Lords Sitting of 7 April 1948

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers.

INDIAN SERVICE PENSIONS.
2.35 p.m.
EARL WAVELL EARL WAVELL rose to call attention to the failure of His Majesty's Government to secure for Europeans of British parentage and domicile, serving in the Central or Provincial governments of India on August 15, 1947, the right to retire on proportionate pension; and to bring forward the claim of a particular group of ex-Service clerks to similar terms of proportionate pension and compensation as have been already announced for members of the I.C.S. and British personnel of the Indian Army; and to move for Papers. The noble and gallant Earl said: My Lords, I rise to move the Motion standing in my name calling attention to the position of certain classes of persons of British birth and domicile serving in India or Pakistan, who, because they do not technically belong to the Secretary of State's services, have been refused the just and generous terms which have been granted by the Government to those services—that is, to the officials of the Indian Civil Service, the officers of the Indian police, and the British personnel serving with the Indian Army. All those classes have been compensated. Those for whom I speak include men serving in subordinate positions in the provincial police forces, men in the secretariats of the Central Provinces, in the forestry branch, on the railways and in similar positions. These men are, so to speak, the rank-and-file of the British services in India, of which the former Secretary of State's services represent the officer class. The officer class have been fully and generously compensated, whilst the rank-and-file are left to shift for themselves. That, I submit, is not in accordance with British tradition.
There is a special class of men—namely ex-Service clerks serving in the Central Government—who, by reason of the
1160
manner in which they were recruited and the inducements then held out to them, have, I consider, as good a claim as any of the Secretary of State's services to proportionate pension and compensation for loss of career. I will deal with their case in some detail later on. The main claim of all the men for whom I speak—and I know, from correspondence I have received, that I speak on behalf of men who are suffering from a deep sense of injustice and resentment—is that the Government should agree to underwrite their claim for proportionate pension for the service they have already rendered, should they be compelled or wish to leave the service of India or Pakistan before completing the statutory period for pension. For some of them there is also a claim to be compensated for loss of career, and in regard to all of them there is obviously an obligation on the Government to try and find further employment for them when they return home.
I will not take up your Lordships' time by expatiating on the work these men have done or the services they have rendered to India and to the Commonwealth. I am confident that your Lordships recognise that these people (many of whom are ex-soldiers and, therefore, have a double claim on their country) have worthily upheld the traditions of their race, and have done great service to the Commonwealth. They are the best type of men, without whom we should never have reached our position as a nation or been able to maintain our independence and freedom—men with a spirit of adventure and boldness, who accept service in distant lands in conditions of difficulty and often danger. I am sure that it will be repugnant to your Lordships that they should receive less than fair treatment from the Government of their country. It is only because strong and urgent representations, oft repeated by those in the best position to know what these men have done and to judge of their worth and claims, have met with no response from His Majesty's Minister, that I felt compelled to bring the matter to the attention of this House.
I will not trouble your Lordships with any details of the representations that have been made in official and unofficial correspondence, and by question and answer both in this House and in another

1161
place. I will try to summarise as briefly as possible, and I hope not unfairly, the position which the Government have adopted. They say, in effect, "We recognise the good service given by these men, and we admit their claim to proportionate pension for the service they have done, but their contracts were with the Government of India as it then was, or with the Provincial Governments as they then were, and not with the Secretary of State as he then was. We therefore admit no responsibility for them. They must press their claim with the new Governments of India and Pakistan, and, in due course, when we negotiate a general settlement with those Governments, we will do what we can to support their claims."
My Lords, it is now over a year since the claims of these people were first urged on the Government, and it is nearly a year since terms were granted to the Secretary of State's services, yet nothing appears to have been done on behalf of these men. I submit that the attitude of the Government, though it may be legally correct—and I am not even sure of that—is not a human attitude, it is not a generous attitude, and it is not a worthy attitude for a British Government. Here I would refer to rather an odd thing. When this matter was last raised in another place, the only reaction of the Government was to give terms to another class of highly paid officials—Judges—while continuing to neglect the claims of the lower classes for whom I now speak. These men are our own people, for whom we are responsible. They are the life-blood of a healthy nation, the men who are the living representatives of the rank-and-file of that great body of adventurous, self-sacrificing, eager men who made and kept British peace and British justice in India for 150 years. Surely it will be a blot on our record if they are allowed any longer to continue in a state of uncertainty, in anxiety for the future of themselves and their families and smarting under a sense of deep injustice.
I put a question in this House some weeks ago with regard to these men, and the Government's reply was that they agreed that the men had a right to proportionate pension if their conditions of service changed. Two questions arise out of that. First, will the Government undertake to underwrite their pension—which the Government admit is their due
1162
—in the same way as they have done in the case of the more fortunate classes ill the Secretary of State's services? In that case the Government went beyond their legal contract with the services—and quite rightly. But, having done so, how can they take up a purely legal attitude towards these other men? Secondly, who are to be the judges of whether the conditions have altered to the disadvantage of these people? I say, and I think the majority of your Lordships will agree with me, that the conditions have already altered and that they are changing rapidly. I would like to call your Lordships' attention to a statement made by the Government on April 30, 1947, to justify the grant of terms to the Secretary of State's services. This is what was said:
" They—
that is His Majesty's Government—
" feel that there is a radical difference in the effect which the transfer of power will have upon the position of European and Indian officers respectively. The former will no longer be serving under the ultimate control of the Parliament of their own country and it cannot be maintained that their prospects will be the same as in the past."
Surely that applies to the lower class of officials as well as to the higher; surely it is wrong that the officer class should be compensated and that the rank and file should be neglected.
I will give your Lordships a few examples of how those conditions have changed and are changing. I would make it clear that I do not for a moment question the good faith of the present Governments of India and Pakistan, who have offered to continue the services of these men under the same conditions as regards pay, leave and the eventual right to a pension on competing the statutory term of service. I am quite sure that those Governments will carry out their obligations, so far as lies in their power. But there are matters which have obviously changed—and quite inevitably. There is the question of promotion. It is the openly avowed intention of the new Governments to nationalise all their services as rapidly as possible, and they have said that when one of their nationals is qualified and available for a post they will give him preference over a European, however highly qualified the latter may be. That is quite natural, especially in a country with newly won nationhood. But it will press hardly on some of these

1163
British officials who were hoping for promotion for which they were well qualified.
Then there is the matter of language. I understand that one Provincial Government have already decreed that all official business, in the law courts or elsewhere, shall be conducted in one of the vernaculars of that Province. Again, that is a quite natural development, but one which will press hardly on the British officials, since that business was formerly conducted in English. In another Province, the Government have laid down that officials posted to any district in that Province are required within a given period to qualify in the vernacular—and there are many districts and many vernaculars in India. Again, there are the questions of amenities and safety. Formerly, when these men or members of their families were ill, they received treatment from British doctors and British nurses. There will soon be no such doctors and nurses left in India. These men knew that in the event of civil disturbance they could rely, in the last resort, on the protection of British troops. Those troops have all gone from India.
His Majesty's Government may argue that these men entered into their contracts with their eyes open since, at the time when they accepted service, it was already the policy of His Majesty's Government to transfer power into Indian hands. Moreover, in many of the Provinces there were already Indian Ministers and in others they were only temporarily suspended. I ask you, could these men, from their humbler standpoint, have foreseen what the very few placed in high positions could foresee? Could they foresee that the withdrawal of British power would be so speedy and so complete, that all the British Governors on whom lay official responsibility for preventing any injustice to them would be withdrawn, or that all the British troops, on whom in the last resort the safety of their wives and families depended, would disappear? Could they have foreseen that the land was going to be divided into two countries? I do not think that any argument on what I believe is the legal principle of caveat emptor could be upheld for these men. It may be argued by the Government that the cost of underwriting pensions and doing justice to these men would entail putting a prohibitive burden on the taxpayer.
I admit that I have no detailed knowledge of what the cost would be, but I do know that it can only be small, in comparison with that which the Government have already undertaken for the Secretary of State's services. I do not believe that there are more than 700 or 800 men in the categories of which I speak—200 to 300 in the police, 200 to 300 on the railways and another 200 or so in the defence services or elsewhere. The Government have already agreed to compensate and underwrite the pensions of 800 highly-paid Indian Civil Service officials and over 2,000 of the defence services. The Government, in fact, have swallowed the camel, hump and all, but are not even straining at the gnat. Surely it is wrong that the officer class should be compensated and that the rank-and-file should I not, and that these men, who have borne the burden and heat of the day in India—and often the burden of the night—should not also receive their reward.
I would ask your Lordships' indulgence for a short time further, to deal with the special case of ex-Service clerks. These are men serving in the Central Government, who were induced by promises of eventual better pensions and prospects to give up their military status and become civilians. There are only some seventy to eighty of them, and the history of their case is briefly this. Right up to the outbreak of the war in 1939, the orders of the Government of India laid down that 25 per cent. of the personnel in the secretarial branch of the Defence Department should be Service or ex-Service British personnel. Up till 1920 those posts were filled by soldiers serving away from their regiments. In 1920 it was decided, for some reason, that those Service clerks should give up their Service status and become civilians. That decision received the approval of the Secretary of State, who thereby accepted moral, if not legal, responsibility for the future of those men. They were given a choice of either giving up their military status and becoming civilians or losing their appointments and reverting to their units. They were promised that, by becoming civilians, they would eventually have much better prospects, higher posts and better pensions. The great majority of them became civilians. In 1928 the same policy was applied to the Royal Air Force headquarters in India, and again it had the approval of the Secretary of State.
In 1933, for some reason, the policy was changed, and future recruits were not required to give up their military status but remained as soldiers or airmen. That decision again was referred to the Secretary of State and had his approval. When that decision was made, the men who had already given up their military service petitioned that they should be allowed to resume it and come under the same terms as new entrants. They were refused, but were again promised that they would eventually benefit when they had completed the statutory period for pension and by the higher posts they would eventually attain. But that was only in the last years of their service. There are very few of those men who have reached the higher grades, except as a temporary war measure, or who have yet qualified for a pension.
I submit that these men are fully qualified to receive the terms granted to the Secretary of State's services. The later entrants who were not compelled to become civilians have received those terms. The other men, however, have fallen between two stools. They are refused the compensation granted to British soldiers serving in the Indian Army, because they had been compelled to give up their military status, and they are refused compensation as civilians because they do not technically belong to the Secretary of State's services, though, as your Lordships have seen, the Secretary of State approved, if he did not actually father, the steps by which they reached their present position. He may not be their legal parent, but I think an application for an affiliation order against him would have a good chance of success.
As Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy, I have been in close personal contact with these men. I have seen their work and can testify to the value of what they have done. The great and orderly expansion of the Indian Army would not have been possible without their effort. Secretarial work in an office is not exciting or dangerous during a war, but it is of vital importance. It was especially so in the great and unparalleled expansion of the Indian Army which took place during the war and which was made possible only by the work of these men. I know that without that expansion of the Indian Army our affairs would have gone ill in the Middle East and the Far East, to say
1166
nothing of Italy and other places. I may add that one of these men, at his own wish, put on uniform again and accompanied me to Java during the short-lived period when I was Supreme Commander of the South-West Pacific Command. He certainly had his share of excitement and danger in one of the last ships to leave Java. Others of these men also put on uniform again and took service. I hope your Lordships will agree that these people have the same rights as those in the Secretary of State's services.
The sum of the arguments I have put before your Lordships is generally this. The whole body of British services in India, at the centre or in the Provinces, high or low, covenanted or uncovenanted, have done a magnificent job of work, to which your Lordships paid tribute in this House in your Motion of August 7 last year. I should like to read you a few sentences from the concluding speech on that Motion, made by a noble Lord who had served India nearly all his life:
" But on behalf of all he Civil Service, alike of men who have held positions of high responsibility and those who have served in lower grades, I would like to say this. We have had a great and, I think, legitimate pride in our past, and it is not a pride that is founded wholly on past performance. We believe, and I think we rightly believe, that we shall have left behind as a tradition of disinterested service, of integrity and devotion to duty, which will be one of the great assets of the new India in her new career."
These men to whom your Lordships paid tribute include all classes, but it is only for a proportion of them that the Government have so far provided terms which have removed their anxiety for the future.
To the humbler classes, who have not the protection of the all-powerful Secretary of State, the Government say that they have no legal obligation, and they recognise no moral obligation towards them. I do not believe that this can possibly be maintained. I ask the Government most earnestly to reconsider their decision, and to say here and now that they recognise and will underwrite the right of these men to proportionate pension for the services which they have already rendered; that they will consider whether some of them are not also entitled to compensation for loss of career—or, at least, to some sum for resettlement such as has been granted to officials in Burma or the Palestine Police. In the

1167
particular case of the ex-Service class I ask the Government to say that they will recognise their right to receive the same terms as the Secretary of State's services, to which I consider they virtually and morally belong, either as civilians or as soldiers.
Lastly, I ask that any terms which are granted shall be retrospective from the date of our handing over power on August 15, 1947. I know from correspondence that I have received that there are a number of men who have already been compelled to give up their service and who have received no pension for all the work they have done. There are some very hard cases among them. It may be argued that by giving these men the right to retire on proportionate pension the new Governments of India and Pakistan will be deprived at a critical period of the services of British officials whom they wish to keep. But that sort of argument did not deter the Government from giving terms to the Secretary of State's services; and I believe that many of these men will wish to continue to serve, provided that they can do so with a quiet mind as to the future. I hope that I have persuaded your Lordships of the fairness of the case which I have set before you, and I hope that His Majesty's Government will also recognise this, and will at once give an assurance which will ease the minds of these men to whom we all owe so much. I beg to move for Papers.
3.5 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL): My Lords, I think it will probably be convenient for the House if I speak now. That will enable me to show noble Lords how far it is possible for the Government to go in meeting the plea that has been made by the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Wavell. It will also enable subsequent speakers to show their approval or disapproval of what the Government are in a position to offer. It leads to one embarrassment, from my point of view, and that is that I may have to ask permission to inflict upon your Lordships a second speech. That will, of course, depend on whether other noble Lords who intend to follow me raise points which I have not been able to anticipate, and which will not be covered in this speech.
1168
I think we are all, and not least the Government, greatly indebted to the noble Earl for the chivalrous way in which he has championed the cause of the subordinate officers of the Government Service in India who have served so patiently and over such a considerable period of time. I should like to assure him, whatever interpretation may be placed upon the actions of the Government, that it would be unfair to say we do not appreciate as keenly as he himself, or anyone else, the great service which these subordinate officers have rendered in India both to India and to the British Government so long as they were responsible in past years. I believe it is generally accepted that in the matter of proportionate pensions there is an essential difference between the position of members of the Secretary of State's services and the military services, on the one hand, and, on the other, the members of the non-Secretary of State's services, who have at no time entered into a contract with the Secretary of State. It is the latter category of persons with whom the noble Earl is concerned in his Motion.
I shall not labour this difference in the legal position of the two classes, because I think it is common ground that such a difference exists, and that we have statutory obligations towards a certain class of officials and soldiers which we do not owe to other Government employees in India or Pakistan. I am not labouring this, because I do not intend to stand upon a legal technicality. It can be said broadly (and I think the legal position ought to be made quite clear) that the former class of persons have for many years past enjoyed the right to retire on proportionate pension, whereas the latter have never had this right, because they have been and are servants of the Central Government of India or Pakistan, or of one or other of the Provincial Governments. Let me say, in parenthesis, that although I shall be talking about pensions and proportionate pensions, I Want to be understood as including provident funds, since a good many of those people with whom the noble Earl is concerned have, in fact, rights only to provident funds and not to pensions.
Although, as I have already mentioned, in time past members of non-Secretary of State's services never enjoyed a right to retire on proportionate pension, the

