Lords Sitting of 13 December 1948

Preamble
The House met at four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
  DUNDEE CORPORATION ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL [H.L.]
  Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
DUNDEE HARBOUR AND TAY FERRIES ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.

PREVENTION OF DAMAGE BY PESTS BILL [H.L.]
4.5 p.m.
Read 3a (according to Order) with the Amendments; Amendments (Privilege) made; Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

CIVIL DEFENCE BILL
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.

NATIONAL SERVICE (AMENDMENT) BILL
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (VISCOUNT HALL): My Lords, the purpose of this Bill is to amend the National Service Act, which was debated in your Lordships' House in the Spring of last year. The Bill is short but vitally important, both in its defence aspects and in its very close effects on the lives of many thousands of young men of this country. Its principal provision is that National Service men called up under the Act after January 1, 1949, shall serve for eighteen months with the Colours instead of twelve months, as in the present Act. The reason for the change is that if this step is not taken the country will be unable to meet its defence commitments
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during the next few years since, under the Act, all men called up before the beginning of 1949 would be released before the end of that year. In terms of man-power this would involve the demobilisation of something like 240,000 from the Army and 110,000 from the R.A.F. during 1949. The Royal Navy is not so greatly affected, the corresponding number being about 17,000. Concurrently with that run-out of trained men, the Forces would be faced with the training of the 1949 intake—something of the order of 150,000. The resultant turnover and disorganisation during the year would have been most damaging to the Services, and on these grounds completely unacceptable.
Apart from the question of disorganisation, we rely upon National Service men to bridge the gap between our requirements in trained man-power and what can be provided from the Regular Forces. With National Service limited to twelve months, the gap cannot be bridged. National Service men serving for twelve months can provide only a short period of productive service. In the Army, for instance, bearing in mind the necessary basic period of six months to cover the preliminary corps and unit training and necessary leave periods during service, the men are able to give only three or four months' effective service overseas. In consequence, the usefulness of such men would be confined, generally speaking, to service in the European theatres. Further, owing to the inability of such men to serve overseas in more distant places, it would be necessary to maintain a large proportion of our Regular Forces in such areas, with the result that a very great strain would be thrown upon the Regular training cadres in this country.
With eighteen months whole-time National Service, however, the position will be greatly improved. The accelerated run-down during 1949 will be reduced, and the essential structure of the Services will be maintained. Looking further ahead, we shall be able to build up a force of trained National Service men who, for the last eight, ten, perhaps even twelve months of their service, will be able to assist the Regulars in the performance of their duties, not only here but also overseas. In particular, we shall be able to use a fair proportion of the

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more able and experienced of the National Service men during the latter part of their service to assist in the training of the others and in the administrative tasks associated with it.
Your Lordships will expect me to refer to the Government decision in the Spring of 1947 to fix the period of whole-time service under the National Service Act at twelve and not at eighteen months. At that time the Government were legislating for a situation which would not begin to take effect until 1949, when the National Service Act came into operation. The Government had reason to hope that by that time there would have been some measure of progress in the difficult business of clearing up after the war and approaching a normal, peaceful world structure. Instead, we face a situation caused by the continuous delays and disappointments in settling the final Peace Treaties in Europe, and the failure of the United Nations Organisation to make substantial progress with those questions which would enable us to rely upon collective security for which the peace-loving nations have striven. It has been impossible to obtain agreement upon the many questions the settlement of which is so essential for world peace. Until the period ending mid-1947 there was always a hope that some understanding would be arrived at in the many outstanding matters, but since that time international tension has increased more sharply.
It was hoped that our commitments, and in particular our overseas commitments, would have been reduced to a level at which they could be handled by the Regular Forces, built up during the intervening period, with some assistance in the nearer European theatres from National Service men. These expectations, reasonable as they were at the time, have not, as your Lordships well know, materialised. We still have troops in Austria, Trieste, Greece, Malaya and Germany. In addition there are the Middle East and garrisons in Colonial territories. Indeed, the expectation that our overseas commitments would be reduced during the last eighteen months has not been fulfilled. We are faced with new factors and new problems. The Government, through the Minister of Defence, gave a warning in the debate on May 7, 1947, on the reduction of the period from eighteen months to twelve
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months that if, contrary to our hopes and expectations, the international situation deteriorated, the Government would have to consider their plans in the light of the new situation. Who is there that will deny that a change in the situation has arisen?—so much so that the Government have been compelled to re-examine the present position.
The review of our defence requirements meant an examination of how far our Regular Forces would be able to meet the situation which has developed. Recruitment since the war to the Regular Forces as a whole has been at least as good as it was during the corresponding period after the 1914–18 war, notwithstanding the fact that we have this time had full employment. In the three years since the end of the war, the number of Regular recruits has totalled some 247,000. This figure can certainly stand comparison with the total of 209,000 for the comparable period after the First World War. Satisfactory though the numbers may appear, they are not in themselves good enough, and there are other factors to be taken into account. In the last two or three years there has been a heavy loss of Regulars on completing their normal terms of service. Some 20 per cent. of the Regulars now serving are short-service men who have re-engaged for periods of three or four years. The re-engagements of these men will begin to terminate in the latter part of 1949, and it follows that, during the next few years, the run-down of the regular components of the three Services is likely to be especially heavy.
In 1947, the Government gave proper weight to the economic needs of the country in relation to what were then seen to be the national defence requirements. They estimated that National Service limited to twelve months would enable them to meet their commitments in 1949 and later years. Events have falsified that assumption, and it is now clear that a period of eighteen months is absolutely unavoidable. One object of National Service in peace time is to ensure that as the years pass we shall, by giving training to our young men, secure substantial reserves which, in an emergency, will provide the Forces on which our survival would depend, the vital need being that such Forces should be able to take the field with the

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minimum of delay at the beginning of a war. That is one justification for National Service in peace. The second object is to provide trained men who will be able, during their period of full-time service with the Colours, to assist the Regular component in the discharge of their duties. On January 1, 1949, it is estimated that the total number of Regulars in the three Services will be 410,000. Nobody, I am sure, can maintain that Forces of such a size would meet our present requirements. They have to be supplemented by trained National Service men who can make an effective contribution to our defence. It has been suggested that if the Government had concentrated on attracting sufficient recruits to build up efficient Regular Forces during the last few years, National Service could have been dispensed with. This entirely ignores the value of the National Service man as a Reservist and also, I believe, gives an unreal impression of what could be achieved by increases in pay and other inducements. We have no reason to suppose that, on any reasonable assumption regarding recruitment, our commitments could be met by Regular Forces alone in the next few years.
My Lords, I should now like to say a word about the Service use of manpower, for the charge of misuse has on several occasions been brought, at any rate against the Army. The Army Council has been very conscious that soldiers must be employed to the best advantage, and some time ago they instituted a special inquiry into the soldier's working day. This revealed that in certain instances too little time was being spent in training and too much on military domestic duties and fatigues. It was not the case that the soldier's time was being wasted, but rather that administrative and domestic duties, sometimes not well organised, made too great inroads into time that would ideally be devoted to training. I should make it clear that this situation was found to apply to the home bases, and not to theatres overseas.
In the consideration of this matter, the problems which the Army—and the other Services—have had to face must be fully realised. The enormous demobilisation programme has presented a turn-over of many millions of men and an instability
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that has militated against organisation of the fullest efficiency. Units at home have inevitably had to take numbers of men with insufficient time left to serve to justify their posting, or further posting, to theatres abroad. Lack of suitable accommodation and other factors have meant that such units have had a considerable amount of extra work to do in maintaining themselves. Thus it has come about that numbers of National Service men may be in a unit for only a short time before release, and have tended to be employed on duties in no way connected with training. I can assure your Lordships that the most active steps are being taken in this matter and that the improvement which is already apparent will be accelerated as the condition of stability in which units can be maintained at strength, and officers and men left posted for a reasonable length of time, is neared.
There is another matter to which I would like briefly to refer, before dealing with the remaining clauses of the Bill. That is the very natural and proper anxiety of the young men of this country, and of their parents, employers and schoolmasters, to know as long in advance as possible when they will be called up. I should like to say at once that the Government have every sympathy with this very reasonable desire and, as my right honourable friend the Minister of Labour and National Service said in another place, they intend to do everything they can to meet it. This anxiety is the more natural because it has already been announced in the Defence White Paper, published in February last, that one of the four quarterly registrations of young men for National Service may be omitted in each of the years 1949 and 1950—as it has been this year. The Minister of Defence has confirmed that if it is found in the next few years that the number of National Service men available is greater than the Services can absorb, the Government will adopt this method of dealing with the position. In fact, the numbers of National Service men available are expected to increase from 165,000 in 1949 to 215,000 in 1951, because of expiring deferments of apprentices and students. The omission of a quarterly registration makes three months difference in the date of a man's registration and the age at which he is called up. This adds to the importance of

