Lords Sitting of 7 July 1949

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
3.5 p.m.
BARNSLEY CORPORATION BILL
Read 2a.
LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (MONEY) BILL
Read 2a.
MERSEY TUNNEL BILL
Read 2a.

LEGAL AID AND SOLICITORS (SCOTLAND) BILL
3.6 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF WORKS (LORD MORRISON): My Lords, the objects of the Bill are, first, to make legal aid and advice more readily available in Scotland for persons of small or moderate means, and, secondly, to provide for the establishment of a Law Society of Scotland which will include all practising solicitors. Part I of the Bill, which deals with legal aid and advice, does not differ in principle from the English Legal Aid and Advice Bill, which has already been given a Second Reading in your Lordships' House, but it has been drafted in sufficiently wide terms to ensure that the new arrangements will preserve the peculiar Scottish characteristics of the existing system. The representation of poor persons by counsel and solicitors in civil and criminal cases in Scotland has a long and honourable tradition dating back to Acts of the Scottish Parliament of the years 1424 and 1587. This tradition has gradually developed into a familiar and comprehensive system under which assistance in litigation is available in the Court of Session, in the High Court of Justiciary and in the sheriff courts.
The present arrangements for representation are that, as regards proceedings
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in the Court of Session, the Faculty of Advocates nominate annually counsel for the poor, and the legal societies appoint solicitors to act as poor's agents. In the sheriff court agents for the poor are nominated annually by the local practitioners, and the sheriff has power to nominate if there are insufficient volunteers. There are at present no statutory income limits but, generally speaking, a person who wishes to avail himself of the poor's roll procedure must not have a weekly income in excess of £3 together with 12s. 6d. for each child or dependant. Under the present procedure an applicant goes to a solicitor on the poor's roll and states his case. The solicitor, in turn, obtains a certificate of means and refers the application to the reporters on probabilis causa, who are local practitioners. The reporters consider the application and, if they are satisfied, recommend to the sheriff that the applicant should be admitted to the benefit of the poor's roll. If the sheriff admits the application the case proceeds as a poor's case without fees being charged, but the poor litigant remains liable for solicitor's outlays. In criminal cases there is an agent for the poor in attendance at the court. In the sheriff court, if a poor person pleads not guilty, a solicitor and, if necessary, counsel are available for his defence, and in the High Court of Justiciary the services of counsel are always available.
When the Bill was considered in another place it was suggested that, while legislation is usually introduced with the expressed purpose of improving a particularly scandalous situation, no such claim could be made in support of the present Bill. It is true that the history of legal aid in Scotland reflects the utmost credit on the legal profession, and it would be ungenerous not to pay due acknowledgment to the extremely meritorious way in which counsel and solicitors have in the past made their services available in poor persons. The existing system, however, is subject to criticism in present-day conditions. First, the income limits are generally regarded as being too low. The cost of living has risen considerably, and wages have risen; and while more people are in need of legal aid fewer are eligible for it. Secondly, those who may be eligible for legal aid are still required to pay their solicitor's outlays and out-of-pocket expenses, such as the travelling

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expenses of witnesses and the cost of copying documents, which may form a very substantial part of any bill of expenses. Thirdly, the litigant is always liable to have the expenses of the other side awarded against him if he loses the action, with the consequent possibility of being ruined financially. Fourthly, the absence of facilities for free legal representation in the smaller courts, such as the burgh court and the J.P. court, has long been felt to be a grievance.
In these circumstances, and in similar circumstances in England, a Committee on Legal Aid and Advice was set up under the chairmanship of Lord Rushcliffe in 1944, and their Report was published in May, 1945. A corresponding Scottish Committee was appointed in November, 1945, under the chairmanship of Mr. John Cameron, now Dean of the Faculty of Advocates, to consider the detailed recommendations of the Rushcliffe Committee and to frame a corresponding scheme for Scotland with the necessary modifications. The Cameron Committee reported in May, 1946, and the principles embodied in their Report have been accepted by the Government and are followed in this Bill. The general objects and scope of the Bill were the subject of confidential discussions between the Lord Advocate and representatives of the principal Scottish legal societies in the autumn of last year. Thereafter, when the Bill had been published, fuller discussions took place and the Bill has since been considerably amended in another place to meet such criticisms and objections as were put forward on behalf of the legal profession.
Part I provides for three forms of assistance, depending on the needs of the applicant, which will be made available under the Bill. The first of these is legal aid proper, that is to say, assistance in the conduct of litigation which under Clause 1 will be made available in the principal courts of law in Scotland. These courts are specified in the First Schedule of the Bill. Certain types of proceedings are, however, excepted meanwhile, for the practical reason that although the Bill represents an extension of the present system it is not possible at this stage to say how far the extension can be carried without overloading the profession. For this reason legal aid will not initially be available in the many tribunals of various
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kinds, but there is power by the affirmative Resolution procedure to extend the scope of legal aid to cover both particular courts and particular types of action.
Clauses 2, 3 and 4 provide that legal aid shall be made available to those whose disposable income does not exceed £420 a year and whose disposable capital does not exceed £500. Clause 4 and the Second Schedule provide that in assessing a person's disposable income or capital deductions will be made for taxes, rates, rent and other items specified in the Bill. In the outcome, legal aid will be available to a substantially greater number of persons in Scotland than ever before. A person with a disposable income of less than £150 a year and a disposable capital of less than £75 will receive legal aid free of cost and will not be asked to contribute towards the expenses of the action. If his disposable income and capital exceed these sums he may be required to contribute towards the cost of the litigation, but his contribution will in no circumstances exceed half his income over £150 a year together with his excess capital over £75. The complicated business of assessing a person's means will be undertaken by the National Assistance Board. It is also provided in Clause 2(3) that an assisted litigant's liability for expenses awarded against him if he loses his action will be limited to the amount, if any, which in the opinion of the court is a reasonable one for him to pay.
The second facility provided by the Bill may be described as intermediate legal aid; that is, assistance in asserting or disputing a claim where the question of legal proceedings has not yet arisen. This is provided for in Clause 5. As the cost of this form of assistance will be appreciably less than the cost of legal aid in court actions a less complicated method of assessing means has been adopted, and the applicant will simply satisfy the solicitor that he comes within the financial scope of this particular type of legal aid. The third form of assistance, which is provided for in Clause 7, is legal advice. This will normally consist of such oral advice as can be given at a single interview, although the solicitor giving the advice will be able to provide a written note where he thinks such a course desirable. To qualify for this form of assistance the applicant will require to satisfy the solidi-

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tor that he cannot afford to obtain professional advice in the normal way, and will pay a nominal fee of 2s. 6d.
These three forms of legal assistance will, under Clause 6, be provided by such advocates and solicitors who volunteer and who will have their names placed on the lists to be prepared for various districts. The assisted litigant will be free to select any solicitor and, where necessary, counsel from these lists. Counsel and solicitors will be remunerated for these services from the Legal Aid (Scotland) Fund, which will be financed from moneys provided by Parliament and from contributions by litigants. But in no case will the litigant be required to make any payment direct to the counsel or solicitor who acts for him. Clauses 8 to 11 provide for the preparation and administration of the scheme of legal aid and advice. As recommended by the Cameron Committee, this will be a matter for the legal profession itself, and the scheme will be drawn up by the Law Society in consultation with the Faculty of Advocates. The scheme will be subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, who will be the Minister responsible to Parliament for the provision of legal aid and for such expenditure from public funds as may be necessary. The scheme will provide for a Central Supervisory Committee consisting of representatives of the Law Society and the Faculty of Advocates, and representatives of the public who will be nominated by the Secretary of State. For expeditious local administration Scotland will be divided into a number of areas, and there will be local committees consisting of local practising solicitors in the more populous districts and local representatives elsewhere.
The operation of the scheme can best be illustrated by considering the course of an individual application for legal aid. The applicant will normally apply to the office of the local committee, where he will be shown the list of solicitors for his district. He will then inform the solicitor of his choice of the reason why he wishes to take proceedings and give a rough estimate of his means. If the case appears prima facie to come within the scope of the scheme, the solicitor will prepare an application and submit it to the local committee for their consideration.
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If there appear to be reasonable grounds for taking proceedings, the local committee will refer the case to the National Assistance Board to assess the means of the applicant. If the applicant's disposable income and capital bring him within the scope of the scheme, the local committee will then assess his contribution, which will be either the sum needed to meet the expenses of the proceedings or the maximum contribution assessed by the National Assistance Board, whichever is the less, and will issue a legal aid certificate in his favour. The solicitor will then conduct the case to its conclusion, and, where necessary, the services of counsel and expert witnesses may be provided. If the assisted litigant wins the case, any expenses recovered will be paid into the Legal Aid Fund, and the assisted person will be entitled to any balance once the cost of the proceedings has been met. If the assisted litigant loses the case, however, his liability for the expenses of the other side will be limited to such sum as the court considers reasonable.
There will be a simple procedure for criminal cases where it is not possible to investigate means before the accused appears in court. In such cases the accused will be entitled to receive aid initially without examination of his financial resources. If he pleads not guilty he will be required to state his means and to apply for a legal aid certificate before further representation is authorised. If he pleads guilty a solicitor will be there to represent him.
As already indicated, the main responsibility for running the scheme will be left to the Law Society of Scotland which will be constituted under Part II of the Bill. This Part of the Bill, which provides for the establishment of the Law Society, reproduces with certain modifications the provisions of the Solicitors Amendment (Scotland) Bill which was introduced in your Lordships' House last Session by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Normand (who I hope will take part in the discussion following), but which, by agreement, was not proceeded with. There is at present no unified Law Society in Scotland, and the General Council of Solicitors, elected by existing legal societies in terms of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act, 1933, has no mandate to speak for the profession as a whole. The

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lack of such a society has long been felt, and the new society will be welcome to lawyers and a convenience for consultative purposes to Government Departments and the public generally. There will be no restriction on membership, apart from the requirement to possess a practising certificate, which will be issued by the Society or, in the interim, by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue. The allegation that the Society will constitute a "closed shop" is met by the explanation that the only qualification required for membership is a professional one. Every solicitor will be required to have a practising certificate as a condition of engaging in practice and these certificates will in future be issued by the Society. I may add in parenthesis that practising certificates in England have been issued by the Law Society since 1932.
Clause 20 requires solicitors to keep separate bank accounts for clients' moneys, and ensures that a solicitor will not unknowingly use clients' moneys for business purposes. This is a useful provision which will provide for proper accounting and will also constitute a safeguard against peculation. The last clause in this Part of the Bill which need be specifically mentioned at this time, and perhaps one of the most important provisions, is Clause 22, which provides for the establishment of a Guarantee Fund to compensate persons who may suffer loss by reason of dishonesty on the part of any solicitor or a servant of his. A similar Guarantee Fund already exists in England, and the establishment of such a fund in Scotland, which has been voluntarily proposed by the profession, will be welcomed by the public. The Guarantee Fund, I am informed, will be entirely supported by annual contributions (probably of £5) from the profession. I do not think that I need add any more beyond commending this Bill as a useful and important measure which will do much to enhance the existing law of Scotland. I beg to move that this Bill be read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Morrison.)
3.26 p.m.
LORD NORMAND: My Lords, the noble Lord who has just spoken on behalf of the Government referred to a Bill for the introduction of which I was
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responsible about a year ago. That was a solicitors Bill, which was introduced by me at the request of the General Council of Solicitors in Scotland. I must acknowledge that Part II of this Bill now before the House is a great improvement on the Bill which I introduced. I am grateful to the Lord Advocate and to others who have co-operated in amending the provisions of the Bill which I proposed and presenting the present Bill in the improved form in which it now stands.
I do not think that that Part of the Bill has provoked any serious controversy in Scotland. There are a few dissidents, but I believe that all dissent will disappear and will be replaced by willing co-operation once the Bill is in operation and it is realised that the Bill preserves complete autonomy for the new Society which is to be established. That autonomy is preserved not only in the administration of the Society's affairs, in the regulation of questions of discipline and in the Guarantee Fund, to which the noble Lord referred, but even in the Society's very constitution, which is not to take final shape until all qualified solicitors in Scotland have had an opportunity of considering and debating the scheme to be put before then by the General Council. The method of procedure to be adopted will ensure that everybody who is interested will have an opportunity of being heard and of objecting to any part of the scheme to which he has a reasonable objection.
I believe that the Bill will solve in a most satisfactory way the difficult problem of constituting a Society of which all solicitors must be members. The need for a Society of this kind, comprehending the whole legal profession in Scotland practising as solicitors, was, I think, manifest some years ago. When I had the honour to be a Judge in the Court of Session, difficulties in the Division arose in correction and discipline proceedings which occasionally came before the Court because the General Council had no funds at their disposal with which to present these cases. There were other reasons which made it highly desirable that a Society which was comprehensive should be created, and with the introduction of a Bill providing for legal aid on the scale laid down in Part I of this Bill the creation of a uniform and all-comprehensive society of solicitors became inevitable. There could be no

