Lords Sitting of 14 July 1949

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers

  TRIAL OF FIELD-MARSHAL VON MANSTEIN
  LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY: My, Lords, I beg to ask the Question of which I have given His Majesty's Government private notice—namely, whether, at the forthcoming trial of Field-Marshal von Manstein before a British military court, they have ensured that the defendant is provided with every facility for the conduct of his defence, and whether, in particular, British counsel have been made available to take part in this defence.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT JOWITT): My Lords, I am satisfied that the defendant will be provided with every facility for the conduct of his defence. He has two most experienced and distinguished German lawyers defending him and, in addition, I understand that at this very moment a British counsel is at Hamburg assisting the defence in the preparation of the case.
  LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY: My Lords, while in no way questioning the competence or impartiality of the court or in any way anticipating either the charges to be preferred or the verdict which will be reached, may I ask His Majesty's Government whether it is true that two eminent British counsel have been retained by the prosecution in this case?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Certainly. I know that one has, and it may well be that there are two.
  LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY: May I ask whether it is not important that the defending counsel should be those best qualified to plead before a British court?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Those best qualified to plead before a British court should have the opportunity to be on close terms with the defendant, to take instructions. The German counsel concerned are counsel experienced at the
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  Nuremberg trial, and I do not think there can be any doubt on the part of those who know that the persons who are accused will be well defended.
  LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY: Is it not true that von Manstein's property has been confiscated by the Russians and that he is therefore without private means to engage either British counsel or indeed any lawyers for his defence? And is it not true that he has to answer seventeen detailed charges covering the four-and-a-half years?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: So far as German counsel are concerned, they are allocated and provided at no expense to the defendant and are paid for out of the funds of the Hamburg municipality under the usual free legal aid machinery for the defence of persons alleged to have committed war crimes in Germany. I understand that is a British arrangement, but I am afraid I do not know the details of it, because it does not concern His Majesty's Government.
  LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY: Is it not true that the British counsel referred to by the noble and learned Viscount has engaged in this trial purely voluntarily and out of compassion for the accused? Are His Majesty's Government indifferent whether the accused is able to furnish himself with the best defence possible in the circumstances, and will not such indifference gravely damage British reputation in Germany and elsewhere?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Lord has no right to suggest that those responsible for the administration of justice can be indifferent in such a matter.
  LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY: May I ask whether the noble and learned Viscount will not furnish funds to provide British counsel to plead before this court, as this would ensure that the defence was adequately provided for?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I shall do everything to ensure that this defendant is properly defended, as I do with any other person accused of serious crime.

STATE OF EMERGENCY
3.10 p.m.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT ADDISON)THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT ADDISON) rose to move, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, thanking His Majesty for His most gracious message, communicating to this House His Majesty's Declaration that a state of emergency exists within the meaning of the Emergency Powers Act, 1920. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, there are two Motions which stand in my name on the Order Paper but perhaps it would be convenient if we were to arrange that whatever discussion took place should take place on the first one—which I now move—on the understanding that when we come to the second one it will be taken formally.
I am sure that the House will be desirous that anything we say on this serious matter should not in any way prejudice as early a settlement as possible. It is a fact which we cannot escape that at British ports on several occasions during recent months we have had sporadic and unauthorised strikes which taken together have held up business for a considerable time; and it is also undeniable that in this particular case there is no industrial dispute at all in London between the employees at the clocks and the Dock Board. The strange fact is that in Canada also, so far as the docks are concerned, there is no industrial dispute; I understand that all the men there are employed on the usual conditions. It is also, I think, undeniable that in this particular industry there has been provided an exceedingly elaborate and commonly-accepted system of negotiation and arbitration in the event of differences. The dock labour organisation which has been set up in this country during recent years has meant the emancipation of dock workers from conditions which were formerly exceedingly distressing. Some of us are old enough to remember the demonstrations that used to be held in Trafalgar Square and elsewhere. But that is all past history. We have in the dock organisation, in London and at our other ports, a very efficient, acceptable and smoothly-working organisation so far as the dock worker is concerned. This strike is an adventitious and entirely outside matter which has intruded into our otherwise well-ordered working in the docks.
I expect that many of your Lordships will have heard the statement made on the wireless last night by the Minister of Labour, and some of your Lordships, like myself, will perhaps have had the advantage of reading some or all of the discussion which took place yesterday in another place. I would particularly commend those who are not very familiar with the case to read the courageous statement which was made in another place by Mr. Mellish, who himself took great pains to get to the bottom of the trouble. There is no doubt at all that his statements are correct—that the point whether this Canadian ship was or was not "black," in the accepted sense of the term, is not in question. It is without doubt that an agreement was arrived at and that, notwithstanding that agreement, the men were called out. It is an extraordinary demonstration of loyalty to sentiment overriding judgment. The trade unionists, the men who are employed at the docks, get it into their minds that some particular action taken is in the nature of "blacklegging." It arouses within them feelings and sentiments which do not lead them to inquire into the merits of the case. They are impelled to their action by what in this case is clearly an entirely mistaken sense of loyalty to something which in itself has not occurred. That is the position. It has spread from these particular ships to others throughout these docks, though happily not through all the docks, and it is a case of men banding themselves together, or at least acting together, from an exceedingly mistaken sense of loyalty.
It is most unfortunate that, for one reason or another, the issues in this case have not been made as clear as we should have desired. The fact is that these thousands of men are being kept out, or are keeping themselves out, not from any considered decision on the case, because it is true to say that at a good many of the meetings only a small proportion of the men affected attend. The votes are run by a show of hands. Many are reluctant to take part in these meetings. Large numbers stay away, and I have no doubt that, when the real facts of this case get into the minds of the men, we shall come to the end of this most unfortunate dispute. It is impossible to imagine that, with ships coming in from all parts of the world, dock work in London can

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be held up because of some alleged dispute in some other country. Such a situation would make the conduct of the docks in any part-of the world completely, impossible; and it cannot be entertained.
The regulations which are before your Lordships are very wide in their scope. They are, of course, in accordance with the Act of Parliament. We are all glad to know that their administration is in the hands of five exceedingly experienced and sensible men. I have no doubt that the powers given them will be wisely used. It is, however, necessary to safeguard the life of the community, and it is on that account that the Government have felt bound to ask your Lordships to approve this most drastic step. I myself am quite sure that, when we can get the real facts of the case into the minds of the men, we shall soon come to the end of this trouble. There is no doubt that originally a delegate—or very likely a paid representative, at all events a delegate—from the Canadian Communist Party was sent across in one of these ships. That appears to have been proved, as your Lordships will see from the speech of Mr. Mellish in another place. These men have been persuaded, by appeals to a mistaken sense of loyalty, to take first one action and then another, until now we have drifted into this present deplorable condition. I do not propose to analyse it. I say only that it is quite evident that, in order to safeguard the life and food of the community, these regulations are necessary. I only hope that your Lordships will support our action and will express our good will to those in charge, and to the men in the hope that they will soon see sense and bring this foolish dispute to an end. I beg to move.
Moved, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, thanking His Majesty for His most gracious Message, communicating to this House His Majesty's Declaration that a state of emergency exists within the meaning of the Emergency Powers Act, 1920.—(Viscount Addison.)
3.20 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, these emergency regulations which the Leader of the House has asked your Lordships to approve to-day are undoubtedly, as he himself has said, of
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an extremely drastic character. I do not imagine that powers so far-reaching have ever been asked for by any Government of the day in the whole of our history in respect of an individual dispute of this kind. The regulations are, I am afraid, a deplorable commentary on the failure of the machinery for settling industrial disputes—however admirably conceived it may have been—to stand up to the strain which is being put on it in the special circumstances of to-day.
My Lords, there will not, however, I imagine, be any difference of view in any part of the House as to the desirability of approving these regulations in the unhappy situation in which we are placed. The Home Secretary, in the speech with which he wound up the debate in another place last night, gave some formidable figures of the appalling damage which is being done to our trade at a moment of great national danger, when the utmost efforts are needed by every individual citizen to save us from economic disaster. The people in this country must be assured of the necessities of life and of the raw materials which will enable them to buy those necessities. That, I think, is common ground among all Parties in the State. For any section of the community to hold up such supplies is not only wrong in itself but can lead only to untold suffering, which it is the aim of all of us to avoid.
It is not my intention to-day to go into the genesis and character of this unhappy dispute. These have been fully dealt with already, both by the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary in another place and by the Leader of the House in the speech which he has just delivered to us, and I am quite ready to accept their account. But, my Lords, why have not all these things been said before? Why has it been left till now to say them? Parliament has occupied its time during the last few weeks and days with matters of far less urgent importance than this. Why have the Government not asked us days ago for an immediate opportunity to say what they said to us last night and to-day? I am quite certain that there is not one of us who would not willingly have acceded to such a request. It is surely very evident that this is, above all, a case for disclosure and yet more disclosure of the full facts, for it is abundantly clear that what has happened

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is that the dockers who are, after all as patriotic and sturdy a body of men as any in the country, have been entirely misled as to the nature of the dispute in which they have allowed themselves to be involved.
There is no evidence that I have read to show that the great body of dockers are actuated by any unworthy motives at all. On the contrary, their guiding impulse seems to have been—as indeed the Leader of the House has said—a sense of loyalty and a desire to help their fellow workers. That is really what has been behind this action of the general rank-and-file of the dockers. Loyalty in itself is an admirable quality. That is what makes the present dispute so distressing to those of us who remember the patriotism and the courage of the dockers in the darkest days of the war. Yet we must not forget that loyalty, if it be misdirected, can be a quality as dangerous as, and perhaps more dangerous than, any other. In this case it has clearly been deliberately misdirected by men who themselves are not patriotic but are concerned only to encompass the downfall of this country. In such circumstances, what is evidently most necessary, I repeat, if this dispute is to be prevented from spreading further, is that the true facts and the full facts should be exposed.
Here, if I may again repeat myself, I cannot resist the conclusion—and I think there are many of us who cannot resist the conclusion—that the Government themselves have been sadly at fault. Up to last night, the full facts of the dispute had never been divulged, either to the dockers themselves or to their fellow workers; or, indeed, to any of us—at least, I had never read a full account until I opened my morning paper to-day. Even now, my Lords, it seems there is much that still needs saying. We have had general statements from the members of the Government that the trouble has been "stoked up" by Communist agitators. But we have had no detailed evidence or proof, except one or two extremely courageous speeches by private Members in another place. Could such proof be produced by the Government, if they had it, I cannot doubt that it would have a great and possibly decisive effect upon the dockers themselves. Neither they nor the rest of the British people are, I am sure, Communistically inclined. But vague
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general statements, unsupported by evidence, are worse than useless, and are liable to do a good deal more harm than good. I therefore beg the Government, if they can, to tell us more than they have yet done, and to see that this information, and also the full facts as to the damage which is being done to the country and in particular to their own fellow-workers by the dockers' present attitude, gets through to those who are at present on strike.
Even now, from all I hear—and I have heard stories from various sources—they seem to be totally unaware of the full issues which are at stake. They hear plenty, very little of it good, from the agitators who move about among them, but they hear little from those from whom they should properly be getting information to guide their judgment. If it is indeed impossible for responsible trade union leaders to get in touch with these men at the present time, could not more be done by means of the wireless and by the distribution of simple and effective leaflets? I think the broadcast which was made last night by the Minister of Labour was undoubtedly a step in the right direction. But I hope the Government will not leave it there. The simple facts should continue to be drummed in day by day until they are fully realised by those immediately concerned. I remember very well that one of the arguments used by the Government at the time of the debates on the Parliament Bill against granting any substantial power of delay to your Lordships' House, was that it is possible by modern systems of information and education to make any issue clear to the people in a very short time indeed. I heard it said again and again from the Benches opposite. Why are those methods not being used now? As the Government themselves agree, it is evident that there is widespread misapprehension. Why is not it being allayed?
I should also like to ask what other measures the Government have in mind. We are being asked to grant immense powers. How do the Government intend to use them? Surely Parliament, which is granting these powers, is entitled to know. I gathered from the speech of the Attorney-General in another place yesterday that in the view of the Law Officers of the Crown this is undoubtedly an illegal strike; that it is, in effect,

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a criminal conspiracy against the community. I understand that to be the legal position. Is it proposed to proceed, not against the rank-and-file, who are, after all, only the innocent victims of this propaganda, but against the instigators of this conspiracy? Are the Government going to take any firm and effective action? Not to do that when they have already announced that this is an illegal conspiracy, would appear to many of us a very feeble and weak position to take up. The Attorney-General, in his speech yesterday, said:
"I do not believe that democracy can be safely rested upon the policeman and the prison … Persuasion is much more effective than coercion in matters of this sort."
I think we should all agree that normally, persuasion is far the better course. But surely there are occasions when even democracy itself must be protected. If the life of the people is being threatened by men who are actually promoting illegal action for their own evil purposes, it is the essence of democracy that they should be restrained, otherwise we shall have not democracy but anarchy.
My Lords, I do not want to say any more to-day. No doubt far wider issues are raised by this and other recent disputes regarding relations between trade union leaders and the rank-and-file, regarding the relationship of both to the State, and so on and so on. But this is not the time, I am certain, to explore such questions as that. To-day all that matters is to prevent the strike spreading further and to get the existing strikers back to work, to make them realise that there is a greater loyalty even than to their own section of the community—that is, their loyalty to their country in a moment of acute economic danger. With regard to this, I am quite certain that we are all, in all parts of the House, in agreement. Equally, I think, we all recognise that the Government have a responsibility, the present Administration have a responsibility, which they cannot shirk—to see that the King's Government is carried on. That, as I conceive it, is the purpose of these far-reaching regulations. I hope that the Government can give us some satisfaction with regard to the points which I have raised. If they can, we shall certainly give the regulations our full support.
3.33 p.m.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, noble Lords on the Liberal Benches support this Motion without hesitation, but with deep concern that it should be necessary—as it is necessary—to invoke powers of such gravity. The noble Viscount the Leader of the House and the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition, who have already spoken, have emphasised their sense of the gravity of this step, and it is, indeed, a most serious flatter that a British Government should be obliged, in time of peace, to ask for powers so extensive and so arbitrary, powers to direct great industries and to determine the actions, and, indeed, invade the liberties, of great numbers of people. Moreover, it has been found necessary to employ soldiers, sailors and airmen, not in the national military services for which they were enlisted, but to load and unload ships in the docks. These are powers which elsewhere have been used by dictatorships to establish and maintain their own arbitrary rule, and they could easily be used to suppress the liberties of a people. They should, of course, be sparsely and carefully used, and under the most complete safeguards.
That those safeguards do prevail in this country is evidenced by the fact that yesterday in another place and to-day in your Lordships' House the Executive have had to come to Parliament to obtain its sanction, on behalf of the nation as a whole, for such powers being conferred and used. In a democratic State we have our normal system of established government and we have our normal system of industrial management, involving collective agreements, freely arrived at after discussion, and which, as a rule, are honourably maintained, and must be honourably observed if the system is to work at all. But in an emergency such as this, it is vital that the Executive should act, and act strongly, to protect the economic life of the whole nation and, indeed, the daily bread of the people, from being injured and prejudiced by the action of a tiny minority of the less-informed and headstrong who would, in effect, hold the whole country to ransom. When the case is clear beyond doubt, as in this instance, there is no other alternative but for the Government to come to Parliament and ask sanction for powers even so drastic as these.