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letting these men know as early as possible when they are to be called up.
Two Amendments on this point were moved in another place. The first proposed that there should be an upper age limit for call-up not much higher than the age at which the majority of young men are called up; and the second, that at least six months' notice should be given of each registration. The Minister of Labour was unable to accept these Amendments. The first would have had the effect of allowing young men whose call-up was sufficiently delayed to escape call-up altogether as soon as they passed the upper age limit. In the ordinary course there are quite a number of men whose call-up is held up for some weeks, or even for a few months. As regards the second Amendment, while we plan ahead so far as we can reasonably foresee, it would be unsafe to embody a firm rule in the Statute which would make it impossible to adjust dates later on if any change of circumstances were to make this necessary. Some measure of flexibility must clearly be maintained.
The Minister of Labour, however, accepted the spirit of both Amendments and gave two undertakings: first that an announcement giving the programme of registrations as long ahead as possible—he hoped certainly six months and, if practicable, a year ahead—would be made early in the New Year, and that similar announcements would be made thereafter; and, second, that the present period of about three weeks' notice between the announcement of a particular registration and the registration itself would be increased. These assurances were accepted by the Opposition. It is the Government's intention, recognising the desire of the young men to know when they will be called up, to reach decisions sufficiently far in advance to enable good notice to be given of a programme of registrations which would be departed from only in the most exceptional circumstances.
My Lords, the other main provision in the present Bill is the proposal to reduce the length of Reserve service from six to four years. It is contained in Clause 2. The whole position in regard to Reserve service has been examined in the light of the fact that instead of serving whole-time for twelve months National Service men will now serve for eighteen months. This means that when men pass into the
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Reserve they will have attained a higher standard of training than would have been possible after twelve months' service. It has been decided that the interests of the Services as a whole will best be served if the well-trained men whom the eighteen months' period of whole-time service would produce are maintained at a high pitch of efficiency over a period of four years. As noble Lords will realise, the amount of part-lime training during the period of Reserve liability has not been reduced and, therefore, the Services will be enabled to gibe the Reservists refresher training for fifteen days in each of the four years of Reserve service, or to adopt any variant found to be more satisfactory in practice. Admittedly, we shall end up with Reserves smaller in size than under the present Act. On balance, however, it is considered that the defence interests of the country will be better served by this smaller Force of more highly trained Reservists than by the larger number of less well-trained men which the present Act would have produced.
I would mention only very briefly Clause 3 of the Bill, which deals with the age of call-up of registered medical practitioners and dentists. Under the present Act, a doctor or dentist is legally liable to call-up only until the age of twenty-six, unless deferred at his own request, when he may be called up at any time before the age of thirty. Experience has shown that a number of medical students do not qualify before reaching the age of twenty-six and a smaller number of dental students also fail to qualify at that age. The Minister of Labour is therefore now faced with the alternative of calling up a student for general service at the age of twenty-five, just before he has qualified, or of allowing him to pass out of liability for National Service altogether at the age of twenty-six. Lateness in qualifying may be the result of failing in examination, illness or, in the case of doctors, the lengthening of courses—now six or seven years, as against five during the late war. The present clause makes all registered medical practitioners and dentists liable to call-up until they reach the age of thirty and gives the authorities who find doctors and dentists for the Services a little more elbow room to grant deferment of call-up in deserving cases.

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Clause 4 corrects an omission in the National Service Act, 1948. It amends Section 61 of the National Service Act, 1948, which provides that the Act will cease to have effect on January 1, 1954, unless a date is substituted by Order in Council. Unfortunately, owing to an omission when the National Service Acts were consolidated, the Order in Council under this section was not made subject to the affirmative Resolution procedure, with the result that, as the law stands at present, the duration of the Act can be extended by Order in Council without prior Parliamentary consent.
In conclusion, may I say that it is easy to make political capital out of the Government decision to increase the period of National Service from twelve to eighteen months, but the fact is that two of the three Armed Services are in a state of unbalance. The trained war-time Service men have been demobilised. Regular recruits have not come forward in sufficient numbers to take their place. Eighteen months' training will give a better trained Service man, than twelve months, and will provide a better Reservist. We have framed our foreign policy to meet the present world situation; we must now underwrite it with men, money and arms. The powers which were taken in the previous Acts, and which are asked for in this Bill, would not be requested unless the Government were profoundly convinced of their imperative necessity for our defence and protection in the state of the world to-day. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Viscount Hall.)
4.33 p.m.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, let me begin by saying how much I agree with the last words spoken by the noble Viscount opposite. We on these Benches are going to support the Second Reading of this Bill, and we shall do so in the hope that it may bring to a slightly more hopeful ending a chapter in the administration of the Forces which I think, looking back on the history of the Services, is one of the most depressing that I can remember. I believe that one has to go back to the time before the Crimean War to find a state of affairs comparable with the one which has prevailed in the last three years. Therefore, while
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we firmly support the Second Reading of this Bill to-day, we must accompany that support with a warning and an urgent request, as I shall try to explain. We agree entirely with the calculation which the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, gave us in the early part of his speech as to the need for eighteen months. We also agree that this is not the time to make political capital out of the state of the Forces. That is something that we have often said from these Benches. But so much has been said and written lately about National Service (which is the subject of this Bill) that I must ask the House to allow me for a moment or two to summarise the events, as I see them, which have led to the introduction of this Bill.
The noble Viscount, Lord Hall, told us that we should expect him to refer to that back history, and indeed we did. According to my information, when the Government took office in 1945, the Chiefs of Staff and their colleagues in the Service Departments had for some time been working on plans for the post-war organisation of the Forces. They realised that the probable conditions of future wars would not allow us the same period of grace to prepare for battle that we had had in the past. It is also fair to say, I think, that the Chiefs of Staff were doubtful, to say the least of it, whether the international situation would remain good enough in the immediate post-war years to allow of planning on any sort of assumption that a major war could not take place for a given term of years. In that respect, to the best of my belief, in taking the more optimistic view, His Majesty's Government took also a very dangerous view. The fact that the original calculation was for eighteen months and the Government decided on twelve months showed, if one can read between the lines, that they had discarded the more cautious view about the likelihood of the foreign situation improving.
Likewise, I think that the Service Departments planned to build up the Regular Forces as quickly as they could. So far as the Army was concerned, certainly, they planned to make the Auxiliary Forces, the Territorial Army, a real second line of defence. Therefore, when the Government took office they found the Service authorities ready to present them with a strong case that

