Lords Sitting of 5 July 1949

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
The Lord Wrenbury—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

URMSTON URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL
Read 2*, and committed, the Committee to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.

GAS COMPENSATION CLAIMS
2.35 p.m.
VISCOUNT BUCKMASTER: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they will consider taking into account the alarming fall in the price of 3 per cent. British Gas Stock 1990–95 in settling the outstanding claims of gas companies for additional compensation under section twenty-six of the Gas Act, 1948.]
THE PAYMASTER - GENERAL (LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR): My Lords, under the terms of Section 26 of the Gas Act, 1948, the addition which may be made to the value of the gas securities as assessable under Section 25 is limited to the amount agreed to be necessary to offset the depreciation in their values due to the war causes described in the Act. It is not open to the Minister, in settling that addition, to take into account the possible effects of variations in the market price of the British Gas Stock in which compensation is paid.
VISCOUNT BUCKMASTER: My Lords, arising out of that reply, I take it that the noble Lord realises that companies which have small claims have practically lost all chance of compensation.
LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: My Lords, that is fully appreciated, and very much regretted.
VISCOUNT BUCKMASTER: I thank the noble Lord.

ANGLO-CZECHOSLOVAK NEGOTIATIONS
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they are aware that the continuance of economic and financial negotiations with countries that respect neither religious freedom nor essential human rights must greatly weaken any representations which they may make on these subjects; and whether they will take this fact into account in the negotiations which are at present proceeding with representatives of the Czechoslovak Government.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD HENDERSON): My Lords, His Majesty's Government have on repeated occasions made it clear that they disapprove of State interference with religious liberty and human rights but I do not think it would be generally agreed that in this matter His Majesty's Government should take special action which would sacrifice the economic interests of this country at the present time. One of our objects in these negotiations is to secure payment of Czechoslovak debts due to this country and compensation for British interests which have been nationalised in Czechoslovakia.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, whilst I thank the noble Lord for his answer, which, as I think he will realise, I cannot regard as satisfactory, will he at least make it clear to the Czechoslovak negotiators, and through them to the Czechoslovak Government, that the religious persecution which is at present obtaining in that country must necessarily arouse great public resentment here and must, therefore, make the present negotiations more difficult.
LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, I do not think that the trade delegation is a good medium for such representations. I would add that having regard to statements made by Ministers, both in your Lordships' House, and in another place as well as in discussion at the United Nations Assembly, the Czechoslovak

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Government can be in no doubt whatsoever as to the views of His Majesty's Government and of British public opinion generally regarding religious persecution and denial of human rights.

LICENSING BILL
2.39 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
[The EARL OF DROGHEDA in the Chair]
Clause 1:
Extension of State management to new towns
(3) In this section the expression "new town" means an area designated as the site of a proposed new town under section one of the New Towns Act, 1946, by an order (whether made before or after the commencement of this Act) which has become operative.
(6) The development corporation for every new town shall, as soon as may be after the commencement of this Act or the coming into operation of the order under section one of the New Towns Act, 1946, designating the site of the new town, whichever is the later, consult with every county and county district council whose area includes any part of the new town and with the licensing justices for every licensing district which includes any part thereof, and also with such other persons and bodies of persons as appear to the corporation requisite to be consulted, as to the constitution of the local advisory committee for the new town, and shall then prepare a draft scheme for the constituting of the committee.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT JOWITT)THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT JOWITT) moved in subsection (3) to omit "section" (where that word first occurs) and insert "Part of this Act." The noble and learned Viscount said: This is the first of a considerable series of Amendments which are to be moved, a number by me and not a few by noble Lords on the other side. The first Amendment is to leave out the word "section" and to insert "Part of this Act." This Bill, as your Lordships know, extends the existing area, what is commonly spoken of as the Carlisle area, to the new towns. When the new towns come on the scene they have normally, and I think always, a development corporation. But it is possible that
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in the course of time these new towns will suffer, what shall we say, a sea change or, if you prefer it, a change of life, and having reached a certain stage, the development corporation will cease to exist. There are various passages in the Bill—for instance Clause 3 (1)—which require the Secretary of State to consult with the development corporation before acquiring land by agreement or compulsorily. Clearly, that clause presupposes that there is a development corporation to consult. Therefore we have to make it plain that under Clause 1 the areas designated under the New Towns Act will become State management districts, irrespective of subsequent developments in the new towns. These later clauses which contain provisions as to land or premises in new towns are dependent upon, the existence of the development corporation. The object of the Amendment is to make that clear. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 7, leave out ("section") and insert ("Part of this Act").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD LLEWELLIN: I do not think that we have any objection to the first two of these Amendments, and perhaps it would be wise for me to say what I have to say on the third.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in subsection (3) to substitute "passing" for "commencement." The noble and learned Viscount raid: This Amendment leaves out the rather ugly word "commencement" and substitutes the word "passing." The reason for that is that the new clause which we are moving after Clause 18, which as your Lordships will see provides that,
"The provisions of this Part of this Act, except section seventeen thereof, shall come into operation on such date as the Secretary of State may appoint."
The reason for that new clause and for the consequential Amendments, which come here and in many places elsewhere in the Bill, is this. We had hoped that this Bill and the Justices of the Peace Bill would be passing through this House more or less contemporaneously—or indeed, that the Justices of the Peace Bill would precede this one. That Bill deals with the areas over which there are to be licensing justices, and I take this

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opportunity of discussing a question which obviously should be carefully discussed on that Bill. But that Bill has repercussions on the present Bill, and we think the only way to solve the problem is to do this. Whereas Part I of this Bill will come into operation automatically on the passing of the Bill, Part II will come into operation on an appointed day, so that when the appointed day comes we shall be able to survey the whole provisions, both of the Justices of the Peace Bill and of this Bill, with regard to licensing justices
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 10, leave out ("commencement") and insert ("passing").—(The Lord Chancello".)
LORD LLEWELLIN: I think that is right. We have no objection to the first subsection of the Amendment which the noble and learned Viscount is to move after Clause 18, saying that Part II is to come into operation on such date as the Secretary of State may appoint. For the reasons he has given, there are obvious advantages in not having a fixed date in this Bill until we see when the other Bill can come into operation. From that point of view we have no objection whatever to the present Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved to add to subsection (3):
"Provided that except in this section the said expression does not include any such area after the development corporation established therefor has been dissolved."
The noble and learned Viscount said: This is an Amendment, to which the noble Lord opposite is moving an Amendment, dealing with a matter on which I have briefly touched already. If your Lordships will look at the provision which occurs on page 5, line 9, you will see that it provides that
"…before acquiring any land in a new town (whether by agreement or compulsorily) the Secretary of State shall consult with the development corporation."
Noble Lords will see that these provisions must be on the basis that there is still a development corporation to consult. Taking this Amendment, and anticipating for a moment what would happen if I left out the words "except in this Section," I think that the affect of the Amendment would be to end State
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management in a new town directly the development corporation was dissolved. The reason for that is that State management is established in the Bill by State management districts. From Clause 1 (4) and Clause 2 (1) you will see that this is so. The issue between us here is therefore this: Is it right, directly the development corporation is dissolved—which may well happen when once a town has attained maturity—to put an end to State management? In that event the owners will be concerned to dispose of their property. We do not want that at all. Once we have this experiment of State management in the new towns, we think it ought to run its course and go on running, notwithstanding that the development corporation, has come to an end. I cannot accept the proposal to leave out "except in this section." I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 11, at end insert the said proviso. —(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD LLEWELLIN LORD LLEWELLIN moved to amend the proposed Amendment by omitting "except in this section." The noble Lord said: Perhaps this is the moment when I ought to explain what my Amendment is intended to do. It is intended to do more than the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor indicated. There are two sets of circumstances in which the development corporation may cease to exist. The first is when a development corporation has been appointed and for one reason or another no new town follows. It may well be that a development corporation is appointed for a district where it was thought a new town would eventually arise. If there is no new town, obviously there is nowhere in which to experiment and let State management run its course, if I may follow the noble and learned Viscount in using that expression. There will be no new town in which that course can be run. It seems to me that before the Bill leaves this House we ought to make some provision in case a development corporation ceases to exist in circumstances such as those.
The second set of circumstances has already been referred to by the noble and learned Viscount. The effect of cutting out the words "except in this section" would be that, when one of these new towns had been established, together

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with a State management district started at the same time, if there were nothing abnormal about the district freedom would be given back to the people of that town to go for their drinks or meals to places in competition with one another, rather than always have to go to this State monopoly—which is what a State management district implies. As I said on Second Reading, I do not like this idea of a State monopoly. I believe it could have been carried out quite differently. Indeed, provision of new hotels and public-houses was made in rapidly growing areas before the war, without the setting up a State management district at all. Foe those reasons I would like to see my Amendment carried.
I do not know what the noble and learned Viscount may have to say about the first set of circumstances in which my Amendment would operate—namely, where a development corporation had been appointed, but was eventually dissolved and no new town was built. That may well happen, and I think we should make some provision for it. I would like my whole Amendment to be carried, but I quite see why the noble and learned Viscount objects to its operation in the second set of circumstances. That, of course, goes very much to the root of the whole policy behind this part of the Bill. The noble and learned Viscount seems to like it for some very odd reason, and I dislike it for very obvious reasons, as, I believe, a great number of consumers in the area will dislike it also. In that case, of course, there is a difference of policy. In order to enable the noble and learned Viscount to answer my first point, I beg to move the Amendment to the Amendment which the Lord Chancellor has already moved.
Amendment to Amendment moved—
In line 1, leave out ("except in this section"). —(Lord Llewellin.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I will briefly answer the noble Lord. The introduction of State management does not depend upon the setting up of a development corporation but on the coming into operation of an order designating an area as a new town. I do not suppose the Minister of Town and Country Planning would ever make such an order and then not proceed with the new town. I confess that this is rather a
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novel point to me, and I am quite prepared to consult with the Minister about it and tell your Lordships more concerning it at a later stage of the Bill. But the test of a new town is the making of an order by the Minister of Town and Country Planning. Having made an order designating a particular area as a new town, I cannot agree that he would not go on with the order. However, it is a matter which merits consideration. On the main point, as the noble Lord has anticipated, I am afraid I am bound to stand firm and say that we cannot let this experiment—for experiment it is—come to an end merely by the accidental event of the development, corporation being wound up.
LORD LLEWELLIN: I do not think this is the moment to press this Amendment to a Division. I am obliged to the noble and learned Viscount for saying he will look into this particular point. Perhaps we might have a discussion between now and Report stage to see what can be done in regard to the matter. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment to the Amendment.
Amendment to Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is the matter I have already discussed. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 30, leave out ("commencement") and insert ("passing").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment deals with the difficulty about the county borough. As this Bill was drafted, we did not deal with the county borough at all, thinking it would probably have been dealt with by the other Bill. Now we have to deal with the matter, and we do it by inserting the words "local authority." Then your Lordships will see that have an Amendment down to add to subsection (9):
"In this section the expression 'local authority' means the council of a county, county borough or county district."
In that way we bring in the county borough—a course which, in view of all the circumstances, has become necessary. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 33, leave out ("county and county district council") and insert ("local authority").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 42, leave out ("county and county district council") and insert ("local authority").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 45, at end, insert—
("( ) In this section the expression 'local authority' means the council of a county, county borough or county district.").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, leave out lines 7 to 8 and insert—
("(a) the expression 'local authority' means a county, town or district council").(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 2:
Restriction of sale and supply, otherwise than by Secretary of State, of intoxicating liquor in State management districts
2.—(1) No person, other than a person acting on behalf of the Secretary of State, shall sell intoxicating liquor by retail in a State management district, and no person, other than as aforesaid, shall supply intoxicating liquor in any licensed premises or club in a State management district:
Provided that this subsection shall not apply—

(a) to anything done in premises which were licensed premises or a registered club when State management came into operation in the district in which the premises are situated and have continued to be licensed premises or a registered club, as the case may be, since that time;

(b) to anything done under the written authority of the Secretary of State and in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be specified by him;

(c) to anything done on premises of a class specified by order of the Secretary of State.

2.59 p.m.
THE EARL OF MUNSTER THE EARL OF MUNSTER moved, in subsection (1) to omit "or club." The noble Earl said: This Amendment is of some importance, and I would ask your Lordships to bear with me while I endeavour to explain the reasons which have prompted me to move it. Clause 2, as drafted, lays down that no intoxicating liquor may be provided or sold in new licensed premises, or in a new club, in the State management districts which are to be set up under the terms of this Bill, without the authority of the Secretary of State. What it really means is that when the Bill becomes an Act, no political club, no social club, no British Legion club, no golf club, no club for dancing and no night club which wishes to sell intoxicating liquor in these new State management areas can do so without the express authority of the Secretary of State, and subject to such conditions as he may lay down. Those conditions which he lays down may well follow the onerous modifications which are usually applied in the Carlisle area. As I understand it, the new towns, when they have been built and are housing the population, will consist of something like 60,000 persons, and those persons will in point of fact be subject to the wishes and the whims of the Home Secretary, as to whether or not they should have a club within the area where intoxicating liquor can be purchased.
I said on Second Reading that I thought the Home Secretary, in the case of political clubs, would be subject to intense political pressure to allow or disallow the formation of these political clubs. The Lord Chancellor—certainly in very mild language—took me to task and told me that he had no doubt in his own mind that that would not occur. The Home Secretary used words of a similar nature when the Bill was going through another place. That political pressure has been applied in the past I have not the slightest doubt, and I intend, if I may, to read to your Lordships two letters which have come into my possession which deal with a club in the north of England, a club which is many years old but which has not previously had a licence to sell intoxicating liquor. In the beginning of 1946, this club applied to the local advisory committee for a licence to sell liquor, and it was some time before

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they received information from the Home Secretary that their application was, in point of fact, refused. The club caused a letter to be written to the general manager of the Carlisle and District State management scheme, who replied on April 17, 1946. Let me read that letter to the House, and your Lordships will observe what happened when this particular club applied to the local advisory committee.
The general manager begins by acknowledging the club's letter, and goes on:
"It is quite correct that your Club's application for permission to sell liquor has been before the local advisory committee. Obviously, you would know this, as Colonel Irwin was present and took an active part in the discussion.
You have not received any official notification on the subject so far because the Home Secretary's decision on the recommendation made by the local advisory committee has not yet been received. I should not, however, anticipate that he will do anything other than accept the advisory committee's recommendation. I will forward you the form of decision as soon as possible together with your copy of rules, et cetera.
Colonel Irwin, who presented the case for you, will no doubt be able to give you his impressions in greater detail, but broadly speaking the decision of the local advisory committee seemed to rest mainly on the fact that yours is a political club. They seemed to feel that if a club belonging to one political Party in Longtown were to be given permission to sell intoxicating liquor, that it would be very difficult to resist applications from either or both of the other Parties,"—
I need hardly tell your Lordships that there are no other clubs in that place—
"and in that event the whole balance of the position with regard to sale of drink in Long-town would be completely altered.
I understood that Colonel Irwin had some discussion after the meeting with certain members of the committee as to how, if at all, such an objection could be met, but I, naturally, have no information as to the details of this conversation.
Yours faithfully,
W. A. Goddard, General Manager."
He seemed to know a very great deal of what was going on.
I was fortunate to get hold of a letter which Colonel Irwin wrote to the club on March 28, 1946. He is much more definite with regard to the decisions which he thought had been reached by that committee. He wrote:
"With reference to your letter of the 11th instant. the application for the sanction of the State management scheme came before an ad-
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journed meeting of the Social Advisory Committee the other day, but I regret to say that my recommendation that permission should be given for your Club to apply to the licensing justices for a licence was defeated by seven votes to two. The objection seemed to be based on the fact that the Club is a political one, and it was indicated that if the title was changed to 'Constitutional' instead of 'Conservative,' the application would have a better chance of succeeding."
I hope that the noble and learned Viscount, when he comes to reply, will not again tell me that political pressure is not applied. Fortunately, I also have a letter from the club itself, dated in April of that year, which I will not bother to read to your Lordships, but I would say this. According to the Secretary of the club there is only one club in the State management area of Carlisle which has applied for a licence since it was originally formed, and that was the Carlisle Labour Club, which had been granted a permit during the existence of State control. I think that for that reason, if for no other, I have a case which demands an answer.
May I now turn to one other point? As the Bill is drafted at the moment, the Home Secretary can give authority for any club to be set up which sells intoxicating liquor, but only on the conditions which he himself lays down. Those conditions in many cases have proved to be very burdensome to the club and, I suppose, to the area. The Working Men's Club and Institute Union Limited—for which I should have thought the Government would have some respect—went to see the Home Secretary, and they were fortunate enough to obtain from him innumerable guarantees, to which I should like briefly to refer. They finally received a letter from the Home Secretary who agreed these points with them: That he would not require that the permitted hours for the supply and consumption of intoxicating liquor should be those prescribed for licensed premises in the area; that he would not stipulate that no commission on intoxicating liquor supplied in the club shall be paid to, or received by, any officer or servant of the club; that he would not require that the prices charged for beer or spirits shall not be less than the retail prices ordinarily charged for beer or spirits of like strength in the public bars of licensed premises in the neighbourhood; that he would not stipulate that no intoxicating liquor shall be supplied in the club for consumption off the premises; that he