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I am not one of those who hold the view that all this might have been avoided if the Government at the very beginning of this matter, in Liverpool, had used troops to unload and load these ships. I do not think that that would have been a proper course to take at that stage of this matter. If that had been done at so early a stage, we may be sure that plenty of disputes would be fomented here and there from time to time, precisely in order to compel the Government to bring in the military, with the result that a feeling of resentment would necessarily grow up among the working classes as a whole and among trade unionists in particular, based on the idea that the present Government were using the military to defeat trade unionism. Perhaps, as the noble Marquess has said, the Government might, at an earlier stage, have made the whole matter much clearer to the people and particularly to the classes of workers involved. The speech made by the Prime Minister yesterday afternoon and the admirable broadcast of the Minister of Labour yesterday evening might have had a considerable effect, not only on public opinion in general but in particular on the opinion of the persons directly concerned, if that speech and that broadcast had been addressed to them at an earlier stage.
The question now is who should judge whether a particular ship is what is called "black" or is "white." I do not here enter into the question of what is proper to be done in one country with regard to a ship which is declared "black" in another country. That is a matter which need not he argued here. The question does not arise in this instance. There is no real controversy as to whether this ship is to be regarded as "black," for the trade union authorities mainly concerned have declared that it is not "black." The dockers' union in Canada the dockers' trade union in this country, the Trades Union Congress here and the corresponding body in Canada, have all declared that no industrial dispute arises in this particular matter at this time and at this place. It is true that some attempts are made to cause confusion by questioning this point here and that point there. It reminds one of Canning's poem, The New Morality, in which he speaks of one:
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"Who finds with keen, discriminating sight, Black's not so black—nor white so very white."
There are some who may be disposed to challenge particular points of detail here and there. The question is, who should judge: should it be a group of dockers in London, led by unofficial leaders who spring from nowhere, or should it be the representative trade unions and unions of employers in this country and in the country where originally the dispute arose—that is, in Canada? Therefore the matter is perfectly clear. This is not an industrial dispute. It is in effect. I believe, mainly a political issue, fomented not from trade union or industrial quarters at all. We know that there is a definite campaign throughout the world fomented from a centre by Communists. It has been very evident in France and in Italy, where strikes alleged to be industrial have undoubtedly been political and revolutionary in their character. It is this movement which has been preying upon the more innocent-minded of the working people in the docks at Liverpool and elsewhere, and will do so again. Therefore, it is essential that this issue should be carried to a conclusion as a matter of democratic principle. These questions must be decided in accordance with the established procedure of negotiation and democratic government, and we must make head against this movement which pursues ends that are mistaken by means that are fraudulent and tyrannous, and often violent and cruel. All your Lordships would wish to support the Government of the day, no matter what their political complexion may be, when they take action as they must, to defend the rights of the community as a whole.
3.41 p.m.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF YORK: My Lords, I rise for only a moment to support the Government and join in making an appeal to the dockers to reconsider their decision. I have always very great sympathy with the dockers. In the past they had a hard deal, but their position now has been improved beyond all expectations, and I feel certain that if this strike is continued they will lose a great amount of sympathy and possibly some of the gains which they have obtained in recent years. It is quite plain that on a matter of this kind the Government cannot give way. If the

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strikers were successful, it would mean that industrial disputes in future would be settled not by negotiation, but by the unreasonable methods of the strike and the lock-out. If this strike were successful, it would follow that the machinery for negotiation which has been so carefully built up is to a large extent useless. Moreover, it would make many people very doubtful about the wisdom of entering into any negotiations with the trade unions, if the trade unions are unable to enforce the agreements which they have reached on behalf of those they represent. There is no doubt the country is suffering greatly from the strike. I fear that it is also prejudicing our position overseas, especially in the United States at a time when the United States have been making considerable sacrifices to help us. Criticism is bound to arise when they see a strike of this nature taking place.
I want to support as strongly as I can what the noble Marquess has said about further information being given to the strikers. I believe that a large number of the men, possibly the majority of them, have entered into this strike through misapprehension. They have been exposed to an active and pernicious propaganda. That ought to be met by even more active propaganda on the part of the Government. The broadcast address given last night was admirable, but if addresses of that kind are to be any good, they must be repeated time after time. Members of the Government feel that if they make a statement, that is enough. It is sufficient in this House—we do not wish it to be repeated time after time—but those of us who have to preach sermons know perfectly well that we have to repeat a thing a dozen times before it makes any impression on the average man. Therefore, I feel that the Government must go on saying this, time after time. They must issue leaflets tracts written in the simplest possible language—and see also that some of those leaflets are addressed to the dockers' wives. I do not think it is realised what influence a woman has on the striker if the strike continues for some period. If an active, widespread and vigorous propaganda is undertaken at once, without delay, it will have a great effect upon the men.
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There is one more point I would like to make, which really repeats what the noble Marquess has said. There is nothing the British working man dislikes more than having been "taken in" and deceived, unless it is being "taken in" by foreigners. If he sees that he has been deceived by Communist agitators, paid by foreign countries, the effect on him will be very great and the reaction will possibly be decisive. I would press the Government to make it quite plain to everyone who these Communist agitators are. Frequent speeches have been made saying that this strike is due to Communists, but we have not been given the reasons on which that statement is based. Now the Government must have definite reasons before they make a statement of that nature. They must know where the money comes from and the names of the people who are acting for the Communists. Let them expose them. Let the workers know who these people are. Then, I believe, there will be a great reaction against the men who have so misled them. The Government, of course, must hold out to the last; there can be no compromise on a matter of this kind. But none of us wishes our fellow countrymen, who are loyal and patriotic, to go back to their work feeling resentful, defeated, angry and bitter. We have to persuade them. I hope that while the Government are prepared to stand firm, they will also use every method of persuasion in their power to induce the dockers of their own will to go back to their work.
3.47 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT JOWITT): My Lords, the noble Viscount the Leader of the House has asked me to say something. I am glad that this discussion has not turned mainly or largely upon any legal question and I should like to thank all the noble Lords who have spoken for the tone and temper of their speeches about what is a very difficult situation. There is not a shadow of doubt in the first place that this dispute is doing us most grievous harm at a most critical time in our history. I think the first thing we all want the dockers to understand is that that is so. I entirely agree with the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition, when he said to the House that we must remember what the dockers did in the war, notwithstanding all the

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long bombardment to which they were subjected. We well know what a gallant and good set of men they are, and, whatever view we take of this, we must avoid the error of treating all these men as if they were enemies of our race. It well may be that in the timing of this matter we have made mistakes. I am not saying it is not so. If we rush in too soon, we are apt to do more harm than good. On the other hand if we delay in taking action, I agree that we create the impression of weakness, and that is bad. It is all a question of timing.
The tragedy of the whole situation is that the disputes at the Bristol port and Liverpool were settled and the controversy between the two unions was exposed at that time. Then it broke out in London, and it was settled. On June 23 or 24 work was resumed, following an agreement between the owners of the two ships concerned, and the seamen from these ships, who were striking and who were undoubtedly guilty of a criminal act in their breach of the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act of Canada. There is no doubt about that at all. The agreement that was made included two clauses: first, that there should be no victimisation and, secondly, that these seamen on getting back to Canada should not be prosecuted. All the dockers returned, and for three or four days peace reigned in the docks and everybody was at work. Then it was alleged that the agreement had not been observed, that the dockers had been, to use a well-known phrase, "double-crossed."
The point of controversy was this. It was said, first of all, in regard to the promise that there would be no prosecution, that that meant the Canadian authorities themselves should not prosecute. The two parties to the agreement were the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, on the one hand, and the seamen on the other. Obviously all the C.P.R. could say was that they would take no steps in regard to prosecution. It was obvious that they could not bind the Canadian authorities, although I may add that it was very unlikely, in the event of that agreement having been concluded, that the Canadian authorities would have taken proceedings. But plainly it is not for the C.P.R. or anybody else to bind the Canadian authorities in that respect.
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The second controversy arose over the question of no victimisation. There is no doubt that everybody agreed that the men would be paid their current wages to take the ships back to Canada. But they said that the agreement implied that they could go on working in the ship without joining the new union. I should explain to your Lordships that the Canadian Pacific Railway Company had on May 4 of this year made an agreement with the Seafarers' International Union whereby they undertook that only members of the Seafarers' International Union should man their ships. I need hardly tell your Lordships that anybody interested in this matter knew of that agreement. Therefore, when the question of no victimsation came up in the agreement of June 23 or 24, it must have been obvious to anybody signing that agreement that, although the obligation of no victimisation extended to the return voyage back to Canada, it could not have been meant to extend to the position thereafter, in view of the perfectly well-known agreement which the Canadian Pacific Railway Company had made with the Seafarers' International Union.
That, my Lords, is the position. Now a meeting is taking place this afternoon between, on the one hand, the Executive of the Lightermen's Union and the Executive of the Stevedores' Union and, on the other, the representatives of the seamen's committee from these ships. I am afraid I cannot tell your Lordships at this time the results of this meeting. I am most anxious that anything I say now shall not stand in the way of, or be any impediment whatever to, a satisfactory solution of this difficulty.
I would like to add this. So far as the law is concerned, under regulation 1305 a strike or lock-out is illegal if it is reported. It is the fact that neither the employers nor the workers reported this matter to the Ministry. I think that is rather technical, and if we go into that matter we may get into the region of whether this is technically a lock-out or a strike. I take the view that plainly this is a strike. I take that view for this reason. If I, for instance, have a farm and a staff of men working on that farm, and they say, "We will cut the barley, but we will not cut the oats"; and I then say, "If that is your line, then you do not come at all," then I should regard that not as a lock-out, but as a strike.

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Particularly would I consider this to be so in this case where, after all, the individual employers do not engage men until they have got ships to unload or load. However, I do not want to go into that controversy, which is much too legalistic to find a place in this matter.
There is no doubt that if any man is exploiting a situation like this, and fomenting a strike, not for genuine reasons in furtherance of a trade dispute, or to support his colleagues in a trade dispute, but in order to bring about chaos, to upset the established organisations of this country and to bring in red ruin in the breaking up of law, then he is plainly guilty of a criminal offence. But before you start a prosecution you must be absolutely certain that you have all your facts provable beyond question, so that in a prosecution you will not fail. This is a matter peculiarly within the province of the Attorney-General, who will not hesitate to act if and when he has information of the sort I have indicated, but who in my judgment would be very unwise to act if his information fell short of that sort of evidence.
I am not going to indulge in general talk about Communists and Communist activities. I have no doubt that Communists generally are on the look-out to see where they can make mischief; but I am afraid they are frequently clever enough not to put themselves in default. I have nothing more to say on that topic, except to assure your Lordships that these great powers which we have will be used with discretion, as I am sure the five people who are using them sufficiently appreciate. I cannot tell the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition exactly what is going to be done, but I can promise him that, having armed these five with these powers, we will keep your Lordships informed of exactly what is being done. I say again it is absolutely deplorable to us, and to any section of this House—in fact to any person who believes in democracy—that we should have to ask for these powers. And the sooner we can get rid of them the better. As I said before, it may be that we delayed too long in asking for these powers. If we did, I think that is a fault on the right side; and the sooner we can get rid of them the better.
I join with all your Lordships—and this is the most important message that can
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go from your Lordships' House—in urging all these dockers not to let a perverted sense of loyalty (for that is what it is) to a trade union ideal prevent them from thinking this matter out for themselves, or encourage them to continue to strike and play against this country of ours at a most critical time. That is the plea I make. I earnestly hope that, as a result of the discussions which are taking place this afternoon, this tragic affair may come to an end. If I say no more now, it is because I cannot help feeling that if I do I might do more harm than good.
On Question, Motion agreed to, nemine dissentiente: the said Address to be presented to His Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.
VISCOUNT ADDISON: I now beg to move the Motion standing in my name with regard to the regulations.
Moved, That the regulations made by His Majesty in Council under the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, by Order dated the 11th day of July, 1949, shall continue in force subject to the provisions of Section 2 (4) of the said Act.—(Viscount Addison.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

HOUSE OF LORDS OFFICES
3.59 p.m.
Order of the Day read for the consideration of the Fourth Report from the Select Committee.
The Committee reported as follows:
1.—PORTRAIT OF VISCOUNT ULLSWATER
The Committee considered a letter from the Speaker to the Lord Chancellor suggesting that room might be found in the precincts of the House of Lords for a portrait of the first Viscount Ullswater which had been offered on loan to the House of Commons. The Committee decided, albeit with great respect to the memory of so eminent a parliamentary figure, that they could not recommend the acceptance of this suggestion.
2.—APPOINTMENT OF A CLERK IN THE PARLIAMENT OFFICE
The Clerk of the Parliaments informed the Committee of the appointment of Mr. Rohan Nicholas Wadham as a clerk on the staff of the Parliament Office. The appointment to date from 13th June, 1949.
3.—HOUSEMAIDS AND PORTERS
The Committee authorised the appointment of two extra housemaids for the cleaning of additional rooms.
The Committee also sanctioned an increase in the weekly wages for porters and housemaids.
4.—GIFT TO CAEN UNIVERSITY
The Clerk of the Parliaments informed the Committee that he had received the following letter from the Rector of Caen University:
Université de Caen,
Caen.
Le 25 Juin 1949.
Monsieur,
J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître quo les sept magnifiques volumes offerts par la Chambre des Lords à notre Bibliothèque Universitaire out maintenant pris place dans sa Salle d'Honneur.
Je vous saurais la plus grande reconnaissance si vous vouliez bien exprimer à leurs Seigneureries la gratitude de l'Université de Caen. Venant après de nombreux exemples de l'affectueux intérê quo porte le peuple britannique à la Nation amie, l'envoi généreux de la Chambre Haute du Parlement Anglois apporte un digne couronnement à une lisle déjà fort longue.
Grâce à cette genérosité, la Bibliothèque de l'Université de Caen vu s'enorgueillir de posséder sur ses rayons des documents précieux dont la rareté sera, croyez le, bien dûement appréciée. Aprés cinq ans d'efforts de reconstitution, elle commence à ofirir ànouveau aux maîtres et aux chercheurs comme aux Etudiants de Caen une collection d'ouvrages dont elle est n'en de dire de certains d'entre eux qu'elle n'en possédait aucun exemplaire avant la destruction qui l'a frappée.
C'est donc au nom de l'Université de Caen tout entière autant qu'à mon nom propre, quo je vous prie d'offrir à leur Seigneureries le témoignage de respectueux remerciements qu'elle leur adresse.
Veuillez agrée, Monsieur, je vous prie, l'hommage de ma très haute consideration.
P. Daure.
(Le Recteur.)"
5—LIBRARY SUB-COMMITTEE
The Lord Badeley was appointed a member of the Library Sub-Committee.
6.—SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE REFRESHMENT DEPARTMENT
The Lord Badeley was appointed a member of the Sub-Committee on the Refreshment Department.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF DROGHEDA): My Lords, I beg to move that the Fourth Report from the Select Committee on the House of Lords Offices be now considered.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
THE EARL OF DROGHEDA: My Lords, there is nothing of importance in this. Report to which I need draw your Lordships' attention. I formally move that the Report be agreed to.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

CIVIL DEFENCE (GENERAL) REGULATIONS, 1949 CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS REGULATIONS, 1949
4.0 p.m.
LORD CHORLEY: MY Lords, I beg to move that the draft regulations, as reported from the Special Orders Committee on the 6th instant, be approved. These regulations are of a highly technical character, but as the question of civil defence has not been before your Lordships' House for some little time, your Lordships may wish me to say just a few words in explanation of the situation and of the regulations in question.
The Civil Defence Act of last year, as your Lordships remember, recognises the permanence of civil defence as part of the military organisation of the country. It is not that there is any objective in view of preparing for an imminent war, or even of a probable war, but the situation is such that your Lordships will agree that it is now necessary to re-create an appropriate civil defence organisation in an orderly sort of way. The Act of 1948 provides that much of the burden of civil defence is put upon the shoulders of the appropriate local authorities. I am sure that your Lordships would wish me to pay a tribute to the admirable work which was done by those local authorities during the recent war, and which undoubtedly qualifies them to accept this onerous responsibility in the times to come. Consultations have been held between the Civil Defence Department of the Home Office and representatives of the various local authority organisations. Although I think it would not be true to say that the ipsissima verba of these regulations have been agreed, I understand that in general the representatives of the local authorities are in agreement with the main framework of the regulations, which are acceptable to them.
I am sure your Lordships will agree that the first step is that we should build up a personnel organisation on a national basis but organised by the local authorities in appropriate territorial and functional units. With that object in view my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, as recently as May of this year established a Civil Defence Corps. It will be recruited on a voluntary and part-time basis, and the men who join it will