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satisfactory administration of Part I of this Bill without a Society such as that which is to be created under Part II.
I now turn very briefly to Part II. I shall not take up much of your Lordships' time because I shall be careful not to raise points which I know are going to be raised by other noble Lords, and particularly by my noble and learned friend Lord Reid who, when he was Lord Advocate, was concerned with the preliminary investigations which have led to the formation of the provisions of Part I. I know that many people have formed great expectations from the introduction of these measures of legal aid in England and Scotland, and I hope that all their expectations will be fulfilled. But it is also certain that they are attended with very great risks. The machinery set up by this Bill is by no means simple and easily worked. It may easily degenerate into a cumbersome and dilatory choking of the administration of justice. It may also greatly exceed the costs upon which the original estimates of the expenses involved in it were framed. What is more important even than that is that it may easily bring about a spirit of litigiousness, which is one of the greatest misfortunes from which any people can suffer.
I am thankful to see that certain forms of action are excluded from the scope of the Bill. I need mention only one—actions for defamation for verbal injury. It would be a great misfortune, I think, if the State were in any way to finance actions for defamation. It has been greatly to the credit of the Scottish people that defamation is a form of action which is very rare in that country—much rarer in proportion than it is in England. It was remarked as long ago as the end of the seventeenth century by Lord Stair, the great Lord President of the Court of Session, that "actions for defamation are much rarer with us than they are with the English." I think the reason at which he hinted was that Scots people were so confident of the good repute in which they stood that they could afford to ignore those who maliciously attacked them. Another good reason is that many Scotsmen believe that the surest way of damaging one's character is to raise an action for defamation, even if one is successful. At
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any rate, I hope that nobody will ever suggest that the State should finance actions for defamation; nor, for that matter, for breach of promise of marriage, or for damages for the enticement of a spouse.
Another danger which is imminent in the Bill is the risk that the legal profession, by accepting in this shape some financial aid from the State, may sooner or later come to be subservient to, or dependent on, the State. That would indeed be the gravest peril of all. But I believe that these dangers, great as they are—and I think they are in no way prevented by the words of the Bill—can be prevented by the spirit in which it is administered. I believe it to be of the utmost importance, in the first place, that in framing the schemes which it will have to frame under the terms of the Bill for the administration of legal assistance, the legal profession should be allowed the utmost flexibility. After all, in Scotland we have had an experience of administering legal aid for 500 years, and we have nothing to learn about that, either from Governments or from any other country. If it is left to the legal profession of its own volition to carry out these duties under this scheme, there is far more likelihood of success and far more likelihood of dangers being avoided than if any busybody begins to put his fingers into pie.
The second point I would like to make about the administration is that it will call for the utmost vigilance on the part of the solicitors and members of the Faculty of Advocates who are concerned in it. If it is laxly administered the costs will soar, as we have recently seen with other affairs in this country; litigiousness will grow, and then there will be an outcry that the legal profession is failing in its duty and ought to be brought under some form of public control. Therefore, it is to the legal profession in Scotland, which has always responded to the call of duty ix this matter of legal aid for the poor, that I would address an appeal that they should co-operate in the administration of the measure vigorously and vigilantly in order to ensure success.
One of the problems which the Bill has had to face is a proper distribution of the rule-making powers between the court and the Executive. On the whole, I believe that a proper distribution has

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been achieved, but I wish to call attention to one point of administration. There is cast upon the court the duty of making rules and keeping the rules abreast of the changes which will from time to time take place in the administration. When I went to the Chair of the Court of Session nearly fifteen years ago, I had little to do except judicial work and the internal administration of the affairs of the Court. But when the war came there were thrust upon me all the duties which the various Acts of Parliament passed in the emergency and afterwards brought upon the Lord Chancellor in England. And my task became one of the greatest difficulty, because I was equipped with no staff for carrying out these duties. Every rule that was framed had to be framed by the Lord President.
In the last three years, since I left the Court, these duties have been very much increased, and I know that the burden which falls upon the Lord President just now is almost unbearable. There is nobody in Scotland, or indeed anywhere else, more capable of bearing heavy burdens than Lord Cooper, and nobody more willing to spend himself to the utmost limit in the discharge of his duties. But there are cast upon the Lord President burdens which no single man ought to be asked to bear. Those burdens not only fall upon him personally, but they may in the long run seriously interfere with the efficiency of the judicial work of the Lord President. The judicial work of the Lord President ought to come first, and therefore I say that the time has come to assert here that the Lord President must be equipped with a proper staff, including draftsmen, to enable him to discharge the kind of duties which have been heaped upon him in the last fifteen years.
The staff of the Court of Session was cut down and altered in the year 1933, after a Royal Commission presided over by Lord Clyde. But at that time it was never thought that burdens of this kind which the Lord Chancellor discharges in England would be cast upon the Lord President. That is an innovation, and I appeal to the Lord Chancellor, who must himself know what the effect of this legislation has been on the work in his office, to consider how difficult it must be for a single individual, with no staff at all, efficiently to discharge all these duties and with them, the duty of con-
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trolling the Court of Session and also the judicial work of the President of the Court of Appeal. The time has come to assert that the situation can go on no longer.
3.40 p.m.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, every member of the legal profession in Scotland regrets very much that this measure cannot be acclaimed in the same language as that which greeted the Legal Aid and Advice Bill for England. But, in spite of the fact that criticism has been levelled, I know from conferences I have had with members of the legal profession that they are determined that such Bill as Parliament approves for making legal aid more readily available for people of moderate means shall receive their wholehearted co-operation.
I am certain that I can say that truthfully, but it would be false if I did not state fairly bluntly the objections which the legal profession feel towards the way in which this Bill has been presented. The first objection is in regard to the manner in which the Bill has been brought in. As the noble Lord, Lord Normand, has said, in Scotland we have had a system of legal aid for poor persons for nearly 500 years. Now what has happened in this case? The Rushcliffe Committee was appointed during the period of the war to investigate any improvements which might be made in this matter in England. Thereafter those with responsibility for Scottish affairs decided that the Rushcliffe Report and the recommendations in it would be brought into play in Scotland. They merely asked the Committee to examine how to apply the recommendations which had already been made in the Rushcliffe Report. If I may say so with great respect, it would hardly be natural if there was not resentment at that method of handling affairs. What in fact is happening? Whereas advantage might have been taken of much which is contained in our well established system and a great deal of it might have been accepted, it is proposed to introduce something which is still—again I say it with great respect—a theoretical system from another country. We feel that not sufficient attention has been drawn to what could have been applied from the existing structure.
It is not my business to criticise the Rushcliffe Report: obviously it is admir-

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able for the purpose for which it was devised. But I think I should be failing in my duty if I did not point out that that Committee received evidence only from England. It did not trouble to make investigations in regard to what is done in other countries where official aid is available to poor people—such countries, for instance, as Sweden, Germany, Austria, Holland, Finland and Brazil. It may be that it would have been difficult to obtain evidence from those countries during the war, but such an argument could not be advanced in regard to Scotland: there evidence would certainly have been available. I feel that that constitutes a great objection so far as Scotland is concerned. Naturally, those people are inclined to resent the introduction of a new system which is still untried, to replace one which has operated for five centuries. Indeed, from a very early stage of our development, many of our institutions have been regarded by other countries as well worth imitating.
In this connection I will quote just a short passage from Sir Archibald Alison's History of Europe.
"The early precocity of Scotland in legislative wisdom, and the extraordinary provisions made by its native Parliament in remote periods, not only for the wellbeing of the people, but the coercion alike of regal tyranny and aristocratic oppression, and the instruction, relief and security of the poorer classes, is one of the remarkable facts in the whole history of modern Europe, and one well deserving of the special attention of historians and statesmen."
The second point which concerns the legal profession in Scotland is that its independence, the very qualities of which Lord Normand has spoken, may in some way be undermined. The legal profession are frequently represented as grasping individuals who take everything they can. This Bill is undoubtedly going to be of assistance to many hardworking and worthy members of the legal profession, but they have not grasped at the opportunity which has been offered because it does appear that in some way their independence and their privileged position with their clients might—I deliberately say "might"—be in some measure undermined. It may be said that it is to their credit that they have opposed this Bill, or at least criticised it. because it has seemed to them that that essential relationship
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with their clients may in some measure not be given full consideration.
If I may now come to more concrete considerations, I would like, as a first point, to stress that in all the representations made on this subject, equally in the Morton, the Rushclilie and the Cameron Reports, every recommendation has been that the administration of the scheme should be laid fairly on the legal profession. Lord Morrison has stated that the responsibility does lie on the Law Society of Scotland, but it is strange that in speaking of the parallel Bill for England the Lord Chancellor said that that Bill was no more than a peg on which he would hang regulations. Those were the Lord Chancellor's words. The peg on which regulations are being hung in Scotland is the Secretary of State for Scotland—not the Lord Advocate, not even a member of the profession, and not one who can know and understand the immense and powerful relationships which are bound up with the profession.
In the circumstances, it is very hard to see that what the noble Lord, Lord Morrison, claims has, in fact, been done. It really seems that responsibility for the administration rests entirely, or to a great extent, on the shoulders of the Secretary of State. If it can be shown that he is willing to forbear from using these regulations, so much the better, but we have no reason to suppose that that is going to be the case. I would like to press the noble Lord for an answer as to just what is meant by the word prescribed "as used in the term" prescribed in regulations." I feel that this is a Second Reading point, even if it is a rather small one. There are a great many different types of regulations. Could we have a statement or could we have any information whatever as to what is meant by that wording as it appears in the body of the Bill?
The second point relates to the National Assistance Board. It is very much regretted in Scotland that the Government should have taken this line for assessing means. We feel, from the point of view both of speed of action and confidence, that the established system of affidavits could very properly have been carried forward with such modification and after such further examination as may or may not be necessary. The argument advanced by

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His Majesty's Government is that this is a method which will remove a stigma from, or, shall I say, raise the prestige of, an institution which was formerly associated with the Poor Law. No one could wish to continue the former situation, which many of us regret, but I think it is a pity that we should encourage people in this country to lean on the State or on the National Assistance Board, or to be associated with an organisation which is to assist them, rather than to stand independently on their own legs. I mention that because I am certain that if it were possible to accept in the first place a statement from the applicant for aid, it would make the scheme very much more readily acceptable in Scotland.
I will turn now to one or two specific clauses in the Bill. In Clause 1(6) there is a passage containing the words:
"may also be refused legal aid if it appears unreasonable that he should receive it…"
May I ask to whom it has to appear unreasonable? Can the noble Lord, Lord Morrison, give us any indication as to what is meant by "unreasonable" in that connection? If it means, in fact, that someone else is the real litigant, I understand the argument; but the words as stated in the clause appear to me to be far too wide if that is their only purpose.
Under Clause 2(5) it appears to me that, quite properly, certain personal articles cannot be taken into account. These include clothes, houses, furniture, tools and so forth. It goes on, however, to provide for what I think might be an invidious distinction, for it states:
"except in such cases and to such extent as may be prescribed."
Parliament has laid down that diligence in execution will not proceed against tools of trade, wearing apparel and houses, but a departmental officer can alter that and these may be proceeded against. I ask the noble Lord to explain what he has in mind: Is it necessary to make that exception?
I would like to ask whether His Majesty's Government will not think again about Clause 6. It has been emphasised over and over again that clients are to be free to have the solicitor of their choice. It has been emphasised that that is an integral part of the Bill. But we are dealing with a Bill which affects people with incomes up to a gross
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figure of £700 a year—and perhaps more—many of whom will have their own solicitor. Why should those who have their own solicitor be denied the use of their solicitor, even if he is not a legal member of the panel, or list, as it is called here? If a litigant in an action in which the client is permitted to be assisted desires a solicitor whose name is not on the list, he will have to go elsewhere. I should like to hear the noble Lord's arguments for this, because it clearly weakens what would otherwise be valuable assistance.
I think the noble Lord has rather underwritten the objection which at the present time is felt in Scotland to the whole system of lists as existing to-day. It is true that the noble Lord made no claim of unanimity or agreement on this Bill; and he was right, because there is no agreement. If I may read the figures recently taken in the Scottish Law Agents' Society on two questions directly germane to this point, the noble Lord will see that that is so. The Scottish Law Agents' Society consists of over three-quarters of the members of the solicitors' profession in Scotland—2,400 out of 2,800. Of that number, just over 1,300 replied to the questions. There were four questions, but I will refer to only two. The first was: "Do you approve of a system of lists provided in the Bill?"—to which 71 said "Yes," and 1,255 "No." That shows there is an overwhelming body of opinion against the provision of lists as in the Bill. The second question was: "Do you consider that the method of administration of legal aid should be left entirely to the profession?"—to which 1,275 answered "Yes," and 60 "No." The essence of this is that the legal profession would like to accept the full responsibility for what it is doing; and the Bill as at present drafted leaves very wide responsibility outside the profession. I urge the noble Lord to try to have the responsibility more closely narrowed on to the legal profession itself.
I should like to ask one question about Clause 8. It provides that one-third of the members of the central committee for administering the scheme are to be outside the legal profession. It does not say by whom they are to be nominated. Am Ito understand that any scheme prepared by the Law Society would be refused by the Secretary of

