Lords Sitting of 21 July 1949

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
  DARTFORD TUNNEL (EXTENSION OF TIME) BILL
  Read 2a.
  ASHDOWN FOREST BILL
  Read 2a.
  BARNSLEY CORPORATION BILL
  Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
  WEST BROMWICH CORPORATION BILL
  Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
  MERSEY TUNNEL BILL
  Read 3a, and passed.

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
  3.8 p.m.
  LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, it has been arranged through the usual channels that we should adjourn during pleasure this afternoon from four to six o'clock. It is hoped to be able to conclude our business this evening, after we have reassembled at six o'clock, by 7.30 p.m. We had a very late sitting yesterday, and it is felt it is unfair to ask the House to sit after dinner again this evening without notice. I should add that there will be a formal Sitting of the House tomorrow for the purpose of receiving the National Insurance Bill from another place. This will be at an hour which will be arranged later in the day.

  HOUSING BILL
  3.9 p.m.
  Read 3a (according to Order).
  Clause 7:
  Power of local authorities to provide board and laundry facilities
  7.—(1) The power of a local authority under Part V of the principal Act to provide hous-
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  ing accommodation shall include power to provide in connection with the provision of such accommodation for any persons, such facilities for obtaining meals and refreshments and such facilities for doing laundry and such laundry services as accord with the needs of those persons.
  LORD ROCHESTER LORD ROCHESTER moved, in Clause 7, after "refreshments" to insert
  "other than the sale or supply of intoxicating or excisable liquor."
  The noble Lord said: My Lords, since the demise of the National Government of which I was a member, I have owed allegiance to no political Party; but I avow myself a Liberal—albeit unattached. I am one of those, however, who believe that the result of the last Election was such that it may well have saved us from a violent revolution; but we have had the revolution all right! My tendency is more and more to the Left, and I think noble Lords on the Government Front Bench would agree that, by and large, I have supported the present Government. I confess, however, to having felt greatly concerned at times about their attitude to some moral and religious issues. The temperance question is a case in point.
  Look at this Bill. There was to me something really disquieting about the attitude of the Government a week ago. I am not criticising the noble Lord the Paymaster-General, whose courtesy and consideration is always exemplary. We know that it was through no fault of his that there was such rigidity last week, for he was representing a Department other than is own; and with that candour which we so much admire in him, the noble Lord told us frankly that he was speaking under instructions and had no discretion to concede anything on this point. However, I still refuse to believe that the persuasive powers of the noble Viscount the Leader of the House and the Paymaster-General, aided and abetted by the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, are not such as to overcome the unwillingness even of the Minister of Health to subscribe to a compromise that was conceded by a perfect galaxy of Ministers on the Civic Restaurants Act, including the Leader of the House, the Home Secretary, the Minister of Food and the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, who was in charge of that Bill in your Lordships' House.
  Your Lordships will remember that the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, moved an Amendment last week in almost the identical terms as he did on the Civic Restaurants Act two years ago—namely, to restrict the granting of a justices' licence for the sale of liquor for consumption only with meals; and on the Civic Restaurants Act it was conceded as a compromise, after my Amendment in exactly the same terms as the one I am now moving had been negatived. In resisting the Amendment of my noble friend Lord Llewellin last week, the Paymaster-General, in charge of the Bill, used these words—and I ask your Lordships carefully to note them:
  "The Government have made no reference to licensing or intoxicants; they have kept them out of the Bill, and it is better to keep them out of the Bill."
  The corollary of that statement is just this: that the door is deliberately left wide open, not only for restricted licences for liquor consumption with meals, but for full justices' licences, with cocktail bars and all the rest. Was ever a more innocent-looking formula evolved by any Government, for which one was expected to vote quite happily and not discover its ambiguity until later? Fortunately, some of us did discover it.
  My noble friend in charge of the Bill also said:
  "The Government feel that this is a case where no applications are likely to be made."
  Well, then, why provide for them? My Amendment will avoid any ambiguity on that score, for it rules out licences altogether. We fought this matter out on the Civic Restaurants Act two years ago and, thanks to the intervention of the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, the compromise to which I have already referred, restricting licences for the consumption of liquor to be consumed only with meals, was accepted by the Government. That being so, could anything be more inconsistent than the attitude of the Government in resisting just such an Amendment to this Bill? It was because of that inconsistency that I have put the present Amendment on the Paper. However, I have no wish to delay your Lordships by arguing the case all over again, and I apologise for talking at such length on the previous occasion. What I want to say is this. I am a realist, and if I cannot get a whole loaf I try to content myself as an interim appeasement of
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  hunger, with half a loaf. If, therefore, the Government upon reflection can see their way, after all, to stand by the compromise agreed to on the Civic Restaurants Act, and intimate their willingness to accept the restrictive Amendment of my noble friend Lord Llewellin when he moves it, then I shall have accomplished my end in putting this Amendment on the Paper, and I shall not be unwilling to ask your Lordships to permit me to withdraw it. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 8, line 2, after ("refreshments"), insert the said words.—(Lord Rochester.)
  LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: My Lords, in order to avoid a continuation of the debate, I can promise the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, that he wilt get his half loaf if he withdraws this Amendment.
  LORD ROCHESTER: I am obliged to the noble Lord, and I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  LORD LLEWELLIN LORD LLEWELLIN moved to add to Clause 7:
  "() A Justices' licence granted under the Licensing Acts 1910 to 1934 for the sale of intoxicating liquor in connection with the provision of facilities for obtaining meals and refreshments under this section shall only authorise the sale of such liquor for consumption with a meal and a local authority shall in carrying on any activities under this section be subject to all enactments and rules of law relating thereto including the enactments relating to the sale of intoxicating liquor in like manner as other persons carrying on the like activities."
  The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name, although I would not describe it as "half a loaf." Noble Lords who were in the House on the Report stage on the Bill will remember that we nearly had a Division on an Amendment in very similar terms. The main reason why I put down this Amendment was that it seemed to me to be absurd that a local authority, under the Civic Restaurants Act of only two years ago, if they wanted a licence to sell alcoholic liquor, should be restricted to a licence to sell it only with meals, whereas under Section 7 of this Bill when it becomes an Act they could apply to the justices for a full licence, which Would allow them,

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  as the noble Lord, Lord Rochester said, to run a cocktail bar if they wished to do so. The great thing, it seems to me, is to have consistency between the two measures. Just as we were on the point of dividing last time the noble Viscount the Leader of the House intervened and asked that a little extra time should be given. It is probably no secret that we have had discussions since them, and I would now like to thank the noble Viscount for his intervention, which I hope, when we have heard the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, will mean that Parliament is being consistent in these two matters and that this Bill can be sent back to another place without any Division in your Lordships' House. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 8, line 12, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Llewellin.)
  LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin mentioned, towards the end of the previous discussion on the Amendment now before us he agreed to withdraw the Amendment provided that consultations took place. Since then my noble friend the Leader of the House and myself have contacted my right honourable friend the Minister of Health. We did it separately and we did it jointly, and we both agreed that there was little hope of this Amendment being accepted, but my noble friend, with that persistent persuasiveness of his, suggested that we had another try. We had a further consultation with the Minister of Health, and the outlook was much more encouraging. At that point we were reinforced by the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition and the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin. After some little talk, I think perhaps due to the superior forces or due to the wisdom of the counsel given, the Minister of Health relented, and I am pleased to inform your Lordships that I can now accept the Amendment.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Bill passed and returned to the Commons.

  LEGAL AID AND SOLICITORS (SCOTLAND) BILL
  3.22 p.m.
  Amendments reported (according to Order).
  Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 13):
  THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF WORKS (LORD MORRISON): My Lords, before I move that the Bill be read a third time, I have it in. command from His Majesty to signify to the House that His Majesty, having been informed of the purpose of the Bill, gives his consent, so far as His Majesty's interest is concerned that the House shall do therein as they think fit. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a third time.
  Moved, that the Bill be now read 3a.—(Lord Morrison.)
  THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, may I be permitted to say one or two words? This Bill has had rather a stormy passage both in the country and in the House. In fact, the noble Lord, Lord Morrison, rather chided me for my moderation in dealing with it. The first reason why I have not pressed certain points more strongly is that the structure of the Bill has been selected by His Majesty's Government. To be perfectly frank, I do not like much of it, and I would like it changed. Secondly, I have not pressed certain points because it is clear that if any points had been pressed unduly there would have been difficulty in getting the Bill through by the end of this Session. I do not think that any small change could have made a great deal of difference.
  However, I do want to emphasise this. It has been thrown in our faces that certain principles of this Bill could have been objected to at an earlier date. I want to make it clear that there are features of this Bill which I view with a certain anxiety, an anxiety which I think is felt over a fairly wide circle. There is a feeling of regret that a Bill dealing with legal aid in Scotland could not have followed more closely the Morton Report. I am fortified in that view by certain remarks made by the Lord Chancellor, when he spoke of the

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  financial burden which this type of Bill may impose. I would have preferred to see a Bill on a wider basis, which would not have placed such a heavy burden on the taxpayer. I very much hope that the anxiety which one feels will not prove justified, but I do ask that there may be an end to what I may describe as some of the petulant expressions which have been made on both sides in regard to this Bill, and that those who are responsible for carrying it out will endeavour to meet the requirements of the other party as fully as they can. We wish this Bill well, even if we do not approve its structure, and we will certainly watch carefully the regulations which will have to be made under it.
  Lotto MORRISON: My Lords, in reply to the noble Earl I can only say that I am grateful to him for the helpful attitude he has adopted during the necessarily short discussions that we have had on this Bill. I appreciate his attitude very much.
  On Question, Bill read 3a with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