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would not require that no intoxicating liquor shall be supplied to any person under the age of eighteen years, and that no condition should be imposed requiring the club to accept police entry.
I have searched this Bill pretty thoroughly but, so far as I can see, none of those guarantees has a place in this Bill. Home Secretaries come and Home Secretaries go. It may well be that the present Home Secretary—who is a very knowledgeable club man, and has been a member of clubs for many years, and also President of the British Legion —will loyally carry out the undertaking which he gave to the Working Men's Club and Institute Union Limited. But new Home Secretaries come, and there is no reason whatsoever why, on the appointment of a new Home Secretary, he should be bound in any degree whatever by the decision which his predecessor made on how he would treat clubs which were in these new State management districts.
I base my plea for leaving clubs out of this Bill on those two points but, in conclusion, I would remind your Lordships of the penal code which was decreed in France in 1810. So great at that time was the suspicion of everybody and everything in the period of the First French Empire, that it was provided in that code that
"no association of more than twenty persons whose aim is to unite every day or on certain days to occupy itself with … political or other subjects can be formed except with the consent of the Government or under such conditions as public authority may impose."
Although that form of despotism was defeated, the present Government have again, 134 years later, raised this same evil. I believe that we have a right to ask —indeed, they have an obligation to answer—whether the proposal outlined in this clause, giving the Home Secretary complete power to open clubs under State management, is not one of the main rules which must and does govern the formation of a Socialist society. It is on that case that I base my plea to your Lordships today, and I trust that I may have the support of the House. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 18, leave out ("or club").—(The Earl of Munster.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I have never doubted that these clubs are power-
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ful bodies and can exert considerable political pressure. I have listened to the statement of the concessions which the Home Secretary announced to the Working Men's Club and Institute Union, and I confess that if they err at all—I am not saying they do—it is on the side of too great latitude. I want to say frankly that, so far as I am concerned, I think this is a position which we ought to watch very carefully. I think all political Parties have walked over these hot bricks with proper caution. If it is right to try this experiment in State management—that is to say, to have the "pubs" under State control, as in Carlisle—it seems to me that it will become impossible if almost unlimited concessions are given to clubs; and if clubs are not to be under the Home Secretary's control whilst the "pubs" are, it creates a position which is quite unreal. I should not for one moment attempt to meet such a case half-way. I should meet it fully and say "I think this destroys the whole value of the experiment."
After all, the man who gets a licence to run a public-house has to demonstrate beyond a peradventure that he is a man of good character; and he is subject to all sorts of conditions and stipulations which are thought to be in the public interest. I have no doubt—though I am not for a moment saying that the vast majority of these clubs are not well conducted—that if they are really genuine clubs, where people come for social intercourse and the like (I do not mind whether political or not), and the matter of drinking is merely ancillary to that intercourse, that they are performing a useful function. But if it does occasionally happen—and please do not think I am making an attack on clubs at all—that these places become mere drinking shops, where social intercourse is at a minimum and facilities for drinking (and very often for drinking at times when drink is unobtainable at a public-house) are at a maximum, then I think it will be idle in this experiment to limit the public-houses but exclude the clubs.
I come now to the question of the granting of licences to political clubs, which is a critical one. I am sure that in the Longtown area of Carlisle there are long-established Conservative, Liberal and Labour clubs, and that the Liberal and Labour clubs have not obtained (and so far as I know have not applied for) a

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licence. If that is right, then it is quite obvious that if you are going to grant a licence for the first time to the Conservative club, then, other things being equal, you must grant licences to the Liberal club and the Labour club. Therefore the weakness of having this concession granted to a political club is that it follows that it must be granted to three instead of one. Now, if the test of granting a concession to a club is that they should give reasonable facilities to obtain drink, bearing in mind the facilities in regard to public-houses and the like, I can well understand the licensing committees saying "Well, we do not think there is any case whatever here for granting a licence to all three clubs, and that means that we shall not grant one to anyone of the three." That seems to me a sensible way to approach it.
With regard to the Home Secretary, I am perfectly certain that in making up his mind whether or not to grant a licence to a club he would not allow himself to be actuated by Party political considerations. In my somewhat long experience of politics I have never known a Home Secretary, of any Party, who would do such a thing. I do not for a moment believe that there has ever been a Home Secretary, or any other Minister, who would prostitute himself by using his official position to confer favours upon a political Party just because he happened to belong to it. I have never come across such a case, and I am quite certain that that question did not arise in this instance in Carlisle. The Home Secretary has made very generous concessions, which the noble Earl read out, with regard to police inspection and the like; and, of course, it follows that if he gives those concessions to one club, political or not, he will ceteris paribus give similar concessions to other clubs. I am told that the Home Secretary had made it quite plain (column 296 of the House of Commons OFFICIAL REPORT) that, although that was the broad approach, he must nevertheless have regard to the circumstances of each particular case. That was his broad approach, yet if in the circumstances of some particular case it were desirable to make stipulations which ran counter to those general principles he reserved to himself the full right to do so. I think that is right and wise; it would be acting improperly if
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the Home Secretary were to announce before hearing a case what he is going to do. The most the Home Secretary can do is to indicate his general approach whilst reserving in each particular case the right to consider the case to see whether or not he should depart from the principles of the general approach.
A broad answer, therefore, is as follows. I am entirely opposed—and I speak for the Government—to the proposition that whilst we put public-houses under the control of State management we exempt clubs. I believe that that would be a completely wrong approach to the matter, and I do not attempt to conceal that that is my attitude. It is the attitude of the Home Secretary and it is the attitude of the Government. Therefore I must tell your Lordships quite frankly that I have nothing whatever to give and no concession whatever to make. If this experiment is to succeed, it must be an experiment which extends over the whole field and does not leave such an obvious gap as leaving clubs out of control. I very much regret, therefore, that I cannot accept this Amendment.
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: The noble and learned Viscount made an announcement on the question of political clubs and free purchase in any one town. Will that apply in the future in these new towns? Let us take one place where a new town is to be built Do I understand the noble and learned Viscount to say that, if there is a Conservative, a Labour and a Liberal club there, in no circumstances will one of them be granted a licence to sell intoxicating liquor unless the other two clubs also apply in the area for a similar licence?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I would not lay down any broad general principle like that, but if a licence were granted to one it would require rather exceptional circumstances not to grant it to the others. Though. I do not assert that that must always happen, I should have thought that, as a matter of broad general principle, having granted licence to one, the fair-minded man would desire to do it to the other two.
LORD LLEWELLIN: I want to follow up this point a little if I may. In replying to this matter, the Lord Chancellor has laid down that clubs have got to come under this control because you

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cannot try this general experiment—I think those were practically his words —if you exclude them. The general experiment of running public-houses and clubs side by side has been in existence in this country for hundreds of years. So far as the ordinary brewer is concerned, the two have run quite happily side by side. You can run public-houses and clubs in the same area, and both can be quite agreeable places of resort for those who wish to use them. As soon as the State comes along—and this absolutely condemns nationalisation—it cannot be done if the State is going to have a club as a rival to its nationalised State management area. That is the whole tenor of the Lord Chancellor's speech this afternoon. You cannot have a new working men's club to start up independently because it may interfere with the profit that otherwise would be made by a State managed "pub"; you cannot have a British Legion club starting up because it may draw away some of the people who would otherwise patronise the State public-house. That is the only reason why they are put in, and that is the reason why the Home Secretary has this power to vet them—in order to prevent competition from his own State managed houses.
That could be the only reason. I think that is an extremely bad one. Over the country as a whole in the past we have been able to start up a British Legion club, a working men's club, a Conservative club, a Labour club or a Liberal club, where people having the nexus together of being ex-Service men, or of belonging to one or other of the political Parties, may assemble, have their drinks together, their talks together and their social intercourse together, with the kind of people they want to meet without, perhaps, the outsiders being there who naturally would be allowed in a public bar. That is the kind of thing that this Bill is going to stop. Then the noble and learned Viscount goes on to say that the Home Secretary has made "very generous concessions." Very generous concessions! He is taking away a long-established right of the people in those districts of the country, and it is said that he is giving "very generous concessions" because, if he grants a licence for one of these clubs, he is going to do what has always been allowed and will still be
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allowed in all other parts of the country, except the ill-fated Carlisle and these ill-fated new development areas.
That is not a generous concession at all. What he is doing by this is taking away from the people in this area the right which people in every other area of the country will, I hope for years to come, still enjoy—unless, of course, this is what is familiarly known as the "thin end of the wedge," and we are all hereafter to be told that the whole of the country is to be a State management area and that without a fiat from Whitehall nobody is to be allowed to start any club. That is a monstrous proposition. To say that never more, unless somehow you get round an advisory committee and obtain the assent of the Home Secretary, is anybody to start a new club in this area for any of these purposes for which they can also enjoy a drink, is really to me quite a monstrous thing. I very much hope that this Committee to-day will say that they too consider it a monstrous proposition.
LORD TEVIOT: I was most distressed to hear from the noble and learned Viscount that these working men's clubs were only drinking places. I have a certain amount of experience of them, and I find that many other recreations other than drinking take place there—for instance, darts, shove-ha'penny and many other old-fashioned pastimes. These places are also generally the basis of the local football club and cricket club, and so on, outside anything that could be organised in a "pub." I do hope that the noble and learned Viscount will take a kindly view with regard to those other activities of the working men's clubs.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I made no sort of attack on these clubs at all. In the case of the great majority of them, I had no such criticism to offer. I said that the drinking there was merely ancillary to other club activities, but that there were occasional clubs which were drinking shops. If I did not say that, that is what I meant.
LORD TEVIOT: If I misunderstood the noble and learned Viscount I apologise, but I do hope that these rather exceptional cases will not carry more weight than they ought, because there are exceptional cases in every instance.
3.26 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: We have had what has, I think, turned out

849
to be an unexpectedly important debate upon this Amendment, because the facts exposed are such as to cause considerable anxiety to a great many of us. The Lord Chancellor did not really attempt to deal with the correspondence which the noble Earl, Lord Munster, read out. There was a definite statement made that, if the club had been willing to change its name to "Constitutional," it would have had a better chance of having a licence than if it kept the name of "Conservative." That is a definite bias of a certain kind. The Lord Chancellor attempted to answer that, as I understood him, by saying that it was not a question of a licence being provided to a club because it was Conservative or of any other Party; it was because the other two clubs, the Liberal and the Labour clubs, had not got licences. He added what I thought was very important, that they had not applied for licences, and that all these clubs should be treated exactly alike. I think there is no difference of opinion in any part of the House on that, but it is rather ludicrous to say that, because a Labour club does not apply for a licence, a Conservative club should not have one; or because a Liberal club does not apply for a licence a Labour club should not have one. If a club behaves itself properly there is not the slightest reason

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.

why it should not have a licence. To deny it a licence in one case is to deny it one of the elementary principles of British liberty.
The noble and learned Viscount also said that, from inquiries he had made, he was told that there was adequate provision of public-houses in the area. A public-house is not the same thing as a club. The noble and learned Viscount himself probably belongs to a club, a political club, which may allow its members to drink. He would not be at all satisfied if he were cold that this club could not provide drinks, on the ground that there was an adequate supply of "pubs" in the district. Some people like to go to clubs and some like to go to "pubs." There is no reason why people should not be provided with the same facilities as in. "pubs," if that is the sort of life they prefer. For all these reasons, the Government are on a very bad wicket here. All sensible opinion of every Party would be against them on this point, and we have no option but to hope that the Government will give very serious consideration as to whether they can reverse their decision.
On Question, Whether the said words shall stand part of the clause?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 18; Not-Contents, 40.

CONTENTS

Jowitt, V. (L. Chancellor)

Calverley, L.

Holden, L.

Chorley, L. [Teller.]

Lucas of Chilworth [Teller.]

Huntingdon, E.

Crook, L.

Macdonald of Gwaenysgor, L.

Darwen, L.

Morrison, L.

Rochester, L. Bp.

Faringdon, L.

Pakenham, L.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel.)

Quibell, L.

Ammon, L.

Henderson, L.

Shepherd, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Salisbury, M.

Maugham, V.

Hayter, L.

Townshend, M. [Teller.]

Swinton, V.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Templewood, V.

Llewellin, L.

Beauchamp, E.

Monkswell, L.

Bessborough, E.

Aberdare, L.

Moyne, L.

Howe, E.

Baden-Powell, L.

O'Hagan, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Rochdale, L.

Lindsay, E.

Belstead, L.

Saltoun, L.

Munster, E.

Carrington, L. [Teller.]

Schuster, L.

Onslow, E.

Cherwell, L.

Teviot, L.

Rothes, E.

Derwent, L.

Teynham, L.

Glentanar, L.

Waleran, L.

Allenby, V.

Grantley, L.

Wolverton, L.

Buckmaster, V.

Hawke, L.

Wrenbury, L.

Hailsham, V.

THE EARL OF MUNSTER: The next two Amendments are consequential, but the second does not make sense as it stands at the moment, and I think I ought to move it in this way: to leave out the words "or a registered club, as the case may be,". That is the Amendment to page 4, line 25. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 22, leave out from ("premises") to ("when").—(The Earl of Munster.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am not going to ask the Committee to divide again. I regard this and the next Amendment as consequential on the Amendment which has just been made. As to the new form in which the noble Earl moves the second consequential Amendment, again I shall not ask the Committee to divide. The Committee understand that I object to all three Amendments.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 25, leave out ("or a registered club, as the case may be,").—(The Earl of Munster.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 3:
Acquisition of land
3.—(1) For the purposes of his functions under this Part of this Act the Secretary of State may—

(a) by agreement purchase or take on lease any land, whether in a State management district or elsewhere;

(b) subject to the provisions of this section, acquire by compulsory purchase any licensed premises in a State management district and any land in such a district required for the erection or extension of, or otherwise for use in connection with, any premises in a State management district in which the sale of intoxicating liquor by retail is, or is to be, carried on on behalf of the Secretary of State:

Provided that before acquiring any land in a new town (whether by agreement or compulsorily) the Secretary of State shall consult with the development corporation.
3.39 p.m.
LORD LLEWELLIN LORD LLEWELLIN moved, in subsection (1) to omit paragraph (b). The noble Lord said: We now come to Clause 3, and having passed from clubs we now come to "pubs." I do not think anybody can disagree at all with Clause 3 (1) (a), which allows the Secretary of State by agreement to purchase land—
852
and in land, I presume, is included the houses and, if necessary, the licensed premises upon it. Then we come to Clause 3 (1) (b), which empowers the Secretary of State compulsorily to purchase existing licensed premises. I really do not see why he should do that compulsorily. I have no doubt that I shall be told by the Lord Chancellor that this State management experiment must have a fair run, and that it cannot have a fair run if there is anybody, even the licensee of an old public-house or hotel, in competition with it.
Let us consider the town after which the noble and learned Viscount takes some part of his title, Stevenage. There, I suppose, the Cromwell Arms—which is no doubt well-known to the noble and learned Viscount—could be compulsorily acquired by the Home Secretary and taken out of the hands of the people who own it and of the person who manages it. It is true that later on we come to a clause which states that in some circumstances the licensee may get a job as manager if the Home Secretary thinks fit. It is rather monstrous, is it not, that you should say that in any of the State management areas you should have the power to buy everyone else out because, although free enterprise can prosper in competition—one brewer against another brewer, one licensee against another licensee—in a State management area if there were any such competition the whole finances of that State management area might break down. That seems to make this Bill, as it were, the mouthpiece for condemnation of the efficiency of State management. It can be nothing else.
Although we may agree, reluctantly, in this Bill, to State management being applied in new houses in the area, the old houses in that area should be allowed to carry on under the old managements which, in many of these old towns and villages, have served the people well in the past. That is the dispute between us. I suppose I shall be told that there must be an absolutely free run without any competition for State-managed enterprises, otherwise nationalisation will break down. If that is to be the answer, it completely condemns the idea that nationalisation is either needed or popular. I want to preserve some measure of competition, some freedom of choice for the people living in such an area, so