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State unless the Secretary of State had the sole nomination of one-third of the members? If that is the case, why not put it in the Bill? Would it not be franker and more honest? Finally, I should like to ask whether the present rules in the operation of probabilis causa are to be continued and, if so, in what form. Are these to be similar to the rules of court as laid down at the present time, or are they to be drawn up on an entirely new basis? I shall he grateful if the noble Lord can give some indication of that. I should like particularly to ask whether the Lord Ordinary can remit a case back where it appears to him that the conclusions of the case go beyond the original one approved by the reporters—by that I mean the case of the assisted litigant who has attempted to push his case greatly beyond the original scope which he had in mind. I would repeat that I hope the noble Lord will endeavour, in the course of our discussions, to try to make this Bill acceptable in the fullest degree in Scotland, because the profession is only too anxious to approve and carry through its principles. But there are still features, as I have indicated, which are unpopular and which I regret could not have been put in a form readily acceptable by the profession.
3.55 p.m.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, I think my noble friend Lord Selkirk has made a conciliatory speech, and I hope that in the later stages of the Bill he will receive the co-operation of the Government, because I know perfectly well with what apprehension the profession in Scotland view this Bill. If the Bill is to be put on the Statute Book we all want it to be a success. The Statute of 1424 has already been quoted and, with your Lordships' permission, I will read two lines from that Statute which you will readily understand, as they are in English—I do not know whether any Statutes were written in English in England at that date:
"And gif their bee onie pure creature for faulte of cunning, or dispenses, that cannot nor may not follow his cause, the King for the love of God sal ordaine the judge before whom the cause suld be determined to put wey and get a leill and wise Advocate to fallow sik pure creatures causes: and gif the, causes be obteined, the wrangeur saJ assyth
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baith the partie skaithed, and Advocate's coastes of travel."
That doctrine has been completely followed in the five and a quarter centuries that have elapsed since that time.
I have been familiar from my childhood with the relations of poor people with their solicitors and agents. I suppose that furth of Glasgow, and possibly Edinburgh, there is hardly any family in Scotland who have not already their own agent whom they familiarly consult and from whom they obtain Advice, either free or for such small matter as they are well and easily able to pay. In proof of this, I would remind you of the case of John Knight, who was a Negro slave brought to Scotland in 1772. And, learning there to read, in the year 1777 he took an action to regain his freedom. He was represented in that action in the Court of Session by John MacLaurin—later Lord Dreghorn—by Alexander Maconochie, who became Lord Meadow-bank, and by Henry Dundas, who became Lord Melville. This man had no money to gain, he had only his freedom. His case illustrates better than anything I have to say that during all these ages no man in Scotland has been debarred by reason of poverty from an action in any court.
I would like to join my noble friend Lord Selkirk in his attack on the means test in this Bill. I would far rather see those provisions modified, at any rate in the first instance. At the present time a poor person can secure legal aid by making a statutory declaration. And in the first instance, I believe that that would be quite sufficient to enable him to obtain the assistance he requires. In my view it would be a strange thing if the party to which the noble Lord, Lord Morrison, belongs, which has laboured so hard for so many years to abolish the means test in another direction, should reintroduce it where it is perhaps unnecessary, as in this particular case.
I greatly regret—and I do not think it is very courteous to Scotland—that it is the Cameron Committee which have been chiefly followed in this matter and that, as I believe, Sir George Morton's Committee have been completely disregarded. The present Bill—particularly Clauses 5, 6 and 7—appears to me to strike at the whole of the present system of legal aid for poor people in

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Scotland. It will be very difficult if people have to go to a solicitor on a panel for certain matters and to their own family solicitor for others. I feel that something should be done to enable the poor people in Scotland to retain the system of going to their own family man of business for all the legal matters with which they may have to deal. The family solicitor knows them and their circumstances, and is far better able to advise them. In addition, there is a great advantage in his knowledge, in that it enables him to avoid wasting his own and their time.
Legal assistance is extended by this Bill to persons with incomes up to £420 a year. Friends of mine who have examined the definition in this Bill tell me that it is possible for a man to have an income of over £1,000 a year and still rank for assistance under the Bill. I believe that the people covered by the Bill comprise a large proportion of the inhabitants of Scotland. I would like my noble friend Lord Morrison to look into this matter, having regard to the fact that legal expenses in Scotland are so much lower than they are in England. It seems to me that a Bill of this kind, which will cover the largest proportion of the population in Scotland—or may do so—should be very carefully considered. If we are to have a planned economy this Bill is rather difficult to understand. So far as I can see, litigation will be much more costly, and far more people will be employed in that business, especially if every man has to have two solicitors. It will also he costly in solicitors' time, and in the numbers of personnel employed. I think that side of the matter should be carefully considered. Having regard to the fact that in Scotland for all this time nobody has ever suffered lack of legal aid by reason of poverty, it looks a little as if the Government, wishing to make a great gesture, have swept away the old system and produced this new one much in the same way as they might have told us that they would make us a present of the air we breathe. To us, legal aid has been as easily obtained and as common as the air we breathe, and it seems to me that in substituting another system for that we already have we should be careful to make quite sure that we have the support of the profession behind us and that the new system really will work.
4.6 p.m.
LORD REID: My Lords, there is no doubt that when this Bill was originally introduced it was the subject of a great deal of opposition in Scotland. Everyone must now admit that the Bill has been greatly improved since its introduction. But in Scotland there is still considerable opposition, much doubt and a good deal of misunderstanding. Therefore, I trust your Lordships will permit me to take up rather more of your time on this matter than I would otherwise feel entitled to. I believe that everyone in Scotland feels it is unfortunate that this Bill requires us, in effect, to abandon a system which has stood us in such good stead for so long. In my view, we can fairly say that for many generations no man in Scotland accused on a serious charge has gone undefended and no man has been unable on account of poverty to put forward a good case. This has meant a heavy and growing burden on the legal profession, which burden has been willingly borne as a form of public service.
However, we have now to re-examine the matter. The reason that convinces me that it is impossible to continue the present system, without, at least, such extensive amendment as amounts to the introduction of a new one, is this. In this Bill the Government propose that legal aid should be made available to persons of moderate means as well as to poor persons. In recent times so little has been done—I say this in no spirit of controversy, as it applies to us all—on behalf of persons of moderate means, in comparison with that which has been done for poor persons, that I could not find it in my heart to object to the extension of this assistance to persons of moderate means. If that is to be accepted, it will create a wholly impossible burden unless there is assistance from public funds. Such assistance necessarily implies supervision, and the first question one must ask oneself in considering what would be the best scheme is: Who is to carry out that supervision? There are only two possibilities—namely, a Government Department, on the one hand, or the profession itself, on the other. If the time ever came when close supervision were to be undertaken by any Government Department, under any Government, then I fear that the independence of the profession and, therefore, the supremacy of the law in this country would be in such serious

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danger that such a system, whatever its advantages, ought to be ruled out at once.
I recognise that in this Bill a great deal has been done to avoid direct interference by any Government Department and to ensure, to the maximum extent, that supervision shall take place by the profession itself. But that means that the profession must have the means to exercise that supervision, and whatever one may think in ordinary circumstances about the introduction of a comprehensive new Society to include all practising solicitors, I feel that in present circumstances there is really no alternative, because, without such a comprehensive Society, supervision by the profession of this or any other scheme of the kind would be so difficult and might prove so ineffective that one might be driven back on the unfortunate alternative. Therefore, I would ask any of those in Scotland who still oppose the constitution of this new comprehensive Society to reconsider their attitude, and to realise that all the objections which they have in mind are really much less important than the objection which would undoubtedly apply if no such Society existed.
The second general point which I would like to make, following my noble and learned friend Lord Normand, is that the scheme must be flexible. I have frequently expressed my dislike of doing by rules and regulations what ought to be done by Act of Parliament, but if ever there was a case for extending the sphere of rules and regulations it is in this Bill. But that leads at once to the question: Who is to make the rules and regulations? Purely professional regulations can properly be and have been left to the profession, but I am sure that we all recognise that where regulations involve questions of public importance or large sums of public money, any Government must have some say in their making. What form is that to take? It has been suggested that more regulations might be made by the Lord President of the Court of Session. I do not desire to add anything, but I wish to express my agreement with everything which has been said by my noble and learned friend on the duties which are already heaped upon him. But there is one reason, above all others, which would prevent additional duties of this
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character being put upon the Lord President of the Court of Session, and that is that he would not be entitled to defend himself in public if he made a regulation which provoked public controversy and, therefore, he ought not to be asked to make regulations of that character.
This Bill provides that such regulations are to be made by the Secretary of State. I agree with a great deal which has been said by the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, on the question, but I would be prepared to accept the Secretary of State on one understanding—that is, that the position of the Lord Advocate is appreciated in this matter. Your Lordships will know that the Lord Advocate is not merely a Law Officer. He is in no sense subordinate as a Minister to the Secretary of State. He is one of the few survivors of the great Officers of State of Scotland, and he occupies an independent position in the Government. If this Bill is to work properly, it is essential that the Secretary of State should enter into the fullest consultation with the Lord Advocate before he attempts to make any regulations which may affect the administration of justice. It is essential—and I am sure nobody knows that better than the present Lord Advocate—that he should undertake the fullest responsibility for any regulations which may be made. Whatever may be the formal division of responsibility among His Majesty's Ministers, there is no doubt that real responsibility will be held, and will properly be held, to lie on the Lord Advocate for all regulations made under this Bill which affect the administration of justice in Scotland. I feel confident that he and his successors will adequately discharge that responsibility.
I do not think it would be useful to enter into any criticism of the main lines of the Bill. It may be that some other scheme would have worked equally well or even better, but I do not think, at this time, that one can well go back on the main lines of the Bill. Nor, I think, would it be useful to enter into controversies again about the earlier history of this measure, or what has happened during its passage to your Lordships' House. I feel that good can and, indeed, will come out of this Bill if the provisions are worked harmoniously and if its administration is attended by reasonable good fortune. I think it is reasonable to ask that everyone shall work to that effect.

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I would like to take up a few more minutes, however, in dealing with some points which perhaps are more properly Committee points, but it may be that I shall save the time of your Lordships in Committee if I give a brief outline of what I have in mind at this moment. The first point which I would like to stress again is the complex structure of the administration under the Bill. We shall be dealing with people who are not always able to express themselves clearly; who are not always reasonable, but who will expect from this Bill legal assistance to the full. It will require a great deal of care in working out the details of any schemes to ensure that they work at all well. It will require the greatest possible care to be sure that the scheme will work with adequate speed. The delays of the law are proverbial, but to-day they are much more proverbial than real; and I fear that one of the difficulties about this scheme is that the administration of justive may be gravely slowed up where assisted persons are involved unless the greatest care is taken to ensure that everything is done as speedily as is consistent with good workmanship.
In this connection, I would like to say a word about the proposed panel of solicitors. I also would very much prefer that there should not be those panels, but I can see practical difficulties, and those who dislike panels have not hitherto convinced me that panels, lists, or whatever they are called, can be avoided. I think the Bill is sufficiently flexible, but if, as time goes on, it proves practicable to avoid maintaining lists, that might be done. There is one difficulty which impresses me, however, and I think I should state it. The man who wants legal assistance will not know a solicitor, and he will know nothing about the law. Somebody will have to tell him to whom to go. The Bill preserves freedom of choice, and it is right that it should. In many cases those who wish will be able to make a choice, because they will know to whom they will be able to go but in the majority of cases I venture to think that the person who desires assistance will not have any idea whom he would like to employ, and therefore someone will have to tell him to whom to go; and if there is no list it will be an extremely difficult and invidious task to advise a person whom he should consult. I can see favouritism being sug
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gested; one solicitor will say "Why was this man sent to me?" Another will say "How is it that I am being overlooked?" I have not yet seen how the practical working out of the scheme can be assured if there are not lists from which a man might be advised to whom he should apply. That does not necessarily exclude, of course, that a person who is already a client of a solicitor should be allowed to employ that solicitor within the scheme. I think that that matter might be examined again, or at least that the door might be kept open for that plan to be adopted as part of a scheme once it is under way.
One matter which I believe is under consideration might, I think, relieve the apprehensions of those who fear the list system to a considerable extent. I do not see why a solicitor, when going on the list, should undertake that he will deal with cases of every possible character that might arise. The experience and aptitude of solicitors, as of other people, vary very much. Some solicitors may have great experience and great aptitude for one class of case; others for another. There is no reason why a solicitor who is willing to undertake work of a family trust character should have to undertake the defence of accused persons; nor why a solicitor who is familiar with and willing to undertake divorce cases should also have to undertake heavy cases of a technical character with which he is unfamiliar. Accordingly, there is room, I think, for different lists for different purposes. If that is done, I think it will remove some at least of the apprehensions of those who fear the consequences of going on to one of these lists.
The second matter to which I wish to refer is the contribution which, under this Bill, will be asked from the assisted person. I think there is a good deal of misapprehension about this. A great many people think they are going to receive something very like free advice and free assistance. I think they will have a shock when they find how heavy the contribution may be. If it is to be based on half of a man's disposable income, above a disposable income of £3 a week, and on the which of his personal property over £75 of capital, some people who at present think this scheme will do them a lot of good will find themselves mistaken. I hope that no one in com-