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be expected to carry through the appropriate training. It is not proposed that the recruiting for the Civil Defence Corps shall commence before the autumn months, but it will then be carried on actively. The regulations which are before your Lordships this afternoon are concerned purely with the framework under which the local authorities are to carry out their part of the work. If Parliament approves these two sets of regulations, which are preliminary, the Government will present further sets of regulations from time to time as the details are worked out. Matters which are particularly in mind are such problems as evacuation, the making of arrangements for the homeless after air-raids, the building up of the fire service organisation and matters of that kind.
Perhaps I may turn for a moment to the two sets of regulations which are before your Lordships. The first of them, the Civil Defence (General) Regulations, provide a general code to enable local authorities to make the necessary administrative arrangements to carry out the functions which are to be conferred upon them at a later stage. The regulations follow fairly closely the wording of Section 2 (2) of the Act of 1948, the main point being to enable the local authorities to set up, and work through, special civil defence committees and also, in proper cases, joint committees. There are a number of subsidiary matters, into which I do not think I need go, except possibly to mention one or two of the more important of them. Provision is made for delegation by the local authorities to other local authorities, in appropriate cases and with the Minister's consent. Provision is made for the Minister himself to take over responsibility in any case, where he is satisfied that the local authority are not doing their job effectively. Provision is also made for the local authority, after consultation and again with the consent of the Minister, to carry through works which may be in contravention of certain statutory provisions but which are necessary in the effective civil defence of the country.
The other set of regulations are the Civil Defence Corps Regulations. Here the object is to enable certain of the local authorities to organise local divisions of the Civil Defence Corps. The Civil Defence Corps, as I have mentioned, is to
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be a national Corps, but the work of organising it is to be carried out by the local authorities, and it will be necessary for them to establish local divisions. Regulation 2 (2) (b) has as its object to make available to certain of the county districts the services of units of the Corps. Normally speaking, the local authority units on which civil defence will be based are the county and county borough councils, and the Metropolitan boroughs in London, but in a number of cases it may be necessary to use county districts as units. Therefore it is essential that county districts should be enabled to obtain the services of units of the Civil Defence Corps. In a similar way it will be necessary to make the services of these units available to such Departments as the Ministry of Food which, as experience showed in the last war, will be very closely concerned with problems of civil defence.
There are a number of other matters even more technical than those with which I have dealt, and which I will endeavour to explain if any points are raised upon them. But I think that with these observations I have said enough to give your Lordships a general conspectus of the situation. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft regulations as reported from the Special Orders Committee on the 6th instant be approved.—(Lord Chorley.)
4.8 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF WORKS (LORD MORRISON): My Lords, it may be for the convenience of your Lordships' House if I intervene to say that the Scottish regulations, which immediately follow these, are substantially the same as the English regulations, except in a number of minor points. If any noble Lord wishes to raise any Scottish point during the discussion on these present regulations I will do my best to answer it when I move the Scottish regulations.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, my noble friends on these Benches will be glad that these regulations have now appeared, and we shall be happy to give our support to them. I would like to thank the noble Lord opposite for having given us a rather wider account than was strictly necessary, by telling us what has been happening to civil defence since last we debated the matter on the passing of

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the Civil Defence Act at the end of last year. We on this side of the House had refrained from putting down a Motion in order to save Parliamentary time, in anticipation that these regulations would be in front of us before long.
As to the regulations themselves I have little comment to make, because they are largely a framework for the executive action which ought to take place once they have the force of law. I shall refer to that action in a moment. I would raise only one point on the Civil Defence (General) Regulations, a point about which I ventured to give the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, notice. Regulations 5 and 6 give pretty wide powers to the Minister to do all sorts of things which we are not accustomed to seeing done in peace-time. All sorts of Acts, and particularly the Town and Country Planning Act, can be overridden by these regulations. In our view, if that is done for an operational purpose it is quite all right, because I would not be one to suggest that we should leave operational action until after the damage had started. We ought to take it before. We want to be careful that regulations of this sort, which give wide powers, presumably for operational reasons, are not in fact used purely for administrative matters but only for operational matters. I am using the word "operations" in the case of civil defence operations. That is the only point I wish to make on Regulation 6. I believe the noble Lord, Lord Clydesmuir, has a point to raise presently on the interpretation of the Scottish regulations.
Now I turn for a few minutes to the wider question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Chorley. First, I think that, generally speaking, what he has told us of the activity up to date sounds quite satisfactory; it sounds as if there has been a great deal of planning already, and as if a point had been reached where it was not possible to go further until the regulations appeared. That is one reason why we are glad to see the regulations. We hope that subsidiary regulations will not be long delayed. One thing strikes me as important, and that is the appointment by local authorities of their civil defence officers. There will be a full-time officer in all but the smaller local authorities, and in those a part-time civil defence officer will be wanted.
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Then we come to the question of personnel. If I understood the noble Lord aright, he said that recruiting was due to begin in the autumn. So far so good. I think that is particularly necessary, because it strikes me that at the moment an undue burden is resting on the Armed Forces. If I understand aright the results of "Exercise Britannia," it seems to me that at the moment the Armed Forces of the Crown are so to speak, underwriting civil defence to a considerable extent. Until the Civil Defence Corps becomes properly recruited, the Army will have to "carry the can." We must be careful that we do not count our Army three times over. We are counting it once owing to the necessity of providing a field force we run the risk of counting it twice in mortgaging it, so to speak, for the assistance of civil defence; and we are counting it a third time because the people designated for those two roles are doing another job of work at the docks.
We have to be careful also about working in with the Territorial Army and the Home Guard. I shall revert to this point when the Auxiliary Reserve Forces Bill, now in another place, comes before this House. I am not suggesting for a moment that recruiting for the Civil Defence Corps need really conflict with the recruiting for the Territorial Army and the other auxiliary forces and the Home Guard, if and when it is formed. I do not take that view. But I do take the view—and this is a point I want specially to make—that unless this question of man-power is gripped now, there will be confusion at local authority level and a lack of liaison between the people designated in these regulations who are supposed to recruit civil defence people, and the Territorial and Reserve Forces Association, who are supposed to recruit the auxiliary forces and the Home Guard. If this is so it will arise from the Government's failure to co-ordinate; the weakness is between the civil defence organisation and the Ministry of Defence. I hope that by the time executive action is taken these points will be remedied. I am not pessimistic about it. I am not saying the job cannot be done. I am saying that I hope we shall be able to recruit both forces with far less friction and confusion than was done in the last war. Those, I think, are all the points I need make at this stage. We shall

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watch these matters as closely as possible, and after the Recess no doubt we shall have an opportunity of checking up again on the progress of this very necessary task. With those words I should like to support the introduction of these regulations.
4.15 p.m.
LORD CLYDESMUIR: My Lords, perhaps it would be for your convenience if I were now to respond to the invitation of the noble Lord, Lord Morrison, to raise any Scottish points. I have only one point, which is to echo a question which I raised during the passage of the Civil Defence Act. It is in regard to the position of the Secretary of State for Scotland. In the Scottish regulations, Section 5, I know that the designated Minister, if he is satisfied that a local authority has failed or refused properly to discharge any of the civil defence functions conferred upon them, may, by order, either empower himself to discharge those functions or require some other authority to do so. Now, it is possible that the designated Minister for certain functions might not be the Secretary of State for Scotland, as the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor explained in answer to a question of mine during discussion on the Bill. There are certain functions which affect the whole of Great Britain: black-out regulations are an example of that. It is possible, therefore, that the designated Minister might not be the Secretary of State, and we might have a Minister other than the Secretary of State administering a rebuke, or having to coerce a local authority to do something that they have not hitherto done.
The Secretary of State stands in a very dignified position towards the Scottish local authorities. He is in a sense the father of them all, and they are all accustomed to going to Saint Andrew's House, Edinburgh, for advice and guidance. I hope the noble Lord will be able to assure us that before a Minister rebukes a local authority, if it be a Minister other than a Secretary of State he will be in close co-operation with the Secretary of State, and that advice and guidance should be given jointly from Saint Andrew's House. I think it is very desirable that on almost all matters local authorities in Scotland should look to the Secretary of
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State for guidance and preserve a close liaison with him. That is the only point I have to raise.
4.19 p.m.
LORD CHORLEY: I am grateful to the noble Viscount for the welcome he has given to these regulations and for his remarks concerning what I have been able to state about the background against which they have been drawn up. As he said, he kindly told me in advance that he would ask a question on Clause 6 in the first set of Regulations—the General Regulations—which I confess, on the face of it, confer a great deal of power. I made inquiries about that, and I understand that the object of regulation 6 is a very narrow one. It is to enable the fire services to take necessary measures of expansion without going through the elaborate set of procedural rules which now have to be followed. As your Lordships are aware, under the Fire Services Act county and borough councils are fire service authorities; and in the performance of these duties they have to keep a close liaison with the smaller local authorities within their areas. Matters have to go backwards and forwards, and a rather complicated set of approvals have to be obtained—a situation which would be unrealistic in respect of the fire services in face of a warlike situation. The object of regulation 6 is to overcome that. I am happy to give the noble Viscount an undertaking that it will only be so used.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: I thank the noble Lord. It is precisely because I realised the point was narrow that I rather questioned the need for such wide powers.
LORD CHORLEY: I hope the noble Viscount will be content with the undertaking I have been able to give him. He may take it that no undue strain will be placed upon the military forces in connection with the civil defence. My right honourable friend and I recognise that the first duty of the Armed Forces is, every time military defence. They cannot be expected to assist with civil defence, except in so far as that first aspect of their duties has been satisfactorily carried out. "Exercise Britannia," to which the noble Viscount referred, was really a conference exercise carried through at the request of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, with the ob-

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ject of securing co-ordination with the civil defence authorities. I am happy to inform the noble Viscount that it was most successfully carried out, and the military were gratified with the arrangements, which are going forward reasonably satisfactorily.
I would not claim that in every respect things are going forward with all possible speed, but definite progress has been made in a number of directions, for example the training schools at Falfield and Easingwold have been reopened, and very soon the new Civil Defence Staff College will be opened. A great deal of careful work has been done, and we hope soon to bring other sets of draft regulations before your Lordships for approval. I think the noble Viscount may rest content that the problem of manpower is being gripped. I am glad that he could see no reason for conflict between recruiting for the Territorial Army and recruiting for the Civil Defence Corps. I am sure that we shall, in fact, be able, over the next months, to build up a fine body of men, as fine a body of men as we had before, but even better organised and trained than during the days through which we so recently passed.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

CIVIL DEFENCE (GENERAL) (SCOTLAND) REGULATIONS, 1949 CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS (SCOTLAND) REGULATIONS, 1949
4.24 p.m.
LORD MORRISON: My Lords, I beg to move that the Draft Regulations as reported from the Special Orders Committee on the 6th instant be approved. As I have already said in the previous discussion, the Regulations appertaining to Scotland are substantially the same as the English Regulations, except for some very minor differences into which I will not go, unless your Lordships especially desire it. I would therefore say merely that the Scottish draft regulations have been discussed with the Scottish County Councils' Association, the Society of Royal Burghs and the Counties' and Cities' Association, and have been generally agreed with them. The only point which they queried was whether Regulation 8 of the General Regulations
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would enable the Minister to require a local authority to take delivery of a greater amount of stores than they could provide storage space for. They have been given an assurance that in practice every effort will be made to operate the provisions of these regulations in agreement with the local authority or local authorities concerned, and it is the intention that a local authority who under the regulations, receive stores and maintenance equipment not needed in connection with their own civil defence functions should be relieved of the cost of storage. In the previous discussion the noble Lord, Lord Clydesmuir, for the convenience of your Lordships, raised a point to which I have much pleasure in replying now. The noble Lord asked for an assurance that if any Minister, other than the Secretary of State for Scotland finds it necessary to use powers of coercion over a Scottish local authority there will be prior consultation with the Secretary of State. I can give the noble Lord a very definite assurance—with this small proviso (which I am sure the noble Lord will accept): "Unless the circumstances are so urgent as absolutely to preclude it." I think the noble Lord will agree that my proviso is essential. The noble Lord knows probably better than anybody in your Lordships' House that no Great Britain Minister would take such action against a Scottish authority without the fullest consideration.
Moved, That the draft regulations as reported from the Special Orders Committee on the 6th instant be approved.—(Lord Morrison.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS (INDEMNIFICATION OF CERTAIN MEMBERS) BILL
4.27 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I do not think that this Bill need occupy your Lordships for more than a few minutes. It is a matter which primarily concerns another place. It did not take them more than a few minutes to pass it through all its stages. In view of the fact that we have suspended the Standing Orders, I ask your Lordships to do likewise. Clause 1 deals with the position of two Members of the House of Commons who were nominated to the

1323
General Medical Council by His Majesty on the advice of the Privy Council. The Succession to the Crown Act, 1707, Section 24, provides that no person holding an office of profit under the Crown created since October 25, 1705, should be able to sit in the House of Commons, and there are heavy penalties for sitting and voting, when disqualified. It came to the notice of His Majesty's Government that the position of these Members might be affected by the Act of 1707.
Provision is made under the constitution of the General Medical Council for payment of fees to members of the Council. They are not paid out of State funds, but out of moneys collected by the medical profession from registration fees. They were not the first Members of the House of Commons to sit on this Council, but this Bill does not provide indemnification for those other Members who in the past have been members of the General Medical Council, for the reason that claims to penalties against them are now Statute-barred. It was felt right that where there may have been a technical infringement of the law relating to this subject, through the Members holding these offices—which they cannot of course continue to hold—that they ought not to be penalised for having held them in perfect good faith.
Clause 2 of the Bill is to provide for a different case. Under another old Statute, the House of Commons (Disqualifications) Act, 1782, a member is disqualified to undertake any contract for or on account of the public service. If a member thus becomes a public contractor, the election is void, and there is a penalty of £500 for every day of sitting and voting while under this disability. Doubts have arisen as to the scope of this Act also, but it does not apply to a member who is a shareholder in, or director of, a company, even though he may be the sole member of a company, though it does apply to a member of a partnership however large that partnership may be. In the case provided for by this clause, there were eleven transactions extending over a period of twenty-one months, and the total sum involved was rather less than £100. The firm, of which the Member in question was a partner, was selected by the Home Office to supply them with certain equip-
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ment. They were selected because, of the various firms approached, they offered the earliest deliveries at competitive prices. The Disqualification Acts of 1782 and 1801 do not extend to incorporated trading companies, and it is only by reason of the fact that the Member concerned is a partner in a firm that he is disqualified. There is no suggestion that either the Department or the Member concerned did not act in perfect good faith, and it is considered right that he should be indemnified from the possible consequences of the breach of the Act.
This Bill is confined to the three members who are named therein, but I feel I should point out to the House, as my right honourable and learned friend the Attorney-General pointed out in another place, that we shall give full consideration to the question of whether further legislation is required and to the general question of the whole of this branch of the law. No one who has ever been a Law Officer of the Crown will fail to realise that this is a matter which constantly gives the Law Officers the greatest anxiety. People may ask their advice as to whether or not they have infringed the law, and no Law Officer that I have ever met has been able to advise with certainty on the difficult cases. I beg to move that the Bill be read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
4.31 p.m.
VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, perhaps I may say one word because I must confirm what has been said by my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack, namely, that at intervals in every Government, at any rate during the last forty years, this question has arisen. It is a very troublesome problem, arising partly because of the fact that an office of profit does not mean an office in which the holder is paid a salary but that it is the sort of office to which a salary from public funds would normally attach.
The first day I was ever in the House of Commons this was the exact question which arose. The new Government had lost one of its Whips in the course of a General Election. The result was that a Member who had already been appointed to the position of a paid Lord of the Treasury and another gentleman who had been appointed an unpaid Lord of the

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Treasury were moved up, and there had to be a new appointment to take the bottom position—that of the unpaid Lord of the Treasury. The problem was, which of the two had to go through a by-election, and I heard the two Law Officers of the day, who were Sir Lawson Walton and Sir William Robson, expounding this intricate point in turn. No less a person than Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, who, at that time, was leading the rather depleted ranks of the Conservative Party, intervened on a rather technical matter and put the thing with extreme clarity. With some spirit and indignation he said that the writ was being moved for the wrong man was being moved up. Ever since then it has been a most difficult subject. On one occasion I recollect that the President of the Board of Trade had to be protected by such an Act.
There is another point which I think the Lord Chancellor did not mention. A few years ago a member of this House whom we knew as Lord Hemingford, but who was then Sir Denis Herbert, M.P., was the Chairman of a Commission which examined in great detail what should be the qualification or disqualification of Members of the House of Commons. I gave evidence for the best part of a day before that Commission, having previously studied the subject—and I knew more about it then than I knew before or have known since. They made a series of recommendations, one of which was that it would be an advantage as soon as possible to carry a Bill to clear the matter up. The present Lord Chancellor has done much to try to clear up the Statute Book, but we cannot expect him to do this immediately. It would be a very good thing, however, if, in the near future, it was possible to revise this complicated and confused series of problems and deal with them in a way which would enable everybody in the other place who was offered a post to realise whether, if he accepted it, he would be in peril or not. That cannot be done now, but I am sure everybody would be very glad if it could be done soon.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for what he has said. May I carry the Hemingford story one stage forward? In the Clays of the Coalition Government I was asked to deal with this matter and
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to prepare a Bill. My recollection is that I did actually prepare a Bill, but I remember being told by Parliamentary Counsel that, with everything moving so quickly, new offices being created and old ones disappearing, they thought it was not an appropriate time to do it. They considered that we should wait until something like the reign of the Antonines to do it. That seems to be a long way away, but I hope we shall be able to introduce the Bill in the near future. I am grateful for what the noble and learned Viscount has said.
On Question, Bill read 2a Committee negatived.
Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended (pursuant to Resolution of July l3), Bill read 3a, and passed.