  MARRIED WOMEN (MAINTENANCE) BILL
  3.26 p.m.
  Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
  Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Crook.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.
  House in Committee accordingly:
  [The EARL OF DROGHEDA in the Chair]
  Clause 1 [Increase in amounts payable under Married Women (Maintenance) Acts, 1895 and 1920]:
  LORD MESTON LORD MESTON moved to add to the clause as a new subsection:
  "() For the purposes of this Act a court of summary jurisdiction shall have the same powers as the High Court in the matter of ascertaining the income of either or both the spouses."
  The noble Lord said: This matter arises in this way. In a proper case at the present time—and this will also apply when the Bill becomes law—any man may appear before a magistrates' court and have an order made against him. But
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  in practice, at the present time, the only men who appear before magistrates' courts in this connection are men whose incomes are comparatively small, and there is no difficulty in ascertaining the amount of their income. When this Bill becomes law it is likely that a number of men whose incomes are £1,000, or even £1,500, a year will appear before magistrates' courts and have orders made against them for the maintenance of their wives or their children, as the case may be. I should like to know how a magistrate is to satisfy himself as to the accuracy of the husband's income in those cases.
  I do not want to go into details but in the High Court, of course, there is a procedure by way of examination as to means, swearing affidavits and so forth, whereby the court is enabled to ascertain the incomes of the spouses with reasonable accuracy. But at the present time there is no such procedure in the magistrates' courts, and I feel that for the purposes of this Bi11 the magistrates should be given exactly the same powers as those which are accorded at the present time to the registrars of the Divorce Division of the High Court. I beg to move the Amendment.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 1, line 22, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Meston.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT JOWITT): This is a Private Member's Bill, and the Government desire that the House should have a free hand in dealing with these matters; it is not for me to attempt in any way to dictate. On the other hand, I think it would be useful if I put before the Committee the view of the Home Office, which is that we should not accept this Amendment.
  The powers of the High Court which the noble Lord who moved this Amendment has in mind are obviously the Matrimonial Causes Rules of March 25, 1947, in particular, Rules 48 and 52, Rule 48 requires the husband, in cases where alimony or maintenance of children is claimed, to file an affidavit setting out full particulars of his property and income. Similar provision, of course, is made as to the filing of an affidavit by the wife, Acre it is the wife who is served with a notice of an application for alimony or maintenance.

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  Rule 50 provides that the wife may file an affidavit in reply, and Rule 52 provides for a preliminary investigation by the registrar in the presence of the parties or their solicitors, and gives the registrar power to order the attendance of the spouses or any other person for the purpose of being examined or cross-examined, to take the oral evidence of witnesses and, at any stage of the proceedings, to order the discovery and production of any document or call for further affidavits.
  The procedure for filing affidavits is no better than the procedure in the magistrates' court, under which oral evidence of both parties can be heard as to the amount of their means. It is already a requirement of the existing law that, in fixing the amount to be paid under a maintenance order, the magistrates shall fix such amount within the prescribed maximum as the court—and here I quote:
  "shall, having regard to the means both of the husband and wife, consider reasonable."
  The provision as to the discovery of documents is no doubt useful in the type of case which comes before the High Court, but it would not be of much use in the general type of case which comes before the magistrates; and as often as not there will be no documents relating to the income of either of the parties.
  An Amendment to this clause was moved on the Committee stage in another place, to the effect that in considering the means of the husband for the purpose of making an order the court should have the right to ask for, and obtain collaboration from, official and other sources regarding the income of the husband. That Amendment was withdrawn after discussion in the course of which objection was raised to the Amendment on the ground that it would permit of the court's having the right to obtain information from the income tax authorities. It has sometimes been suggested that the magistrate should have power to require the husband to produce a certificate of his earnings from his employer, but that seems to us to be objectionable because it would disclose to the employer the man's matrimonial difficulties, and might possibly have an effect upon his employment. Since both parties are present before the magistrates, when the question
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  of their means is considered with a view to an order, any statement which is made by one of them, and which the other thinks is untrue, can be challenged there and then, and steps can be taken to call further evidence if required.
  In addition, Section 5 of the Summary Procedure (Domestic Proceedings) Act, 1937, gives power to courts in matrimonial proceedings to request a probation officer to conduct an investigation into the means of the parties to the proceedings, and to direct him to report the result of his investigation to the court. The section provides that the probation officer may either make a statement in writing, which must be read aloud in the presence of the parties, or make an oral statement to the court, and that the parties are to be given an opportunity of objecting to anything in the statement. Where the objection is made the probation officer must be required to give evidence on oath as to his investigation.
  The provisions of this section were brought to the notice of all courts of summary jurisdiction by a Home Office circular in September, 1937. It was pointed out that it is important that the courts should have the fullest possible information as to the means of the parties concerned, and that the new procedure placed in the hands of justices a valuable instrument for ensuring that orders for periodical payments are just and equitable in amount, having regard to all the circumstances. The hope was expressed that the services of probation officers would be fully utilised for this purpose. This provision of the Act of 1937 which has been commended to magistrates' courts, is sufficient to enable the necessary information to be obtained by the magistrates as to the means of the parties. Moreover—a matter of considerable importance in this class of case—it enables the information to be obtained discreetly and in a way which will not cause prejudice to either party in their employment or business. For these reasons, we advise the Committee that it is undesirable to accept this proposal to transfer to the magistrates' courts a procedure which is perfectly proper and useful in the High Court—which deals, in the vast majority of cases, with a wholly different set of circumstances.
  LORD CROOK: I should like to say a few words on behalf of the promoters

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  of the Bill. The attitude which I propose to take on these Amendments is mainly to secure the original objects of the Bill, which were simply to secure an increase to £5 in the amount of an order which may be made in favour of the woman, with an increased amount for the child. We have no desire in this Bill to make large-scale changes in the law; on such matters we are anxious to be guided by those better versed in this subject than we are. We are grateful for the advice given by the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, and are perfectly prepared to accept it; and so far as I am responsible for the Bill in this House I would ask your Lordships to accept the view which the noble and learned Viscount put forward.
  LORD MESTON: I wish to thank the Lord Chancellor for his observations. I was only trying to make a suggestion which might be helpful, but it seems to me that there are a good number of reasons why the Amendment should not he accepted, and I beg leave therefore to withdraw it.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause 1 agreed to.
  3.35 p.m.
  LORD CROOK LORD CROOK moved, after Clause 1, to insert the following new clause:
  Provisions as to separation agreements
  ".—(1) In determining for the purposes of section four of the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, whether a husband has been guilty of wilful neglect to provide reasonable maintenance for his wife or her infant children, payments made by the husband shall not be deemed to be sufficient to provide such reasonable maintenance by reason only that they are made in accordance with an agreement made between the husband and the wife before the commencement of this Act.
  (2) Where an order under paragraph (c) of section five of the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, or under section one of the Married Women (Maintenance) Act, 1920, is made in pursuance of an application under section four of the first-mentioned Act, and the husband is liable, in pursuance of any agreement, whether made before or after the commencement of this Act, to make payments to or for the benefit of the wife or any child for whose maintenance provision is made by the order, the liability of the husband tinder the agreement shall be treated as discharged to the extent of any payments made in pursuance of the order."
  The noble Lord said: I beg leave to move the Amendment standing in my
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  name on the Marshalled List. It has been put down in order to deal with an outstanding point and to remove what some people regard as a possible anomaly. The clause as it stands has been drawn by co-operation between the promoters of the Bill and the Home Office and, broadly, deals with the position of those who have made voluntary agreements. Your Lordships may know that many couples dislike the publicity involved in going to court to secure an agreement, and accordingly they enter into a voluntary agreement outside the court, either written or verbal, for an amount within the limits laid down in the present Act—or perhaps an amount in excess of that. The point that has been raised is whether the existence of these agreements may not cause the woman to lose a certain amount of the benefits which this Bill proposes to give to women in general.
  If she goes to a magistrate the plea must be that her husband is failing to maintain her, and it is not at all certain that the existence of an agreement which has been made voluntarily might not be held against her. The position is stated by my noble friend Lord Merriman in the case of Morton v. Morton (1942 All England Law Reports, page 273) from which I quote:
  "I am content to des with this case on the basis that a deed like this, providing for periodical payments, the obligation to make which has been punctually performed, is very strong evidence indeed against the complaint of wilful neglect to provide maintenance."
  In view of that decision the promoters of the Bill and the Home Office have felt that it might be difficult for the woman to go to the magistrate and say: "I am getting all I am entitled to under the agreement. I entered into with my husband, but I now ask you for more." Accordingly, the Amendment on the Paper, by the first subsection, empowers the court to look at the position as a. whole and, by the second subsection, to deal with the position which would arise if the court made an order in excess of the amount which the woman was receiving; it allows the ore to be included with the other. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  After Clause 1 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Crook.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is a question on which the Home Office

