, that so far as we are concerned this Bill, even in an amended form, would be unsatisfactory; that in the unamended form it is wholly unsatisfactory, and that the people of this country should have an opportunity of judging not only of the unsatisfactory nature of the Bill but also of the motives and the doctrine behind those who prompted and sponsored it.
  On Question, Motion agreed to.
  COMMONS AMENDMENT IN LIEU OF ONE OF THE LORDS AMENDMENTS AND COMMONS REASONS FOR DISAGREEING TO CERTAIN OF THE LORDS AMENDMENTS.
  ["The references are to Bill No. 93]

  LORDS AMENDMENTS
  Clause 1, page 2, line 8, at end insert—
  ("The initial and subsequent appointments shall be so made as to secure the inclusion of at least three persons appearing to the Minister to have had wide experience of and shown capacity in the production of iron ore or iron or steel.")
  Clause 1, page 2,line 8, after the words last inserted, insert—
  ("The initial and subsequent appointments shall be se made as to secure the inclusion of at least one person appearing to the Minister to have had wide experience as a consumer of iron or steel for industrial purposes.")
  The Commons disagreed to the above Amendments for the following Reason:
  Because the Amendments might fetter the Minister's power to make the most suitable appointments to the Corporation from among persons possessing the necessary qualifications.

  LORDS AMENDMENTS
  Page 3, line 18, at end insert new clause:
  Powers of subsidiaries of the Corporation
  (".—(1) No company being a subsidiary of the Corporation shall, notwithstanding any provision of its Memorandum of Association or its charter of incorporation or other charter, carry on directly or indirectly any activities except:

  (a) activities specified in the first column of the Second Schedule to this Act;

  (b) activities which that company was in fact carrying on immediately before the general date of transfer;

  (c) activities which for technical reasons ought, in the opinion of the Minister, to be carried on by that company with a view to the better carrying on by any such company of its activities under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) hereof and which are specified in an order of the Minister;

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  (d) such other activities as shall be specified in an order of the Minister;

  and the Memorandum of Association or charter of that company shall be deemed to be limited accordingly.
  (2) A copy of any such order as aforesaid shall be delivered by the Corporation to the Registrar of Companies.
  (3) An order made under this section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.")
  Clause 2, page 3, line 26, leave out from ("any") to end of line 30, and insert ("subsidiary of the Corporation is authorised to carry on and is not by any provision of this Act prohibited from carrying on")
  Clause 2, page 3 line 33, leave out from second ("any") to ("or") in line 35, and insert ("subsidiary of the Corporation is authorised to carry on and is not by any provision of this Act prohibited from carrying on")
  Clause 2, page 4, line 18, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
  ("(3) The Corporation shall have power to carry on such other activities as shall have been specified in an order of the Minister, such order being subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.")
  Clause 50, page 54, line 6, after ("by") insert ("section (Powers of subsidiaries of the Corporation), section two and")
  The Commons disagreed to the above Amendments for the following Reason:
  Because the Amendments would unduly restrict the powers of the Corporation and their subsidiaries and are administratively impracticable.

  LORDS AMENDMENTS
  Clause 3, page 4, line 43, leave out from first ("the") to ("and") in line 44 and insert ("principal activities of the Corporation and of the publicly-owned companies")
  Clause 3, page 4, line 44, leave out from ("and") to ("as") in line 2 on page 5, and insert ("the availability of those products in such quantities, types, qualities and sizes and at such prices")
  Clause 3, page 5, line 5, after ("purposes") insert ("and desire to purchase those products from the Corporation or from a publicly-owned company")
  The Commons disagreed to the above Amendments for the following Reason:
  Because a statutory requirement to promote the supply of products in which there is a free market and to meet demands for those products is unnecessary.

  LORDS AMENDMENT
  Clause 3, page 5, line 13, leave out ("or from the public interest")
  The Commons disagreed to the above Amendment for the following Reason:
  Because the words to be left out are necessary for furtherance of the export trade and to give a margin of discretion in meeting the demands of the home market.

  LORDS AMENDMENT
  Clause 3, page 5, line 13, after the words last inserted, insert—
  ("The Corporation shall, before the general date of transfer, prepare and submit to the Minister a scheme showing the manner in which they propose to exercise the rights conferred on them by the holding of interests in publicly-owned companies so as to secure for those companies the largest measure of autonomy consistent with the proper discharge by the Corporation of their duties under this Act, and the Minister shall lay a copy of such scheme before each House of Parliament.")
  The Commons disagreed to the above Amendment for the following Reason:
  Because the procedure laid down in the Amendment would be too rigid.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: My Lords, in accordance with what has already been said, I beg to move that this House do not insist on the Amendments in the group down to the second Amendment to page 5, line 13.
  Moved, That this House do not insist on the said Amendments.—(Viscount Addison.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  LORDS AMENDMENT
  Clause 3, page 5, line 13, after the words last inserted, insert—
  ("() If any such undue preference or unfair discrimination as aforesaid is shown or exercised or reasonably apprehended, any person affected shall have a right of action for damages, or for an injunction or other relief as may be just.")
  The Commons disagreed to the above Amendment but proposed the following Amendment in lieu thereof:
  Page 5, line 13, insert—
  ("(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as imposing on the Corporation, either directly or indirectly, any form of duty or liability enforceable by proceedings before any court.")
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: My Lords, this is the Amendment which another place has moved in lieu of the one inserted in this House. It deals with the showing of undue preference. I beg to move that this House do not insist on the Amendment to which the Commons have disagreed, but agree with the Commons in the Amendment proposed in lieu.
  Moved, That this House do not insist on the Amendment to which the Commons have disagreed, but agree with the Commons in the Amendment proposed in lieu.—(Viscount Addison.)
  3.25 p.m.
  VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords, I do not think your Lordships would wish to pass this Amendment entirely in silence. I am rather surprised that the noble Viscount the Leader of the House has not given a little more explanation to your Lordships of why this change is introduced. But observe what is happening here. This is not a case where we disagreed with the Commons, and offered them an Amendment in disagreement with them—nothing of the kind. On the contrary, when the Bill came here it contained a provision—and this was the intention of the Bill as presented to us by the Government—that the subject should have a right of action if there were undue preference. Not only that: the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, commended to us that there should be this right of action, and we supposed that it was common ground. The only discussion in this House was not whether there should be a right of action, which the Government themselves proposed, but whether the words of the Bill gave the right of action which the Government intended.
  The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, informed us in Committee that he was advised by the Law Officers that no special words were necessary. Assisted by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Maugham, and others, I ventured to submit that the Law Officers were not right in law, or at any rate that there might be a doubt as to whether the intention of the Government was fully carried out by the words in the Bill. Your Lordships will remember that there was cited a speech by Lord du Parcq, in one of his last judgments, in which he said that where it was intended that the subject should have a right of action in regard to a statutory duty that right ought to be clearly expressed. Noble Lords thought that all they were going to do was to include simple words to say that the right of action which the Government proposed should be there and should be expressed in terms as Lord du Parcq advised.
  Then, to everybody's surprise, at the end of the Report stage the Lord Chancellor, who had not hitherto taken any part in the Bill, came down to the House and said: "Of course, the Opposition are quite right; if there is to be a right of action, it ought to be expressed in the
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  Bill." Naturally, we supposed that all that was going to happen, in view of the fact that we had had the assistance of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Maugham, was that the Lord Chancellor would say: "I accept the Amendment." But, to everybody's intense surprise, he said, "I have had a look at this Bill now "—and this is the Bill for which there was a mandate and for which the country was so clamant! He had had a look at it, and had come to the conclusion that it would be better if there were no right of action at all. He commended that to us—whether on instructions or on his own motion he did not tell us. We considered this and, when the Bill came to Third Reading, your Lordships, not unanimously but by a great majority, were of opinion that what was proposed to us by the Government was perfectly right, that there should be a right of action, and that the right of action should be expressed. We carried the Amendment, which was merely a clarifying Amendment to make it plain that the right of action lay.
  Observe what happens next. The Bill goes hack to another place. If we had not inserted the clarifying Amendment, which all the lawyers said was necessary and proper, in order to give effect to the Government's intention, I very much doubt whether the other place could have offered an Amendment in lieu, because we should have taken the Government's drafting at its face value and the Bill would not have been amended. But what now comes back is a proposal that we should reverse what the Government themselves did when they sent the Bill up to us—and I thought that the whole idea of the Parliament Bill was that Bills should pass in the form in which they were presented to us—and that the last thoughts of the Lord Chancellor should be substituted for the considered opinion of the Government!
  It is worse than that. When we had Clause 2 before us originally—Clause 2 sets out the duties of the Corporation and its subsidiaries—we extended its operation from the Second Schedule activities, which are iron and steel activities, to all the principal activities. That Amendment was rejected by another place when the Bill was returned there and your Lordships have not insisted upon the change. The result is that the duty not

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  to give an undue preference is now confined to Second Schedule products—that is, iron and steel, pig iron, ingot steel and rolled products. Those are exactly the products which are the raw materials of every manufacturing industry, every engineering industry, the hundreds of undertakings (ninety-six in theory but far more when you take into account the subsidiaries) which are taken over by the nationalised Corporation, and all the other independent competitors. Those are exactly the cases in which, if the Corporation wanted to favour their own subsidiaries, they could do so by giving an undue preference. Therefore it is all the more important that the subject should have his right of action.
  What has happened? At the last moment a change is made by the Government. Although the obligation not to give an undue preference is limited to ingot steel and rolled steel, yet they say "If an undue preference is given there should, at any rate, be no right of appeal to the courts." Let the country clearly understand what is being done now. Not content with rejecting the other Amendment, the Government insist on inserting an Amendment depriving the subject, the free industries, of that protection which the Bill as presented to this House had originally given to them, and was intended to give them. It deprives them of the right which every subject ought to have—namely, the right of appeal, not as a suppliant to a Minister (and in this case an interested Minister, the Minister responsible for the Corporation), but as a free man to the independent law courts of this country. Only a year ago or less the Lord Chancellor was boasting —and rightly so—that he had introduced a Bill in order that everybody might have equal rights as against the Crown. This takes away that right. Let us be perfectly clear as to what is to happen if this Amendment goes through. A duty is imposed in the Bill that there shall not be an undue preference; but if that undue preference is given, if the Corporation or its subsidiaries discriminate against the ordinary man, the ordinary man will have no right of action. It is said that he can go to a Consumers' Council. But of what use is that? He can go to the Minister as a suppliant. I say that in common justice he ought to
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  have the right of any subject to go to the law courts if he has been injured by a statutory undertaking. That right is going to be denied him.
  This is a bad enough Bill, even after amendment. The country will appreciate that every Amendment which gave extra protection to the subject or made the Bill more workable is to be rejected. From a political point of view, perhaps that is rather a good thing, for the country will know not only that they have before them the plain issue of whether this great industry should be nationalized, but that the Government have made the Bill as impossible as they can.
  3.35 p.m.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: My Lords, perhaps I might be allowed to say a few words in general about the representation of the noble Viscount as to previous proceedings. Whether intentionally or otherwise, he has very seriously misrepresented the position. This particular provision, providing against undue preference, was not the subject of consideration by the Lord Chancellor months before the Bill was introduced. It was inserted in another place in order to meet points raised by the Opposition, and this particular subsection was, I believe, agreed with the Federation of British Industries as a fair way of providing that there should not be undue preference; and it is not proposed that that should be deleted from the Bill. As the noble Viscount has quite correctly stated, the question then arose whether there was or was not an appeal to the courts in all these cases. Then it is perfectly true, as he said, that the Bill as it then stood was subjected to careful and prolonged consideration by our legal advisers; and it was perfectly clear that one might have a long series of actions on all kinds of issues which were exceedingly difficult to define and which would be brought to the courts quite contrary to all commercial practice; because in the other part of the same clause the Corporation is required to supply people and firms with articles of such types, qualities and sizes as are available at certain prices, and all the rest of it. It is perfectly clear that this is in the ordinary course of business. If all these troubles between a supplier and his customer were to come to the courts of law—
  VISCOUNT SWINTON: I think I am entitled to ask this question. Is it not a fact that the Minister of Supply in another place deliberately inserted the words:
  "but without prejudice to such variations in the terms and conditions an which those products are supplied as may arise from ordinary commercial considerations or from public interest "?
  Is it not a fact that those words were inserted in order to preclude a variety of actions in petty cases to which the Minister has referred? And is it not a fact that the Minister did not move any Amendment to say that there should not be a right of action, but that the Law Officers said that there would be a right of action?
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: I am not disputing the history of the case. What I am saying is that this provision was put into the Bill to oblige the Opposition in the other place. But it having been subjected to prolonged and careful examination as to what might be involved, it was decided that it would be much better and, indeed, necessary to follow the example of the Transport Act to which the noble Viscount and his followers did not object. The provision which we proposed should be inserted, and which was rejected by the other side, reads as follows:
  "Nothing in this section shall be construed as imposing on the Commission, either directly or indirectly, any form of duty or liability enforceable by proceedings before any court or tribunal to which they would not otherwise be subject."
  That was put into the Transport Act with the full accord of this House. After careful and prolonged examination of all that might be involved in the vague words which were inserted, it was felt that it would be an impracticable matter in ordinary business; and it was for that reason and that reason only that this subsection was inserted. It was not done, I agree, until the latter stages of the Bill, and after prolonged consideration. But the proposition was put fully before this House and debated. It was rejected by the noble Lords opposite, and it has been reinserted in another place.
  3.40 p.m.
  LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, before the noble and learned Viscount deals with legal matters, I should like
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  to put a question to him, because I must confess that I feel a little dubiety concerning the whole situation which we are discussing. I refrained from raising this at an earlier stage because I had not given notice of it, but the Lord Chancellor now knows what is in my mind as the result of a conversation which I have had with him. The matter is made rather more important because of the new wording which we are asked to insert in the Bill in accordance with the proposal from he other place. We have heard arguments about the subject not being able to sue the Corporation. I accept what the noble Viscount, Lard Addison, said, though I confess with a little uneasiness because I happen to know from first-hand knowledge, as I explained earlier, how it is possible to discriminate unfairly in the case of raw materials. We had some examples of that during the war. It is most important that we should do anything we can to prevent any unfair discrimination.
  The question which I should be grateful if the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack would be good enough to answer is this. Do these new words preclude the subject—in this case the independent companies left outside the scope of the Bill—from proceeding against the individual companies with whom they will in practice deal and from whom they will buy their plates, billets and so on. Are they precluded from proceeding against those companies? I think it is of the greatest importance. If I may say so with great respect to my noble friend below me, this is a matter which differs somewhat from the position under the Transport Commission. The Transport Commission, after all, deal with the whole of the railways and with the whole of transport together. Here we have a different set-up. This is a different experiment in national ownership—and I believe a very valuable one —under which the companies are left a great dealt of autonomy, with the overriding Corporation settling policy. Therefore there is some difference between the situation of the Transport Commission and that of the Iron and Steel Corporation, and I should be grateful if we could be informed whether the right of proceeding against and suing the companies in extreme cases is in any way weakened by the words which we are asked to adopt.
  3.43 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the position is that any company has the right to sell to any person any commodity it likes at any price it likes, unless it is precluded from doing so by some obligation with regard to undue preference. The obligation with regard to undue preference is an obligation which is imposed only on the Corporation. There is no obligation on one of the companies and there never has been. Your Lordships will note that Clause 3 of the Bill starts out by saying:
  "It shall be the general duty of the Corporation so to exercise their powers as"—
  and so on. There has been no obligation on any companies at any time; the right has been only against the Corporation. This clause profoundly affects the Corporation. If I may say so with respect, I think the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, was a little in error in certain of the points which he raised. May I tell your Lordships this quite categorically? The Lord Chancellor is in a somewhat ambiguous position for he is a member of the Cabinet and also Speaker in your Lordships' House: I interpret my position in this way. When it comes to advising your Lordships on matters of law I will accept no instructions from anyone. I shall often be wrong, I do not doubt. But I shall explain the law to your Lordships as I believe it to be. I shall be utterly indifferent whether anyone else disagrees with me or not. That is the line which I have taken in this case, and I believe it is the line which would commend itself to your Lordships.
  The noble Viscount seemed to assume that I knew nothing whatever about this Bill. As a matter of fact, I was as responsible as anyone, and perhaps more responsible than most, for the form in which this Bill was introduced in the House of Commons. I had gone through every line of it. I confess, however, that I had not followed the later alterations made to the Bill in the House of Commons. If excuse were needed, I may say that I had plenty of other things to occupy my attention. So I confess I was not aware of this alteration. The first time that I realised that this Amendment had been moved in the House of Commons was when they came
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  to consult me about the question whether there was some ambiguity, some room for doubt, about the right of the individual. I came to the conclusion that in a Statute of this sort there was some room for doubt, and that it was undesirable to have a Statute which allowed any form of ambiguity in this regard. Therein I was following out what the late Lord du Parcq said in one of his last judgments.
  I will tell your Lordships why I came to that conclusion. I have one ambition which I have tried to carry out throughout my term of office as Lord Chancellor: I want to keep the judges out of anything that looks like politics. In that I am sure I am right.
  As this Amendment was moved and accepted by the Minister, it contained a clause against an undue preference which was qualified, however, in this way, which is quite without precedent:
  "but without prejudice to such variations in the terms and conditions on which those products are supplied as may arise from ordinary commercial considerations or from the public interest."
  When that wide consideration was raised, I came quite definitely to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that that was not a desirable subject to leave to His Majesty's judges. There is no precedent for it at all. I do not believe it is desirable that the judges should embark on consideration of what are ordinary commercial considerations; still less, in this sort of topic, that they should deal with what is regarded as the public interest. If judges are going to pronounce on these matters—and these matters are in essence political matters—there is danger of the judges being drawn into the political arena. I am quite convinced that that is completely opposed to the interests of the country.
  Therefore, when I saw that the clause had been qualified in that way, I came to your Lordships and said: "If you want this clause in this form, the remedy which anyone has who thinks he has a grievance is a political remedy. He can go to the Consumers' Council, and from the Consumers' Council to the Minister, and raise this matter in Parliament." For that point of view I make no apology. I believe that to be the right point of view. The fact that the House of Commons accepted my view is to me