MARRIED WOMEN (RESTRAINT UPON ANTICIPATION) BILL [H.L.]
4.37 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
[The EARL OF DROGHEDA in the Chair]
Clause 1:
Abolition of restraint upon anticipation, and consequential amendments and repeals.
1.—(1) No restriction upon anticipation or alienation attached, or purported to be attached, to the enjoyment of any property by a woman which could not have been attached to the enjoyment of that property by a man shall be of any effect after the passing of this Act.
(2) The preceding subsection shall have effect whatever is the date of the passing, execution or coming into operation of the Act or instrument containing the provision by virtue of which the restriction was attached or purported to be attached, and accordingly in section two of the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, the proviso to subsection (1) and subsections (2) and (3t (which make provision differentiating as to the operation of such a restriction between an Act passed before the passing of that Act or an instrument executed before the elate mentioned in the said proviso on the one hand and an Instrument executed on or after that date on the other hand) are hereby repealed.
(3) The enactments mentioned in the first column of the First Schedule this Act shall have effect subject to the amendments specified in the second column of that Schedule.
(4) The enactments mentioned in the Second Schedule to this Act are hereby repealed to the extent specified in the third column of that Schedule.
VISCOUNT SIMON VISCOUNT SIMON moved to leave out Clause 1 and insert the following new clause:
"… Section 169 of the Law of Property Act, 1925 (which enables the Court, in a case where a married woman is restrained from anticipation or from alienation in respect of any property or any interest in property belonging to her, where it appears to the Court to be for her benefit, by judgment or order, with her consent to bind her interest in such property) is hereby amended by adding the following subsections:
'(2) The Court may treat as being for her benefit what it is satisfied would be for the benefit of a husband, child or collateral relation of a married woman whom she desires to assist.
(3) The fact that since the date when the restraint was imposed there has been a substantial diminution in the net income receivable by the married woman from the property the income from which she is restrained from anticipating or alienating may be taken into account in determining whether it should be for her benefit to bind her interest in such property.
(4) The power of the Court shall extend to removing a restraint altogether, if it thinks fit, as well as to binding her interest for the purposes of a particular transaction or transactions.'"
The noble and learned Viscount said: I have put down this Amendment because I would invite the Committee to consider whether the way in which this Bill is now drawn is really the best way and the right way to meet the difficulty. I do not deny that there is a difficulty, and it is right that we should consider the best way of dealing with it. But it has seemed to me that the method which the Bill proposes is not the best way. In any event, I would invite the Committee to consider the sort of alternative which I have put down in my Amendment. May I say that noble Lords need not run away in alarm, thinking that this is a purely technical and what is sometimes called a legalistic question? In order to understand the question you certainly have to understand what is meant by "restraint upon anticipation," but once that has been mastered the question itself is not a technical one. It is a question of public policy; it is a question of what is the right thing to do: it is a question of whether in the circumstances we ought, by a General Act of Parliament, to cancel a provision which is contained in many marriage settlements and in many wills,
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which were made years and years ago and which are now being operated according to their terms.
The Committee will forgive me if, in a sentence, I endeavour to point out what restraint upon anticipation is. The Lord Chancellor gave an accurate description of it in his speech on Second Reading and there is no doubt that this procedure has been less frequently resorted to of recent years, particularly since 1935 when Parliament passed an Act which ensured that the procedure would not be adopted in the future; that it should be void in connection with wills or marriage settlements made after the year 1935. But for many years earlier, in various circumstances it had been commonly used. When a daughter was about to be married, somebody, usually the father, although it may have been somebody else, considered what provision he would make for her during the time that she was a married woman. In a great many cases the father took advice, considering the matter carefully, sometimes with the help not only of solicitors but in many cases also of counsel. In the past the father wishing to provide for his daughter found the sum of money which he could put into the settlement—it might be so many thousand pounds—and provided that the income upon that amount during the time that his daughter remained a married woman should be paid to her regularly—by the year or by the half-year, or whatever it was. But he further provided that the money should be settled on the terms that it would be paid to her regularly, as time went on; it was not given to her on the terms that she could anticipate it. In other words, she could not sell the whole of her interest for a lump sum which might be given to her by an insurance company or anyone prepared to take it on.
That is the nature of a restraint upon anticipation, and the fact is that the father could perfectly well have secured by other ways, that his daughter did not dispose in one fell swoop of the whole of the money he was providing. He could, for instance, have established a discretionary trust. In the past, however, the practice has been to do it in this way in the case of daughters who were going to be married. The present Bill—if your Lordships will just remind yourselves of it for a moment—provides that

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"No restriction upon anticipation or alienation, attached or purported to be attached, to the enjoyment of any property by a woman which could not have been attached to the enjoyment of that property by a man shall be of any effect after the passing of this Act."
In plain English it really means: "We do not care what a father wanted, or what he may have deliberately decided. We do not care what he wanted to do with his money. We do not care if he did make this condition because he wanted to make it clear that his daughter should get an income during her married life. Be it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, that that shall be struck out from every single settlement and every single will, even though it was made thirty or forty years ago.
The question which I raise is this: Is this really a proper thing to do? Once we understand the subject matter the issue is not really a technical issue, but it raises the question of whether we ought to agree to pass a clause which will compulsorily cancel a provision which is to be found in many marriage settlements and wills that have been made in the past by fathers for the benefit of their daughters, so long as those daughters are married. There was a Committee which sat, I think in 1935, to consider whether or not this particular method should be authorised for the future. I believe the noble Lord, Lord Schuster, was a member of it. I would call attention to the fact that when that Committee reported, they reported on what should be done in respect of future married settlements and wills—that, of course, is quite right. That being so, anyone who wanted to provide money for his daughter subject to restrictions knew that he should not do it by this particular device but by some other device—as he can do at this moment. The result of that Committee's Report was that the Act of Parliament was passed in 1935. I invite your Lordships to be good enough to give me your attention while I read a short extract from it. It says:
"Provided that nothing in this subsection shall interfere with or render inoperative any restriction upon anticipation or alienation attached to the enjoyment of any property by virtue of any provision attaching such a restriction, contained in any Act, passed before the passing of this Act, or in any instrument
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executed before the first day of January nineteen hundred and thirty-six."
The meaning of that is, "We leave past marriage settlements and past wills alone. We do not think it is right to go back and alter what has already taken place, but for the future we think it right to enact that this particular form of protection or restriction shall not be effected." That was quite right. It may be that we shall hear in this debate whether or not it was ever contemplated by this Committee that Parliament ought to go behind that and say, "We do not care whether this was done before or after; we are going to take up the pen and strike this provision out of every instrument containing it, no matter when that instrument was made." I think no one ever previously proposed to cancel such a provision in documents made before 1936.
I am not at all disputing that there are cases—there may be a large number of cases—in which it would be right for the court to exercise jurisdiction, which it already exercises within certain limits, to relieve a married women from this restraint, or even in an extreme case to remove it altogether. It is already the law that a married women who finds herself unduly hampered by this restraint upon anticipation may apply to the court, and the court, within the limits of the existing permission which the Statute confers can then give her relief, if that is thought to be wise and right. The difficulty is that as the law stands at present the court can do that only if they are satisfied that the relaxation is in the interest of the woman herself. That limitation has in practice often meant that the relief was not given. I think it is a pity that we should not realise that there are two sides to this matter. I do not for a moment claim that my way of looking at it is the only way, and I hope that noble Lords who may take a different view will not think that their view is the only one. I want to urge on the Committee that there are really two classes of case, and that the only way to deal with this problem is to take each particular marriage settlement and to consider whether it is the sort of settlement in which the court should give relief.
I have indicated to your Lordships how this matter in practice arises. I ask you to consider why is it that a father—such

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as any noble Lord here may be—within the last thirty years or so may have made a marriage settlement in which he has provided money for his daughter, saying, in effect: "I have provided this money so that my daughter may enjoy this income, subject to restraint upon anticipation." It is ridiculously archaic to suggest that that was done merely because the woman might be a simple sort who could not stand up and look after her own affairs. Many women can; some cannot. That is not the fundamental reason. The reason—I speak for myself and I hope perhaps for other noble Lords here; I am sure that others in this House have done the same sort of thing—is that the father says: "My girl is going to be married and I should like to do something now to make sure she will have a certain income of her own as a married woman. In the circumstances, I think it is important that I should secure that she will get that income regularly, so long as she is a married woman, and that she will not be in the position or under the temptation to take her rights under this settlement and sell the whole thing for a lump sum with the result that for the rest of her married life she will have no secure income of her own." I am sure that there are fathers in this House who have been actuated by that motive. It is not a dishonourable motive. It does not inflict injustice on anyone, and it does not insult anyone. It is a provision made by a father who is likely to die long before his daughter, so that he can say: "At any rate I have done what I could for my girl. I have made sure that whatever happens throughout her married life she is secure in having this settled income."
I trust the Committee realise—I do not think it will be contradicted—that if we pass this clause and do not amend it, that is absolutely destroyed. Anyone who has relied on that provision, who has been actuated by that motive, is from this time forward told: "You are a fool. You have made that provision but this Bill is going to strike it out." If there was something innately wicked or selfish about the father's action I would acquiesce in this step. But your Lordships know as well as I do that it is not true that it is wicked or selfish. I think it will need very strong arguments to show that this Bill as it stands is right.
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And this is by no means the only case in which, by reason of public policy it has been thought necessary to restrict the power of commutation. There may be members of your Lordships' House—there probably are—who are drawing retired pension from the Army or the Navy, or whatever it may be. I remind your Lordships that, if such a person be here, he is not allowed to commute his pension. Under regulations he is allowed to commute a portion, because it is felt that it is not right that a man who has served the country as an officer, by giving away for a lump sum his right to pension, should find himself destitute. If that is good public policy for officers on retired pay, why is it not permissible for a father to make a corresponding provision to protect his own daughter from being rendered destitute by the dissipation of her inheritance?
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: It is hardly a corresponding provision, is it? In the daughter's case it is during coverture only.
VISCOUNT SIMON: I think I have not said anything inaccurate up to now. I think I said his married daughter. It is true, and I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for having pointed out this to me on Second Reading, though I think I have clearly understood it, that restraint upon anticipation applies only during the married life of a married woman.
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I only commented on the word "corresponding" provision. It is a very different provision.
VISCOUNT SIMON: I accept the correction. I thought there was a certain guidance to be derived from this comparison; but if my noble friend thinks not, I am content to leave it. At any rate, let it be clearly understood that restraint upon anticipation operates only during the married life of a married woman. That may be regarded as a difficulty, but it is so. I hope I have made plain and stated accurately that in many cases the father who provides the money is thinking about his daughter who is to be married and who during her married life is to be protected by being assured of this regular income. I agree that there is another class of case in which, largely owing to a change in circumstances, it would be right to give relief. That was

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the object of the Mountbatten Bill. I think it was my noble and learned friend, Lord Simonds, who presided over our Committee and reported that the Bill should become law.
LORD SIMONDS: I did not preside.
VISCOUNT SIMON: The noble Lord was a member of the Committee; I beg his pardon. As the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor pointed out, a most unusual thing happened to the Mountbatten Bill. After we had passed it in this House, when it went to another place objection was taken and the Bill had to be withdrawn. I understand that it is therefore considered desirable, and I agree, to make a new provision. The whole question is what sort of provision. I submit for the judgment of the House that the right provision is not to cancel every one of these marriage settlements and wills, retrospectively and automatically, whatever the circumstances, but to extend the power of the court, which at present is limited, to certain cases not yet covered. I included in my Amendment, as well as I could and after taking some advice, these three further considerations. As I have said, at present a court can give relief only if they are satisfied that it is for the benefit of the married woman herself. In my Amendment I suggest that:
"The Court may treat as being for her benefit what it is satisfied would be for the benefit of a husband, child or collateral relation …"
There are some married women who find their income so much reduced by, let us say, surtax that in practice what the father designed is largely defeated by the heaviness of taxation. I provide, therefore, that
"The fact that since the date when the restraint was imposed there has been a substantial diminution in the net income receivable by the married woman from the property the income of which she is restrained from anticipating or alienating may be taken into account …"
in determining the giving of relief. I agree that there may be cases in which the court might go so far as to say the restriction should be removed altogether. I admit that this class of case requires the attention of Parliament and further relief, as was provided in the Mountbatten Bill. I have not the slightest desire, any more than has any other of
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your Lordships, to interfere with proper relief in that or similar cases. I respectfully submit, however, that it is wrong, in order to do what is thought to be wise in a certain class of case, to pass this measure which says, in elect, "We do not care what the circumstances are, or what the reasons of the father were, we are going to cancel that out and alter the provision which he made"—and that though the provision wits made, in many cases, after careful reflection, because he thought the circumstances justified what he did.
I do not want to keep your Lordships much longer, but I want to call attention to one other matter. I made these; observations on Second Reading—I am afraid perhaps in rather too heated a manner, and I am sincerely sorry that I have upset anybody. But I made them because I feel that some of your Lordships were making the change without realising its full significance. I happen to have here a letter sent to me this morning by an eminent and well-known firm of solicitors who are responsible for many of these marriage settlements. Any of my noble friends interested in the status of the firm may willingly look at this letter. I have the permission of the firm to read to the House a passage from the letter: it seems to me to put the case very fairly.
"It is a fact that since 1935 such restraint has been of no effect, but there must still be a very large number of settlements made prior to that date, in favour of a woman on marriage, in which such restraint was imposed by the senior (generally her parent) expressly for her protection. Without such restraint or at least some alternative protection for her, the funds for the settlements might not have been provided."
That is to say the man who provided the money might not have been prepared to give this lump sum unless it was given in this way. The letter goes on:
"In all such settlements this protection is to be swept away at a stroke regardless of the merits of each case.
We suggest this action may well be too drastic. If it is thought that some modification of the present law is desirable to meet, for instance, a case such as was indicated in the recently withdrawn Mountbatten Bill, the wiser plan would seem to be to enlarge the powers of the Court for that purpose, even to the extent of lifting the restraint altogether in a proper case."
I am glad to be able to read that letter because it will show that I have not raised this question in your Lordships' House