853
that they may, if they wish, go to places other than State-managed public-houses. For that reason I beg to move, the Amendment which stands in my name.
Amendment moved—
Paee 5, leave out lines 1 to 8.—(Lord Llewellin.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: What is the point of State management at all? Surely it is this: that in regard to drink the Home Secretary and the local advisory committee have a chance of planning as a whole the future arrangements of the area. That is the whole point of it. That being so, I say that if this Amendment is accepted it means that you are by a back-door method striking at State management, and there is nothing left to it. It may well be that the State management authorities will not want to interfere with the existing public-houses. They may or they may not. But unless they are to have the power to interfere, it is obvious they will have no power to plan as a whole in regard to this scheme. The noble Lord, Lord Llewellin, in this Amendment wants to prevent them having that power to plan as a whole. What is he seeking to do? He is seeking to say, in this Amendment, that there can be no compulsory purchase of any licensed premises in a State management district, and, more than that, that there shall be no power to acquire compulsorily, land for the building of premises. If that is so, if the authorities, the local advisory committee and the Home Secretary, are to be put in that position—and be it remembered that this is a State management area; that is to say, an area in which Parliament has thought right to entrust to them the whole arrangements of the drink trade in the area by way of experiment—what is being said to them in effect by this Amendment is: "You shall not have the right to lay a finger on any existing licensed house and you shall not have the right to acquire any land compulsorily for the building of any licensed house."If that is to he the case then the Home Secretary clearly will have no power to manage the area as a whole, and the whole conception of State management is struck at from the very beginning.
With regard to this Bill it is clear, as I said on Second Reading, that we must stand firm on the principle that we must
854
have the power to take over all the public-houses in the area of the new towns. I went on in my speech to say:
"the extent to which we exercise that power and the time at which we exercise it are obviously matters on which the local advisory committee ought to be consulted and to have a say."
By that I stand. I maintain that unless that power is to be conceded and the right is to be granted to exercise the power as may be thought proper, the whole conception of State management, based as it is on the possibility of regulating the drink trade in the area, becomes a snare and a delusion and is absolutely worthless. Therefore, I am sorry to say that I can make no concession. I can make no advance to meet the noble Lord. It seems to me that this is a fundamental division, and I ask your Lordships not to accept this Amendment.
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: I wonder whether the noble and learned Viscount, before he concludes, could further explain subsection (1) (b) of this clause. That provides that the Secretary of State may, subject to the provisions of the clause, acquire by compulsory purchase any licensed premises in a State management district, and it goes on to say:
"and any land in such a district required for the erection or extension of, or otherwise for use in connection with, any premises in a State management district in which the sale of intoxicating liquor by retail is, or is to be, carried on on behalf of the Secretary of State:"
Does that mean land including buildings? Does that mean that anyone who may live in,a house bordering on a public-house in a State management district can suddenly have his land compulsorily acquired, and his buildings too? Does it mean that he can be turned out of his house for the purpose of enlarging licensed premises, for example for making a bowling green, or for anything else in that line which the Secretary of State may think fitting? If that is actually to be the case in these State management areas, then no man will have any certainty or security that the house in which he lives may not be compulsorily acquired for the purpose of erecting, enlarging or extending a public-house.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Of course it must be assumed that the Home Secretary will exercise his powers of control under the Act like a reasonable human being. I have no doubt that if

855
the Home Secretary and his advisers were to behave like pocket Hitlers and as tyrants generally, all sorts of things might happen. But the effect of the clause, as the noble Earl knows, is to confer upon the Home Secretary the power, after consultation, of acquiring land or premises in order that there may be constructed, or that the existing premises may be adapted for the purpose of, a public-house, in order that persons living in the town may have reasonable facilities for drinking. That power the Home Secretary must have if he is to regulate and plan the whole of the drink trade of that area.
LORD LLEWELLIN: I must say that I am not at all satisfied with the explanation which the noble and learned Viscount has given. If your Lordships will cast your minds back, you will recall that the genesis of this measure is that here are new towns with a new problem. The original way in which it was proposed to deal with this problem was for some advisory committees to ascertain which brewers or other people were willing to build licensed houses in these new towns and come to arrangements between them with a view to getting enough but not too many licensing facilities in any of these new towns. That function has now been taken over by saying that any new hotel or public-house in one of these new towns shall be owned only as part of the State management area, and therefore that problem is solved.
But it does not mean that because there are some existing houses and hotels, we are deprived of planning facilities for an area as a whole. We know of these in advance of making a plan and can plan accordingly. Therefore, there is no necessity to say that because there happens to be a house here and a hotel there it hampers planning as a whole. It does not in the least hamper the overall general plan. It makes no difference to the facilities available in a district, except with regard to the kind of beer and wine served, whether one of the existing hotels is managed by the State or by free enterprise. It is a facility already there, and before we start to make an overall plan we must take it into account. We have now taken clubs out of the scope of the Bill, but even in the Bill as it was originally drafted, existing clubs were to be allowed to continue. Why? Because
856
they did not upset the overall planning arrangements of an area, as we knew where they were. Why have we to do anything at all in regard to existing premises?
The noble and learned Viscount said that the Amendment would not allow the Secretary of State to lay a finger on any existing premises. I would let him lay a finger on them, if the licensee and owner allowed him to do so. What I would not allow him to do is to commit the kind of rape contemplated by the compulsory purchase powers in this Bill. He could take over by consent any of these premises, but I would not let him compulsorily acquire them in the way that is contemplated. Why should a State management district, run as a commercial undertaking by the State, have compulsory powers that a private individual does not possess? If the Home Secretary has an hotel and wants to put a bowling green beside it, why should he be able to pull down a house belonging, say, to the noble Lord, Lord Quibell, after taking it by compulsory purchase? Why should he not make a proper arrangement with the noble Lord and buy his house, if those extra facilities are essential for his hotel? The use of compulsory purchase powers for naval, military or air force purposes which are for the genuine defence of the country, are justifiable and have long been justifiable; but why have these powers in order to carry on a commercial enterprise? Why should the Home Secretary have these facilities over his commercial rivals? I cannot see why, unless he needs these additional powers because he wants to eliminate competition and to buy land at knock-down prices, as agreed by the district valuer, in order to show a balance in the accounts.
I believe that this measure is going to become unpopular in the new towns when we begin to turn old-established licensees out of premises they have occupied for a very long time and deprive people of the kind of drinks they have been accustomed to have. Not only to prevent your Lordships having the unwanted experience of going round the Lobbies once again this afternoon, but in order to allow this State management scheme to have enough rope to hang itself in the public estimation, I do not intend to press my Amendment to a Division, and I will not move the further Amendments

857
as they are all consequential. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 3 agreed to.
Clause 4:
Provision of alternative accommodation where licensed premises acquired
4.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (2) of section five of the New Towns Act, 1946 (which relates to the provision of accommodation where land is acquired by a development corporation), a development corporation shall not have any duty to afford, to a person formerly carrying on a business of selling intoxicating liquor by retail on land in a State management district, any opportunity of obtaining alternative accommodation for such a business. But the Secretary of State shall as far as practicable secure that any resident tenant of licensed premises in a new town, which are acquired by the Secretary of State under section three of this Act, shall have the opportunity to remain the tenant of the said premises under conditions not less favourable than those under which he was tenant thereof immediately before the premises were so acquired.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in subsection (1) to leave out all words after "business," where that word occurs a second time, to the end, of the subsection. The noble and learned Viscount said: I think we may discuss this and the next Amendment together. We propose to insert a new subsection in place of the second half of Clause 4 (1), which was an Opposition Amendment proposed on Report in another place in order to protect the livelihood of tenants of licensed premises acquired by the State. It was accepted by the Home Secretary on the understanding that some revision would be necessary; first, because the provision was confined to tenants and it was pointed out that an owner-occupier or resident manager should have the same protection as a tenant, and secondly, to make it clear that closure of the premises was not necessarily debarred. The Opposition in another place argued that the words "as far as practicable" covered the case of a man not fit for his job, and I confess I think they are sufficient for that purpose.
It is now proposed to replace the second half of the clause by a new subsection referring to a "resident tenant or manager," a phrase which is already defined in Clause 4 (3), so as to include any resident licensed holder, and including the words
858
"if the business previously carried on in the premises is continued by the Secretary of State."
Examination of the position has demonstrated to us that a further alteration is needed. The Opposition Amendment now embodied in Clause 4(1) provided that an existing tenant, who becomes a tenant under the State after the premises are acquired, should do so under conditions not less favourable than those previously in force. But in any case of compulsory acquisition, the matters in respect of which a tenant is entitled to compensation include any loss of his tenant's rights. It follows, therefore, that unless the State simply took over the existing lease, there would have been an overlap between the tenant's rights to compensation and the proposed right to remain a tenant under conditions no less favourable than those of the previous tenancy. In other words, the State would have been required both to pay compensation for the loss of tenant's rights and also, so far as practicable, to preserve those rights.
Having regard to the provisions we have made for compensation, it is clear that the most the State can be expected to undertake to pay to a tenant after acquisition of the premises is what I may term "the rate for the job" of managing them, irrespective of any profits above that rate he may have been making as a tenant. For this the new subsection provides, and there can be no doubt about its meaning, as appropriate minimum rates are laid down by orders made under the Catering Wages Act. I hope your Lordships will find that this new subsection carries out the intention underlying the Amendment which was moved on the Report stage, and it was accepted subject to the qualification that revision would be necessary. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 8, leave out from ("business") to end of line 14.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: I rise only to say a few words, really on the next Amendment which the Lord Chancellor has down on the Marshalled List. It is true that it was made quite clear that revision would be necessary when the Bill came to your Lordships' House, and the noble and learned Viscount carries out the revision by the Amendment standing

859
in his name on the Order Paper. I wonder whether he would consider leaving out the words in his proposed subsection, "so far as is practicable." It seems to me that wherever we can we should give the licensee, the resident manager or tenant, the right to continue in the premises, even though they are compulsorily acquired. It seems to me that if you give power to the Home Secretary to acquire these premises, then the licensee or manager has no definite right to continue in occupation. The premises might conceivably be old and well-established, with a quite admirable manager in charge. We believe that to decide to get rid of a manager who has been there for many years would be an extremely unhappy and unfortunate thing to do. Therefore, I make the suggestion to the noble and learned Viscount, and perhaps he will consider it between now and the next stage of the Bill.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I will gladly mention the matter to the Home Secretary and find out what he thinks about it. However, it is my impression that it would not be possible to leave out these words, I am speaking from recollection but I think I am right in saying that they were suggested by the Opposition to meet this very case. The Home Secretary has this obligation thrust upon him. If it is not practicable, what then? It might not be practicable for several reasons. First of all, it might not be practicable because the existing tenant or manager might be in failing health and unable to carry on any longer—he may still be alive, but be bedridden. In such a case, I take it the noble Earl would not desire that he should continue as manager. Equally, the man might be quite incompetent at his job. In that case, also, the noble Earl would not desire that he should continue as manager. Therefore, I think we should do well to adhere to these words, which, after all, are words suggested by the Opposition to meet this sort of case. Though I will gladly undertake to see that the matter is considered afresh by the Home Secretary, as the noble Earl requests, I do not think we can leave out the words "so far as practicable" in view of the possibility of the sort of cases that may arise.
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: If I may make a suggestion, it seems to me that it would be useful if the words "used his best endeavours" could be inserted somewhere in the clause. Those are the sort of words I should expect to find in an agreement of this kind. I do not know whether the noble Earl, Lord Munster, would agree with them.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 23, at end, insert:
(" ( ) The Secretary of State shall so far as is practicable secure that a resident tenant or manager of licensed premises acquired by the Secretary of State under the last foregoing section shall have the opportunity, if the business previously carried on in the premises is continued by the Secretary of State, of being employed in the carrying on thereof on terms not less favourable than those appropriate to a manager employed in a business such as was carried on in the premises before their acquisition.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is to meet the point that there may be two holders, and not merely one. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 28, after ("holder") insert ("or one of joint holders").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 4, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 5 to 14 agreed to.
Clause 15 [Commencement of foregoing provisions of Part III]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The object of leaving out Clauses 15 and 16 is to find room for the insertion of the new clause which comes after Clause 18, which your Lordships will see on the Marshalled List. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 15.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 16 [Transitional provisions as to licensing authorities]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move the next Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 16.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD LLEWELLIN: I understand why Clause 15 has been left out—indeed, the noble and learned Viscount has already explained it to us. But Clause 16 makes transitional provisions as to the licensing authorities. Broadly, it provides that arty type of action started before this Bill becomes law shall go on in the same way as it was started. As I understand it, the Lord Chancellor is going to substitute for Clause 16:
"An order of the Secretary of State…may contain such transitional provisions as appear to the Secretary of State expedient in consequence of the coming into operation of the said provisions of this Part of this Act."
And then:
"The power … shall be exercisable by statutory instrument."
The Government introduced the original Clause l6 in the Bill, and I would like to know why it is now sought to depart from the method contained in Clause 16, which I should have thought was the right one. I think we are entitled to a little more explanation on this point than we have been given. The noble and learned Viscount has already told us about the date, on which we are agreed. There may be some perfectly good reason for leaving out Clause 16 which we have not yet heard.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I will do what I can to indicate to the noble Lord why we thought it necessary to do this. The original conception in Clause 16, as the noble Lord said, was that arrangements should be made as there set out. Transitional provisions, of course, cannot be drafted until we know the appointed day. When this Bill was framed it was known that the Justices of the Peace Bill would deal with separate commissions of the peace for non-county boroughs, and it was felt that the case for the Government's proposal in this connection should be stated when the Justices of the Peace Bill was under consideration, and that it would cause confusion if that proposal were discussed on a Bill confined to the licensing aspect. The Licensing Bill was therefore framed so as to keep the position in non-county boroughs entirely open for discussion on the other Bill, and it leaves untouched the present provisions as to licensing authorities in non-county boroughs.
We had always hoped that, before the Licensing Bill was passed, the Justices of the Peace Bill would have made such
862
progress as would establish the future position of non-county boroughs, and so make it possible to set forth in the Licensing Bill the future arrangements its respects all licensing authorities without controversy in that connection as respects the non-county boroughs, that matter having been cleared up. It is now clear that the Justices of the Peace Bill will not pass into law in time for next year's licensing arrangements to be made on the basis of its provisions. We think that it would cause great confusion to bring into force piecemeal the new licensing arrangements, and the relevant provisions of the Justices of the Peace Bill are to 'take effect from an appointed day. The only convenient plan seems to be to adopt the same course in the present Bill. That is why we think it right to leave out Clause 16, and to substitute a new clause.
LORD LLEWELLIN: I am still not quite certain about this. It may be because I am not quite so cognisant of the position under the Justices of the Peace Bill as I should be. I would ask the Lord Chancellor this. Under the rules which the Home Secretary is to make—which are merely transitional provisions—is he going to do anything new, or will he say merely that during the transitional period the old practice of the licensing justices shall continue?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: What I anticipate is that, subject to the difficulty of fixing the day, the old system will continue until then, and then on the day fixed the new system will come into force.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clauses 17 and 18 agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move this new clause. I have really discussed the purport of this clause already, and I do not think I need say anything further about it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved.—
After Clause 18, insert the following new clause:
Commencement of Part II
".—(1) The provisions of this Part of this except section seventeen thereof, shall come into operation on suet date as the Secretary of State may by order appoint.
(2) An order of the Secretary of State under this section may contain such transitional provisions as appear to the Secretary of State expedient in consequence of the coming into operation of the said provisions of this Part of this Act.
(3) The power conferred on the Secretary of State by this section to make orders shall be exercisable by statutory instrument."—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 19 [Special hours certificates for certain hotels and restaurants]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is little more than a drafting Amendment. The word "frequenting" rather conveys the idea of the person being an habitué who continually frequents or goes there, whereas "resorting to" applies to casuals as well. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 38, leave out ("frequenting") and insert ("resorting to").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 19, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 20 [Special hours certificates for certain clubs]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Subsection (1) of Clause 20 provides for the grant of special hours certificates for clubs by
"the Metropolitan police magistrate for the police court division in which the premises are situated."
Clause 23 provides for revocation by the
"magistrate by whom the certificate was granted."
It might therefore be argued that a special hours certificate for a club could be revoked only by the individual magistrate who granted it. The Amendment meets the point by referring in each case to "the magistrate," which we define later on as a magistrate for the division. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 15, line 8, leave out from the beginning to ("is") in line 9, and insert ("magistrate").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD LLEWELLIN: This is obviously an improvement, and we have no objection to it.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 20, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 21 agreed to.
Clause 22 [Later permitted hours where special hours certificate in force]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in subsection (3) to omit all words from "relates" down to the beginning of proviso (b) and to insert:
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"that is to say:—

(a) notwithstanding anything in the Act of 1921, the permitted hours shall be the hours from half past twelve in the afternoon to two o'clock on the following morning, with a break from three o'clock until half past six in the afternoon, so however that this paragraph shall not affect the sale, supply or consumption of intoxicating liquor at any time on Sunday;

(b) paragraph (d) of section five of the Act of 1921 (which authorises the consumption of intoxicating liquor with a meal within half an hour after the conclusion of the permitted hours if the liquor was supplied during the permitted hours and served at the same time as the meal and for consumption with the meal) shall have effect, in relation to the conclusion on any day except Sunday, of the second part of the permitted hours, as if the words ' with a meal ' and the words from 'and served' to 'with the meal' were omitted; and

(c) section three of the Act of 1921 (which provides for an extension of an hour in certain premises as respects intoxicating liquor sold for consumption with a meal) shall not apply:

Provided that—

(i) if on any occasion when the permitted hours would apart from this proviso end at two o'clock in the morning, music and dancing is not provided after midnight, the permitted hours shall cease at midnight, and if on any such occasion the provision of music and dancing ceases at a time between midnight and two o'clock in the morning the permitted hours shall cease at that time;

(ii)"

The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment, although it looks rather formidable, is little more than drafting. The main object of the Amendment is to remove any possibility of doubt being cast on the meaning of the subsection by arguments as to whether questions of drinking on Saturday nights from midnight onwards are questions of week-day or Sunday drinking. In one sense, of course, they are an extension of the Saturday drinking, and in another sense they are drinking on Sunday. The concluding words of the new paragraph (a) make it quite clear that the Saturday permitted hours will end at midnight. This was always the intention. An Amendment to provide for extensions to 2 a.m. on Sundays was proposed on Report stage in the House of Commons but was withdrawn after it had been pointed out on behalf of the Government that the proposal would open up an additional field of controversy. There is, however, the possibility of argument that subsection (3) as it stands in the Bill