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  have no definite views, except to point out that it is a very serious matter. I should have thought that where the husband and wife have agreed as to the amount to be paid, by a voluntary agreement freely given and so forth, it is, save in the most exceptional circumstances, impossible for any court to say that the husband who has carried out literally the terms of the agreement has been wilfully neglecting to provide reasonable maintenance. The whole object of the agreement was to assess as between the parties, having regard to all the circumstances—which they know better than anybody else—what was reasonable maintenance. And though I can conceive of a case where one party is dishonestly treated, or circumstances change, yet as a general rule I should have thought that the fact that the parties had voluntarily entered into an agreement was cogent evidence to show that there was no such thing as wilful neglect.
  That difficulty, of course, would confront any woman who went to the magistrates' courts to-day and alleged that her husband was guilty of wilful neglect. It would be said: "But you entered into an agreement with him, did you not?" She would say, "Yes." They Would say, "It was a free and genuine agreement?" She would answer "Yes." She would then be asked: "And he has carried out that agreement?" She would say, "Yes." Then they would say: "Can you really say that, in that he has carried out the agreement entered into between yourselves, he has been guilty of wilful neglect?" That would be a difficult bar for her. The object of this clause, if I understand it aright—as to this clause the Home Office do not attempt to give any guidance to the House; they simply want me to point out the serious nature of it—is that it enables a woman now to go to the court and to allege wilful neglect, to allege that she should be receiving much higher payment than she is now receiving, notwithstanding the fact that there has been this voluntary agreement. That may be right; the agreement may have been come to many years ago; circumstances may be different to-day. But still the provision has the disadvantage, of course, of treating an agreement which is genuinely come to between the parties rather as if it were a scrap of paper. I
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  am not raising any objection to the clause: I merely point out these facts to the House, although it may be right and desirable to have such a clause. We do not want a woman applying to the courts necessarily to be prevented from making her claim by reason of the fact that there is such an agreement. I want your Lordships to realise, however, that this is a serious proposition which we are now discussing.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 2 [Extension of Finance Act, 1944]:
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment makes the adjustment required in Clause 2 of the Bill in consequence of the addition to the Bill at the Report stage in another place of Clause 3. Clause 2 is an income tax machinery provision. It does not affect the tax liability of either the payer or the payee of the sums payable under the relative magistrates' orders. It simply applies to the payments under the larger orders which the Bill proposes to enable mangistrates to make, a convenient income tax procedure introduced in 1944, in Section 25 of the Finance Act of that year, for the taxation of the payments that magistrates have hitherto been authorised to order. This procedure is the charging of the payments in question by direct assessment on the recipient instead of by deduction of tax by the payer at the standard rate of tax. Clause 3 enables magistrates in certain circumstances to make orders for the maintenance of children up to the attainment of twenty-one years of age. Hitherto, orders have not normally been made for payments in respect of children after they have reached sixteen years, and the provisions made in the Finance Act, 1944, were confined, as respects payments for the maintenance or education of children, to payments for children under sixteen.
  It is clearly desirable that all payments which magistrates will in future be able to order in respect of children should be within the convenient income tax procedure referred to, instead of the procedure being subject to change when the child reaches sixteen in any case where maintenance payments are ordered thereafter. This Amendment therefore makes Clause 2 applicable, in the case of payments ordered in respect of any child, to all payments up to the child's attainment

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  of the age of twenty-one. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 2, line 10, after ("section") insert ("for the words 'sixteen years of age' there were substituted the words 'twenty-one years of age'").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD CROOK: I beg leave to support this Amendment; in substance it is tine same as the Amendment to Clause 3, page 2, line 36, which I have down on the Marshalled List as my next Amendment. That was drawn by myself as an amateur draftsman. This Amendment now before your Lordships has been drawn by skilled, legal draftsmen. It achieves the same object but more easily overcomes the other difficulty by transferring Clause 2 to follow Clause 3. I beg leave to support the Amendment and, if it is carried, I propose not to move the next one standing in my name.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is a matter of drafting and arrangement. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Transfer Clause 2 to follow Clause 3.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 3 agreed to.
  Clause 4:
  Duties of collecting officer in respect of enforcement of maintenance orders
  4.—(1) Where an order made under the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, or under section five of the Licensing Act, 1902, requires that any weekly sum payable to or on behalf of a married woman shall be paid through or to an officer of any court, and the payments are at any time in arrear to an amount equal to four times the said sum, that officer shall, unless it appears to him that by reason of special circumstances it is unnecessary or inexpedient so to do, give to the married woman notice in writing stating the particulars of the arrears.
  (2) Where an order made under the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, or under section five of the Licensing Act, 1902, requires that any weekly sum payable to or on behalf of a married woman shall be paid to or Through an officer of any court, and any sums payable under the order are in arrear, that officer shall, if the married woman so requests, proceed in his name for the recovery of those sums; but the married woman at whose request the proceedings are taken shell have the same liability for all costs properly incurred in or about the proceedings as if the proceedings had been taken by her.
  LORD MESTON LORD MESTON moved, in subsection (1) to omit "by reason of special circumstances." The noble Lord said: I rise to move the Amendment standing in my name. This is a minor point, and I must not waste any of your Lordships' time over anything which may be a triviality. It appears to me desirable to leave out the reference to "special circumstances" for the simple reason that those words in themselves generally start an argument as to what is or is not a "special circumstance." I feel that the subsection would read far better and far simpler if these words were left out. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 2, line 43, leave out from ("that") to ("it") in line 44.—(Lord Meston.)
  LORD CROOK: I hope the noble Lord will agree to withdraw this Amendment. The words are not put in accidentally or merely trivially. They were put in deliberately by those originally handling the Bill in another place because, in the course of some of the considerations, they paid regard to the fact that, however efficient the majority of our magistrates' courts are—and we all want to pay tribute to their efficiency in general—there are a limited number of less well-run courts who employ officers of somewhat less efficiency than others—that is to say, officers who may from time to time take the line of least resistance in undertaking certain of their duties. It is to guard against those limited cases that we have the insertion of these words which make the duties rather less automatic. When an officer realises that he can act only "by reason of special circumstances," the insertion of these words will make him pause and think. In those circumstances, I hope that the noble Lord will see his way to withdraw his Amendment.
  LORD MESTON: I thank the noble Lord for his explanation. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  LORD CROOK LORD CROOK moved, in subsection (2) after "requests" to insert:
  "and unless it appears to him that it is unreasonable in the circumstances so to do."
  The noble Lord said: This Amendment is put down to deal with another point of criticism which was made in the course of the debate in another place, where attention was called to the mandatory nature of the clause. Some worry was

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  expressed as to the opportunities that would be afforded to a vindictive wife to make a wrongful use of the mandatory nature of the clause. In the extreme case—the example quoted in another place was where there was another woman in the case—the woman in receipt of the allowance might be only too ready to bring her husband to court on an arrears action. Your Lordships, so many of whom are members of the magisterial bench, appreciate that that would mean that the husband could be proceeded against by the wife. He would be brought up before the court. He might have to be away from work; it might cost him his job, and so on. Therefore, subject to what the Home Office may say, it seems that this is a course which should be taken only when it is essential. The clause as redrafted makes the collecting officer the judge of the situation. On the other hand, the woman must not be deprived of her normal rights, and the next Amendment would give her the normal right, which she ought to have, to proceed in her own name. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 3, line 6, at end insert the said words.—(Lord Crook.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The Home Office think this is a good Amendment and I should advise the Committee to accept it. It was pointed out in the House of Commons that Clause 4 (2) as it stands makes it mandatory on the collecting officer to take proceedings for the recovery of arrears at the request of the married woman, and that this gives complete latitude to a vindictive woman to bring her husband up at frequent intervals—from week to week if she likes. The provision in the subsection rendering her liable for costs is really no safeguard, because the costs would be an amount merely of 2s. for the summons. In order to provide a safeguard against this abuse of the provisions of the subsection, the Amendment gives the collecting officer a discretion by providing, in effect, that he need not proceed on the woman's request if it appears to him that it is unreasonable in the circumstances so to do. This, coupled with the next Amendment, seems to us to be the right lines on which to tackle this problem.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD CROOK: This is consequential, as indicated. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 3, line 11, at end insert—
  "(3) Nothing in the last foregoing subsection shall affect any right of a married woman to proceed in her own name for the recovery of sums payable under any such order as is mentioned in that subsection."—(Lord Crook.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 4, as amended, agreed to.
  Clauses 5 and 6 agreed to.
  Clause 7:
  Appeals
  7.—(1) An appeal shall lie to the court of quarter sessions in manner provided by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts from any order made by a court of summary jurisdiction under the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, or under section five of the Licensing Act, 1902, from the revocation, revival or variation by a court of summary jurisdiction of such an order or from any refusal by a court of summary jurisdiction to make, revoke, revive or vary such an order.
  (2) Section eleven of the said Act of 1895 (which provides for appeals to the High Court) is hereby repealed, and accordingly the Summary Jurisdiction (Appeals) Act, 1857, and section thirty-three of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (which provide for the statement of cases on points of law by courts of summary jurisdiction), shall apply in relation to any such proceeding as is mentioned in subsection (1) of this section.
  LORD MESTON: I am not guilty of the first Amendment on page 3 of the Marshalled List—namely, the Amendment to page 3, line 37. I do not know how it appears in my name. I never wrote it. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Crook, might explain it. But, with my noble friend, Lord Schuster, I am responsible for the Amendment which follows it, to leave out Clause 7, and I formally beg leave to move that Amendment.
  Amendment moved—
  Leave out Clause 7.—(Lord Meston.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I confess that I had thought this a most difficult point. I think there is a danger in these Private Members' Bills, particularly when we are rather pressed for time, as we often are just before a Recess, that we may pass or refuse to pass without adequate consideration a particular clause which, for better or for worse, may have a great effect on the administration of law in this country. I confess that I think Clause 7 in the controversy that rages is just such a clause, and I would