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  satisfactory These matters are typically the sort of matters on which the Lord Chancellor must advise this House and his own colleagues. Though I apologise in that I have not kept in touch with day-to-day changes of the Bill in the House of Commons, as soon as I saw that the Bill contained this clause I came at once and told your Lordships what I thought about it. I think the House of Commons have acted wisely in accepting the sort of vague principle which is here enunciated as being a matter far more suitable for political sanction than judicial sanction. Accordingly, I maintain that the Commons have taken the right view.
  3.50 p.m.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I had not wished to intervene on this question, which is undoubtedly one of considerable legal complexity. I have listened very carefully, as I am sure all your Lordships have, to what the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor has said. I think that none of us will disagree with his general contention that the judges ought to be kept out of politics. I think that is common ground in all parties. Of course the result of what the Government have now done is unhappy. None of us can deny that. Under the Lords Amendment the citizen who felt he was aggrieved had an appeal to an independent tribunal. Now he has only an appeal to the Minister.
  LORD LUCAS 0F CHILWORTH: To the Consumers' Council.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: To the Consumers' Council, which can only make a recommendation to the Minister. That is the unfortunate result, and whether it is a question of undue preference being a political affair or not, I should have thought it would have been possible to find some completely independent body which could have dealt with this from a legal angle. I believe the Bill was a happier one, and would have given more confidence before this Amendment was introduced. I can only regret that it has been done, and I feel bound to say so.
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  LORDS AMENDMENTS
  Page 9, line 17, at end insert new clause:
  Appointment of Iron and Steel Prices Board
  (".—(1)The Minister shall, within a period of six months after the general date of trans-
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  fer, by order establish an Iron and Steel Prices Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as "the Board").
  (2) The Board shall consist of the following members—

  (a) an independent chairman, appointed by the Lord Chancellor and being a person having legal or accountany qualifications or such other qualifications as the Lord Chancellor may consider appropriate;

  (b) a member appointed by the Minister to represent the interests of the Corporation and its subsidiaries as producers of specified products;

  (c) a member appointed by the Minister to represent the interests of producers of specified products other than the Corporation and its subsidiaries;

  (d) a member appointed by the Minister, after consultation with the Iron and Steel Consumers' Council, to represent the interests of consumers of specified products;

  (e) a member appointed by the Minister to represent the interests of workers in the iron and steel industry; and

  (f) such additional members, not exceeding two, as the Minister may from time to time appoint, for the consideration of any particular matter.

  (3) No person who is a member or officer of the Corporation or a director or officer of any subsidiary of the Corporation shall be qualified to be appointed or to be the chairman of the Board. The members of the Board shall not at any time include more than two persons who are members or officers of the Corporation or directors or officers of any subsidiary of the Corporation. No person who is a member of the Commons House of Parliament shall be qualified to be appointed or to be a member of the Board.
  (4) In this, section the expression "specified products" means iron or steel products of any of the descriptions set out in the Tenth Schedule to this Act and such other descriptions as may be specified in an order of the Minister made under subsection (9) of this section, and the expression "iron or steel products" means products wholly or mainly composed of iron or steel.
  (5) It shall be the duty of the Board to consider:

  (a) any representation, which may be made to them by the Iron and Steel Consumers' Council or by any other person who appears to the Board to be a person affected or representative of the interests of a class or classes of persons affected, with respect to the prices at which or the terms and conditions on which all or any of the specified products are sold or supplied by any producer or class or classes of producers of such products;

  (b) any matter which nay be referred to them by the Minister for consideration, including without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, a review of the prices at which and the terms and conditions on which all or any of the specified products are sold or supplied by any producer or class or classes of producers of such products; and

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  (c) any proposal for the making of an order under subsection (9) of this section specifying other descriptions of iron or steel products for the purposes of this section.

  (6) When the Board have considered any such representation or matter or proposal as aforesaid, they shall make to the Minister a report thereon containing such recommendations if any as they think fit.
  (7) Without prejudice to the exercise of any powers conferred by or under any enactment other than this Act, on any Minister of the Crown or Government Department, the Minister may from time to time, on receiving a recommendation in -that behalf from the Board, make in accordance with that recommendation an order for controlling the prices at which and the terms and conditions on which all or any of the specified products may be sold or supplied by any producer or class or classes of producers of such products.
  (8) Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with the requirements of an order made under subsection (7) of this section shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and shall be liable—

  (a) on summary conviction to imprisonment for not more than three months or to a fine not exceeding five hundred pounds or to both such imprisonment and such fine; or

  (b) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for not more than two years or to a fine not exceeding whichever is the higher of the two following amounts—

  (i) One thousand pounds;

  (ii) Three times the amount of any benefits derived by him from the offence;

  or to both such imprisonment and such fine.
  (9) The Minister may from time to time on receiving a recommendation in that behalf from the Board, make in accordance with that recommendation an order specifying a further description of iron or steel products for the purposes of this section:
  Provided that the Minister shall not make such an order with respect to any description of iron or steel products, unless it appears to him that at least one third by weight of the iron or steel products of that description supplied in the United Kingdom are supplied by the Corporation and its subsidiaries.
  (10) The power conferred by subsections (7) and (9) of this section shall he exercisable by statutory instrument and any such statutory instrument shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
  (11) The Board shall, as respects each financial year of the Corporation, make to the Minister a report on the exercise and performance by the Board of their functions during that year, and the Minister shall lay a copy of every such annual report before each House of Parliament, together with a statement of any action which has been taken by him in that year in consequence of any recommendation made to him by the Board.
  (12) The Minister and any producer of the said products shall provide the Board with all such information and other assistance as the Board may reasonably require for the exercise and performance of their functions under this section.
  (13) The order made by the Minister under subsection (1) of this section establishing the Board shall provide for such incidental or supplementary matters as appear to the Minister to be necessary or expedient to provide for the purpose of giving full effect to this section including provisions—

  (a) as to the procedure of the Board;

  (b) requiring the Corporation to provide for the Board such officers and office accommodation as appear to the Minister to be requisite for the proper exercise and performance of their functions, subject to the approval of the Treasury with respect to the number of such officers; and

  (c) for the payment by the Corporation of such remuneration and allowances to the chairman and other members of the Board and to their officers as the Minister with the approval of the Treasury may determine.")

  Page 95, line 49, at end insert new Schedule—
  ("DESCRIPTION OF IRON OR STEEL PRODUCTS
  1. Iron or steel (including alloy steel) in any of the following forms (and whether or not new or secondhand or prime or defective)
  Pig;
  Ingot;
  Billet, bloom, slab;
  Tinplate bar, sheet bar;
  Plate, medium plate, sheet (and whether coated or uncoated);
  Angle, channel, tee, joist, piling section, other sectional material (and whether fabricated or not);
  Round, rod, square, hexagon, flat, other section and shape (and whether black or bright);
  Rail, sleeper, fishplate, soleplate;
  Tinplate, tinplate base (uncoated), terne plate, black plate, silver-finished plate;
  Hoop, strip (and whether coated or uncoated, and whether hot or cold rolled);
  Tube, pipe and standard fittings (not being conduit fittings) therefore;
  Tyre, axle, wheel;
  Casting, block for forging, block for pressing, forging, drop forging;
  Colliery arch, and accessories therefor, pit prop;
  Spring;
  Wire rod;
  Coated or uncoated wire (whether plain or barbed), wire rope, wire strand, wire netting, wire chain link fencing, wire reinforcement fabric mesh, wire rod reinforcement fabric mesh, wire nail, wire staple;
  Bolts, nuts, screws, screw studs, washers and rivets.
  2. Ferro alloy of any kind.
  3. Scrap iron and scrap steel (including alloy steel).")
  The Commons disagreed to the above Amendments for the following Reason:
  Because the Bill already provides adequate machinery for dealing with the prices of products of the publicly-owned companies and the Corporation.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: My Lords, in accordance with the understanding at which we have arrived, I beg to move that this House do not insist on the Amendments to which the Commons have disagreed. These two Amendments relate to the same subject, the Iron and Steel Prices Board.
  Moved, That this House do not insist on the said Amendments.—(Viscount Addison.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  LORDS AMENDMENT
  Clause 11, page 10, line 21, leave out (" May") and insert ("July").
  The Commons disagreed to this and five other Amendments for the following Reason:
  Because it is in the national interest that the securities of the iron and steel companies should be transferred as soon as practicable.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: My Lords, I beg to move formally, in order to reserve my liberty to make observations later, that this House do not insist on the first Amendment to Clause 11, relating to dates, to which the Commons have disagreed. This Amendment and the next five all affect the same issue.
  Moved, That this House do not insist on the said Amendment.—[Viscount Addison.]
  3.57 p.m.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, with this group of Amendments we come to what Mr. Churchill, in a vivid phrase but in another connection, once called "the crunch." The purpose of these Amendments which this House inserted in the Bill has been to postpone the coming into operation of the nationalisation of the iron and steel industry until the British people have been given an opportunity of pronouncing on this particular scheme, and with them we come to the main difference between the Government and those of us who represent the Conservative and, I think, the Liberal Opposition in this House. The Government and their supporters in
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  another place have made it clear that they cannot accept these Amendments. To us, on the other hand, they are vital, and we consider that we should stultify our whole existence as a Second Chamber if we gave way on them.
  What, after all, are the reasons which the Government adduce in support of their contention that we should accept the view of another place with regard to these Amendments? Officially, there is one reason. It is that
  "…it is in the national interest that the securities of the iron and steel companies should be transferred as soon as practicable."
  We do not for a moment accept that it is to the national interest, nor do we believe that that is the view of the majority of the British people; nor have the Government, throughout all these debates in both Houses, produced any facts to justify their contention. I do not want to carry this particular aspect further, for it has been fully debated on many occasions in this House. I would merely say again that no argument, economic or financial, has at ally time been produced to justify the taking of this step, at a moment in particular of grave national economic danger, whereas overwhelming arguments have been produced on the other side.
  But—and this is what I want to deal with in particular this afternoon—behind this one specious official reason there are two others which, to my mind, are far more formidable, in view of the constitutional issues which they raise. The first—and this has been advanced both by the Government speakers in this House and, this week, in another place—is that the Government have already had a mandate for their scheme from tie British people, and that we are dent inching that they should obtain a double mandate. We entirely deny that. As I have already explained in the earlier stages of this Bill, it is extremely doubtful whether the Government had a clear majority of the people behind them on the issue of the nationalisation of iron and steel—on which, I would remind the Government, Liberals and Conservatives were and are at one—even at the General Election.
  Moreover, even if they argue that they had such a broad mandate, it was not a mandate for this particular Bill, which seeks to nationalise not merely portions of the iron and steel industry but wide sections of the engineering industry as