1169
need for the grant of such a pension would nevertheless clearly arise in either of two sets of circumstances. The first is where the authorities in India or Pakistan decide that they wish to terminate an officer's service prematurely, before he has qualified for his final pension, through no fault of his own; and the second is where a fundamental change in the conditions of service of an officer takes place. We hold the view—and we have always held the view—that in either of those sets of circumstances a proportionate pension ought to be granted. So far as I am aware, it is unlikely that any serious objections or difficulties would arise if either of these two eventualities were to happen and the men concerned decided to claim a proportionate pension. But I should like to emphasise and, as the noble Earl has given me this opportunity, to repeat, that it remains the considered view of His Majesty's Government that proportionate pension ought to be granted to officers whose conditions of service are materially and substantially changed to their disadvantage, or who are discharged from Government service on some ground other than their own unsuitability and shortcomings.
The most difficult position that may arise is one which has undoubtedly already arisen. It is where, without any fundamental change in conditions of service, circumstances have supervened which in fact have led to the employees of one or other Government in India or Pakistan being themselves anxious to terminate their services. Those are the conditions which I think the noble Earl has in mind, and those are the people of whom he has been thinking in the course of his speech this afternoon.
Since the transfer of power on August 15 of last year, we have not had occasion to discuss with the Dominion authorities the question of proportionate pension for the class of officers to whom the noble Earl has referred, but we expect that a suitable opportunity will arise in the near future. It is hoped that during the course of this summer there will be discussions with representatives of the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan on the general question of the capitalisation of pensions, both for the members of the Secretary of State's services and for the non-Secretary of State's services. One of the questions which will obviously need
1170
careful examination is the precise scope of any capitalisation scheme which may be devised. I can say now that a suitable opportunity will be found at that time to discuss the provision of proportionate pensions for members of the non-Secretary of State's services. I shall therefore be much obliged to the noble Earl and to other noble Lords if they will not press me further this afternoon in regard to the attitude of the Government on this subject, without, of course, prejudicing their own future action after these talks have taken place.
The noble Earl who moved this Motion has for a long time shown a keen and sympathetic interest in the difficulties of the small and special class of ex-British soldiers employed as clerks. I can assure him that this is a problem which has caused much heart-searching and received extremely careful scrutiny in the Commonwealth Relations Office. I agree entirely with him that these people deserve a good deal of sympathy, because their civilian status has deprived them of certain rights they would have enjoyed if they had remained soldiers. They have been working side by side with men in uniform who have had more favourable treatment than themselves, and their expectations as civilians have been disappointed. I agree, of course, with the natural grievance which they feel as the result of these unfortunate circumstances. At the same time, I think it should be remembered that it was at their own choice that they originally left the Army for Government service.
EARL WAVELL: A choice which was practically forced upon them. They had either to become civilians or to return as private soldiers to their units and give up lucrative employment.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: Of course, their position in the Army might not have been so satisfactory as it had been before, but they were given the choice at the time of one Service or the other. As a result of the exercise of this option they decided to become civilians, and whether in the long run they may have regretted this choice is, of course, a question for them to decide. They have been treated as civilians new for more than twenty years. To single them out at this moment, as the noble Earl asks, for more favourable treatment than other civilian members of the non-Secretary of State's

1171
services, would surely be an act of injustice to the rest. As they have been regarded as civilians for so long, I fear it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to offer them any special treatment. I cannot see that any facts which the noble Earl has adduced to support his case this afternoon point to any distinction which can be drawn between these civilians and other civilian members of the non-Secretary of State's services.
EARL WAVELL: Surely they are in an entirely different position; they are a very special case. They were induced to give up their civilian status, and when they wanted to come back and become soldiers again they were refused.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: The fact is that when they originally gave up their civilian status it was a choice they made themselves, whether wisely or unwisely. But may I add this concluding sentence, which I hope may be a little reassuring to the noble Earl? What I have already said in regard to the talks which will take place this summer applies equally, of course, to this small category of persons, and the question of affording them an opportunity to retire on proportionate pension will arise when the general question of making such provision for the members of these services is discussed.
The noble and gallant Earl addressed two questions to me which I will endeavour to answer. The first question was: Will the Government underwrite proportionate pensions for members of the non-Secretary of State's services? Well, I do not think it is altogether fair to expect His Majesty's Government to accept liability for the payment of pensions to, people whose services have been rendered and carried out in India. I do not think that the British taxpayer should be saddled with that liability. The noble Earl will remember that the Governments of India and Pakistan have already accepted liability for the payment of proportionate pensions to members of the Secretary of State's services, so that, wherever the liability may go, I do not feel it is altogether reasonable to expect us to accept it.
The second question the noble Earl asked was: Who is to judge whether conditions have altered to the detriment of these men? I think we must be the judge of whether conditions have altered. I do
1172
not think the noble Earl suggested that anybody else should determine that question. It is really a matter of fact. We have excellent sources of information in India and Pakistan. We have the High Commissioners and their staffs, and I can assure the noble Earl that we have done our utmost to ascertain the facts and to arrive at a perfectly objective judgment about the conditions under which these people are working.
3.20 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW: My Lords, I desire to thank the noble Earl the Minister of State for the sympathetic tone of the speech which he has just made. I am not perfectly certain—though I confess that I should like to examine what he has said in detail and at leisure—that the substance of his utterance is quite as satisfying as its tone. Your Lordships will easily understand with what profound concern I, amongst others who have held responsible office in India, awaited the announcement of the terms granted by His Majesty's Government to the Members of the Secretary of State's services, which I had the honour of leading and which gave me such loyal and devoted service through seven and a half years of what was perhaps the heaviest and most difficult Viceroyalty in history. I thought those terms generous. I had for long foreseen that the case of those for whom the noble and gallant Field-Marshal has pleaded so eloquently to-day might raise difficulties.
Up to the last moment I had hoped that His Majesty's Government might rise to the height of a magnanimous decision and place those persons in the same position as the members of the Secretary of State's services in their original announcement, in so far as that announcement included a clear statement that their rights would be supported by His Majesty's Government and in the ultimate resort, if necessary, by the taxpayers of this country. I very much wish they had been able to do that—though having been on both sides of the table in this matter I fully realise the difficulties. I do not think the cost would have been excessive and I do not think it will be excessive now, if we can persuade His Majesty's Government to take this course. These persons have been left out and I can testify to the fact that they feel aggrieved. I can assure the noble Earl, with great respect and a full understanding of his difficulties, that those of us who are perhaps best qualified to testify

1173
to the high quality and the essential nature of these services, are genuinely and profoundly unhappy on their behalf. All of us realise well that to end a long and honourable association, such as that which has existed between this country and India, without poignant regrets and much sadness is impossible. I hope we shall do our utmost to see to it that at any rate we do not fail in proper support to faithful servants. And I beseech His Majesty's Government, so far as they are able, to take a sympathetic and generous view of this matter and to do what is right and fair for these persons.
Like the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Wavell, I have not the least reason to suppose that either the Government of India or the Government of Pakistan will fail in their honourable obligations in this matter. On the other hand, it is no use pretending that for these men the future does not hold many hazards and uncertainties, the greater number of which no one could have foreseen when these men undertook service on the terms offered. That is the force of our case. These men have been very faithful and they deserve from us the peace of mind that can be afforded them—and which can be afforded them in no other way—by their country's guarantee that in no circumstances will they be left in penury. I listened with the greatest attention to the speech of the Minister of State, and I was not clear whether he wished to convey to your Lordships that His Majesty's Government would be behind the terms offered. If that were so, it would make a great difference and I should be grateful if the noble Earl could make that plain when he speaks a second time.
I do not desire to detain the House for a moment longer than is necessary. I thank the noble and gallant Earl for the admirable speech which we heard a little while ago, couched in terms which were forceful, clear and moderate, and in which he put forward a case which in my respectful submission to your Lordships and to His Majesty's Government is, in its force and humanity, unanswerable.
3.28 p.m.
LORD CLYDESMUIR: My Lords, I crave the indulgence of your Lordships for a maiden speech—and not only a maiden speech but one early in time. I confess
1174
that I had intended to preserve a modest silence in your Lordships' House for some time yet, but when my noble and gallant friend told me he was raising this point I felt that I wished to support him. It is a matter on which I feel strongly and one of which I have had recent personal experience, both at Bombay, where the police were in a very special sense my charge, and also, for a shorter period, at New Delhi. The noble Earl who spoke for the Government was sympathetic and understanding, and yet he has left some anxiety in my mind. And I think he will find that he has left anxiety in the minds of these men whose case we are discussing. In effect what he has promised is that in the course of months—
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: This summer.
LORD CLYDESMUIR: —there will be discussion of their claims. It is not to be wondered at, in an immense operation such as the transfer of power in India, that some relatively minor matters should not immediately be satisfactorily dealt with. We have been thinking in terms of hundreds of millions in India. To-day we think in terms of a few hundreds. But to those concerned this is not a minor matter; it is a matter of very great personal import.
The noble Earl who raised the Motion dealt with the case of Army clerks. I do not propose to enlarge upon that, and I shall speak mainly on the subject of the subordinate police officers, with whose work and case I am closely familiar. First of all, who are these men and what is their special claim? For the most part they are British soldiers, recruited as sergeants into the provincial police forces. They were recruited in the years betwen the two wars, right up to 1939, and they were employed in the great cities where their ability to handle crowds and traffic, and to deal with any emergency which called for liaison with European residents, made them extremely useful. As an example, in the Presidency of Bombay almost all the men were located in Bombay City, a few only being employed in the cities of Ahmedabad and Poona. That was true also of other Provinces. Originally, they formed a closed cadre of their own, with internal promotion; but this was later changed, and they became part of a general list of sub-inspectors,

1175
including Indian sub-inspectors. The old term "sergeant" was abolished.
The men received pensions at the age of fifty-five. If they retired voluntarily before that age, they received no pension. The Minister of State was quite clear on that. In another place, recently (I think it was on February 23 in the debate on the Civil Estimates) the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, speaking of these officers, said:
" It must be remembered that these officers have always been subject to the control of the Governments by whom they were appointed. It must be remembered that they never had the right to retire on proportionate pensions. Therefore, so long as there is the guarantee that their conditions are not to change, the case for granting proportionate pensions to those whom the Governments wish to keep is clearly not very strong."
It must also be remembered that under Section 56 of the Government of India Act, all regulations relating to the police were made by the Governor in his individual judgment. When exercising his individual judgment, the Governor was under the superintendence of the Secretary of State, through the Governor-General. I know that one of the most important parts of my duties as Governor during five years was the superintendence of the police, and in that I was ultimately under the control of the Secretary of State. Therefore, it is clear that the Provincial Police Service, though not recruited directly by the Secretary of State, has always been recruited under his authority. Similarly, their conditions of service have always been regulated under his ultimate control. Therefore I submit that the position of these men is not, in fact, different from that of the members of the Secretary of State's services who have been, as we are all agreed, fairly and properly dealt with.
The Secretary of State's services, as the noble and gallant Field-Marshal has said, received a proportionate pension, a right which they already held; but, in addition, they received compensation for loss of employment for which there never was any statutory guarantee. Your Lordships will also recollect that a differentiation was made between British and Indian officers in the matter of compensation because, to use the words employed by the Secretary of State in another place:
" The former will no longer be serving under the ultimate control of the Parliament of their
1176
own country, and it cannot be maintained that their prospects will be the same as in the past. On the other hand, Indian officers will continue to serve their own country on the same terms as before."
I hold the view that these European subordinate officers are, in fact, in the same position as their more highly placed colleagues, but, to paraphrase the Scriptures: "One has been taken and the other left." The Minister of State felt that it would be necessary before the case for a proportionate pension could be made out, to say that there had been a fundamental change in the conditions of service. I think that the transfer of power is a fundamental circumstance here. Surely the transfer of power to a great sub-Continent like India is a fundamental change and operation.
I come now to the attitude of the Governments of India and Pakistan. As the noble and gallant Field-Marshal said, their attitude is understandable. It is most important that we should preserve the good will which undoubtedly exists in those two Dominions towards this country at the present time. Therefore, we must understand their attitude in this question. I hope that anything which is said here to-day will reflect India in a true and understanding spirit. These Governments have held the view that they cannot give more favourable terms to British officers than to Indian officers of comparable rank. I explained that the sergeants have now been merged into a general cadre of sub-inspectors and rank equally with a large number of Indian officers. The Dominion and Provincial Governments have offered a continuation of employment and a pension at fifty-five, but they do not feel able to continue certain provisions (I might almost call them prerequisites) which were made specially for the benefit of these European sub-inspectors, as they consider that it would be unfair to the much larger number of Indian subordinate officers of the same rank. For example, in a large Province there may be 50 Europeans and 500 Indians serving in the same cadre. The Government feel unable to continue for the European officers certain provisions which mattered a great deal to them. The attitude of the Government that employs these men is understandable.
The special provisions of which I speak are these. The English sergeants were always allowed European quarters—they

1177
were mainly employed in the great cities where such accommodation was more readily to be found. Facilities existed for the education of their children. These also were to be found in the large cities. There were places of worship which they could attend. Also they were not compelled to pass examinations in the regional languages of their Province. In future they will be liable, as part of the general cadre of sub-inspectors, to be posted to any part of the Province in which they serve. They will not have special quarters provided, but will be subject to the same rules as regards residential accommodation as Indian sub-inspectors.
They will no longer be exempt from passing examinations in languages. I cannot say how far that examination rule is being enforced, but I think it likely that the Provincial Governments are being rather light in the enforcement of that rule. Nevertheless, they will be bound to say, "You are all in this cadre, and you are all liable to the examination test." That may be a serious matter for these men. There are three regional languages in the Province of Bombay alone. They are Mahratti, Gujeratti, and Kanerese—three distinct and separate languages. I can imagine many a good ex-Army sergeant who would know exactly what to do with a large crowd, or how to put out a fire or deal with an emergency of that sort, but who would be confounded if confronted by a paper on any one of those languages. It is beyond the ability of many of these men, whose educational attainments (although some of them are extremely good in a general way) do not qualify them for such subjects.
I hope I have made out a case to show that the prospect of these men remaining till the age of 55 in order to qualify for their pensions is extremely poor. Therefore, I consider that the fundamental change of which the Minister of State himself spoke is now evident and must be faced. I rejoice that the Secretary of State's services and the Judges have been adequately compensated. In my view, His Majesty's Government have dealt justly and properly with them. If, as I imagine, the Treasury is the watchdog in this case, I would repeat what
1178
the noble Earl said: that the Treasury are apparently straining at a gnat but have very creditably swallowed a camel. Possibly the digestion process is not yet complete, and that may be one of His Majesty's Government's preoccupations. It would be just that these men should receive proportionate pension rights and passages home, and that, if they are to be treated alike with the Secretary of State's services, there should be a measure of compensation for loss of employment.
Another matter which I regard as important is the provision of machinery to help them find employment in the future. Some of these men have many years of useful service before them, and I hope that machinery for advising on suitable employment may be devised; possibly that has already been done, but I have not heard of it. If that should result in the majority of these men retiring, I do not think that the Dominion Governments should object to it, as the number involved is relatively very small compared with the total number in the police forces of the Dominions. But, as the noble and gallant Field Marshal has pointed out, it may not have that result. It may give them a sense of security and peace of mind, and a number may elect to continue in their present posts. Nevertheless—and I think this is important, because we mast understand the point of view of the Dominion Governments at the present time—I do not think that the removal of the majority of these men would substantially effect the police problem in India just now.
I know these men; I have seen them at work. They are steady, brave and courageous. They have served their country well, and to-day they are attempting loyally to serve the two new Dominions that have come into being and whose welfare is much in our hearts. But they are sorely perplexed because they feel they have been forgotten by the country of their birth and, when they see their more fortunate and more highly-placed colleagues compensated and dealt with fairly and adequately, a sense of bitterness creeps in. If the Government will look into this case, not purely from the aspect of contractual obligation but from the point of view of justice and equity, it will, I believe, greatly redound to their credit.
3.43 p.m.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: My Lords, it falls to my very pleasant lot to follow a maiden speech in your Lordships' House. The noble Lord, Lord Clydesmuir, is one whom many of us have known as a prominent person in another place. Both he and I were members of the House of Commons for many years, and his courtesy and consideration, and the reasonableness of the case he put forward, were always noticeably admired in the other place. Since then I have had the great pleasure of being associated with him in regard to the Government of India. I think I may say, and he will agree, that we never had the smallest difference of opinion, and if we had I am quite sure we should have settled it in the most amicable manner. We have listened today to the first, but only the first, of his speeches, and I hope we shall have many more, from which your Lordships will be able to sample the fruit of his judgment, his wisdom and his capacity to put his case clearly and succinctly before your Lordships' House.
Now I come to the substance of this debate, and I hope your Lordships will pardon me if, for the sake of those who are not so well acquainted with the situation in India as some noble Lords, I try to answer one or two elementary questions. In the first place, who are the people about whom this question has been raised? They belong mainly to these classes: first of all, there are the technicians on the railways, which are a central service of India; secondly, there are the police, a provincial service, of whom the noble Lord, Lord Clydesmuir, has principally been speaking; thirdly, there are certain servants of the Post Office; and finally there are the particular clerks to whom the noble Earl, who moved this Motion in such eloquent and pressing terms, devoted the last part of his speech.
In the second place, what are the approximate numbers with which we have to deal? I do not think it is possible to find that out with any precision, because these people have never been servants of the Secretary of State; they have always been servants either of the Government of India or of the Provincial Governments, in regard to whom particulars are not sent home to this country. I believe, however, that some years ago, before I
1180
became Secretary of State, an enumeration was attempted and I think at that time the number was something like 2,000. Since then it has been steadily reduced, and I should hazard a guess that the number of men affected can be measured by hundreds, certainly not by thousands, although it is just possible that they reach four figures. The next question I want to put and to endeavour to answer is, What precisely is meant by a "proportionate pension," and how are these people affected by the question? With the exception of a certain number of persons of whom the noble Earl, the member of the Government, spoke, all these people are entitled to pension at the recognised end of their term of service; and in their case, up to recent times, there has been no suggestion that they would be entitled to retire before the end of their term and get a pension proportionate to the number of years that they had already served.
It is proposed now that, owing to the change of circumstances in India, they should be accorded a right which they have not had before to retire earlier than the full term and to get a proportionate pension. Your Lordships are probably aware that this question has arisen in the case of the home Civil Service. I believe it is still true that an ordinary civil servant is, theoretically, not entitled to retire and get such a pension, but in fact he is generally accorded one. I am not in the least suggesting that the number being a little smaller than some of your Lordships may have imagined is any reason why justice should not be done; on the contrary. The fact that the number is not very great, and the sum in question therefore will not be very large, is, in my opinion, an added reason for not passing them over. The question really is not whether we should like to see these people getting a proportionate pension, but what is the best attitude His Majesty's Government can take at the present time to secure the desired end.
When I was the Secretary of State we had more than one debate in this House regarding the cost of the Secretary of State's services, and, because we had not been able to arrive at any definite decision, your Lordships often felt somewhat disappointed in the answers I was able to give. But I was working at the matter the whole time. Shortly after I retired from office a decision was announced, and the noble Marquess, with