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mending this scheme will represent that it amounts to free, or anything like free, assistance for persons of moderate means. Of course, I acquit anyone who has hitherto commended the Bill of saying that. I believe the public response will greatly depend on how this matter is worked out. Perhaps when we come to the Committee stage it will be appropriate to deal with the matter in a litle more detail.
There is one other point, which I think has not received the attention it deserves, and which seems to me to be of much importance; and that is the question of expenses. To begin with, I think people will get the idea that under this scheme once their maximum contribution has been assessed that is all they will have to pay. I understand that that is not so. If such a man loses his case, the court may require him to pay by way of expenses such sum as the court thinks reasonable. Therefore, what is assessed at the beginning is not the maximum liability under which the man may come.
But what I want to ask your Lordships to consider for a moment is the position of the other litigant, the man against whom the assisted litigant is fighting, who may be little better off financially than the assisted litigant. What is his position? If he wins he receives an award of expenses, but he gets only such sum as the court thinks reasonable. I do not think he gets even the sum which the Legal Aid Fund has already taken from the assisted person. I think he should. I think that if a person is, in effect, financed by public money to litigate against another, and that other person is successful, then that other person's claim to expenses should be preferred to the Treasury's claim to the contribution for legal aid. I hope to raise that matter again on Committee stage. And if that other person loses, what then? Why should he not have the same advantage as the disadvantage he suffers if he wins? If the assisted person is to be required to pay only what the court thinks reasonable, why should the unassisted person be required to pay more? Here, it seems to me, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If there is to be a rule of this kind—and I do not object to it—it should be a rule which should apply equally to both sides; and there
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again I hope to raise this matter again at a later stage.
I should like to say only one other thing. However this Bill is framed, by reason of the large amount of public money which is to be spent in the administration of this scheme the independence of the legal profession is bound to be endangered. I am sure everyone agrees that it would be disastrous if anything occurred to impair that independence, but the danger will not be averted by verbal Amendments to this Bill. It is inherent in any scheme of the kind and it can be averted only by constant vigilance on the part of all concerned, and in particular on the part of solicitors and advocates in Scotland. I believe that Scotsmen, being much as they ever were, will show that vigilance and will be successful. But if they are not then the result of this Bill will be so disastrous as far to outweigh any benefits which it confers. I think it right to draw your Lordships' attention to that matter, while at the same time expressing my confiddence that the danger will in fact be averted.
4.29 p.m.
LORD MORRISON: My Lords, if I may open on the same note as that on which the noble Lord ended his speech, I would say that, so far as I am able to understand the matter, it will take a much stronger Bill than this to undermine the sturdy independence of the Scottish people. It will not be as easy as that. I must confess that I have been agreeably surprised at the reception accorded by your Lordships to this Bill. About a fortnight ago, when I was in Scotland, I spent some time in reading the Scottish Press, and I observed some startling headlines about speeches of a leading member of the Scottish Law Agents' Society, I think it was. He used some rather strong language—language which is seldom used in your Lordships' House and will, I hope, never be used here about this Bill.
The report quoted a statement referring to the Bill as "unscrupulous mendacity." From that the speaker worked himself up to a series of extraordinarily extravagant statements, and finished up by saying:
"It is perfectly clear from this Bill that what Scotland has now to decide upon is

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whether we are going to have Karl Marx or Jesus Christ."
My native land, since I left it, I thought, seemed to be becoming a nation of extremists when we heard language like that. So, when I come to your Lordships' House and hear the reasoned debate and the helpful and constructive suggestions which have been made to-day, I am agreeably surprised. I need not remind your Lordships that this Bill comes to us from another place. Nor need I remind your Lordships of the state of political tension that exists between the Parties in another place, which is almost unknown here. And yet, making allowance for that political tension in another place, this Bill passed through its Second Reading and Third Reading there without any Division being taken. That feeling has 'been borne out that, while many objections have been raised to the Bill, the objections are Committee points and are not fundamental.
It is obvious that I shall not be able to cover all the points that have been made, but I will endeavour to answer some of them. I would ask noble Lords to allow any other points to remain over to a later stage. In particular, I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, knows quite well that I am not possessed of that intimate knowledge of the Scottish courts and Scottish law procedure which he has, But his points will be noted, and I can assure him that the Government would welcome consultations with him concerning the points he contemplates raising at a later stage of the Bill. I will, however, endeavour to answer at once at least one of his points. As I understood it, he suggested that under the Bill solicitors should not be required to enter their names on the lists for all purposes. I am advised that this is already covered by the provisions of Clause 6(1), which provides that there may be different lists for different purposes.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Normand, who informed me that he had another important appointment and could not remain, raised something to which I want to reply, even in his absence—that is, the difficulties of the Lord President. The Secretary of State and the Lord Advocate are aware of the difficulty which the Lord President has in dealing with
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his existing staff with the growing volume of administrative business which he has to transact. Informal arrangements already exist to provide him with some assistance, but my right honourable friends agree that more adequate provision is required. Additional drafting staff has recently been recruited by the Lord Advocate's Department. It is hoped that, when the necessary period of training has been completed, arrangements satisfactory to the Lord President may be made for placing at his disposal the assistance which he undoubtedly requires in the preparation of Statutory Instruments and other documents.
The noble Earl, Lord Selkirk (who probably speaks on behalf of the whole of the legal profession Scotland) made a statement which I am sure we all welcome—namely, that in whatever form this Bill ultimately reaches the Statute Book he is sure that the members of the profession will join wholeheartedly in working the Bill when it becomes an Act. He went on to ask rile more questions than I can possibly answer—which is not an unusual experience for me when dealing with Scottish Bills. However, I will try to answer one particular point, which he regarded as important; the others can wait. The noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, asked "Who will make: these regulations?" The regulations under the Scottish Bill fall to be made (a) by the court, and (b), in certain cases involving finance and responsibility to Parliament, by the Secretary of State. I would remind noble Lords that under the English Bill, the regulations are made by the Lord Chancellor, who is both a Judge and a Minister.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: May I ask this question? Is there somebody other than the Secretary of State who can also make regulations? If so, who is that person? The noble Lord has said that the court makes some regulations and the Secretary of State makes others. Does he mean that there is a third category?
LORD MORRISON: No. Obviously the regulations for which the Secretary of State is responsible must be the financial ones. I would add that the Secretary of State's regulations will be subject to either an affirmative or a negative Resolution of Parliament, so that the matters in them can be raised. The noble Earl

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then asked me, who will decide whether it is unreasonable that a person should receive legal aid? I am advised that the answer to that is to be found in Clause 1(6). It will be for the local committee of the Law Society to decide whether it is unreasonable that a person should receive legal aid. Although the applicant has a probabilis causa. it might be clear that his object in seeking to litigate is vexatious, and there must be some safeguard against that.
The noble Earl raised the question of tools of trade and wearing apparel. He will find that under Clause 2(5) the assisted person's wearing apparel and household furniture will be left out of account, except in cases prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State—not by a Departmental official—and subject to negative Resolution by both Houses of Parliament, as I have already said. This power is required to cover the case—which will, I think, admittedly be unusual, but one never knows—where an assistant litigant possesses unusually valuable items (say, a number of fur coats) which it would be fair to take into account. It is to deal with unusual cases of that kind.
LORD SALTOUN: That would not cover valuable tools of trade, would it? That is a very important point.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: Wearing apparel.
LORD MORRISON: Wearing apparel and workmen's tools. The noble Lord, Lord Saltoun, and other noble Lords mentioned the question of what they called the "means test." On this point I should like to say this, although we shall probably have an opportunity of going into the matter in more detail at another stage. The sheriff court's inquiry into means, under the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act, 1907, used to be carried out by the inspector of poor of the parish. That office was abolished under the National Assistance Act, 1948. Since then, an affidavit has been accepted purely as an interim measure pending, the passage of the present Bill. An affidavit is at present accepted in the Court of Session but the main point that I am making now—as I say, we may have to return to it on Committee stage—is that
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the number of persons who are at present eligible for legal aid is very much smaller than the number who will be eligible under the Bill. That is why it has been considered necessary to bring in some organisation to assess means. I understand that the National Assistance Board have expressed their willingness to undertake this work, and I think they will do it efficiently. If my noble friend will forgive my leaving the matter there, perhaps we may go into it more fully later.
As the House has yet another Scottish Bill with which to deal before we finish our labours for the week, may I conclude by saying that between now and the next stages of the Bill I should welcome further discussions with noble Lords, particularly those who have special knowledge—indeed, most of them have greater knowledge than I have on this subject. I have had no indication that noble Lords are going to resist the Second Reading of the Bill, and therefore I ask with confidence that it be given a Second Reading.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

NURSES (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]
4.40 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD MORRISON: My Lords, this Bill, as your Lordships will know, is the counterpart of the Bill for England and Wales to which your Lordships recently gave sympathetic consideration. Like the English Bill, it is based on the recommendations of the Working Party on Nurses published in 1947, and has been framed after extensive consultations with all the interests concerned. I am happy to say that on all the major issues dealt with in the Bill the Government have the general support of the profession in Scotland. The prime purpose of the Bill is to improve the training of nurses and the conditions under which they are trained. Your Lordships are well aware of the great need for increasing the number of nurses available for the health services in Scotland. The Working Party told us that one of the obstacles to increasing the numbers of trained nurses was that there was very heavy wastage in training. The Government hope that as a result of the

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changes proposed in this Bill conditions of training will be improved and that wastage will be substantially reduced.
Student nurses receive their training in hospitals approved for the purpose by the General Nursing Council for Scotland, and their training follows a curriculum laid down by that body. In the past this training has commonly not been of a comprehensive character but has been related to separate aspects of nursing, such as general hospital work, for which separate registers are maintained for men and women; the nursing of infectious diseases, including tuberculosis; the nursing of sick children, and of mental patients and mental defectives. There is a strong body of opinion, supported by the Working Party, that all student nurses ought to receive a comprehensive basic training, followed by a period of further training in the specialist field of nursing which they wish to take up. It will be for the General Nursing Council for Scotland to take the lead in bringing changes about, and Clause 4 of the Bill enables it to make limited experiments and trials of new schemes of training before adopting them generally.
At the present time the Council consists of nine elected nurses, together with six other members appointed either by the Privy Council or by the Secretary of State. A change in the composition of the Council is regarded as necessary to enable it to perform the new and wider functions to be laid upon it under this Bill, and it is desirable that specific provision should be made for the presence amongst its members of specialists in educational methods. It is therefore proposed—your Lordships will find the details in the First Schedule—to increase the size of Council from fifteen to twenty-six members; of these, thirteen will be nurses elected by nurses, eleven (including two nurses) will be appointed by the Secretary of State, and two will be appointed by the Privy Council. It is generally agreed that in present circumstances adequate representation of the nurses on the fever, sick children's, mental and mental defective registers should be provided for. In this Bill, therefore, we are proposing that seven of the elected nurses shall he chosen by nurses, both men and women, on the general registers, two shall be elected by nurses on the registers for mental nursing and the nurs-
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ing of mental defectives, one by nurses on the fever register and one by nurses on the sick children's register. In addition, we propose that two members should be elected by those sister tutors who hold certificates of training in the teaching of nursing recognised by the General Nursing Council. It is not considered desirable by any of the interests concerned that the elections for the Council should be based upon the five regional hospital board areas, and in this respect the proposals for Scotland differ from those contained in the English Bill.
Of the thirteen appointed members it is specially provided that two must be nurses employed by local health authorities and that the Secretary of State, before appointing them, must consult appropriate interested organisations. We should have been happy to provide for the election of public health nurses, but nobody has been able to devise a satisfactory electoral system. I am informed that in filling the other nine seats the Secretary of State will ensure appropriate representation of the various branches of the medical profession and of general educational, hospital management and local health authority interests, and that he will also include persons with qualifications for administering the training grants to which I will refer in a moment. The Privy Council are required to give one of their seats to a representative of Scottish universities. Your Lordships will see from what I have said that the Council will include fifteen nurses out of its total membership of twenty-six, which is preserving for the nursing profession the majority of seats on the Council.
At the present time courses of training for nurses are largely based upon individual hospitals. The development of new methods of training will, however, mostly require the participation of several hospitals, to afford the student nurse various types of experience. And it may often happen that the existing grouping of hospitals under boards of management will not be a suitable grouping for the purpose of nurse training. In order to assist the General Nursing Council in bringing about the necessary collaboration of boards of management, Clause 2, with the Second Schedule, proposes the establishment of regional nurse-training committees, one for each of the five Scot-