  647
  well. Indeed, as I pointed out on the Third Reading, the mandate for nationalisation generally at the General Election, if such a mandate existed, which I do not admit:
  "—was a mandate to try an experiment. It was not a blank cheque. Now, the position is entirely different. The experiment of nationalisation has been tried in one great industry after another The results have certainly not come up to expectation and, in the view of many, have been disastrous. In such circumstances as those, surely it is not unconstitutional for the Second Chamber to give a chance to the people to have another look at this policy, in the light of experience, before yet another great industry, the most complicated and most vital of all, is put into the same straitjacket."
  I stand absolutely by every one of those words. To my mind, nothing that has been said since in another place has provided any reason for altering them in any respect.
  Then there is the second argument, which was used by the Minister of Supply in another place and by the noble Viscount the Leader of the House in our own debates—namely, that this House is an unelected body and that we have therefore no right, in any circumstances, to disagree with the House of Commons, even with the object of referring doubtful matters to the judgment of the people. That, of course, is only a very thinly veiled argument in favour of single-chamber Government. If, under no circumstances and for no reasons, however good, can this Second Chamber disagree with the First, why does a Second Chamber exist at all? I have always understood, and I think I have the support of most of the political thinkers of the past, that the main purpose for which the Second Chamber forms part of our Constitution is to provide the British people with a protection against hasty or ill-considered legislation as to which their views are doubtful or likely to be hostile. Our chief function, in fact, is to provide a double check in such cases as that, so as to ensure that the will of the people shall prevail.
  Your Lordships are no doubt aware of the practice prevalent among householders, in these days of frequent burglaries, of providing their front doors with two locks, with different keys. That no doubt gives the householders—or they hope it does—increased protection. But if both the locks opened with the same
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  key, the protection given would be nugatory. In this instance, the position of the British people is exactly the same. They have, in the British Constitution, provided themselves with a double protection to ensure that their will prevails. If the Government, as the Minister of Supply has said, find this double check intolerable, it can be only because the Government are unwilling to accept the judgment of the people. This is brought out in a paragraph in the Daily Herald on July 21. This paragraph states, quite briefly—I will quote the relevant portions:
  "If the Bill went forward in its present form"—
  that is to say, with our Amendment—
  "and if a Tory Government were returned to power"—
  in other words, if that were the will of the people—
  "they, the Tories, could repeal it before it disturbed the private ownership of the industry. Therefore the Commons will restore the vital provisions of the Bill which the Lords have cut out. And, under the Parliament Bill, the Iron and Steel Bill can be passed, in spite of the Lords' opposition, so as to come into force on May 1, 1950, before the likely date of a General Election."
  What could be more frank, and what could be more cynical, than that?
  No doubt the Government are perfectly right to be nervous of the reactions of the British people at the next General Election. There is steadily growing evidence that they are rapidly losing the support of the electorate. Since your Lordships last discussed this subject there has been a by-election in a working class district in the North of England—not, I understand, a marginal seat, but a seat normally considered a safe seat for Labour—and even there the Government majority fell by three-quarters. That disastrous setback—and I do not suppose it, gave any great satisfaction to members of the Labour Party —was undoubtedly in part due to the distrust and the dislike which the electorate feel for this Bill. In such circumstances I am astonished—and I think we are all astonished—that the Government should continue to force it through without any further appeal to the people whom they affect to represent. It shows an utter disregard for democratic principles—those principles which they are so very active in professing.

  649
  No doubt it is not possible for this House entirely to protect the interests of the people in this respect. The Government have not scrupled to alter the Constitution to ensure that this Bill passes into law, whatever the electorate may think. But we can do our best, and we must do our best, to see that the people are consulted; and we are quite content to abide by their verdict. What in fact is at issue here is not whether the Lords or the Commons shall prevail. It is whether the British people shall prevail; whether in a country with no written Constitution the electorate are to have any protection against violent or ill-considered action by the Executive. It is the whole proper working of the British Constitution that is involved. That being the case, my Lords, I submit that we have no option but to disagree with the other House and reinsert this Amendment in the Bill.
  4.3 p.m.
  VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, the other Amendments that your Lordships have been discussing this afternoon deal with particular provisions of the Bill, and my noble friend Lord Rennell, who has represented our views with so much assiduity and ability through all the stages of this Bill, has to-day expressed them on those matters. This Amendment does not deal with any particular provision, but with the propriety of the procedure that has been adopted for carrying the Bill into law. I find myself one of three survivors of the Government which introduced and passed the Parliament Act of 1911. The others are Mr. Churchill, I ant glad to remember, and my noble and learned friend Lord Simon. We are the only three still taking some part, of varying degrees of activity, in the politics of this later age. We are sometimes challenged to say how it is that we who were authors, alders and abettors of the Parliament Act of 1911, should now be upholding the Peers against the House of Commons. We are told that the course we are now taking is contrary to the whole purposes and intentions of the Parliament Act. That is not so. The procedure is that which was contemplated by the Parliament Act, 1911.
  At that time—well do I remember those bitter and sometimes violent controversies—we were denounced with the
  650
  utmost vigour by the members of the Conservative Party for being in favour of a single-Chamber Constitution. We were told that we were depriving the House of Lords of all rowers, and were creating a single-Chamber Government. The example was given that perhaps at some future time—possibly towards the end of a tired Parliament—the Government of the day might choose to introduce some measure which had never been clearly before the electorate, a measure of great and permanent importance which had no large body of public opinion behind it, and would be prepared to see it forced into law. Our answer to that was: "No, that is not our view. We are not in favour of a single-Chamber Parliament. In such a case as that we have in the Parliament Act reserved to the Second Chamber powers to intervene in precisely such a case, and to require that the Bill should be referred to the judgment of the people."
  It is pleasant to think, after looking hack on all those controversies, that the Conservative Party are now issuing a very able statement of their present views on these matters. After thirty-eight years of experience of the Parliament Act, 1911, they declare themselves in favour of reform of the House of Lords, and that such a reformed Chamber should have powers—and I now quote:
  "not exceeding those conferred by the Act of 191 1."
  It is very soothing to our feelings that, after full experience, they have taken so very different a view from that which they adopted at that time. It seems to me that this Iron and Steel Bill illustrates precisely the case foreseen by the Parliament Act, 1911. It is a measure introduced towards the end of a tired Parliament; it is a measure which was never clearly before the electorate at a previous Election; it is one which is of great and permanent importance, and one which has behind it no great volume of popular support. Therefore, we agree that this House should insist upon this Amendment. We are not abandoning the principles that we held in an earlier day; we are advocating precisely the procedure which the Parliament Act enacted, and which it intended that Parliament should pursue in a contingency such as that which has arisen to-clay.
  I can well understand after this long lapse of rime that some people, in the

  651
  interests of democracy, might urge that the Parliament Act should be made more drastic, and that the delay provided therein should he shortened. No doubt many Liberals would hold that view. But that is not the matter that we are considering now. That is the matter which was brought up under the Parliament Bill which your Lordships rejected in the course of this Session. We are faced now with the question whether we should act upon the provisions provided by the Parliament Act, 1911. I observe that in another place the Minister of Supply, who was in charge of the Bill, said that they in the Commons were being told by your Lordships' House
  "—that this Bill may not be carried into effect unless and until the electorate have pronounced on it twice; once at the last Election and once at the coming Election. In brief, that is what the House of Lords are suggesting in this Amendment. They are demanding a double mandate from the electorate before the Bill is put into operation."
  But we deny altogether that this Bill was prominently and consciously before the electorate in 1939.
  Can anyone honestly say that it was brought before the electorate in a manner proportionate to its importance?—that the prominence given to it was proportionate to the immense and lasting importance of this great measure for sweeping away, as it will in effect, all private enterprise in this great industry? It was not brought prominently before the electorate, and we know why. At that time there was no agreement in the Labour Party as to what kind of Bill should be produced, and some members of the Labour Party were hoping that there would be no Bill produced in this Parliament. My Lords, at the next Election the people will be made clearly aware of what is proposed to be done with this important industry, and we on these Benches have no hesitation in supporting this Motion to insist on our Amendment. In doing so, we shall be doing no more than taking steps to fulfil the very function which the Parliament Act itself intended should be fulfilled by the Second Chamber.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: My Lords, I—
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Would the noble Leader allow me one moment? I do not claim to speak as a member of the Government of that day, but I was a
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  Whip in those days, and I had the task of explaining to our followers what the Parliament Act intended to do. I cannot recognise, in the presentation of the case by the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, any of the essence of the Liberal case of 1911. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in his proposal, put forward a period of six-months' delay, and on that proposal the noble Viscount himself spoke.
  VISCOUNT SAMUEL: I have challenged the noble Viscount before to produce the quotation, and he has never done so. I have no recollection of having spoken as he suggests.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: The original proposal was by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and that proposal of six months' delay received support from, among other speakers, the noble Viscount himself. I do not complain that a Liberal turns into a Conservative—it is often done these days—but what I do complain of is that they should attempt to represent the same Liberal Party who fought the Parliament Act in 1911.
  VISCOUNT SAMUEL: May I say, in reply to that, that there was no question of a period of six months at any stage during any of the debates on the Parliament Act, 1911?
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I am not speaking of the Parliament Act.
  VISCOUNT SAMUEL: But I am!
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: Having a good memory of these events, I sent my noble friend out whilst this debate was proceeding to supply me with the necessary reference, which I now have in front of me. I will give it to your Lordships in a few moments. However, before I come to the remarkable metamorphosis of Liberal opinion represented by the noble Viscount I should like to say a word on the general case put before us by the noble Marquess opposite. This is a matter which is much greater than the Steel Bill: the Steel Bill is merely the particular focus of our discussion. The claim which the noble Marquess advanced—with great frankness, and I respect that—was that when this House was of opinion that a thing should be referred back, so that the people might express their opinion again, or confirm it, if you like, at a General Election, this House was acting within its proper limits in so determining the issue.
  THE MARQUESS of SALISBURY: May I intervene one moment to say that I did not say "confirm it again"? I referred to cases where the view was uncertain or might he hostile. The view might never have been before the electorate at all. That is what is so important in the majority of cases.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: It is the same thing in other words; it is this House which the noble Marquess claims—this unrepresentative House, because it is an unrepresentative House; do not let us forget that—is to determine whether or not the opinion of the people is clear—this House, not elected by a soul, not responsible to a single constituent. We deny absolutely that that is the right of this House, and that is the issue between us; and it is something much more important that the Steel Bill.
  Now let us come to the claim affecting this Bill put before the House by the noble Marquess, and enlarged upon by the noble Viscount, Viscount Samuel, that this Bill was not before the people at the General Election. Of course it was not; neither was the Transport Bill; neither was the Bank of England Bill; neither was the Indian Independence Bill; neither were lots of other Bills. Of course they were not. You do not put Bills in an Election manifesto, you put before the people a manifesto which gives you, or does not give, as the case may be, authority to proceed upon certain lines of policy. That is what you do, and that is what the Labour Party did at the last Election. There were no more details of this Bill in the manifesto than there were of the Transport Bill; there were just as many and there were just as few. The manifesto was intended to allow the Party to receive the authority of the people to adopt a line of policy; that is all. Of course it did not include the details of the Bill. The noble Viscount himself never in the whole course of his political career dreamed of drafting a Bill and putting it in an Election manifesto. Business is not done that way. If I may say so, that as an objection has no relation whatever to reality, and therefore I pass it by. The claim of the noble Marquess is that it is for this House to give another chance to the people; that it is this House which has to decide whether that chance should be given.
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  I come now to the metamorphosis which the Liberal Party have displayed, through the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, because I was very interested in those days, although I was not in the House of Commons in 1907.
  VISCOUNT SAMUEL: 1911.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: It was 1907. But I was old enough and lively enough to take an acute interest in their proceedings, and I still remember the famous Motion that was brought before the House by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. I will read it to your Lordships because there is a very interesting sequel to this. His Motion was on June 24, 1907, and these are the words of it:
  "That in order to give effect to the will of the people as expressed by their elected representatives it is necessary that the power of the other House"—
  that is, of course, this House—
  "to alter or reject Bills passed by this House should be so restricted by law as to secure"—
  note this—
  "that within the limits of a single Parliament the final decision of The Commons shall prevail."
  That is much further than the Labour Party are proposing to go in the Parliament Bill which your Lordships rejected not long ago.
  This Motion of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was that the view of the Commons should prevail on any Act within the lifetime of that Parliament. Under the Parliament Bill which we have introduced we are much more considerate of your Lordships' views than Sir Henry was in 1907, because we provide in the Bill (which is still alive, although at the present moment sleeping) that this House will in two Sessions—I will not go into the question about the time now; but it provides that a Bill introduced in the last Session of Parliament shall not necessarily become law if your Lordships object in that Session.
  VISCOUNT SAMUEL.: Why not? We are an unrepresentative Chamber! What right have we to object !
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: I am not telling you what your rights are; I am telling you what is in the Bill. What is in the Bill is that in the case of this House differing from the House of Commons on any