1181
whose distinguished career as Viceroy we are all familiar, has said that in his opinion the decision ultimately, so far as those persons were concerned, was a generous one. With that I think we shall all agree.
He suggested to-day that, had it been possible, he would have liked the decision, when taken, to cover all these people. I myself think it was better to take the cases one at a time, because, whatever we may say about the moral obligation—and I am not in the least going back on that—so far as the legal obligation is concerned I think everyone must admit that the cases are on an entirely different footing. It was much better, therefore, to get a decision taken where that other matter did not arise and where there was a definite legal obligation on the Secretary of State. It was better to get that decision in favour of the employees. When that had been obtained, the case of the other people would not be prejudiced but would be advanced by that decision.
Two suggestions made by those who attack the present Government in this matter are, I venture to think, wrong. It is said that the Government and the British people are being asked to make differentiation between those in high places and those in low places; that whereas officers and people of some importance have already been given terms, other people of less importance are being neglected and passed over. I think that that is not quite the right way of putting it. There is a distinction between these people. In one case there is a definite legal obligation and a promise made and repeated on a number of occasions. The other people are in a different position on many grounds, because they have not been servants of the Secretary of State, as such. They have been servants of the Government of India or of the Provincial Governments. That is not the only difference that I see between them, but I think it is a vital one. The Secretary of State's servants were persons in very high position indeed in India. They were regarded by the Indians as rulers of the country. Under the new régime, these people who had been regarded, and who regarded themselves, to some extent, as rulers of the country, were going to be put in subordination to Indian people and would have to take their orders from Indians.
1182
I do not think you can say that that is quite the case with regard to the people whom we are considering to-day. They have always been in the position of having to obey orders given by their Indian superiors. They are not, therefore, being asked to change their fundamental position. The only difference (and I am not going to understate it) is as Lord Wavell has stated: that whereas they had a sort of big brother behind them in the old days, that big brother has now packed up and left. It is not a question of what we are going to do about the matter, or how we are going to approach, it, but of who is, in the first instance, responsible for seeing that justice is done and what we are going to do in case justice is not done. There seems to me to be no doubt whatever that the first characters who come into the picture are not His Majesty's Government but the Government of India, the Government of Pakistan and the Provincial Governments. Those are the people who come directly into the picture. His Majesty's Government would come in only if, in fact, it were to be the case that justice was not done between the parties directly concerned.
When I was Secretary of State, I always went on the principle of believing not only in the integrity and good faith of the Indian authorities but also in their sense of justice and fair play. I believe that that attitude, which I always insisted upon taking up, was of great value, not only in keeping our relationships with the Indian statesmen on a happy and pleasant footing, but, in the long run, in getting justice and proper terms and conditions for European persons living in India. I adhere to that position to-day. Whatever may be said—as it has been said in the debate to-day—to the effect that we are not distrusting the Indians, not, in fact, assuming that they are going to do the wrong tiling, not, in fact, feeling it necessary to try to use some extraneous method of dealing with them, I believe that the first and most important thing is to say: "I believe that the Indians will do the right thing with regard to these people." And the right thing is not simply the just thing—it is to the Indians' own interest. If you want good service you have to treat the men who serve you well. I believe that Indians are just as capable of understanding the larger ground for being

1183
not only just and generous but also fair and reasonable, as we are in this country. Therefore I agree with His Majesty's Government in saying that this matter is primarily the concern of the Indian Governments, and that, in the first instance, at any rate, we are going to assume that they will do the right thing with regard to these people.
That being so, I think it would be most foolish of His Majesty's Government, at this stage, to suggest that they might give a kind of bilateral guarantee. I cannot imagine anything of that sort being done in private life. I do not believe that noble Lords sitting opposite would attempt anything of that kind in connection with their own affairs. Let me suggest a simple case to your Lordships. A man has a servant on his estate, and, for some reason or other, on the estate passing into the hands of someone else, this servant ceases to be the servant of the original master and goes into the service of the newcomer in the tenancy. The new employer, so far as you are aware, is a man whose moral attitude, whose sense of justice, whose intelligence and whose generosity are just as great as those of his predecessor. And yet, before the new tenant has a chance to say whether or not he will deal with the servant whom he has taken over in a reasonable way the first employer steps in and says, "In case your new master does not treat you fairly, I am going to make an arrangement that I will foot the bill if he will not do so." I think that for the old master to do anything of that kind would be most foolish. And, mark you, that goes a great deal further in the opposite direction from the case in point, because these particular people never were the servants of the British Government. They were always servants of the authorities in India, who are, in fact, more or less the same people who are carrying on to-day.
Therefore it seems to me that the promise which the Secretary of State has given is eminently reasonable. He says, in effect, that up till now the time had not arrived when this could be talked over with the members of the Indian Governments who would ultimately be responsible. He says, "We, the Government, are not prepared to make any statement in advance, but we do promise that when the time comes to discuss a great
1184
number of matters regarding pensions and the like, we will certainly have talks with the Indian authorities on those matters. We are confident that they will do the sensible and the just thing. That seems to me an entirely reasonable attitude to take up. I am certain that noble Lords opposite, if dealing with a matter of this sort in relation to their private affairs, would not be so foolish as to follow any different course. So, although I feel that there is no difference in this House as to our attitude, as to our admiration and gratitude for the splendid way in which these people have performed their duties, I do not think that what the Government have promised is anything which should cause anxiety to your Lordships.
There is one further point I would like to put which I think may have escaped the attention of your Lordships. The people of whom we are speaking have, as I have already said, the right to a pension when the normal term of their employment comes to an end. In a great number of cases these men are long-established servants, and the termination of their employment is not so far distant. Therefore it is not a case of asking young men of thirty-five to stay on for twenty years more in order to get the normal pension. Many are closely approaching, and some have already passed, the date on which they are entitled to a pension. That is a point worth bearing in mind.
There is one final matter which I would like to mention. Here I propose to follow the noble Lord, Lord Clydesmuir, and put a specific question to the member of the Government who has promised to make a further reply if necessary at the end of this debate—namely, whether the Government will take steps to help such of these men as do come out to find other employment. I think they will. I cannot believe they will not do it, because that was the principle we adopted all through; and probably the Government are doing the same thing in this case. I trust the noble Earl, when he comes to reply, will answer that point. To sum up the position as I see it: We are all agreed that these men are worthy of the friendly respect and sympathy of the people of this country, and particularly of members of His Majesty's Government. We are most anxious that that sympathy shall not exist merely as an emotion but that the Government shall do the best thing for

1185
the protection of these men. Until I am otherwise convinced, I feel that the course the Government are pursuing is the right one—in deciding, when the occasion arises, to press the claims of these people on those who are directly responsible for their service at the present time. I think that your Lordships may have confidence, bearing in mind the decisions that the Government took in days gone by with regard to other servants in India, that they will not be behindhand in doing their duty in that matter. When those questions have been decided, and if there should be members of your Lordships' House not satisfied with these decisions, the time will have come when we should go again to the Government to see what further action they are prepared to take in the matter.
4.3 p.m.
THE EARL OF SCARBROUGH: My Lords, the noble Earl who spoke for the Government made it clear that the door was not closed on this matter. The noble Lord, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, in the speech which he has just made, elaborated that, and made out the case why more perhaps cannot be expected at this moment. Nevertheless, there are many of us who still have great anxiety on this point, and that is my excuse for saying a few more words to your Lordships on this topic. I speak as one who received such loyal service from those subordinate police officers to whom my noble friend Lord Clydesmuir referred that I should regard it as a matter of shame for this country if, because of the great change in policy which has been made, they are in any way adversely affected. There are still, I think, some obstacles in the mind of the Government to doing the right thing, and if I may I would like to deal with some of them.
It is said there is a distinction between the Secretary of State's servants and the others. The noble Earl suggested that we are all agreed that the distinction was to be made. I do not think I do agree—certainly not when it comes to the point of what shall be done in the matter of compensation as the result of this change in policy. In any case, I would point out that if that is the distinction which is to be made, it creates one indefensible anomaly—that is, in the case of European employees of the railways. If my
1186
information is right, employees on railways which were taken over by the Government of India before 1935 became Secretary of State's servants, but those employees of railways which were taken over by the Government of India since 1935—and they are, in fact, the majority—did not become Secretary of State's servants. They became servants of the Government of India. By sticking to this distinction we have this anomaly, that over 300 of these employees are not treated as Secretary of State's servants and do not get compensation, while there are some seventy or eighty who do. That is a pure accident. There may be other anomalies.
I would point out, moreover, that a breach has been made in the argument that this distinction must be maintained—namely, in the case of the High Court Judges. The Government have already come to the conclusion that although they had (again assuming that my information is correct) no contract with the Secretary of State, but served under the Provincial Governments of India, their case was considered to be sufficiently strong to enable them to be treated in exactly the same way as Secretary of State's servants. I say that for these two reasons alone this distinction cannot be maintained. But there is another suggestion underlying this plea that there is a distinction between these two classes of Government officers, supported to some extent, I was sorry to find, by the noble Lord, Lord Pethick-Lawrence. It is suggested that the character of the service of the two classes was different. I would utterly deny that. The service of the Secretary of State's officers and others can be described simply as service to India during the British period. I do not believe there was any real distinction in the character of the service which they rendered.
Take, again, the subordinate police officers, about whom my noble friend Lord Clydesmuir spoke. They have rendered exceptional service in past years. I can recall no communal riot of any dimensions in which both sides did not clamour for the service of these European officers; and there were other occasions when only these European officers were able to do the job. I do not see why I should not mention, either, that it was on these officers, to a considerable extent, that the Government

1187
relied when there were subversive movements. These men about whom we are talking have rendered magnificent service, not only to India but to the British rulers of India when they were there. It seems to me that it is up to Parliament, who, as my noble friend pointed out, were responsible for their recruitment, to make sure that they are not let down.
Another obstacle (I do not think it has been mentioned in this debate, but on occasions it has been mentioned elsewhere) is that it is said that these men knew what the situation would be when they took up their employment. As the noble Marquess has already pointed out, that is not a fair argument. I left India about five years ago. I never expected that the situation could be what it is at this moment, without there being in office a Governor with special responsibilities, and with not a single British soldier left in India. I never expected that it would move so quickly, so how could these men expect anything different? If I might try and interpret the feelings of these men, it would be that they did not bother over much about matters of higher policy; but when they did think of them, they thought that if their job were ever affected by changes in higher policy they would not be let down. That is what we want to ensure.
A further obstacle—I admit that it is a difficult one—is to make sure whether it really is the case that their conditions of service have altered. I think enough has been said upon that by other noble Lords. I entirely agree with my noble friend Lord Clydesmuir that the transfer of power has made a fundamental difference in innumerable ways to their conditions of service. If that is not enough, I would point to a statement made by the Minister of Transport in the Dominion of India. It was quoted in another place, and I think it is worth while reminding your Lordships of it. If I may say so, I think it is an entirely proper statement, from the point of view of the Indian Dominion, but it has an important bearing on the subject which we are discussing. He said this about the railways:
" In the public interest it is necessary now to build up as quickly as possible a reserve
1188
of Indian officers with the training and experience required for holding key positions on the railways. This cannot be done overnight. Therefore, a beginning in this direction must be made immediately."
I would particularly direct your Lordships' attention to the next passage:
" We propose, therefore, that, when vacancies arise hereafter in key positions, preference should be given definitely to Indian officers of proved ability, irrespective of considerations of seniority. This would necessarily imply that individual claims of senior non-Indian officers would in some cases be overlooked."
I think we can all understand the desire of Indian Ministers to pursue that policy. From their point of view, it seems to me to be a very right and proper policy for them to pursue. But, as they admit themselves, it will have an effect on European employees.
The other obstacle is one which has already been brought out, and which I think we must recognise. The Government feel that, in the first place at any rate, this is a matter which ought to be dealt with by the Governments of India and Pakistan. I must say that I am bound to agree with that. I shall be very surprised if, when it comes to the point (I hope it will very soon), the Governments of India and Pakistan do not do the right and generous thing in this matter. I think I am right in saying that it has already been done by the Government of Burma. It would be unthinkable, at least to me, that India—noted as Indians are for their generous characteristics—should be niggardly where Burma has been generous. So one hopes very much that the conversations which are to take place before long with those two Dominion Governments will be fruitful. If they are not, I am quite sure that the noble Earl who moved this Motion will return to this House, and we shall all support him in pressing His Majesty's Government to see that these men are not let down. These men, who have done splendid service in India during the period of British rule, are very definitely affected by the transfer of power which has been made as a matter of high policy; therefore, they ought not to be let down.
4.17 p.m.
LORD ISMAY: My Lords, I rise to speak on this Motion because as recently as four months ago some of the men