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out of any desire to be obstructive. I desire nothing but this: that contracts should be carried out, that good faith should be preserved, and that the merits of the individual case should be considered.
What is to be said against this? I listened with great attention to my noble and learned friend, and his view may be held by other noble Lords. I do not think this is so much a lawyers' question as a question for the good sense of any member of the House good enough to take an interest in it. What may be said against it? I have endeavoured to list the criticisms on the other side. First, it may be said, and it would be true, that in the past this provision about restraint upon anticipation has been inserted merely as a matter of tradition, as a matter of form, without very special examination of a special case. These people in Chancery—nice people in all respects, but they are on the other side of the road!—take up their big volumes (I think I know them) and find there the provision about restraint upon anticipation. There may be cases, I admit, in which this has been put in a marriage settlement as a matter of form. But is that so in all the cases? I am sure that no one here who has had anything to do with this business will say that it is.
There are plenty of cases in which the the matter has been considered deliberately, where the one who is providing the money has discussed it with the solicitor, and possibly with the father of the young man. It has been discussed between them and they have each put in their money on certain terms—sometimes, indeed, on the advice of counsel. What I want to know is: Is it any justification for cancelling and nullifying those cases to say that there are other cases where it will do no harm to nullify them?
The second suggestion that is made is that if it is done in the way I propose, it means applying to the court. I agree that it does. Already there is a provision in law for applying to the court, but on rather too narrow a ground. If, after the event, you are going to interfere with trusts of this kind, I think it is not unreasonable to say that you ought to get the leave of an impartial, judicially-minded authority. It is suggested that it would be a great expense. I stand
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subject to correction by those fortunate persons who used to be Chancery K.C's.—I was never one—but I should have thought that in a great many cases the expense is very small. It is a simple application, supported by affidavits, not, as a rule at any rate, requiring the calling of witnesses, and it has been done in proper cases again and again. Moreover, I think I am right in saying that if the trustee of the settlement thinks it a proper application for a married woman to make, there are cases in which the trustee himself will come forward to assist. According to the ordinary practice of the law—I stand subject to correction by those who know so much more about it than I do—if the trustee makes a reasonable application, and it is granted, the costs, whatever they are, usually come out of the estate.
But there is a further consideration. We are not dealing here with an arrangement which is entered into habitually by people of all sorts and kinds. We are here dealing with marriage settlements. Though there are a great many of them—I suppose 10,000 or more—still they are settlements that are entered into by people who have some money, who consult solicitors, who appoint trustees and all the rest of it. So by my Amendment I am not proposing any burden upon the ordinary man and woman, who possibly never dream of such a thing; indeed, there are some of us in this House, if our secrets were told, who would have to tell your Lordships that we had no marriage settlements—we had no money I am talking of the people who have money and who feel they live in circumstances where it is reasonable to take advice, to draw up the document and to impose this limitation.
A third view—and I know this is the view taken by some distinguished friends of mine, and they may urge it to-day—is that this particular system is much less used than it was; it was falling off before 1935. I believe they are quite right. I suppose that was one of the reasons why the Committee to which the noble Lord, Lord Schuster, belonged recommended that in future it should be stopped altogether. But what has that to do with the question of whether it is right to strike this out in cases in which it already

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exists, and where there was every justification for putting it in? The plea:
"To do a great right, do a little wrong,"
is not supposed to have been very effective since the time of the Merchant of Venice. But let us say: "For doing good in 50 per cent. of the cases, do wrong in the other 50 per cent." Is it any better? If there is an alternative remedy by enlarging the power of the court in proper cases, I respectfully submit that `mine is the proper way.
There is one other matter to which I must refer. I hope I have made it plain that what I propose is proposed with no intention on earth of resisting the reasonable claims dealt with in the Mountbatten Bill. So far as I know, they were completely reasonable, and the fact that a Committee of this House so reported confirms that view. But I believe some people are under the impression that the Mountbatten Bill was withdrawn more or less on a gentleman's understanding that a Bill in the form of the Bill now before your Lordships would be introduced and carried. Even if that were so, it would not relieve your Lordships of your duty. But it is not so. I have asked to be provided with the terms of the Motion tabled in the House of Commons as a result of which the Mountbatten Bill was withdrawn. These are the terms:
"On Second Reading of the Mountbatten Estate Bill [Lords] to move, That this House"—
that is the House of Commons—
"declines to give a Second Reading to a Personal Bill promoted to secure an amendment of the law which, if justifiable, should be made by Public Act for the benefit of all whom it may concern."
The important words are "if justifiable." That is the whole question. What is the just way of doing this? In my respectful submission, the right way to do it is by the method I have endeavoured to suggest. I very much regret that I should have come into collision—almost a head-on collision—with the Lord Chancellor on Second Reading, and I hope he will forgive me. I trust that I have made plain to your Lordships this afternoon that I am concerned merely with trying to get in a General Act of Parliament the sort of provision which is right. There is no doubt whatever that we should never have heard of this Bill had it not been for the Mountbatten Bill. I think it was quite reasonable to seek a
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way out of this difficulty if the Personal Bill failed. But I submit, with great respect, that the method proposed in this Bill is not the right way to do it. I am glad to know that I am not alone in this, because on Second Reading (the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, could not be here then; perhaps he will say something to-day) my noble friend Lord Swinton expressed what I think is the commonsense view. He said:
"I am not saying there is act a case for relieving married women in instances in which it is justified and where it is right and reasonable to overrule the declared wishes of the testator. But that is a pretty strong thing to do. After all, if we once get into the habit of general legislation, and of feeling that we can undo all that has been done and settled in the past, we are creating a rather dangerous precedent. The Lord Chancellor admitted that that is true."
Your Lordships will judge, and I shall take the result with complete composure. I have only done my best to call the attention of the Committee to what I think is a very serious question. When your Lordships have heard the full argument, you will decide. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause I and insert the said new clause.—(Viscount Simon.)
LORD SIMONDS: My Lords, it is seldom that I have felt impelled to intervene in your Lordships' debates. I do so rather unwillingly on this occasion, for this reason. I rise for the first time to challenge the view of my noble and learned friend who has moved this Amendment, and to oppose it as vigorously as I may. I do it unwillingly, for I cannot but remember the encouragement I had from him when I first entered and anxiously addressed this House. Nor, indeed, can I forget that my noble and learned friend was already an acknowledged master of the law when I as yet lisped it in uncertain phrase—some of my candid friends may say that I do that still. But, at any rate, I have the consolation that the opening words of the speech of my noble and learned friend indicated that, at least, we have the same aim—namely, to remove a disability which in many cases is a source of injustice and sore distress. I think the only difference between us is that I would apply a more drastic surgery, and he a palliative; I by giving my whole hearted support to the Bi1l before the Committee, and he by an Amendment which, in effect, substitutes a

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new Bill for the existing Bill, and which I humbly think and fear may prove a disservice to those whom he would serve.
As my noble and learned friend said, this is really a question of what is to be done to meet a situation which demands that something should be done. Which of two remedies will the Committee adopt? I suppose the Committee, like any good doctor, when considering what are the remedies will look at the disease. What does the Bill propose to do? It proposes to remove a strange anomaly. It is called the restraint upon a married woman's anticipation during coverture. Your Lordships see how, from long familiarity, those words trip lightly off my tongue! But indeed it would not surprise me if many a man in the street—and, indeed, some of your Lordships, from conversations that I have had—were to ask me: What is this strange creature of which you are speaking? And it is a strange creature. It is an anomaly in our law, owing its existence to the conditions of a previous age and, in particular, to the status of women in a state of society which we do not now know.
Let there be no doubt about this, because my noble and learned friend has talked as if this bore some relation to a protective and discretionary trust which is imposed for the benefit of a beneficiary. It is nothing of the kind. Your Lordships will forgive me if I appear to lecture, but this is, after all, a rather technical subject in which I have spent my days. It is a cardinal feature of our law that a man may do what he will with his own, subject, of course, to the rule of law and of ethics alike that he must not so use his own as to injure another. But, subject to that, a man may do what he likes with his property, be it horse, dog, house, stocks or shares, and whatever his interest in it may be. If he has an absolute interest he may dispose of it; if he has a limited interest he may dispose of it or deal with it how he will. But upon a married woman this strange restraint was imposed, a doctrine and a device invented towards the end of the eighteenth century. Again, your Lordships can be in no doubt about this, that it was invented for one single purpose—namely, to mitigate the rigour of the Common Law, and to make sure that a husband should not use his influence or coercion in order to compel
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his wife to make her property his or to use it as he should direct. It was invented for that and for no other purpose whatever. That that is so appears plainly from this case. Suppose that a man settled his property, or part of his property, upon his daughter, then unmarried, but with the common provision that during coverture she should be restrained from anticipation. So long as she was a spinster she could do what she would with it. If she married but was later divorced, or divorced her husband, she could do what she would with it. But if she married again, the restraint, like a jack-in-the-box, would be imposed again. But if she became a widow the restraint would be gone.
It is therefore abundantly clear—and if I may respectfully say so the matter really does not bear any argument—that it was not in order to avoid this supposed influence of a husband that the restraint was imposed. It is inconceivable to me—and I could not understand my noble and learned friend when he suggested it—that a father, considering that his daughter needed protection, would attempt to provide that protection in this way. He would adopt one of the familiar ways of providing protection—namely, by a discretionary trust.
VISCOUNT SIMON: If I said "for the purpose of protecting his daughter" in this connection—although I do not think I did—I am glad to be corrected. But I must be allowed to say that, whatever may have been the origin of this, it is quite certain that a great many fathers in the last thirty or forty years have made a provision in this form on advice, because they wanted to make sure that their girl who was going to be married should, during the whole of her married life, have a regular income. The proposal now being made destroys that provision.
LORD SIMONDS: I was coming to that. I have reached the stage in my argument that in its origin this restraint was due to nothing else than the desire to mitigate the rigour of the Common Law in this respect. As your Lordships know, the Common Law was pretty harsh to married women, and it was for that and no other reason that the restraint was imposed. Is it necessary, in 1949, to say that that is regarded as an utterly outmoded manner of providing for the protection of a married woman? Surely it

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is not, because the Act of Parliament of 1935 has, by its terms, made it absolutely clear that it is so regarded. Therefore, from 1936 onwards, this restraint upon anticipation cannot be imposed. Why cannot it be imposed? Because it is thought to be wholly out of keeping with the ideas of the middle of the twentieth century. If so, something has to be done, as my noble and learned friend has so dramatically said. The question is: What is to be done? I understand that the first objection, with which I sympathise, is that in some measure this may be described as retrospective legislation—in the sense, and in this sense only, that it will in a certain respect upset a disposition previously made.
If the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition will forgive my referring in the most general way to what has passed between us in private, I know that that is a consideration of principle which weighs with him. But I would assure the noble Marquess that I am no more a revolutionary than he is. I am not an iconoclast in the temple of the law, and I would do myself no greater honour than to associate myself with him in saying that neither of us is in the least like a revolutionary. Having said that, I am not to be deterred from endeavouring to find the best remedy for what I conceive to be to-day, in present conditions, a real injustice.
Now this question of the principle of retrospective legislation demands, I think, a moment's consideration of the history of the matter. As your Lordships have been told, this doctrine was born towards the end of the eighteenth century; and by the third part of the nineteenth century it had become such common form that, irrespective of the character and propensities of the lady, restraint upon anticipation was always imposed upon her interest. Whether it was done by a testator's will, providing for a number of his daughters simultaneously and settling their shares, or whether by marriage settlement, it was absolutely common form; and it formed a precedent. The status of married women generally was receiving some consideration by that time, and I think my noble and learned friend, who sat at the feet of John Morley (it is strange to find in him a champion of restraint upon married women's interests !) will remember that this trend towards equalisation of the status of
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women began to find its way towards the latter part of the nineteenth century; and in fact it was felt, in regard to the matter which your Lordships now have under consideration, that a restraint that was meant to protect remained to injure.
Accordingly, in 1881 a breach was made in this principle, for by the Conveyancing Act of 1881 married women were enabled to apply to the court, and the court could, if it thought fit and that it was to her benefit, "lift," as it is sometimes called, or remove the restraint upon anticipation. Now, here was a breach. Here was a settlor, a father who, anxious to provide for his daughter, was determined that whatever befell she should get until the end of her life the whole income from her fortune. Yet she could go to the court, and for the will of the testator the court substituted the judgment—
VISCOUNT SIMON: In that particular case.
LORD SIMONDS: Of course, I have said it was a particular case and for her benefit. There is something rather Olympian about the court. But, whatever happens, you have substituted for the will and the resolution of the testator the will and resolution of an old gentleman sitting in the Strand—that and nothing else. The testator would say, in effect, "This is my will my money, my daughter; and I want her to have this interest up to the end of her life." But the court could upset the settlor's intention, which would be defeated. There is a particular case of retrospective legislation. That could apply to any settlement that is in existence.
Observe again, my Lords: suppose you vote for this Amendment, what happens to a senior who has settled his property, the settlement being made after 1881, upon the footing that the daughter or whoever it may be will be restrained from anticipation—knowing nevertheless, we will assume (though truly it is a fantastic admission) that an application may be made to the court to remove restraint and that if the court thinks it for her benefit it will remove the restraint? That disposition was made in the belief that the daughter would benefit, and it is upset because the court thinks it to remove the restraint for her benefit in the sense that it is for the benefit of a collateral. Once

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more, the settlement is upset. Surely this principle is getting a little frayed at the edges already. This, surely, is not a case where you need fear that as an instance of restrospective legislation it will let loose the floodgates upon established rights.
I fear I have taken up too much of your Lordships' time, but in considering the two remedies I have, I am afraid, dealt only with the remedy which the Bill itself proposes and have paid little attention to the remedy proposed by the Amendment. I may have been somewhat out of order in that respect. But now I want to consider the remedy and to face the realities of the situation—forgive me if I put it in that way. I have been, as my noble and learned friend has not, through many years face to face with this sort of case, and therefore, though my judgment, Heaven knows, may be wrong, I speak out of practical experience. I want to take a normal case of a lady who is in distress through no fault of her own. I do not fix my eyes on great fortunes and special circumstances, such as were present in the Mountbatten case. That clearly, upon its own merits, was a Bill that deserved to become an Act; and it was a strange thing to me that some spirit of egalitarianism found an unaccustomed resting place in the breasts of those who opposed it—apparently on the ground that all married women should be treated alike. That is not the sort of case that I have in mind.
I have in mind the case of a married woman who has a small settled fortune, let us say a sum of £10,000, bringing in, being invested in trustee securities, say some £300 a year, subject to tax. She has a husband who earns a modest salary, and she has a family. Upon her descends one of the many misfortunes that befall mankind: illness, or her husband being out of a job, or something of that kind. Or she may desire to provide a better education for her children, or perhaps to get one of them out of trouble, or whatever it may be, and she wants to raise a modest sum of, say, £500 or £1,000. But she cannot do it, and she is in distress. Now what does this Amendment tell her to do? It says, "Go to the court." But, my Lords, going to the court is not like going to the Post Office and buying a stamp. Going to the court means going to a tribunal which exercises a dis-
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cretionary jurisdiction, and it will want to be well assured on the facts before it exercises that discretion in favour of the applicant.
So this distressed lady will go to her solicitor; and her solicitor, I expect, will say "Well, this is not the sort of matter that comes the way of solicitors every day: I must take the opinion of counsel." They go to counsel versed in these matters, and they put before him all the facts. In the meantime, time passes and expenses mount for this distressed lady. And what is counsel going to say? If counsel gives advice as counsel, he will say, "This is not a matter of law; this is a matter of discretionary jurisdiction, and where it is a matter of discretionary jurisdiction it will depend upon the idiosyncrasies of the particular judge." No counsel will advise that you are certain to succeed. Particularly, he will tell you that you are not certain to succeed when he looks at the Amendment which the noble and learned Viscount has put forward. What then happens? She says: "May I perhaps succeed?" He says: "You have a fair chance of success." Then she asks, "And how much will it cost?" I do not know quite what the answer would be, but I feel sure that I am well within the margin if I say that he would be bound to reply:" It will cost you at least £50." Then she would say: "How can I find £50 when I am already in this distress? I cannot make the application." Therefore, in the normal case for which I speak, distress will mount upon distress and this Amendment would provide no remedy.
I am aware, as everybody must be aware, that there may be cases in which the settlor, testator or such person as the noble and learned Viscount in moving this Amendment has envisaged, solemnly sits down and says to himself: "My daughter needs protection. She does not need it when she is a spinster; she will need it when she is married. She will not need it if she is divorced, and she will not need it if she is a widow." It is suggested that he then says, "What I will do is to settle her property subject to restraint." I do not believe that there was ever such a man in this world. If he thought that his daughter needed protection, he would adopt the perfectly familiar practice of having what is called a "discretionary trust," which would put the funds in the