  655
  measure, it will be referred back to the Commons and there will be a second Session. In the last Session of a Parliament you cannot have a second Session, because there is not one. So the Bill that we have introduced, which provides that your Lordships should have this power, means in effect that a measure introduced in the last Session of a five-year Parliament cannot, if your Lordships object, be passed into law during the lifetime of that Parliament. That is what is in the Bill which we have submitted to the House.
  Now I want to go back to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, because he went further than that—much further. He provided that it should become law within the lifetime of the Parliament.
  VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: That was never the proposal—
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: Allow me to go on. That is the Motion which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman submitted to the House of Commons on June 24, 1907. Now what was the noble Viscount's view of the matter? I have his speech here. He was then the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, and he made an eloquent and excellent speech in support of that Motion. It is Column 1003 of Hansard for June 24, 1907. The noble Viscount supported the Motion that the view of the Commons should prevail during the lifetime of that Parliament, notwithstanding anything your Lordships might do. How he reconciles his present speech with those declarations, I find it difficult to imagine.
  VISCOUNT SAMUEL: Then perhaps I may assist the noble Viscount, if he will allow me. That was a sketch of our ideas. Four years later, when we decided what measures we should propose, we did not propose the terms of that Resolution. My change of view was that of Mr. Asquith, of Lord Grey, of all the members of his Cabinet and, I have no doubt, of my noble friend who was then Mr. Wedgwood Benn. We presented to Parliament a different scheme. By that scheme I stand, and that is the scheme which passed into law and under which this House is now proceeding at this moment.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: That is ingenious but not convincing, because in
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  fact, as we all know, in the discussions on the Parliament Bill which became law, the proposal that there should be this second year—or really it went on to a third Session—was inserted in order to conciliate the Opposition, and was not part of the original proposals. The original proposal of the Liberal Party during all those years—and I myself, as an amateur, made many a speech in support of it—was to the effect that the view of the Commons should prevail but, as a concession which we make in British political life, the Parliament Bill was passed in that form., The Bill which we introduced to your Lordships' House last year, however, was to the effect that there should be a second reference, and only a second reference, to the House of Commons in the event of a difference.
  That was done deliberately, in order to secure that the will of the House of Commons up to and including the fourth year of a Parliament should be carried into law during the lifetime of that Parliament. That is our view and we stand by it. That is the issue which is now before your Lordships. This complaint might just as well have been made about the Bank of England Bill, the Transport Bill and many other Bills. Why was it not? It was, no doubt, because the mandate was perhaps fresher in the mind, as the noble Marquess would say. It was, no doubt, a very diplomatic and skilful act of the noble Marquess. I cannot imagine any subject to which there was more violent opposition than the nationalisation of the Bank of England, and I myself took part in the controversy for many years. But that Bill was passed by this House—and quite rightly so—and all the prophecies of woe which were uttered in connection with that legislation have been proved to be nonsense.
  VISCOUNT SWINTON: Surely the noble Viscount has so manipulated the Constitution under the Parliament Bill that the Iron and Steel Bill will either stand or fall, not under the old Act of 1911, but under his Parliament Bill.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: As I said, we object to this unrepresentative House being able to sterilise two years out of live of the representative Chamber. That is the issue between us.
  SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No, no.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: Oh, yes it is, and make no mistake about it. It is true that the Steel Bill happens to be the particular occasion for dispute, but the dispute is much greater than the Steel Bill. We shall never give way upon it—let that be quite clearly understood.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: You do not want the people to decide.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: If the noble Marquess says that, why did he not say so with regard to half a dozen other Bills?
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: Because we were not sterilising Parliament—we passed the Bills.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: We dispute the right of this House to decide when the people should be consulted. Noble Lords may laugh, but we dispute the right of this House to undo the work of the House elected by the people for two years out of the five.
  VISCOUNT SAMUEL: For one year, you agree.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: For the last year. We have considered the point, and the interruption of the noble Viscount only shows what reasonable people we are. We do not PO as far as he did in his more violent days of 1907. That is the issue before your Lordships, and do not let us disguise it. It is true that the occasion is provided by the Steel Bill, but we stand upon the rights of the representative Chamber, and therefore we refuse to assent.
  4.28 p.m.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, this is an occasion, apparently, when the ancient offer their recollections of what happened a long time ago, and I have listened with great interest to what the noble Viscount the Leader of the House has been good enough to say on this historical subject. I do not want to argue the matter with any heat, but really there is not the smallest doubt as to the relative importance of the two dates, 1907 and 1911, to which we are now invited to go back. It is perfectly true that, in the year 1907, after a long period when Liberals felt that their legislation had been continuously rejected by this House, the Liberal Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, proposed a
  658
  Resolution which formulated—I think for the first time—a particular plan for reducing the Lords' power of absolute veto. In those days, and in earlier days, it was not altogether uncommon to move Resolutions. Mr. Gladstone did it again and again with regard to some of his most important Bills. They were Resolutions to gather opinion and then, at a later stage, in the light of all the discussions which had taken place, the Bill itself was formulated. That was done about the Irish Church Bill and many others.
  But I, too, have a fairly clear recollection of this period, for I have a slight advantage over the noble Viscount in that I was in the Government when this thing happened; indeed, the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, aid I were among the Ministers whose names were on the back of the Bill. So I flatter myself that I still recall fairly accurately what happened. The noble Viscount was inaccurate when he said that no Government ever put a Bill, as a Bill, before the electorate. That is exactly what Mr. Asquith did in the second Election of 1910; and the actual language of the Parliament Act was before the people of this country at the time the Election of December, 1910, took place. That is the measure of the importance of the decision, and I do not apologise in the least. I believe that I voted for the Campbell-Bannerman Resolution. I know was intimately concerned in the framing and exposition of the ultimate Bill; and that Bill, of course, was the decision of Parliament at the time. Everybody is entitled to say now that it ought to be amended, and on a proper occasion we can discuss that opinion; but it is really quite idle to pretend that the governing factor in the event is the terms of a Resolution passed by the House of Commons on the Motion of the Prime Minister in the year 1907.
  The issue is quite accurately stated when we remember that we are not discussing the Parliament Net except for the purpose that it was plainly recognised by both the supporters and the opponents of that Act that the extent to which a decision given at a General Election could be regarded as completely valid and final tended to diminish. That is the fact. Everybody knows that when the members of the House of Commons are freshly returned, the majority may fairly

  659
  be regarded as representing the views of those who have returned them. But when five years—it used to be seven years —have elapsed, something more happens. People have had five years' (or seven years') further experience and have had the opportunity of seeing some of the results which have followed their action. Experience shows that another General Election often reveals a very considerable change of opinion. That change has not occurred between night and morning; it has come gradually.
  That is the reason, the perfectly good, logical and constitutional reason, why we who were responsible for framing the Bill in 1910 which was passed in 1911, provided that there should be a recognition of the difference between the validity of authority at the beginning and at the end of a Parliamentary period. That is why we provided that if, indeed, the General Election repeated the authority of the previous Election, the power to carry a measure on the will of the Commons under the Parliament Act, in spite of this House, would 'he provided by a decision taken in the second Parliament, after the Election had taken place. As a mere matter of history, I would assure your Lordships that there is no doubt that that was the proposition which was accepted after two Elections in the year 1910—one in January and one in December. That was the proposition then
  accepted by the people of this country: that it was right to curb the absolute veto of the Lords. To suggest that there is no essential difference between finally passing legislation at the end of the period, as compared with the beginning, is ridiculous nonsense; and, if I may say so very respectfully, I believe that the argument raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, is irresistible. We are insisting on this Amendment because it is expedient that at the end of this present Parliament the people should he consulted before this tremendous measure is brought into effect.
  4.35 p.m.
  LORD ROCHESTER: My Lords, I want only to say in one sentence that I was in Parliament in 1907 and took part in both the Divisions on June 26 of that year, after listening to a three-days' debate on this identical issue. I submit that the issue is the same this afternoon as it was in Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's Resolution before the Commons on that occasion. Therefore, I should consider myself inconsistent if I did other than support the Government in a Division in this House this afternoon.
  On Question, That this House do not insist on the said Amendment:
  Their Lordships divided: Contents, 29; Not-Contents, 103.

  CONTENTS

  Jowitt, V. (L. Chancellor.)

  Crook, L.

  Marley, L.

  Darwen, L.

  Morrison, L.

  Addison, V. (L. Privy Seal.)

  Douglas of Kirtleside, L.

  Nathan, L.

  Faringdon, L.

  Pakenham, L.

  Huntingdon, E.

  Foley, L.

  Pethick-Lawrence, L.

  Hare, L. (E. Listowel.)

  Quibell, L.

  St. Davids, V.

  Henderson, L.

  Rochester, L.

  Stansgate, V.

  Holden, L.

  Shepherd, L.

  Kershaw, L. [Teller.]

  Strabolgi, L.

  Adams, L.

  Lucas of Chilworth, L.

  Williams, L.

  Chorley, L. [Teller.]

  Macdonald of Gwaenysgor, L.

  Winster, L.

  NOT-CONTENTS

  Camden, M.

  Fortescue, E. [Teller.]

  Allenby, V.

  Cholmondeley, M.

  Howe, E.

  Bledisloe, V.

  Reading, M.

  Iddesleigh, E.

  Bruce of Melbourne, V.

  Salisbury, M.

  Lindsay, E.

  Buckmaster, V.

  Willingdon, M. [Teller.]

  Munster, E.

  Camrose, V.

  Perth, E.

  Cecil of Chelwood, V.

  Albemarle, E.

  Portsmouth, E.

  Chaplin, V.

  Birkenhead, E.

  Radnor, E.

  FitzAlan of Derwent, V.

  Brooke and Warwick, E.

  St. Aldwyn, E.

  Hailsham, V.

  Carlisle, E.

  Selborne, E.

  Harcourt, V.

  De La Warr, E.

  Stanhope, E.

  Long, V.

  Dudley, E.

  Ypres, E.

  Margesson, V.

  Maugham, V.

  Carrington, L.

  Mancroft, L,

  Mersey, V.

  Cherwell, L.

  Meston, L.

  Monsell, V.

  Clydesmuir, L.

  Milverton, L.

  Ridley, V.

  De L'Isle and Dudley, L.

  Monkswell, L.

  Samuel, V.

  Denman, L.

  Mowbray and Stourton, L.

  Simon, V.

  Dorchester, L.

  Moyne, L.

  Swinton, V.

  Dowding, L.

  Polwarth, L.

  Trenchard, V.

  Fairfax of Cameron

  Rea, L.

  Gage. L.(V. Gage.)

  Remnant, L.

  Aberconway, L.

  Gifford, L.

  Rennell, L.

  Ailwyn, L.

  Grenfell, L.

  Rockley, L.

  Airedale, L.

  Harlech, L.

  Rotherwick, L.

  Altrincham, L.

  Hawke, L.

  Sempill, L.

  Amherst of Hackney, L.

  Hindlip, L.

  Somers, L.

  Ashton of Hyde, L.

  Howard of Glossop, L.

  Stanmore, L.

  Audley, L.

  Hylton, L.

  Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

  Balfour of Burleigh, L.

  Jessel, L.

  Balfour of Inchrye, L.

  Kenilworth, L.

  Swaythling, L.

  Belper, L.

  Layton, L.

  Templemore, L.

  Boyle, L.(E. Cork and Orrery.)

  Llewellin, L.

  Teynham, L.

  Brand, L.

  Lloyd, L.

  Wardington, L.

  Braye, L.

  Luke, L.

  Wolverton, L.

  Brocket, L.

  Lyle of Westbourne, L.

  Wright, L.

  Broughshane, L.

  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  Resolved in the negative, and the said Amendment insisted on accordingly.

  LORDS AMENDMENTS
  Clause 11, page 10, line 22, leave out ("fifty") and insert ("fifty-one")
  Clause 11, page 10, line 23, leave out ("passing") and insert ("coming into force")
  Clause 11, page 11, line 11, leave out ("May") and insert ("July")
  Clause 11, page 11, line 12, leave out ("fifty") and insert ("fifty-one")
  Clause 60, page 62, line 10, at end insert—
  ("() This Act shall come into force on the first day of October, nineteen hundred and fifty.")
  The Commons disagreed to the above Amendments for the following Reason:
  Because it is in the national interest that the securities of the iron and steel companies should he transferred Os soon as practicable.
  4.48 p.m.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I think perhaps it would be for the convenience of the House if I moved en bloc the remainder of the Amendments in this group, beginning with the Amendment to page 10, line 22, and ending with the Amendment to page 62, line 10. These Amendments all deal with the same point. I therefore beg to move that this House do insist on the said Amendments.
  Moved, That this House do insist on the said Amendments.—(The Marquess of Salisbury.)
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: My Lords, in accordance with the understanding at which we arrived when we took a Division on the first Amendment in the group, we
  662
  will not ask the House to divide again, it being understood that my views remain the same.

  LORDS AMENDMENTS
  Clause 13, page 12, line 31, leave out from ("not") to ("to") in line 35, and insert ("a proper transaction made in the ordinary course of business, regard being bad")
  Clause 13, page 12, line 48, leave out from ("not") to third ("the") in line 4 on page 13, and insert ("a proper transaction made in the ordinary course of business, regard being had to the circumstances at the time")
  Clause 13, page 12, page 13, leave out lines 6 to 13.
  Clause 25, page 34, line 13, leave out from ("not") to end of line 17, and insert ("a proper transaction made in the ordinary course of business, regard being had to the circumstances at the time")
  Clause 25, page 35, line 1, leave out from ("applies") to second ("the") in line 6.
  The Commons disagreed to the above Amendments for the following Reason:
  Because in certain cases the Amendments might prevent the publicly-owned companies and the Corporation from disclaiming improper contracts and recovering dissipated assets.

  LORDS AMENDMENTS
  Clause 15, page 17, line 36, at end insert℄
  ("() (a) If it is proved by the stockholders' representative or by the Minister that the values of a company's securities as agreed or determined under the provisions of subsection (2) to (7) inclusive and Subsection (9) of this section (in this section referred to as "the Stock Exchange values") in the aggregate fall short of or exceed the value of the company's undertaking and assets on the first day of October nineteen hundred and forty-eight the amount of such short fall shall be added to the Stock Exchange values or the amount of such excess shall be deducted there from as

  663
  hereinafter provided and the Stock Exchange values as adjusted by such additions or deductions shall become the values of those securities for the purposes of this section;
  (b) for the purposes of this section the value of a company's undertaking and assets on the first day of October nineteen hundred and forty-eight shall be such amount as they might have been expected to realise if:

  (i) they had been sold on the said date in the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer;

  (ii) in so far as they comprised a business capable of being sold as a going concern they had been so sold; and

  (iii) this Act had not been in contemplation.