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would not have the intended effect. The subsection was framed on the basis that Section 2 of the Licensing Act, 1921, which deals with permitted hours on Sundays, would rule out any extension of the permitted hours on Saturdays beyond midnight. But it might be argued that, as this would be a question of extending the week-day hours allowed under Sections 1 and 3, Section 2 would not apply. The new paragraph (a) will leave no basis for any such argument. The revised draft also deals with other minor points, and if your Lordships want any reference to them I will gladly make it. I think I have said enough to show the reason for this Amendment which I have described as little more than drafting, and I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 16, line 8, leave out from ("relates") to ("nothing") in line 29, and insert the said newords.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 22, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 23:
Revocation of special hours certificates
23.—(1) At any time, not earlier than the expiration of twelve months from the granting of a special hours certificate, while the certificate is in force the Commissioner of Police for the metropolis may apply to the licensing justices or magistrate by whom the certificate was granted for the revocation of the certificate on the ground that while the certificate has been in force—

(a) the premises or part of the premises to which the certificate relates have not been used as mentioned in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of section nineteen or paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section twenty of this Act, as the case may be; or

(b) a person has been convicted of having on the said premises or part contravened section four of the Act of 1921 (which prohibits the sale, supply or consumption of intoxicating liquor outside the permitted hours),

and if the justices or magistrate are or is satisfied as to the ground of the application they or he may revoke the certificate.
4.18 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in subsection (1) to omit "not earlier than the expiration of twelve months from the granting of a special hours certificate, while the certificate" and to insert "while a special hours certificate." The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amend-
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ment deals with a point which was overlooked during the Report stage in another place. The clause sets out the ground on which the Commissioner of Police may apply for the revocation of a special hours certificate, and at present empowers the commissioner to apply
"at any time, not earlier than the expiration of twelve months from the granting of a special hours certificate, while certificate is in force…"
The effect of the Amendment is to omit the reference to the expiration of twelve months. That reference was originally included when the proposals for special hours related only to licensed hotels and restaurants and the only ground proposed for revocation was similar—though not exactly similar—to that stated in paragraph (a) of the present subsection (1).
As it originally stood, this ground was that the premises were not being habitually used as was intended when the special hours certificate was granted, and the object of twelve months' grace was to give the hotel or restaurant a year in which to work up to full use. The question was raised as to the meaning of the word "habitual" and it was asked whether it covered, for example, the use of special hours on alternate days. The conclusion was that such a practice would not prove attractive to tourists and would give rise to administrative difficulties. For that reason the Bill was amended by the insertion of Clause 24 (2), which makes it plain that, apart front temporary interruptions and the provision made in Clause 21 for seasonal certificates, nothing less is contemplated than regular use for dancing and refreshment six days a week. In these circumstances it would clearly be wrong to allow occasional use to continue for a year before the police could take action, and it was never intended to allow a year's grace as respects breaches of permitted hours, which are made a ground for revocation by paragraph (b) of the subsection. That is the reason for this Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 17, line 1, leave out from ("time") to ("is") in line 3 and insert ("while a special hours certificate").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD LLEWELLIN: I do not think we have any objection to this Amendment. When it comes to the new subsection I may have something to say.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHORLEY: This is really consequential on the Amendment which my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor explained a moment ago, in that it substitutes the word "magistrate" in the way he explained for the words which appear at present. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 17, line 4, leave out from ("justices") to ("for") in line 5, and insert ("if the certificate was granted under section nineteen of this Act, or to the magistrate if it was granted under section twenty thereof").—(Lord Chorley.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, at the end of subsection (1) (b), to insert:
"or that on the whole the persons resorting to the premises or part are there at times when the sale or supply of intoxicating liquor therein is lawful by virtue only of the special hours certificate, for the purpose of obtaining intoxicating liquor rather than for the purpose of dancing or obtaining refreshments other than intoxicating liquor."
The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment provides an additional ground on which the Commissioner of Police may apply for the revocation of a special hours certificate and is designed, so far as possible, to meet two points which were raised when the provisions for the special hours were extended to registered clubs on Report stage in another place. The first of these points is that under Clause 19 hotels and restaurants which apply for special hours certificates must satisfy the conditions laid down for reduced licence duty. These include a requirement that the liquor receipts must not exceed half (for a hotel) or three-fifths (for a restaurant) of the total receipts, but no comparable condition is imposed as respects clubs. Secondly, the clubs which apply for special hours certificates are likely to be proprietary clubs including, perhaps, clubs formed in replacement of existing bottle parties; and while some proprietary clubs and bottle parties provide perfectly respectable entertainment of the kind now in question for their members and visitors, it was suggested that some guarantee must be provided to prevent a special hours certificate continuing if what happens is that the club members and visitors sit drinking round an empty dance floor while music is provided from time to time.
We have given further consideration to the question whether a fair and effective
868
check on the liquor receipts of clubs which obtain special hours certificates could be devised, but after going into it I say quite frankly that it seemed quite impracticable. After all, a comparison between liquor receipts from members and total receipts would be quite ineffective, as charges for liquor could be reduced if subscriptions were raised. A comparison between expenditure on liquor from the club funds and total expenditure from those funds—even if an appropriate proportion could be arrived at—would, on the one hand, be unfair to the clubs, as it might impose on them a necessity not imposed on hotels and restaurants of evening out their annual purchases of liquor and so perhaps missing favourable opportunities of large purchases, and, on the other hand, the type of night club proprietor for whose elimination the check is intended would probably be fully equal to producing the most plausible accounts of total expenditure up to any necessary figure.
Clearly, then, what we must have is a test based not on accounts but on observation of what actually happens, and it is thought that the words proposed to be added to paragraph (b) of Clause 23 (1), while avoiding any suggestion that a certificate can be revoked because a fair proportion of the patrons prefer to watch the dancing instead of dancing themselves, will certainly enable the police to secure a revocation in any case where the dancing is confined to one or two couples or to cabaret artistes and is a mere pretext for additional hours for drinking. It was not thought necessary to insert a ground of this kind for revocation when the special hours provisions were confined to hotels and restaurants, but if such a provision is included there seems to be no justification for excluding hotels and restaurants from its scope.
So we get the difficulty that whilst on the one hand it is good that we should have places where, so long as they are decent, young people can go and enjoy themselves and where drink is served—always provided that the drink is ancillary to the entertainment and the dancing and the like—it would on the other hand be utterly wrong to have clubs like this and give these added hours if all that is being done is to afford facilities for a great deal of drinking and nothing much else. The difficulty is to know where to

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draw the line. I think we have done the best we can by these words. On the whole, the persons using the premises are there at times when the sale or supply of intoxicating liquor is lawful, not for the purposes of obtaining intoxicating liquor but rather for the purposes of dancing and of obtaining refreshments other than the intoxicating liquor. If you are dancing and a little drop of drink happens to go down your throat you are all right! But if the dance is a mere excuse for pouring liquor down your throat, it is wrong, and these words will, we hope, divide the sheep from the goats. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 17, line 17, at beginning insert the said words.— (The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD LLEWELLIN: I think the whole Committee will be indebted to the noble and learned Viscount for describing these night clubs so accurately as he has. I was glad to think he was reading most of the time from a brief. As I was listening to the Lord Chancellor I was picturing the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, at one of these places, sitting down having got tired of dancing, and having a little refreshment, so that he might go on again. I can envisage the manager coming up to him, if he sat there too long or had taken an extra drink of some sort, and saying: "My Lord, you can remain here if you will either have a dance or will now take a lemonade instead of the liquid which we have just been providing to your Lordship." Those awkward situations, of course, may occur! It may be perfectly all right. Nobody would ever think that a place that the noble Lord went to was anything but a most respectable place, or that he was not there for the most respectable purposes.
Obviously, it will be difficult for the manager to know when to intervene and when to turn out somebody who perhaps has not had enough dancing and who has spent rather more of his time taking intoxicating drink. I can see great difficulties arising in these places. I am happy to think that I do not waste much of my money in frequenting such places, and therefore those awkward situations will not, I think, arise in my case. I am not certain that I could invent any better words than those provided by the noble and learned Viscount, but I can foresee some of my noble friends (not all of them)
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in embarrassing situations sometimes being requested peremptorily, though they are quite exhausted, to take the next dance or they will have to leave the premises. That is the kind of fate which may be in store for anybody who goes to these places. Perhaps, on the whole, we had better accept the words that the noble and learned Viscount has put before us.
LORD ROCHESTER: I am grateful to my noble friend for his solicitude! It only shows where we get to when we sacrifice principle to expediency. However, I would like to thank him for his consideration, because I am reminded that my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor also referred to my younger days when he said I may have been a "gay young thing." I should like to apologise to the House for not having been here sooner, but I was at Rochester on the Water Board, feeling that it was more necessary to secure God's pure water for my friends down there than to be up here debating intoxicating liquor. It only shows how this House goes wrong when I am not here! I am distressed to hear that my noble friend's Amend rent on Clause 2 was carried in my absence. Needless to say, had I been here I should not have been able to support him in the Division.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHORLEY LORD CHORLEY moved, after subsection (1) to insert as a new subsection:
"( ) At any time while a special hours certificate granted under section twenty of this Act is in force the Commissioner of Police for the metropolis may apply to the magistrate for the revocation of the certificate on the ground that the revocation thereof is expedient by reason of the occurrence of disorderly or indecent conduct on the premises or part to which the certificate relates; and if the magistrate is satisfied as to the ground of the application he shall revoke the certificate."
The noble Lord said: Now that we have had this pleasant and amusing little interlude, I beg to move the Amendment that stands in the name of my noble and learned friend. This Amendment enables the Commissioner of Police to apply for the revocation of a special hours certificate on account of disorderly or indecent conduct. It is confined to certificates given in respect of clubs, because at licensed premises disorderly conduct, as your Lordships are probably aware, is already covered by the general law, while indecency is covered by a condi-

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tion attached by the London County Council to all licences for public music and dancing. The requirement in Clause 20 (1) (a) that a club must obtain a certificate from the London County Council before it can obtain a special hours certificate was included for the purpose of safety, and in that connection it is clearly desirable to have the advantage of the technical knowledge and long experience of the officers of the London County Council. But any question of disorderly or indecent conduct is more appropriate to be dealt with by the police in the course of their duties as respects hours and other matters. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 17, line 18, at end, insert the saidsubsection.—(Lord Charley.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 23, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 24 [Supplementary provisions as to special hours certificates]:
LORD CHORLEY: This is the last of the three Amendments which hang together, the purport of which was explained by my noble and learned friend in connection with the Amendment to Clause 20, page 15, line 7. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 17, line 38, at end insert—
("(a) the expression "the magistrate", in relation to any premises, means a metropolitan police magistrate for the police court division in which the premises are situated; and
(b)").—(Lord Charley.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHORLEY: The object of this addition to Clause 24 (2) is to make it clear that a special hours certificate is not to be granted, and may be revoked, unless an adequate proportion of floor space is provided for dancing. I am sure your Lordships will agree that it is essential that what is sometimes called a "postage stamp" floor should not be allowed to fulfil the requirements and in that way be a cloak for drinking facilities. This clause has been re-drafted to secure that end. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 18, line 4, at end insert ("; and references in the said provisions to providing dancing shall be construed as references to
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providing facilities for dancing which are adequate having regard to the number of persons for whose reception in the premises or part of premises in question provision is made").—(Lord Charley.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 24, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 25 [Prohibition of consumption of intoxicating liquor outside permitted hours at parties organised for gain.]:
LORD CHORLEY LORD CHORLEY moved to leave out subsection (8) and insert in its place:
"(8) In the case of premises in a part of the metropolis specified for the purposes of subsection (1) of section nineteen of this Act, the following provisions shall have effect:

(a) before the first day of February, nineteen hundred and fifty, any time at which the consumption of intoxicating liquor would be lawful on premises of a club as respects which subsection (3) of section twenty-two of this Act had effect for the time being shall be treated for the purposes of this section as not being outside the permitted hours;

(b) where it is proposed that such premises shall become premises of a registered club, application may be made for the grant of a certificate under the Second Schedule to this Act and of a special hours certificate under section twenty of this Act before the registration of the club and its occupation of the premises, and accordingly references in that Schedule and section to a registered club and premises thereof shall include references to a club proposed to be registered and to premises proposed to be occupied by the club."

The noble Lord said: Subsection (8) provides that Clause 25, which applies to bottle parties the latest permitted hour for licensed premises, shall come into operation on January 1, 1950. It was added to the clause on Report stage in another place, and was put forward as a means of enabling those bottle parties, which could quickly qualify as clubs under Clause 20, to do so without being put out of action in the meantime. Obviously, the time will be insufficient where any substantial alterations are needed to satisfy the safety requirements of the London County Council, and there could be no question of allowing a prolonged period of grace. But the best bottle parties (if I may use that expression), though evading the spirit of the law, have kept within its letter and have made their contribution towards meeting the demand for decent night entertainment in London. The purpose of Clause 25 and the preceding clauses is to end the evasion but to provide a respectable

873
way of meeting the demand for night entertainment. The Government therefore accepted the Amendment, subject to further consideration of its terms in relation to other clauses.
The scheme of the new subsection (8) is as follows. In the first place, the coming into operation of the clause is not postponed beyond the passing of the Bill, except in the area in central London in which special hours are to be allowed under the preceding clauses; and within that area paragraph (a) provides that, as soon as the Act is passed, drinking at bottle parties must be kept within the hours permissible under special hours certificates. Secondly, whereas the Amendment accepted in another place postponed the operation of the whole clause to January 1, 1950, the limited relaxation described above will operate for a period of a further month. This is in order to avoid the inconvenience of a last-minute rush of work just at the busy time of Christmas. Thirdly, paragraph (b) makes the necessary administrative concession of enabling the bottle parties to apply for London County Council and special hours certificates while they are actually in, process of conversion into registered clubs. Otherwise, the steps required for obtaining a special hours certificate would be delayed by procedural difficulties, and even with the extra month the time is none too long for the completion of these steps, if structual alterations and things of that sort are to be carried out. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page l9, line 44, leave out subsection (8) and insert the said new subsection.—(Lord Chorley.)
LORD LLEWELLIN: As I understand it, putting it shortly, this postpones the date from January 1 to February 1, with a few consequential changes. We have no objection to that.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 25, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 26 to 28 agreed to.
Clause 29: [Restriction of retail sales by wine or spirit dealers without justices' licence]:
4.42 p.m.
LORD LLEWELLIN LORD LLEWELLIN had given notice of two Amendments to subsection (1) of which the first was to delete "or" in
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paragraph (c). The noble Lord said: The Committee will see that I seek to put in another purpose in Clause 29 (1) in the shape of paragraph (e). That clause reads:
"Subject to the provisions of this section, and notwithstanding anything in subsection (1) of section one hundred and eleven of the Act of 1910 … the said subsection (1) shall not authorise a dealer to sell any spirits or wine by retail at any premises without a justices' licence except—

(a) to a person holding an excise licence for the sale of intoxicating liquor;

(b) to a mess or registered club;

(c) for delivery outside Great Britain; or

(d) to a person engaged, at the premises in question or elsewhere, in any business carried on by the dealer."