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  very much like to air this matter before the Committee. Let me say at once that I am not going to oppose the deletion of Clause 7, but I would like to put to the Committee the difficulties which I have felt about this clause. To-day magistrates' courts are given power to award amounts up to £2 and 10s. respectively and there is an appeal which, by a matter of rules, I think, goes to the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division. That court, as a result of its administration, has been able to bring about a very considerable degree of uniformity and certainty in the administration of this difficult branch of the law. The problem now arises, when we move from £2 to £5 and from 10s. to 20s. or 30s. as the case may be, whether the old machinery, which in my belief worked well in the past, is still satisfactory.
  Let us see what the position is. At the present time, if any individual is brought before the magistrates for careless driving and fined 40s., he has the absolute right to go to quarter sessions. What happens at quarter sessions is, of course, a complete re-hearing of his case. Unless we introduce something like Clause 7 into this Bill, a man who is ordered to pay £5 a week to his wife and a sum of 20s. or 30s. for each of his children until they are twenty-one, has no right whatever to go to quarter sessions to obtain a re-hearing. I must point out that the appeal which takes place to the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division is a very different thing from a re-hearing. Indeed, an appeal to that Division stands, to my mind, halfway between what I might call a "case stated," which is a very narrow position in which to put a court and in which they can deal only with the actual point of law emerging on the case stated. But the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, like any court of appeal, have to be satisfied that there is evidence on both sides. It is true that they can draw inferences, but so long as there is nothing wrong on the face of the thing with the evidence given on both sides, they do not arrogate to themselves the position of the court below and do not attempt to hold a re-hearing.
  I say at once that it is a very difficult question. Ought we now to introduce to magistrates' courts, without the chance of a re-hearing by quarter sessions, this enlarged and increased jurisdiction? I take this view about the matter. This
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  is a Private Member's Bill, and I cannot think it right that we should use the vehicle of a Private Member's Bill to introduce changes which may be highly controversial, as I am sure this change would be. Therefore, I propose to advise the Committee to accept the Amendment which the noble Lord has moved to leave out Cause 7; but, on the other hand, I do not conceal from the Committee that this is a matter which has given me considerable anxiety. I am anxious to know whether I should not have done better to advise the Committee, whilst retaining the appeal as it exists to-day from the magistrates, to give an alternative appeal to quarter sessions and to have a similar appeal from quarter sessions as there is from petty sessions. That, of course, means that one would add very considerably to the expense of litigation.
  I understand that the representatives of quarter sessions who have met and have considered the matter are anxious that this responsibility shall not be transferred to them. It may have the effect of interfering considerably with their business. No one knows to what extent appeals would be brought. All I will say, therefore, is that while advising the Committee to accept this Amendment and not on this occasion to make this alteration, I think it is a matter which we should keep most carefully under review, in order that we may see whether the working of the Act as it is to-day does or does not produce possible hardship and injustice. Therefore, I advise the Committee to accept this Amendment, deleting Clause 7 from the Bill; and at the same time I shall ask the President of the Divorce Division to help me with his observations in the future as to how the scheme is working under the new and enlarged jurisdiction, so that we may consider whether we ought to make some such change by a Public Bill as was proposed by Clause 7.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: May I say in a single sentence that the Lord Chancellor asked me to consider this difficult question, and apart from what I said on Second Reading I have taken particular interest in what he has now advised us to do. I have no doubt whatever that the advice he has given is wise, and I have no doubt about the position as he has stated it.
  LORD SCHUSTER: As my name follows that of my noble friend, Lord Meston, in proposing the Amendment to leave out Clause 7, may I express my gratitude to the Lord Chancellor for the advice he has given to the Committee, and say in a word that, while we greatly wish Clause 7 to disappear, I myself feel the weight of the argument which he has addressed to the Committee on the subject and the difficulty in which he finds himself. But, for the moment, we are grateful to him for the action which he has taken.
  LORD CROOK: May I on behalf of those responsible for the Bill say, as I tried to indicate in opening, that we fully recognise that the original intentions of this Bill are what really matter? On the other hand, those responsible are also very conscious of the problem posed by Clause 7, to which the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack has just addressed himself. We are greatly obliged to him; we hope that he and those associated with him will look into the problem thoroughly, and will give us the benefit of a Public Bill, for we quite realise that a Private Member's Bill ought not to be used in this way if it can be avoided.
  LORD MESTON: I thank the noble and learned Viscount for accepting this Amendment.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Remaining clause agreed to.
  House resumed.
  Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 13) Bill reported with Amendments; Bill read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
  LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, before the House adjourns during pleasure until six o'clock, I have to announce that the formal meeting to-morrow will take place at eleven-thirty.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, I take it that on our resumption after the adjournment, the Committee stage of the Adoption of Children Bill will be taken at once.
  LORD SHEPHERD: That is right.
  [The Sitting was suspended at four minutes past four o'clock and resumed at six o'clock.]

  ADOPTION OF CHILDREN BILL
  6.0 p.m.
  Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
  Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Viscount Simon.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.
  House in Committee accordingly:
  [The EARL OF DROGHEDA in the Chair]
  Clause 1:
  Scope of power to make adoption orders
  1.—(1) It is hereby declared that the power to make adoption orders conferred by the Adoption of Children Act, 1926 (hereinafter referred to as "the principal Act"), includes and has always included power to make an adoption order authorising the adoption of an illegitimate infant by the mother or natural father of the infant, either alone or jointly with the spouse of the mother or natural father.
  VISCOUNT SIMON VISCOUNT SIMON moved, in subsection (1) to omit all words from and including "illegitimate" down to the end of the subsection, and to insert:
  "infant by the mother or father or natural father of the infant, either alone or jointly with her or his spouse, in any case where the adopter or, as the case may be, either of the joint adopters has not, in relation to the infant, all the rights, duties, obligations and liabilities of the parent of a legitimate infant."
  The noble and learned Viscount said: The Marshalled List of Amendments to be moved in Committee may look a little formidable, but I think it will be found that perhaps there are only two really serious points which the Committee will wish to consider in detail: the other matters are really matters of improved drafting. I am glad that indication has been given that we are taking only the Committee stage to-day, because we shall have an opportunity of looking at the Bill reprinted, if we alter it in Committee, before we give a final decision.
  This Amendment is nothing more than an expression in better form of what is desired, which is to remove the doubt at present existing as to whether the mother or the person whom I may call the natural father of an illegitimate child can adopt it. Those who are acquainted with this corner of the law will know that

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  the mother of an illegitimate child has not all the rights over it which attach to the father of a legitimate child. Cases have arisen where it has been thought desirable that the natural mother of such an infant should take proceedings to obtain an order from a court to make it her adopted child in the fullest sense and to establish the relationship between herself and the infant which would exist if the child had been born in lawful wedlock. By inserting words to allow a mother or natural father of an illegitimate child to adopt it the draftsman was a little afraid he might throw doubt on whether the mother or father of a legitimate child can adopt it. That also is possible in certain circumstances. There might be the case of a child which is the subject of an adoption order, and, therefore, part of the family of the adopter, which subsequently, for good reason and with the consent of everybody concerned, returns to the family from which it originally came, These are little more than formal matters. I have looked at the amended words with care, and I had the great advantage of a most careful check by the accomplished draftsman that the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor was good enough to put at my disposal. I am certain that this Amendment should he made, though in fact it is little more than formal. I beg to Move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 1, line 9, leave out from ("an") to end of line 11, and insert the said new words.—(Viscount Simon.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble and learned Viscount has been in touch with the Parliamentary draftsman and, at my suggestion, with the Home Office, and is better able than I am to say what their views are. I have had them only indirectly and he has had them face to face. I am prepared to accept this Amendment.
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: The Amendment is perfectly right in substance, but it is difficult to understand. More than one noble Lord to-day has come up to me and said, "Why say 'or father or natural father'?" They have been considering the case of the illegitimate child. I put it to the noble and learned Viscount, would it not be well, in so intimate a kind of legislation as this, even
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  at the expense of a few more words, to use language which nobody can doubt? It seems to me that what is wanted to make the matter clear are some words like these:
  "or mother or father of an infant being illegitimate or the mother or father of a legitimate child."
  It is a small alteration, but it expresses what I myself find are difficult words to understand.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: I thank the noble and learned Viscount. Anything he suggests on tills sort of subject one wishes to consider with care. If he will agree that we put in this Amendment as I have moved it, I will undertake to look into it further and, if he will allow me, to confer with him on the subject.
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I could not suggest anything more than that.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 2 [Restrictions on making of adoption orders]:
  VISNOUNT SIMON: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 2, line 3, after ("or") insert ("father or").—(Viscount Simon.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 3:
  Consent to adoption
  (2) Any consent required by this section for the making of an adoption order may be given whether or not an application for such an order is pending and may be given either generally in respect of the adoption of the infant or only in respect of the adoption of the infant by a specified person; and where any such consent is given generally as aforesaid by any person and is subsequently withdrawn, after the making of an application for an adoption order, on the ground only that he does not know the identity of the proposed adopter, his consent shall be deemed for the purposes of the last foregoing subsection to be unreasonably withheld.
  VISCOUNT SIMON VISCOUNT SIMON moved, in subsection (2) to omit all words from the commencement down to "on the ground only" and to insert:
  "Subject to the following provisions of this section, any consent required by this section for the making of an adoption order may be given either before or after an application has