  (c) if with respect to any company the stockholders' representative or the Minister desires to prove any matter which may be proved by him under this subsection, he shall so inform the Minister or the stockholders' representative (as the case may be) by notice in writing given within three months after the date of transfer.")
  Clause 15, page 17, line 37, leave out subsection (8).
  Clause 15 page 18, line 26, at end insert—
  ("() If any question arises under any of the foregoing provisions of this section as to the value of any securities it shall be settled by agreement between the Minister and the stockholders' representative or in default of such agreement, by arbitration under this Act:
  Provided that in the case of any additions or deductions to be made to or from the Stock Exchange values of two or more classes of securities of a company the total amount of the additions or deductions shall be settled as aforesaid and the proportions in which the total amount is to be allocated to the different classes of securities shall he settled by a scheme assented to by such majority as is specified in subsection (2) of section two hundred and six of the Companies Act, 1948, of the holders of each class of securities concerned or in default of such assent determined by arbitration under this Act.")
  The Commons disagreed to the above Amendments for the following Reason:
  Because the Bill provides a fairer and more expeditious method of assessing the compensation payable to security holders than the Amendments.

  LORDS AMENDMENTS
  Clause 38, page 44, line 26, leave out from ("1948") to end of line 30.
  Clause 38, page 44, line 39, at end insert—
  ("() The accounts of each publicly-owned company shall give or be accompanied by a statement giving separate information as respects each of the principal activities of the company and as far as may be the financial and operating results of each such activity.")
  Clause 38, page 44, line 46, at end insert—
  ("() Where it appears from the accounts of a publicly-owned company that in any year
  664
  such publicly-owned company has incurred a loss from its activities taken together the Report of the Corporation required under section four of this Act shall draw attention to such loss and to the circumstances in which it has been incurred.")
  The Commons disagreed to the above Amendments for the following Reason:
  Because these Amendments impose unnecessary tasks of accountancy on the Corporation and the publicly-owned companies.
  VISCOUNT ADDISON: My Lords, with regard to the remainder of the Amendments on the Paper, they all come into the next group on which, according to what I have said already, this House do not insist. Therefore, if I may take them collectively, beginning with the Amendment to page 12, line 31, and ending with the Amendment to page 44, line 46, I beg to move that this House do not insist on the said Amendments.
  Moved, That this House do not insist on the said Amendments.—(Viscount Addison.)
  A Committee appointed to prepare a Reason for the Lords insisting on certain of their Amendments: the Committee to meet forthwith.

  LICENSING BILL
  4.49 p.m.
  Order of the Day read for consideration of the Commons Reason for disagreeing to certain of the Lords Amendments.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons Reason for disagreeing to certain of the Lords Amendments be now considered.
  Moved, That the Commons Reason for disagreeing to certain of the Lords Amendments be now considered. (The Lord Chancellor.)
  COMMONS REASON FOR DISAGREEING TO CERTAIN OF THE LORDS AMENDMENTS
  [The references are to Bill No. 101]

  LORDS AMENDMENTS
  Clause 2, page 4, line 18, leave out ("or club")
  Clause 2, page 4, line 22, leave out from ("premises") to ("when")
  Clause 2, page 4, line 25, leave out from beginning to ("since")
  The Commons disagreed to the above Amendments for the following Reason:
  Because the Amendments would prevent the proper planning in State management districts of facilities for the supply of intoxicating liquor.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, three Amendments are dealt with here, and I will take them together. I beg to move that this House do not insist on the Amendments to which the Commons have disagreed.
  Moved, That this House do not insist on the said Amendments.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: My Lords, as the noble and learned Viscount has said, Were are three Amendments on the Paper, two of which are merely consequential upon the first. We on these Benches very much regret that the Government did not see their way to recommend these Amendments to another place. If this House should agree with the other place this afternoon, I want to make quite clear what in fact we shall he doing. We shall be leaving the Secretary of State in a position to disallow the opening of any new club which wishes to sell intoxicating liquor in any State-management area. In our judgment, that is the most objectionable feature, more especially when any conditions which the Secretary of State may feel disposed to insist on can be applied. I stated on the Committee stage of this Bill that I believed the question of politics was bound to enter into every new case concerning the formation of a political club which desired to sell intoxicating liquor. The case I quoted on that occasion, which I have no wish to go into again, was left unanswered by the noble and learned Viscount in this House and was not replied to in any way by the Home Secretary two days ago in another place.
  I feel quite certain that political pressure will be applied to the Home Secretary, and that in certain cases he will be hound to take that pressure into account. I am perfectly prepared to admit that the present Home Secretary certainly would not bow to any pressure. But Home Secretaries come and Home Secretaries go, and the next holder of that highly important office may well bow to some form of Left or indeed
  666
  Right-wing political pressure. Nevertheless, in spite of my misgivings about the rejection of these Amendments, I feel bound to advise noble Lords who sit on this side of the House, with great reluctance, to accept the view of another place. But I want to make it abundantly clear to the noble and learned Viscount and to other members of the Government Front Bench, that we shall take the first opportunity that is afforded to us to amend this Bill and to abash all the State-management areas and the arbitrary powers which at present a Socialist Minister sees fit to take upon himself.

  ISLE OF MAN (CUSTOMS) BILL
  4.52 p.m.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  THE MINISTER OF CIVIL AVIATION (LORD PAKENHAM): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill, which is in the usual form, be new read a Second time.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.— (Lord Pakenham.)
  On Question, Bill read 2a; Committee negatived.
  Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 13), Bill read; and passed.

  LAW REFORM (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) BILL
  4.53 p.m.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: My Lords, this Bill, the Second Reading of which I have the honour to move, has not as its purpose the making of any sweeping changes in the law, such as to extend the grounds for divorce. Its purpose is the much less ambitious one of clearing up some procedural anomalies which are, as I hope I shall be able to convince the House, matters that merit the attention and indeed the support of your Lordships. Before dealing with the clauses, which I am afraid must he dealt with individually because each is concerned with a different topic, I will content myself by saying

  667
  that the principle underlying and running through this measure is to right some of the anomalies that have arisen in the administration of the branches of the law with which the Bill deals.
  I come, quite shortly, to the clauses. Clause 1 seeks to confer on the High Court in England jurisdiction in proceedings by a wife for divorce, notwithstanding that the husband is not domiciled here, provided that:
  "(a) the wife is resident in England and has been ordinarily resident there for a period of three years immediately preceding the commencement of the proceedings; and
  (b) the husband is not domiciled in any other part of the United Kingdom or the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man."
  The period of three years is laid down to prevent a party who has not a real domicile here trying to take advantage of this clause. It is to ensure that people cannot go, as it were, from State to State, as is sometimes done in the United States, in order to obtain a more favourable decision in one place than perhaps they might in another. Paragraph (b), which I have read to your Lordships, is inserted in order to prevent the overlapping of jurisdiction between different courts in the United Kingdom. This clause carries out the recommendation made in that most valuable Report of Mr. Justice Denning and his colleagues, and is referred to at Paragraph 83 (1) of the final Report. Subsection (2) of Clause 1 of the Bill merely applies the same rule to cases of nullity. Clause 2 makes similar provision in regard to the Court of Session in Scotland.
  Clause 3 deals with a different point. At present the law of Scotland recognises for the purpose of divorce proceedings in Scotland any relevant period of detention in England under the English Lunacy and Mental Treatment Acts. England has not yet a similar provision in regard to persons detained in mental homes in Scotland. Paragraph (a) serves to put that position right, and paragraph (b) makes similar provision in respect of persons detained in Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. The principle underlying the clause is to ensure that the rights of the parties under our matrimonial law are the same wherever may be the location within the United Kingdom of the mental hospital
  668
  in which the respondent has been detained.
  Clause 4 again seeks to carry out one of the recommendations of the Denning Committee. I would refer your Lordships to paragraph 46 of that Report, the end of which reads as follows:
  "We recommend, however, the more positive step of legislation, on the one hand to enable the magistrates to order higher payments to meet the increased cost of living and, on the other hand, to enable the High Court to order payments up to any amount against a husband who has been guilty of wilful neglect to provide reasonable maintenance for his wife or her infant children, without the necessity of proceedings for restitution."
  At present the High Court has no jurisdiction to order payment of alimony or maintenance unless proceedings have been instituted for divorce, for nullity, for judicial separation, or for restitution of conjugal rights. Magistrates, of course, can make such an order, and under the Married Women (Maintenance) Bill recently before your Lordships' House, the amount has been raised to £5 a week maintenance for the wife and 30s. for each child. So that Bill has dealt with the first part of the recommendation of the Denning Committee which I have just read to your Lordships, and the provision which is contained in this clause deals with the other part.
  If I may, I will now pass to Clause 5. At present, any order made for monthly or weekly payments by a husband to a divorced wife can be discharged, varied or suspended by subsequent order of the court. That is done by virtue of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938. But so far there is no power to vary an order made for secured maintenance, however much the circumstances may have altered. That matter too, was dealt with in the Denning Report in paragraph 50 (3) which says that:
  "At present there is no power to vary deeds of settlement, which have already been varied by order, that is to say there is no power to vary an order of this character, however much the circumstances may change. Power to make such variations as are required from time to time should be conferred."
  This clause seeks to put that matter right.
  I now come to Clause 6, which seeks to abolish the rule in the case of Russell v. Russell. That matter has also been

  669
  commented upon by the Denning Committee. Their comments are to be found in paragraphs 65 to 69 of their Report. Perhaps your Lordships will allow me to refer to paragraph 65 which states that:
  "In 1924 the House of Lords in the case of Russell v. Russell…decided that neither spouse may give evidence tending to show that he or she did not have marital intercourse if such evidence would tend to bastardise a child prima facie born in wedlock. The decision was a surprising one. There had been a long standing practice in the Divorce Court to admit a spouse to give evidence of non-access. The trial judge and the Court of Appeal had held that the practice was right and the evidence was admissible: but the House of Lords by the narrow majority of three to two held that it was inadmissible."
  Now, if I may, I will pass to Paragraph 69 of the Report which states:
  "The rule has been repeatedly criticised. In South Africa it has been expressly repealed by S. 101 (3) of Act No. 46 of 1935. We have had much evidence in favour of its abolition and none for retaining it. We recommend that it should be altered, so far as matrimonial causes are concerned, so as to enable a party to give evidence tending to show that he or she did not have marital intercourse, notwithstanding that such evidence would tend to bastardise a child prima facie born in wedlock."
  This rule had extremely stupid results during the course of the war in cases such as that of a soldier or a sailor whose wife went off with some other man while the husband was overseas and had a child of which the husband could not possibly be the father. The Service man in that case was not allowed to give evidence to show that he had been parted from his wife for two or three years, that he had been for that time in India, the Middle East or Burma, or wherever it might be. Great difficulty was often occasioned, owing to the necessity of having to get someone from the Record Office or the man's commanding officer, or someone else, to give that simple piece of evidence which because of the rule laid down in Russell v. Russell the husband was not able to give himself. I hope the time has come when we in this House will do as the House of Commons has done and consent to the abrogation of that rule.
  Perhaps I may add here that in the course of the Committee stage I intend to mow an Amendment to leave out the words: "for divorce or nullity of marriage," so as to make the abrogation of this rule general to all kinds of matrimonial disputes as it obviously should
  670
  be. Subsection (2) of this clause rightly makes it the rule that neither spouse's evidence shall be compellable upon a matter of this sort. There was, in this connection, the recent case of Tilley v. Tilley which was decided only last year, in which the court said that the wife could be compelled to answer a question on this very matter although she did not wish to do so. I think your Lordships will feel that it is right that just as in criminal proceedings neither husband nor wife is a compellable witness against the other, the same rule should apply to cases falling within the ambit of Clause 6.
  Clause 7 arises from an odd anomaly which has only just been discovered—at least I think that is so, though I may be wrong about it. There was one case which was brought prominently to the notice of a number of people in this connection. The position was that anyone—it did not matter whether he was a father or not; he need not even be a relation of the child concerned—could settle a sum of money on any British infant resident in the United Kingdom and so make that infant a ward of court, without the consent or the parents and without the consent of the court. I think that in the case to which I have referred it was not a stranger who settled the money but a father. He induced his wife, from whom he had been divorced, and their daughter to come back to this country from the place where they had been living overseas, ostensibly to pay a short visit here. While both of them were in this country he settled a sum of money on the daughter, and made her a ward of court. The result was that until that had been put right, the wife could not take the daughter back again to the Dominion, or wherever it was that she had been living with the girl.
  The idea of this clause, except for a provision for a very temporary order, made only in cases of necessity, to make a child a ward of court, is that children cannot be permanency made wards of court without the consent of the appropriate Judge in the Chancery Division. So I hope that this very proper alteration of the law will be consented to by this House.
  Finally, let me say this regarding the Bill. Although its title is an extremely

  671
  wide one, the measure has only reached where it has because in another place it was recognised by all Parties—and by the Government, I am glad to say—as a Bill that made some very useful and urgent alterations in the law of this country. Of course, it would never have come to this House if it had been turned into a Bill substantially to alter the grounds for divorce. I should welcome any Amendments which are in line with the present basic principles of the Bill. I hope the House will not insist on any wider Amendments than those which will fall into that category, otherwise this useful measure, which so far has the support of all Parties in another place and will, I hope, have the support of all Parties in this House, will cease to be a measure of that character and will never reach the Statute Book. I commend the Bill to your Lordships and hope that it will be given a unanimous Second Reading. As a result we too shall have played our part in righting several matters in our law which the time has come to alter.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a. —(Lord Llewellin.)
  5.11 p.m.
  LORD MERRIMAN: My Lords, as one who will have some responsibility for the administration of this Bill, I should like to welcome it wholeheartedly. I shall have one thing to say upon a matter of principle in connection with one clause, but taken as a whole I agree wholeheartedly with the spirit and provisions of the Bill. May I say a word in passing about the question of wards of court, and what has been called the rule in Russell v. Russell? In regard to wards of court, as the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin said, it is true that anybody can constitute a ward of court by settling a sum of money on an infant and then applying to administer the trust. The thing has become absolutely farcical and, of course, is liable to abuse in connection with the custody of children. Oddly enough, it used to be thought that the minimum tariff should be £5 for such a settlement, but that has recently been reduced to 2s. 6d.—a curious inversion of the ratio to the value of money. It is quite time that this procedure was abolished and a positive order of the Court substituted.
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  In regard to the rule in Russell v. Russell, if the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, will forgive me, may I make a slight correction in what he said? It is often spoken of as if this were a rule which applied purely to divorce. On the contrary, it is a rule of universal application, and has been so for a very long time. Where the bastardisation of a living child is possibly involved neither spouse can give evidence whether there has or has not been sexual intercourse at a particular time. It was in Russell v. Russell that that was applied to divorce, where it had been studiously ignored for years; and even since the decision of Russell v. Russell, I think it may be said, without breach of confidence, that judges from time to time have been astute to seek some modification or possible way out of the difficulty. But we were pulled up short about six years ago by a decision in the Court of Appeal which left no doubt that there was no loophole whatever. The Court of Appeal gave leave to the petitioner as a pauper to appeal to the House of Lords. It has been rumoured that at any rate that might have given the opportunity for your Lordships sitting judicially, not of course to overrule themselves but, as Lord Sumner once said, to "distinguish" themselves; but that opportunity was frustrated by the fact that learned counsel refused to certify that there was even an arguable case.
  The words of the clause read "in proceedings in England for divorce or nullity of marriage." The noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, said he intended that the clause should be applicable to any form of matrimonial proceedings. I am hound to say that I hope he will take a rather wider sweep than that. I should have thought that the proper way to deal with it was to make it of universal application. It seems to me to be a dangerous precedent to say that in a particular type of case some rule of law of evidence shall prevail, but that it shall not prevail in other cases. That is a point for Committee, but I hope that amendment will be made. If it is to be limited to matrimonial cases there should be no distinction in the case, for instance, of judicial separation. People often take proceedings for separation in anticipation of taking divorce proceedings after the three years' bar has elapsed, and it would be manifestly