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tish hospital regions. These regions vary considerably in size and in the number of their hospitals, and the Bill, therefore, empowers the Secretary of State, if he should find it necessary after experience, to combine two or more regional areas for the purpose of establishing a joint nurse-training committee.
The functions of the committees are defined more fully in this Bill than they are in the English Bill, and in particular Clause 3 lays down in some detail the procedure where a nurse-training committee feels obliged to intervene to secure the preparation of a satisfactory nurse-training scheme. This has been done in response to representations reaching the Secretary of State from all interests concerned, that the Bill should make clear the position of the various statutory bodies in this matter. Apart from assisting in the planning of nurse-training, the 'nurse-training committees will, under subsection (2) of Clause 2, generally supervise the training of nurses in their area, reporting to the General Nursing Council on matters of significance which appear to require attention. The Committees are also to advise and assist the General Nursing Council on matters referred to them, including the approval of institutions for the purposes of training; and are empowered by Clause 4 to promote research and investigation into matters relating to nurse-training.
In the debates on the English Bill some of your Lordships doubted the suitability of the nurse-training committees and the General Nursing Council for handling the financial side of nurse training, as Clauses 5 and 6 of this Bill propose. Eventually we agreed on I think two main Amendments. These were the insertion into the Bill of requirements that, first, the Minister should include among the members whom he appoints to the General Nursing Council a number of persons with experience in hospital management, and secondly, the General Nursing Council should appoint from among their members a statutory finance committee, to which matters relating to the finance of nurse training would stand referred. Initially I think your Lordships had specially in mind the position of the English teaching hospitals under their boards of governors, who are independent of the regional hospital boards.
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That particular aspect of the matter does not arise in Scotland, for the teaching hospitals there are part of the hospital service administered by the regional boards. The Secretary of State has, however, an open mind on the desirability of introducing into this Bill Amendments similar to those which I have mentioned, for what they require will in fact be done, whether the Statute explicitly requires it or not. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Clydesmuir, and any other of your Lordships who are interested, would care to have an informal talk on this subject before the next stage of the Bill.
Looking to the time when comprehensive training may replace the present system of sectional training, power is taken in Clause 9 for the Secretary of State to close the individual Supplementary Registers of nurses—that is, the existing sectional registers apart from the General Register—on request to that effect by the General Nursing Council. This power will not, of course, be exercised until new systems of training have been tested and proved, and the Supplementary Registers will remain until then.
I need not detain your Lordships much longer. Perhaps, however, I should refer to one or two of the lesser provisions in the Bill. First, as in the English Bill, we propose under Clause 7 to set up a Mental Nurses Committee of the General Nursing Council, to deal specially with matters concerning mental nurses and nurses trained in the nursing of mental defectives. Details of the composition are to be found in the Third Schedule. Clause 8 seeks to empower the General Nursing Council to admit to the Register nurses trained abroad who, in their opinion, have been trained to a standard equivalent to that of Scottish trained nurses. It is also provided in Clause 12 that Scottish nurses who were eligible for admission to the list set up under the 1943 Act—namely, the nurses who did not take advantage of the original opportunity afforded to them under the 1919 Act to secure admission to the Register—shall now be entitled to admission to the Register.
Your Lordships will recall that, under the 1919 and 1943 Acts, appeals against the refusal of the General Nursing Council to approve hospitals for training purposes lie to the Secretary of State. Such appeals, we feel, ought not to lie to the

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Minister responsible for the administration of almost all the hospitals which might he concerned, and Clause 10 accordingly provides that any appeals shall, in future, be made to the Lord President of the Court of Session, who is required to refer the matter for decision to two or more persons appointed by him. Clause 13 authorises the Secretary of State, on application from the General Nursing Council, to approve an increase in the annual fee for retention of a nurse's name on the Register to a sum exceeding the present statutory limit of 2s. 6d. per annum. There is no reason to suppose that any such increase will be necessary in the near future, but we fear that a limit dating from 1919 cannot indefinitely be maintained.
Clause 14 empowers the Secretary of State to require the General Nursing Council, should they ever cease to publish the Register and Roll annually, to publish a supplementary list of admissions and deletions at such intervals as he may direct. These two last provisions do not go quite so far as those in the English Bill, but they have the support of those who can speak for Scottish interests, and are regarded as adequate to meet the Scottish position. The only other provision I need mention is Clause 18, under which the Council will in future be called upon to make an annual report to the Secretary of State, for presentation to Parliament. My Lords, I trust that I have given you a brief and fair picture of the contents of this measure. It is the Government's belief that what they are here proposing will not only maintain the high standard of nurse training in Scotland but will raise it to even higher levels, and make a bigger contribution to the cutting down of wastage in training than any other step which can be taken in existing conditions. I ask your Lordships to give the Bill a Second Reading.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Morrison.)
4.57 p.m.
LORD CLYDESMUIR: My Lords, I am glad to be able to accord a welcome to this Bill, the Second Reading of which has been moved by the noble Lord, Lord Morrison. The noble Lord, shortly but very clearly, covered the contents of the Bill, and I think that your Lordships can be in no doubt as to what it
1014
effects. As your Lordships will see, it is a measure designed to improve the status of nurses and especially to make a more imaginative approach to their training. Emphasis is laid on training. It is, of course, a machinery Bill, and everything will depend on how the machinery is worked. But machinery is capable of improvement, and when a similar measure was passing through this House, your Lordships were able by agreement to improve the machinery in some respects.
As the noble Lord has pointed out, conditions are not exactly comparable as between Scotland and England. For example, the teaching hospitals in Scotland are wholly integrated into the regional organisation and do not carry the special position of the English teaching hospitals. Therefore, certain changes made in the English Bill might not necessarily be advisable here. None the less, I think that some improvements in the Bill may be possible, and I would like to accept the noble Lord's invitation to discuss them between now and the Committee stage.
On the purpose of the Bill, and what it is designed to Secure, there can be no difference of opinion between members of your Lordships' House, no matter on which side they sit. The desire is to improve the recruiting of nurses and to lessen wastage. Wastage, as the noble Lord has said, is serious. It seems to be due to several reasons. In the first place, young girls feel that the code of discipline is unnecessarily severe and that the relationship between senior staff and students sometimes tends to be rather formal, if not unfriendly. Girls are also apt to feel that regulations concerning their off-duty hours are sometimes rather unreasonable. Moreover, there are complaints about food, accommodation, pay and recreational facilities, and about the pressure on the girls during working hours. Whether the new Council will help to improve these matters remains to be seen. I have great hope that it will, because it will touch new sources of information. In the mental hospitals, on which the noble Lord briefly touched, the wastage is higher still—for understandable causes; because the strain must be particularly great in those hospitals. Their staffs certainly deserve imaginative and sympathetic treatment.

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I will now, if I may, mention one or two minor suggestions which, after consultation with the noble Lord, I may want to follow up later. First, in regard to representation on the Nursing Council. I note that only two of the nominated places are retained for registered nurses. I am not clear what the Government have in mind as regards the other places which the Secretary of State is to fill. I suggest that further guidance may be desirable here to ensure that constructive and knowledgeable opinion is fully represented on the Council. Clause 8 deals with reciprocity. We cannot legislate for other countries, we can legislate only for ourselves, and I presume that the Government are satisfied that this clause will not affect any of the reciprocal arrangements already in operation. I hope that every effort is being made, both in Commonwealth and foreign countries, to secure full reciprocity. This is not a matter of legislation but rather of administration, and it is important to make known the terms we give here and to ask that reciprocity be given by other countries.
Clause 15 has come under a little criticism in some quarters for what may seem to your Lordships to be a small point, but I think it is one of principle. The Council may provide out of moneys provided by the nurses' registration retention fees for the expenses and loss of earnings of nominated council members who will probably not be nurses. I think that up to now the retention fee has been limited to 2s. 6d., and though it is a small sum, perhaps it is not quite fair that expenses of council members should come out of nurses' fees. Should not public money be used to cover this common outlay? I note, while on the subject of fees, that Clause 15 abolishes the limitation of 2s. 6d. The noble Lord said that for some time 2s. 6d. would be enough; but it may rise. No doubt it is necessary to have power to increase the fee, but I attach importance to its being an annual fee and not a life subscription or a composition. If there is an annual fee, there is an annual check on the Register. There is the advantage of a check on the continued existence and whereabouts of nurses, because they have to declare themselves once a year when they pay their 2s. 6d. This gives control of the Register, which must be a live
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one if it is to be of any value. A Scottish nurse who has to pay 2s. 6d. will surely make known where she is. There may be an occasion in our discussions for adding a clause to make sure this is an annual fee of 2s. 6d., so that we do not fall into the evil habit of compounding by payment in a lump sum.
The whole emphasis of this Bill is made on training. I am sure that is right. We may find a slight clash of opinion or interest between the hospitals and the nurses' training committees. The hospitals, hard pressed, may think it desirable to get work, of whatever kind, done and may fear that training will interfere with that work. But I am sure that in the long run it will be recognised that a comprehensive training of the best possible kind will pay. This is essential if we are to secure the best possible nursing service. I feel certain there will ultimately he harmony on this point, though there may be the risk of slight misunderstandings in the early stages. I am glad that the noble Lord has introduced a separate Bill for Scotland. Once or twice I have ventured to criticise the Government for hanging measures on to the English coattails—unhappily, when the coat does not fit. In this case we have imaginative treatment of Scottish conditions and I hope the Bill will receive its Second Reading.
5.5 p.m.
LORD POLWARTH: My Lords, I had not intended to intervene in a debate conducted by a Minister and a former Secretary of State, feeling awe and wonder at the manner in which the noble Lord, Lord Morrison, expounded the incredibly intricate piece of machinery that is contained in the Bill. But I must emphasise one point that the noble Lord, Lord Clydesmuir, made. I have said this is a remarkably involved piece of machinery. It will be of no use whatever unless administered by all those concerned with it with a very considerable amount of understanding and feeling.
It is well known that one of the principal reasons for the small number of women coming forward as nurses and for the large number of nurses falling out in the course of training, has been the rigidity and the often pettifogging nature of the rules and regulations under which they carry out their training. I

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think we are beginning to realise that much more nowadays, and we are improving on it; but there is still a great deal of room for improvement. We shall not achieve the best results until the people at the top, both in hospitals and on the various elected bodies mentioned in this Bill, really understand how to handle their fellow human beings. I have always felt that discipline in female hands can be a dangerous thing, and nowhere is that more the case than in the nursing profession. To take one example which I came across during the war. A nurse well en in her twenties serving in a military hospital was never allowed during her days on duty to keep the lights on after ten o'clock. For people of that age, such a rule is ridiculous. As I have said, the one thing which will bring results is to administer the Bill in an understanding and sympathetic manner.
5.7 p.m.
LORD MORRISON: My Lords, the reception given to this Bill by both noble Lords who have spoken has been so kind that I am sure that I should not be justified in taking up much more time, particularly as we Scottish members have monopolised the whole House this afternoon. We must not be too greedy or we shall lose our good reputation! I should like to thank both noble Lords for their kind references to the Bill. I am sure that with their co-operation we shall make it even better before it leaves this House. The noble Lord, Lord Clydesmuir, referred to the fact that the Council might have to pay out, for expenses and loss of earnings of Council members who possibly will not be nurses, money provided by the nurses' retention fees. It is important to know that the same point could have been raised on the English Bill, but was not raised—which again shows that the Scottish character is maintaining itself. Without saying whether I agree with the reply or not, I am advised that, since a penny on the amount of retention fee produces not far short of £100, any increase on that account on the retention fee of 2s. 6d. would be insignificant, and the burden on the nurses would still remain far lower compared with the registration charges payable by members of other professions.
In view of the long time that Scottish affairs have occupied your Lordships' House this afternoon and in view of the
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further fact that the criticism has been entirely friendly and that we have other opportunities, privately and in the House on other stages of the Bill, of making this Bill even better than it is to-day, I will add no more. I thank the noble Lords for their confirmation of the Bill.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