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  been made for the order; but the consent of the mother of the infant shall be of no effect for the purposes of this section if given earlier than six weeks after the birth of the infant.
  () Any consent given for the purposes of this section after the making of an application for an adoption order may be given (subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified therein with respect to the religious persuasion in which the infant is to be brought up) in respect of any order which may he made in pursuance of the application, and shall be valid notwithstanding that the identity of the applicant is not specified in the consent or known to the consenting party; and where a consent so given by any person is subsequently withdrawn."
  The noble Viscount said: This is a clause which undoubtedly deserves careful consideration. It is drafted in a form slightly different from the form in the Bill, and perhaps I may be allowed to say, especially after what my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor has just observed, that a great deal of pains have been taken by the draftsman, by representatives of the approved societies and of the London County Council, who sent two gentlemen to see me, and, may I add, by myself, to put it in a form which may be right. I think I may best serve the House if I make a short statement, which I trust will be worth considering when it appears in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
  Clause 3, deals with consents which are required as conditions of making adoption orders. The clause begins:
  "An adoption order shall not be made except with the consent…"
  Once an adoption order is made, whether by a juvenile court, which is much the commonest case, or by a county court, or occasionally by the High Court, the infant passes irrevocably into the family of the adopter. After that, neither the adopter nor the natural mother can revoke what has been done; that is the final step. As I conceive it—and, indeed, the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor expressed the same thought on Second Reading—what we are endeavouring to do by this Bill is to improve the law so as to make the transfer of such as infant a real transfer to the new family. That is the nature of the consent with which Clause 3 is dealing.
  But a certain confusion has arisen in some minds because of a different kind
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  of consent—what I may perhaps call an assent—which is not the consent needed for the adoption order. In practice, when a child is put in the hands of a would-be adopter—which as your Lordships will see from Clause 5 must be for at least three months before the adoption order is made—there is a preliminary assent or agreement which is sought and is obtained—namely, an assent from the natural mother. Of course, people who would like to adopt a child and are prepared to welcome it and make it part of their own home would not be willing to do so unless they were at least assured that before the child was put into their care the natural mother was willing that that should be done. That is really a preliminary and informal expression of consent, but it is not the consent that is dealt with in Clause 3 of the Bill, as your Lordships will see if you look at subsection (1).
  I will give two examples, because I have been at some pains to understand the way in which the thing really works. Yesterday I had the advantage of receiving two officials of the London County Council, specially detailed to see me because they wanted to be sure that the Bill in this respect was right. They went away quite satisfied. They explained to me that the London County Council would not place a child that is being taken care of with would-be adopters without first ascertaining that the mother of the child—if she were available—wished her child to be adopted. The London County Council authorities—to take that example, which is a very good one—ask the mother to give her written consent to what I may call a placing. If she says: "I do not want my child adopted," they will not offer the child to anybody to take into their home to see if it will lead to an adoption. If she says: "Yes; I think my child is a child that ought to be adopted, and I should like it to be adopted," and she signs the form which they have, which indicates that wish, then they feel they can put the child in the hands of the would-be adopter for the purpose of seeing whether they have made a good arrangement. Those two consents, as your Lordships see, are quite different things. It is only the consent which is needed for an adoption order to be made that is dealt with in this clause.
  I said I would give two examples. That is the London County Council example. I will now take the practice of the adoption societies, which I have been at pains to ascertain with the help of some of the ladies and others who are devoted to this work. A registered adoption society is actually required by the present law—by regulations made under Section 4 of the Act of 1939—before it places the child under the care of people who might like to adopt it, to explain to the mother the effect of adoption, to explain to her what would be the result if it led to the making of an adoption order, arid to get from her a signed document showing that she understands what adoption is and that she wishes her child to be placed in the care of such a would-be adopter. Your Lordships therefore see that these preliminary arrangements—this preliminary assent—go very far to settling the whole matter, if the thing is wisely handled. Yet, when the time comes for the proposed adopter to go to the court and say: "I apply for an adoption order, the effect of which will he to move this child into my family for all purposes," then there has to be the written consent such as is required under Clause 3. That is the way in which it works. If I have made it plain to your Lordships, you will see that it is necessary that it should work in that way.
  What the amended clause proposes is that the written assent which should be given for the purposes of the adoption order may be of one of two kinds. It may be the mother's consent that the named applicant—the individual whom she knows, because she has been given his name and address—should adopt the child in the fullest sense of the word under the adoption order. But there is a second alternative which needs to be carefully considered. For the purposes of the adoption order, the consent may also be the mother's consent that the order may be made without her naming the particular adopter. One is what may be called a particular consent, and the other is a general consent. It is highly desirable in most cases that the natural mother should not know who the adopter is, or where to find the adopter, once the adoption order is made. We are doing this primarily in the interests of the child; nothing conies in front of that. All experience goes to show, and the
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  advice I have received from all quarters is, that as a rule it is a great advantage if the natural mother, who feels that she should surrender her child to an adopter, does not know who the person is. It is better for the child. better for the mother and better for everybody.
  It is not always so, because I happen to know that there are parts of the country where there may be two workmen's families living in the same street, one of which is blessed with nine or ten children and the other of which is childless. It may be that the childless couple will openly say to their neighbours: "We should like to adopt such and such a child of yours." The neighbours may then say: "We should like that to be so." In that case, of course, they would know who was adopting the child, and you would not dream of asking for what I may call a general form of consent. But there are cases where it is needed, and it greatly helps the attainment of this most important result: that the natural mother, when she finally gives up her child, should feel that she has no further contact with it. However, if that is to be done, it is necessary to attach strict conditions, because if strict conditions are not attached to what I may call a general consent, then the natural mother may in some cases be tempted recklessly to sign away her responsibilities without caring what happens. That is a bad thing all round, and none of us would wish to encourage that sort of mother.
  Therefore, in this amended clause—which is far from being all my work, but is the result of a great deal of consultation with people who have considered the subject—two conditions are attached. The first is a condition which applies both to the consent for a particular person to adopt and also to the general consent. It is a provision which is quite new. For either consent to be valid it must be made before a justice of the peace, dated on the date at which the consent is so signed, and it must be made not earlier than six weeks after the mother's confinement. Your Lordships appreciate the reason—I mentioned it on Second Reading. A girl who finds she is going to have a baby, especially if she is not married, is often thrown into the greatest sense of distraction about what is to become of her. Will her people disown her? Will she lose her job?

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  Very often, before the child is born there is a strong temptation for her to feel: "After all, the great thing is to get rid of my baby." Of course, she cannot give a valid consent until she actually becomes a parent, but I am sorry to say that there have been cases where a form has been signed by the girl in her distracted state, before the baby is born, and such a form of consent might be used after the baby is born.
  I submit to the Committee that it is most important—and I think everybody who has considered this subject agrees—to lay down that no consent given by the mother should be valid unless the child has been born, and unless six weeks have elapsed, because in the week or two after confinement many a young mother is not master of her judgment. With regard to what I have called the general consent—that the child may be the subject of an adoption order so far as the natural mother is concerned, though she does not know the name of the person who is to adopt it—what is suggested here is that a second condition ought also to be fulfilled. The mother's consent may be subject to a condition with respect to the religious persuasion in which the infant is to be brought up (which seems to be plainly right); and, further, a general consent is not to be given save in respect of an application which is pending before the court. Otherwise, this matter may be floating about for a long time, and the consent is not given sufficiently with reference to an application which has been made.
  I have occupied rather a long time on this Amendment because I know that many of your Lordships are keenly interested in the question. It is very important that we decide this point correctly. I hope that the Committee will agree that it is right to put in this Amendment, and I should be grateful if noble Lords would study what I have put down—I have prepared my Amendment with as much care as I can, and I believe it to be watertight. I have had the advantage of discussing it with many people, including Home Office representatives, and subject always of course to further consideration (which I have no doubt some would like to give it) I respectfully suggest that this is the right way to deal with this matter. I believe that it will bring about a substantial
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  improvement in the law. It will stop cases which are quite shocking, where a girl may lightheartedly give her signature before she has had time to reflect. It is only after the birth of the child that the maternal instinct may arise, and she must be given time to think what is meant by giving up that child. On the other hand, the Amendment helps the important object that once the adoption order is made the natural mother is parted from the child and does not haunt the home of the adopters who have taken over the responsibility and added the child to their own family. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 2, line 21, leave out from beginning to ("on") in line 28 and insert the said new words.—(Viscount Simon.)
  6.25 p.m.
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I have only one suggestion to make for the consideration of my noble and learned friend; otherwise, so far as I understand them, I entirely agree with the proposals contained in the Amendment. The suggestion is with regard to the question of religious persuasion, which very much interested the House when this matter was before us at an earlier stage. In the ordinary case there would be nobody to see that the provision as to the religious persuasion designated by the parent as a condition of the adoption was being properly carried out. There is a great difficulty, because the real mother has lost sight of her child altogether. What I would suggest is this: that there should be added further words to say that if the adopting person is of a religious persuasion different from that suggested by the mother of the child, the adopting person shall be required at the time to give an undertaking so far as possible to carry out the condition which has been made. That would make some difference, because an undertaking is regarded as binding. This particular clause does not possess an undertaking at all. I am only putting this forward for the consideration of my noble and learned friend; otherwise I have no objection to the suggested Amendment.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF SHEFFIELD: I should like to take this opportunity of saying from these Benches how grateful we are to the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, for the trouble he has taken in this matter in consulting all the various people concerned with this problem.