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  absurd if the rules of evidence were different according to whether or not a case was brought in during the first three years after marriage.
  That brings me to the one point of substance about which I wish to make a reservation. I am entirely in favour of Clause 5, giving power for the future to reopen secured provision for maintenance, but I ask your Lordships to consider very seriously whether there is any justification for making that clause retrospective. It is not a matter for argument that the clause is retrospective, because it expressly refers to orders made under the Judicature Act. 1925, by which we are now guided, or by any Act of Parliament which was repealed by that Act. In other words, we are avowedly dealing with orders which may have been made as long ago as twenty-five to thirty years. As regards the future, there can be no possible objection, and I would like to make it plain to your Lordships that it is quite a common thing, in making one of these orders for a secured provision of maintenance, for the court itself to insert a limiting condition, either of wide application, that it shall be only until a further order, in which case the whole thing can be reconsidered, or the narrower condition that it shall be only so long as the wife remains unmarried. But if no such condition is put in, the wife gets what is an absolute trust in her favour. A certain sum is ordered by the registrar, or if necessary on appeal from the registrar by the judge, to be put aside in trust for the wife for life.
  I should like your Lordships to know that I have given the gravest consideration to this question. Before I addressed your Lordships on this topic I consulted two very experienced registrars of long standing, and also a very experienced counsel. The utmost care is taken to see that in any given case the right order is made. The order can be made in one of two ways, or in both combined. The noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, was perfectly accurate in what he said about that. We can either have a plain order for maintenance on joint lives—which automatically comes to an end with the decease of the husband and may not afford any sort of security to the wife if he happens to die young—or you may have what is called a secured provision—the matter with which we are now dealing
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  —whereby the husband is ordered to provide out of his capital a certain amount of securities which are then put in trust for the wife for life. Or, of course, you can have a combination of the two.
  One thing is quite certain. When the question of the amount of maintenance which is to be secured is considered (if any is to be secured), everything is taken into account—the length of the marriage.. the likelihood of the wife re-marrying, and all the rest of it, and in particular the amount of the husband's capital. Another thing that is certain is that inasmuch, and to the extent that, the wife has a secured provision the amount which she will receive for joint lives unsecured is diminished. Of course, there is no sliding scale which can be applied in all cases, but that is the general principle which is applied universally.
  For example, take a case where everybody is agreed that the wife shall he entitled, shall I say, to £1,000 a year. If a third of that were settled it is certain that the totality would be reduced to about £800, £850 or £900, as the circum stances of the case warranted. So that one of these wives who has had an order like this for a long time has suffered a general diminution of her total income because of the very fact that part of it has been secured. The argument that is always used about this principle is that the wife may re-marry. Of course she may. But she re-marries only because her previous marriage has been broken up, against her will, by a husband who has ill-treated her. The Net that she might re-marry has already been taken into account. If she does re-marry she has all the commitments of that new marriage, including possibly a new family, all of which have been entered into on the basis that she has this money absolutely secured to her.
  I hope that in Committee this clause will be made to act prospectively and not retrospectively. It is all very well to say that all these things can be taken into account by the court, if you leave it to the court. If Parliament passes an Act deliberately saying that these things may be reopened retrospectively, the court is bound to assume that Parliament meant something by that. I can assure your Lordships that the probability is that there will be—I do not say a flood of applications but at any rate a good number of applications—which will

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  be occasioned by nothing else in the world than that the value of money has changed adversely to the husband. But so it has to the wife.
  I asked this particular question (and this will be the last word I say on the subject): whether in their experience the registrars could point to there being any real hardship in this matter. From time to time, when there is a re-marriage or when circumstances otherwise change favourably to the wife, registrars get applications, not, of course, to reopen the secured provision but either to reduce or abolish the unsecured provision. I am told that in practice it is not unheard of, but that comparatively speaking it is rare, for it to be necessary to reduce to nothing the unsecured provision. In most cases the circumstances are met by a substantial reduction in the unsecured provision. That, of course, will still be open to any husband who is aggrieved by one of these secured provisions made in the past. The considered opinion of those who advise me in these matters is that there will be immeasurably more hardship to wives by making this clause retroactive than there can possibly be to husbands with regard to these old cases.
  5.26 p.m.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, I want to add only one word of general agreement with the provisions of this Bill. It obviously tidies up a number of not unimportant matters. From the aspect of Second Reading that is all I desire to say—with one reservation. Clearly, from what the noble and learned Lord who has just spoken has told us, the Bill will require careful consideration in Committee. While accepting in every detail that no controversial matters must be introduced which would be likely to jeopardise the passing of this Bill, I would at the same time express the hope that a matter which I raised, at some length I am afraid, before your Lordships not long ago might find itself the subject of an acceptable Amendment on the Committee stage of this Bill. That matter would arouse no controversy. I laid before your Lordships certain cases in regard to the legitimacy of children who were born of a marriage which was subsequently the subject of successful nullity proceedings. So far as my knowledge goes, from
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  inquiries that I have made, I believe that the remedying of what I regard as an unjust position in the cases of these children would not be regarded as controversial. I therefore trust that when the Committee stage is reached an Amendment will be moved from some quarter to put right the existing state of affairs.
  5.27 p.m.
  LORD MESTON: My Lords, I think this is an admirable Bill and the Government are to be congratulated on having given facilities for its further progress. Clause 1 of the Bill removes a very real hardship. Take the case of a married woman whose husband is a blackguard, who has committed some matrimonial offence and who acquires some domicile overseas. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred it is absolutely impossible, for financial and other reasons, for that married woman to pursue her husband to the country in which he has acquired a domicile and there start proceedings against him for dissolution of the marriage. She must either remain in this country and take proceedings for judicial separation, or do nothing at all. The marriage can never be dissolved, because it is well established in law that, subject to the exceptions of the 1944 Act, a woman must always take the same domicile as her husband.
  Clause 1 (2) relates to nullity. As your Lordships all know, the test of jurisdiction in nullity is a morass of difficulties and technicalities. One of the difficulties arises over the question of whether the ceremony of marriage was celebrated in England or abroad. Therefore, merely in order to obtain information on the subject, on the Committee stage of the Bill I intend to put down an Amendment to add at the end of Clause 1 (2) the words,
  "irrespective of whether the ceremony of marriage took place in England or abroad."
  Clause 4 of the Bill places a great power in the hands of married women; but everybody knows that married women are powerful on all occasions, so it will not make much difference if they have another power put into their hands! At all events, it is the logical outcome of the status of marriage At the present moment, if a husband deserts his wife or fails to maintain her, the most the woman can do is to go to the police court and get an order for £2 a week.

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  After to-morrow that will become £5 a week. But, at all events, she has no better redress. Therefore, it is a matter of satisfaction that the High Courts are to be given the jurisdiction which is conferred upon them by Clause 4 of the Bill.
  As to Clause 6 of the Bill I only hope that the rule of evidence as to access will be extended to all matrimonial proceedings. It appears to me to be purely a question as to whether a person is to be believed or not, and. I am unable to understand why any question of law should come into that matter at all. Subject to those few observations I think that this is an excellent Bill, and I hope that in due course it will be passed into law.
  5.31 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I think this is a good Bill, and its promoters (this is a Private Member's Bill) were very careful in another place not to embark upon controversial matters. I think they were completely right so to do. That being so I shall do all I can to give assistance to this Bill in order to try and pass it into law. There are many points which will obviously have to be considered in Committee and some of them have been mentioned, notably by my noble and learned friend Lord Merriman; obviously the point he has made needs very careful consideration. And there are also the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Meston and Lord Reading.
  I have been wondering whether we should find that measures on the lines of those that. Lord Reading mentioned, are not controversial, and if so I shall be pleased to discuss them with Lord Llewellin and Lord Reading. First of all, I think we might deal with the question of the legitimacy of children of marriages which are voided on the ground of wilful refusal or incapacity to consummate the marriage (your Lordships will remember that Lord Reading gave some illustration of that recently). From soundings that I have made I believe that an Amendment on those lines would prove to be completely uncontroversial.
  The second question is as to the possibility of obtaining a degree of nullity on the ground of wilful refusal or of incapacity to consummate the marriage where a child has been conceived after the solemnisation of the marriage. Your Lordships
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  will realise how that question may arise nowadays, and I have reasons for supposing that an Amendment on that point will also prove completely uncontroversial. If that is so I shall be happy if the noble Lords who are interested in these matters will keep in touch with me. I think we shall be wise to follow the same rule here as was observed in the House of Commons: not to embark on any controversial legislation; but, having taken soundings, as I have said, I think neither of these matters will prove controversial and it will be worth while to discuss them to see whether we can include them in the Bill. This is a useful little Bill. The Title I do not like very much, and we must try to think something better. I think this is a Bill which certainly should receive a Second Reading, and should receive careful consideration in Committee.
  5.36 p.m.
  LORD LLEWELLIN: My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords in all parts of the House for the reception they have given to this Bill, and particularly to the, noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack for the welcome he has given it. I was surprised at only one remark that he made: that he did not like the Title very much. I recollect that I once had to draft a document whilst I was a member of the Government. It was brought to me by one of the civil servants working with me, and by the time the document had gore through a great deal of examination the Permanent Secretary of the Department turned up and said: "The one thing I do not like about this document is its title." The other civil servant replied. "That is an awful pity because t -tat is the only bit of the original draft that Colonel Llewellin has left in." And so that had to come out too. However, if, of course, we do not like the Title, I understand that in your Lordships' House we can alter that as well.
  All I would say at this stage is that, given your Lordships' support, it is certainly not my intention to cause this worth-while little measure to he wrecked by allowing anything really controversial to he included. I myself very much welcome the suggested two clauses which have been proposed ay the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack and do not think they would be controversial.

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  I would further say, in regard to Clause 6, only that that I think it should be made general; I believe it was only because of some technical procedural matter in another place that it was not made general there. In regard to other matters, I hope that we shall have consultations about this Bill, and that in the end we shall be able to pass it through as a completely agreed measure, containing everything worth while and nothing controversial.
  On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

  ADOPTION OF CHILDREN BILL
  5.37 p.m.
  Amendments reported (according to Order).
  Clause 1:
  Scope of power to make adoption orders, 16 & 17 Geo. 5. c. 21.
  1.—(1) It is hereby declared that the power to make adoption orders conferred by the Adoption of Children Act, 1926 (hereinafter referred to as "the principal Act"), includes and has always included power to make an adoption order authorising the adoption of an infant by the mother or father or natural father of the infant, either alone or jointly with her or his spouse, in any case where the adopter or, as the case may be, either of the joint adopters has not, in relation to the infant, all the rights, duties, obligations and liabilities of the parent of a legitimate infant.
  VISCOUNT SIMON VISCOUNT SIMON moved, in subsection (1) to omit "or natural father." The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this Amendment, and, indeed, the other Amendments in my name, all deal with a single point. As the Bill is now drawn we have used in several places the phrase "natural father" and in one place, I think, "putative father." My noble and learned friend Lord Maugham pointed out that the language of the first subsection was not as clear as it might be. All that is cured, if I may point to a later Amendment, by the Amendment to Clause 14 which will insert the definition:
  "'father' in relation to an illegitimate infant means the natural father."
  Once that is done these other expressions can be cut out of the other clauses. Therefore the Amendment I am now moving will make Clause 1 read much
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  more clearly, as Lord Maugham suggested. It will read as follows:
  "It is hereby declared that the power to make adoption orders conferred by the Adoption of Children Act, 1926 (hereinafter referred to as 'the principal Act'); includes and has always included power to make an adoption order authorising the adoption of an infant by the mother or father of the infant, either alone or jointly with her or his spouse."
  That, I think, is very clear, and that is the sole effect of the Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 1, line 9, leave out ("or natural father").—(Viscount Simon.)
  VISCOUNT SIMON: I beg to move the next Amendment.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 1, line 11, leave out from ("spouse") to the end of line 14.—(Viscount Simon.)
  Clause 2 [Restrictions on making of adoption orders]:
  VISCOUNT SIMON: I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 2, line 9, leave out ("or natural father").—(Viscount Simon.)
  Clause 3 [Consent to adoption]:
  5.39 p.m.
  LORD FARINGDON LORD FARINGDON moved, after subsection (2) to insert:
  "() A consent given for the purposes of this section shall not be withdrawn after the expiration of three months from the date on which it is given."
  The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is, in essence, the same Amendment which was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Darwen, in Committee. We had hoped that the alteration which has now been made in the wording would meet the objections of those who did not like the Amendment in its previous form. The Amendment deals with a very difficult problem. I think all the problems in this Bill really arise from the fact that we are divided in our minds between a number of interests. There are the interests of the natural mother, of the adopting parents and of the child itself. These are not necessarily all in accord, and one desires to be absolutely fair to all of them. But I would suggest that of those particular interests, the one which must