I seek to put in paragraph (e) to this effect:
"for the purposes of carrying on a bona fide wine and spirit business supplying customers regularly throughout the year."
Hitherto, and indeed until this Bill becomes law, a grocer in a small town or village, or anywhere else, has been able on getting an excise licence to sell wine and spirits in his shop without getting a justices' licence in advance. I see no reason why that practice should be discontinued. I know that in the past when there has been a shortage of wines and spirits a certain number of "quick sales" shops have arisen, particularly in London, and these shops have been selling all sorts of concoctions. They have sprung up and carried on this business perhaps only in the month of December, for the Christmas trade.
I do not want to encourage those people, and I believe the decision to leave out a provision similar to that which I am moving was largely aimed against them and not at the bona fide village or small town grocer who has, as it were, always tested the marl, et by sales on an excise licence before he has applied for a justices' licence. If we leave out this class of person it will be very difficult for anyone to prove need to the justices, because you cannot very well prove need unless you have in some way tested that need, which can be dove at present under an excise licence. I do not want to favour these "mushroom" liquor shops, and I think we ought to be able to find some appropriate words without pushing on the Licensing Benches in villages and country towns throughout the country applica-

875
tions for sales by a new grocer, or whatever he may be, in what has hitherto been a perfectly legitimate trade under an excise licence. Those are my reasons for moving this Amendment. If it is thought to be so wide that it will let in the "mushroom" shops, I hope we may find words to exclude them. It is not my intention to include them, and I hope I have excluded them by my words "bona fide" and "regularly throughout the year." That was the intention behind those two phrases. I think I have explained the matter sufficiently and I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 28, leave out ("or").—(Lord Llewellin.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Clause 29 is, in effect, an Amendment of Section 111 of the Act of 1910. The clause reads:
"Subject to the provisions of this section, and notwithstanding anything in subsection (1) of section one hundred and eleven of the Act of 1910"—
it defines what that is—
"the said subsection (1) shall not authorise a dealer to sell any spirits or wine by retail … without a justices' licence."
Section 111, I think I am right in saying, applies only to premises which are exclusively used for the sale of intoxicating liquor. Therefore, I do not think the grocer's shop comes into the picture at all. Obviously, it is not a shop which is "exclusively used for the sale of intoxicating liquor." It does not come within Section 111, as I understand it, and therefore is not here dealt with. But there is plenty for the Amendment to bite on, and personally I have some sympathy for the Amendment though I cannot sec my way to accept it, and I have been completely defeated in trying to find a way.
May I take, for instance, a perfectly reputable establishment which has a number of branches? I am talking about the wine and spirits trade, and we can all think of such an example. At present, if they see a village shop and think they would like to try to establish a business there, they will get the shop and will start off with only an excise licence. Then, having tested the market, subject to restrictions which are applicable to an excise licence, they will, at the next appropriate session, go to the justices and apply for a
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licence to sell by retail. That is what has been going on and, so far as perfectly reputable shops are concerned such as the noble Lord and I can think of, I personally think that it worked well. On the other hand, very often under that style of trade there has sprung up a very undesirable type of trade. There are the little "mushroom" shops which come into being at or about Christmas and which sell very inferior drink at exhorbitant prices; and then, having done that and having to a large extent exploited the public, after Christmas is over they disappear. Everybody in the trade wants to strike at those shops because, be it observed, it is an anomaly. It was never intended that Section III should operate to allow sales by retail under excise licence, unless such sales were merely incidental to the business of a wholesaler.
This matter was very carefully considered by the Royal Commission which reported on it in 1929. May I read to your Lordships the relevant paragraphs? They are paragraphs 600, 601 and 602. I had better read them in full because they set out the argument fully.
Paragraph 600 reads:
"To the general requirement of the licensing law that all sales by retail required to be authorised under a justices' licence there is one notable exception, the 'bottle shop.' Under an exemption contained in Section III (1) of the Act of 1910, if a wine or spirit dealer desires to carry on the sale by retail for off-consumption of spirits or wines he may, provided that (i) only intoxicating liquors or, in addition to these, non-intoxicating drinks are sold on the premises, and (ii) the premises are self-contained, take out a retail excise licence without first obtaining the corresponding justices' licence. Such establishments have been called 'bottle shops.'"
In Paragraph 601 the Commission go on to say:
"We regard the provision as anomalous. It may have been justified in the past when it was first introduced. We do not think it now is. It presents a means by which persons may carry on retail sales of intoxicating liquor without the approval, and possibly contrary to the judgment, of the licensing justices. It offers a means by which, without check, an area may become overlicensed, and the schemes of licensing justices frustrated. It denies to the citizens of the neighbourhood the opportunity which they ordinarily have of expressing their views before the licensing justices in regard to the establishment in their midst of liquor retailing businesses."
Then, in Paragraph 602, they state:
"We, therefore, recommend that the exemption should be abolished and that persons at

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present trading under licences obtained under it should be required to obtain a justices' licence."
That is the provision. I have looked at it from this point of view: is it possible for the excise authorities to differentiate between the two classes of people between whom we all want to differentiate—the perfectly reputable firm which wants to open a new branch and the very disreputable people who indulge in this practice which I have mentioned, and which the whole trade and all decent people must deplore? Frankly, I do not think it is. The excise people are concerned merely with a man coming forward presenting the appropriate form, paying the appropriate sum of money and getting his licence: it is not part of their function to differentiate. They are in no way fitted to do so, and I do not think it is desirable that they should exercise discretion in trying to winnow the grain from the chaff. If discretion, as between one set of people and another, is to be brought into play at all, it cannot be done by the excise authorities. But it can be done by the magistrates. After all, that is what they are for—to differentiate between the worthy and the disreputable cases. Therefore, I see nothing for it but to say that these people shall have to procure justices licence.
In making up their minds—if they possess that common sense which I am sure they nearly all do possess—the justices will surely have regard to the question of whether the applicant is really a man who wants to start a branch establishment of a business—that he is prepared to risk his money in the venture, thereby showing in the best possible way that he believes there is an opening in the area. I should hope that the justices would extend favourable consideration to that man. Certainly, in so far as may be, the Home Secretary in his circular would make it quite plain that he does not want unduly to handicap that class of people. On the other hand, undesirable people who open these shops, who take advantage of what is undoubtedly a gap in the legislation to establish what is entirely a retail business, would be stopped. I am afraid that I cannot accept the Amendment, not because I have not sympathy with it, because, frankly, I have. But, as I say, I am satisfied that the excise people cannot differentiate between the unworthy and the worthy. Their task is
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simply to collect money and grant licences. In this instance the responsibility for differentiating must rest with the magistrates. I think we may leave it to them to ascertain whether people coming before them are undesirable people trying to take advantage of this gap in the law and, on the other hand, we may rely on them not unduly to handicap the perfectly reputable people who in the past have provided reasonable facilities for the public to buy drink. As I say, I am sorry that I cannot accept the Amendment, but I hope that what I have said will give noble Lords some small satisfaction.
LORD LLEWELLIN: I am obliged to the noble and learned Viscount for the sympathetic way in which he has dealt with this Amendment. I will withdraw it now, but perhaps the noble and learned Viscount and I may have a talk to see whether, between now and Report stage, we can find some words to meet the case. I am certain that, as always, he will be willing to do that. In view of the reasons which he has given for not accepting it, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The next Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 32, leave out ("commencement") and insert ("passing").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The same applies to the next Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 23, line 10, leave out ("commencement") and insert ("passing").—(The Lord Chancellor)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR had an Amendment on the Marshalled List after subsection (4) to insert:
"( ) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (5) of section twenty-six of the Act of 1910 (which prohibits the ordinary removal of a licence if objection is made by certain persons therein mentioned), where application is made to justices for the removal from any premises of a licence to which this subsection applies, that is to say—

879

(a) a licence granted in respect of the premises by way of renewal by virtue of subsection (2) of this section, or

(b) a licence granted in respect of the premises by way of renewal of any licence to which this subsection applies granted in respect of the premises.

the justices may, if they think fit, make an order authorising the removal notwithstanding that objection to the removal is made by any such person (other than the holder of the licence) as is mentioned in the said subsection (5)."
The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment covers more or less the same ground as the Amendment which follows it, and which stands in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Llewellin. I think I prefer Lord Llewellin's Amendment to my own. In those circumstances, if convenient to him, I shall be prepared not to move my Amendment but to accept his—subject, of course, to what I shall have to say about it.
LORD LLEWELLIN LORD LLEWELLIN moved to add to the clause:
"(6) Where a justice's licence is granted for the sale at any premises of any spirits or wine by retail for consumption off, but not on, the premises, then the provisions of section twenty-six of the Act of 1910 shall have effect in relation to the said licence as if in paragraph five thereof the words 'by the owner of the premises from which the licence is to be removed, or' were omitted."
The noble Lord said: I am obliged to the noble and learned Viscount for what he has just said. Both of us, I think, are out to achieve the same object. I understand that my Amendment is so drafted that it will operate in respect of off-licences, whereas I am told that the one which the Lord Chancellor is not moving would be limited to licences converted into justices' licences under Clause 29. Perhaps that is the reason why he prefers my Amendment to his own. I am not at all sure that he may not have to readjust the wording of my Amendment, but I believe that it carries out quite a worthy object. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 23, line 35, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Llewellin.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I will accept the Amendment which the noble Lord has proposed. I have already indicated my willingness to do so, it being understood that the drafting of the noble
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Lord's Amendment requires some attention. He will understand that I accept it in that way. The reason why I prefer his Amendment to mine is because his is rather wider, and I do not see why in this case we should not go wider. I accept this in principle, on the understanding that I can come back to it on Report stage to see whether we can agree on appropriate drafting.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 29, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 30:
Persons under eighteen not to be employed in bars
30.—(1) If any person under the age of eighteen years is employed in any bar of licensed premises at a time when the bar is open for the sale or consumption of intoxicating liquor, the holder of the licence shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding five pounds in the case of a first offence, or twenty pounds in the case of a second or any subsequent offence.
5.0 p.m.
THE EARL OF MUNSTER THE EARL OF MUNSTER moved to add to subsection (1):
"Providing that this section shall not apply to a son or daughter of the holder of the licence not being under the age of fifteen years."
The noble Earl said: The Amendment which I now move reduces the limitation on the age at which young persons can be employed in a bar. This clause was inserted during the passage of the Bill in another place and it covers all licensed premises throughout the country, so that from the passing of this Bill no young person under eighteen will be allowed to be employed in bars and licensed premises: that is to say, he cannot be employed to wash the glasses, or fetch and carry drinks from one part of licensed premises to another. There may be a great deal to be said for limiting the employment of young people in licensed premises, but I have been told that the clause as it stands will prohibit a licensee and his wife from ever being able to go out during the time the public-house is open to the public. Therefore, it is suggested that we should put in a proviso permitting the son or daughter, not being under the age of fifteen, to help their parents if there is a need for it. I do not think this would damage the Bill in one way or another and I put it to the

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noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor for his consideration. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 23, line 42, at end insert the said proviso.—(The Earl of Munster.)
LORD ROCHESTER: I have already apologised to the Committee for not having been present when the noble Earl moved his Amendment to Clause 2. I am glad to be hack from the scenes of my youth where, according to the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, I may have been a "gay young thing," at least in time to deal with this Amendment. I would suggest that this is a most pernicious Amendment. Seldom has a Bill been more stripped of its most beneficial proposals than this one has been, and I sincerely hope that the Government will not be a party to weakening this clause. The lowering of the beer tax, the amending of the Licensing Act of 1921 to fix the latest permitted hour of sale at 10.30 o'clock instead of 10, the provision for intoxicants to be sold and consumed in clubs in London until 2.30 a.m., have followed one another in quick succession.
Though persons under eighteen may not drink in a bar, the law at present permits them to serve drink. The clause which the noble Earl seeks to weaken by his Amendment affects the whole country and not only the new town areas. It is good to have young people guarded, on whichever side of the counter they may live. That is about the only bright spot left in the Bill. Then again, the Amendment, if accepted, would put a premium on brewers up and down the country seeking managers to hold the licence who have families of young people between the ages of fifteen and eighteen. I do not think the noble Earl has added to the attraction of his Amendment by suggesting that he moved it in order to allow licensees and their wives to leave the premises in charge of a young person between the ages of fifteen and eighteen. That, to my mind, is an argument in favour of retaining the clause in its present rigidity. I hope that the Government will not weaken this clause. These young people should be protected on whichever side of the counter they may happen by accident to live.
THE LORD BISHOP OF ROCHESTER: I would ask the noble Earl not to press
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this Amendment. In regard to the question of young persons serving behind bars, does the noble Earl think that if you have in your veins the blood of a publican, you are immunised from the demoralising influences which would affect ordinary young persons of seventeen? Again, I wonder whether he considers that a publican who is a father would be more careful of his own children than he might be of other people's children, and more likely to protect them from the demoralising influences from which this clause tries to protect young people. Apparently, that is not so, because the publican and his wife are to retire and, as it were, leave the floor to the boy or the girl of fifteen. My knowledge of publicans leads me to believe, as the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor said previously this afternoon, that publicans are men of high character. Most of them would never dream of using their own boys and girls of fifteen in this way, and those who would must be prevented from exploiting them.
LORD CALVERLEY: This is a dreadful Amendment and I hope the House will not allow it to ire withdrawn, bur will negative it—that is the practice of another place. The noble Earl is unjust to the publican in suggesting that he would go out of the house and leave it in charge of children of fifteen plus. The noble Earl is putting too great a burden upon the police and is making the work of the licensing justices more difficult. It looks as though the noble Earl knew only the Carlton Club and had never been in a "pub" in his life. I hope the House without further ado, will negative the Amendment.
LORD LLEWELLIN: Before the noble and learned Viscount replies, may I say this? Let us get this matter in its right perspective. At the present moment the position under law is that a boy or girl under eighteen is allowed inside a public-house but is not allowed to be served with intoxicating liquor. The Amendment which my noble friend has moved does not permit the ion or daughter of a licensee to be served with intoxicating liquor. Under the law, as it will be if this Bill goes through unamended, boys or girls under eighteen will be allowed to be in the bar when it is open to the public, and they will be able to help washing up glasses before and after closing hours

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and to arrange for opening time. What they will not be allowed to do is to help the father and mother in serving liquor. That is the only distinction. I do not think it is one of very great principle.
LORD MARLEY: I would like to ask this question: If the publican has married a girl of seventeen, does she come under this restriction?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I should like notice of that question. Frankly, I do not know. I must say that I think this is a bad Amendment. It may or may not be true to say that it does not damage the Bill, but what we have to think of is what damages the child. I would ask the noble Earl—and I am certain what the answer will be: Would he like a child of his at the age of fifteen to be working in a bar and serving behind a counter? I am astounded that the proposition should be put forward. If we do not want to do it in the case of our own children, we have no right to do it in respect of those of anyone else. I do not suggest for a moment that all "pubs" are haunts of vice, or anything of the sort, but I do think that for a child at the age of fifteen years to spend his or her working life in a "pub" is very bad. The Gowers Committee dealt with this matter, and this is what they said in paragraph 275 of their Report:
"The Intoxicating Liquor (Sale to Persons under Eighteen) Act, 1923, makes it an offence for a licence-holder to supply liquor to a juvenile, or for a juvenile to buy liquor, for consumption in a bar."
"Juvenile" there means under eighteen years of age, and we are talking about fifteen here. The Report continues:
"We regard it as anomalous that a licence-holder may nevertheless employ a juvenile in a bar; and we recommend that such employment should be prohibited by statute."
I am quite convinced that we should prohibit by Statute the employment of juveniles in a bar.
The case cited by the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, of the mother and father going out in the evening, perhaps going to the pictures, and the little girl who has just reached her fifteenth birthday spending the evening behind the bar and running the place, is a deplorable one. That is quite something, coming from me because unlike the noble Lord, who said that he
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has never been to a "pub," I have been often. I would not in any circumstances contemplate a child of mine being placed in that position; and neither would any parent who was considering the welfare of his child. Therefore I must say, definitely and strongly, that I reject this Amendment.
LORD O'HAGAN: I should like to express what I believe to be the feelings of a good many noble Lords on this side of the House. I am sorry to differ from those sitting on the Opposition Front Bench, but I feel that this is not advisable and is not in the best interests of the children.
LORD HAWKE: May I associate myself with what my noble friend has just said? There may be things to be said in this respect, but I believe people will think this a very shocking thing if it is pressed to a Division.
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for the observations he has made on this Amendment, which I never intended to press to a Division. However, it is well worth while to consider for a moment what this clause does. The noble and learned Viscount, in all his glory, says that it is a monstrous thing for a child to be employed in the bar of licensed premises; that it is disgraceful that the child should serve drink (I do not ask that the child should serve drink); that it is disgraceful that the child should go into the bar and hear the common everyday talk which may go on; it is low and demoralising. But in this clause the noble and learned Viscount does not cover clubs. There are hundreds of young boys, well under the age of eighteen, who are employed in clubs all over the country. I did not for one moment expect that Lord Rochester would know anything about it, because his knowledge of public-houses must be very small—indeed, if he had not drunk so much water at Croydon perhaps he would not have been so ill. As for Lord Calverley, I am afraid his knowledge of clubs and "pubs" must be very slender indeed. However, I do not desire to press this Amendment. If the noble and learned Viscount is determined that his child shall be treated in a proper manner, and not go into licensed premises, then we should apply it to everything. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
LORD CALVERLEY: I hope it will be negatived.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 30 agreed to.
LORD LLEWELLIN LORD LLEWELLIN moved, after Clause 30 to insert the following new clause:
Extension of the Act of 1945
".Section fifteen of the Act of 1945 (which provides for the expiry of that Act) shall have effect as if for the word "five" there were substituted the word "eight.""
The noble Lord said: Your Lordships will remember that the Licensing Planning (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1945, does what it says, and allows the temporary planning provisions to be made. I am told that the complete provisions will not be made within the five years. It has been suggested to me that this is a convenient opportunity for making that five years into eight years, when it is considered that this Act will have served its term and will no longer be necessary. If that is so—and the noble and learned Viscount will know whether or not it is—I think this is a good opportunity of extending it, so that it may not expire before its full work is done. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 30, insert the said new clause,—(Lord Llewellin.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: It is true that the licensing planning committees will not be able to complete their work, and it is true that an extension of three years is desirable. But having said that, I am bound to say that for technical reasons this is not a convenient instrument in which to do it. The expenses of licensing planning committees are defrayed by the local planning authorities, and the proposal would therefore involve an increased charge on the rates and, in consequence, an increased charge on the Exchequer Equalisation grants. This was not provided for in the money Resolution in another place. Consequently, in order to insert such an Amendment as this we should require a further money Resolution. I have no doubt that this Amendment, which was down on the Report stage in another place, was not carried because it would have been technically out of order. I think the way to deal with it (the noble Lord will see I am at one
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with him in his purpose) is to continue the Act from year to year, under the Expiring Laws Continuance Act in order to avoid any consequent need for annual reappointments of members. Your Lordships will see that we have provided in Clause 31 that the term of appointment shall in future be for three years. In that way we shall be able to achieve what the noble Lord desires in his Amendment. Though I am entirely at one with him in that, we cannot, for technical reasons, do it this way.
LORD LLEWELLIN: I am obliged to the noble and learned Viscount. The Amendment was not called on the Report stage in the other place, and no doubt the reason why the Speaker did not select it was because it was outside the Money Resolution. The explanation which the noble and learned Viscount has now given will afford considerable satisfaction to those employed in working the 1945 Act. That explanation could not be given in the other place, and I think it is convenient that it should have been given now. It is obvious, for technical reasons, that the method suggested by the noble and learned Viscount is better. I have achieved what I wanted by the statement which the noble and learned Viscount has made, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 31 [Terms of appointment of members of licensing planning committees]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is the formal Amendment which I have moved several times. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 24, line 29, leave out ("commencement") and insert ("passing").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 31, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 32 to 35 agreed to.
Clause 36 [Power to amend constitution of London Licensing Planning Committee]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Clause 36 enables the Secretary of State, by statutory instrument, to reduce the number of members of the London Licensing Planning Committee