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hands of trustees and provide her with an income until such time as she might become, say, bankrupt, and then with trusts over to the benefit of the beneficiary's family. If any of your Lordships says that as a father he sat down and considered the matter in the former way and deliberately adopted that method of protecting his daughter, I should believe him, but I should regard him as a very strange father. In my long experience, I do not think. I ever came across such a case.
No, the remedy which the noble and learned Viscount suggests in his Amendment just will not work. If it will not work, what are you going to do? I suggest that now, in this Year of Grace, you should take your courage in both hands and abolish this outmoded relic of an ancient day. Will your Lordships not say that the dead hand of a testator shall no longer press down upon living necessity? Will your Lordships not allow a man and a woman who are married and have to meet their common problems together to plan their own lives and to deal as they think best with their own fortunes? You are not dealing with children; you are dealing with men and married women. Will your Lordships not allow them to plan their own lives? Will not your Lordships, at least those who sit on the Opposition Benches, listen to them when they say: "Surely the planners plan enough for us in our lives. Save us at least from the planners who plan for us from their graves." I feel I have detained your Lordships too long, but, with reference to what I read in the Second Reading debate, I think that if I have felt and spoken strongly, at least I have not spoken warmly. I hope that this Amendment will be rejected.
5.34 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, a layman with no legal knowledge who intervenes in a debate of this technical character, it will be agreed, shows courage of no mean order. I must confess I feel rather like Daniel entering the lion's den, after listening to a rather prolonged bout of roaring and gnashing of teeth. But I must say a few words with regard to the Amendment which has been moved by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon. Stripped of its legal trimmings, what is the purpose for which
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this Bill is being introduced? As I understand it—I speak entirely as a layman—it is to deal with certain cases in which, say, a man has made a settlement on a woman—his daughter, grand-daughter or whomsoever it may be—in a period before the year 1935 (I think that is correct), being at the time of sound mind and probably having taken skilled legal advice, and has included in the settlement a particular provision to limit the power of this lady to control her capital during the period of her married life. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simonds, that it is important to emphasise that point. A man may have done this, not to protect his daughter or granddaughter from the consequences of her own extravagance but to protect her from the danger that, she having married some young mail who might be either disreputable or merely extravagant, he might make away with her fortune; alternatively, the parent or grandparent may have done so for the reason which was mentioned by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon" in order to provide her with an assured income for the remainder of her married life.
As I see it, the settlor may have been wise or unwise to adopt this special procedure of restrain upon anticipation. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Simonds, seemed to think him not only unwise but presumably almost mad to do such a thing. He said that it was inconceivable that a man should do such a thing now. I do not think it is at all inconceivable that a man should try to give a protection to his daughter against possible extravagances on the part of her husband. I have no daughter but, speaking as a father, I should have thought it quite a natural thing to do. If I may say so with all deference, I do not think it right for the noble and learned Lord or anybody else to say with such certainty what a settlor would have done in present circumstances, since the settor may have made this settlement fifteen or twenty years ago. The real fact remains that we are assuming quite deliberately in these cases that a sailor did use that method, and that he had a perfect right to do so at the time. As was said by the distinguished solicitor in the letter which was read out by the noble and learned Viscount Lord Simon, very likely the

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man would not have made that settlement at all without a provision of that kind.
It is no good talking about the dead hand. It is not a question of a dead hand. It is a question of a man who made a settlement, which he had a perfect right to make; he put in whatever provision he liked and he put in this particular provison, which he intended to be there. It is perfectly true that at a later date Parliament passed a law, as I understand it, making that particular clause inoperative in any future settlement, but it did not make that law retrospective. In view of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simonds, has said, that was presumably because Parliament felt at that time—and I think rightly felt—that it had no right to interfere with settlements already made, or to embark upon anything of that kind, which would be embarking upon a very slippery slope indeed. But, contrary to what was done by Parliament at that time, this Bill has the effect of removing all such protection as we have in mind, protection which was given after careful thought by the settlors.
As I understand it, the argument is that such a novel step is justified by the change in conditions which has occurred in this country since those settlements were made. Of course it is perfectly true—and all of us would recognise it—that there have been very great changes, due to increases of taxation and so on—unpleasant facts with which we are all too painfully familiar. But I cannot feel that that justifies Parliament in entirely removing a protection which the settlor himself so carefully and so intentionally provided. Yet that is what the Bill does. It does not replace this original protection by some other form of protection—by discretionary trust or whatever it may be; it simply washes out the protection altogether, and that, as I see it, is entirely contrary to what was intended by the man who settled the money. That seems to me to constitute a most dangerous precedent. Once Parliament approves the nullification of settlements legally arrived at for a definite purpose, I do not know where that process is going to stop.
I am not so confident about this as the noble Lord, Lord Simonds, was. I think that it is an extremely slippery road on which we are treading if we pass the Bill
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in this form. What is undoubtedly true, the times having changed in the way they have, is that there is good ground for arguing that the court to whom the appeal is made to deal with a settlement should have a greater discretion in revising its terms. I think everybody would agree with that. That would still protect a lady who benefits under a settlement against the danger which is anticipated by the settlor, but it would make allowances for unforeseen changes in our situation which the court might very properly wish to take into account. As I understand it, that is the purpose of this Amendment and I believe it to be the right and only way of dealing with this problem. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Simonds, said that it would be much too expensive, and that in the case of smaller fortunes a considerable proportion would be swallowed up by legal fees, and that therefore the intentions of a settlor would to some extent be defeated.
LORD SIMONDS: If I may just intervene, I said merely words to the effect that the expense would be a deterrent.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Well, that it would be a deterrent. I do not know whether that is correct; the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, might not entirely share that view. But I do not wish to come down on one side or the other—indeed, I am not in a position to do so. However, in any case, if it is true that the right thing cannot be done by reason of mere machinery and expense it is a dreadful commentary on legal procedure. I should have thought, if that were the case, the right remedy was to make the procedure less expensive, not to scrap the right method of dealing with it. It would be quite wrong for Parliament to reject the right solution, a solution which they knew to be right, and remove any protection for reasons such as that. Lord Simonds also said that he and Lord Simon had the same aim—they both want to use surgery, but, as I understood it, his surgery would be rather more drastic than Lord Simon's. If I may say so with all deference, I prefer Lord Simon's surgery to that of Lord Simonds, because Lord Simon proposes merely to remove the appendix when a patient is complaining of discomfort, whereas Lord Simonds seeks to remove every appendix, whether it is diseased or

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not I cannot help feeling, whatever be the noble and learned Lord's protestations, that that is rather a revolutionary procedure.
I am not here to give advice to the Committee; I think this is eminently a case where the Amendment should go to a free vote. It is, I think, an issue about which people should be competent individually to judge for themselves. Some may take a different view from others, but for the reasons which I have stated, and in spite of the very cogent arguments which have been produced by Lord Simonds, I think this Amendment is a right and proper way in which to deal with this very complicated problem. Feeling as I do, I shall have no option but to go into the Lobby in support of it.
5.46 p.m.
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: May I add a few words on this? I shall endeavour to be as brief as possible, first because I expressed my opinion when the matter was before the House on the last occasion, and secondly because my noble and learned friend Lord Simonds, has expressed very clearly a good many of the views which I myself would have been glad to put before the Committee. There is one thing I should like to say by way of supplement to his observations—namely, that I cannot agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Simon as to the reasons for the restraint. Ever since I went to the Bar I have heard reasons given for the invention, in the year 1786, I think, of the method of putting a restraint on anticipation. The reasons have always been that it was to protect the wife against the improper tyranny of her husband. Although I have not brought any references here to that statement, Lord Davy, the greatest equity lawyer for many years, expressed that opinion quite clearly in the case of Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart. It could be only to protect the wife against the husband because, after the marriage settlement or the settlement by will has come into operation, the daughter whom it is said the testator or settlor is trying to protect has the simple method of executing a deed removing the restraint before she goes to the wedding. She is entitled to do it by a deed if she so pleases, and because before the marriage the property is hers she can do what she likes with it.
VISCOUNT SIMON: May I ask for information? My noble and learned friend speaks with great authority, but am I wrong in saying that a marriage settlement which contains a restraint is made in prospect of the marriage and usually contains a clause that if the marriage does not take place the property is to go elsewhere? I certainly do not understand—although I shall be corrected by those who know more about this than I do—that in the ordinary marriage settlement made in contemplation of marriage, the lady can do what she likes with this lump sum until the moment that she goes to church.
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: She can do what she likes until the moment of marriage, and if the settlement is executed before marriage—and in probably ninety-nine cases out of a hundred it is made three or four days before the marriage—she is perfectly entitled to remove the restraint on anticipation, because at that moment she is not subject to the restraint. That my noble and learned friend will find if he cares to look into the cases.
So I start with the very strong opinion that the restraint has all along been imposed to protect the woman against her husband and his influence. That being so, I think it is fair enough to consider whether, in the circumstances that now exist, the restraint is or is not for her benefit. I am strongly of the opinion that if it can be shown that it is still for the interest of the great body of married women who were subject to restraint before the year 1936 that the restraint should remain, then this Bill is wrongly conceived, and the Amendments or some of them ought to be made. But for my part, having a long experience, I think that for the great body of married women who are concerned, it is in their interest that the restraint should be removed. Now it is asked: If it is for their benefit that it should be removed, why was it ever imposed?
The fact is that the position of married women since the end of the eighteenth century has been so greatly altered—and it is in the process of being altered now, as the years go by—that the arguments in favour of this restraint when it was invented and for many years after it continued to be in force, have now become almost worthless. The cases of which I am thinking are cases in which a married

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woman—I am considering only the interests of a woman during marriage—has found that the income which was settled upon her by her father or some other relation or friend is about half now what it was when the deed was executed. It is not only taxation which has brought that about. The cost of living has greatly increased, and it is very likely that in a number of cases the woman concerned can no longer exist on the footing of the income of the settled property; and it may be that her husband is unable to help her.
In those cases, as I know from practical experience, the common desire of the married woman is to be allowed to work. At present, the effect of the restraint upon anticipation is that she cannot work in the management of a small or large business or trade, because she does not possess the necessary capital to start and carry on until such time as her enterprise is on a proper footing. In such a case, while the restraint exists, there is the greatest difficulty in doing anything of the sort, and the Committee which sat under the chairmanship, I believe, of my noble and learned friend Lord Wright, observed in somewhat caustic language that it was rather improper, or that it approached impropriety, for a married woman whose whole property was restrained from anticipation to start in trade. That is the sort of argument that has impressed me very much, and I venture to think that, on the whole, this measure is for the benefit of the general body of married women.
I wish to say just a few words on the subject of the Amendments. We have not had very much opportunity for discussing them. Subsection (2) of the proposed new clause reads:
"The Court may treat as being, for her benefit what it is satisfied would be for the benefit of a husband, child or collateral relation of a married woman whom she desires to assist."
That is, to my mind, something exceedingly new, because the ordinary case where restraint is removed is a case in which the children are not any worse off than before. The restraint is removed so that the married woman can borrow money from an insurance company or some institution of that sort, and the insurance company is given a right against her income for a certain number of years and, of course, there is a policy of insurance against her death. That entails
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further economy by the married woman for a certain number of years—for seven years or ten years, it may be—but it does not do any harm to her children; they remain in absolutely the same position as regards their benefits under the will or settlement.
I do not know whether members here or in the other place will think it right that collateral relations should be given such a benefit, if the court considers the matter as being for the woman's benefit in the sense that it is satisfied that it would be for the benefit of collateral relations. I do not know how that is to be dealt with by the judge. There were a number of these cases when I was sitting in Chambers and had to deal with them. According to the Court of Appeal, discretion had to be exercised on the narrowest grounds and with the greatest care. Bearing in mind that injunction from the Court of Appeal, I doubt very much whether a court of first instance would be willing to exercise its discretion under subsection (2) as proposed.
Still less do I see how a court is to deal with the fourth subsection proposed. This reads:
"The power of the Court shall extend to removing a restraint altogether, if it thinks fit, as well as to binding her interest for the purposes of a particular transaction or transactions."
On what grounds is the judge to exercise discretion of that sort? There are now, I think, five judges of the Chancery Division. There were six in my time. These judges sit separately and the discretion is to be exercised in Chambers. I cannot see that there is any likelihood of a general rule being laid down which would bind the various judges. The result, I think, would be that some of the judges would think that restraint upon anticipation should always be removed. They have not to consider whether it is for the benefit of the wife or not; they have to consider what they think fit. Some of the judges, on the other hand, would, I assume, take another view, rather like the view of my noble and learned friend, Lord Simon, and refuse to exercise their discretion.
VISCOUNT SIMON: May I be forgiven for asking my noble friend if he has before him the existing provision? This is merely proposed to be added to the existing provision. The existing provision requires that before a court exer-

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cises its discretion in the lady's favour, it should appear to be for her benefit. It follows, therefore, that the proposed subsection (4) is to be decided by reference to that consideration and is not to be treated as though it were not part of the existing section.
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: My noble and learned friend is quite right. I had for the moment forgotten that there were these preliminary words which do not appear in the Amendment. But it does not greatly alter my argument. Some judges will think it is for the benefit of every married woman that the restraint should be removed, others will take the view that it is seldom or never for her benefit. Speaking from a large experience, I do not know of a single case where so wide a discretion has been given to the court in cases where the discretion is exercised in Chambers and generally does not come to the knowledge of the public at all.
These are my honest feelings as to the Amendment. I think that it is exceedingly ill-judged and would put the courts into a very great difficulty. I have always admitted that there is something to be said for the other side. There is some weight in the argument that this measure is of a retrospective character—all that I do not shirk at all—but I answer all those arguments by saying that, from my experience, which goes back far longer than I could wish, I think the measure before us without the Amendment is, on the whole, in the interests of married women. That is a sufficient reason for making retrospective this provision, which has been in existence for twelve years, and has not been proved to have resulted in any grievances whatever and has been accepted by the profession as reasonable. On these grounds, I support the Bill and object to the Amendment.
6.1 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I can reply to this debate, I hope, briefly. I have known the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, in many rôles and he has played them all with charm and distinction; but I must confess that if I had been asked to select an unlikely man to take the line he did, I should have chosen the noble and learned Viscount himself—and I mean to pay him a compliment. It seems to me that he is adopt-
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ing an attitude which has no relation to the facts of the day.
On the last occasion the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, asked how it came about that this Bill was introduced; they had heard nothing about it in the Government programme. The explanation was quite simple. A Private Bill was introduced and following our practice was referred to the Personal Bills Committee. The Personal Bills Committee is the successor of what used to be the Estates Bills Committee, which had been functioning for hundreds of years. I have looked up the records so far as I can, and I am confident that I am right in saying that for the last hundred years the House of Commons have never questioned anything which that Committee have done. I believe I should be right in saying that is true for the last 200 years; indeed, the actual illustrations I found of the House of Commons querying what that Committee did are dated in Queen Elizabeth's time. The Personal Bills Committee is in a quasi-judicial position. Just as this House in its other capacity pronounces what the law is, so that Committee is a quasi-judicial body which deals with Bills on that footing.
It was greatly to my surprise, as one who values tradition, to find that when the Mountbatten Estate Bill came before another place, it was proposed by a number of Members, for whom I have respect and regard, by a notice of Motion in terms which the noble and learned Viscount read out, that:
"This House declines to give a Second Reading to a Personal Bill produced to secure an amendment of the law which, if justifiable, should be made by Public Act."
As to its justifiability—if there is such a word—that was proved conclusively by the fact that this judicial Committee had pronounced on it, and never before had there been any question of an action of that Committee. It was in those circumstances, finding that this Bill which had been passed by our Committee was objected to in another place, that I took such soundings as are usually taken on these occasions. I am not making any complaint, because in taking informal soundings, one can obtain only the best advice that the person sounded is able to give. I thought the best thing to do was to introduce this Public Bill. I had neither lot nor part in the fact that the