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  take precedence—and I am certain your Lordships will agree—is the interests of the child.
  We had hoped, and it is with great regret that I understand our hope is not to he gratified, that the alteration we have made, from a six weeks' to a three months' period, would meet the major objection that was made to my noble friend's Amendment during the Committee stage. It seemed to us that the objection taken was that our suggestion removed, as it were, the position of reciprocity as between the natural mother and the adopting parents. We thought that by extending the period to the same length as the probation period, we should have met that objection. Unfortunately, it appears that we have not been able to satisfy all those with whom we have been in touch. Whilst I myself appreciate the strength of some of the objections, I still feel that basically this Amendment is in the interest of the child. It is surely the case that nothing can be more inimical to the child's interest than constant choppings and changings of its home life. What worries us is the ability of the natural mother for a prolonged and, in fact, an indefinite, period to withdraw her consent. We desire to limit that to a distinct, stated period, so that the adopting parents shall know that, after the natural mother has given her consent in writing and this period has expired, the child shall not be torn away from them.
  I have been in touch with a woman who has possibly more experience than almost anybody in this country in the matter of adoption. I understand that she has arranged for the adoption of about 10,000 children in the last twenty-five years, and I think, therefore, her views should carry considerable weight—they certainly do with me, and I believe they will with your Lordships. She maintains three fundamental points. First of all, in her view, there is no doubt that the most tragic aspect of the whole situation is that in which adopting parents are compelled to give up their children. She has described to me really pitiful scenes when these children have been taken away from the adopting parents. She says that these cases are not as rare as one might wish. She claims that there has been—and she has produced the figures—an increase since the 1939 Act,
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  and she expresses anxiety lest, as the result of this Bill, there may be a further increase. Her third point is that which I have already made myself in a general way, that the revocation is contrary to the interests of the child. She claims that in nearly every case it is contrary both to the economic and psychological interest of the child. Usually the natural mother will not be in the same economic condition to look after the child satisfactorily as are the adopting parents. Clearly they would not have undertaken this charge themselves, nor would hey have been accepted as adopters, unless their economic circumstances justified it. She says it is psychologically bad for the child, because she claims—and one states this with some regret—that the vast majority of these revocations are not made with the motive of the child's interest, but rather from selfish motives.
  She has given me a number of instances—in fact, she gave me an unlimited number—and if your Lordships will excuse me and have patience for a moment, I should like to mention one or two cases which seen to me typical. They are the type of case which make those of us who move this Amendment so anxious that this particular danger should be met. This woman spoke to me of a case in which a mother thinks that, by taking the child back and by showing it in her arms, she can force the father of the child to marry her. She will take the child back, and apparently more often than not her stratagem is unsuccessful. There was one case in particular she mentioned, in which a woman took back her twins at the eleventh hour and thought she could induce the father to marry her, but he refused to do so. There was another case—and this is, I think, a particularly distressing case—in which an unmarried mother who was serving a term of imprisonment was pestered (I hesitated to use the word, but it is the word she used) by the representative of an adoption society, who put it to her that it was, as it were, a form of penance, of expiation, that she should take this child back and make herself responsible for it. The child was taken from a good home and is now the child of a convicted mother who does not want it. In cases of this sort there can be little doubt where the true interest of the child really lies.
  I have heard recently an additional objection which I think may be made in your Lordships' House to-day. It is the objection that if the mother's consent cannot he withdrawn after three months, she will none the less, until such time as the adoption order is made, be legally responsible for the child. Now that is perfectly true, and I would not deny it. But, on the other hand, when she has given her consent she is still legally responsible until the adoption order is made; and because the child is returned by the adopting parents does not mean that she therefore withdraws her consent in any way; the full responsibility is thrust back upon her regardless of the fact that she has given that consent. The fact that that consent can no longer be withdrawn after the three months does not seem to me to change the situation. But this is really very largely a hypothetical situation.
  I am informed that there are somewhere around twelve would-be adopting parents waiting for every child available to be adopted. There is therefore no chance, except in a purely transitional sense, of the child going back to a mother who does not want it. It will in fact be found another home immediately. I do not wish to labour this point, because it has been made most ably in Committee by my noble friend Lord Darwen, but it is a matter which gives us great anxiety. We feel that the interest of the child is in some jeopardy. We feel, too, that the very natural feelings of the adopting parents deserve every possible consideration: indeed, I am sure that all your Lordships will agree with that. I have been assured by those who have had much to do with adoption that in a remarkably short time the adopting parent acquires all the feelings of a true parent, and that to remove the child is as agonising and as dreadful an experience as it is for a natural parent.
  To expose adopting parents to this indefinite period—indefinite, because it must await the making of the adoption order, which cannot take less than a month and may, I am told, take up to two years—and to put them, as it were, in jeopardy during the whole of that period, is in effect to discourage the object that we desire to encourage, the adoption of children into good homes.
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  I had hoped that this Amendment would receive support from other members of your Lordships' House, as well as those with whom I am associated on the Order Paper. I still hope that perhaps its reception may be more favourable than I was given to understand was likely. But, if it is not, all I can say is that I believe that there is a serious danger here, and it is one which ought not to be beyond the wit of noble Lords in this House to meet. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 2, line 32, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Faringdon.)
  5.51 p.m.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, this point was raised in very suitable terms, if I may say so, by the noble Lord, Lord Darwen, in Committee, and I then felt a sincere desire to see, so far as I could, how it could be dealt with. And, since the Committee stage I have done everything in my power to obtain the best advice. The view which I must present to the House I can explain very briefly; but I would first state that it is not from any want of sympathy with this particular case that I must ask the House to reject this Amendment. In so doing, I hope I may be permitted to say that I shall be acting in accordance with the view of the Home Secretary, and I believe that I shall receive support from other quarters.
  It is not possible to judge this case fairly if one emphasises too much some particular instance with which the noble Lord has been provided by the lady to whom he has referred. I am sorry she is not one of those who communicated with me, because she must have known, since she is interested in this matter, that, with the help of the adoption societies, of the London County Council, of the Home Office and others, I have been studying it for some weeks now. We ought to understand what is the central machinery of the law relating to the adoption of children. It is this. In the first place the child is put in the care and custody of some persons who are hoping to adopt it; they do not adopt it blindfold. This period is an experimental one; the child is put in their care, and by the law it has to be in their care for three months before they can apply for the adoption order. If at the

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  end of the three months they want to have the child as a legally adopted child, there is not the slightest reason why they should wait for months or years more.
  The noble Lord was in error when he talked about an indefinite time; nothing of the sort happens, elf the proposed adopters do wait, it is because they choose to wait; but they are perfectly entitled to go and apply to the court for an adoption order as soon as the three months' period is over—though I agree that it may take a little longer before the application comes before the court. Then the court has to know whether the mother of the child consents to the adoption. I think that, properly speaking, the consent has to be a present consent—a consent at the time the order is made; but as soon as the order is made, the consent 'being in existence, from that moment the child (passes into the new family and the mother has no claim whatever.
  The whole machine would break down —as I am advised, and believe—and there would be most unwelcome results if the proposed adopters remained free to reject the child though at the same time the mother were not free to withdraw her consent. There are cases, of course, in which the proposed adopters receive the child—it is not necessarily a baby; it may be a child of eight or ten years of age—and when they have it they do not desire to keep it; and in such cases they return it. I do not see myself how this scheme could work in this experimental period (which need not be more than three months) if the would-be adopters were able to reject and the mother were not free to withdraw her consent. The noble Lord said that in such a case somebody else might adopt the child. But that would not be likely, perhaps, if the child were, as is sometimes the case, not a very desirable child. It is therefore essential in this scheme that these two things should work together. From the moment the would-be adopters apply for an adoption order they have got to look after the child.
  LORD FARINGDON: I am not sure whether I have understood the noble and learned Viscount aright. He said, I thought, that from the moment the adopters apply for an adoption order they have no right to return the child. Is that what the noble Viscount said?
  VISCOUNT SIMON: That was not strictly correct. I should have said, "From the moment that they apply and, in accordance with their application, the order is made."
  I have looked into this matter as well as I could, and I have taken the greatest care to get the view of both adoption societies and local authorities. I have been in communication with the Home Office, who are entirely sympathetic, and I find that both the official and the unofficial feeling is unanimous on the matter. I only wish I were entirely in agreement with the noble Lord. I realise that the interest of the child is his concern, as it is mine, but I can hardly imagine a worse case than that where a mother is prohibited from changing her mind. There must be this experimental period; and in practice, as I am disposed to think, this problem is skilfully and sympathetically handled. The number of cases in which difficulty arises, through people desiring to return a child is really very small indeed.
  I am quite satisfied that our view is the right one. I will not argue further about it. I wish very much that I could meet the difficulty that does sometimes arise. I think the remedy, SD far as it is a remedy, is to say: "Make up your mind whether you really want to have this child. I hope you do. If you do, then under Clause 3 you can apply for an adoption order as soon as you have had this child in your custody for three months." If the mother consents, in the ordinary course of events this order will be made. But, even if the mother was debarred from withdrawing her consent, if she turned up in court and said: "I do not agree with the child being handed over," I do not suppose that any court would make an order against tier demands. Of course, they would not. I am extremely sorry that there should be controversy over this, because we are trying to do the right thing, but I sincerely believe that is the right conclusion and it is the one with which I hope the House will agree.
  6.2 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I may say that the Home Office have gone into this matter most carefully, because I have represented the views of the noble Lord to the Home Office. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, was perfectly right in saying that the advice of the Home Office is that we

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  should not accept this Amendment. That is the advice I must give your Lordships. I can assure your Lordships that that view was not reached without very careful consideration and close consultation with those who are best qualified to advise. For my own part, I will say this. I confess that I feel a little anxiety about this matter and, therefore, though I am going to ask the noble Lord to withdraw this Amendment, I want to give him two pieces of consolation.
  The first is this: that I think it is becoming clear that this measure will need carefully watching. I do not for a moment suppose that the last word on the adoption of children has been written in this Bill. I think it is certain that, in the light of experience gained under this measure, we shall have to consider the whole matter again in the not too distant future. In regard to this particular matter, I think it is one which should be watched very carefully in order that we may learn what is the right course to adopt. That is the first piece of consolation I have to offer to the noble Lord. The second is this. So far as it rests within my power—and I think it does—I propose to give instructions, by order or otherwise, that persons who wish to apply to the magistrates should take all the preliminary steps and get all their cards in order before the three months are up, so that directly the three months are up, having taken all the necessary steps and got all the necessary documents, they can promptly apply. So it may be possible to get the consent, not after a long or considerable interval of time, but almost at once.
  I confess frankly that this matter has given me personally some worry. I do not know very much about it. It is partly for that reason that I have been unable to form a clear idea. But I have been to the Home Office, who know about these problems, and they have been at great pains to consider the matter. Their advice, as the noble and learned Viscount has rightly said, is that we should not accept this Amendment. Therefore, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw it.
  6.6 p.m.
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: My Lords, before we part with the matter, there is one question I should like to ask. I have
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  taken a great interest in these adoption of children cases. I have mentioned before that I used to be concerned in a number of cases of that kind when I was a Judge in the Chancery Division. Therefore, I have followed this question with much interest, and I have some statistics and figures which, to my mind, are ex-ceedingly interesting. The question I want to ask—because I do not know the answer and because I want information—is this. As the matter stands, and without the Amendment to Clause 3 that we are now discussing, I suppose that a consent once given cannot be recalled, because there is nothing in the Bill to authorise its being recalled in any circumstances. I would ask whether it would not be right to allow the mother to withdraw her consent if, before the expiration of the probationary period, she finds that so far as she can judge it would be much better if she took back her child. I really do not know the answer to that problem. It seems to me that the noble Lord who is in favour of this Amendment would be on strong ground if he said: "Inasmuch as the order will not be made till the expiration of the three months, it is only fair that the mother, if she has given a previous consent shall be entitled to withdraw it within that period."
  On the other hand, I agree with what was said by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon—that after the order has been made, after the great and important act has taken place of removing from the mother her obligation for the child, and it has been transferred to other people, I think it would be quite impossible to allow the mother to withdraw the consent. I hope I have not been at all dogmatic in that, because this probationary period is something new to me. When I had to deal with these matters, what had to be proved were a number of things with regard to the parents and the fact that there was a consent by the mother. They were not, as a rule, cases of much difficulty. They may be more difficult in future.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, I am obliged to the noble and learned Viscount for those remarks. If I may presume to say so, the noble and learned Viscount makes a real point. I suggest the answer is this. I did indicate it—perhaps not very clearly—in Committee.