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National Service was indispensable, and that eighteen months was the period which was necessary. The Service authorities had two main reasons for taking this view. The first was that everybody who might later on be required to serve in the Auxiliary Forces should be trained so that, whereas before the late war no volunteer for the Territorial Army, the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, or anything else, received a proper basic training, everyone this time would have a proper basic training which could be secured only by full-time service.
Secondly, in putting forward National Service, the authorities had the idea—as the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, has mentioned—that the active Forces should be maintained at the required strength, whatever that might be at the time, whether sufficient Regulars could be recruited for the purpose or not. As I say, calculation of the numbers needed gave the figure of an equivalent of eighteen months' service. Furthermore, the Services were well aware that, if this plan for national service was to succeed, there was a strong need to attract sufficient Regulars of the right type, and to rely as little as possible upon National Service men for the active Forces, particularly in what the Americans call the "task forces," such as we now have in Trieste, Malaya and (if I am to believe the papers) Hong Kong. They also realised that, without proper Regular Forces, neither the Reserve Forces nor the National Service men could be given sufficient stiffening and a proper training.
I have missed out a number of important details, but I think that is the outline of the state of affairs as it was found to be in 1945. Despite the passion for planning which was exhibited in other directions—some of which we on these Benches did not consider entirely necessary—nothing at all happened about this until 1947. When I say that nothing happened, I mean that no measure was brought before Parliament to implement this or any other recommendation. So for two years the Services were unable to make any firm plans for the reorganisation of the Forces, and the unfortunate people who were being called up for National Service—and the Regulars, too—were unable to make plans for their careers. During this time a great many opportunities for per
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suading experienced war-time leaders to stay on as Regulars, were missed, and now we are feeling their loss. All the time the international situation was developing in the way that I think the Services had feared, and certainly in the way that we on these Benches feared.
Then, in 1947, the National Service Bill was introduced. That was the original eighteen months' plan. But it was two years late. There was the plan for eighteen months' National Service, Reserve service and, by this time, no Regulars to run it. We all know what happened after that. The eighteen months' period was provided for in the original Bill. We realise that it cannot have been an easy decision for His Majesty's Government to introduce a Bill of that sort. I do not want anybody to think that we minimise the importance of that decision, or the difficulties which must have been felt in taking it. But it was the right decision and it was based, so far as I know, on solid advice. I think His Majesty's Government must have looked for every way of escape before they brought in that Bill, and I do not blame them. They must have thought of the industrial aspect from every conceivable angle, and I do not blame them for that. The noble Viscount, Lord Hall has not mentioned industry to-day, although, if I remember rightly, he did chide me for not mentioning industry in my speech last time.
At this point, in another place, there appeared two armies on the battlefield who joined together in a very curious alliance, because the opposition to National Service comes, I think, from two quite distinct classes of people. There is one class who, according to their reported utterances—I say deliberately, "according to their reported utterances "—do not appear to care whether this country is defended or not. There is another class who think that the country ought indeed to be defended, but that it is a job which can be done by volunteers. As to that I would say only that while I sympathise very much indeed with that point of view what prevents me from agreeing with it is that, as I see it, the whole of the available evidence goes to show that the objective of having a completely volunteer Army equal to the task in hand is quite unattainable, at any rate during the period for which this measure is to operate.

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Therefore, like His Majesty's Government, we feel that National Service is the only answer. Then there was another school of thought (I believe not a very logical one) which seemed to argue that because National Service was not necessary for the Navy and because it was not essential for the R.A.F., therefore the Army—which badly required it for the solution of its man-power problem—should not have it. However, these converging attacks all met in another place, and the result was to go back to the twelve months, on the ostensible ground that industry could not afford it.
My Lords, any plan which deals with manpower on a large scale must necessarily, if it is to work smoothly, be a very delicate and intricately geared plan. The effect of this decision was to take a cogwheel out of this delicate machine and to replace it with another cogwheel which was exactly two-thirds the original size; and everything happened which one would expect to happen to a machine if that sort of thing is done to it. That is the reason (and I think the main reason) why there has been so much bad working and frustration between then and now. I do not think anybody who is not in close touch with the Regular Forces realises all the evils that have flowed from that wrong decision. It has driven the Regular staff nearly out of their wits; it has contributed to the loss of a very large number of valuable officers and noncommissioned officers; but, worse than that, it has made forecasting and manpower planning quite impossible. It has caused postings to be irregular, and changes of plan and organisation far too frequent. One of the results of this, of course, as I have said before in this House, is that the programme of releases has been altered and varied in such a manner as to interfere in a totally unnecessary way with the private lives of a large number of young men to whom one wants to give a purposeful start in life and who, for a number of these reasons, have not had it. Of course, as we must all admit, these alterations in plan, these defects in management, have been responsible for a great deal of frustration and boredom on the part of the soldier himself, as well as for a great deal of waste of good material.
I agree with a good many of the remarks made by the noble Viscount,
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Lord Hall. We should be careful not to listen too much to the "grouser," because the grouser is always news, and the good man who does his duty is never news. Moreover, in my experience—and I have some first-hand experience—a great many of the grouses come from those young gentlemen whose brains and intellect surpass their character and powers of leadership, and who find themselves peeling potatoes when, if they were better leaders, they would have a stripe up. None the less, my Lords, it is not for nothing that people like Mr. Wolfenden, who speaks with great experience as a Headmaster, writes an article in one of the leading Sunday papers and says, in so many words, that the fact is that the National Service man has learned to "scrimshank," and so forth. It is not for nothing that one receives letters from young people in the Army who say that the comment in the article by the Headmaster of Shrewsbury in last Sunday's paper is unfortunately very true—namely that "We spent last week lying on our beds." There it is. We have to get this out of the system. The Regular Army and the other Services cannot do it by themselves. There is a great deal they could do, and if I might offer a word of advice it would be that the Regular officers should take more trouble to get the Regular N.C.O. interested in this matter of dealing with the National Service man. The spotlight has not been quite enough on the sergeant-major; I think it could go there a little more. But nothing can happen until we have better planning, and the Army is working smoothly. The same applies to the other Forces.
Now let us come back to our story, this tale of woe. The international situation was worsening all the time, so much so that in September last we had to take the emergency decision to add three months to the service of those who were serving under the transitional White Paper. And now we come back to 1947 or, as I really think, to 1945—three and a half years late. We cannot put back the clock. A great deal of mischief has been done. Post-war National Service has made a bad start, when it might have made a good one, and we have yet to see evidence that the Government are capable of producing a plan or of sticking to it. There comes to my mind a

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passage from an Army Training Manual which, if I remember aright, said "a moderate plan resolutely carried out is much better than a really good plan weakly executed." That I think is the answer to many of these problems. Any plan would be better than no plan at all. However, in the 1945 plan the Government had a good plan technically.
It was thought out over a long time. In so far as we knew it, we on these Benches thought it was a good plan; and we never ceased to press for it, or for something like it. When it came along in the form of the eighteen months' National Service, we supported it because we were convinced that eighteen months was necessary, and we could see no change in the circumstances which led up to the adoption of the eighteen months or in the calculations given by the noble Viscount. And so we support it now.
But there is still a little more to add than this. There are, as I have said, two reasons for National Service. The first is the need for basic training, so that our Reserves may be in a proper state of readiness, particularly anti-aircraft, signals and so forth. This is an argument for training every man who will be wanted in emergency, and not training merely those required for full-time service. Thus, in so far as people who ought to be trained, are let off, that part of the plan is not working. This is unsatisfactory. The training of every man for the Auxiliary Forces appears likely to be a permanent commitment, but it does not necessarily involve eighteen months' service. The basic Service training does not take that. The argument for eighteen months' service arises from the second basis on which the Bill stands—namely, the need to maintain at the proper strength active Forces of some sort or other. In theory, these Forces need not be National Service men at all—indeed, in a great many cases it would be better that they should be volunteers.
We want to keep our Forces up to strength, not only at home but at overseas stations as well, as the noble Viscount has said. This period of eighteen months is necessary now, but conditions may alter later, and if they do there is no special virtue in that figure, any more than in having compulsory as against voluntary service. In fact, the arguments are in favour of the volunteers. But the
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main argument, and the main reason for National Service, is the paramount need to keep our Forces up to strength in trained men. Therefore, until we can attract volunteers to meet all our needs, then so long must we have National Service for the longer period, and so long shall we support it.
We have not had industry mentioned very much to-day, and in fact industry does not come very much into this as a major issue in regard to the effect upon it of National Service. The needs of industry demand that only the minimum number of men necessary shall be taken for full-time service with the Forces, and whether they are obtained by providing good and attractive conditions for volunteers or by National Service, makes no great difference from the industrial angle. We are concerned to see that there are enough people in the Forces to do the job, and we do not want to see a single man called up who we do not believe is genuinely necessary to do the job. That is the old doctrine which is almost in the British Constitution, of using only the minimum Force required.
If we are to obtain value from this National Service, we must be concerned to see that one or two things happen. First, the National Service man must be properly used and looked after in the Forces. His education must be seen to; and he must be sent back from the Forces with a greater sense of purpose, greater physical fitness and strength of character than when he went in. Secondly, the National Service man must be replaced, to the greatest extent possible, by volunteers. Of course we are concerned to see that the international situation should improve, so that we can get rid of the task Forces which are taking so much of our man-power and locking it up. I say no more about the international situation to-day. There is no doubt in my mind that the key to the first two requirements is the well-being of the Regular Forces, especially—because it has suffered most—the Regular Army.
There are still so many things to be seen to that I could keep your Lordships for a long time if I were to indulge in a recitation of them. But we have told the Government about them many times. They include such matters as proper accommodation, proper terms of service, proper arrangements for married soldiers;