1189
whose cause has been pleaded so powerfully to-day were my friends and colleagues in India. Before I left the country, two or three of them came and spoke to me privately, and in great distress, about their unhappy plight. Although I have little to add to the arguments which have been deployed to-day, my silence on this occasion would be misunderstood by my friends, and therefore I must for the first time crave your Lordships' indulgence. Let me say at once that, so far as I can understand the case, these men have a very doubtful legal claim upon His Majesty's Government. But let me also say at once that the men themselves consider that, whatever the legal merits of the case, their moral claim is overwhelming and unchallengeable. They say that, through no fault of their own, they are now in a most unhappy position.
I will, if I may (probably it is the most useful contribution I can make), try to portray the frame of mind of those men. In the first place, there is the gnawing uncertainty as to what the future holds for themselves and for their families. Everything is fluid in India at the moment, and one cannot get away from that uncertainty. Uncertainty, as your Lordships know well, breeds hopelessness. And I felt that some of these men were in fact becoming hopeless. Secondly, they have a feeling that they have been forgotten, deserted, and indeed almost betrayed by their own countrymen. When a man is crying to do his duty far from home, the one thing that he needs above all else is the feeling that he has the good will, the support and the sympathy of his own people. If he does not have that, it is heartbreaking and demoralising. Thirdly, these men cannot but be anxious about their physical safety and still more about the physical safety of their women and children.
Many of them were eye-witnesses of the horrors which took place in the Punjab and Delhi last autumn. It is quite true that on that occasion there was no sort of threat to British lives, but I do not think it is generally realised how nearly all semblance of law and order disappeared throughout India's capital. It was a close thing, and if matters had got much worse, I believe that all foreign nationals would have been in the gravest jeopardy. In
1190
the event the Government of India, led by their Prime Minister Pandit Nehru, gripped the situation with immense courage and immense energy; and the danger passed. But the memory of those days will not easily be forgotten by those who were there, and more particularly by those who are still there.
Fourthly, these men are now lonely. When they volunteered for their present employment there were any number of their kith and kin alongside them. The position is now very different, and they tend to feel more and more like strangers in a strange land. I believe that all their worries would be lightened a great deal if only something were done for them—and done quickly—and if they could see some evidence that they had the sympathy of the people at home. I do not believe there is any noble Lord in this House but who will agree that it is no imaginary grievance which these men have. If they are not suffering a real downright injustice, they are at least in a very miserable position I do not believe there is a single one of your Lordships who would not wish that a helping hand should be held out to them.
What form that help should take is not, I think, a matter that can usefully be discussed at this moment. It need not follow stereotyped lines. His Majesty's Government have already shown, in the attitude they have taken up towards the Secretary of State's services, that they have the fullest sympathy with all those whose careers have been so fundamentally affected by the political decisions of last year. I am absolutely confident that if they hesitate to take the same step in regard to the non-Secretary of State's services, it is certainly not due to any lack of sympathy on their part, or to any pedantic insistence upon the strict letter of the law: there must be wider considerations which are outside the scope of this Motion. It would probably be difficult for His Majesty's Government to say precisely, here and now, what they will do or what they will not do for these men. But I beg them, for the sake of my friends in India, to reconsider this matter in the light of all that has been said in your Lordships' House to-day, and to do their utmost to bring a sense of security and peace of mind to men who have deserved well of their country.
4.26 p.m.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I am sure your Lordships would wish me, before I reply to this debate, to express your congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Ismay, on a maiden speech which was both admirable in substance and admirable in length. As many of your Lordships will remember, the noble Lord played a most important part as political adviser to the Viceroy in the concluding stages of British rule in India. From my personal experience I can speak of the immense benefit derived by Ministers here from his advice, and I know that his guidance was no less appreciated in India. I need not mention here the noble Lord's unique rôle during the war, but I am sure we all feel that the House is exceedingly fortunate to have secured the services of one who has so long and distinguished a record of public service in many different capacities. The account of the noble Lord, based on his own experience, of the state of mind of men with whom he has been so recently and so closely associated, is indeed a piece of first-hand evidence which will not be ignored by His Majesty's Government, and we are extremely grateful to him for giving it to us.
I am in a rather embarrassing position, because I promised the House that I would reply to points that were raised since I spoke last. If I do so, however, I shall be delaying another and extremely important debate. It is difficult for me to know what the House desires. Perhaps the best thing is to try to compromise and to reply rather briefly, omitting, I am afraid, some of the points raised by speakers in this debate which I would otherwise have answered. Let me say this to the noble Marquess, Lord Linlithgow. I am afraid that I cannot satisfy him on his suggestion with regard to a financial guarantee. On the other hand, of course, any view expressed by the noble Marquess about the members of a service which he led and looked after with such exemplary care in India, will carry special weight with His Majesty's Government, and will not be forgotten when the discussions to which I have referred take place.
I should like to associate myself with what my noble friend Lord Pethick-Lawrence said by way of congratulation to the noble Lord, Lord Clydesmuir, on
1192
his maiden speech. This is the first time I have met the noble Lord in person, for he was in India while I was at the India Office, but I feel that I have known him for quite a long time. When I went to the India Office in 1944 it was the practice for the Secretary of State and some of the Provincial Governors to exchange letters at regular intervals. I remember distinctly the extremely detailed picture which we used to receive from Lord Clydesmuir about events in the Province of Bombay. One of the outstanding impressions that I had was the immense activity and industry of the noble Lord himself, at his headquarters in Bombay or on tour in the Province. In recent years the Viceroy was often invited home for consultation with the Cabinet—more often, I think, than used to happen before the war. On several occasions the noble Lord deputised for him with conspicuous success, and he left India with a high reputation and universal popularity, both as a Provincial Governor and as Acting Viceroy. I very much hope that we shall continue to have the benefit of his advice in time to come on all the questions of which he has special knowledge.
I have some particulars about the conditions of service in the Bombay police and I propose to let the noble Lord have them without giving them orally in your Lordships' House. There are several points which the noble Lord raised which I shall be obliged to omit. I should like to reply to a question asked both by the noble Lord, Lord Clydesmuir, and by the noble Lord, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, about what we are doing to find employment for men who retire from Government service in India and want to find further employment in this country. We are doing and have done our best for both classes, members of the Secretary of State's services and other Government services who have returned or who will return from India. There is an India and Burma Services Section in the London Appointments Office of the Ministry of Labour which will give any assistance possible to European officers of the non-Secretary of State's services if and when they come to this country and seek its help in securing further employment.
The noble Earl, Lord Scarbrough, made a number of interesting points based on his own intimate knowledge, but again I feel that, in deference to the wishes of

1193
your Lordships' House, I shall have to disappoint him by not giving a full reply. I have a fairly reliable and interesting statement saying that the view expressed by Dr. Matthai, the Indian Minister of Transport, may have been misinterpreted. The noble Lord quotes the views expressed and, with his compliance, I intend to submit the evidence we have since collected to show that the Minister was misinterpreted by those who thought that he was intending to discriminate between European and Indian servants on the Indian Railways. This has been a particularly interesting and valuable debate from the point of view of the Government, because every speaker has spoken from first-hand experience of the men whose welfare has been under consideration. I can assure all the noble Lords who have taken part in the debate that their views will be carefully considered and weighed; and I should like to thank them on behalf of the Government for raising this important matter in such a moderate and constructive spirit.
4.33 p.m.
EARL WAVELL: My Lords, I wish to make just a few points in reply to this debate. I thank the noble Earl who has spoken for the Government for the sympathy he has expressed towards these men. May I, in return, offer my fullest sympathy to him in his having been put up to make such a weak and unconvincing case? The Government have again ridden off on a purely legal argument.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No.
EARL WAVELL: Yet they went beyond their legal liabilities to the Secretary of State's services in guaranteeing their proportionate pensions. Therefore I cannot see why they should stand on purely legal conditions as regards these people. The feeling among these men has been ably described by the noble Lord, Lord Ismay, in his admirable maiden speech; and there can be no doubt of how they view the matter. As regards the ex-Service clerks, the argument of the Government is that they accepted their position voluntarily—that it was of their own choice. But the choice was practically forced on them. The Government later on changed their policy and did not require people to become civilians. It was not a matter in which they had any
1194
sort of choice at all. I regret very much that the Government have not been able to see the justice of these men's claim. The argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, practically amounted to a plea for festina lente—with any amount of lente and practically no festina. When the question of the Secretary of State's services was under consideration in February, 1947, the Government sent out the Under-Secretary of State to India. They regarded the matter of such urgency and importance that they sent a member of the Government to India to consult the Government in India. Why cannot they do the same on behalf of the subordinate men? It is just as urgent for them as it was for the Secretary of State's services. It is, in a way even more urgent, because there is but a short time left before all vestiges of British control and influence will be removed, and there are numbers of men who have already retired or are retiring.
If I press this matter no further to-day it is not because I feel satisfied, but because I hope that as a result of what has been said in your Lordships' House the Government will reconsider the question. Surely it is for a Labour Government, which claims to represent the rights of the common man, to see that justice is done to the humbler men in the same way as it has been done to the more highly-paid ones. In asking leave to withdraw my motion for Papers, I reserve the right to raise the matter again unless some action is taken by the Government very soon.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE.
4.38 p.m.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT ADDISON): My Lords, I should like to intervene to make an important statement which is being made to-day in another place by the Minister of Health with regard to the position of medical men in relation to the National Health Service. It will, I think, be best if I report it to your Lordships in the Minister's own words. He said:
" I think that the time has come for me to make a statement to the House about the medical profession and the National Health Service. Needless to

1195
say, I make this statement on behalf both of the Secretary of State for Scotland and myself, and of the Government as a whole. I have been receiving representations from many quarters and I have studied the resolutions which both the Royal College of Physicians and the British Medical Association have sent on to me—and which have since been published and are familiar to the House. Meanwhile I have been trying, so far as I am able, also to determine for myself what it is that is really and sincerely worrying the doctors.
No doubt, as we gain experience, we shall find many modifications which would improve the scheme. That is always true of major legislation of this kind. But it seems to me that it is somewhere beyond all this that the key to the doctors' uneasiness and restlessness lies, and that it consists of some instinctive fear—shared by many most well-meaning men and women—that, although the Act does not propose it and although the Government have themselves denied it, the real objective is a full-time, salaried, State medical service. It is this fundamental point which I want now to tackle once and for all. As long ago as 1946, in this House, I said: ' Some doctors have expressed the fear that this is merely the beginning of a full-time salaried service. I cannot read that into the mind of any future Minister or prophesy what may be done by future Governments, but that is not our intention.'
But it seems clear that something more than my spoken assurance is needed, and I am certainly quite willing to do anything to banish this apprehension for good. The Royal College of Physicians has made the useful suggestion, with which the other Royal Colleges associate themselves, that I should now make it statutorily clear that a whole-time service will not be brought in by regulation, but would require further legislation to make it possible. My colleagues and I accept that, most cordially. In short, we propose that it should be made clearly impossible to institute a full-time salaried service by regulation alone. It would then need express legislation if it were ever proposed.
1196
As the House knows, I am about to set up an expert legal committee to advise me on the disputed effect of the Act on the partnership agreement. I hope to announce details of this Committee at Question time to-morrow. It seems likely that a short clarifying Bill may be needed as a result of its inquiries. If so, I shall take the opportunity—and, if not, I shall invoke an opportunity specially—to ask Parliament also to clarify our intentions about any full-time salaried service, in the way suggested above.
There is one further way, I think, in which we can eliminate these apparently widespread fears of a full-time salaried service. By many doctors the proposed fixed element of £300 in remuneration seems itself to be a menacing thing to freedom. I for my part have always conceived it rather as an assurance for the young beginner and for the older practitioner wishing to ease up in old age, and as a peg on which to hang additional assured payments for doubtful areas or other risks—and these are all worthy objects. However, if doctors are afraid of sinister intentions in this, I think these worthy objects can be achieved in another way, and no amendment of the Act is needed for this. Let all new entrants to practice have the advantages of this assured element of £300 for, say, three years. Then let each doctor decide for himself whether he will forgo it and pass to a system of plain capitation fees, or stay as he is with his fixed £300 plus a lower proportionate rate of capitation. He will be able to do this at any time. Similarly, let any doctor in established practice be able to elect for himself at any time to go on to the system of £300 fixed payment, plus the lower capitation fee, if and when he wants to—for example, in old age—instead of the higher rate with no fixed payment at all. So now it can rest with the individual doctor himself to decide the extent to which he prefers the combined system of £300 plus lower capitation, or all capitation—with the exception that beginners will start with three years on the former system.
One other point. I have already given assurances in this House that I do not for one moment intend to interfere with the ordinary rights of doctors to express themselves in speech or in

1197
writing with absolute freedom. Similarly, I have already given assurances to the profession that the Chairman of the Tribunal under the Act will be a lawyer of high professional standing appointed by the Lord Chancellor. I need scarcely repeat such assurances now, but—for the removal of any vestige of doubt—I do so. I trust that what I have said will finally free doctors from any fears that they are to be turned into ' salaried civil servants.' I look forward now to a future of active and friendly co-operation with the profession in putting into operation next July a great social measure, which can be made a turning point in the social history of this country and an example to the world."
4.45 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the extremely important statement that has been made by the noble Viscount the Leader of the House on behalf of his right honourable friend clearly deserves and needs a good deal more consideration. In addition, we shall all no doubt wish to scrutinise the legislation, which I understand is envisaged, when it comes to your Lordships' House. For the moment, I would say that it is quite evident that the Government are making efforts to break the deadlock which exists between them and the medical profession. I am sure we all hope that the proposals which are now being put forward will lead to an agreement satisfactory not only to the Government but to the medical profession, to whom we all owe so great a debt for their selfless endeavours on our behalf.
4.46 p.m.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, the statement that has just been made by the noble Viscount the Leader of the House may be taken to indicate the possibility, indeed, the probability, of a settlement between the two contending parties. As such, it will I am sure, be welcomed with great pleasure in all quarters of the House. It must be of special satisfaction to the noble Viscount, Lord Addison, himself to be able to announce what may be a measure of reassurance to his own old profession of which he was so distinguished a member. I think, that the House also would wish to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Moran, who, as President of the Royal College of
1198
Physicians, has been able to do so much to promote a settlement of this prolonged and acute controversy.
4.47 p.m.
LORD MORAN: My Lords, in the exceptional circumstances, and in view of the importance of the issues, I hope the House will forgive me if in a few words I thank the noble Viscount the Leader of the House for his statement and congratulate the Minister on what he has said in another place Let me say at once that I wholeheartedly welcome the Minister's statement. This Health Act, it has been said, is feared far less for what it is than for what it may become. Doctors have dreaded that the Act may be the prelude to a whole-time medical service. The Minister, by promising an amendment of the Act, has done all that is possible to remove that dread. He has done more. He has fully met the representations which some of us have made to him, by making the basic salary optional after three years in practice. The Minister has boldly met the main fears of the doctors. I hope he will be rewarded by the loyal support of all reasonable members of my profession, and that we shall now set our minds to the task of making this service, under very difficult circumstances, in the Minister's own words "a turning point in the social history of our country."

PALESTINE BILL.
4.49 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I have it in command to acquaint the House that His Majesty, having been informed of the contents of this Bill, is prepared to place his Prerogatives and interests, so far as concerns the matters dealt with by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament.
Before I proceed to the Bill, your Lordships will expect me to say a few words about the brutal murder of some of our soldiers yesterday by Jewish terrorists. So far I have received only preliminary reports of this incident. Early yesterday morning, a party of armed Jews forced their way into a military camp at Pardess Hanna, and shot indiscriminately at British soldiers. The commanding officer

1199
and six British other ranks were killed. A number were wounded. The attackers made good their escape, but four persons who are believed to have taken part in the attack were later arrested near another military camp.
This senseless crime adds yet another tragedy to the long list of outrages perpetrated against our troops and police in Palestine over the last few years by members of the Jewish community. The blight of terrorism spreads like a slow stain over the Jewish people in Palestine, and it is a sorry commentary on their claims to statehood that this menace should still stalk unchecked through the land. The bullet and the bomb are not the insignia of statehood. Protestations of condemnation by the leaders of the Jewish people are not enough. This monster of violence has been nurtured by Jewish refusal to recognise it as an evil and to co-operate with the British authorities to eradicate it from their midst. We have done our utmost to eliminate terrorism. But without co-operation from the people by whose complacency it has been fostered, success is impossible. This drain on British life is now being closed as quickly as we can. Meanwhile we shall pursue the assassins, and do our utmost to bring them to justice. I am sure your Lordships will wish me to express the sympathy of this House for the bereaved, and to offer them our tribute to the brave men who have given their lives in their country's service.
My Lords, this Bill is designed to give effect to the decision of His Majesty's Government to relinquish the Mandate for Palestine, and to provide for certain consequential matters arising out of that decision. Your Lordships will recall that in the forefront of the unanimous recommendations of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine was one that the Mandate for Palestine should be terminated at the earliest practicable date. When those recommendations were considered by the General Assembly of the United Nations the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated that this recommendation was endorsed without reservation. In order that there might be no misunderstanding of the attitude and policy of His Majesty's Government, he announced that they had decided that in the absence of a settlement they must plan for the early
1200
withdrawal of British Forces and of the British Administration from Palestine. We subsequently stated that the date we had in mind for the termination of the Mandate was May 15 of this year, and that it was our intention to withdraw all British troops from Palestine by, at the latest, August 1, 1948. It is provided in Clause I of the Bill that on May 15, or such earlier date as His Majesty may by Order in Council declare to be the date on which the Mandate will be relinquished, all jurisdiction of His Majesty in Palestine shall determine, and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom shall cease to be responsible for the government of Palestine.
It has been argued in another place that the Bill ought to transfer His Majesty's jurisdiction to the Commission appointed by the General Assembly of the United Nations to implement the plan of partition with Economic Union which was adopted by the resolution of the Assembly of November 29, 1947. That is not possible for two reasons. First, we do not know that the Commission will in fact endeavour to take over authority there. Secondly, an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament cannot vest jurisdiction in some other international authority—it cannot establish any other authority as its successor in Palestine. It is indeed obvious that Parliament here cannot legislate for a country that will not be subject to the sovereignty of the Crown. That is a matter which lies in the international field. This Bill can only bring His Majesty's jurisdiction in Palestine to an end and thus leave the way clear for the establishment of any successor Government or Governments which can effectively exercise authority in the country.
Even now it is not certain that the United Nations Commission will in fact be able to carry forward the task assigned to them by the General Assembly. It is within your Lordships' knowledge that the Commission, on examining the problem which faced them, have reported to the Security Council that the difficulties caused by the worsening situation in Palestine, and the reactions of the Arab world to the decision of the United Nations to partition the country, have made it evident that without the backing of a strong international security force the Commission would not be able to carry out their task. After careful consideration of this report, the Security Council