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  If your Lordships will read Clause 3, you will see that
  "An adoption order shall not be made except with the consent of…"
  and I read there "the mother." I understand, as I think the Lord Chancellor understood when he spoke in Committee, that the real question for the court is: "As we are making this order now, does the mother consent now?" Sometimes, the mother actually appears before the tribunal and says: "I consent." But there are also, under the Rules which the Lord Chancellor makes, a series of very useful forms, which include the signing of a written consent. Under this Bill, that has to be done:
  "… not earlier than six weeks after the birth…"
  and before a justice of the peace.
  I apprehend that the way that provision will work is this. If one speaks strictly, when the mother signs that written document she is giving her consent at the date when she signs. The document is attached to the application, the application is then filed before the tribunal, and they examine the documents. In most cases, they will say: "Well, we see that this consent was written in proper circumstances. There is nothing to suggest that the woman has altered her mind. We consider there is sufficient evidence here to show that the mother consents." So that, although the written document has in fact been signed before the date when the order is made, the court is entitled to infer that the consent is what I may call the present consent.
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: Is not the consent consequently given before the probationary period has even started, or at any rate at a very early stage in the probationary period?
  VISCOUNT SIMON: Yes. I do not think there is any difference between us.
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I think there is. If consent is given just before the end of the probationary period, power to withdraw the consent does not seem to me to matter at all. But if the three months is when the matter is in medio and you cannot tell whether or not the adoption order will be made, it does seem to me that the mother might have a right to claim.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: I agree. That is the whole point. The mother, of course,
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  has the right to change her mind up to the moment that the adoption order is made.
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I am not sure about that.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: Everybody else sees the point.
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I may be quite wrong, but I cannot see it.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: Would the noble and learned Viscount mind looking at the first words of Clause 3:
  "An adoption order shall not be made except with the consent.…"
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: Yes, but the consent may have been given three months before.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: I do not think so, with respect. If one reads right through, I think it is plain that the principle of the thing is that the order is made because the consent of the mother has been obtained. If the evidence of that is a document signed some time before, in most eases that will be regarded as sufficient. But whether that is so or not is entirely for the court. The court might say, "We should like to have a more recent proof of this consent." But my noble and learned friend is perfectly right in saying that from the moment the order is made, the mother cannot withdraw any more than the adopting parties can withdraw. That is the moment when the thing becomes final on each side. I think you will find that the present form says, "I, the proposed adopter, apply to the court for an adopter order which will cause such and such a child to be my adopted child, and I annex to my application the consent it which has been signed by the mother,"—and which will now have to be signed under special conditions. In the ordinary way the court says that that is enough, but they are perfectly entitled to ask whether the mother consents now. There are cases where the mother comes forward and says, "I do not cons ant now," just as there are other case; where she says, in face of the court, "I do consent."
  6.12 p.m.
  LORD DARWEN: My Lords, I do not want to detain the House at all, but I would like to say how great is my disappointment at the line that has been

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  taken. My disappointment is only slightly tempered by the kind words of the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, and the promise that he has made. As I said in the previous discussion, I feel the tremendous difficulty of the question regarding the primary consideration which ought to be given to the matter. I also feel, however, that not sufficient consideration has been given to the position of the adopter, to the period of serious suspense and anxiety through which the adopter is likely to pass, and, I think I may say, to the influence upon the child itself of that suspense and anxiety. The very fact that a person wishes to adopt a child makes it almost certain that that person cares for children, loves children, and is going to become more and more attached to the child as the child stays with him. Therefore, one has to face the fact that the anxiety and suspense on the part of the adopters is bound to be increased until the child is securely theirs. I must say that I do not feel that sufficient weight has been given to that consideration. I hope however, as the Lord Chancellor has said, that in working out the regulations it will be possible for the date of the adoption order to be fixed more immediately at the end of the three months, and that there will not be any considerable extension of time.
  LORD FARINGDON: My Lords, the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, used one argument which would have very great weight with me. Incidentally, and I think all members of the House are indebted to him for his exposition of this extremely complicated subject. He made one point which was not an elaborate legal point but was one which seemed to me to have tremendous weight. He said that even though the mother had no legal right to withdraw her consent, if she went down to the court and said that she would withdraw if she could, no court would in fact make an adoption order. I am quite certain that the noble Viscount is perfectly right in that—
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I confess I have great doubt about it. I do not think you must take that as being clear.
  LORD FARINGDON: I believe that our courts have that humanity which obviously the noble Viscount, Lord
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  Simon, also believes they have. I do not think they would make an adoption order in face of such a protest. I cannot accept the noble and learned Viscount's argument in regard to the situation where a child is thrown back to a mother who cannot withdraw her consent to adoption. In fact, that will happen anyhow. If the child is thrown back it is thrown back only if the adopters do not want it. That is the present situation. In any case, I do not see that it is fundamentally altered by the fact that the mother has no right to withdraw her consent. However, I was considerably comforted by the remarks of the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor. I feel appreciative of his guarantee that the working of this Bill will be closely watched, and even more appreciative because I think his guarantee that the processes of the law shall be speeded up and that the making of these adoption orders shall not take an excessive length of time does meet a great deal of our anxiety. That does not cover the case where a natural mother happens to be vacillating, and where the adopting people cannot proceed because they are not sure whether they can—
  VISCOUNT SIMON: The only person who can move for an adoption order is the person who wishes to adopt. If there is a delay it is because the application has not been made. No one can guarantee that a person who wants to adopt will apply for an adoption order.
  LORD FARINGDON: I know of cases where the natural mother who has given consent is vacillating, and the adopting parties who would desire to take out an adoption order are prevented from doing so because the mother might withdraw her consent at the court. However, it is very consoling to hear that the legal delays will be reduced. I thank the noble and learned Lord Chancellor for his assurance and, not wholly happily, I withdraw my Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment to page 2, line 33.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 2, line 33, leave out from ("of") to the first ("an") in line 34.—(Viscount Simon.)
  Clause 10 [Provisions supplementary to s. 9]:
  VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, this is quite formal. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 6, line 29, leave out from ("order") to ("is") in line 30.—(Viscount Simon.)
  VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 7, line 4, leave out ("putative").—(Viscount Simon.)
  Clause 13 [Definition of "relative"]:
  VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, I beg to move the next Amendment.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 9, line 29, leave out ("natural").— (Viscount Simon.)
  VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 9, line 33, leave out ("natural").(Viscount Simon.)
  Clause 14 [Interpretation and construction]:
  VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, this Amendment follows on the others which have been made. I think by inserting this definition of "father" we shall get rid of references to "natural father" and "putative father," and all the rest of it. It is a simpler and much better way in which to do it. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 10, line 14, at end insert ("'Father' in relation to an illegitimate infant means the natural father").—(Viscount Simon.)
  Clause 15 [Application to Scotland]:
  THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF WORKS (LORD MORRISON): My Lords, perhaps I may deal with the next two Amendments together. The first is a drafting Amendment, consequential on the Amendment to page 11, line 14. These adaptations are necessary in applying to Scotland a new subsection added in Committee—namely, subsection (4) of Clause 3, as (a) the securing of consents in Scotland is regulated by the Court of Session by act of sederunt, and (b) it is usual, and for the convenience of the public in Scotland, to empower a sheriff to carry out the duties of a justice of the peace. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 11, line 11, leave out ("and").—(Lord Morrison.)
  Amendment moved—
  Page 11, line 14, at end insert ("and in subsection (4) for any reference to rules there shall he substituted a reference to an act of sederunt, and any reference to a justice of the peace shall include a reference to the sheriff").—(Lord Morrison.)
  LORD MORRISON: My Lords, this Amendment to the Scottish application clause is consequential on the insertion in Committee of Clause 10. Clause 10 deals with supplementary matters arising out of the provisions of Clause 9, which provides for changes in the law of succession as regards adopted children in England. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 11, line 24, leave out ("section nine") and insert ("sections nine and ten").—(Lord Morrison.)
  LORD MORRISON: My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 13, line 43, leave out ("ten").—(Lord Morrison.)
  Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 13), Bill read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

  HOUSING BILL
  6.22 p.m.
  Returned from the Commons with the Amendments agreed to.

  LEGAL AID AND SOLICITORS (SCOTLAND) BILL
  Returned from the Commons with the Amendments agreed to.

HOUSING (SCOTLAND) BILL
Returned from the Commons with certain of the Amendments made by the Lords agreed to and one of the Amendments disagreed to, with a Reason for such disagreement.
LORD MORRISON: My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons Reason be now considered.
Moved, That the Commons Reason be now considered.—(Lord Morrison.)

LORDS AMENDMENT
Clause 9, page 7, line 12, at end insert—
("(iii) (a) if in relation to any dwelling the Secretary of State (after consultation with the Agricultural Executive Committee and District Wages Committee having jurisdiction within the area in which such dwelling is situate) certifies that such dwelling is necessary for the proper and efficient carrying on of an agricultural holding, the provisions of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section eleven of this Act shall not apply with respect to such dwelling during such period as such certificate continues in force;
(b) any certificate granted by the Secretary of State as aforesaid may be revoked by him if he is of opinion that the dwelling to which it relates is no longer necessary for the proper and efficient carrying on of the said agricultural holding but before any such certificate is revoked the Secretary of State shall consider any representations made to him by the owner of the dwelling or by the tenant of the said holding;
(c) where any such certificate granted by the Secretary of State is revoked as aforesaid the owner of the dwelling to which the certificate related shall within a period of three months pay to the local authority the like amount as would become payable to them under subsection (2) of section eleven of this Act in the event of a breach at the date of the revocation of the certificate of any of the conditions specified in subsection (1) of the said section and in the event of the owner failing to pay such amount as aforesaid the provisions of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section eleven of this Act shall extend and apply to the dwelling in like manner as they
696
would have applied if in the absence of a certificate from the Secretary of State an improvement grant had been made in respect of the dwelling.")
The Commons disagreed to the above Amendment for the following Reason:
Because it is undesirable that improvement grants should he given except in respect of dwelling houses occupied by the owners or by tenants who have the protection of the Rent Restrictions Acts, and because administrative arrangements required by the Amendment would involve uneconomic of man-power.
6.24 p.m.
LORD MORRISON: My Lords, I beg to move that this House do not insist on the Amendment to which the Commons have disagreed. Noble Lords will remember that the Amendment with which we are now dealing was moved by the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, with the object of admitting a limited number of farm cottages to improvement grants under the Bill without the application of the condition that the cottages must be occupied on an ordinary tenancy basis. The machinery for doing so was to be that of a certificate by the Secretary of State that he was satisfied that the dwelling was necessary for the proper and efficient carrying on of an agricultural holding.
The Secretary of State has asked me to say that he has given careful consideration to the Amendment and to the arguments advanced by the noble Lords who supported it. He is most anxious that a solution should be found to this problem. While the Amendment goes some way towards such a solution, he felt that it has certain defects which prevented him from advising that it be accepted in another place. In particular, he felt that its terms did not touch the kernel of the problem as he had encountered it; the risk in the occasional case—the very occasional case—that the occupier of a State-aided cottage might be turned out at too short notice and without due process of law. We are not suggesting that this would happen often, but it might. That is the sore spot and the Amendment does not touch it.
As I have said, the Secretary of State regrets that it has not been possible to find a solution acceptable to both parties—even a compromise solution; but he is still open-minded and anxious to find one. These discussions which we have had have narrowed the issue, and in that

697
respect have been helpful. At this stage, the only course left is to let the Bill go and give it a trial, but at the same time to encourage all efforts to narrow the issue still further. The Secretary of State believes that both sides of the industry should give further thought to the problem. Sooner or later, the need for improving the Bill will arise; and if a solution emerges then the Secretary of State will be ready to consider it. I beg to move that this House do not insist upon the said Amendment.
Moved, That the House do not insist upon the said Amendment.—(Lord Morrison.)
6.26 p.m.
LORD POLWARTH: My Lords, on the Second Reading of this Bill I said that I felt rather like the twelfth man who was being called on to play in a side, so perhaps it is not entirely inappropriate that at every stage the noble Lord, Lord Morrison, and myself have found ourselves making last wicket stands. If we were to insist on this Amendment, however reasonable we think it is, we realise that it would mean that the Bill could not pass into law for several more months. As I have said before, we on this side of your Lordships' House are extremely anxious to see the Bill come into effect, particularly in order that those who stand to benefit most from the operation of it—namely, those in the towns and cities of Scotland—should have the advantages of it at the earliest, possible moment. For that reason, we must, reluctantly, allow the Bill to go through at the moment.
At the same time, we are sorry that His Majesty's Government have not thought fit to accept what we consider to be a constructive and reasonable Amendment. We feel, too, that we must express our disappointment at the limited consideration which has been given to this matter, for, after all, it is only two days since the Amendment left this place. The consideration given to the problem, in our view, has been very short. What is still worrying us is the decision which the Secretary of State for Scotland has reiterated since the Bill left this place, that he is powerless to act in this matter until he has the agreement of the Scottish Farm Servants' Union. We feel that, as a matter of public policy, it is
698
entirely wrong, that the proper housing of the people, and particularly where it affects agricultural production, should be held up simply because a small body, a very small proportion of the agricultural community, object. They have adopted what is something of a "dog in the manger" attitude in doing so. While it is a poor consolation to those who in the next few years ma" find themselves living in cottages which it has not been possible to improve, I think it should be widely known that this reason is still preventing a solution to this problem being reached. I must say, however, that on this subject we have heard a more co-operative note on this occasion than we have heard for a long time. I hope it augurs well for the future.
6.28 p.m.
LORD CLYDESMUR: I think your Lordships will have listened with some disappointment to the message from the Secretary of State for Scotland which the noble Lord, Lord Morrison, read. Yet it is evident that the Secretary of State has been impressed with the desire of this House to find a solution to the deadlock that has been reached. Personally, I am not without hope that later on a satisfactory solution may be reached. I feel that if we had not been hurried so greatly, if this matter had not come on so late in the Session, it would have been possible even now to devise something to meet the difficulties about occupiers being turned out, et cetera. I believe we might have formulated a workable Amendment. I hope that the matter will be considered by the Department concerned. I have a feeling that what has happened is that the Secretary of State has not been allowed to let go the coattails of the English Bill. The English Bill, as your Lordship know, has passed into law without any provision for improving tied houses. This suggested Amendment was put forward to meet the difficulty, which was a real and obvious one, of ensuring that al abuses shall be guarded against. But, as I say, I fear that the Secretary of State and his Department have not found it possible to let go the coat-tails of the English Bill. There we must leave the matter for the present. We want the Fill to become law as soon as possible, but we desire to express the earnest hope that this particular matter will be considered in the

699
Department later and that it may be possible to bring in an Amendment to this measure which will achieve the desired result.

IRON AND STEEL BILL
Report from the Committee of the Reason to he offered to the Commons for the Lords insisting, on certain of their Amendments: read and agreed to: Ordered that a Message be sent to the Commons to return the Bill with the Reason.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
6.31 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, before the House adjourns I think I should let your Lordships know that it will not be necessary to ask you to meet for Public Business to-morrow (Friday). The House will meet, however, at 11.30 a.m. on Saturday. July 30, when we hope to pass the Appropriation Bill through all its stages before the Royal Commission, which is expected to sit at 11.45 a.m.

BRADFORD CORPORATION BILL
SOUTHAMPTON HARBOUR BILL
WEST BROMWICH CORPORATION BILL
Returned from the Commons with the Amendments agreed to.
RHODESIA RAILWAYS LIMITED (PENSION SCHEMES AND CONTRACTS) BILL [H.L.]
  SLOUGH CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
  Returned from the Commons, agreed to with Amendments: the said Amendments considered and agreed to.