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  We are grateful for the form which this Amendment takes. We particularly approve the emphasis on a lapse of six weeks after the birth before the mother makes a decision in the matter. As the noble and learned Viscount said, very often the maternity instinct is aroused after the birth of the child. We are also anxious that so far as possible the mother's wishes with regard to religious persuasion should be met. I do not know whether the point just made by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Maugham, could be considered. In a sense, that would strengthen the position, from our point of view. But I rise merely to say that we approve the Amendment and are most grateful.
  6.28 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I confess that find this a very difficult clause to understand, Indeed, I had not really understood it at all until the noble and learned Viscount gave his very clear explanation of it. I think I may understand it better when I have had a chance of reading the Bill quietly and carefully with these new words in it, but even now I confess that I am a little puzzled—no doubt from lack of knowledge of the subject. I would like to consider this for a moment. Clause 3 deals, of course, with consent to adoption. We are now told, if I read the first limb of the Amendment correctly, that consent to adoption may be given before or after an application has been made. That is the same consent, if I understand it aright, as is dealt with in subsection (1) of Clause 3. The consent may not be given within the six weeks and I entirely agree with the right reverend Prelate that that safeguard is most valuable. Such a consent will be a real one; any consent given in less than six weeks would be a nullity.
  Let us consider this case. Supposing the parent gives the consent two months after the birth—which is out of the six-weeks period—what happens? Under Clause 5, to which we are coming in a moment, an adoption order shall not be made in the case of any infant unless the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) have been fulfilled. But that clause, as drafted, says nothing about any consent. Such consent as is there necessary is to be derived from the earlier Act. Section 3 of that Act provides that before making an adoption order the court should be
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  satisfied that every person whose consent is necessary has consented. I want to try to get my mind clear on this point. When the court comes to make an order under Clause 5—the child having been for three consecutive months in the custody of the adopting parents—and finds that the adopting parents are proper people, has the court at that stage to be satisfied that the natural parent is then consenting? Or is it enough for the court that the parent had consented two months after the birth of the child? The Act seems to me at present to be ambiguous, and I think on this issue there a rises a very important question. It is a question on which I have no definite views, because I have not sufficient knowledge of the matter. I do not know whether it is right or not, but, of course, the longer the power of the natural parent to withdraw consent is extended the more uncertain becomes the tenure, so to speak, of the adopting parents. It seems to me—though, as I say, I hake not formed a definite view—that that is a matter of the first moment.
  In this Bill, so far as we can, I think we ought to make it quite plain whether or not the court, when it comes to operate after the conditions of Clause 5 have been complied with, must be satisfied that at this moment of time the parent is still in a consenting mood—whether consent still operates—or whether it is enough to say, "The parent did consent; here it is in writing, signed by a justice of the peace, given two months after the birth of the child." I do not think the Act of 1926 is entirely clear on this point; the matter is left in a rather ambiguous state. I am not saying this by way of criticism, but simply that the point may be considered because it is one of great importance.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: I am greatly obliged to the noble and learned Viscount. He has put with admirable clearness a point which does arise here. I also have been concerned to find out how that matter stood. There are just one or two things which perhaps I may be permitted to mention, though I appreciate that the noble and learned Viscount is not opposing the Amendment. The first point is this. Under the law as it stands, the Adoption of Children Act, 1926, there are forms which are made under the authority of the Lord Chancellor.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I ought to know about them, but I do not.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: I should be surprised if any Lord Chancellor knew all about every form he had authorised—let alone forms authorised by a predecessor. The form of application for an adoption order states, first, that the parents of the child now reside at such-and-such an address; and then it goes on: "Their written consent to the making of the adoption order is appended hereto." The actual practice—at any rate in the county courts; it is not quite the same in other courts—is for the written consent to be appended. I conceive that the court which has a discretion to make the order will be to some extent guided by how long ago consent was given; whether consent had been obtained in the circumstances which the Lord Chancellor mentioned, and whether reasonable expedition had been used. I think they would be entitled to presume, unless there were evidence to the contrary, that the mother had not changed her mind within a short interval. But after a longer interval the court could say, "We should like to be more sure than we are."
  Sometimes there arises a case in which the mother comes before the court and gives her assent in the face of the court. Then the welfare authority—which I am glad to say we now have in every local area—are, by the very terms of this Bill, required to regard it as a duty to notice that there is a child in the hands of people who propose adopting it. They have the fullest opportunity to discharge faithfully that duty of finding out what the circumstances are. It is sometimes the case that a woman genuinely consents to her child being adopted and to herself being treated as having finally and irrevocably signed away all interest in the child, either at that moment or within a very short time afterwards. But cases have arisen where the mother, in her distress, has signed away the child, and then the father of the child has turned up and said to the woman, "I never knew that you were in this plight. I love you, and I want to marry you. Will you marry me?" If these two parties then marry, by that merciful provision which recently became law the child born of these two before the marriage becomes their legitimate child. Therefore, I could never consent to depriving the mother completely
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  of the opportunity of changing her mind within a certain period. Once the adoption order is made, it is a different matter. If the adopting parents make application for an order as soon as the law allows—that is to say, three months after they have had the custody of the child—the order would presumably be made. I think that principle will, to a large extent, be found to be observed in the present Amendment. I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack for his suggestion.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: This is a drafting Amendment. Perhaps I may be allowed to draw your Lordships' attention to a misprint in the first line of the Amendment; the word "section" should be "subsection." I beg to move the Amendment in that form.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 2, line 30, leave out ("the last foregoing subsection") and insert ("this section.")—(Viscount Simon.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  6.39 p.m.
  VISCOUNT SIMON VISCOUNT SIMON had given notice of an Amendment, after subsection (2) to insert as a new subsection:
  "() Provision shall be made by rules under section eight of the principal Act for securing that any consent given for the purposes of this section otherwise than before the court which makes an adoption order shall be given in writing, in such form as may be prescribed by the rules, and signed, upon the date upon which it purports to be given, in the presence of a justice of the peace."
  The noble Viscount said: This is a very important Amendment, as the Lord Chancellor has said, and I think it will be generally accepted. The mother is not to be treated as giving a valid consent unless it has been made before a justice of the peace and signed on the date on which it purports to be given. The Amendment as at present printed says:
  "Provision shall be made by rules under section eight of the principal Act for securing that any consent given for the purposes of this section otherwise than before the court …"
  and so on. One of the consents sometimes needed is the consent of the local authority, and I think it must be made plain that here "consent" refers to consent by the mother of the infant. With the Committee's permission I would like to

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  move the Amendment in a slightly different form, including, after "consent given" the words:
  "by the mother of the infant."
  The London County Council themselves for certain purposes by Statute take the place of the parent. The London County Council usually execute these things under seal. It is absurd, of course, to say that they must also go before a justice of the peace. We really mean that the consent of the mother should be given in this case. I beg to move my Amendment in the amended form, which I think your Lordships will agree is right.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 2, line 31, at end insert—
  "() Provision shall be made by rules under section eight of the principal Act for securing that any consent given by the mother of the infant for the purposes of this section otherwise than before the court which makes an adoption order shall be given in writing, in such form as may be prescribed by the rules, and signed, upon the date upon which it purports to be given, in the presence of a justice of the peace."—(Viscount Simon.)
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Would there be anybody in loco parentis? If the mother had died, it might be the aunt. The person needed is someone in the position of the mother?
  VISCOUNT SIMON: Yes. May I just consult the draftsmen further about that? It is apparently connected with the importance of the mother, who has been through the pangs of childbirth, actually making a true decision formally before a justice of the peace, before she signs a piece of paper. I agree it would be worth considering in relation to the cases of other individuals. May I look at it and consult my advisers?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Let us take this Amendment in its amended form now, and then let us consider whether that is quite right.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD DARWEN LORD DARWEN moved, after subsection (2) to insert:
  ("(3) A consent given for the purposes of this section shall not be withdrawn after the expiration of six weeks from the date on which it is given.")
  The noble Lord said: In moving this Amendment, I recognise clearly that it deals with an extremely difficult question. We have to consider, first of all, the
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  mother, the strain that she has gone through and the probability, as the noble and learned Viscount has suggested, of changes occurring in her situation which will make her wish to withdraw her consent; and yet we have also to consider the position of the adopters. I think it is entirely a question of trying to do the best we can to hold the balance between the two.
  I am not wedded to the words of this Amendment; nor am I wedded to the length of time stated. What I feel is important is that there should be a definite term to the suspense which is necessarily hanging over the adopters. The period that it takes to make order may vary from four months, say, to almost any length of time. There have been cases where the adopters have been held up over a very long perioi—I had one such case only yesterday, which had occasioned something very near to a nervous breakdown on the part of the woman concerned. It hung over her for six months beyond the three months' period as to whether or not this child, which had found its way into her heart, was to he torn from her. I think we have to consider the adopters. I feel it is important that there should be a definite period in which the mother has power still to withdraw her consent. While I feel there are great difficulties in the way, I hope the Committee will agree that there should be such a definite limit to that period of suspense on the part of the adopters. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 2, line 31, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Darwen.)
  VISCOUNT SIMON: The noble Lord has raised a very important question. If I may say so, he has done so in a most admirable way, because he has recognised that we have here to try to reconcile considerations on either side. I, too, have thought a great deal about this, and have consulted those who have helped me. There is just one thing which I venture to think the noble Lord has not mentioned, and it of value. By Clause 5 the infant must have been continuously in the care and possession of what I will call the would-be adopter for three months preceding the application for the adoption order. That is plainly right, because it means, amongst other

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  things, that during that experimental period the would-be adopter can reject the child and send the child back. There have been cases I have heard of in which the child has turned out to be, for some reason or other, wholly unsatisfactory—perhaps showing signs of lunacy or some other serious defect—and beyond any question the good people who wanted to adopt the child are certainly entitled to say: "We must return this child." They may do so during this period of three months which is necessary in the experimental period.
  On the other hand, it is for the adopter to apply for an adoption order. The noble Lord said that there were chances and changes about these things. There always are. The fact is that if, after three months of the care of the child, the adopters really desire to have the child into their home as an adopted child by an adoption order, they have only to apply to have an adoption order made. Normally, the adoption order will be made and from that moment the natural mother has no right whatever to claim the child back. The case that the noble Lord mentions is undoubtedly one that does arise and it is a most distressing case. Childless people may get a baby in their care and decide that they would like to keep it; they grow desperately fond of it, and yet there is a period when it may be taken back. That is also the period when they may reject it.
  It has been pointed out to me by the Home Office that, if we do say that the natural mother is debarred from claiming the child back at a moment when the would-be adopters can reject it, what is to happen to the child? It will simply come on the rates, because the mother cannot claim it back. Nobody wants to increase the number of children in that most unhappy state. Therefore, those who have helped me about this have thought this question over very carefully, and their advice to me is—and I must say I see the force of it—that if this matter is well handled by the adoption societies, or by a great authority like the London County Council, they never attempt to do this without carefully advising the mother and assuring her of the good home to which the child has gone; and in effect they carry the day. Rarely does the mother claim the child back.
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  But our case is where the child does not satisfy, as I instanced just now. Therefore, while I will most gladly consider further whether anything should be done, I hope my noble friend will realise that these are important considerations which must also be met. I ask him to withdraw his Amendment.
  LORD DARWEN: I am much obliged to the noble and learned Viscount. I hope that the matter will be further considered before the next stage of the Bill, because I think it is very important. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause 3, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 4 agreed to.
  Clause 5:
  VISCOUNT SIMON: This is a formal and obvious provision. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 3, line 27, at end insert—
  ("() Any notice under this section may be served by post.")—(Viscount Simon.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 5, as amended, agreed to.
  Clauses 6 to 8 agreed to.
  Clause 9 [Effects of adoption orders in relation to intestacy of adopters and adopted persons]:
  6.51 p.m.
  VISCOUNT SIMON VISCOUNT SIMON moved to delete Clause 9 and to insert two new clauses dealing with the treatment of adopted persons as children of the adopters for purposes of intestacies, wills and settlements. The noble and learned Viscount said: This is the other point of substantial importance in the Bill, and though the clause printed on the Marshalled List may look formidable the draftsman has prefaced it by a statement of the sort I very much like in legislation, which explains what it is all about. You will observe that the first subsection says this:
  "The provisions of this and the next following section shall have effect for securing that adopted persons are treated as children of the adopters for the purposes of the devolution or disposal of real and personal property."
  As the Bill left the Commons, a provision to this effect had already been included, but it dealt only with the case of intestacy—that is to say, if a man and his wife had adopted a child and added it to