1201
have resolved that, owing to the increasing violence and disorder in Palestine, it is of the utmost urgency that there should be an immediate truce between the conflicting communities. The Council have also decided, in view of the reports of the Palestine Commission, and the subsequent consultations which have taken place between the permanent members of the Council, to request the Secretary-General to call together a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine.
At the recent meeting of the Security Council at which these decisions were taken, our representative supported the idea of a truce, recalling that His Majesty's Government had always favoured the adoption of all possible measures to bring disorder to an end and establish better relations between the two communities in Palestine. He made it clear that in supporting the idea of a truce His Majesty's Government adhered firmly to the decision for the termination of the Mandate and final withdrawal of British troops, and that there could be no question of our retaining any responsibility for civil administration in Palestine after May 15, even in order to see that a truce was observed. Our representative also voted in favour of a further special session of the General Assembly. He pointed out that, in voting in this way, His Majesty's Government were not departing from the neutral position they had hitherto taken up and were not passing any judgment on the solution which the Assembly originally worked out. In view, however, of the intense disturbances that had arisen in Palestine, and of the apparent desire of the Security Council that the Assembly should be given an opportunity to review their decision in the light of subsequent events, His Majesty's Government had decided to vote in favour of giving the Assembly this chance to think again. The special session is due to meet in about one week's time, and I cannot forecast what may be the outcome of these further deliberations.
It is not even now clear in what way the Palestine Commission propose to interpret the task assigned to them, pending the outcome of the special session. One thing remains definite and unaltered: that is the fixed determination of His Majesty's Government to terminate the
1202
Mandate for Palestine at the latest on the 15th day of May, and to withdraw their troops at the latest by the 1st day of August. Nothing which has happened or can happen at Lake Success will modify this time-table. I am sure it is in accordance with the wish of this country and of the House that we free ourselves at the earliest possible moment from this commitment, which has caused heavy casualties through the years on many British soldiers and police, and a drain on our resources which can no longer be allowed to continue. We have again and again made it clear that British Forces cannot be used to impose on the people of Palestine a settlement of their differences which lacks the essential ingredient of mutual consent.
In the discussions which are now proceeding in New York preliminary to the special session of the Assembly, our representative has been instructed to make it clear that British troops will not be available after May 15 to support any policy upon which the agreement of both Arabs and Jews has not been obtained. We have given of our best to Palestine and it has brought us little reward. Our Mandate has proved a thankless and ultimately an impracticable responsibility. In the nature of things, neither Jews nor Arabs have been satisfied that their rights and claims have been fully acknowledged by the Mandatory Power. They have not felt able to take genuine responsibility for administration, or to acknowledge their differences and find mutual accommodation. No one can expect us to carry this burden indefinitely, and we have given ample warning of the circumstances in which we propose to relinquish it.
It is with no light heart however, that we see this chapter in the history of our association with Palestine drawing to a close. The storm clouds are gathering, and nowhere do we see that spirit of conciliation and compromise without which a peaceful future for Palestine seems impossible. Supported by sympathy and encouragement from the neighbouring Arab States, bands of armed Arabs have infiltrated over the frontiers of Palestine and have established themselves in the tangled hill-country, whence they descend to attack Jewish settlements and communications. Wherever possible, these bands have been intercepted by our

1203
security Forces, and either prevented from entering the country or driven back across the frontiers. Owing to the nature of the frontiers, however, it is not always possible to ensure continuous supervision by day and night, and many groups have escaped the vigilance of our patrols.
These forces, which style themselves units of the Arab Liberation Army, are dispersed among the villages of Northern Galilee and Samaria, with smaller concentrations in other purely Arab sections of the country. A conservative estimate of their total numbers is 6,000 men. The principal object of their operations appears to be to interfere with communications between the main zone of Jewish settlement on the coastal plain and the more isolated Jewish communities in the interior, particularly in Jerusalem. We have protested to the Arab Governments that they should not permit the incursion of such bands from their territories, and have urged them to take all possible steps to prevent further incursions. Our representatives with the States members of the Arab League have recently been instructed to reiterate to the Governments to which they are accredited the view of His Majesty's Government that the establishment on Palestine territory of irregular military formations recruited in Arab States is a major factor contributing to the ever-increasing danger of a large-scale outbreak of violence in that country. In bringing this danger to the attention of the Arab Governments we have expressed the earnest hope that they will take effective steps to prevent further violations of the frontier of Palestine and to restrain irregular forces already established in that country.
Meanwhile the Jews of Palestine have been clamouring for permission to import further quantities of arms, although in the past the Mandatory Power has never found the Jewish illegal armies lacking in weapons of war. We are convinced that it cannot be conducive to peace in Palestine to allow the importation of arms by either community, and so long as the Mandate continues we propose to maintain our impartial embargo on the importation of such supplies. The increasing turbulence in the country, and the appalling readiness with which each side resorts to force at the smallest provocation, has not only rendered more difficult
1204
and costly the task of our troops and administration in withdrawing from the country, but has led many of us to entertain grave fears lest chaos and bloodshed should be our successors. In this connection we are particularly anxious about the situation in Jerusalem. Since we referred the problem of Palestine to the United Nations, we have again and again drawn the attention of that organisation to the supreme importance in the eyes of the three great faiths of the Holy Places in Jerusalem, and have urged that satisfactory arrangements for the safeguarding of the City must be an essential feature of any plan for the future government of Palestine. Our representative on the Trusteeship Council has placed at the disposal of the Council all available information derived from our long experience, and has lent every assistance in the task assigned to the Council by the General Assembly of working out an international Statute for the City. The Council have now finished their work on the Statute, which they regard as being in a satisfactory form, but in spite of the strong objections lodged by our representative they have decided to defer final approval of the Statute, and the appointment of a Governor, to a further meeting towards the end of April.
The proposal for an international régime in Jerusalem forms part of the Plan for Palestine approved by the General Assembly in November last, and the implementation of the Plan as a whole is the responsibility of the United Nations Commission. In considering this aspect of their task, the Commission have pointed out to the Security Council that the City, with its mixed population, cannot be in peace if there is no peace between the two main communities. There are approximately 100,000 Jews and more than 105,000 Arabs resident in the area designated by the General Assembly as that for which an international régime is to be established. The City constitutes an island in territory which is almost exclusively Arab, and it depends for its essential supplies and communication with the outside world on the good will of its neighbours. Its water supply, its electricity supply and its food supply are at the mercy of any hostile force which may invest the City.
The Jewish community in Jerusalem depend for their food on supplies brought to them by road from the main Jewish

1205
area in the coastal plain, and the authorities in Palestine are at the moment much concerned to devise some means whereby Jewish food convoys making for Jerusalem can be protected against ambushes by Arab bands. Negotiations with the Jews have been undertaken by the military authorities in the hope that some mutually acceptable arrangement can be made for the safeguarding of essential convoys. Similarly, the economy and finances of the City depend on the general economy of Palestine. Without peace in Palestine as a whole there are, therefore, grave dangers facing Jerusalem, dangers which might be mitigated if international authority could be effectively established there to keep the peace between the communities. The Government of Palestine have been working unremittingly for months to gain the consent of religious and political leaders of all Parties to a holy truce within the City. They have also taken steps to form a municipal police force of 600 men, half Arab and half Jew, to be left behind on our departure to protect life and property in the quarters of their respective communities.
The task of providing a special police force to keep the peace between these communities rests with the United Nations, and we have stated that no obstacle will be placed in the way of any members of the British section of the Palestine Police Force volunteering on the termination of their present contracts for service with an international force. As I have said, it is by no means clear at the moment how the Palestine Commission will interpret its functions now that a further special session of the General Assembly is contemplated. We have heard that the Commission intend to create a special interim police force for Jerusalem to operate from May 15, until other arrangements are made by the United Nations. That is the latest information available. This emergency force, it is hoped, will be formed and paid for by the United Nations. It is not the force which the resolution of November 29 contemplated would be raised by the Governor of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, if it can be raised, it will be a substantial neutral force, and we certainly wish the Commission well in any efforts they may undertake to preserve peace in Jerusalem, and we shall afford as great a degree of co-operation as we can.
We are particularly concerned about the dangers to the fabric of the Christian Holy
1206
Places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. This danger arises not from the risk of any direct attack on the sacred buildings themselves, but rather from the fact that they are situated in what may well become a battle area, where they may suffer damage incidental to the main conflict. It is our sincere hope that this conflict will not develop. The safety of the Holy Places depends on peace in Jerusalem, and this in turn depends on peace in Palestine. The best hope of their preservation lies in pressure from the conscience of the world at the United Nations which is now, as an organisation, responsible for the future of Palestine, and also on the warring peoples of Palestine itself, between whom some accommodation must be reached if tranquility is to be restored in the Holy Land.
I now turn from the main provision of the Bill to consider those consequential provisions which necessarily flow from the surrender of His Majesty's jurisdiction in Palestine. From this it follows that proceedings before the Privy Council must abate. That is provided for in Clause 2 (1). It seems likely that all pending cases from Palestine, lodged with the Judicial Committee before the introduction of this Bill, will be disposed of by May 15. In this same clause, Clause 2, we provide for an indemnity conferring immunity from action in British courts in respect of acts done by our Forces in Palestine in good faith and in the execution of their duty for the protection and withdrawal from Palestine of His Majesty's Forces or stores or other property. Acts which they may do similarly for the protection in Palestine of the life or property of British subjects will also be covered by this immunity. The position of our Forces still in Palestine after the termination of the Mandate will be that of armed forces in a foreign territory. We have not much doubt that tinder international law they will be entitled to protect themselves and exercise such powers as may be required to secure their own withdrawal. We have thought it right, however, to give them the support and encouragement of knowing that they need not hesitate, through fear of proceedings, to do any acts which they conceive to be their duty, and which they do in good faith.
Similarly, immunity has been conferred on the Civil Government in respect of acts

1207
done for peace, order and good government in Palestine before the appointed day, or for the purpose of, or in connection with, the termination of His Majesty's jurisdiction. This does not imply that the Civil Government intend in any way to act illegally. In the closing stages of the Mandate, in the increasingly disturbed state of the country and in circumstances and amid difficulties which cannot be foreseen, it may not be possible for the servants of the Palestine Government to complete all their duties as though they were conducting a normal administration in a peaceful country.
The enactments repealed by Clause 3 (1) of the Bill authorise the raising of loans by the Palestine Government and their guarantee by the Treasury. There is only one outstanding loan, the 3 per cent. Guaranteed Loan, raised under the Finance Act, 1934, which was guaranteed as to principal and interest by the Treasury. This guarantee continues, but it is our intention to make arrangements with the successor authorities in Palestine to assume continuing responsibility for this loan. Clause 3 (2) deals with the future application of Acts of Parliament to Palestine. These Acts will, after May 15, cease to apply to Palestine so far as the law of the United Kingdom is concerned, but they are left to continue in force as part of the domestic law of Palestine unless and until they are altered by the successor authorities. These authorities will thus inherit as a working basis an existing body of law which, in its validity in Palestine, is in no way affected by this Bill.
Clause 3 (3) and the Second Schedule contain certain transitional provisions relating to Acts which will cease to extend to Palestine as part of the law of the United Kingdom under the preceding sub-section. For example, persons who have obtained judgments in the Palestine courts before May 15 will be able to register them in the High Court here if they wish to enforce them in the United Kingdom. We have also provided for the modification of the Colonial Prisoners Removal Act, 1884, so as to authorise the detention in the United Kingdom after May 15 of convicted prisoners removed from Palestine before that day. It is our intention to remove to the United Kingdom (as we have done in the past) any British subjects domiciled here who have substantial
1208
terms of imprisonment to serve. Whether we shall remove other prisoners must depend in the first instance on what arrangements can be made for their continued detention in Palestine after that day. We had hoped in our discussions with the United Nations Commission to reach some acceptable arrangement with them on this matter. That may not be possible, but I am unable to say more on the subject at the moment.
Clause 3 (4) enables Orders in Council to be made dealing with transitional matters arising from the termination of the Mandate, some of which, of course, we cannot at the moment foresee. Paragraph (a) will enable us to transfer to appropriate authorities here the liquid assets of the Palestine Government to enable us to meet obligations remaining undischarged on May 15. We shall also be able to transfer here funds ear-marked for special purposes in respect of which we have responsibilities—for example, liquid German enemy assets in the hands of the Palestine Custodian of Enemy Property; and a fund established to provide special compensation for officials killed or injured by terrorist activities. Paragraph (b) of Clause 3 (4) enables us to adapt the Acts relating to superannuation so as to avoid any break in the service of officers of the Palestine Government which would otherwise be caused by that Government coming to an end. Under Clause 4 of the Bill Orders in Council are subject to annulment by resolution of either House of Parliament, in the ordinary way. I submit this Bill to your Lordships and I commend it to you because it is, I think, the logical fulfilment of the policy which has already received the approval of your Lordships' House. I beg to move.
Moved, That this Bill be now read 2a.—(The Earl of Listowel.)
5.16 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, before proceeding to the main subject of the debate, I should like most sincerely to associate those of us who sit on these Benches with what was said by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, in regard to the shocking outrage announced in the Press this morning. The brutality and irresponsibility of this outrage is on a par with others which have been inflicted on British Forces doing what is, after all, an international duty. I hope that all possible steps will be taken to

1209
apprehend and punish the criminals. I hope, too, that the responsible leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine will both assist the authorities in this object and express wholeheartedly their detestation of this last example of the policy of violence which, if only they would realise it, is alienating sympathy with their cause throughout the civilised world. I would also like, if I may, to express our very real and deep sympathy with the relatives of those who have suffered in this shocking event.
May I now pass to Palestine and the Bill? To-day must have meant an exhausting Parliamentary experience for the noble Earl. He has already made three full speeches and, I am afraid, is threatened with one more. We ought to be very grateful to him for the full and lucid exposition he has given, both of the short but extremely complicated measure which we are now discussing and also of the general situation in Palestine. I must confess that the story he told us was even darker and more alarming than I had anticipated. I am afraid that I have little that is new to add to what has already been said, either with regard to the unhappy position which has led to the introduction of this Bill or to the Bill itself. It was only a few weeks ago that we in your Lordships' House had a full discussion on Palestine, and I have no doubt this afternoon that much will be said by others well qualified to speak.
I feel, personally, that there has never been a sorrier page in recent history than the story of Palestine during the last thirty years—a story which started with such high hopes but which up to now has resulted only in bitterness and bloodshed. I cannot imagine a more melancholy monument to the fallibility of human endeavours. From the start, right away back at the end of the last war, it was clear that the earliest years of the Zionist experiment were bound to be turbulent and troublesome. In a small country such as that, the superimposition on the existing inhabitants of an entirely new population, with different traditions and different standards of life, was bound to be a difficult and delicate operation. But it was hoped that under the guidance of a Mandatory Power—an independent and unbiased Power—the two communities, Arabs and Jews, with good sense would gradually weld themselves into a
1210
single unity. As your Lordships know, it was with that aim, and that aim alone, that Great Britain accepted the Mandate.
We had no personal interest in Palestine, except, of course, a general interest in the peace and prosperity of the Middle East. We undertook the extremely invidious task from quite disinterested motives, and we carried it out to the best of our ability for nearly thirty years. I think we may fairly claim that we achieved very considerable success. Under our temporary administration—and it was known from the first to be merely temporary—the country flourished. The Jewish community established themselves in Palestine, and by their energy and enterprise increased the wealth of the country. The Arabs also flowed in and shared in that prosperity. The mandatory Power carried on the administration of the country in accordance with the Mandate with fairness between the two communities. No doubt mistakes were made—mistakes are always made—but, broadly speaking, law and order were equally maintained, and the conditions for the success of this great experiment appeared to have been established.
But that happy situation depended upon two considerations: either the two communities had to blend themselves into one single unity—which is what was hoped—or the Mandatory had to remain and maintain the balance between the two. Unfortunately, this essential fact was not recognised by the leaders of either the Arabs or the Jews, or, what was even more important, by their backers in foreign lands. The Jews thought they could do without the Arabs; the Arabs thought they could do without the Jews; and both of them thought they could do without the Mandatory. In this last opinion they were supported by propagandist groups in other countries, who, in turn, influenced their own Governments to bring pressure on the Mandatory, first in one direction and then in the other. So the moral backing of the world, which was essential if the Mandatory was to be able to carry out its task effectively, was withdrawn. The Palestine Administration, as I know very well from the time I spent in the Colonial Office during the war, was under constant attack by the supporters of both sides, both inside and outside Palestine. In its desperate efforts to resist this pressure, it gave the impression inevitably