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and, last but not least, a guarantee of employment for the Regular soldier when he leaves the Service—"jobs for the boys," if you like, but in a different context. Whether the National Service man spends a useful time or a boring time in the Forces is a matter which is entirely in the hands of the Regulars; and if the Regulars are not in a good state then the National Service men never can be. But whether the Regular Forces can do their job must depend, in the last resort, on the Government—on the Minister of Defence, and the Secretary of State for War and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. They will have to do much more if the "goods are to be delivered." I wonder whether these Ministers read the newspapers—I suppose the newspapers are right—and, if they do, what they think of the results of "Operation Sunrise." I wonder whether they are satisfied that Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery has sufficient Forces at his disposal to make our contribution to Western Union plans. I shall say no more about these matters to-day because to do so would perhaps be getting away from the Bill. But National Service is intended to improve the efficiency of the Forces, and it will not do so unless the Regular Forces are attended to.
We have been told little to-day about the Territorial Army and the effect of National Service upon it. I agree with the noble Viscount that the training of sixty days is much better concentrated, as it is now, than as it was in the earlier Act. I think the new system is right. But, of course, this decision means a complete recasting of the order of battle. The noble Viscount mentioned several matters relating to the shorter training, and in what he said in that respect I agree with him. But he said nothing whatever about the reconstitution of the order of battle of the Territorial Army which we must have if the total numbers under arms at any one time are cut down so much. There has been nothing said about that, either here or in another place. But, as I say, this does mean a major recasting of the Territorial Army. And once more the unfortunate Territorial units, and the Territorial Associations who are trying to plan and are trying to "deliver the goods," are to be thrown into confusion.
I have spoken most about the Army because the Army are the most concerned.
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I agree with the noble Viscount that at the present time the Navy do not want National Service. I believe that the R.A.F. want National Service with a difference, if the noble Viscount, Lord Portal of Hungerford, who spoke the other day to your Lordships' great delight, is to be listened to. But that is not for me to judge. It seems quite plain, however, that although the eighteen months is the right pattern for the Army, someone has got to get down to do some much more serious thinking in the Ministry of Defence about the adaptations required for National Service for the Navy or the Air Force. We are much too much in the habit now of crying down National Service because, perhaps, it takes more account of the Army's needs and not sufficient account of the needs of the Navy and the Air Force—needs which exist, though in a different form. I have said very little about the aspect of a man's education and the Army. One of the reasons for that is that we shall put down an Amendment in that connection. I have given private notice of this, and I now give the noble Viscount notice in this House. I think it may be convenient to discuss that matter at greater length on the Committee stage.
Subject to that, let me say this about National Service. Let us now try to make it work. Let us stop "cracking down" on National Service for this reason or that. I am convinced that it is necessary and I am certain that it will work. But, equally, do not let us think that merely by passing this Bill we are going to make it work. No such thing is going to happen. We have to get the Regular Forces right, and get them right by active steps. The only thing I am interested in, when it comes to active steps, is whether or not those steps are reflected in the Army Estimates which will come before another place in a month or two. Nothing else matters. Nothing else is important.
We come again to the warning and the requests which I mentioned when I started to speak—and I apologise for having spoken longer than I meant to do. The demands and the warning should be quite plain by now. We want a firm plan and a firm order of battle based on the eighteen months calculation. We want real attention to the state of the Regular Forces, money spent on them, and houses built for them.

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The warning is still more obvious, because even the British Armed Forces, which during their history have suffered so much from some British Governments, will not go on enduring this for very much longer unless the requests we have made are really heeded. Those requests and that warning must form the context into which we would ask the Government to read our support for the Second Reading of this Bill.
5.2 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, the noble Viscount who has just spoken addresses your Lordships on questions of this kind with far more authority than I can bring to bear, but, at the same time, these are questions which concern us all. In all these Service discussions those of us who speak from the Opposition Benches are under a double handicap: first, we do not know what expert advice may have been tendered to His Majesty's Government and consequently whether or not they have accepted it, and secondly, we do not know, except in the most general terms, what the full commitments may be. Perhaps that situation is inevitable, but it is certainly inconvenient. The noble Viscount who moved the Second Reading of the Bill warned us, rightly, against a tendency to make political capital out of Service matters. I accept entirely that ruling as a general principle, but I do not accept it as a bar to any criticism of the policy of the Government on matters of defence, and I am sure the noble Viscount would not urge it to that extent. It can be only a source of disquiet to look back upon the history of this matter and realise the alterations in policy which have taken place on so vital an aspect of defence over the past eighteen months.
I do not propose to follow the matter in any detail—an accurate exposition of it has been given by the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman—but the arguments which the noble Viscount on the Government Bench adduced were surely admirable arguments not only for the extension of the period at this moment to eighteen months, but also for the retention of the eighteen months when the original Bill was before the House. He pointed, a little vaguely, I thought, to the great changes which have taken place in the situation during the intervening period. The only really material change
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I can see is that the Government have changed their minds twice on the same point. It seems to me improbable that their favourite musical composition at the moment is the "1812" Overture. When the original Bill was before the House we were prepared to support it, because we considered that in the then existing international situation there was a case for the continuation of the National Service scheme which was then in operation. We supported it from that angle and not from any inherent love of National Service or any desire to rivet that system on the people of this country in an unwelcome permanence. Many of us took the view that there was an advantage in eighteen months over twelve months, because it was to be hoped that the article which was to be produced by the machine—the trained soldier—would be, if not fully, at least more complete at the end of the extended time.
As regards the present Bill, we are forced to the conclusion that the Government are so deeply committed to the system of National Service that to urge upon them to abandon it now would be asking them to do something which could give only dismay and discouragement to our actual and potential friends abroad, and delight to our potential enemies. Moreover, we cannot ask that one system shall be abandoned before another and more efficient system has been devised to take its place. I read recently that in Costa Rica the whole army had been disbanded at one fell swoop. Costa Rica still has fewer responsibilities than Great Britain, but even there it has turned out that the army had to be somewhat hastily reformed to deal with an insurgent onslaught.
In supporting the Bill, I would add very emphatically this reservation: that, in giving this support, we do not desire to be thought to be content to sit back and watch the Government twiddling their collective thumbs for the five years during which this system is to be in force and making no attempt towards a more efficient substitute. I am one of those who believe still that the ultimate goal is the production of a compact, highly-trained Regular Army on a volunteer basis. That is far more in tune, not only with the strategic requirements and the demands on man-power at the moment, but also with the needs of the high specialisation which mechanisation