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"by reason of any reduction under the London County Council (General Powers) Act, 1948, in the number of petty sessional divisions in London.…"
Clause 13 of the Justices of the Peace Bill, however, contains general provisions as to the division of counties into petty sessional divisions. These provisions apply to London, and it is therefore desirable to replace the particular reference contained in the words quoted above by the general words proposed in the Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 26, line 18, leave out from ("of") to ("the") in line 19 and insert ("the reduction under any enactment (whether passed before or after the passing of this Act) of").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 36, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 37 and 38 agreed to.
Clause 39 [Permitted hours in the metropolis]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: These are formal Amendments. If I may I will move them all together.
Amendments moved—
Page 28, line 9, leave out ("commencement") and insert ("passing")
Page 28, line 14, leave out ("commencement") and insert ("passing")
Page 28, line 17, leave out ("said commencement") and insert ("passing of this Act")
Page 28, line 23, leave out ("commencement") and insert ("passing").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Clause 39, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 40 agreed to.
Clause 41 [Repeals]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment relates to the commencement of Part II of the Repeal Schedule, and is consequential on the postponement of the commencement of Part II (except Clause 17) to an appointed day. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Pace 29, leave out line 20 and insert ("date specified by order under section (Commencement of Part II) of this Act.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 41, as amended, agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
First Schedule:
State Management Districts
Part II (Ancillary functions exercisable by Secretary of State):
3. The provision of entertainment or recreation at premises in a State management district provided by the Secretary of State for the sale of intoxicating liquor, meals or refreshments.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I wish the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, were still here, because he would regard this as another bright spot in the Bill, for here we deal with water. The Amendment is required because under the Water (Scotland) Act, which we passed recently, special water districts were outlined as from May 16, 1949. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 31, line 28, after ("except") insert ("that part of that parish which immediately before the coming into operation of section nine of the Water (Scotland) Act, 1949, was known as").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
5.26 p.m.
LORD LLEWELLIN LORD LLEWELLIN moved, in paragraph 3, after "entertainment" to insert:
"other than the showing, except to private audiences, of cinematograph films commercially produced for exhibition to the general public."
The noble Lord said: Now we come to Part II of the First Schedule which refers to "Ancillary Functions exercisable by Secretary of State." Your Lordships will see at the top of page 32 that one of the functions is:
"The provision of entertainment or recreation at premises in a State management district …"
My reason for inserting the words in my Amendment is that, so far, cinemas have never had licences attached to them. The London Pavilion, for instance, carries a liquor licence when it is open for plays with human actors, but when it is used as a cinema the bar is always closed down. There are other cases I could cite where liquor licences have never been attached to cinematograph houses. To put it the other way round, here I am seeking not to attach a cinematograph house to a liquor bar. Nobody will have any objection to somebody in a public house, whether it is State managed or not, showing a film accompanied by a

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talk. It would obviously be right in the case of a film which somebody had taken personally and where a lecture was given. But I think it would be wrong to attach licences to cinemas, or to allow a full-scale cinema performance to be given in a public-house. It would be a departure from our present practice, whether it be done in State "pubs" or free enterprise hotels or "pubs." I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 32, line 1, after ("entertainment insert the said words.—(Lord Llewellin)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I can assure the noble Lord at once that the Home Secretary does not contemplate going into the film business, neither does he contemplate showing rival film exhibitions in public houses. The noble Lord will see that Part II is described as "Ancillary Functions exercisable by Secretary of State." One of the ancillary functions is that specified in paragraph 3. If I remember my Latin correctly, ancilla is Latin for "handmaid," and obviously they are functions which are not the primary functions but the assisting functions. I think the Amendment is unduly restrictive. Suppose, for instance, there is a cycling or rambling club who are showing films of their own activities. That obviously would be proper and right, and they should not be stopped.
LORD HAWKE: That is free entertainment.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The Amendment reads:
"other than the showing, except to private audiences, of cinematograph films commercially produced for exhibition to the general public."
The general public would be there, because you would not have a selected audience. At any rate, we all agree that things of that sort should not be prevented, There are instructional and documentary films produced by the Central Office of Information, who also have other films produced for general exhibition. I am told that the Amendment would rule out the exhibition of these films and also the exhibition of entertainment films along with such films as it would permit.
LORD LLEWELLIN: But is what is produced by the Central Office of Information really "commercially produced for exhibition to the general public?"
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I believe so. I am told there may be in certain cases, perhaps in Scotland and possibly in Cumberland in connection with Carlisle, certain districts so far away from the local cinema that the local residents would greatly appreciate a weekly showing of even purely educational films, if a suitable room were available. There would he rare cases of that sort. But we have not the slightest intention of going into the film business. We think it better to rely on the general words, which make it plain that the entertainment is to be ancillary to the main purpose of State management.
There was much talk about this matter in another place, and after amendment in Standing Committee paragraph 3 of the First Schedule contained the provision to promote, in State-managed districts where refreshment is sold by the Secretary of State, entertainment in licensed premises. The wording was criticised then; it was said that the Secretary of State might use his powers to add cinemas or greyhound racing tracks. To meet this point we amended the paragraph on Report, so as to make it clear that the prime purpose for which the premises were provided must be the sale of liquor, meals or refreshments. The Home Secretary then made the Amendment, and Mr. Grimston, speaking on behalf of the Opposition, said:
"I think this meets the point we raised in Committee, that the Secretary of State should not be able to use sale of liquor as a peg on which to hang a far larger enterprise."
So I hoped and expected that we had met the point by these general words, making it plain that the main purpose of the premises was to be the supply of drink and so forth. I hope the noble Lord will rest assured with the statement that, save in the most exceptional case—the sort of case I have mentioned as possibly arising in Scotland or Cumberland, where it would be appropriate to give some sort of weekly showing—we do not contemplate going into the film business.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: I am sure the intentions of the Lord Chancellor and the Home Secretary are strictly honourable—they always are. But I wonder whether I may give an example that occurs to my mind. Take the case of a dance band in a restaurant. I should

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have supposed that a dance orchestra in a restaurant was ancillary to the main purpose, which is eating—and, as the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, is not here, I can also say drinking. But in the case of a cinema you might get a competitive element which would bring about a much more elaborate form of entertainment in itself. I am sure that that is not the intention here, but I wonder whether the Lord Chancellor, if he cannot give us an answer now, will be able at a later stage to say that the Home Secretary would give a direction of some kind to the management (who presumably, once they are set up, will try to make a success of the thing) to provide that these cinemas should not be in competition with the cinema industry. If that could be done, I think everybody would be satisfied.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I will gladly do that. I will see if I can get the Home Secretary's consent to something of that sort. I am, of course, not committing him to anything. He might even consider an amendment of the words. We do not want to run a cinema business, and I should like to look at the matter and ask my right honourable friend whether he can do anything to allay the fears that the Home Secretary is going into the cinema business. He has not the slightest desire so to do.
LORD LLEWELLIN: In view of the last remarks of the noble and learned Viscount, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
First Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
Second Schedule agreed to.
Third Schedule [Enactments repealed]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The effect of these two Amendments is to transfer subsection (5) of Section 40 of the Act of 1910, which relates to the disqualification of justices for licensing work, from Part I to Part II of the Repeal Schedule. Part I deals with enactments to be repealed as from the commencement of the Act, and Part II with enactments which are now to be repealed as from the day appointed for the commencement of Part II of the Bill (except Clause 17). Clause 18, which contains the new provisions as to dis-
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qualification of justices, will not come into operation until the appointed day, and the same should apply to this Amendment of Section 40 of the 1910 Act. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 34, leave out lines 38 and 39.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD LLEWELLIN: I have no objection whatever to the transfer from Part I to Part II. But was the Lord Chancellor quite right in saying that Part II with enactments was to be repealed as from the day appointed?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think I was right but I will check it up.
LORD LLEWELLIN: The noble and learned Viscount said, I thought, that everything in Part II of the Third Schedule of the Act was to be repealed as from the day appointed.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am now told that the answer is that the heading is altered: it is a matter of printing.
LORD LLEWELLIN: I am much obliged.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move this drafting Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 35, line 21, column 3, at end, insert ("in section forty, subsection (5)").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Third Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
The Title:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The fact that the Bill has been amended means that certain words in the Title may not be appropriate and may not be coextensive with the words of the Act. We must therefore extend the Title. We have also to take into account Clause 30 of the Bill, on the employment of persons under eighteen years of age. Another Amendment is to cover Clause 38 of the Bill, regarding the fixing of notices on church doors. That Amendment was moved by a private Member on Report stage in another place. All these Amendments seek to ensure that the Title correctly states what the Bill does. It is

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a matter of form, but it should be right. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
In the Title, line 9, leave out ("provide in certain cases for later") and insert ("amend the law as to").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD LLEWELLIN: We have no objection whatever to any of these three Amendments. It seems to me that one of the sensible things about this Committee is that we always defer the Title to the end, and then make it fit what we have done in the meantime.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment has already been referred to. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Line 11, after ("dealers") insert ("to restrict the employment of persons under eighteen in bars;").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This Amendment also has been dealt with. I bee to move.
Amendment moved—
Line 14, after ("licences") insert ("to make further provision as to certain notices;").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Title of the Bill, as amended, agreed to.
House resumed.

VEHICLES (EXCISE) BILL [H.L.]
5.42 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this is another of these Consolidation Bills. They are coming thick and fast. I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill he now read 2a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Bill read 2*. Bill, together with a Memorandum laid before the House on the 22nd June last, and any representations made with respect thereto under the Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure) Act, 1949, referred to the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills.

MARRIED WOMEN (RESTRAINT UPON ANTICIPATION) BILL [H.L.]
5.43 p.m.
Order of the Davy far the Second Reading read
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I rise to move that this Bill be read a second time. It is a Bill to carry one step further the process of removing the inequalities between men and women which have survived from the old Common Law of England. It is a Bill to remove a legal restriction upon the right of a woman to do what she likes with her own property, a restriction commonly known among lawyers as a "restraint on anticipation." I will be perfectly frank in telling your Lordships that this Bill was not part of the original programme of the Government. It owes its origin to the implications or a Personal Bill, which was passed by your Lordships' House, called the Mountbatten Estates Bill. That is a Bill to remove the restraint upon anticipation in that one particular case. I am told that, as the result of the introduction of this Bill, that measure has now been withdrawn in another place.
That Bill followed the normal procedure of your Lordships' House with regard to a Personal Estates Bill. It was considered by a highly expert Committee appointed by your Lordships for the purpose, consisting of the Lord Chairman of Committees, Lord Hailsham, Lord Simonds, the late Lord Uthwatt and Lord Kershaw. On this Committee reporting in favour of the Bill, I introduced it into your Lordships' House and it passed through all its stages without opposition. It attracted some public attention in the Press, and there is a Motion on the Paper in another place in the names of certain Conservative Members, criticising the Bill on the ground that it does not go far enough; that while it removes a hardship from one particular woman, the hardship is one that ought to be removed generally from all women who now suffer from it. I confess that that point seemed to me to merit consideration. The more I considered it, the more I became convinced that, in the circumstances of today, the restraint upon anticipation is a hardship in practically every case where it applies, and there is now no reason why it should not be removed generally.

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The history of the matter goes straight back to the days when, by the Common Law of England, a husband was entitled to all the property of his wife. Any property which she had before marriage and any property which came to her during the marriage fell completely under her husband's control, and he could do what he liked with it. From the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century, inroads upon the husband's rights were made by predecessors of mine in this office. That was because the total incapacity of a married woman to own property appeared more and more unsatisfactory and illogical. Property could be given to trustees in trust for the married woman for her separate use. It was found that that involved the proposition that the married woman could dispose of such property as an unmarried woman could. Before the end of the eighteenth century, it had become clear that to give a woman that right was to put her at the mercy of her husband. By one means or another, he could induce his wife to sell or mortgage her future income and hand him the proceeds of the sale or loan.
The Court of Chancery came to the rescue. Lord Thurlow was the first Judge to devise this restriction, and he and Lord Eldon, by their decisions, established it as valid in law. It was established that, by imposing a restraint upon anticipation, a wife could be effectually prevented from disposing of her future income and thereby protected against her husband. It was said at the time that she was protected against both the kicks and the kisses of her husband. Gradually it became the invariable custom of those lawyers who prepared settlements and wills to insert the clause whenever property was to be left in trust for a woman. The restraint did not operate until she married. It operated during her marriage, but ceased the moment her husband died or the marriage became dissolved, and it attached again to any property left when she re-married.
After the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, when all the property of a married woman became her separate property and not that of her husband, the scope of the restraint became very wide indeed, and what had originally been invented as a protection for a married woman against her husband became less and less necessary for that purpose, and
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came to be regarded by those interested in the emancipation of women as an anachronism which ought to be removed. The matter was referred by my predecessor, Lord Sankey, to the Law Revision Committee, an expert Committee of which four of your Lordships' House were members—Lord Wright, Lord Goddard, Lord Porter, and Lord Schuster. That Committee unanimously recommended that in all future instruments a clause retaining the restraint should be void. The Committee refrained from recommending the abolition of a restraint in instruments already executed.
I should like at this point to refer to what that Committee said, in order to get it on record, because I believe they put the matter as plainly as it can be put. In paragraph 20 of their Report, dated 1934, they say this:
"This makes it necessary to examine the institution know as 'restraint upon anticipation' and to make a recommendation upon it. This institution is somewhat technical, and we shall do our best to describe its main features in simple and non-technical language. The 'restraint upon anticipation' means that in the case of a married woman, and only in her case, it is possible, by inserting the appropriate clause in the settlement or will whereby property … is settled upon her as her separate property … to prevent her, during her marriage, from disposing of or charging by way of anticipation the corpus of that property (that is, the fund or capital itself) or the income accruing from it or both. Such a clause is said to impose a 'restraint upon anticipation,' and in practice to-day it is usually confined to preventing her from anticipating the income, that is to say, disposing of it in advance and before it becomes due. The effect of it is not only to protect her property from her husband, which was the original object of settling it upon her for her separate use, but also to protect it from her creditors and from herself, from her own extravagance, generosity, speculations, or natural desire to comply with her husband's suggestions for its use. The way in which it protects her from her creditors is that if they obtain a judgment against her, they cannot enforce it against so much of her property as is subject to a 'restraint,' either by causing the capital to be seized and realised or by attaching the income before it reaches her hands. From one point of view, this may be called protection against creditors; from another it appears to be a not very creditable means of defeating creditors, and a means not open to an unmarried woman or to a man. Moreover, even when such income has come to her hands and is thus freed from the restraint, it cannot be made available to meet her liabilities under a contract entered into by her at a time when that income had not accrued due and was therefore covered by the 'restraint.' Incidentally, now that many married women engage in professions, trades