1211
to each party that it was favouring its opponent, whereas, as a matter of fact, it was merely attempting, with considerable success, to maintain a central, unbiased position. However that might be, eventually it became evident that that situation could not continue; the burden on the Mandatory was too great.
As I see it, two alternatives remained. Either world opinion—and especially opinion in the United States—must face up to facts and give moral, and possibly physical, support to the Mandatory in maintaining the law and order on which the Zionist experiment depended, or the Mandatory must hand back its responsibility to those who conferred it and leave it to them, if they could, to devise a better plan. If we on this side of the House have a complaint against His Majesty's Government over Palestine, it is that in the years immediately following the war they did not appear to recognise this fact and either attempt to enforce an effective policy, or, if they found the difficulties of the Mandate too great—as they might well have done—immediately take steps at that time to renounce the Mandate before the situation got entirely out of hand. They still continued (I am not blaming them for it; it was a well-intentioned effort) to strive for a solution agreeable to both Jews and Arabs, when it ought to have been abundantly clear to them that such a solution was no longer possible.
So, when they eventually decided to renounce the Mandate, the bitterness was so great, and the passions in the country so inflamed, that it was impossible for bloodshed to be avoided. I cannot help but feel that the appalling situation which has been disclosed by the noble Earl's speech to-day might conceivably have been avoided if it had been possible for His Majesty's Government to act earlier and with rather more resolution. But having said that, we on this side of the House have no quarrel with their final decision to renounce the Mandate, and to hand back a problem which I agree with them is too great for any single nation, and leave it to be dealt with on an international plane. I do not think the Government have any alternative but to do what they are doing now. Therefore, it is not our intention to oppose this Bill, with the main purpose of which we are in full agreement.
1212
So far as the details are concerned, these are largely legal, and I expect there are others more competent than I to deal with them. There is a point—a very difficult point, as I understand it—about the future nationality of the people of Palestine. I understand it is the view of the legal advisers to the Crown that these people have never been British subjects; they have merely enjoyed the protection which is given to people living in an area where we are temporarily in charge of the administration. Now that, on May 15, we are divesting ourselves of responsibility for this administration, I gather that the legal position is that they revert to their original nationality—the nationality, I suppose, of their birth—until some new State or new States are set up of which they can become citizens. I understand that to be the position. It seems to me to be a queer one. So far as I know, there are considerable numbers of these people who had no previous nationality, and are what are called "Stateless persons." I do not know whether they revert to being Stateless persons when we leave Palestine. Perhaps the noble Earl can inform me on that matter. What I think is clear—and here I am in complete agreement with His Majesty's Government—is that we cannot continue to be responsible for their protection when we no longer have any special connection with the country.
There is then the question of the general act of indemnity for acts of our soldiers and officials during the interim period between the surrender of the Mandate and our departure from the country. I think that is the period covered by the indemnity. That is undoubtedly an extremely strong measure, which probably would not be thought justifiable in normal conditions, but in the exceptional circumstances of the case I am bound to say I think it is absolutely right. If I may go a little way back into the past, I remember a story that was told me about my grandfather when he was Foreign Secretary. In his day difficulties arose in a remote quarter of the world where we had administrative responsibility, and those difficulties involved the possible use of force. The young officer in charge—apparently he was quite a young junior officer—faced with appalling decisions, telegraphed back asking for instructions, and received a reply from the Foreign

1213
Secretary: "Do as you think best. You will be supported." That seems to me rather a similar situation to that with which our troops and officials are likely to be faced in Palestine. It is to be noted that the Government of that day took exactly the same view as the one incorporated by the present Government in this Bill.
Another point is about the incorporation of the date of the termination of the Mandate in the Bill. That was not in the Bill as it originally appeared before another place. I must confess I am very glad it has been included. I think it is important, so that there shall be no doubt in any quarter as to the possibility of our weakening on our decision. If we were to give that impression we should do a great deal more harm than good.
I would like now for a few moments (I am going to speak only briefly to-day) to advert to the future. Though, as I have said, I think the Government are entirely right to terminate the Mandate, and to terminate it at a fixed date, I must confess that I am a little shocked by their apparently frantic desire to underline the fact that they are washing their hands entirely of the whole business. No doubt this altitude (though I am sure this is not their intention) will be extremely popular with wide sections of the electorate of this country. The British people are, if I may use a colloquialism, "fed up" with Palestine, and they want to hear no more about it and to have no more to do with it. But we, who are responsible people in Parliament, must recognise that we remain members, of the United Nations, and we cannot entirely divest ourselves or absolve ourselves from the responsibilities which such membership involves. We shall, of course, no longer have any special responsibility to the country. We are giving up our Mandate; we are disposing of that responsibility. But we shall continue to have the same responsibility as other members of the United Nations. Moreover, it is in the interest of general peace—which is, after all, the supreme British interest—that chaos should be avoided in that country. A civil war in Palestine might easily flare up into some thing very much wider. Wars in modern days have a habit of spreading rather like a forest fire, which quickly involves areas a long way from the original source of the conflagration.
1214
Finally, there is the question of the protection of Jerusalem and the Holy Places, which must be of vital interest to all Christian peoples. I deeply deplored hearing from the noble Earl that the United Nations had decided still further to defer the appointment of a Governor. I gather that last-minute attempts are being made to recruit an international police force for the defence of the City, but how this defence force is to be operated before May 15 it is difficult to discover. I am afraid that the outlook in that respect is formidable. I do not suggest with regard to this question, or any other question, that we should do more than any other country; but, as I say, we, as a member of the United Nations, cannot divest ourselves of all interest in the matter. I hope that the Government will make this clear, and publicly clear. I should have thought this was a matter where Governments should not follow public opinion but should lead it; because this is far too vital and too important a matter for us to act in any irresponsible manner.
What is the immediate future of this distracted country? I suppose no one could actually say. The position is extremely obscure. As I understand it, partition for the immediate future is now dead, since it would have needed enforcement, and the Security Council have found themselves unwilling to take the necessary measures to enforce it. As a result, the United Nations have no longer any scheme for Palestine, and have been driven back upon the expedient of calling on Jews and Arabs to agree to a truce. That is really all that is left to the United Nations at the moment. In the meantime, I gather, it is proposed by the United States that the country should be put under International Trusteeship, under the direct administration of a Trusteeship Council, through a Governor assisted by an International Police Force.
What does that in fact mean? It means the renewal of the Mandate in a new form. It is a renewal of just that form of government whish the protagonists on both sides have worked so hard to destroy. That, surely, is a melancholy commentary on the actions of those irresponsible people in the United States and elsewhere who made our own administration impossible when it was doing an admirable job. One can only pray that in the light

1215
of the appalling events of the past few months the appeal for a truce will fall on more fruitful ground than it did when it was made in the past. For what is the alternative? It is purely and simply chaos. There is no other alternative. It is extremely improbable that the Jews could impose their will upon the Arabs. It is equally improbable that the Arabs could impose their will upon the Jews. But what either can probably do is to make organised government by the other impossible. If that were to happen no one would benefit. The whole Zionist experiment—which has brought such prosperity to the country—would go down in smoke and ruin; and the Arabs, who have also benefited by that prosperity, would suffer equally.
If ever there were a case when not fanaticism but hard common sense is necessary, it is now. We have failed, and we must confess our failure. Yet I personally feel that it is a failure of which we have no cause to be ashamed. It is now for the leaders of the Jews and Arabs to show that spirit of statesmanship which, up to now, has been so conspicuously lacking; and it is for their backers in other lands to counsel moderation where hitherto they have counselled violence. Only in this way, as I see it, can this problem—which has so great potentialities for good or evil to the whole world—be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. The proposed truce at any rate gives the chance of a breathing space, if it does no more; we can only pray that the leaders of the two sides will seize it. Our task as Mandatory is ended. We have handed back, and this Bill is designed to take the necessary statutory measures to give effect to that decision. As such, though we may have something to say of the details on the Committee stage, it receives our general support to-night.
5.36 p.m.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, this Bill is of a juridical nature; its clauses are legal provisions designed to cover evacuation from Palestine. We on these Benches regard the Bill as necessary for its purpose and support it on Second Reading. If there are any matters of detail to be discussed we will leave them for the Committee stage. As the interesting speech from the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition indicates, our minds
1216
this afternoon are not so much upon the actual provisions of the Bill, as upon the situation out of which the Bill arises. We still ask ourselves whether there may not be some way out from the present impasse and, if so, what that way can be.
Having myself a very special experience of the problem of Palestine, and having kept in close touch with movements there since I ceased to be High Commissioner about twenty years ago, I would venture to-day, at this moment of crisis, to lay before your Lordships, in brief outline, some concrete proposals. They are, I think, of a character that both sides, if they wished for peace, could accept without dishonour. The last debate in this House was held at a time when we were awaiting action by the United Nations. Since then it must be confessed that the proceedings at Lake Success have been marked by vacillation and failure. We have had an almost exact repetition of the course of events of ten years ago, when the Royal Commission, under the Chairmanship of the late Lord Peel, in despair of any alternative, advocated partition. Some of us in this House and elsewhere opposed that proposal and declared that it was impracticable. The Government of that day proceeded. They appointed an expert Committee, the Woodhead Committee, to go to Palestine to draw the lines of the frontiers between the two States. That Committee reported that they found it impossible to draw any lines which would be workable, and the plan was dropped.
Now the special Committee of the United Nations, for the same reason, has adopted another plan—the same in principle, but with the boundaries drawn in different places. They have appointed a Commission to put it into effect, and the Commission have reported that they found their task an impossible one. Both these plans, to my mind, are marked by the same fundamental error of principle. Palestine, by its racial, economic, religious and cultural conditions, does not allow itself to follow any geographical pattern. It has its own pattern, which cannot be made to coincide with any division into areas. Nevertheless, all the plans recently put forward, except one, have proceeded along the same lines. We are so familiar in Europe and America with constituencies and boundaries and democratically

1217
elected assemblies, majority Governments and minorities acquiescing, that we cannot realise that there are countries where this system simply does not work and cannot be applied. Nevertheless, as I say, every one of the schemes put forward has been upon those lines. We have had what is called the Morrison Plan of 1946, which suggested divisions into provinces—an Arab province and a Jewish province, each with its elected Legislature and its Executive. That plan also provided for a British Trusteeship for Jerusalem and certain other areas.
In the following year, 1947, we had the Bevin Plan. The scheme then was to divide up the country into cantons according to the character of the populations. Those cantons, after a period of four years, were to elect a Constituent Assembly. In August, 1947, the United Nations Committee proposed by a majority a Plan which was endorsed by the Assembly, and this Plan has been under active consideration with a view to adoption. It proposes two States, with an enclave under Trusteeship, all the three together to form a special organisation to preserve the economic unity of the country—the map itself of Palestine looking more like a patchwork quilt than anything else. A Minority Report proposes two States with frontiers which could be federated together for common action for certain purposes.
But to my mind all these plans are mistaken. They are all, in essence, geographical. The plan which I myself have advocated for many years—which has received support from Dr. Magnes, President of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem, and some support from many of the most sober and wise elements in the country—rests upon an entirely different principle, the principle of communities.
The only exception to this melancholy procession of futile plans has been the Report of the Anglo-American Committee. That body, appointed by the Governments of this country and the United States in 1946, came unanimously to the conclusion that Palestine could not be as a whole either an Arab State or a Jewish State, and that partition was equally impracticable. They declared that the country should not be governed on the basis of dominant majorities and passive minorities but should be organised under
1218
Mandate or Trusteeship; and that there could be no complete self-government in the country until the two sections had learnt how to live and work together. To my mind the refusal of the present Government in this country to press for the adoption of that plan was a cardinal error of policy.
Before we went there, the Turks governed all those countries, with mixed populations and religions, on the principle of what they called Millet—that is, an organisation in each community which the Turkish Government recognised, and which was taken into consultation on all matters of importance, used as agents of the Government and allowed a considerable measure of freedom for the management of its own specific affairs. In spite of the universal corruption and the general incompetence of Turkish administration, this principle allowed then to keep their ramshackle Empire in being for several centuries. It is this principle which, twenty-five years ago, I endeavoured to put into effect in Palestine and which was the basis of my policy there. The Jewish community already had there the beginnings of an organisation, which the Administration encouraged and gave statutory authority. It provided for the raising of a revenue and it was created on a freely elected central assembly, known as Va'ad Leumi, a Council of the People. It has worked ever since that time, on the whole successfully. It is working to-day.
I was anxious to establish a similar organisation for the Arab community, but they were so torn by internecine disputes and personal and family feuds—or perhaps I should say differences—that it was impossible to establish any organisation except the supreme Moslem Council which was set up for the government of purely religious affairs. The Christian communities also had their own organisations as such. The Latin was effective. The Orthodox was at that time inefficient and, in fact, insolvent. We built it up again and made it strong, self-reliant and financially sound. Partition between Jew and Arab is now being regarded as out of the question. Another plan on different lines should therefore be submitted for consideration. But first it is essential to settle what has been done with regard to immigration, because that matter is fundamental and must

1219
be decided beforehand; otherwise it will bring down any Constitution or any organisation which leaves to local decision this question of immigration. It is far more vital to the Jews than the question of the establishment of a State—least of all of a State which would draw at least one-third of its citizens from among the Arabs.
The White Paper of 1939 is the beginning of our present troubles. That Paper proposed to shut down Jewish immigration absolutely at the end of five years, unless the Arabs consented to its continuance. Everyone knew that the Arabs would not consent, and that in effect vitiated the Mandate for Palestine—an international document. And that was being done without the approval of the international authority which had endorsed the Mandate, the League of Nations. That was denounced by no one with greater vigour than by Mr. Churchill—unless it was by the Leaders of the Labour Party, who were then in Opposition. All the various authorities I have mentioned have disagreed more or less on every point except this: they are all in favour of the reopening of immigration. The Anglo-American Committee advocated that it should be reopened and facilitated, and that 100,000 should be allowed in within two years. The Morrison Plan proposed the admission of 100,000 Jews at once and others to follow. The Bevin Plan proposed the same. The United Nations Committee Majority Report advocated the admission into the Jewish State in two years of 150,000, and afterwards of 60,000 a year.
The United Nations Minority Report, which was not so favourable to the Jewish cause, advocated that immigration into the Jewish State should be reopened up to the capacity of that State to absorb whatever numbers there might be—the question of absorptive capacity to be decided by an International Commission consisting of three Jews, three Arabs, and three members appointed by the United Nations. In Palestine, there is a great demand for labour, and a very great number of immigrants can be absorbed economically without difficulty, and to the benefit of both communities. Under the British Mandate the population of Palestine increased threefold, and there is no unemployment. The Jews have increased
1220
by 525,000. Meanwhile the Arabs, so far from being driven out of the country and being superseded, have increased by 626,000–100,000 more than the Jews—and their standard of living has been greatly raised above anything that has ever previously been known in the history of the country.
In those circumstances, I would suggest for consideration that a settlement might be advocated on the following lines: that the administration of Palestine should be transferred, at the ending of the Mandate, to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations—I think that is generally agreed—and that the Trusteeship Council should appoint a Commission to administer the country. Perhaps there should be a Governor-General, but whatever the actual procedure adopted might be, that is not of first importance. The important point is that there should be constituted in Palestine an Arab Council and a Jewish Council. Each Council would be elected by the members of the respective community wherever they might be resident, and not on a geographical basis. Each Council would make and administer laws on matters to be specified, relating to education, religion and other communal affairs applying to its own community. Provision would be made for adequate revenues, to be under the Council's control. The Commission would consult with each Council on all matters of importance, whether communal or general, before taking action. All that is now in operation on the Jewish side through the Va'ad Leumi.
Then, if desired by the Christian communities, there should be constituted a third Council, with similar functions for those communities as a whole. Alternatively, any one of those communities might be empowered to elect such a Council. The Arab Council and the Jewish Council, and any Christian Council, should have direct access to the United Nations on any matters concerning Palestine. That is a new proposal which would go far to meet the psychological case of the Jewish community. Next, the present system of local government in towns and districts should continue. Wherever the population is homogeneous now, there is a local council or municipality of its own colour, using its own language and carrying out local