MARRIED WOMEN (MAINTENANCE) BILL
5.9 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD CROOK: My Lords, it is a great privilege to move the Second Reading of the first Private Member's Bill which has been before your Lordships' House since the war. The subject, I am afraid, is not a happy one; the subject of wrecked marriages and of allowances for women who have suffered from wrecked marriages can never be very happy. It is the kind of Bill which I feel sure will have the sympathy of this House and will have an easy passage. It has the claim upon your Lordships that it is, I think, completely non-political. It is true that in another place it was moved by a member of the Party of which I am a member, but that was due entirely to the luck of the ballot. It would have been moved by a Member of the Opposition, Mr. Bromley Davenport, had he been successful in the ballot. The Bill deals with a problem both of the courts of summary jurisdiction and of the higher courts, in which many of your Lordships are active. Indeed, in the presentation of this Bill and in its passage through this and its remaining stages, I rely upon the benefit of the experience of those of your Lordships who sit in those various courts. Had I not known that I could rely upon those good offices I should not have ventured to bring the Bill here, for what was a small measure of some two clauses when introduced in the other place has now become a measure of eight clauses, a number of which were added on Report—and added only live minutes before the Third Reading of the Bill. I start, therefore, by saying to your Lordships that I appreciate that in the course of the Committee stage it may well be that there will be some slight "polishing" to be

1019
done. However, I know no better place to which to come for the adequate polishing of a Bill than to your Lordships' House, particularly when the Bill deals with procedure in courts.
The main purpose of the Bill is to amend the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, in Sections 5 and 7, and the Married Women (Maintenance) Act, 1920, which itself amended Section 4 of the original Act. Briefly, the 1895 Act provided that married women might apply to magistrates on various grounds—which I will not enumerate to your Lordships, because you will be familiar with them—for allowances which could be granted to them up to a limit of £2 a week. Under the 1920 amending Act it was provided that the order could also cause payments to be made either to the applicant or to an officer of the court for weekly amounts up to 10s. for the maintenance of any child under sixteen years of age. The amending Act of 1920 followed a good deal of agitation for the increase in general of the amounts which the courts could award. Indeed, in October, 1920, as a result of that agitation, the then Home Secretary, in reply to a Question in the other place, made it clear that the Government of the day had an amending Bill ready for presentation. But, unfortunately, from that day to this the Bill has never been brought before the House. This is the first opportunity that Parliament has had of righting what many of us regard as an outstanding wrong. I believe the Bill has not only the blessing of all Parties, but also the blessing, in principle, of the Home Office.
The main provision for the increasing of the £2 to an amount of £5 will be found in Clause 1 of the Bill, which also provides for the increase of the child's allowance from 10s. to 30s. I do not think it needs any persuasion from me to convince your Lordships that while £2 was an adequate amount in 1895, it is not adequate to-day. I think one could say that in 1895 a woman granted £2 a week by a court was guaranteed freedom from want; but I do not think one could say anything like that to-day. In those days husbands in many cases in the ordinary workaday world were able to earn only 18s. a week, and your Lordships will not need me to remind you of
1020
something with which you are only too familiar—namely, the general trend of wages to-day. I think it is true to say that the £2 really represented the dividing line between the responsibility of the courts of summary jurisdiction and the High Court. I would remind your Lordships that a case cannot be taken to the High Court merely on the basis of an order for maintenance. To go to the High Court it is, in fact, necessary for an application to be made for judicial separation, divorce or a decree of nullity, placing on the wife the added expense of petitioning, which many of us feel is an unnecessary burden.
I do not think that the sum of £5 has any sacred sanction, or that there is any particular logic in it. In the other place there was a good deal of discussion on this matter; some members wanted £10, but finally £5 was put into the Bill. I am bound to say that it seems to represent something like a reasonable amount. It is two-and-a-half times the amount given by the 1895 Act, and one can say that the cost of living has risen approximately two-and-a-quarter to two-and-a-half times since then, while wage standards have certainly risen by at least two-and-a-half times. So the £5 really represents the new guide of the division of responsibility of the court of summary jurisdiction and the High Court, just as limits are otherwise imposed on the magistrates' courts in respect of the six months' imprisonment rule and various other penalties about which many of your Lordships know much better than I do.
Some of your Lordships will have had great experience of the difficulties of the applications made by women whose husbands are earning considerably greater sums of money than the £5 or £6 a week which was originally regarded as about the maximum remuneration of the husbands of those applying. Magistrates have found, in respect of applications from the wives of men earning up to £1,000 a year, that they have been completely hamstrung in any opportunity of making a change and giving an amount that was justifiable. I find in practice that the courts are paying regard to the joint amounts received by the husband and wife and, by and large, in the majority of well-run courts they are making awards approximating to one-third of the remuneration of the two together. In the case, therefore, where

1021
only the man is earning it means that what we propose by this increase is, broadly, to increase what is taken as the maximum standard of remuneration of the people coming before the courts of summary jurisdiction from £6 to £15 a week.
Turning to the amount proposed for children's maintenance, I am bound to say that the 30s. a week mentioned in the Bill has no logical basis. I know full well from my experience in your Lordships' House that it would be absurd my trying to bring a case of 30s. a week which had no logical background; and my experience as a trade union official similarly teaches me not to try to make a case when its feet are not firmly and squarely placed on the ground. I am bound to say that when I looked at all the documents a week ago I could see the logic of this being made 20s., rather than 30s., a week. Had I been drafting the Bill, I am sure that is the amount I should have inserted. That would bring the amount into line with the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925, which in Section 7 (c) provides for 20s. a week. I reach that conclusion largely because I agree that there is a fine dividing line between the women who are successful in obtaining an order on the grounds of desertion or cruelty under the 1895 Act—which it is now suggested to your Lordships should be amended—and those who cannot take proceedings under that Act, but find themselves unable to live with their husbands, who seek a settlement under the Guardianship of Infants Act, and thereby are entitled to claim only 20s. a week.
VISCOUNT SIMON: Is this a sum for each child?
LORD CROOK: Yes.
VISCOUNT SIMON: So that, where there are a number of children, you multiply as a maximum the 30s. by the number of children.
LORD CROOK: Yes. On the main basis of the Royal Commission on Population figures, of approximately two children per family, you would in the ordinary course under this clause be fixing a limitation of £3 more than the £5—a total of £8 in the average case. I imagine—in fact, I feel sure—that the basis for the 30s. figure in the other place was the desire to see that the 20s. amount laid
1022
down in the Guardianship of Infants Act was also raised. I deduced that by seeing that the Speaker ruled out of Order some Amendments which clearly aimed at amending that Act. It does seem logical that the amount under this Bill ought to be 20s., in order to bring it into line with the Guardianship of Infants Act. I think the whole of the enactments ought to be looked at, and, it may be that those of your Lordships who are more skilled in these matters of consolidation may feel that the Acts dealing with women and children are crying out aloud for attention—especially in view of the consolidation arrangements which recently had the approval of your Lordships. Certainly when I looked into them for the first time this last week, they appeared to me fairly chaotic and contradictory in various places. I leave Clause 1, knowing as I did before I commenced to address your Lordships, that on the Committee stage some query about that 30s. figure was bound to arise.
Clause 2 has been put into the Bill on the drafting of the Treasury to make the necessary provision for the amendment of the Finance Act, 1944. That Act provided that small maintenance payments could be made without deduction of tax, being taken out of the normal rules for the deduction of tax at source. That was clone by the Government of the day at the request of the Magistrates' Association, for reasons with which I need not detain your Lordships at the moment. This is merely the correction of the 1944 Act to bring it into line with Clause 1 of the present Bill.
Clause 3 is a new proposition. It is in line with the new trends of education in this country. At the moment, under the 1920 Act, allowances can be made in respect of children only up to the age of sixteen years. Those who sponsored this Bill felt it unfair that, fathers should escape the responsibility of contributing towards the further education of those children who are capable of going on to higher things. Accordingly the clause provides that application can be made to the court for an order for payment after sixteen years of age; the court not to be permitted to give an order for a longer period than two years. If at the end of two years it is still desired to continue an allowance for educational purposes, the clause provides that further application may be made. Again, your

1023
Lordships may ask me to justify the age of twenty-one and ask what logic there may be in it. I am bound to admit that there is no logic in it other than that there must be some age; and twenty-one is not only the ordinary coming-of-age figure but by and large it represents, except for those who are going on for express university careers or medical training, the end to the normal run of education.
I would like to bring to your Lordships' attention—hoping, particularly to receive the advice of noble Lords more learned in the law—a small point which I happened upon in reading through the Finance Act, 1944, last night. I think it merits attention, although I hesitate to challenge or criticise the draftsmanship of His Majesty's Treasury in this regard. The Clause 2 provision drafted by the Treasury is supposed to have cleared the income tax position, but in Section 25 (1) (b) of the Finance Act, 1944, I observed that the definition of "small maintenance payments" includes the words,
"… for the benefit of, or for the maintenance or education of, a person under sixteen years of Age."
I am a little apprehensive that the limit of sixteen years of age in that small subsection may have escaped attention, and the good intentions of the drafting of Clause 2 might be undone in this regard. I should be very grateful if noble and learned Lords would have a look at that point before we reach the Committee stage, so as to be able to give me some help on the matter.
Clause 4 deals with the obvious point that it is useless enlarging the powers of a court to make orders unless there is adequate provision for enforcement. I referred earlier to the fact that the court had the power to make orders for payment to be paid, not to the woman herself but to an officer of the court. It lies within the discretion of the court to make an order of that kind, and it is generally agreed that there are many advantages in doing so. It helps a women with no knowledge of the law, and in general it eases the practice of the court. Indeed, a Departmental Committee, appointed by Sir John Gilmour when he was Home Secretary, recommended the expansion and use of this idea in
1024
general, and I know that it is a practice in many courts to use the procedure that the collecting officer takes action. During the progress of this Bill through another place, attention was directed to the fact that there is some doubt about the legality of the practice, although it is very general in the courts. This clause, therefore, covers that technical point, and provides for the use of this machinery in all possible circumstances. The effect of the clause is that if the court decides that payment shall be made to the officer, he will have a statutory duty, after four weeks of arrears, to inform the woman. He is left with the discretion that where, for instance, he knows that a man is unemployed or away from work through sickness he need take no steps. When he does take steps, the woman will have the right to ask him to take proceedings in her name on her behalf. He proceeds to take action, the woman running all the risks of costs which might be involved. The main benefit to her, of course, is that she is probably saved two or three abortive journeys to court.
In Clause 5, provision is made for access to the children by the husband. It is the normal practice in most courts, as your Lordships are well aware, for a clause to be put in the order providing for this access, but at present no Statute makes express provision in this regard. The opportunity has been taken, in presenting this Bill to your Lordships, to put in this extra clause to regularise the position. Clause 6 is somewhat fresh in its nature. At the moment, inconvenience and hardship is caused to women by the fact that the only court able to deal with her claims is the one in the area in which the cause of complaint arises. An example of the hardship is, of course, where the matrimonial offence occurs in the north of England. As a result of the matrimonial offence, the wife leaves with her children to rejoin her parents in the south of England. To make the application she would have to go north. It is perfectly true that, as a result of the change proposed, it may be that the man would have to come south. It is a question of balancing the hardship. Which is the greater hardship—to make a woman with the responsibility of children travel, or to make the man, who is to answer, travel down to where she has gone? In addition to that, it transpired in the course of the

1025
Committee stage in another place that the provision proposed in this clause ties up closely with the provision under the Bastardy Acts, and also with Scottish Court procedure. In view of the attempts at present being made to secure mutual enforceability in England and Scotland, I understand that the Home Secretary regards this particular clause as valuable.
I now come to Clause 7, the clause upon which I anticipate criticism, and upon which doubtless there will be some debate on the Committee stage. This clause was one of those added at a late stage, not after quick consideration but after a good deal of consideration by certain of the honourable gentlemen learned in the law who were advising those sponsoring the Bill. At the moment a large number of men labour under a strong sense of grievance that they have only one form of appeal—the appeal to the High Court. To those not living in London the High Court is a long way away; and to all, whether living in London or not, it is very expensive. Even the Legal Aid and Advice Bill will not obviate the fact that there will be expense involved in this connection.
What this clause does is to bring the appeals procedure broadly into line with that in criminal cases; that is to say, there should he an appeal on a mixture of fact and law or on law only—not, as at the moment, an appeal to the High Court on a point of law only (which, as I understand it, rarely, if ever, receives a very pleasurable reception from the High Court, who are obviously loath to intervene). The noble and learned Lord, Lord Merriman, who is to follow me, is skilled in these matters; I myself claim no legal knowledge and no ability to debate the particular nature of this clause. I know, too, that the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor has some doubts on this matter, and I also know from private conversations with some of your Lordships that you share those doubts. The Lord Chancellor told me that but for other engagements he would have been present at this debate to express his Own point of view on this and other matters, and he asked me if I would say to your Lordships how sorry he is that he is not able to be here in time.
1026
Well, my Lords, there is the Bill. I am sorry I have had to take up so much of your time. I hope I have not taken too long. What I have tried to do is to paint a sufficient picture to justify your going ahead with this Bill and, as I hope, not only taking it through the Committee stage at an early date but placing it on the Statute Book before we rise for the Summer Recess. I believe in the Bill. It may be that your Lordships will desire to give it a little polish before it goes any further. I commend it 10 your Lordships' House, and beg to move that the Bill be read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Crook)
5.32 p.m.
LORD MERRIMAN: My Lords, I have no intention of opposing the Second Reading of this Bill, but in. Clause 7 of the Bill there is one big question of principle, to which the noble Lord, Lord Crook has just alluded. That clause makes a radical change in the method of appeals from these matrimonial cases before the magistrate—and, in my opinion, it is a change which is very much for the worse. The noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor has asked me to say how sorry he is not to be present at this debate, and he has permitted me to say that he urged me to state fully what I thought were the objections to this change, so that it might be considered, as it has not been fully considered anywhere, when the Committee stage is reached.
The noble Lord, Lord Crook, was perfectly correct in saying that there had been some discussion on a slightly different clause at an earlier stage in another place, but that owing to circumstances into which it is not necessary to go it was introduced on Report and passed on Third Reading with exactly half a column of discussion—one speech. Now I must admit that I suffer under a certain feeling of personal embarrassment in this matter, because I preside over the Court whose activities are to he drastically curtailed. But that very fact enables me to say something which may be of assistance. It is not really sound, in nay opinion, to talk in this connection of linking this system of appeal with the general system of appeal from magistrates' courts in criminal cases. I say that for this reason. When in 1895