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Mountbatten Bill was withdrawn, because it was withdrawn on the terms of the notice of Motion. That is how the present Bill came along.
Let me consider the rights and wrongs of the position. I do not want to give a lecture on the law—I am afraid I did that on the previous occasion—but I should like to point out how fundamentally different this doctrine is from the doctrine of trusts. It has nothing whatever to do with trusts. Taking the illustration of discretionary trusts, the beneficiary is not the owner, the trustees are. The odd feature of restraint upon anticipation is that the woman is the absolute owner of the property. If one tried to say at one and the same time that a man was to be the owner of that property and to be restrained on what he was doing with his own property, one could not do it. It would be repugnant, This is how Lord Aylwin explains Lord Thurlow's reasoning:
"Reasoning thus, making her the owner of it and enabling her as a married woman to alienate it, might limit her power over it, but the case of a disposition to a man who, if he has the property, has the power of alienating it is quite different."
Therefore, the first principle to make out is that this doctrine applies to a woman because she is a woman, and that it could not apply to a man. Secondly, that it applies to a woman only during the period of her coverture.
I agree with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simonds, says, that if a father were really apprehensive about his girl, believing she was wild and flighty, he would not impose restraint, which would operate only during her married life; he would subject her to a discretionary trust. If on the previous occasion I became a little heated, and I am afraid I did, I hereby make my apology in the fullest manner I can. The noble and learned Viscount was enunciating some doctrine such as this. For boys there is the discretionary trust; for girls there is restraint upon anticipation. If we remove this for girls and do nothing for the boys, then we are being unfair to the boys—another injustice to the men! Putting it shortly, I think that was the burden of his song. But the truth of the matter is that a discretionary trust applies equally to boys
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and girls, and has absolutely nothing to do with the doctrine of restraint upon anticipation which, in my belief, is now entirely out of date.
Your Lordships will remember what the Committee which considered this matter in 1935 said:
"We have come to these conclusions; (a) that however useful it"—
that is, the doctrine of restraint—
"may have been over a century ago when it was invented and received the approval of the Court of Chancery, its continuance is no longer consistent with the present position of married women to whom alone it applies."
It is not consistent with the position of married women.
VISCOUNT SIMON: Its continuance.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Its continuance is no longer consistent with the position of married women. It is true that 1935 was only fourteen years ago, but therein I think lies the fallacy. During these fourteen years we have lived through a period during which change has gone on at a pace which makes it seem not fourteen years, but a hundred. If it were true in 1935, that the continuance of this doctrine was no longer consistent with the position of married women, how much more true is that today?
I claim not to be an iconoclast about the law. I claim to be one who wants to uphold the tradition and pillars of the law. I say, frankly, that I do not believe you render a service to the law by trying to uphold an anachronism. I claim that the policy which I am asking your Lordships to accept—namely, to put an end to this restraint by Statute straight away—is much more likely to be carrying out the wishes of testators than the policy which the noble and learned Viscount is advocating. It must have been imposed before 1935, because there could he none after that. If testators could have seen the conditions of to-day, I venture to think that in the vast majority of cases they would have said: "Had I realised what was going to happen, could I have foreseen the state of affairs in the Year of Grace 1949, I would never have dreamed of imposing a restraint." I claim, therefore, that I am carrying out the wishes of testators. But the noble and learned Viscount, who holds up his hands in horror at my

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alleged offence of interference with these wills and testaments and so on, is himself doing it by his Amendment. I do not think his Amendment is a very happy one. I feel there was a sufficient amount of obscurity and uncertainty in the law before, and I am bound to say that I think this Amendment would increase the obscurity. It seems to me that if this Amendment were accepted we should have a great deal of uncertainty about the position. It is easy to say that the law ought to be cheaper, and that sort of thing—I am appointing a Committee to try to make it cheaper—but there is no doubt that this method of applying to the court would cost a substantial amount of money, which in many cases can be ill-afforded.
I am not here to protect the rich people. I concede at once that the fact that a man has rendered distinguished service to his country is no earthly reason why he should be treated in these matters differently from anyone else; nor why his wife should be treated differently. But I would ask this question: If it be right to pass the Mountbatten Estate Bill—do not forget that it was passed by this judicial committee, and by this House—what Bill of that nature are you going to refuse to sanction? That will be a precedent. Is it really to be said that everybody can now introduce a Bill, and the Bill will go through easily—although at great expense—but that we must not have one General Bill to achieve what we can certainly achieve by a number of Bills? That is the position, and I must say that it seems to me wholly lamentable. I ask your Lordships to say that it is about time this antiquated document was done away with; and that, in the circumstances of to-day, it is defeating and not carrying out the wishes of testators. I very much hope your Lordships will not insist upon carrying this Amendment in the form in which it has been moved.
6.16 p.m.
VISCOUNT SIMON: We have had an interesting and lively debate, and I do not think it is necessary for me to say more than a few words now. I would like to assure the Lord Chancellor that I have listened with great care to what he has said, as I have also listened to what was said by my noble and learned friend Lord Simonds. But now we under
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stand the matter, the issue is this, and nothing more: there are some cases in which it would be right to give relief from the restraint on anticipation, and there are other cases in which it would not be right. Then which of two courses shall we pursue? Shall we do what this Bill proposes, and strike this clause out of every past document, whether it is justified or not? Or shall we make an improvement in the law which will enable the relief to be given in the cases in which it ought to be given? That is the whole issue.
What I have proposed, substantially, is not in the least contrary to the view taken in the Mountbatten Estate Bill. This would be the means by which that relief would be given—and, so far as I can see, ought to be given. I am quite confident, with all respect to those who have spoken the other way, that there are other cases in which it ought not to be given. Are we then going to strike it out in a hundred cases, when only a portion of those are cases in which it ought to be struck out? That is the whole issue. That being so, I am sorry, but I cannot see my way to withdraw the Amendment. My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor has given the fairest possible account of the origin of this business. I accept any correction as to my law, equity or anything else that anybody likes to administer. But I have the impression that in these matters we want a decision which is consistent with justice to everybody. It is justice in a great many cases to give this relief, and in other cases it is not justice. Therefore, we ought to discriminate. In conclusion, I would point out only that in 1935, when the Committee reported on this matter, and used the language which my noble and learned friend has just quoted, what they said was that the continuance of this particular restraint—which I agree is open to many criticisms—was no longer justified. What happened? They recommended that it should be declared in future not to be effective. Parliament accepted their recommendation, and passed an Act which said that in future it would not be effective. But as recently as 1935, so far as I can see without any dispute from anybody, they went on to say, what I would expect them to say: "Though we are altering this for the future, we are not attempting to tamper

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with contracts of the past." That is the issue, and I am afraid that I must ask your Lordships to divide.
Resolved in the affirmative and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
Clause 1 agreed to.
Remaining Clause agreed to.
First Schedule agreed to.
Second Schedule [Enactments Repealed]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move—
Page 4, line 9, leave out ("'from anticipation or'") and insert ("'is restrained from anticipation or from alienation' and the word 'or' where it occurs for the third time.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)
Second Schedule, as amended, agreed to.

REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE BILL [H.L.]
6.25 p.m.
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bill: the Amendments proposed by the Joint Committee made.
Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended (pursuant to Resolution of July 13), Bill read 3a with the Amendments, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
On Question, Whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 28; Not-Contents, 23.

CONTENTS

Jowitt, V. (L. Chancellor.)

Maugham, V.

Marley, L.

Samuel, V.

Morrison, L. [Teller.]

Addison, V. (L. Privy Seal.)

Nathan, L.

Carrington, L.

O'Hagan, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Clydesmuir, L.

Pakenham, L.

Gainsborough, E.

Derwent, L.

Pethick-Lawrence, L.

Huntingdon, E.

Gifford, L.

Rochester, L.

Scarbrough, E.

Henderson, L.

Saltoun, L.

Holden, L.

Shepherd, L. [Teller.]

Hall, V.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Simonds, L.

Margesson, V.

Macdonald of Gwaenysgor, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Cholmondeley, M.

Manvers, E.

Broughshane, L.

Salisbury, M.

Onslow, E.

Cawley, L.

Townshend, M.

Selkirk, E.

Hawke, L.

Killearn, L.

Albemarle, E.

Simon, V. [Teller.]

Merthyr, L.

Bessborough, E.

Swinton, V.

Polwarth, L.

De La Warr, E.

Radcliffe, L.

Fortescue, E.

Amherst of Hackney, L.

Schuster, L. [Teller.]

Halifax, E.

Brassey of Apethorpe, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

CIVIL AVIATION BILL [H.L.]
House in Committee (according to Order), on re-commitment of the Bill: the Amendment proposed by the Joint Committee made.
Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended (pursuant to Resolution of July 13), Bill read 3a with the Amendment, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

HOUSING BILL
6.30 p.m.
Amendments reported (according to Order).
Clause 4 [Power of local authorities to make advances for purpose of increasing housing accommodation]:
THE PAYMASTER-GENERAL (LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR): My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 5, line 28, leave out ("improvement, repair") and insert ("repair, improvement").—(Lord Macdonald of Gwaenysgor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 7 [Power of local authorities to provide board and laundry facilities]:
LORD LLEWELLIN LORD LLEWELLIN moved to add to the clause as a new subsection:

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"( ) A Justices' licence granted under the Licensing Acts 1910 to 1934 for the sale of intoxicating liquor in connection with the provision of facilities for obtaining meals and refreshments under this section shall only authorise the sale of such liquor for consumption with a meal and a local authority shall in carrying on any activities under this section be subject to all enactments and rules of law relating thereto including in England and Wales the enactments relating to the sale of intoxicating liquor in like manner as other persons carrying on like activities."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Amendment which stands in my name. In this Bill the Government seeks—I do not know why it is necessary—to take power to run restaurants in connection with the municipal housing estates, as well as to provide laundry services. Laundry services are, of course, a new provision which we discussed earlier in connection with this Bill and I am not raising that matter now. I do not know why it was necessary to include this provision for restaurants in connection with these new housing estates. Your Lordships will realise that under the Civic Restaurants Act, which was before this House in 1947, a local authority already has the power to run a civic restaurant where there is a need. It is true that the restaurants contemplated in the present Bill are to be only for those who live in that block of flats or on that particular [housing estate. If there is a real need the local authority can well apply the powers they have already under the Civic Restaurants Act.
Clause 7 of this Bill states:
"(1) The power of a local authority under Part V of the principal Act to provide housing accommodation shall include power to provide, in connection with the provision of such accommodation for any persons, such facilities for obtaining meals and refreshments"—
that is the word to which I particularly wish to draw your Lordships' attention—
"…as accord with the needs of those persons."
"Refreshments," as your Lordships would expect, include alcoholic beverages. We had a considerable discussion when the Civic Restaurants Act was before this House as to whether it should be permissible for local authorities to apply for a licence. There are only three possible courses open to the authority in this case: to apply for the full licence, which is a general publican's licence; to apply for a licence to serve drinks with a meal;
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or not to apply for any licence at all. During the Civic Restaurants Act discussions, the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, put down an Amendment providing that no licence should be granted in any circumstances to any civic restaurant; and the original attitude of the Government on that measure was that the authority should be allowed to apply for any licence. A happy compromise was reached, on an Amendment proposed by myself, that they could apply for a licence to have drinks with a meal; it was not thought right to turn civic restaurants into the kind of place where there was a cocktail bar, or even a bar where a noble Lord could lean on his elbow and drink his pint of beer.
I want to know the Government's intention in regard to this new power for which they are providing in this measure. Do they intend that the local authority may be able to apply for a full licence, to apply for a licence for drinks with meals, or not apply for a licence at all? If, within this Parliament, after extremely careful discussion, we have adopted one principle in regard to the Civic Restaurants Act we should surely adopt the same principle in this Bill. It may be said by the noble Lord in charge of the Bill that the Government do not want the local authorities to apply for a licence. But what is likely to happen when a case comes before a licensing bench? It will be said by interested parties that in the Civic Restaurants Act Parliament was careful to say that civic restaurants would get a licence only for drinks with meals, but that in its 1949 Housing Act (as this Bill will become) no such provision was made by Parliament; and that therefore in regard to restaurants of this sort it is clearly the intention of Parliament that the local authorities should be able to apply for a full licence. Advocates would call in aid that principle in applying to a bench for the licence.
I say that what was good enough for the Minister of Food in his Civic Restaurants Act ought to be good enough for the Minister of Health in his Housing Bill. I think it would be deplorable if we did anything else. I am delighted to see the noble Viscount the Leader of the House is in his place. When we discussed this matter before he said, in regard to an absolutely similar Amend-

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ment to this one, put down by myself, that the Government had given
"much thought to making a sensible and reasonable arrangement to meet the necessities of the case."
A "sensible and reasonable arrangement" is exactly what is contained in the words I am now moving. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 8, line 12, at end insert the said new subsection.—(Lord Llewellin.)
LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: My Lords, neither I nor any other noble Lord could possibly take exception to the fine tone and temper in which this Amendment was moved. When I hear an Amendment moved in so excellent a tone, I am always inclined to be sympathetic towards it; but I am very much afraid that on this occasion I shall not be able to accept this Amendment. We prefer the words in the Bill unamended.
LORD LLEWELLIN: I like the words in the Act.
LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: If we take them unamended, I think that were I to read them in my way, we would see in them a little more value than the noble Lord has given them. They are:
"The power of a local authority under Part V of the principal Act to provide housing accommodation shall include power to provide, in connection with the provision of such accommodation for any persons, such facilities for obtaining meals and refreshments … as accord with the needs of those persons."
In the first place, the local authority, having got their housing estate, have to examine the position: should they or should they not have a refreshment room inside the housing estate? They consider that, which is a far greater question than the one posed in the Amendment on the Marshalled List. Having considered that, they decide, "Yes, we will provide accommodation for meals and refreshments." The local authority make that decision. They then deal with the point of refreshments and say: "Shall we make any special reference to the type of re-freshments?" The Bill says: "If the local authority are the people to be entrusted with the bigger, major decision that they shall have a refreshment room, they ought also to be able to determine
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whether the refreshment shall be of one nature or another nature. If you entrust them with a major operation, then entrust them with a minor operation." Having done that, they have in mind the drinking facilities to be provided. I was saying last week privately to the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition that I was very disturbed at the attitude taken over the "clubs and 'pubs'" Amendment—that he seemed to ignore the facilities provided in the area for drinking and that in some areas the drinking facilities today were far too many. The Amendment unfortunately put in the Licensing Bill last week seemed to have no regard to the drinking facilities already provided. The Government take a strong stand on this question. They say: "The local authority with their knowledge are able to decide, first in regard to a restaurant. They are the only people to decide whether it is in accord with the needs of the persons on the housing estate—and nobody else—that a drinking licence should be permitted."
LORD LLEWELLIN: But even under the terms of this Bill, the local authority can only apply to the licensing justices. The local authority will not be deciding this question even if the measure goes through as it is.
LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: That is right. That brings me to my second point. When they have decided that they will apply to a licensing authority, what does this Amendment do? It restricts the licensing authority. The Government feel that this is a case where no applications are likely to be made. The Government have made no reference to licensing or intoxicants; they have kept them out of the Bill, and it is better to keep them out of the Bill. You have to remember that when the ordinary housing estate is erected it seldom exceeds 300 to 400 houses. On most housing estates there are not more than 600 to 700 adults to be found. In my opinion, there will be few of those refreshment rooms decided upon by local authorities, for the reason given by the noble Lord—because they will already have a civic restaurant. I am certain that the number of applications for a licence will be near zero. The whole township and all the visitors can frequent a civic restaurant because they have a limited