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has brought into every aspect of Army training. It may well be that the moment for that has not come and it will take the Government the next five years to bring about that state of affairs, but that is no reason why they should sit back, depending upon their National Service men and making no effort towards attaining that objective.
We were fortified by two hopes, in supporting the original Bill and the present one: the first, that the continuation of the principle of National Service would not conflict with the proper training of the Regular Army; the second, that it would be so conducted that the National Service man would be given adequate training from the outset, and that his enthusiasm and interest would be aroused and maintained throughout his service. I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, that it is not wise to listen too much to the inveterate grumbler. On the other hand, too much evidence reaches us all, not just from irresponsible newspapers or over-educated young gentlemen, but from sober, responsible, public-spirited young men who have gone into the Army with high hopes of serving their country adequately and efficiently during that period but who have only too soon come to be faced by disappointment and disillusionment.
There are those who believe that the first seven formative years are the most important in life. I should think that many of those who have had experience of the training of men would take the view that the first six formative months of service are probably the most important of all. If that period passes with the man being without profitable occupation, the only too likely consequence is that his mind will cease to be receptive to instruction. He will shut his mind against further benefits of widening instruction and training as the service goes on; and he will pass into the Reserve without having a desire to take proper advantage of the later training offered him. Consequently, if the moment comes for his recall, he will return with reluctance to a life in which he had already been disappointed.
As I have said, we shall accept this Bill, but we do so with the profound hope that it is not to endure longer than is necessary, and that, so long as it does endure, those
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who are subject to it will be given a training which makes their experience worth while. The noble Viscount who moved the Second Reading spoke in his last few words of peroration of the provision of money and arms in the service of the country. Nobody will grudge that, if it is put to a good purpose. But the people of the country are entitled to insist that they get full value for their money and fair treatment for their men.
5.13 p.m.
LORD FARINGDON: My Lords, I confess that I have enjoyed to-day's debate considerably more than I had expected. Your Lordships will be aware of my views on this particular subject, and will understand that I naturally did not expect to derive much pleasure from the debate. I have, however, derived most unexpected comfort, if I may say so, from the speeches made by the noble Viscount who spoke on behalf of the Opposition, and by the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, who spoke—well, I suppose he did not speak for the Liberal Party. The position is a little equivocal, as I understand the Liberal Party in the two Houses are somewhat divided in this matter. At any rate, I imagine the noble Marquess spoke for the Liberals in this House. I was particularly encouraged, because both noble Lords said, what I regret the noble Viscount who spoke from our own Benches did not say—namely, that they considered that conscription in peace time was in itself a thing undesirable: they desired that it should last for the shortest possible period; and they urged upon the Government the necessity for building up the Regular Army in order to be able to dispense with conscription. This unanimity of opinion on the part of the two Opposition Parties is to me extremely encouraging and refreshing. I hope—perhaps it will happen before the end of this debate—that a speaker from the Government Benches will express most emphaticaly the same feeling.
I found myself, rather surprisingly, if I may be excused for saying so, very much in agreement with the noble Viscount who spoke for the Opposition. He spoke, and read a quotation from a newspaper, about the unfortunate effects of idleness in the Army. He made suggestions for the occupation of the men, and indicated that some of those occupations should be educational. I would

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like to support that suggestion. One of the main criticisms of conscription has been in regard to its interference with education. Educationalists complain that the young men who are about to be called up lose interest in their work. Industrialists also complain that young men who are undergoing training are disinterested and refuse to co-operate when they expect shortly to be called into the Forces. I dare say the noble Viscount will agree with me that this defect may be made good by educational activity during the man's period of National Service. Incidentally, I would say that I have been deeply depressed by accounts I have received of the deterioration of educational activity in the Services since the end of the war. I may have been incorrectly informed, but whether I have or not, I hope that this activity will be greatly increased in the future.
I did not agree with the noble Viscount, however, in what he said about industry. I suggest to him that, in actual fact, one of the great disadvantages of the conscription system is that it draws everybody out of industry for a certain period with a very dislocating effect, but not the same effect as is caused by taking a man into Regular service. The noble Viscount made the point that the length of service is not a question of the training of the men, but is really a point related to the total size of the Forces. I imagine that he will agree that it might be possible again to cut down the period from the point of view of training, but only if the Armed Forces were of a sufficient size for their defence service. I hope I have made myself clear. The noble Viscount stressed that in order to get additional men in the Regular Forces it was essential that conditions should be improved; and I gather that he was supported in that opinion by everybody on the Opposition Benches. The noble Marquess, Lord Reading, said exactly the same thing. It is a point that was made in another place: that one of the great defects of this conscription system is that it does allow those responsible for the defence Forces to sit back; it is the easy way out. I believe that both Houses of Parliament will have to watch carefully to see that in fact the Minister of Defence does the job that we all imagine he was appointed to do but which quite clearly he has not yet done. Indeed, that is the reason why we are in our present position and why
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the Government are asking for an increase in the length of service.
I am not going over all the general arguments against conscription. I and others have made them in your Lordships' House before; they have also been made at length in another place. The objections against this Bill are, in fact, the same objections that many of us voiced against the original Bill, and I will not stress them again. This is a Bill merely to amend the original Act, and it certainly makes it more objectionable; but, still, it is not in essence a different Bill, and the arguments against it have already been put forward. To some of us it is not only distressing, but surprising that this Bill has reached your Lordships' House at all. His Majesty's Government have in effect "steam-rollered" this Bill through another place, and with the support of the Opposition will do the same in your Lordships' House. I rise to voice a warning which has in effect been already voiced by both previous speakers: that the people of this country will not support indefinitely a system of conscription.
His Majesty's Government are, I believe, under some delusion in this matter. The Minister of Defence in another place said that it was essential that this measure should go through with consent. I think he overrates the amount of consent in the country. It has been accepted because the people of this country as a whole believe that they have elected their own Government, a Government in which they took personal pride and for whose judgment they were prepared to undergo hardships, or at any rate inconveniences, which possibly they would not have undergone for another Government. I believe that the opposition in the country to this measure would have been much greater if either of the other two Parties had tried to enforce it.
Now I speak really to my friends on these Benches. This feeling will not continue indefinitely, and I fear that there is amongst the Government an excessive complacency: I do not believe that they are aware of the depth of feeling to the extent they should be. They received very half-hearted and comparatively small support from their own Party when this Bill was going through another place. Not only is the support

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half-hearted in the Parliamentary Party, but it is less than half-hearted in the country as a whole. The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, speaking in your Lordships' House the other day, stated most emphatically—I do not know whether he was so emphatic because he was whistling in the dark—that the Opposition speaker was wholly wrong when he said that the Labour Party was not behind the Government in their foreign policy. I am not going into the details of foreign policy, but I am afraid I entirely agree with the Opposition speaker. It is clear that there is a considerable anxiety in the Labour Party about foreign policy, and the Government had better be aware of it. If they are not, they will be made aware of it, particularly when the country comes to appreciate the inconvenience to which it is being put owing to conscription, because the people will be under no delusion that it is the Government's foreign policy which makes this conscription measure necessary.
A NOBLE LORD: No.
LORD FARINGDON: Oh yes, it is; there is no doubt about that at all. While they may be ignorant about foreign policy, when they come to appreciate it in their own personal experience, then the opposition will become very great. I do not believe that the people of this country—and the Government had better take warning—will ever vote for "Guns before butter."
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: Before the noble Lord sits down, may I be certain that he is quite clear about what I said? I said that although volunteering was the ideal state, unfortunately I saw no hope of being able to rely only on volunteers for a very long time, and, therefore, we supported this Bill.
LORD FARINGDON: I quite appreciate that the noble Viscount said he did not see any alternative, but I understood him also to say that he would prefer a volunteer Army.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: If it is possible; but it is not.
5.24 p.m.
LORD WILSON: My Lords, may I be permitted to echo the support which has
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been expressed by the noble Lords who have preceded me as to the decision of His Majesty's Government to extend the National Service period to eighteen months. I can say with confidence that the feeling in the Regular Army is one of satisfaction, in that it feels that the extra period will allow it to produce better results than could be achieved in the shorter period. A higher and better standard of training will be attained, especially as regards specialists and technicians, who, as your Lordships are aware, play a very important part in any field unit of to-day. The one-year period was too short. Before a soldier could be started in his proper training programme, time had to be allowed for fitting him out, inoculation shots, moves overseas, embarkation leave and so on; and, at the end of his period, similar deductions had to be made for getting him home and releasing him to the Reserve.
The extra period will allow the National Service man to be sent further afield to join units where the weather conditions are more suitable for training, thus counteracting the time spent in journeys. Training is to be progressive and cumulative. The longer period now available without interruptions will have enhanced value, and the standard reached by the National Service man on joining the Reserve will exceed in proportion the 50 per cent. extended period of service. It is also hoped that benefits will accrue psychologically from the extra length of service. In this I endorse the remarks of the noble Viscount and the noble Marquess who have preceded me, because under the one year's service the time a young soldier spent with his unit was too short, and he never absorbed properly the atmosphere of a regiment, with all its traditions. One hears of these young men counting the days to their release, rather as schoolboys count the days to the end of term and the next holidays. The longer period will give them a better chance to settle down, and to appreciate the robust and hearty side of Army life which is rarely advertised, so much ventilation being given to the disgruntled and psychopathic side which, unfortunately, makes news to-day. It is thereby expected that if these men come to appreciate Army life, and what it stands for, they will be encouraged to continue either in the Regular Army or the Territorial Army.