1221
administration in accordance with the wishes of the people.
Jewish immigration would he permitted as proposed in the recommendation of the Majority Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine—namely, up to 150,000 in the first two years and 60,000 a year thereafter. Certain unanimous recommendations of the United Nations Special Committee should be applied dealing with Holy Places and religious interests, with Jewish displaced persons, with democratic principles and the protection of minorities, and with peaceful relations. Lastly, Palestine should maintain the closest relations of cordial co-operation, political and economic, with the neighbouring States. In particular, unrestricted access to the sea through Palestinian ports should be assured to the inland States. If such a system were established, it might be hoped that the two communal Councils, though separate at first and consulted separately by the Government at the centre, would gradually grow together by joint committees dealing with special subjects for the sake of administrative convenience. After a series of years, it might be found that the two Councils would gradually become more and more amalgamated, until they would at last form a Central Assembly.
If some such plan as this, or any plan, is not adopted, or if the United Nations do not establish some effective administration backed by an adequate force, then after May 15 (five weeks from to-day) anarchy, in the literal sense of the word, will prevail in Palestine. There will be no government—that is the meaning of anarchy. When this Bill was being discussed on Second Reading in another place, the Attorney-General in His Majesty's Government made a statement which he repeated textually in the Committee stage, showing the importance he attached to his observations. He said this, in the circumstances which I have just described,
" the position in that unhappy country will be that it would no longer have any de jure government or be entitled to recognition in international law."
In that event, after May 15, if not earlier, there would be open and unrestrained civil war in Palestine. That might last for months; it might last for years. Already there have been hundreds of casualties on both sides; hundreds of
1222
splendid young lives have been sacrificed. With full civil war, casualties would number thousands, possibly tens of thousands, with immense material destruction. At the end, it might well be that the problem would be exactly the same as it is now. Consequently, it will be obvious that it would be far better to have a settlement before these events instead of after them.
The first condition of any settlement must be abandonment of terrorism. I agree with everything that has been said on this point by the two previous speakers. Nothing can excuse morally such brutal murders as those which have been reported to-day. Terrorism is always politically suicidal. It destroys the very cause which it is intended to promote, first because it evokes such universal anger and hatred that it alienates every friend of the movement it is supposed to assist, and stimulates every enemy; secondly, because sooner or later the terrorists, whose boast is that they are unrestrained and ruthless, always turn their weapons against their own leaders when these begin to displease them, so that, in the common saying, which we all know, "the revolution devours her own children." Thirdly, and most important of all, terrorism deprives any movement of its moral basis and its sense of mission. Instead of its members being able to take pride and satisfaction in the cause they serve, they have a sense of guilt and of shame. There could be no blessing on a Jewish State founded on assassinations and wholesale murder. Let them remember the words of the Jewish prophet Micah, who denounced those who
" build up Zion with blood and Jerusalem with iniquity."
The British Government must show a greater spirit of co-operation with the United Nations in this period of transition. They seem to take pride in declaring that, after May 15, they will be utterly unconcerned with what may occur. The Colonial Secretary in another place a few days ago said:
" We cannot do more. It is not our responsibility."
They wash their hands of all that surely will happen. There was once a Governor in Jerusalem, the representative of an occupying Power, who disclaimed all

1223
responsibility with regard to a deed that was about to be done—
"…he took water and washed his hands before the multitude."
History does not praise him. Let His Majesty's Government, and the Foreign Secretary in particular, bend their energies to aiding the United Nations by constructive co-operation. Let the Zionists restrain their own extremists, and the Arab League do the like with theirs. Then, and only then, shall we find a way out of these confusions and dangers.
6.0 p.m.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF YORK: My Lords, I am sure we all feel this to be a very melancholy occasion. We are debating the failure of a very great enterprise. We took on the Mandate in Palestine with high hopes. We believed that we should be able to restore order and prosperity to a land which for centuries had suffered under misrule. We believed that we should there be able to create a religious and cultural home for the Jews. Now, within five weeks, we shall surrender our Mandate and, as the noble Viscount has just said, we shall be leaving the country in a state of disorder, on the verge of chaos and anarchy, and we shall leave the country hated by both Jew and Arab.
We are bound to ask what is the cause of this failure, for we have to admit that we have failed. There were times when it looked as if we should be successful. In the early years of the Mandate all seemed to be going well; but everything has changed since then. The noble Viscount who has just spoken puts a good deal of blame on the White Paper. I have often heard that argument, and I have no doubt that there is something to be said for that point of view. I would remind the House, however, that there is another side to it, and I prefer to answer in the words of a Jew, Professor Zander, who has quite recently written a most valuable pamphlet on the whole subject of the Jews in Palestine. Speaking of the White Paper he says:
" It was impossible to pretend indefinitely that our right to enter the country was unlimited; that it was Britain's duty to enforce the admission of every Jew for whom we could provide a living until at last we reached the majority in the country. It was impossible to demand that Britain by this method should do just what she had refused to do from the beginning—that is to establish a Jewish State
1224
against the will of the Arab, and thereby run the risk of violence and even war."
It is no good concealing the actual hard facts of the position. The Mandate has failed through the inveterate hostility shown towards it by the Zionists, and by the acquiescence of the Agency in their violence. We went there to form a home. The Jews demanded a State, and they followed up their demands with crimes of violence. Remember, the crimes of violence started with the Jewish terrorists. There was the blowing up of the King David Hotel and the hanging of those two young boy sergeants. Murder after murder has followed and, side by side with these murders, there has been carried on a campaign of what I can describe only as venomous slander against this nation and those who attempted to carry out the Mandate. What has happened now? The results are plain. The Jews are now surrounded with the hatred of the neighbours in their immediate neighbourhood. From Pakistan to Greece there is not a nation which does not oppose all thoughts of a Jewish State. The suspicion of the Arabs in Palestine has been turned into bitter hostility. The Jews have despised the Arabs. They have looked upon them as hewers of wood and drawers of water.
I hope the noble Viscount will forgive me for referring to his remarks about the material benefits which the Jews have undoubtedly brought to the Arabs in the land. I feel that he was forgetting that even the Arab has something higher in his mind than material benefits—that he also feels the urge of nationalism and patriotism. That is what the Jews out there have never recognised. They felt that the Arabs could be ignored, and they declared that Arab opposition was simply a bluff. The result is they now have the Arab nation in full hostility towards them. It is no good disguising that the Jews have lost the friendship of this country, which for centuries has been their friend. These events have started in this country a dangerous and deplorable movement of anti-Semitism. Now it look as if the Jews might easily lose the friendship of the United States. Those are deplorable facts, and I cannot see how the Government could have adopted any other course than that which they have adopted—namely to withdraw our Forces from the country. How can they allow our soldiers to remain out there, to be murdered by the very people they are

1225
trying to help, exposed to every kind of treachery?
I was speaking to a man only a day or two ago who had recently come from Palestine. He told me that both Jews and Arabs are murdering our soldiers simply for the sake of getting possession of their weapons and uniforms. This last attack was a cold-blooded and cruel outrage which could have been carried out only by people who delight in murder. I have no doubt the Agency would denounce this; in fact they may have denounced it, for all I know. But no help whatever has been given by the Agency in bringing to justice the perpetrators of this and other outrages. I know the men out there; I have met them. I know many members of these Forces who are going through this terrible ordeal, and that is why I speak strongly. I feel that if we have failed out there it has been due to the actions of the Jews themselves, and to the failure of the Agency to recognise their responsibility towards the Mandatory Power. It is no good merely looking back upon the past. I know, of course, that the noble Viscount and a great number of the Jews in this country deplore as strongly as any of us here what has been happening in Palestine, but we have to think of the future. What is to happen in the immediate future? Here we come to the anxiety which has been expressed already by those who have spoken—anxiety about Jerusalem.
I find it difficult to state fully how deeply anxious many of us are about the future of Jerusalem in the next few weeks. Jerusalem is in the very heart of millions of Christians. It is true that they may sometimes idealise it, more perhaps than they would had the circumstances there been different. It stands for them not only as a symbol; if there are doubts about the authenticity of some of the sacred spots, there is no doubt that it was on the spot where Jerusalem is built that the Saviour of the world died and rose again from the dead. It is for those reasons that the whole of Christendom—and I am not thinking of any particular Church—is deeply and profoundly concerned with what happens in Jerusalem. I think of the great work which has been done there, by the Latin Franciscans for instance, the courteous and cultured custodians of the Holy Place. I think of the Orthodox and the Armenian Greek Church. I think of the devotion (and we must remember this) which was
1226
shown to Jerusalem and to the Holy Land by the Russians before the Revolution. I think of the millions of pilgrims who used to go there. I shall never forget the spectacle of great bodies of those pilgrims in Jerusalem. The Russian Church has many possessions still in Palestine, and the interest of Russia in Palestine might easily revive.
Then I think of the work which has beer done by our own Church of England, its schools and its hospitals, and of the work done by the Presbyterians. There is not a Church in the world which has not a real living interest in Palestine. Now there is a danger that this City may be destroyed. The Jewish Agency have recognised that. In a statement made in Palestine and reported in the newspapers, I think, on Easter Monday, it was said that when the British left Palestine there might arise fierce fighting in and around Jerusalem, and they could not guarantee the safety of the Holy Places. A few days later, another Jewish spokesman said that next year there might not be any Holy Places in which there could be worship at Easter. I fear that the dangers are terrible. There is danger of fighting in the streets as Jews and Arabs seek possession of the City, danger that the City will presently be found piled up in ruins, rot one stone left standing on another, and that the Holy Places will be destroyed in the general ruin. It is easy to prophesy these things; the real question is: what can be done?
I see only two possible courses. One has already been referred to; it is that there should be a truce between Arabs and Jews until further order is taken. I wish, indeed, that I could feel that this was probable. I wish, indeed, that Jews and Arabs, would say: "At any rate, we will regard Jerusalem and the country around it as sacred, and will allow no kind of fighting there." But I fear that the Jewish Agency would not be able to control their terrorists and that the Arab headquarters would not be able to control their independent bands. The other course is to appeal in the strongest possible way to the United Nations Organisation to act at once. I felt almost despair when I heard the noble Earl who moved the Second Reading of this Bill tell us, as he was bound to tell us, that nothing has yet been decided. He says that there is the intention of doing this and that, and that in two or three weeks' time a meeting of U.N.O. is to be held to decide

1227
about a Governor. That is merely playing with the whole question. I am sure that the Government—it is hardly necessary for me to ask them to do so—will not fail to press upon the United Nations Organisation in the strongest possible way what is at stake. Of course, His Majesty's Government cannot shelve all responsibility. They must take their part as one of the United Nations, and I understand that they are ready to do so. But they must press and press again upon the United Nations the gravity of the present position. There is no time to waste.
Here, I would venture to say that we ought to make a special appeal to the United States of America. I hesitate to say anything which might appear to be criticism of a nation which is, at the present time, doing so much for Europe, and acting in such an unselfish and statesmanlike way. Yet, I am bound to remember the fact that from the United States there came the strongest criticism of our management of the Mandate, and that the United States, more than once, apparently, hindered agreement which was almost in sight. It was from the United States—not of course from the Government of the United States—that there were sent many of the sinews of war to the people who were supporting the terrorists. It was the United States who pressed this policy of partition from which there has lately come the worst evils, though it is only right to say that Mr. Marshall and those working with him have shown great courage in admitting recently that they were wrong in pressing for partition and that they are now prepared to advocate another policy. I say that, in view of these facts, we have a right to appeal to the United States to do everything in their power to see that a Governor is appointed at once, and that forces are sent out—if necessary, that Americans are sent out—so as to save Jerusalem and its environments from destruction.
I cannot stress too strongly the urgency of this matter. If Jerusalem is destroyed, there will come from the whole of Christendom a cry of horror and indignation. Christendom will be grievously wounded, but a vital wound, I believe, will be inflicted on the United Nations Organisation, for it will show that they are incapable of dealing promptly and firmly with a question like this affecting a
1228
small place like Palestine. And, if they fail there, how can we expect the Organisation to keep the peace of the world? I therefore hope that the Government will do everything in their power again and again to press upon the United Nations Organisation and the United States the vital importance of taking action, and taking action at once, to preserve Palestine from the misery of anarchy and bloodshed.
6.17 p.m.
LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, I think it is true to say that if we hesitate in any way to pass this Bill, we may give an impression to the world that we are wavering in our determination to end the Mandate. But I suggest that this Bill does not mean that after May 15 we shall have no further interest in Palestine. On the contrary we shall be gravely concerned in the future of that unhappy country. There is little doubt that we have reached the most critical period in the affairs of Palestine, and I cannot help feeling that the call of the Security Council of the United Nations for a truce is nothing more than a despairing gesture which can have little hope of realisation. The Jewish representative has already made it clear that he cannot support a truce which would involve the interruption of the partition scheme, and to-day we have heard of another murderous attack on a British post for the seizure of arms by Jewish extremists.
I think it is quite clear that whatever solution has so far been proposed, whether it be partition, federation or trusteeship, under the present conditions in Palestine it can only be imposed by force. I suggest that of those three solutions, trusteeship is the only one which can be imposed by force on a fair basis in the interests of both parties. It is, of course, a trusteeship which has been proposed by America to be implemented by the United Nations when we lay down the Mandate. I am sure that this is a wise proposal: but how can it be accomplished? Mere words and exhortations can be of little value at the present time. It is now clear that the Security Council have taken the realistic view that the scheme of partition has broken down, and, in fact, they confirmed this view by refusing to comply with the request of the Palestine Commission for an international force to put the scheme into operation. Therefore, the affairs of Palestine are again in the melting pot.