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licence. The question is, should we in this Bill limit licences for these very small housing estates in the area of a local authority? I want to tell your Lordships that I see no hope of this Amendment being accepted—none whatever. On the question of the Amendment itself, what surprises me is this. This Bill was for weeks before another place, and it has been before this House for some weeks, and there has been no reference to this point before.
LORD LLEWELLIN: I had an Amendment down on Committee stage. Unfortunately, because I was away it was not moved. That was the first occasion when we could have done it here.
LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: I agree. But here is something fairly new raised at a rather late stage in the proceedings of the Bill. If you were to carry this Amendment to-day, we would meet with another difficulty which would have to be considered before we forced it to a Division. The business in another place before the Summer Recess is well cluttered up. If this Amendment is carried by your Lordships' House, I am advised that it is questionable whether the Bill can be disposed of before the Summer Recess. I am not putting that forward in the form of a threat; I am putting it forward on definite advice that it is very doubtful indeed, if this Amendment were carried, whether the necessary arrangements could be made to have the Bill back in this House and agreement reached before we rose for the Summer Recess. In that case, the operation of the Bill would be delayed for at least three months. I thought I should tell the noble Lord that before he forced his Amendment to a Division. Our feeling is that the point under discussion ought to be left to the local authority. They will decide on the question of refreshment rooms, which is by far the bigger question involved; and they will also decide on the smaller question of refreshment. I cannot accept the Amendment.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am not going to intervene on the substance of the Amendment which has been moved by my noble friend, Lord Llewellin, but I am going to say something with regard to the last few words spoken by the noble Lord opposite. I quite realise that those words were not
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uttered in any way as a threat. I do not take them as such, but more as a statement of fact. The Leader of the House will realise the great difficulties in which we work in this House. We have hurled at us by another place a great amount of legislation in the last weeks before we separate for the Summer Recess. We are always being told: "You must not amend this or that because it will mean that it will interfere with the arrangements for the rising of Parliament." I do not think that is really an argument which ought properly to be put to us. It was used in argument as a statement of fact.
LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: Yes.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I do not think it is an argument that should be put to us because, if the worst came to the worst, it would always be open to the Government to sit a day or two longer before they separated for the Summer Recess. I think it would be shocking if they did rise to go on their holidays and thus delayed the coming into operation of this measure for three months. The House of Lords would not be to blame; it would be the Government who insisted on rising at an earlier date. We shall come to our decision purely on merit. If it does mean a great pressure of business, I am perfectly sure that the Leader of the House and I can talk it over and be able to fit things in so that all will eventuate as we hope. I would not be ready to advise my own supporters to refrain from voting on an Amendment because it might mean sitting a day or two longer.
6.49 p.m.
LORD ROCHESTER: I confess frankly that I am not a little surprised at the attitude of the Government. I deplore that attitude. When I discussed this matter on the Civic Restaurants Act, I spoke on this important issue and it was keenly debated on an Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin. If I may recall your Lordships' attention to the circumstances, we were indebted to the noble Viscount the Leader of the House for bringing us together and securing this compromise. What I want to point out is that the Government cannot very well get away with this, even with the special pleading of the noble Lord the

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Paymaster-General, because the issue seems to me to be a simple one. When I saw the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, on the Order Paper, I said to myself "Is Saul also among the prophets?"
It was an accident of circumstance that the noble Lord was not in his place to move the Amendment during the Committee stage. We recognised that. If we had known about it other members of your Lordships' House would gladly have moved the Amendment for him; but we did not know. What I want to point out is that the issue seems to me to be simple. I concede the point that this provision is confined to the housing estates of a local authority on which they decide to place a refreshment room. But as the Bill stands at present, the local authority would be enabled to apply for a full justices' licence—I see the noble Lord agrees. Surely the Government must accept this Amendment, if only to be consistent. These words are in the Civic Restaurants Act, and I hope the Government will reconsider their decision. The Paymaster-General has said that the Minister is adamant, but surely the Minister of Health can be persuaded to make some concession on the same lines as the Minister of Food. I shall regret it if the House has to divide on this issue, but I shall follow my noble friend, Lord Llewellin, in voting against the Government if the House does divide.
I hope, however, that no such difficulty will be presented to your Lordships. I would be bold enough to ask whether the noble Viscount the Leader of the House cannot see his way to intervene to help us on such an issue as this. Could not we delay the final decision on this issue until a later stage? I cannot help feeling that if the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, and the Paymaster-General got together, they would be able to persuade the Minister of Health to be more conciliatory about this. But if this is forced to a Division, I shall be compelled to vote against the Government in support of Lord Llewellin.
LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: My Lords, all I can say, with the leave of the House, is that I see no hope of settling this by reserving a decision until a later stage. One does not like to disregard a plea by Lord Rochester, and when he and Lord
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Llewellin are in combination one feels something ought to be done. I am loath to say anything which may lead to a Division and an insertion of these words in the Bill, but on instructions I am sorry to say that I can give no undertaking whatever that if the matter is left over the position will be any different in a week's time. If the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, has any confidence in further talks on the matter, I am quite prepared to consider them, but I see no opportunity at all of compromising on this issue.
LORD LLEWELLIN: My Lords, the noble Lord has spoken frankly, as we would expect, and I hope I shall be equally frank. I think it is quite wrong in the same Parliament to make two different provisions—namely, to give a local authority power in one case to come along and ask for a full justices' licence, and, when the clerk of the court looks it up, to say "You realise this application is not made under the Civic Restaurants Act; this application is made under Section 7 of the Housing Act, 1949, and so we are perfectly in order." If the noble Lord has his way, that will be the exact position. I can tell the noble Lord that quite a lot of this Housing Bill is a reenactment of legislation which was previously in force; but a great deal of it, as I think I said once before, consists of a certain amount of verbiage about which nothing much is likely to be done. This is the Government's Housing Bill, and not ours. It is for them to decide whether or not they would like it held up because they cannot be consistent between the Civic Restaurants Act and the Housing Bill. That is not for us.
When we have had careful and earnest discussions, as the Leader of the House will remember, when we persuaded the Government to assent to exactly the same words in the Civic Restaurants Act less than two years ago, and when, apart from the general Government for which they were speaking, the Home Secretary, the Minister of Food, the Leader of the House and Lord Henderson were all in complete agreement personally and the matter was carried in this House, I do not see why the Minister of Health should not fall into line with his colleagues. Therefore I advise the House to insist now on this Amendment and, if necessary, to insist upon it if it comes back I from another place.
VISCOUNT ADDISON: My Lords, I seem to be the victim of circumstance in this particular case. I well remember the discussions to which the noble Lord refers, and it is true that we arrived at the arrangement embodied in the Civic Restaurants Act. So far as I understand, it is also true that if this Bill stood simply as it is it would be open to the local authority, if they had the consent of the justices, to obtain a licence for such a thing as a cocktail bar. If the noble Lord's words were put in, they would not be able to do that. Until three-quarters of an hour ago the matter was quite new to me. Being concerned with other matters, I was not aware of this particular difficulty. I would suggest, without giving any undertaking, that if the noble Lord would be good enough to let us have a further talk about it, perhaps we may reach some solution.
LORD LLEWELLIN: My Lords, if I may speak again by leave of the House, I am always ready to fall in with any suggestion made by the noble Viscount. If I may, by leave of the House, I will withdraw my Amendment now and I give notice that I will put it down again on Third Reading. If we can have talks in the meantime, I hope we shall find that the Government will be consistent in regard to these two matters. I appreciate that the noble Viscount cannot give me an undertaking now. One realises that on Third Reading an Amendment cannot be altered by further oral amendment, and I will try to word my Amendment so that it exactly reproduces the words of the Civic Restaurants Act. In the meantime, we can have talks and reserve our right to divide. I hope that by the time we come to the Third Reading our talks will have been successful. On that condition, I ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 21 [Amounts, and payment, of improvement grants]:
LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment to correct a clerical error.
Amendment moved—
Page 16, line 18. after ("executing") insert ("the").—(Lord Macdonald of Gwaenysgor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 23 [Conditions to be observed with respect to dwellings]:
LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move—
Amendment moved—
Page 18, line 12, leave out from ("subsection") to first ("to") in line 13 and insert ("at a time when they are required").—(Lord Macdonald of Gwaenysgor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 27 [Provisions as to further improvement grants]:
LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 34, leave out ("in relation") and insert ("with respect").—(Lord Macdonald of Gwaenysgor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: My Lords, this and the following Amendment are both drafting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 35, leave out ("for the time being apply") and insert ("are for the time being required to be observed").—(Lord Macdonald of Gwacnysgor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 6, leave out from ("occasion") to end of 1ine 11, and insert ("the condition as to rent applicable by reason of the giving of assistance, on the last occasion shall be deemed to be the condition as to rent applicable also by reason").—(Lord Macdonald of Gwaenvsgor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 28 [Provision as to dwellings improved under Housing (Rural Workers) Act, 1926]
LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: My Lords, the next three Amendments are drafting Amendments. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 15, leave out from ("which") to ("for") in line 17, and insert ("conditions contained in the Housing (Rural Workers) Acts, 1926 to 1942 ").—(Lord Macdonald of Gwaenysgor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 20, leave out ("the conditions aforesaid") and insert ("conditions contained

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in the Housing (Rural Workers) Acts. 1926 to 1942 ").—(Lord Macdonald of Gwaenysgor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 21, leave out ("the Housing (Rural Workers) Acts, 1926 to 1942") and insert ("those Acts").—(Lord Macdonald of Gwaenysgor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 30 [Provisions as to security of tenure of tenants]:
LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential on a previous Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 23, line 27, leave out from ("is") to ("to") in line 28 and insert ("at a time when the conditions specified in subsection (1) of section twenty-three of this Act are required ").—(Lord Macdonald of Gwaenysgor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 43 [Amendment and extension of s. 7 of the Building Materials and Housing Act, 1945]:
LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 33, line 6, leave out ("other") and insert ("remaining").—(Lord Macdonald of Gwaenysgor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LICENSING BILL
7.2 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a Third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD ROCHESTER: My Lords, I feel rather like the bridegroom who, with his best man, was waiting very nervously for his bride, who was late. He got very agitated and he kept his head down. The best man said to him: "Have you lost anything; have you lost the ring?" But whatever the best man said he could not reassure the bridegroom. Finally, the best man demanded: "What have you lost, man?" And the bridegroom replied: "I've lost my enthusiasm." I, too, am in
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that predicament to-night; I have lost a good deal of my enthusiasm for this Bill and yet I feel that there is enough good left in it to justify it being given a Third Reading. I deplore the fixing of the latest permitted hour for the sale of liquor at 10.30 p.m. instead of 10 p.m., and still more do I regret the provision for intoxicants to be sold and consumed in certain clubs in London until 2.30 a.m. I believe it to be a libel on our tourist visitors from overseas to suggest that they require any such extension.
However, the provisions in the Bill eliminating private profit by disinterested management, thereby removing any incentive to encourage drinking, is clear social gain and in the best interests of the community. Especially am I grateful for the Bill's total exclusion of young people under the age of eighteen from employment in liquor bars throughout the country. I hope, above almost all else, that clubs may yet find a place in the Bill before it receives the Royal Assent. I therefore support the Third Reading of the Bill, albeit with rather less enthusiasm than I anticipated when it was first introduced.
On Question, Bill read 3a with the Amendments.
Clause 5 [Provisions as to licences in suspense in State management districts]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I am going to move two Amendments. We anticipate, with good reason, that one of the Bills which will receive the Royal Assent when the Royal Commission sits in a few minutes time is the Lands Tribunal Bill. That being so, I propose that there should be inserted into this Bill these references to the Lands Tribunal assuming—as we all confidently do—that what happens in ten minutes time will give the Royal Assent to the Lands Tribunal Bill. We shall then have this Bill in Order. I beg to move the Amendment to Clause 5 which stands on the Order Paper in my name.
Amendment moved—
Page 8, line 11, leave out from ("by") to ("for") in line 16 and insert ("the Lands Tribunal.
( ) For the purposes of any reference to the Lands Tribunal under the last foregoing subsection, section five of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919 (which relates to costs) shall have effect with the substitution)—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD LLEWELLIN: My Lords, I rather wondered why we did not put this in during the Report stage. The explanation which has just been given by the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack justifies us, I think, in making this new Amendment on the Third Reading.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the position with regard to Scotland is rather different. There will have to be an interregnum in Scotland in respect of Lands Tribunal work. It is for that reason that I am moving the second Amendment which your Lord ships will find on the Order Paper. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 8, line 22, at end insert—
"( ) In the application of this section to Scotland, subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall have effect as if, for the words 'the Lands Tribunal' there were substituted the words the Lands Tribunal for Scotland,' and the following proviso were inserted at the end of the said subsection (2), that is to say:
'Provided that until sections one to three of the Lands Tribunal Act, 1949, come into force as respects Scotland the expression "the Lands Tribunal for Scotland" shall be construed as meaning an official arbiter appointed under the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, and the following provisions of the said Act of 1919, that is to say, section three thereof (which relates to procedure), section five thereof (which relates to costs) as modified by sections five and ten of the said Act of 1949, but with the substitution for references to the acquiring authority of references to the Secretary of State, and section six thereof (which relates to the statement of special cases) as modified by section ten of the said Act of 1949, shall apply for the purposes of this subsection.'"—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.

SLAUGHTER OF ANIMALS (SCOTLAND) BILL
7.6 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill, the Slaughter of Animals (Scotland) Bill, be given a Second Reading. I commend this Bill to your Lordships both for its merits and
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for its brevity. It contains only two operative clauses and its effect is to extend the provisions of the Slaughter of Animals (Scotland) Act of 1928 so that all animals—and not as at that time all animals with the exception of swine—will be humanely killed in knackers' yards and slaughter-houses in Scotland. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Earl of Selkirk.)
LORD MORRISON: My Lords, I have only to say that this Bill has the full blessing of the Secretary of State for Scotland. We will do all that we can to assist its speedy passage.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

ROYAL ALEXANDRA AND ALBERT SCHOOL BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to with Amendments: the said Amendments considered and agreed to.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
LORD MORRISON: My Lords, before the adjournment during pleasure I am asked to say that it is proposed that the House should meet formally at 4.15 p.m. to-morrow for the purpose of receiving the Airways Corporations Bill, which is expected to come up from another place.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ROYAL COMMISSION
7.15 p.m.
The following Bills and Measures received the Royal Assent:

Lands Tribunal,

Merchant Shipping (Safety Convention),

Superannuation,

U.S.A. Veterans' Pensions (Administration),

House of Commons (Indemnification of Certain Members),

Alexander Scott's Hospital Order Confirmation.

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Royal Bank of Scotland Officers' Widows' Fund Order Confirmation,

City of London (Various Powers),

People's Dispensary for Sick Animals,

Teignmouth and Shaldon Bridge,

Harwich Harbour,

Royal Alexandra and School,

Church Dignitaries (Retirement).

Parochial Church Councils (Powers) (Amendment).

Pastoral Reorganisation.

House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

BARNSLEY CORPORATION BILL
Reported, with Amendments.
AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills, without amendment, and re-committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

HOUSING (SCOTLAND) BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and to be printed.
House adjourned at twenty-six minutes past seven o'clock.