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This is a point in relation to the effect of this extension on the Regular Army to which I would like to call your Lordships' attention. A heavy strain will be placed on units as regards the provision of instructors and the maintenance of interior economy. I am sure your Lordships will agree that to get the best out of these young soldiers a well-run and happy unit is essential. Already, under the one-year programme, units in Germany have begun to feel the pinch in relation to their Regular establishment. With increased and extended training, this strain will increase and, if steps are not taken to rectify matters, discredit will fall upon those responsible. These establishments for the Regular Army require careful scrutiny to ensure that they allow a unit to function administratively and properly.
The young soldier must have the best feeding possible, according to the present-day ration scale—incidentally, the recruit joining to-day does not put on weight as he did in the past. He must live in clean and well-kept barracks with proper amenities. The standard he experiences greatly affects his morale. If the Regular establishments fall so low that, owing to sickness, transfers and other casualties, a Regular soldier has to do three men's jobs, the result is bound to make itself felt. There arises a situation in which the young soldier, who should be progressing towards a higher standard of training, is put on to work which has nothing to do with that training. Your Lordships may have seen last week a cartoon in a famous weekly paper about a soldier's life and the effect of this extension. I personally do not think that it is such a bad thing for a young soldier to peel potatoes now and again; it makes him feel that there is some domestic life in barracks—one might say, perhaps, that it gives him a "home from home" outlook. But I do feel that when he writes home to his parents, and they start complaining, a false impression of Army life is created. I do not wish to detain your Lordships longer, but I would ask the noble Viscount who is to reply whether he will represent to the Minister responsible for the Army the necessity for maintaining adequate establishments in the Regular Army, so that the success of the higher standard of training, which deserves full support, shall not be prejudiced.
5.32 p.m.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords the ground has been so well covered by high military authority that I shall add only a few words; but this Bill is so important both in itself and in its wider implications that I think I ought to add those words. Let me at the outset apologise to the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Admiralty that I missed a part of his speech. Unfortunately I placed too much faith in our railways, and my train (we now say "my train" with a new significance) was ratter late, and that deprived me of the opportunity of hearing the first ten minutes or so of the noble Viscount's speech. While I am speaking of the unfortunate risks of travel, may I assure the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon—if I do not intrude unduly—that I feel fairly confident that the Government Front Bench know who are the fellow travellers on their train!
We support the Bill, but, frankly, we support it in a fog—that is an appropriate word in view of what we have experienced recently—and it is a fog engendered by the Government. I do not think we can consider this Bill intelligently apart from the general strategic position and the consequent needs of the Services. It will, I believe, be universally agreed that the object of enlistment, whether it be voluntary or compulsory, is to raise and train and have in being adequate Forces in the three Services; and the numbers recruited and the length of service must depend upon the character and the size of the Forces required. That, in its turn, must depend as to number and priority upon whatever is the overall plan.
At the end of 1947 the Government, after mature consideration, said that they regarded an eighteen months' period of conscription as essential. Presumably—indeed we know, for we were told so—that statement was based on a careful assessment of the international situation, of the size and character of the Forces required, and in accordance with a plan worked out by the Committee of Defence—a plan designed to meet an immediate and urgent need. Indeed, the plans for all three Services must have been based on that. Yet, within a few days of that carefully-prepared and fully-justified plan, the Minister of Defence—on in

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structions —ran away. All Service plans must have been frightfully dislocated, if not frustrated. More than a year was lost, and now the Government—and let us give them credit for it—return to the charge and say that a period of eighteen months is essential. They are, in fact, doing now what they were convinced was right and necessary a year ago. We shall support them for that reason—though frankly I, in common with those who have spoken from these and other Benches, find it impossible to follow and, indeed, to understand what are the great changes which have taken place in the situation (not in the Labour Party, for I do not know what changes have taken place there, but in the world situation or the Service situation) which make this alteration necessary. It is surely a false argument to say that an entirely new international situation has arisen. Everything that unhappily confronts us in the international situation to-day—
VISCOUNT ADDISON: It is a situation which continues.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: Of course it continues. But my complaint is that the situation should have been, and, indeed, must have been, plain to the Government eighteen months ago. In fact, the theme of speeches of members of the Government is that in spite of all they do, the situation remains so intractable. But it has not suddenly become intractable. The whole situation with which we are faced is a situation which must have been completely foreseen eighteen months ago and more, as one against which it was necessary to take effectively deterrent precautions there and then.
All this was known when the eighteen months' period of conscription was first introduced—and abandoned. I am not much impressed when I am told by the Minister of Defence—and I do not think the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, emphasised this quite so much—that the eighteen months' period has suddenly become necessary because men must serve overseas. Men were serving overseas eighteen months ago. As a matter of fact, I suppose there were more people having to serve overseas when the eighteen months' plan was produced than there are to-day. It is true that, in spite of what
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the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, said recently of the placidity of the situation in Burma and of the Government's surprise (why the Government were surprised, nobody else knows) when the Communists, having failed to get what they wanted without fighting, started fighting, we had to send a division or so out there. But eighteen months ago, there were masses of troops in Palestine, and the number who had to serve overseas was greater than or at least as great as it is to-day.
It is not as if there had been something in the nature of a ten-year rule or an x-year rule which had come to an end, either by effluxion of time or the decision of the Government. On the contrary, the Government spokesman said in another place—and I think here, too, for the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, gave me a most emphatic assurance in a recent Defence debate—that never had the Government been so foolish as to contemplate a ten-year rule, or any rule at all. Therefore, there cannot be a sudden change in the foreign situation and a sudden abandonment of an x-year rule. But, if that is so, if there were no year rules and no instruction had been given to the Service Departments that they had so much time in hand, what is the corollary? The corollary of that, surely, is that there was a need for preparedness which was equally present and equally imperative last year—and, indeed, last March, which was actually the date of the retreat. Even now we are left in anxious doubt as to whether there is any overall plan, or any real plan, of what the Army is to be. The speeches which we have heard, and more particularly those in another place, which I have read, leave me floundering on this point.
Surely two things are certain. I do not think that this can be said too often, or too emphatically, because these are the "things which belong unto our peace." The first is that the effective deterrent of war—and that is what is vital—is to be so prepared that the aggressor will be deterred from aggression. The second point, which is equally certain, is that if war comes the impact will be vast and immediate; and there will be no time to plan. That applies to us, as it applies to other countries. I was reading again only to-day the amazingly wise Report by Mr. Finletter, who is now the representative of American Aid in this