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or business the 'restraint' clause may have the effect of preventing a married woman who is enjoying an income from settled property from raising capital, by a charge on that income, of start or help her in her profession, trade or business."
Then the Committee call attention to the fact that the law has been somewhat modified by the Bankruptcy Act and by the Law of Property Act. They go on to say:
"We have considered whether we should recommend either preserving the ' restraint upon anticipation' in its present state or giving the Courts wider power to modify it in proper cases, or abolishing it entirely. We have come to these conclusions: (a) that, however useful it may have been over a century ago when it was invented and received the approval of the Court of Chancery, its continuance is no longer consistent with the present position of married women, to whom alone it applies: (b) that the restraint upon anticipation' should be abolished by legislation as regards all settlements, whether made by deed or will, which take effect after such legislation comes into force or after such later date as may be provided by it."
That was the Report, and when that Report was received the drawing of the line between the past and the future incurred a good deal of criticism. Five bodies united to press for the Bill to be made retrospective—the National Union of Women Teachers, the Open Door Council. St. Joan's Social and Political Alliance, the Six Point Group and the Women's Freedom League. If, they said, the Bill were not made retrospective, it would mean postponing the coming into effect of the complete reform of the married women's property law until almost the end of the century. They quoted with approval the view of the Law Revision Committee, that the restraint "provides a not very creditable means of defeating creditors," and also that it is "no longer consistent with the present position of the married woman." They maintained that the restraint is based on the presumed irresponsibility of the married woman, and that this is not in accordance with her dignity as an adult human being.
They pointed out some of the results. It meant, they said, that some married women—in general, those already married and therefore older—were to be kept under a ban in relation to the use of their property, which in future it was to be illegal to place on the property of other married women, in general the now unmarried and, therefore, younger. These
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older women, they said, were to have a lower status. The restriction was to keep them in a position said by the Law Revision Committee itself to be "no longer consistent with the present position of the married woman." Should these women desire to use their restrained property before it came into their hands, they were to be required to incur what they said was the humiliation and expense of applying to the court for an authorisation to deal with their own property. The court was, in their case only, to have power to decide whether or not the particular use a woman wished to make of her own property was or was not in her interest. Other women and men, married or unmarried, they said, were to be considered as responsible human beings, able to decide for themselves what was best for themselves. They said that it meant a continuation of the complication of the law of the married woman's property, which was unfair to all married women and to those who had dealings with them. It meant that those injustices, as they so regarded them, should continue so long as settlements which had already become effective were in force—that is to say for another fifty of sixty years from that time.
My Lords, I must say that I think those objections have great force. Although, of course, it is true that a fool and his money are easily parted, my experience is that that applies as much to fools in trousers as to fools in skirts. But it was decided—and I have no doubt decided on what then seemed good grounds—to carry out the recommendation of the Committee. The result is that an Act was passed—the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act of 1935. I think that that was a very intelligent decision at that time. The reforms recommended by the Committee were exceedingly bold, and fourteen years ago it was possible to say that such a restraint might have been in the interests of some married women.
Since that date, of course, taxation has increased and the whole position has been radically altered. A clause which had been put in as a matter of routine by settlors and testators, as a protection of a married woman against her husband, has now become nothing less than a frustration of the settlors' desire to benefit the married woman. Compare the

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case of a married woman who has property under a settlement executed before 1935 with that of the ordinary married woman of to-day. The ordinary married woman of to-day can, if she thinks fit, raise a little ready money, either by pledging or selling part of her future income or, if her children are of full age, by agreeing with them that some of the trust funds should be sold and divided between them in equitable proportions. The married woman under a pre-1936 settlement can do no such thing—that is to say, so long as she is married, if her husband should die, or if she should divorce him or he divorce her, she immediately regains her freedom to use her money as she likes, and in the interval before she marries again, she may agree with her children, if they are of full age, to dispose of as much of the trust property as she and they think fit.
I believe it to be almost impossible to find a case in the conditions of the day in which the continuance of the restraint can be to the benefit of the married woman. I invite your Lordships to consider the implications of the Mountbatten Estate Bill. If that Bill had been passed (and your Lordships passed it through this House—in my view on good grounds), it might be followed by Personal Estate Bills introduced successively by every married woman who could afford the expense of bringing in such a Bill; and Parliament, if it had passed the Mountbatten Estate Bill, would find there were no grounds on which it could properly refuse to pass the other Bills. The only married women who would not benefit would, broadly speaking, be those who could not afford the expense, unless there were one or two who succeeded in running up debts and were relying on the restraint clause to keep their creditors at bay. I do not think that this would be justice, and in my view the only proper course is to remove all these restraints by means of this Bill.
My Lords, that leads me to one further topic. Some attention has been drawn by the Press to the possible effect on the Exchequer of removing these restraints, and I think I should say something about that. The effect of this Bill on the Exchequer is purely incidental. If a man or a woman, not subject to restraint, spends or gives away half his
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or her property, there is, of course, less property left to be taxed. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue cannot and do not complain of this; they continue on their way, taxing what they find and not taxing what is not there.
There may be exceptions. If, for instance a man gives away his property to his relatives, hoping to avoid death duties, and dies within five years of making the gift, he fails in his object. The property is liable to estate duty as if it had still been in his possession when he died. That is the effect of a general liability, applicable to men and women alike, whether married or unmarried. To single out one particular class of married women and to restrain them from doing what they wish with their property, for the sole purpose of being able to tax it, would be most unfair. That is not part of the policy of His Majesty's Government, nor, indeed, would such a policy, even if it were just, be effective, because even if the property of a married woman were artificially kept intact until the end of the marriage, it by no means follows that it would remain intact between the end of the marriage and the time when estate duty came to be assessed.
I need say little about the wording of the Bill itself. It has only one substantive clause. Subsection (1) abolishes restraints upon anticipation generally. The wording follows the wording of subsection (1) of Section 2 of the Act of 1935. The greater part of that section consists of provisions for drawing the line between the past and the future. Subsection (2) of Clause 1 of the Bill repeals those provisions. The remaining subsections and the Schedules contain consequential amendments and repeals in other Acts. It is true that none of us favours retrospective legislation, and we are all reluctant to proceed in such a way as to upset what may have been stipulated by settlors. But I justify it without any hesitation in this way. I believe that if any settlor who in pre-1936 days imposed restraint upon anticipation in regard to a woman upon whom he was settling property could have lived to see the circumstances of to-day, and could see the way in which that restraint was operating, he would have said: "Had I known this I would never have imposed this restraint." Therefore, I do not think we shall breach the wishes of these people. Had they been here they would, I am

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confident, have said we were doing the right thing in carrying this through to provide for and help the married woman. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2*.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
6.4 p.m.
VISCOUNT SIMON: My Lords, neither the Lord Chancellor nor I is a Chancery lawyer. We have both been brought up in what we like to think is the robust and more comprehensible atmosphere of the Temple. If I say a few words now about this Bill it is certainly not with any claim to speak with exceptional experience of the rather difficult subject matter. The Lord Chancellor is evidently wholeheartedly breast high with the whole business. He cannot imagine that there is anything at all worth saying on the other side, and he presents himself in the agreeable pose of the champion of married women in general. I wish to do all that is right and fair by married women and by everyone else, but I hope I may point out to him that the problem here to he solved is not quite so simple as he evidently thinks. It is not an uncommon thing for a man who has some money to leave or to settle to wish to secure that those who share in his bounty will share in it on terms which will secure that they do not waste it. In the case of a man, the usual way in which it is done is by providing either what is called a "discretionary trust" or by providing that if the beneficiary makes any attempt to dispose of the property or to sell his future interest, there is forfeiture, and the property passes to the next person named.
Any solicitor who is really skilled in his business—and, if I may respectfully say so, I think any lawyer who really has practical experience of the matter—knows that that is the way in which it is customary to secure that property which does not belong out and out to the beneficiary, but which is given to the beneficiary by will or settlement on certain terms, is protected from the individual's recklessness or gambling habits or what you please. I conceive that in such cases the settlor, the testator, is entitled, since he is disposing of his own money, to say: "I dispose of it on these terms." He can do that, of course, whether the beneficiary is a man or a women. No
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question of sex comes into it and no question of marriage. Therefore, if you take this first clause as it is in the Bill—whether it was meant or not I do not know—you will find that that sort of restriction upon alienation will not be altered by the Bill at 311. No restriction upon alienation is touched by the Bill unless it is the sort of restriction which could not have attached to the enjoyment of that property by a man.
What I have described, which is well known to those concerned with such matters—the ordinary way in which a provision may be made to protect the proper use of, say, a life interest given to a man—is, as I have said, normally, either by a discretionary trust under which a trustee has the duty to give to the individual adequate amounts from time to time or, on the other hand, a provision that the interest will be forfeited altogether if the individual seeks to alienate it or to dispose of it. All that is to remain. There is nothing in this Bill which is going to do justice, if it is justice, to those people. But what happened in the case of married women in the past has been this. I do not differ at all, so far as I understand the history of the subject, from what the Lord Chancellor has said as to its origin. I rather think it was Lord Thurlow who discovered this most ingenious process and got it supported in Chancery, in the interests, I believe, of an individual who was a relation of his.
But, however that may be, this doctrine of restraint upon anticipation is absolutely limited to the case of a woman who is married and living under what the law calls "coverture." The money which is provided for her is not necessarily provided out of her own efforts. It is very likely—indeed, it is very often—provided by her ancestor, her father or someone else. In the case of a marriage settlement it is often provided in the form of quite modest sums by the respective parents, in view of the fact that the girl is going to be married. It provides that she is to have an income of so much, and proceeds to attach to it the condition that it is to be an income which is subject to a restraint upon anticipation. That is the thing, and the only thing, with which this Bill deals. It is a very much more serious change in the law than one would suppose from what the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor aid. It means that however long ago the marriage settlement

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was made, whatever good reason there was for the parents to impose a condition which would restrain the married lady from anticipating her income, it is all to be cancelled.
I must call the specific attention of the House to the fact (although the noble and learned Viscount has already referred to it) that when this matter was gone into by the Committee to which the noble and learned Viscount referred, and whose Report he has quoted, and when Parliament, as recently as 1935, carried an Act on the subject, it contained, as one would expect, a provision for preventing retrospective effect. If that is not done, it means that any marriage settlement which was made before 1935, though properly and deliberately made by those who provided the money with this condition attached to the income which the wife is to receive, is to be altered retrospectively. The people who made the provision may be dead. The provision itself may be a most reasonable provision. None the less, from the moment the Lord Chancellor's Bill goes on the Statute Book, the whole of that is to be struck out, though deliberately contracted before 1935.
Contrast that with what Parliament did when they made this change in the law in 1935. I approve of the change they made. I think the idea of introducing for the future this very recondite conception of restraint upon anticipation is a very good thing, but to say that that should apply to everything done before 1935, to all marriage settlements entered into solemnly at that time between the parties, is a different matter. When the 1935 Act was passed, it provided that:
"Nothing in this subsection shall interfere with or render inoperative any restriction upon anticipation or alienation attached to the enjoyment of any property by virtue of any provision attaching such a restriction contained in any Act passed before the passing of this Act or in any instrument effective before the first day of January, 1936."
Those words in the Statute preserved past marriage settlements and did not seek to look behind what had been done by people who had put their money into a settlement for the purpose of providing for the next generation. It quite deliberately provided that they could not interfere with marriage settlements of people before their time, and the Act,
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which received the Royal Assent in August, 1935, applied only to marriage settlements made in 1936 and onwards.
The Lord Chancellor's Bill may be a Bill which seeks to do, in general terms, what is sought to be done in the Mountbatten Bill. I am not concerned with that. We are not considering the particular interest of anyone in England at all; we are considering whether this is a good change to make in the law as a whole. If it is carried out, two remarkable consequences follow. First, it is the most flagrant example of retrospective legislation of which I have ever heard. It cancels the terms of every single marriage settlement that was made before the beginning of the year 1936, and there are hundreds and thousands of them in existence at this moment. Many people in all parts of the country have been living under these marriage settlements. I think it is a matter which requires very substantial justification. It is evident that neither the Committee which the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor quoted, nor the Act of Parliament to which he also referred, conceived that such a thing would be right, for both Committee and Act of Parliament confined themselves solely to what should be done in the future.
But it has a second consequence, about which the noble and learned Viscount said nothing at all. I do not claim to be a great expert in this branch of the law, but I have tried to understand it and I am very much astonished about this result. The sons of a family may in ordinary practice be restrained from anticipation of income, not by the doctrine of restraint upon anticipation but by the ordinary methods, which I have described already, of discretionary trusts or by forfeiture if there is an attempt to deal with the interests. All that is to remain. The men are not to be relieved of anything at all; but the married women, in whose case in practice I can assure you any good family solicitor would secure the same result by the process of inserting this provision against anticipation, get their freedom. I do not know why the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor should say that this Bill is one of those noble Bills which are to equalise the position between men and women.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not think I said anything of the kind. The noble and learned Viscount has been caricaturing for some time what I said. I would ask him not to try and caricature what I said.
VISCOUNT SIMON: I am sorry, I thought the noble and learned Viscount said that this was a noble Bill.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not think the noble and learned Viscount thought I said the word "noble." He knows perfectly well I said nothing of the sort.
VISCOUNT SIMON: The noble and learned Viscount seems to be a little annoyed with me. I will content myself with saying that this is not a Bill which makes any contribution to the equalisation of the law between men and women. I understand the noble and learned Viscount would agree with me.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not. I entirely and fundamentally differ. That is exactly what the Bill does.
VISCOUNT SIMON: It must be one thing or the other. The Bill must either do something for the equalisation of the law between men and women or it does not. I am only saying, from such limited knowledge as I have, that it does nothing whatever to relieve the man who finds that his income provided in a settlement or a will is restrained from being used by the methods ordinarily employed, whereas it does, in fact, whether rightly or wrongly, remove that restraint in the methods ordinarily employed in the case of a married lady. I do not think the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor has followed me.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Indeed, I have. In so far as a discretionary trust is concerned, it is not touched at all, either in the case of a man or a woman. So far as restraint upon anticipation is concerned, it applies only to married women during coverture. That it does deal with, and does away with.
VISCOUNT SIMON: We are there quite at one. I am sorry the noble and learned Viscount feels so "touchy" about it. The observation I want to make is this—and certainly those engaged in drawing up marriage settlements will confirm it. In the ordinary way, a married woman is
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restrained from using as she will what she has been given by the method of restraint upon anticipation. That is a method which can be applied only in the case of married women during coverture. On the other hand, the ordinary way to restrain a man given an income which he is not to use as he likes is by methods which are not the same but which produce the same result—namely, discretionary trusts or forfeiture if there is any attempt to dispose of interests. All I am saying—and I do not think there is any doubt about it—is that this is not a case, therefore, which equalises the law between men and women, whether the Lord Chancellor says that or not—and I apologise most sincerely if I am mistaken. I say, in any case, that it does not do so. In fact it releases one kind of person from a restraint which the settlor was disposed to make, even though the settlor made it long ago, but it does not do anything whatever to remove a similar restraint, expressed necessarily in a different form, which is applied, in what are thought to be proper cases, to a man's benefit.
I am not in the least hot about this matter; I am, for my part, concerned only that we should appreciate what we are doing. What we are proposing to do is to enact retrospective legislation applied to the case of married women in connection with restraint upon anticipation, when in practice in the case of men a similar protection of the income is provided by methods which are not the methods of restraint upon anticipation at all. I assume that the Lord Chancellor appreciates that fact, and I should be greatly surprised if anyone who is really acquainted with Chancery practice would not agree that this is a Bill that deals, not with the two cases, but is confined entirely to the one case, and deals with it retrospectively. I respectfully suggest to the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack that the matter ought to be looked at from that point of view, and, if it is not, there is a certain danger, in view of his eloquence and enthusiasm, that we may make a bigger change in the law than we really intend.
6.22 p.m.
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: My Lords, it is always a difficult matter to intervene in a case where two eminent gentlemen are not in agreement. Nevertheless, I have to