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  their family, and then the man died intestate and subsequently his wife dies and the property goes to his children, the word "children" in such a case would include the adopted child. At this moment that is not so, and I am told that there are people who made wills or believed in other ways that their property would go to the adopted child, share and share alike, together with their own children. That is not so at all. I do not feel any doubt that what the other place did about intestacy was right. But if we are really going to say that once the child has been adopted under an adoption order and it has been transferred to the new family, the original, natural mother passes out of the case, then there is a very strong argument for saying that the principle that "children" includes an adopted child should apply not only in the case of intestacy but also in the case of wills made by the adopter after the date of the adoption.
  Once you come to put it down on paper it has a very elaborate air, but I can only say that to the best of my understanding it is well done here. Subsection (2) deals with intestacy in these words:
  "Where, at any time of the making of an adoption order the adopter or the adopted person or any other person dies intestate in respect of any real or personal property"
  then the adopted child is to be treated as a child born in wedlock. Then comes a more complicated matter. Subsection (3) says this:
  "In any disposition of real or personal property made, whether by instrument inter vivos or by will (including codicil), after the date of the adoption order"—
  then "children" in the document include the adopted child. In the same way we must make it work that way round if the will is the will not of the adopter but of the mother who has given up the child. Her will, of course, will not confer her property on the child with whom she has parted. You cannot give the child the benefit of a claim on both funds.
  Subsection (4) is one of some interest to the Committee because there are cases in which property is attached to a dignity. No one suggests that because a man has adopted a child, property which is essentially attached to the dignity should go Ito the adopted child, any more than that if any of your Lordships had an
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  adopted child and an only child, the adopted child would, by heredity, become a member of your Lordships' House. That is not suggested. Subsection (4) deals with that point. I think the rest of the clause is intelligible, and the details are more particularly worked out in Clause 10, which I shall move formally because it all goes together, and I think it will be found that the way in which it is expressed is accurate. There is one amendment to the language which is suggested to me by the draftsman. It is at the top of page 3. Paragraph (b) at present commences in this way:
  "any reference (whether express or implied) to the child or children of the adopted person's natural parents or either of them …"
  and I think that from there it would run better in this way:
  "shall be construed as not being or as not including a reference to the adopted person."
  That is a rather clearer way of expressing the idea. The English law of devolution of property is complicated, and if we are going to use it at all it has to be done at this length. There are others who know more about it than I, bat I think it will he found to work out very well. I have some very high authorities behind me who have been good enough to look at it. I would add that this relates only to England and Wales. It cannot relate to Scotland because the law of heredity in Scotland is very different. It may have to be considered at some date, but we could not take it upon ourselves to make this change in regard to Scotland. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Leave out Clause 9 and insert the following new clauses—
  Treatment of adopted persons as children of adopters for purposes of intestacies, wills and settlements.
  9.—(1) The provisions of this and the next following section shall have effect for securing that adopted persons are treated as children of the adopters for the purposes of the devolution or disposal of real and personal property.
  (2) Where, at any time after the making of an adoption order the adopter or the adopted person or any other person dies intestate in respect of any real or personal property (other than property subject to an entailed interest under a disposition made before the date of the adoption order) that property shall devolve in all respects as if the adopted person were the child of the adopter born in lawful wedlock and were not the child of any other person.
  (3) In any disposition of real or personal property made, whether by instrument inter vivos or by will (including codicil), after the date of an adoption order—

  (a) any reference (whether express or implied) to the child or children of the adopter shall be construed as, or as including, a reference to the adopted person;

  (b) any reference (whether express or implied) to the child or children of the adopted person's natural parents or either of them shall be construed as not being or as not including, a reference to the adopted person; and

  (c) any reference (whether express or implied) to a person related to the adopted person in any degree shall be construed as a reference to the person who would be related to him in that degree if he were the child of the adopter born in lawful wedlock and were not the child of any other person,

  unless the contrary intention appears.
  (4) Where under any disposition any real or personal property or any interest in such property is limited (whether subject to any preceding limitation or charge or not) in such a way that it would, apart from this section, devolve (as nearly as the law permits) along with a dignity or title of honour, then, whether or not the disposition contains an express reference to the dignity or title of honour, and whether or not the property or some interest in the property may in some event become severed therefrom, nothing in this section shall operate to sever the property or any interest therein from the dignity, but the property or interest shall devolve in all respects as if this section had not been enacted.
  (5) References in this section to an adoption order shall be construed as including references to an adoption order made before the date of the commencement of this Act; but nothing in this section shall affect the devolution of any property on the intestacy of a person who died before that date, or any disposition made before that date.
  Provisions supplementary to s. 9.
  10.—(1) For the purposes of the application of the Administration of Estates Act, 1925, to the devolution of any property in accordance with the provisions of the last foregoing section, and for the purposes of the construction of any such disposition as is mentioned in that section, an adopted person shall be deemed to be related to any other person being the child or adopted child of the adopter or (in the case of a joint adoption) of either of the adopters—

  (a) where he or she was adopted by two spouses jointly, and that other person is the child or adopted child of both of them, as brother or sister of the whole blood;

  (b) in any other case, as brother or sister of the half-blood.

  (2) Notwithstanding any rule of law, a disposition made by will or codicil executed before the date of an adoption order shall not be treated for the purposes of the last foregoing
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  section as made after that date by reason only that the will or codicil is confirmed by a codicil executed after that date.
  (3) Notwithstanding anything in the last foregoing section, trustees or personal representatives may convey or distribute any real or personal property to or among the persons entitled thereto, without having ascertained that no adoption order has been made by virtue of which any person is or may be entitled to any interest therein, and shall not be liable to any such person of whose claim they have not had notice at the time of the conveyance or distribution; but nothing in this subsection shall prejudice the right of any such person to follow the property, or any property representing it, into the hands of any person, other than a purchaser, who may have received it.
  (4) Where an adoption order (as defined by the last foregoing section) is made in respect of a person who has been previously adopted, the previous adoption shall be disregarded for the purposes of that section in relation to the devolution of any property on the death of a person dying intestate after the date of the subsequent adoption order and in relation to any disposition of property made after that date.
  (5) Subsection (2) of section five of the principal Act is hereby repealed.")—
  (Viscount Simon.)
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I am in some trouble about this Amendment and the course which I am going to ask the Committee to allow me to take will save time. Having considered this clause or a clause to this effect which was suggested to me about a month ago, I am of opinion that subsection (2) with regard to intestacy is quite right and just. I think that if the adopted person dies intestate, his property ought to go to the child, if there is one adopted child, and if he has children of his own they must share equally. With regard to that I feel little difficulty, because the adopting person whose property we are considering has not taken the trouble to make a will. He could easily do something different. But if he has done anything different, it is the duty of the Legislature so far as possible to ensure that his property shall go where he wished it to go, and where in nine cases out of ten it would go. That is the principle on which we work.
  Then we come to something in regard to which I am probably not a very good judge because I began life as a conveyancer and I am accustomed to the laws of property of this country, and particularly the way in which we construe wills. To my mind it is quite a different idea from the idea of disposing of property on an intestacy, to step in and say that in future in a case where there

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  are any adopted children a will is to be construed in a different way from that which the testator may have intended, in a different way from what the courts would have said was its meaning immediately before the Bill came into force, and in some cases in a way which would be quite contrary to the wishes of the testator.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: Would my noble and learned friend forgive me? I very much value his observations, but might I draw his attention to page 2, the fourth line from the bottom, where these words appear:
  "after the date of an adoption order."
  There is no proposal to alter the construction or the effect of any will made before the date of the adoption order. We limit ourselves entirely to such wills as are made after the adoption order. May I also call attention to the words which appear in the first new clause, just after paragraphs (b) and (c):
  "unless the contrary intention appears"
  That means that once a man has obtained an adoption order which makes a child his child, if after that he makes a will and says in it: "I give my property to be shared among my children" it is to be taken as meaning "including my adopted child." If he has a contrary intention he will say so, using words to the effect that he leaves his property to his children excluding the adopted child.
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I hope I shall not be thought to be a bad-tempered person, but I do not think my noble and learned friend was called upon to intervene. I was quite aware of the facts which he has just mentioned, and I was going to allude to them myself. I said nothing contrary to that which he says is the effect here. Of course a contrary intention might be made clear, and it would govern the whole question. I was going to put the concrete case (there are many others which could be cited but I select this one) of a man who adopts a child, and his wife, perhaps, dies and he marries again. We will suppose that he then has two children who are his own children, and for whom, of course, he has naturally a great affection. His adopted child, meantime, may have reached an age for going out into the world, may have left the home of the adopter and may have gone to live in a
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  Dominion or somewhere else a long way away. In such circumstances it is quite probable that the relations between the adopting parent and the adopted child may become very faint after the lapse of time. The man then makes a will and leaves all his property "to my children." I do not think I am wrong in saying what I believe to be quite obvious—and it has been laid down again and again—that reference to children in a will means legitimate children.
  The result of inserting the Amendment would be that we should be altering the fact that the courts say that "children" in the absence of context indicating otherwise, means legitimate children: we are saying: "it includes an adopted child." That, I think, is clear. I could give a number of other illustrations, but it is fairly reasonable to assume that we should be defeating in some cases the intention of the testator who might, at the time of making his will, have no desire to benefit an adopted child at all, but who, if he did have such a desire, could easily include in the will the phrase "my adopted child." There is the point. I think my noble and learned friend is wrong in thinking that any clause to which he has drawn attention meets that case. It does not do so at all.
  It is a fact, as I started by saying, that this Bill alters the true construction of wills according to the views that have been held in courts for hundreds of years. Is there a conclusive argument for so doing? I do not think so. I think we ought to consider with great care whether, in certain cases, we wish to alter the construction of a will. I do not think it would be wise for this Committee, with the not very large attendance which we have to-night—indeed I think it would be very unwise—to decide a matter which is really a question of principle. A short time ago, we heard my noble and learned friend Lord Simon inveighing against the impropriety of retrospective legislation. It is just as bad to alter a man's will contrary, it may be, to his intention by Act of Parliament. That is a point which has to be considered. It would be a precedent and it might be followed by other cases. I am not now prepared to express a final opinion upon it, and I do not think the Committee, as now