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country. This is the most masterly document on air strategy that I have ever read. I warmly recommend to those of your Lordships who have not read it (I believe that copies are available in the Library) Mr. Finletter's masterly report to the President of the United States on air strategy, under the title Survival in the Air.
Mr. Finletter says that if there is one lesson which the United States must have learnt from the last war, it is that never again would any aggressor allow the United States time to bring their vast industrial machine into play. From that he argues—and I think the whole of his strategic conception has been largely adopted by the American Defence Departrnents—that that means the most rapid expansion and immediate preparation in the air. Both those factors—the need of the deterrent and the certainty that there will not be time—were equally true and apparent two years ago. Both require an overall strategic plan, embracing the three Services and according the necessary priorities. Without such an overall strategic plan, the Defence Minister, the Service Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff cannot convert into terms of man-power and material the powers in this Bill, which will so soon become an Act. Chopping and changing make it impossible for the Services to plan, train and operate.
So much for the general. It is on the general that the particular depends. Other speakers have dealt effectively with particular matters. I wish to refer to two only. The first thing I would say is this—and it is not only criticism of the past; this matter is so serious that I am sure we all want to be constructive in the present. Certainly the Government cannot complain of the support that they have received from us in this matter. I think the necessary "key" men should have been kept, if need be by means of special pay. These "key" men are essential in the highly technical Services. A few weeks ago your Lordships listened with deep interest to Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Portal of Hungerford speak of the changes in the Air Force since he was a boy. He spoke of the little machine that a carpenter had been able to keep going. The bomber of to-day is infinitely more complex than even those great bombers, such as the Lancaster, and so on, which it was my
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privilege to lay down and which operated during the whole of the Second World War. Those "key" men are essential to keep such a force in being.
When dealing with the Air Force, do not let us ever forget that the whole situation has changed. Defence to-day is not as it was when we won the Battle of Britain with our brilliant fighters, fighter pilots and Radar. They will not now be sufficient. I say advisedly that I am quite convinced that to-day both the effective deterrent and the first line of defence lie in an adequate bomber force, prepared for immediate action and able to operate a long way from this country to put out of action enemy bases before they have time to advance. That is at once the deterrent and the first line of defence. I am worried about one thing. I should not have said this but for the fact that I have seen so much in the papers about it, though naturally I was not unaware of it. We must all be worried, by what we have heard from this recent exercise, about our ability—I will not say more—to put such a bombing force into action, even for an offensive defence much closer to our shores than, please God, they would be operating if we ever came to the misfortune and disaster of war. Therefore, those "key" men ought to be kept, and kept if necessary by special pay. I know the difficulties. It can be done by giving people extra rank. After all, there is nothing new about grading people, both in rank and in pay, by their proficiency, and particularly their high technical proficiency, with which must go long service, because it takes a considerable time to reach such a proficiency.
We were told—and I do not think we dissented from it—that when it was necessary to get men into the mines there must be every kind of special facility afforded to them—special pay, which nobody grudges them; special food—
VISCOUNT HALL: Special pay?
VISCOUNT SWINTON: Greatly increased pay for the mines. One of the boasts of the Government is that the miners' pay has risen so much.
VISCOUNT HALL: No; the noble Viscount did mention "special pay." I assume that he thought that special pay was paid to those men who were sent into the mines.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: No. I am much obliged to the noble Viscount for interrupting me. I did not mean that. What I meant was—it is common ground—that when it was necessary to attract recruits for the mines, it was said, both for those who were in the mines and for recruits, that special inducements were necessary. I am not saying this should be done just to attract new men. Indeed, my charge against the Government is that they let these highly expert men go. That is what was most wrong about it. If the Government wanted to keep the Air Force effectively in being, they ought never to have allowed these men to go; a Minister of Defence worth his salt would have brushed the Treasury aside in this matter. Where our lives are at stake, we cannot have this matter settled by Treasury clerks with slide rules. These things are much too serious, and I will give the noble Lord every possible support in relation to that. But what I said was that, when it came to recruiting for the mines, the pay of those miners who were there, and of the new entrants coming in, was raised; new amenities were given; special food, I think, was given; and they had a few extra things put into the shops. I am not complaining about that, but if it was necessary and desirable for the mines, it is really much more necessary when we come to what is the vital insurance of our defence.
In matters of that sort it is not a case of what we can afford, but whether we can afford not to have it. In certain things the priorities are absolute; and in the first line of defence, the offensive Air Force, the priority should be absolute. It is one of the things we cannot afford to do without. My Lords, in this fog it is not surprising that there has been some misuse of man-power. The Minister of Defence has admitted it, and the First Lord has admitted it again to-day. The Secretary of State for War said in another place that after the first four months of good initial training there was a steady deterioration. I must say that that, coming as it did from that quarter, shocked me.
But he went on to say—and this surprised me even more—that a great deal of this waste of time and man-power could be avoided by a few labour-saving devices, and he cited as an example the potato-peelers. The Field Marshal under whom I had the privilege of serving in
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the 1914–18 war (and we were associated again in the last war) said that potato peeling gave a homely touch. That rather reminded me of the story with which he may be familiar, that of the farmer who put a prize bull to a plough. When he was reproved for so doing, and was told that that was not what the bull was meant for, the retort made by the farmer was that he was going to teach the beggar that life was not just all pleasure. Possibly a certain amount of potato peeling is desirable, but I should have thought that if we are spending £300,000,000 or more on the Army we could have got a few automatic potato-peelers and labour-saving devices. That does not seem to me to be a difficulty.
The other thing, I want to say is this. Even now I am by no means clear (I do not know whether my colleagues are) at what age men are to be called up. There still seems to be great uncertainly about this. In this matter of conscription, when we are dealing with young men at a critical time of their lives, and when their education and their whole future may be affected, the machine must be human. I think there is a great danger in increasing these deferments, and I hope it will not be done more than is absolutely necessary. Certainly there is risk of unfairness, and it will make the whole system very unpopular if people are left in uncertainty, and men with their education before them do not know whether they are to be called up at nineteen, twenty or twenty-one. It certainly would be very wrong to leave them in uncertainty until they get to twenty-three or twenty-four. I hope that my mind will be set at rest on that.
I would have said that the right course would be to have a reasonable estimate—a liberal estimate if you like—of the intake required from the age group of each year and, having fixed that, to take in that number at the normal age; but people should not be left in uncertainty from year to year.
I have spoken for longer than I meant to, but the subject is one of very grave importance, and our anxiety is to get together on this and to do the right thing. The Government will appreciate that we are critical because we are anxious that there is not this overall plan. We shall support the Bill because we believed that it was necessary a year ago, and we

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believe it is necessary to-day for exactly the same reasons that made it necessary then. We do support it, however, with great disquiet as to whether, even now, the Government have an overall plan—or indeed any plan at all—and I think we shall probably have to return in a more far-reaching debate to those wider aspects of defence.
5.57 p.m.
VISCOUNT HALL: My Lords, it would be ungracious on my part if at the outset I did not say how much I appreciated the very constructive speeches which have been made by those of your Lordships who have taken part in this debate. Of course, I expected a little ragging. I expected a little more from the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, but I may remind him that he and I have been long enough in Governments to know that it is not left to one Government alone to change its mind. We can from time to time, because of certain events; but this afternoon, no.
The main theme which has been running through the speeches is that of the importance of seeing that the young men who are called up under the National Service Acts are properly employed and properly taken care of. I entirely agree with everything that has been said in that regard, and I was very impressed with all that fell from the lips of the noble Marquess, Lord Reading. We, who are charged with looking after the Services at the present time, have a great responsibility to the youth of this country. As has been rightly said, we take them at their most impressionable age. To many of them it is a case of being made or unmade. I am pleased to think that, speaking for my own Service—and I am not going to hold that Service up in any way as a pattern for the other two Services—there has not been, as far as I know (and I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, of this) any deterioration in the educational service. I will certainly convey to my other two colleagues and the Minister of Defence the remarks made by those of your Lordships who have spoken to-day on the imperative need for an eye to be kept on the conditions under which young men serve, in relation to their work, their accommodation, their protection, and the facilities which must be provided to ensure their healthy recreation. I have
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no complaint at all in relation to what has been said about that matter.
With regard to the point about calling-up which was made by the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, I deliberately dealt rather fully with that in my opening speech, for it is so important. I will just repeat what I said as to the form it takes. We have already deferred for three months one call-up this year. As a result these young men, instead of being called up at eighteen years of age, are being called up at eighteen years and three months. For every deferment, there is a delay of three months, and, as my right honourable friend the Minister of Labour mentioned when the Bill was before another place, there may possibly be two or three deferments during the course of the next two or three years. He said that he could give no guarantee. If there were two next year, that would mean raising the age of call-up from eighteen years and three months, which it is at the present time, to eighteen years and nine months. If there should be another deferment in the following year—that is in 1950—the call-up age would become nineteen years only. So the noble Viscount need have no apprehension that the call-up age will reach 21, 22 or even 23 years.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: And you will let them know as long as possible in advance?
VISCOUNT HALL: I have repeated the assurance given by my right honourable friend in another place in relation to that matter. As the result of the assurance which he gave, two Amendments which had been put upon the Order Paper were withdrawn.
May I make the position of the Government quite clear in relation to the functions of the National Service men? It cannot happen—indeed I think anyone would be very stupid to assume that it could—that the National Service men could take the place of the Regular Service men. They just cannot do it. The noble and gallant Field-Marshal, whom I was delighted to hear speak—and who made such a practical and constructive speech—put his finger right on the point, as did also the noble Viscount. You just cannot train in eighteen months the type of man required for our technical set-up in the Forces at the present time. Indeed, they must have much more than eighteen