1027
this matrimonial jurisdiction was introduced, it was natural that as a matter of procedure—and it was expressed to be simply a matter of procedure—it should be linked with the machinery of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts which, in the main, as your Lordships know, deal with small offences, though also with orders for the payment of money.
Similarly, with our passion for legislation by reference, as bastardy proceedings had already been included in the same procedure it was natural enough that it should be provided that, for the purposes of enforcement, these orders should be enforced as bastardy orders. But in fact this is neither criminal procedure, nor anything to do with bastardy; and, oddly enough, although the Acts which govern this code are headed "Summary Jurisdiction Acts" it has been held that they are not part of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts at all. The whole series of Acts—and this is a point of supreme importance—constitutes a code of purely civil character, a matrimonial code as between husband and wife which, in the main, is absolutely identical with the divorce law as administered in the Division over which I preside—the only difference, of course, being that the magistrates' courts have power to make an order only for judicial separation, whereas we have the additional power to dissolve a marriage. It was therefore almost inevitable, when this first Act was passed in 1895, that the appeal in these matters should be given to a Divisional Court of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division.
After all, the issues are absolutely the same. When you have to discuss the question of adultery, whether it is from the point of view of obtaining a separation order—for either party can now get a separation order on the ground of adultery—or whether it is by way of bar to a married woman getting an order against the husband, the issue is the same, and the standard of proof required is the same, as in the High Court. The same thing applies to a charge of desertion, whether it is because the man has left the woman or has behaved so outrageously as to drive her away. Similarly, with regard to cruelty and even with regard to a summons for wilful neglect to maintain (a remedy that is at present con-
1028
fined to the magistrates' court, though, as your Lordships know, there is a private Bill which will probably be coming up shortly to your Lordships' House, giving the High Court also power to deal with this matter without the necessity for a petition for judicial separation or divorce) the issues are still the same. A married woman is not entitled to an order if she is living apart from the husband unless she can prove that he has deserted her by driving her away, or has treated her with cruelty, or the like. Therefore, the standard of proof in these cases is exactly the same throughout on all the major issues. Moreover, the order made by magistrates in these cases forms the basis of a divorce case. It is expressly provided in the latest Act, the Herbert Act, that the obtaining of an order on any of these grounds may be accepted by the High Court as proof of the offence charged, provided only that the petitioner himself or herself gives evidence.
There is another point. Lord Crook, if he will allow me to correct him, made a mistake when he said that we deal with these matters in the Court of Appeal only on questions of law. We have exactly the same written rules, and we are guided by exactly the same principles in practice, as the Court of Appeal is bound and guided by when sitting in appeal from one of us in a divorce case. We are not limited solely to questions of law. We examine the whole evidence. The matter is a rehearing. It is true that it is a re-hearing without witnesses, and I will return to that presently. We are expressly empowered to draw any inference of fact which the court below could have drawn, exactly as the Court of Appeal is entitled to do when sitting on appeal from us. We are not to upset a case simply because there has been a misdirection, unless we are satisfied that that misdirection has caused a substantial miscarriage of justice.
May I, in passing, say this? I have had sixteen years' experience in this business now, and when I first came to my present position it was the exception and not the rule to receive an intelligible note of the evidence and an intelligible statement of the magistrates' reasons. For one reason or another—it is not for me to say what reason—the situation has completely changed, and it is now the exception rather than the rule to have a bad note and an inadequate statement of the

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magistrates' reasons; so that we are really well equipped. We do not get a shorthand note in most cases. Sometimes they provide us with a shorthand note, but we get what I think is much better than a shorthand note—a really good longhand note, and a statement of what is in effect the judgment, which is exactly what the Court of Appeal—at any rate when I was a young man—used to count on getting front the judge's note and the transcript of the judgment. In other words—and this I regard as a cardinal point in this discussion—our Divisional Court and the justices are in precisely the same relationship to each other as the Court of Appeal are to the judges of the Divorce Division. The result is that over the whole code governing these matrimonial offences—and the rights of married women against their husbands and, indeed, the rights of husbands against their wives—the appellate control is vested either in the Court of Appeal or in two judges of the Divorce Division whose particular business it is to be versed in these matters.
I happen to know that our decisions are widely reported, and I believe that they are widely read. It is certainly not for me to say whether they are helpful, but I hope they are. One would have thought, therefore, that when you get, as is proposed in this Bill—I am not going to discuss the question of amount—this jurisdiction raised in amount by 150 per cent., the appellate control to which I have referred would be rather more than less necessary. I have nothing whatever to say against Quarter Sessions. I myself happen to be a Chairman of Quarter Sessions, but this at least it is fair to say: I doubt very much whether clerks of the peace of the counties have had any experience whatever in this jurisdiction. They are most unlikely ever to have been clerks to justices and to have had to deal with this class of case. Quarter Sessions do not sit, even if there is a legal Chairman, in very learned circles; as a rule, there is no access to books at Quarter Sessions, except in some of the bigger cities. What is more—and this is not the least important—there is no method of co-ordinating the decisions of one court of Quarter Sessions with those of another. That, at any rate, I claim the Divisional Court of our Division does.
There is one other very serious matter. We do not know, of course, exactly how
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the Rushcliffe Bill is going to be applied to Quarter Sessions but, if a wife has obtained an order before a magistrate, or if she is charged with adultery or anything like that, we have power to order that she shall have security for costs to defend herself against the charge of adultery, or to maintain her order. So far as I know, Quarter Sessions have no power to order any security for a wife's costs. It horrifies me, when there is this talk of men being disgruntled with decisions of magistrates, that a woman's reputation should be at the mercy of an appeal by her husband to Quarter Sessions when there is no way of providing her with the means of defending herself. I do not want to labour this matter too much, but I have seen something about the lack of consideration in another place. So far as I know, this point has never been considered by any of the Departmental Committees that have been appointed. There has never been any recommendation of this sort. I know that the General Council of the Bar first heard of it two days before Report. I do not know that the Law Society or the Association of Recorders and Chairmen of Quarter Sessions have heard of it at all. But I do not want to labour that point.
Now let me come to the reasons which have been given. It is said—and the noble Lord, Lord Crook, repeated almost verbatim what was said in another place—that these appeals were expensive. With the greatest possible respect, that is not true. I have taken out the figures for this. The cost of an appeal to the Divisional Court averages about £30. I have made inquiry from my own Quarter Sessions, and the average cost of an appeal to Quarter Sessions is about £35. In this class of case, which often requires a certain number of witnesses—and obviously, the more witnesses you have to transport to Quarter Sessions, the greater is the expense—there is nothing in this question of expense. Then it is said: "Put the thing in line with the rest of the criminal law." I have already tried to explain that this is not the criminal law at all, but that does impel me to say something about the alternative which is provided.
These appeals—as we know, they are appeals by way of re-hearing, on the same principle as the Court of Appeal

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re-hears from us—are to be replaced by what is called a "case stated." A case stated by justices is an admirable weapon for ascertaining the law with regard to some offence on facts which are either admitted or indisputable. The sort of thing I am thinking of—and they are the daily routine of cases stated—are offences under one of the thousand-and-one regulations and orders by which our lives are governed nowadays. I have looked through some of the latest King's Bench Reports, and that is the sort of thing. I need not elaborate the point, but there is no analogy whatever between that sort of thing and a re-hearing on points of fact, or on a mixed question of law and fact, which is what the noble Lord, Lord Crook, quite rightly described these appeals as being. You must obtain a correct appreciation of the facts and then apply the law to those facts. It is quite impossible to talk about a case stated in connection with the sort of question which arises as to a course of conduct extending, maybe, over a series of years, when a woman has been subjected to this, that or the other ill-treatment, and when the question is whether that amounts to cruelty or has or has not justified her in leaving her husband. You cannot alter the facts which are stated in a case; the Court is bound absolutely by the statement of the facts. I submit that a much better way of dealing with the matter is to do as we do now—obtain from the note a correct appreciation of what the facts are and then apply the law to them, instead of binding us, as I suggest it is impossible for us to be bound, by a case stated on what is really inference from a course of conduct which may have extended over years. After all, the hearing of these appeals is something in which Judges in my Division are particularly versed, and they feel very strongly—I am speaking for them too—that if this change is made it may deprive us of our most useful class of work.
There is one other matter which the noble Lord, Lord Crook, mentioned—namely, as he said, the resentment felt by some appellants because the Divisional Court, not having seen the witnesses, feels that it cannot interfere with the decision of the court below. My Lords, precisely the same argument—neither more nor less—could be used to justify
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the demand that a man or a woman who had been unsuccessful in a divorce case should be allowed to have the right to a re-trial before another judge without the necessity of going to the Court of Appeal. I suggest that that is really no ground at all. But may I just add this in support of what I have said? I have done my best in the last few days to make some sort of analysis of these appeals that come before us. I do not pretend that it is mathematically exact, but I am satisfied that it is near enough to be useful. I find that of recent appeals only about 15 per cent. could possibly be appropriate to be dealt with by way of case stated, and that is really the residue which will be left to us if this clause goes through.
For the rest, not more than another 15 per cent. are simply questions of amount. I do not believe that appeal is necessary on amount. It has long since been settled that the proper way for a man to deal with the matter, if he is dissatisfied on the question of amount, and if he cannot pay what has been ordered, is to go back to the justices, who have ample jurisdiction to review their former order without being bound by anything that they have decided before. The other 70 per cent. or thereabouts are these questions of mixed law and fact which I have already described. Of those, we allow appeals in rather more cases than we dismiss them; and I am quite clear in my own mind that the proportion of those dismissed in which we are not able to say absolutely definitely that the case is either right or wrong, but merely have to dismiss it, because we have not seen the witnesses and the justices have, is very small. I doubt if it amounts to 10 per cent. of all appeals. I, therefore, close with this remark: that this seems to me to be the slenderest possible reason for making a drastic change of this character in a Court which, I believe, has functioned with reasonable satisfaction ever since the institution of this jurisdiction. I hope that on Committee stage wiser counsels will prevail, and that this clause will be withdrawn.
5.55 p.m.
VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, I would like to add a few words, not because I have any special professional knowledge of this particular procedure but because, as the noble Lord, Lord