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  constituted, ought to express any final opinion to-day. All I do is to give notice that in my belief there is a definite point of great importance in the administration of the law to be considered; and that point, I think, ought to be raised on a future occasion.
  I shall endeavour if I can—though I know I shall have some difficulty in doing so—to find out what other noble Lords (particularly some of my old colleagues who are sitting daily in the House of Lords) may think about this matter. If I find that most people whom I consult think it right in such cases, even in the extreme case I have put of an adopted child having disappeared almost from the mind of the testator, to include the child as a person designated under the will I shall not move an Amendment. But, if I may respectfully say so, I desire an opportunity of consulting with other lawyers, people who are accustomed to dealing with matters of this sort, to see (whether they agree with me that the matter is very doubtful or whether they do not. I agree with the clause as regards intestacy. As regards the rest, let us treat the Amendment as going through but with clear notice that it may be that I shall fight with all the force at my command the part of the Amendment which I have indicated.
  LORD CAWLEY: In such an Assembly as this I feel that it is rather venturesome for me to ask a question. It may sound a silly question, but I hope the noble and learned Viscount will not think it so. The question I wish to ask is this: does the clause as drafted make it clear that this provision applies only to the will of the adopter or his wife, and that it would not affect, say, the will of a father and mother who might say that they left their property to the children of their daughters Alice and Jane, shall we say, or whatever their names might be?
  VISCOUNT SIMON: I will not continue the debate but would like to say how grateful I am to the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Maugham, for his observations. Before dealing with them, may I answer the question which the noble Lord, Lord Cawley, has just put to me? The answer is that it does not apply to any will that is not made after the date
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  of the adoption order. Any will made before that date is not affected at all.
  May I now say a few words with regard to what the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Maugham, has said. I am sorry that I interrupted him unnecessarily. I thought from the language that he was using at the beginning of his remarks that he might not have observed the limitation that this applies only to wills made after the date of an adoption order. I was mistaken in thinking that, and I apologise to the noble and learned Viscount. It is quite clear, of course, that it would be the height of nonsense to say that there is anything retrospective about this. It is entirely in respect of wills made in the future. I am not referring necessarily to wealthy persons who consult solicitors and draw up elaborate wills. I take the simple case of a man who has adopted a child and who for every purpose counts that child as one of his own children. When he comes to make a will he says: "I want my property to be shared among my children." Which is the better view to take—to say that it has been the law that when a man says "children" he means only legitimate children?
  VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I do not want to argue it, but there is a complete answer to that.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: I am only saying that that is the sort of case that appeals to me. I am sure that in most cases when a man says "children," he really means children that call him father, live in his home and are members of his own family, though as the law stands, as my noble and learned friend explained, he may desire that and say that but the adopted child gets nothing. It is purely a question of which is the better rule of the two: whether, if we say "children," we do not mean to include adopted child; or whether, if we say "children" in a will after adopting a child, we do mean to include the adopted child.
  LORD KERSHAW: All adopted children are not illegitimate children, are they?
  LORD DARWEN: I should like to support this Amendment. I know nothing at all about the law, but there is a real psychological reason for supporting this Amendment. At all times it is difficult to weld an adopted child into a

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  family where there are other children. It is difficult to make an adopted child feel it is really a part of the family, and I think the mere fact that it was differentiated against in the law would make a difference to it after it grows up. Therefore, I hope this Amendment will be carried.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 10 agreed to.
  7.11 p.m.
  Clause 11 [Registration of Adoption Orders]:
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is the only effective part I am taking in this Bill, and it is not a big part. The point of this and the following three Amendments is that when one cancels anything, one puts a pen through it; when one erases it, one has to rub it out or use acid. We have had enough of the use of acid recently, so I think we will just have cancellation. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 6, line 41, leave out ("erase") and insert ("cancel").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Amendments moved—
  Page 7, line 10, leave out ("erased") and insert ("cancelled").
  Page 7, line 12, leave out ("erased") and insert ("cancelled").
  Page 7, line 14, leave out ("erasure") and insert ("cancellation").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Amendments agreed to.
  Clause 11, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 12 [Definition of "relative"]:
  VISCOUNT SIMON: I think the three Amendments to this clause can be considered together. They are the result of the draftsman's efforts to put the language of the Bill in a more convenient form. If any noble Lord is interested, I would add that the object of the Amendments is to introduce into Clause 12 the words "adoption order" for the purpose of attracting a new definition in Clause 13 as proposed to be amended. That new definition will make this clause operate on an adoption order made by a Scottish or Northern Ireland court so that a person who is a relative by adoption will rank as such under Clause 12, although the relevant adoption order was made in another part of the United Kingdom. That, with a certain improvement in
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  drafting, is the effect of the clause. It is little more than formal.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 7, line 45, leave out ("a legitimate") and insert ("an").—(Viscount Simon.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Amendments moved—
  Page 7, line 47, after ("half-blood") insert ("or")
  Page 7, line 47, leave out from ("affinity") to the first ("the") in page 8, line 1, and insert ("and includes—
  () where an adoption order has been made in respect of the infant or any other person, any person who would be a relative of the infant within the meaning of this definition if the adopted person were the child of the adopter born in lawful wedlock;
  () where the infant is illegitimate,").—(Viscount Simon.)
  On Question, Amendments agreed to.
  Clause 12, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 13 [Interpretation and construction]:
  VISCOUNT SIMON VISCOUNT SIMON moved, in subsection (1), in the definition of "adoption order" to omit "has he same meaning as in the principal Act," and to insert:
  "means an order under section one of the principal Act and includes, in sections eight, nine, ten and twelve of this Act, an order authorising an adoption under the Adoption of Children (Scotland) Act, 1930, or the Adoption of Children An (Northern Ireland) 1929, or any enactment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland for the time being in force;"
  The noble Viscount said: Here again, I think your Lordships can safely accept the proposal which the draftsmen have given careful consideration to preparing. It is designed to secure that in Clause 8 and the new clause to replace Clause 9, and Clauses 10 and 12, an adoption order made by a Scottish or Northern Ireland court has the same effect for the purposes of the law of England as an order made by an English court. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 8, line 18, leave out from ("order") to the end of line 19 and insert the said new words.—(Viscount Simon.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: The Bill as it stands is required to be construed both with the 1926 and 1939 Acts. It is pointed out to me that those Acts are not themselves construed as one, and so confusion might be caused. It seems better to make this Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 8, leave out line 33.—(Viscount Simon.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 13, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 14 [Application to Scotland]:
  VISCOUNT SIMON: This Amendment is only re-drafting. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 9, line 31, at end insert—
  ("() section nine of this Act shall not affect the law of Scotland relating to the distribution of the moveable estate of a person dying domiciled in Scotland or the devolution of heritable property situated in Scotland;").—(Viscount Simon.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: On behalf of my noble friend Lord Morrison, I beg to move the next four Amendments.
  Amendments moved—
  Page 10, line 33, leave out ("erase") and insert ("cancel").
  Page 11, line 6, leave out ("erased") and insert ("cancelled").
  Page 11, line 10, leave out ("erased") and insert ("cancelled").
  Page 11, line 12, leave out ("erasure") and insert ("cancellation").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Amendments agreed to.
  VISCOUNT SIMON: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 11, line 44, at end insert—
  ("() in section thirteen for the definition of 'adoption order' there shall be substituted the following definition '"Adoption Order" means an order under section one of the principal Act and includes in sections eight, ten and twelve of this Act, an order authorising an adoption under the Adoption of Children Act, 1926, or the Adoption of Children Act (Northern Ireland), 1929, or any enactment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland for the time being in force';").—(Viscount Simon.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 14, as amended, agreed to.
  Clause 15 [Short title, commencement and extent]:
  VISCOUNT SIMON: I am glad to say that this is the last Amendment with which the Committee will have to deal. Perhaps your Lordships will let me give a word of explanation. Parliament in Northern Ireland has power to legislate on the subject of adoption, but nationality is a reserved subject and must be dealt
  384
  with by Parliament at Westminster. It is therefore necessary to provide that Clause 8 of this Bill, which deals with the acquisition of citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies by foreign children when adopted by United Kingdom citizens, is extended to Northern Ireland in order that, if the Parliament of Northern Ireland should pass legislation enabling the adoption of foreign children on the lines of subsection (2) of Clause 1, those children should obtain the benefit of Clause 8 of this Bill. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 12, line 10, after ("Act") insert ("except section eight").—(Viscount Simon.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Remaining clause, as amended, agreed to.
  Schedule agreed to.
  House resumed.

  SLAUGHTER OF ANIMALS (SCOTLAND) BILL
  7.21 p.m.
  House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.
  Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 13):
  EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time. I should like to say that this is the first Private Member's Bill to pass since 1937.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Earl Fortescue.)
  On Question, Bill read 3a, and passed.

  ROCHDALE CANAL BILL [H.L.]
  Returned from the Commons, agreed to with an Amendment; the said Amendment considered and agreed to.