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months—a very much longer period. To refer once again to the Service over which I have the honour to preside at the present time, I may say that that is why in the old days those who arranged the intake into the Royal Navy decided to catch boys young, because, even under the conditions which then prevailed, that was the only way that the requisite training could be given. It was necessary to get boys young, not only to give them the right background but also to give them the knowledge which is so essential. How much more important is that to-day!
The noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, who himself played such an important part in the build-up of the pre-war Air Force, compared the present day aeroplanes with those which existed before 1939. As we all know, there is a tremendous difference in the bomber and the fighter compared with the models which existed eight or ten years ago. Again, ships at the present time are very different from those which were considered to be absolutely up-to-date only a comparatively few years ago. A notable example of this is to be found in the aircraft carrier. Unless there are apprenticeships for a very long period, it is quite impossible to train men up to a standard when they can be entrusted with the responsibility of looking after those very valuable and important instruments of defence. We shall have to pay close attention to this question of training and to the retaining in the Services of the best type of man for purposes of that kind.
The noble Viscount, in the course of his speech, in effect said more than once: "Why did you not keep the trained men?" That is so easy to say, but so difficult to do! Quite a substantial number of the Regular Service men were anxious to get out into civilian life. National Service men were most anxious. Nothing would retain them. I am sure that noble Lords will not complain about changes which have taken place. Some of your Lordships are not unaware of the changes which have taken place in relation to the pay of Service men to-day compared with the rates which were paid even during the period of the war, or those in 1938 and 1939, or again, those in 1931 and, indeed, 1922, when the cost of living was very different. There was the new pay code of 1945
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and 1946; and the new increases which have been made recently are an indication that the Government have done all they possibly can in the way of offering inducements.
I am not suggesting that everyone in the Services is getting the amount of pay which he would like, but I should like to tell your Lordships of an interesting experience which I had a week or so ago when I was in H.M.S. "Vanguard." I was very anxious about the effect of the recent announcement of new rates of pay, particularly as they affected single officers. I spent some time in the "Vanguard," I met sixty or seventy officers, and we had absolutely frank discussions concerning the new pay conditions. Now, although the officers I spoke to were a mixed lot in the sense of some being married and some being single, there was general agreement on the increase which had been given by way of marriage allowance. It was remarkable what a fine spirit was shown by the single officers in speaking of that matter. They said: "You have done the best thing that could be done by increasing marriage allowances to the point to which you have now raised them."
It must be borne in mind that if young men have no desire for a Service life they will not stay in one of the Services. It may be that some new method will have to be adopted—the result of this debate and the suggestions which have been made can only be helpful. The great importance of training and retaining men for the highly technical work involved is not a problem which affects only one Service. Possibly the technical side of the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy may make greater demands than the technical side of the Army, but, nevertheless, trained technicians are needed in the Army. We cannot train these men, give them three, four or five years' training and then release them without trying to induce them to stay for a longer period—it may be seven years or twelve years, or, indeed, if possible, to give life service, in just the same way as an officer is trained to give a life of service to whichever branch of the Forces he goes. These highly trained technicians must be trained in the same way.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: I apologise for interrupting the noble Viscount. I

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am very glad to hear his last words. I am afraid that I did not make my original point quite clear. When releases began in 1945, a large number of potential Regulars were lost because, at that time, terms of service for Regular soldiers had not been announced.
VISCOUNT HALL: I do not think there is any difference between us with regard to the general principle of the extension of the period of time, or, indeed, regarding the need for the use of the men who come under that period.
The noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, wanted to warn the Government of certain things which he said were happening not only in the Party but in the country. There are other members of the Labour Party who go out into industrial areas and take soundings, so to speak, with a view to ascertaining the reaction of the public to the Government's policy—and, indeed, to ascertain the reaction of our own colleagues. I must say, as one who has been a member of the Party for a very long period, that I have found little evidence of reaction against the principle of conscription at the present time. The fact that there has been a change to the extent that the period of National Service has been altered from twelve months to eighteen months has created some difficulty, but not all that difficulty which the noble Lord fears.
Then my noble friend complained that I did not say that I hoped conscription would not be continued any longer than necessary. I will give him that assurance, if it is necessary. The Act itself provides that if the Government are satisfied that it should be discontinued at any time within the period of five years, it can be done by an affirmative Resolution of Parliament. But, of course, the Act itself is limited to five years. I do not think there is anything more for me to say, other than to express again to the House my gratitude for the helpful suggestions which have been made and for the reception which your Lordships have given to the Bill.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

PRIZE BILL
6.11 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Viscount Hall.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
[The LORD KERSHAW in the Chair]
Clauses 1 to 3 agreed to.
Clause 4 [His Majesty's forces to which this Act applies]:
VISCOUNT HALL VISCOUNT HALL moved to add to the clause:
"(3) Persons who during the late war were members of the Royal Artillery and served as such in any ship or vessel for the purpose of defending it against enemy attack shall be deemed for the purposes of section two of this Act to have been members of His Majesty's naval forces to which that section applies."
The noble Viscount said: This Amendment becomes necessary by reason of the decision, following the discussion in another place and the promise which I made on the Second Reading of the Bill in your Lordships' House, to admit to entitlement members of the Maritime Regiment, Royal Artillery, who manned the guns in defensively equipped merchant ships. I should explain that no Amendment is required in respect of members of the Royal Navy or the Royal Marines who performed similar services since they are already covered in the Bill under Clause 2 (1). Your Lordships will realise, however, that the draft Royal Proclamation will need to be amended in respect of them.
The Amendment refers to members of the Royal Artillery and not to the Maritime Regiment exclusively, because a number of gunners performed the type of service in question in merchant ships before the Maritime Regiment was formally constituted. The effect of deeming members of the Royal Artillery to be members of the Naval forces to which Clause 2 of the Bill applies will be that they will be able to Participate in the Prize Scheme on exactly similar terms—that is to say, past and present members who served in the merchant ships, in order to defend them against enemy attack, will be covered and in the case of their death any entitlement they had earned will pass to their representatives.

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A further Amendment to the Royal Proclamation will, of course, be necessary in order to bring the soldiers completely within the scheme. The Royal Proclamation will also be suitably amended in respect of persons killed or losing their lives at sea from causes attributable to their service. I think this carries out my undertaking, with the exception of commodores of convoys, who will be likewise covered by amendment to the draft Royal Proclamation. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 36, at end insert the said new subsection.—(Viscount Hall.)
LORD TEYNHAM: We are certainly grateful to the noble Viscount for this Amendment. I am sure it will be very well received by all officers and men in the Royal Navy. I understand from what the noble Viscount has said that commodores of convoys and their staffs, and also air pilots, will be included by amendment to the Royal Proclamation.
VISCOUNT HALL: Yes, by amendment to the Royal Proclamation.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 4, as amended, agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
House resumed.
Then, Standing Order XXXIX having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of December 9), Bill reported with an Amendment; Bill read 3a, with the Amendment, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

PETWORTH (FITTLEWORTH) HOUSING CONFIRMATION ORDER, 1948
Report by the Chairman of Committees of the House of Lords and the Chairman of Ways and Means in the House of Commons under Section 3 of the Statutory Orders (Special Procedure) Act, 1945, that no Petition has been presented against the Order: Laid before the House (pursuant to Act); and ordered to lie on the Table.
House adjourned at eighteen minutes past six o'clock.