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Crook, said, we have a responsibility in this House to make this Bill, by co-operation, as good a Bill as we possibly can. What we have just heard from my noble and learned friend, Lord Merriman, is, of course, a matter we shall want to consider at the Committee stage, but I will say just a word about it before I sit down. But first let me say that I think we owe a real debt of gratitude to Lord Crook for presenting the Bill as a whole to us so clearly and comprehensively, and I think we in this House would at the same time like to express our satisfaction at the fact that in another place, in spite of the pressure of business, time and opportunity have been found for a private Member of the House to introduce a most useful Bill, to carry it through in good time and to send it up here, where I am certain we shall want to assist in putting it on the Statute Book. At a time when tremendous problems of public importance are crowding the minds and thoughts of everybody, it must be a great satisfaction to be able, with everybody's good will, to do this useful piece of work as a private Member of the House and get it on the Statute Book. This is the first time that such a Bill has come up here in recent years. Another, of which I shall have the honour of taking charge—namely, the Adoption of Children Bill—is coming up in a few days' time, and to a certain extent I am preparing the way for a repetition.
The main provisions of this measure are surely admirable. The object of the Bill as it was introduced was really to correct the ridiculously low maximum figure which magistrates may order a husband who has behaved badly to pay his wife under this procedure. To say that he must pay her £2 a week as a maximum and another 10s. as a maximum for each child, may have been right long ago, for all I know, but it is not right now. I need not say anything more about: that, except that Lord Crook has completely convinced us that the main object of the Bill is perfectly right. Whether the amount for the child should be 20s. or 30s. we may perhaps have to consider in Committee.
That was the real object of the Bill, but a very odd thing happened to it which may be quite all right but which we must consider. At the very last moment, on the Report stage of the Bill
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on June 24 last, there was added to it what is now Clause 7. I do not say that that is not within the scope of the Bill—of course it is—but it was no part of the original project at all, and though it was presented in a very clear speech, it is perfectly correct to say that except for the speech of the honourable Member who moved it, nothing else whatever was said. Even the seconder elected only to second the Motion, and the clause was then and there added to this admirable Bill, without any discussion. Therefore I think we are bound to consider during the Committee stage whether that particular addition is useful or not.
We all listened with great care to what my noble and learned friend Lord Merriman said, and it is obvious that he, with very great knowledge of this subject—far greater knowledge than I think anybody else in this House possesses—is convinced on public grounds that it is a mistake to add this clause to the Bill. I can see one or two considerations which might be urged in its favour, but I appreciate the argument he uses. As I have said, I am not speaking from any special knowledge of this subject; it does not happen to be in the line of country with which I have been professionally concerned. But if one puts it in very simple terms, that is how it seems to me to stand.
Of course, when magistrates decide some matter of summary jurisdiction, it is in most cases right that the party who does not feel that the decision is just should have the right of appeal. In an ordinary case, as for example, if I am charged with driving a motor car while under the influence of drink or have any other of a variety of charges brought against me, if I am not satisfied with the decision I have an appeal, and that appeal is to Quarter Sessions. An appeal to Quarter Sessions, as your Lordships appreciate, is a wholly different thing from an appeal of the kind which has hitherto existed in regard to orders made against husbands by magistrates in cases where the wife alleges that she has been treated cruelly or deserted, or whatever it may be. Before Quarter Sessions, the matter is begun all over again. All the witnesses are called again. It is a retrial in the strictest possible sense, and the appeal succeeds or, it may be, fails.

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That is the ordinary way in which, nowadays, those charges which are dealt with in the first place, summarily, in the magistrates' court, or at any rate by a magistrate, are reviewed.
I understood my noble and learned friend, Lord Merriman, to say, on the ground of conformity with the regular practice, that it would be a mistake to say that that is the best way in which to proceed for an appeal in cases where magistrates order husbands to pay something to their wives. The object of Clause 7 really is to say that an appeal in a case of that sort shall be as it is in cases of ordinary charges relating to some petty crime. At first sight, it might be thought difficult to see why, if it is a good thing in one case, it should not be a good thing in the other. But I do point out that, for my part, I feel that my noble and learned friend has made some very important points in this connection. In the first place, it is the judges of the Divorce Court and no one else who have to deal with these very issues of cruelty or desertion or whatever it may be, if the matter ripens into a divorce case. They are, unquestionably, the persons who, by experience, devotion and skill, are specially qualified to judge that kind of question. On the other hand, the ordinary Quarter Sessions Benches—to which many of us here have belonged at some time or another—really cannot claim to have any special knowledge of that subject. The question of what amounts to cruelty and what amounts to desertion is sometimes a rather special sort of question. I think, moreover, that Lord Merriman is strongly based when he says that it is necessary to lay down a general set of principles which will be followed. That is much better done in the High Court than by the people who sit at Quarter Sessions in different parts of the country.
There are, of course, arguments the other way. One possibly good argument—if there is a good argument the other way—is this. If the decision of a magistrate or magistrates in a case of this sort is wrong, and the husband ought not to be ordered to pay money to his wife on the grounds suggested, the method of appeal at present is to go to London and there in the High Court to get the appeal dealt with, whereas, if he had an appeal
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to Quarter Sessions, in some cases he would be able to get it heard much nearer to his home. Therefore, at first sight, Quarter Sessions, from that point of view, might appear to be the better tribunal. I mention these points merely to show that I have followed all that my noble and learned friend has said. I think that when the Committee stage is reached we shall have to consider this matter a little more closely. My present inclination is to think that Lord Merriman has made a very strong case for leaving this part of our procedure as it is. The change which is proposed was put in the Bill only at the last moment and, so far as I know, without any consultation with those who may be supposed to have any qualifications to advise on such a matter. We shall hear in due course what the Lord Chancellor has to say and we shall be, I am sure, largely assisted by his view. I merely say that, having listened to the arguments which have been put forward, my impression is that it would be just as well if Clause 7 were left out. I would add that I have not the slightest doubt that the Member of Parliament and his supporter who moved its insertion were actuated by nothing except the consideration of improving the Bill. For the rest, this is admittedly a very good Bill; it is most desirable that it should get on the Statute Book, and no further words from me shall delay its progress.
6.8 p.m.
LORD MESTON: My Lords, subject to certain criticisms, I think that this is an excellent Bill, and I hope that your Lordships will have no difficulty in giving it a Second Reading. Clause 1 of the Bill contains a most desirable provision. Apart from any question of depreciation in the value of money, I have taken the view for a long time that the jurisdiction of magistrates is far too restricted in regard to the amounts which they may award both to wives and lo children. Let me take the case of a married man with no children, who has an income of £1,500 a year. Suppose he deserts his wife. Until his wife takes proceedings in the Divorce Court, she can get no more than £2 a week by way of maintenance for herself. When she takes proceedings in the Divorce Court, I may say, without going into any technical details, that she will be entitled to one-fifth of her husband's income, pending proceedings. That is to say, she will be entitled

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to an allowance of £300 a year or £6 a week. Therefore, your Lordships will see at once that the present Bill fills a very important gap.
There is one point in regard to procedure, however, which I would like to mention. As your Lordships know, the state of a man's income is just as much a fact as the state of his digestion, but it seems to me that the view which a man takes of his income is sometimes coloured by the circumstances in which he ands himself. For example, if a man knows that a charge is going to be levied upon him and that that charge is going to depend on the size of his income, human nature being what it is he will take a very depressed view of his financial resources. In other words, I suggest that magistrates should he given precisely the same powers as the High Court in regard to ascertaining the amount of income of respective spouses. I observe that in this Bill there are no provisions for making regulations. Perhaps regulations may be made under some other Act which is to be read as one with this Bill, and therefore it may not be necessary to have such provision in this Bill. But, under any clause which gives power to make regulations, I hope that in due course regulations will he made which will confer upon magistrates similar powers to those enjoyed by the High Court for ascertaining the amounts of incomes of parties to matrimonial disputes. Clause 2 is consequential to Clause 1. Clauses 3, 4, 5 and 6 are all commendable.
With regard to Clause 4 (1), speaking for myself, I would leave out the reference to "special circumstances." I think that when you use the phrase "special circumstances" you are simply opening up an avenue for argument as to what does or does not constitute "special circumstances." The subsection would read equally well if the relevant passage were framed as follows:
"that officer shall, unless it appears to him that it is unnecessary or inexpedient so to do, give to the married woman notice in writing stating the particulars of the arrears."
I come to Clause 7 of the Bill, and I will say at once that I disagree entirely with it. And if everybody else is too modest to take any steps in the matter I propose to move art Amendment on Committee stage to delete the clause from the Bill. As your Lordships know, the
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present method of appeal is an open appeal to the Divisional Court of the Divorce Court. It is a method of appeal which, by general consent, is expeditious, reasonably cheap (I insert the word "reasonably" because nothing in the law is cheap), and I have never heard one single word of complaint about that method of appeal. The Divisional Court of the Divorce Court looks at the substance of the matter, rather than at the mere bones of the dispute, and from personal knowledge I may say that immense pains are taken in every case to see that justice is done and that the court gets to the root of the matter. The suggested alteration provided by Clause 7 is, in my view, cumbersome, does not reduce expenses and will not effect any improvement in justice at all.
The further procedure by way of case stated on a point of law is, in my view, most undesirable. It has been said that a case stated is sometimes an excellent way of ascertaining a point of law upon admitted facts. But I believe the "case stated" procedure is almost always a very undesirable way of ascertaining anything. I have no doubt that many of your Lordships, in the course of your careers, have been asked to draw up a case. May I strike a personal note for a moment? I have sometimes been asked to draw up a case to be stated before the High Court. I say without hesitation that I would sooner try to draft an Act of Parliament. When that document has finally been agreed with the clerk of the court and comes before the High Court, the deciding judge has always turned to me and said, "I have never seen a worse piece of work in my life." However, I have the satisfaction of knowing that he has probably said that to everybody else, so I am not unduly disturbed. I can assure your Lordships that appeal on a point of law by case stated is one of the most uncertain ways of arriving at the real truth in any matter. Therefore I hope Clause 7 will be removed from the Bill. Subject to these few criticisms, I think this is a very good Bill, and I hope your Lordships 'will give it a Second Reading.
6.13 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, I would like merely to add a few words to what my noble friend Lord Meston has said. The noble Lord who

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moved the Second Reading of this Bill did so with such a disarmingly conciliatory approach that at one moment I thought he was going to move for us on Second Reading the Amendments we might move on Committee stage, for I think he already has under his eye the possibility of some Amendments being needed on certain points. Like other noble Lords, I want to say one word on Clause 7. Apart altogether from the circumstances in which it entered this Bill, it seems to me that in its present form the clause has the undesirable effect of making what was neat clumsy, and what was definite vague; and that is surely not a very happy method of drafting a provision in an Act of Parliament.
It was said by the noble Lord, Lord Crook, that men had a grievance about being brought up to London. At Quarter Sessions on a re-hearing, a litigant and witnesses have to appear personally on the spot. Re-hearing in London is a re-hearing on paper material, and there is no reason whatever why the litigant, and certainly his witnesses, should appear in London at all. The matter can well be handled by his advisers. The view was put forward in another place that the Divisional Court of the Divorce Division was generally regarded as inefficient and dilatory. Those who practise in that Court, some with considerable experience whom I have consulted on this matter are the last persons to advocate or in any way support that view. The efficiency of the Court is unquestionable, and in regard to any question of its being dilatory it is true to say under present conditions that no court could be more thoroughly abreast of its work than that Court. I very much hope that when we come to Committee stage wiser counsel will prevail, and that this somewhat regrettable clause will disappear from this Bill into the shadows from which I think it should never have emerged.
6.17 p.m.
LORD CHORLEY: My Lords, I am in the somewhat embarrassing position of having to be prepared to explain the views of my noble and learned friend on this Bill, as he has not returned from his other
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engagements. He has asked me to express the warm appreciation of the Government of the general principles of the Bill and his own welcome to it. In respect of its general principles it has been received with support on all sides of the House. As my noble friend Lord Crook, who moved the Second Reading in such a pleasant and lucid speech, has said, any little blemishes can be removed during the Committee stage. My noble friend pointed out that Clause 2, which deals with the financial provisions, brings in the age of sixteen. That is a perfectly good point, but my noble friend will appreciate that Clause 2 was there before Clause 3 was added at the last moment, and steps are already being taken for the purpose of correcting that matter by an Amendment at the next stage. My noble friend himself appreciated that there will be some question as to whether the provision of 30s. for each child is not rather too generous. My noble and learned friend also felt that, but it is again a matter which can be argued on Committee stage.
The new proposed arrangements for appeal have, I think, met with no sort of commendation from any noble Lord, most of whom have had a good deal of experience in these matters. These provisions have been severely criticised by the noble Lord, the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, than whom, either inside or outside your Lordships' House, no one speaks with such a weight of authority. In regard to that I will say only that it was not inserted at the very last moment. A clause of this kind was in fact sanctioned at Committee stage, but was withdrawn after criticism of its drafting. The clause which now appears was a re-drafted clause of the same kind. I understand that the substantial point made in its favour was that at Quarter Sessions it is possible for magistrates to see and hear witnesses, which is sometimes better than going into what has been said, so to speak, secondhand, on paper. My noble and learned friend has himself felt that this is a clause which would require very careful consideration, and he is inclined to regard it with considerable apprehension. I am sure if he had had the pleasure of hearing the criticisms made about it on all sides of your Lordships' House this afternoon his

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misgivings would have been increased. It may be that my noble friend Lord Crook will be able to accept an Amendment removing that clause from the Bill when it reaches the Committee stage. With those few observations, I have no doubt that your Lordships will give the Bill a Second Reading.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

SUPERANNUATION BILL
6.22 p.m.
Read 3a (according to Order) with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

WEST BROMWICH CORPORATION BILL
The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES informed the House that the opposition to the Bill was withdrawn; the Orders made on June 21 and 23 last discharged, and Bill committed.
HALIFAX CORPORATION BILL
Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.

HOUSE OF LORDS OFFICES
Fourth Report from the Select Committee made, to he printed, and to be considered on Thursday next.
House adjourned at twenty-three minutes past six o'clock.