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say what I think in this matter, and I must say without hesitation that I agree with the view put forward by the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack. I think his description of restraint on anticipation is perfectly correct. Those who wish to read an account of it in different language, but precisely to the same effect, can be referred to the 12th volume of the History of English Law, by the late Professor Holdsworth, at page 324 and the following pages. There is only one thing I would add to what the Lord Chancellor has said on the history of this matter; it is not in the least in opposition to anything he said, although it is important to bear it in mind in dealing with the argument of my noble and learned friend Lord Simon. It is that, according to English law, if you give a man property, or give him interest in property, such as a life estate, you cannot put any fetter on the way he shall use it. The law has always regarded that as repugnant and, therefore, any attempt to do it is void.
If any noble Lord wants an incidental view to that effect, it so happens that my eye has caught page 326 of this 12th volume of Holdsworth, which begins with the words:
"In fact, this great exception to the principle that the owner of property cannot be prevented from alienating it freely, can be justified both on technical and on substantial grounds."
The great exception is the exception which the author has been expounding in the preceding three pages, which explains how, in the case of women—and, I ought to add, in the case of a married woman, and no other woman—it is possible by a gift, by a settlement or by some instrument or other such as a will, to provide that the property is given to the married woman, or to the woman when married, with a restraint on anticipation. This is not Common Law at all, and common lawyers may not fully understand it, if I may say so with great respect. This was an equity doctrine invented, as has already been said, by Lord Thurlow. For many years it was not certain, and had not been decided beyond doubt, that property to which the woman while married was equitably entitled could be tied up by the restraint on anticipation. Ultimately, after many decisions, it was found that it could be so tied up. If anybody interested in the
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whole thing cares to study the great decision of Lord Cottenham in Fullett v. Armstrong (Milne and Craig) he will find the authorities dealt with; that great Lord Chancellor explained how it was that this striking exception to the ordinary Common Law had been permitted, and how it had been worked out in the way in which it has been stated by the Lord Chancellor.
That being the position, I want to point this out. It is entirely wrong to suppose that the doctrine of discretionary trust, which my noble and learned friend Lord Simon has said is commonly adopted, or a clause which says that a man shall hold property given by a third party until he goes bankrupt, or until he allows somebody to levy execution on his goods and chattels, has any resemblance whatever to this restraint on anticipation. You are not then interfering with a man's enjoyment of the property he is given; you are saying he shall hold the property until something happens: it might be until he goes to Rome; it might be until he gets his hair cut—any possible termination of his estate or his interest can be given. The words in the Bill we have before us,
"…no restriction upon anticipation or alienation attached … to the enjoyment of any property by a woman,"
do not, in my opinion, cover such a case as an equitable trust in favour of a man, his children and his relatives. That is not a restriction on anticipation; it is a diminution of his property. He is given by the trust only that which the trustees in their discretion think fit to hand over.
Nor is it a restriction upon anticipation to say that if he goes bankrupt the interest comes to an end. There is no anticipation there. He holds the property until he becomes bankrupt, or other things happen which put an end to his estate. So it is wrong to suppose that the interests which my noble and learned friend Lord Simon has so well explained—subject to the criticism which I make—come within subsection (1) of the Bill before us, which deals simply and solely with the restriction upon anticipation or alienation attached or purported to be attached to that enjoyment of the property by a woman under coverture. It relates not to the termination of the property, but to its enjoyment.
VISCOUNT SIMON: I am very glad to learn from the noble and learned Viscount, but is it no restriction upon alienation attached to the enjoyment of property to say that a man is to enjoy the property as long as he does not seek to alienate it?
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: My answer is: Certainly not—nothing of the sort. That says the man has a limited property. That is not the enjoyment. It means that his interest in the property comes to an end in a certain event. I have suggested a ridiculous event, but the common one is that he should go bankrupt. That is the restriction of his enjoyment. He governs the property until he goes bankrupt. That is not regarded as the same thing in law at all. The difference is that the restriction that he may enjoy the property until he goes bankrupt is a perfectly good Common Law statement of his interest. That is Common Law, and the other depends upon a view of equity—upon which at one time there was doubt and on which Lord Thurlow chose, with some advantages at that time, to express a view,. There is a difference between this sort of situation and the cases which my noble and learned friend has cited as showing that the proposed subsection (1) goes too far. The words in the Bill refer not to discretionary trusts or terminable trusts, but simply and solely to restriction upon anticipation such as those I have mentioned.
I hope that. I am always frank in dealing with anything, particularly where law is involved. I do not like the drafting of subsection (1), because it puts in words which I think have misled my noble friend and which, at first sight, misled me. After the words:
"purported to be attached, to the enjoyment of any property by a woman"
it says:
"which could not have been attached to the enjoyment of that property by a man …"
That is an interesting piece of law, but it is absolutely ridiculous to a lawyer because, of course, the restriction of anticipation during coverture could not possibly affect a man, and, therefore, the words are not good. There is no permanent restriction of alienation on the enjoyment of any property by a woman. The only person who is ever going to enjoy anything under the first part of this
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clause is the woman, and what is the good of saying that is not to attach to a case where we are talking about the enjoyment of property by a man?
The reason why it is put in is a somewhat curious one. Section 2 of the Law Reform (Married Women and Tort-feasers) Act, 1935, shows clearly that the Legislature is going to deal only with this separate property of a married woman or property belonging to the daughter of her marriage, or with property acquired by her or devolving upon her as a married woman. Then there is a proviso which my noble friend read. But that proviso does not, in my opinion, refer to those classes at all. What the proviso is putting in, rather curiously, is a statement as regards restrictions imposed by an Act. I am going to complete the story in a moment, but this is what it is dealing with mainly. I think it is dealing there with restrictions imposed on certain noble gentlemen—I think the Duke of Wellington was one, and one or two of our great admirals were others—mho were given property by an Act of Parliament which they were not to alienate. "This," says the proviso to the 1935 Act," we are not touching at all."
It then goes on to say:
"…or in any instrument executed before the first day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-six."
I am in a difficulty at the moment in knowing how that applies to the preceding section, which does not deal with men or the powers of men, but simply with the powers of women while married. My noble friend is making a mistake here, and I must put him right. Subsection (2), which he did not read to the House, says:
"Any instrument executed on or after the first day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-six, shall, in so far as it purports to attach to the enjoyment of any property by a woman any restriction upon anticipation or alienation"—
and then there is added, for what reason I know not—
"which could not have been attached to the enjoyment of that property by a man, be void."
That is the section which says that no restraints upon anticipations are good if they were imposed after the date of the Act.
I must say a word on the vigorous way in which my noble friend attacked this

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Bill as a flagrant example of retrospective legislation because, he said, it left the boys subject to their difficulties and conferred these advantages on the girls.
VISCOUNT SIMON: No—because it referred to past marriage settlements.
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: That is one thing, but surely the noble Viscount also said that it was not fair to the boys. I wanted to point out that in truth the effect of this Bill, if it becomes an Act of Parliament, is to put the girls, or the women, into exactly the same position as that in which the men have been for hundreds of years. They both can be made subject to discretionary trusts. There is nothing to prevent a discretionary trust for a girl. There is nothing to prevent giving to a woman who may or may not marry rights which come to an end if she goes bankrupt. In these days a woman can be made bankrupt, which was not the case originally, with the result that ever since the 1935 Act came into effect women have been made, where it was thought to be necessary, the subjects of discretionary trusts. You can give your money or anything you like to Mary Jane, with trustees to hold it for her and with certain other people—generally relatives, of course—to be employed in a discretionary rôle. There is nothing to prevent that either in the case of a boy or a girl.
I think that this Bill—the reasons for the justice of which have been admirably stated, if I may say so, by the Lord Chancellor—should pass. I do not shirk the point that, with regard to instruments which came into effect before the Law Reform Act of 1935, the position is this: that ever since the beginning of 1936 women who married after that date have been free from restraints on anticipation. The women who were already married in 1935 have been subject to that restraint, and the position now is that the man may say that, if he had known the position earlier, he could have made the girl subject to discretionary trust, but never thought of doing so because there was an easier way of doing it. I confess that I am wholly unable to see any injustice in this measure, for the reasons which have been explained, and I support the Bill.
6.41 p.m.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords, I should like to add a word or two to this extremely interesting discussion—not by way of intervening in the legal argument but merely to show how it strikes the common man. The first thing that has certainly been established is that this is a pretty substantial measure. The second thing is that I was greatly interested in what fell from the noble and learned count on the Woolsack, which echoes what many of us have said: that the weight of taxation which is now imposed necessarily and inevitably leads people into doing things which they would not otherwise have done. The third thing that strikes me is that it is very odd that we did not hear anything about this Bill before.
I am not going to say anything about the merits or demerits of the Private Bill which passed through this House. If I had taken strong exception to it I should no doubt have spoken against it. It went to a Committee here which held that on the whole it was justified, and it then passed to another place. But I do not think I should be either impertinent or irrelevant if I took leave to observe that if that Bill had not gone into rather still water in another place we should not have had this Bill brought here. I am not saying there is not a case for relieving married women in instances in which it is justified and where it is right and reasonable to overrule the declared wishes of the testator. But that is a pretty strong thing to do. After all, if we once get into the habit of general legislation, and of feeling that we can undo all that has been done and settled in the past, we are creating a rather dangerous precedent. The Lord Chancellor admitted that that is true. But at the same time one does find terribly hard cases. Of course, no one can look into the mind of a man who took a certain course twenty or more years ago. It may well be that if a testator had been able to look forward to the world we are living in to-day he would not have done all he did do or he might not have done it in the same way.
I am going for a second to entrench on legal ground. I do so, not to express a legal opinion but merely to give my experience in trusts, not as a lawyer but as a person who has come constantly into contact with trusts. Some discretionary

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trusts for a son or daughter are, of course, as strict as a restraint on anticipation. On the other hand, my experience has been that a wider discretion is as a rule left to the trustees; they are not just automata. One of the most common forms is that there is a general restriction that the daughter is not to anticipate the income, but discretion may be given to the trustees to anticipate a small part of the capital—perhaps, for example, in a case of a youth, to use in some way for the youth's benefit. That is a discretionary trust. But surely there is a halfway house between this absolute removal of all restraint on anticipation under these past settlements—a thing which the Lord Chancellor very fairly said the Committee were dead against when they reported and Parliament was on the whole against in 1939—and the complete bondage of maintaining the restrictions. Otherwise anybody who had enough money might come and present a Bill, which would be unfair, because the people who had not so much money, and who perhaps needed relief just as much, or even more, would not be able to get it. Is there not a halfway house?
It is very common for trustees to apply to the court if there is jurisdiction. It is a very cheap process as I well know, because it can be done on an originating summons—provided you give the power. Of course, if the trust is absolute there is no right for anybody to go to the court for relief.
VISCOUNT SIMON: Is that quite so? A section of the Act says that a married lady who had property in restraint of anticipation could none the less apply to the court, and that if the court thought proper they could give relief.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: Is that so? Then what are we doing with this Bill? I am sorry; I ought to have known about that. But I certainly assumed that there was no way out.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: For a particular purpose—for instance if one of the daughters of the marriage is going to get married, or something of that sort—the lady who is restrained from anticipation can go to the court and, for that particular purpose, if the court thinks that the application is in her interest, the court has power to make an order notwithstanding the restraint. That is for a particular purpose, and that is all.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: May I carry it further? That is for doing something for the daughter. May I take the case which I think the Lord Chancellor indicated, where a woman wanted to get at some money? She would not be able to get more than she could raise upon her life interest. But could a woman who, under a settlement, is restrained from anticipation, go to the court to-day and say, "I want to raise some money. Therefore, I propose that I should be allowed to anticipate nine-tenths of my income," and upon that sell her life interest to somebody and with it buy an annuity or an insurance policy?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Maugham, can say much better than I can, but that would not be granted. I think the practice of the Chancery Judges is to want to see some particular, specific and peculiar cases such as I have mentioned. They would never do it at all in that general way.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: Then apparently the general provision does not go far enough to satisfy what the Lord Chancellor said he thinks is a reasonable thing to do. On the other hand, I must say I rather boggle at the complete reversion of win at a testator has laid down in his settlement. I should have thought that it might be a wise thing to say: "There should he power to approve the removal or the lightening of this restraint upon anticipation in a case where the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of the woman that that should be done." As I say, Parliament having given that general power, the court would have the general discretion. It would not be an expensive application. As I understand it, could be made on an originating summons, for that is quite a cheap way of doing it. The Chancery Judges in Chambers, who are well accustomed to doing this sort of thing to-day, are very wise and understanding people. If it be said that some of these women have quite small estates and even that is too much to do, I would point out that where an estate is small or at any rate below a certain figure, it has not been uncommon to say: "Very well, you can go to the county court." That is a possible elaboration. I suggest that, if the House gives a Second Reading to

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this Bill and it goes into Committee, it might very well be worth further consideration whether something on those lines would not be a fair compromise between the complete restriction and the complete removal of it.
LORD CLYDESMUIR: I rise only to ask a question. I note that in Clause 2 (2) of the Bill the Act is not to extend to Scotland or Northern Ireland. I am aware that the law of Scotland differs widely from the law of England. It may be that this point has been fully considered, but I shall be grateful if the Lord Chancellor, when he rises to reply, can say what are the Government's intentions regarding Scotland, and whether this matter is fully under consideration.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, this discussion proceeded in the earlier stages on so Olympian a level that I had no intention of intruding into the "closed shop," but, as the result of the intervention of my noble friend, Lord Swinton, I wish to say only a very few words. Had I spoken before the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Maugham, I should have been groping about to express in intelligible English what I felt to be the need for impressing upon the House something which had impressed itself upon my mind—namely, that a very clear distinction is to be drawn between the type of provision in a discretionary trust or a forfeiture, and that in a restraint upon anticipation. Listening respectfully, as I always do, to the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, I was struck by his saying, and repeating on more than one occasion, that these were similar restraints. I find it difficult to persuade myself that that in fact is so. I confess, again with great respect, that when the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, was opening his objection to this Bill I thought he was expressing an objection to some of the provisions of the Act of 1935. Obviously in that I was wrong, because he later gave vent to his entire concurrence with those provisions.
We cannot dismiss entirely from our minds the fact that the Mountbatten Bill passed through this House and that no exception was taken to its provisions, although it was framed, I believe, to achieve the same object in a particular case as this Bill is intended to achieve
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generally. No exception was taken to it, and it proceeded without criticism through the House. Expediency alone can, or at any rate should, never be a reason for altering the law. If expediency conflicts with justice, justice should prevail; but if expediency and justice in any instance go hand in hand, I can see in such a case no reason why the law should not undergo amendment. I believe this to be an example of that situation. Therefore, so far as I am concerned, I desire to support the Bill.
6.57 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, may I briefly reply to this discussion which, greatly to my surprise, has engendered neat, although I had thought it was the last type of Bill to do so? Some of the heat was on my part. I must say that I found the speech of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, wholly lamentable. I still think so. I think so for several reasons. First, I think that to introduce the question of discretionary trust was most unfortunate. It only befogs the whole issue. This Bill has nothing whatever to do with discretionary trust—nothing whatever. It is a wholly different topic and subject matter, and I cannot conceive why that was introduced. Of course, if the noble and learned Viscount is under the impression—and he said so several times and, therefore, perhaps he is—that the restraint imposed by a discretionary trust is similar to a restraint upon anticipation—if he is under that strange illusion, then I can understand some relevance in bringing in discretionary trust. But I hardly think that, on reflection, he would consider the two cases are in the smallest degree in pari materia.
Next, the noble and learned Viscount seemed to suggest that I had almost concealed from the House—or, at any rate, that I had glossed over the fact—that this Bill was retrospective, and that I had referred to it as a "noble Bill" and passed over that matter in silence, The noble and learned Viscount will be good enough to-morrow to see what I did say. He will find that I devoted a large part of my speech to the fact that this was retrospective, and I justified the retrospective element in the Bill by saying that, in the changed circumstances of today, the testators or settlors, if they were

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aware of the changed circumstances of to-day, might well have said that, in effect, we were carrying out their wishes. At any rate, the suggestion that I had concealed from the House, or at any rate not brought out, the fact that this was a Bill dealing retrospectively with certain matters, certainly was unpleasant to me.
VISCOUNT SIMON: May I say that I hope the Lord Chancellor will understand that I had no intention of suggesting that? If I did, I am the first to say that I am sorry. I do not think the Lord Chancellor has quite appreciated the point that I made, perhaps rather obscurely. It may be that settlors and testators in times past would think that some qualification was right, but naturally it was not put into discretionary or other clauses at the time because the restraint upon anticipation did everything they wanted; and perhaps more. My whole point was that in the past that has not been done, which makes it rather strange simply to cancel the whole thing in one sentence.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Viscount in one respect is quite incorrigible. He said that the restraint did all they wanted. But it did not; it applied only to the coverture. If the husband died, or if someone divorced his wife or the wife divorced the husband, it ceased. The point about a discretionary trust is that it attached always, while this applied to a woman only in certain conditions. When I was a young man in the law there still used to be a textbook which was called Persons Under Incapacity, and they were classed together as "infants, lunatics and married women." Upon my word! when I see what married women have sometimes to put up with, I am inclined to think there may have been a grain of truth in that.
Let us consider the position. Are we going to forget the fact that the Mountbatten Bill came up and has been passed by the Committee, over which I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simonds presided? We set up a Personal Bills Committee, and if a Bill has been passed by our Personal Bills Committee, it is a quasi-judicial process. We always have eminent Judges presiding, and it has never been opposed by the House of Commons—never in history, as I under-
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stand. That Bill was passed, and I certainly thought it would go through the House of Commons without any question. But persons on the Conservative side there put down a Motion to the effect, that "If you are going to do it in this case you ought to do it in all cases." That is how the trouble arose.
Therefore, the position simply comes to this. We have got to do it in every Bill in which the person has enough money to go through the process of promoting a Bill. That is a more expensive process than an originating summons in the Chancery Court. When I reflected upon this matter, I could not see that we were justified in not acceding to the form of Amendment which was put down by the Tory members in another place. I do not claim this to be a "noble" Bill, but I claim it to be a good common-sense Bill. I waited throughout the noble and learned Viscount's speech to hear what he was going to say about the problem. I think he rose without knowing whether he was going to vote for or against the Bill, and I think he sat down in the same condition. I do not think he knows.
But what is the answer to this? If you are going to do this in the Mountbatten case, are you going to decline to do it in other cases? If you are going to do it in all cases, why not do it by means of one general Bill, rather than by a series of individual Bills, at considerable cost to the parties? That is the proposition which I put forward. I do not say, and I never did say—and the noble Viscount knows that I never did say—that this was a "noble" Bill. But I do say, that we can strip this matter of all the extraneous and irrelevant circumstances that have been introduced. This is a simple case of a good common-sense Bill which I commend to your Lordships. In regard to the question of Scotland, I do not pose as an expert on the equity law of my own country, still less of Scotland; but I understand that Scotland had no doctrine corresponding to this restraint on anticipation. I will find out whether or not I am right in flirt view, and I will communicate with the noble Lord, Lord Clydesmuir.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

SOUTHAMPTON HARBOUR BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1*; and referred to the Examiners.
SWINDON CORPORATION BILL
Reported, with Amendments.

STATUTORY ORDERS (SPECIAL PROCEDURE) (SUBSTITUTION) ORDER, 1949
Draft Order in Council proposed to be made under the Statutory Orders (Special Procedure) Act, 1945: Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) for an Address to His Majesty, and referred to the Special Orders Committee.
House adjourned at seven minutes past seven o'clock.