1229
No doubt the question of trusteeship and other solutions will be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the Assembly. But the sands are running out, and no amount of discussion will avert the appalling calamity which is impending in Palestine unless some force is available to maintain order and allow some form of administration to function after May 15. I was glad to hear from the noble Earl of the proposal to form an interim police force for Jerusalem, but this does not go far enough. As your Lordships are aware, America has now put forward certain proposals for trusteeship to be discussed in the Assembly, which include a new Government for Palestine to act on behalf of a Trustee Council, and further, that this Government are to rely on local police and volunteer forces to maintain order. It has also been suggested that if those forces should prove insufficient, the new Government should be authorised to call upon the assistance of certain other Status who may become parties to the trusteeship.
I fully support those suggestions, but they are provisions for a long-term policy and it is essential that a short-term policy which will operate effectively after May 15 should be found as soon as possible. All these American suggestions for the future are admirable, but what is to happen in the intervening period? I now wish to put forward a short-term policy. I want to make it quite clear that I am speaking for myself on this very controversial matter. I do not wish in any way to suggest that we should not terminate the Mandate on May 15, but I do suggest that if America were prepared to give an undertaking, with an agreed date, to assist us with troops and finance on an equal basis, we should be prepared to enforce a trusteeship on behalf of the United Nations and hold the scales of justice until such time as American help was made available.
But we cannot continue to carry the burden unaided until the long-term policy is in operation, which is bound to take a long period of time. Our troops have behaved magnificently, in spite of every form of provocation, but we cannot expect them to continue their unpleasant duties for an indefinite period. On the other hand, I think it should not be forgotten that America has already given assistance to Greece and Turkey. I suggest that our
1230
withdrawal from Palestine without putting anything in our place would undoubtedly mean a general weakening of the barrier against the Red Front and Communist infiltration in the Middle East. It is essential that a joint Anglo-American policy should operate as a co-ordinated whole in this area until the long-term policy can be put into force.
The joint Anglo-American policy which I suggest will have to be a realistic one. I think it should be established within a period of six months. It should continue until the new Palestine Government has been effectively established and the trusteeship upheld. But I maintain that we must not be manœuvred into a position by which we remain in Palestine until such time as the long-term policy for a new Government is in operation, except with financial and military assistance from America, guaranteed and available within six months from May 15. If trusteeship is enforced until such time as the ringleaders of the extremist elements have been brought to justice and passions have cooled, it may well be that the federal solution will succeed. Such a federal solution, in my view, should mean that both the Jews and Arabs will be Palestine citizens, with equal rights and responsibilities, but with autonomy in all matters relating to domestic questions within their own communities. The noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, has put forward many useful suggestions on those lines.
What is the alternative to a joint Anglo-American policy? It is civil war on a large scale. It can be nothing else. Surely we cannot take the cynical view, which is prevalent in many quarters, that the Jews and Arabs should be allowed to settle their differences by civil war, which will undoubtedly happen unless a force is available to keep the peace after May 15. The long-term policy for a new Government in Palestine cannot possibly operate quickly enough to prevent such a war. Apart from the humane point of view, I suggest that we must not forget our interests in the Middle East, and that civil war invites interference from other Powers which may well have disastrous effects on world peace.
I maintain that there is only one possible alternative that will preserve peace in the Holy Land, and that is the evolution of a joint policy between ourselves and America. With such a policy, it

1231
might be possible to improve the relations between the Jews and Arabs. Alternative arrangements for immigration of the displaced Jews in Europe might be made, and assistance could perhaps be given to the Arabs in their economic difficulties. But we must make it quite clear that we cannot carry out any scheme single-handed and that there is only one conceivable condition under which we would remain in Palestine, and that would be to help carry out an agreed Anglo-American policy, provided the Americans were prepared to carry at least half the burden, both with finance and with troops, until the long-term policy could be established.
We have got beyond the time for declarations by the United Nations and the Security Council. We are now down to stark facts. Action, and not talk, is absolutely necessary. If the Americans will give an agreed date, within six months, when troops will be landed in Palestine, I suggest that British troops should remain to enforce a trusteeship on behalf of United Nations. With a properly integrated Anglo-American force in sufficient numbers, the right degree of control could be established in that unhappy country and the ringleaders of the extremists could be brought to justice—they are nothing less than murderers and thugs—and I think the majority of the unfortunate people in Palestine could have the peace they are already looking for. If America is not willing to share this burden with us, I agree that the only alternative is for us to leave Palestine on the agreed date and concentrate our efforts on localising the ensuing conflict as much as possible and preventing arms and materials of war from reaching either of the contending parties.
Our withdrawal will be a declaration of failure, but a failure for which we are by no means entirely responsible. We cannot forget that it was the declaration by the President of the United States that 100,000 Jews should be allowed immediately to enter Palestine that largely caused the failure of the settlement. If only for that reason, I feel that the United States have a great responsibility in the matter. I hope His Majesty's Government will press forward a scheme for joint action by both Governments on the lines I have suggested, which may
1232
avert a catastrophe in Palestine the outcome of which is fraught with the greatest danger to world peace.
6.29 p.m.
LORD ALTRINCHAM: My Lords, we have reached a late hour and most of your Lordships have had a long day, especially the noble Earl opposite, who has been dealing so adequately with the two great questions which have been posed to-day. But I hope that in spite of the lateness of the hour your Lordships will forgive me if I deal, as briefly as I can, not so much with the Bill (because we are all agreed about the Bill) as with the situation with which the Bill is intended to cope. I want to do so and I want to do so to-night because, after all, it is just possible that words spoken in this House may be read elsewhere and even marked elsewhere. All of us who have the slightest chance of moving opinion in any quarter of the world upon the situation in Palestine at the present time have a great responsibility. No-one who knows the history of the Mandate in Palestine can look upon this Bill without affliction and distress.
The ending of our Mandate takes my mind back to three places in Palestine. One is a little Crusader church—which I am sure the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, remembers—in a green valley close beside the road which leads from the coastal plain up to Jerusalem. It was the last stage of the Pilgrims going to Jerusalem, and it stands beside a lovely stream. In that church now there is an altar to Australian soldiers who fell in the First World War. I remember praying there that those soldiers might have done more for the good of Palestine and the peace of the world than the Crusaders, who came there and merely left that church behind. Move up the road, and pass through old Jerusalem, and you are faced at once with the great war cemetery upon Mount Scopas. Again there are there British soldiers, and others, who laid down their lives. There are many such cemeteries in Palestine. It is terrible that all that sacrifice should have been in vain. Finally, I remember the War Memorial in Jerusalem itself, at the point where Lord Allenby entered on foot, the humblest of conquerors.
All that sacrifice, all that hope, all that faith, now seem to have been in vain. We

1233
have not succeeded. But let us say here to-night that, whoever may have failed, it is not our men who have served in Palestine. They have served magnificently, and even now I do not believe that their sacrifice will have been all in vain. Let us then say to our living, and to our dead, that we are proud of them; and let us be certain that when the judgment of history is given upon this thirty years of Mandate it will absolve at any rate the Forces of the British Crown from the appalling misrepresentation, the cruel misrepresentation, which they have suffered in recent times. I believe that history will give us credit for a noble effort, long and patiently sustained.
There are only two points in the Bill which I should like to mention before I come to the main situation. The first, of course, is absolute approval of the principle of the Bill and the surrender of the Mandate. That was urged upon us from all sides last year, and it was accepted by the United Nations, as the noble Earl made plain, many months ago. The United Nations took the responsibility, and they must discharge it. We must make it perfectly plain that we are not to be diverted from our resolve to bring the Mandate to an end in the middle of May. The country demands it. I believe there was a great turning of opinion in this country at the time when the two young sergeants were murdered. Often opinion is mounting, and then it suddenly crystallises, and I think that was the time when this country made up its mind that it had had enough, and that no more of its young men were to be sacrificed in this apparently hopeless cause. The country is right. We have sacrificed enough, if we are to be called upon to make all this effort without moral support from the world; to do it absolutely alone; to do it, indeed, while the rest of the world juggles with the world issue which is centred in Palestine.
The only other point about the Bill which I would like especially to support is the clause which deals with amnesty. I am sure that that is wise. The situation in Palestine when our troops are trying to evacuate will be an exceedingly difficult one. The only possible way of enabling our leaders and Forces to carry out evacuation with the minimum of loss to others, as well as to themselves, is to
1234
give them an absolutely free hand. That is what the Bill will do, by giving them an amnesty in advance. With enthusiasm I support that clause of the Bill. There are other points that we may wish to raise in Committee, but I will not detain the House with them at this late hour.
The Bill concludes a chapter. We are all thinking of the chapter which opens when we go. More than one eloquent speech—the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, and that of the most reverend Primate—has been made upon that theme, and there are just a few words which I should like to say upon it before the noble Earl replies. The ghastly fact that confronts us is that there will be bloodshed and chaos throughout the Holy Land in the middle of May unless the United Nations take up the Mandate and discharge it with absolute impartiality, as we have striven to do, supported by Armed Forces at least as strong as ours, and representing two of the major Powers. I believe that to be absolutely indispensable. It is a delusion to think that the minor Powers can undertake this task. If the great Powers do not face their responsibility to the United Nations, then the United Nations will not survive. I could not feel more strongly in agreement with all that the most reverend Primate said about Palestine.
I fear that at Lake Success they are nursing the delusion that steps may be taken to preserve the peace of Jerusalem without preserving the peace of the whole of Palestine. That is absolutely impossible. They have talked of an area of ten square miles. What is ten square miles? The people cannot live or be sustained in ten square miles. The power that keeps the peace of Jerusalem must, in my opinion, control the airport of Lydda and the seaport of Haifa, and must have free access to water and electricity supplies. It must control the whole of Palestine. Palestine is a very small country; you can drive from end to end of it in two or three hours. After all, it is only about 50 miles across and 120 miles long. It is ludicrous to suppose that you can deal with this country unless you deal with it as a whole. The authority which attempts to protect Jerusalem, in taking the measures which are necessary over the rest of the country, must find itself at odds with both races, as we have done, unless it has very strong forces which it can deploy everywhere. That

1235
is all the more certain because Haifa is one of the key points where battle will be waged, if battle is not prevented in time. Moreover, it is inconceivable to my mind that the population of Jerusalem will remain calm and indifferent in a sheltered area, while their friends and relations are being slaughtered throughout Palestine. To suppose that a Governor-General can maintain peace with a newly raised local gendarmerie, where the whole strength of the British Army, the Royal Air Force and the British Palestine Police have failed, is one of those pipe dreams in which only politicians far removed from the facts and bemused with their own political convenience can indulge. Peace in Jerusalem means peace in Palestine from Dan to Beersheba and from the Jordan to the sea. I hope that will be realised at Lake Success, where these questions are being considered at the present time.
Why have we failed? This is the last question to which I would seek to give my own humble answer, because I believe that even now a solution may be found by looking back to what has gone wrong. Many consider that the policy of the Mandate was doomed from the cradle, because it was devised without adequate knowledge of the facts. I have never agreed with that point of view. The men who made the Mandate thought much further and knew much more than their critics nowadays pretend. Every word of the Mandate was carefully devised and thought out at every point. It is because the message and meaning of the Mandate have been distorted that our task has been impossible. The Balfour Declaration, upon which the Mandate was framed, was a great document, carefully and laboriously devised. I was not present when it was made, because I was then in the Army, but as a temporary civil servant I was later closely associated with Lord Balfour, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Churchill, who made the Declaration, and were then carrying out the policy. I know that what I say is true.
There were behind the Balfour Declaration three ruling ideas which we should remember now. One was the belief that Christendom and Islam would be rendering tardy justice to the Jews by enabling a representative section of that people to live as of right, as equal citizens, in the
1236
land where their great history began. No one can deny the Jewish contribution to Western life and thought, or the age-long yearning of the Jews to recover some real footing in their ancient home. That idea commended itself, and rightly so, to many leading Gentile minds at that time, Arab as well as European. In the second place, behind the Balfour Declaration was the idea that Jerusalem should be the heart and centre of the project. Palestine, without Jerusalem, without Zion, is really nothing at all. It was believed that a great university could be established there, where all the leading Jewish men of thought and science in the world would ultimately resort, men like Einstein and Bergson. It was thought that there would be a centre of research there which would help the whole Middle Eastern world. Such a centre would indeed have helped the Middle Eastern world, but unfortunately many of the great men never went there, partly because conditions lacked the security which that kind of work requires. Professor Magnes, the Principal of the Hebrew University, has, however, done splendid work and, as the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, said, he has had the courage throughout these years to take a moderate and practical view. I pray only that the influence of the Hebrew University may even yet prevail.
In the third place, behind the Declaration was the idea and the belief that the project would enlist Arab co-operation and good will, and could be carried out so as to strengthen and not prejudice the standing of Jews in other parts of the world. The wording was carefully framed to show that that belief was held. That that was our interpretation was made clear once again by Mr. Churchill's White Paper of 1922. We then undertook the Mandate, honestly, because only a great Power could lay the foundations for this project. We were quite ready at that time to concede it to the United States, if the United States had been prepared to undertake it. Let no one say that the Mandate was not a noble document and that the project in it was not one upon which the civilised world, Christian, Moslem and Jewish, should even now attempt to do its utmost to agree.
Why then did it fail? I say that it failed for two main reasons. One great figure at that time in the Arab world, and

1237
himself a great man, King Feisal understood the problem, and understood how special a case was Palestine. If King Feisal had controlled a great Arab Kingdom in Northern Syria, giving security, dignity and cohesion to the Arab cause, conditions would have been different. Unhappily, European conditions prevented a settlement in Syria and the Lebanon on terms which the Arabs could approve. King Feisal was driven out of Damascus—a tragedy. Northern Syria was atomised and practically annexed, and the Arabs became deeply embittered and impregnated with fear. That was what happened in the early years when the Mandate was first undertaken and when our work in Palestine began.
The other cause of our failure, ten years later, was, I believe, Hitler. Hitler made Zionism—and quite naturally—a devouring nationalist ideal. He led to the arrival in Palestine of a very different type of immigrant. It was from that time that our difficulties began, with the frustration which came from the kind of life the young people were living and the terrorism which had grown up. I submit that the moral of all this is plain: we must get back, if we can, to the spirit of the time when the Mandate was first planned. It is only in that spirit, and with that ideal firmly grasped, that the civilised world can do any good in Palestine. That ideal, our ideal, the ideal of the Balfour Declaration and the ideal of the Mandate, is still the thing for which we should strive as the only hope of peace in Palestine.
Clearly, as many speakers have said, we must try to get a truce; and we must try to get some sign that the two sides in Palestine will abate their extreme demands and consent to consider some form of compromise. But there is no hope of a truce—on this I agree with the noble Lord who has just spoken, although I do not entirely agree with the personal view which he expressed about our common action there in the next few months—unless it is certain that some adequate force will be sent immediately to Palestine. That is the only condition upon which a truce can be made. The small Powers cannot do it. The plain fact is that the United States of America now hold the peace of Palestine in their hands; and that must be recognised. If a force is promised to guarantee security, then an appeal for a truce may at last succeed. After all, the
1238
Jews cannot establish a sovereign State in the conditions which prevail; nor can they hope that such a State would work even if it were founded and proclaimed.
If the fanaticism continues—the fanaticism exemplified in the tragedy which took place yesterday, which has been so rightly denounced—the fanaticism of these modern Sicarii will once again lay Zion in the dust, will make its destruction inevitable, as did their predecessors. Professor Magnes, in the Hebrew University, has long urged a more moderate course, and I was in agreement with what the noble Viscount said about attempting to work out a system of government in Palestine based upon communities. I have always shared that view, and I believe it is the only hope. Frankly, I do not know any administrator really intimate with Palestine—and I have discussed it with many of them—who does not think that that is the only hope for peace between the races, and for real collaboration between them in Palestine. I hope, therefore, that the Jews may see the reason for speaking out against terrorism and for consenting to consider some form of compromise such as their wiser leaders have long urged.
As for the Arabs, can they not hark back to the wisdom of Feisal? This is an appeal which I would like especially to make them to-night. They have sovereign and independent States in all parts of the Middle East, except in Palestine. That sovereignty, that independence, most of them owe to the Allied arms and more particularly to British arms. As Feisul recognised, Palestine is a case apart in which the whole world is concerned. It is a pity that the Arab League have hitherto been mainly negative in their policy and activities, and that they have not given the attention which we, who favoured them from the start, had always hoped they would give to the social and economic problems which at the present time are so grave in most of the countries of the Middle East. Warfare in Palestine, as the wiser Arab leaders must recognise, is bound to endanger the security and development of those countries. Alter all, the Arab States are members of the United Nations and must be deeply concerned in assuring its success. No Powers need the United Nations so greatly as Powers whose international standing is guaranteed by its

1239
Charter and bound up with its success. The Arabs owe their freedom to the victory of the United Nations. Can they not bring themselves now into a compromise which will show true greatness of spirit, and be worthy of the splendid contribution which Arab genius has made to the progress of humankind in the past?
It has been said to-day that immigration is the crux of this issue, and that no agreement is possible between Arabs and Jews until agreement can be found on that point. There is no hope of getting the Arabs to agree to immigration into Palestine in any form whatsoever at the present time, unless Christian nations recognise that they also have a duty to the dispossessed Jews. It is inconceivable that we should go on telling the Arabs that they, in Islam, should take the sufferers from cruelty which has been inflicted for years in Christian lands, if the United Nations and the Great Powers in particular do not show willingness to take their share and do their part in succouring the dispossessed Jews in Europe. If they were to play their part, then indeed it would be possible to appeal to the Arabs on that ground. The response at Lake Success was not promising. Only if there is more of that willingness can there be any hope of compromise between the Arabs and Jews.
In those circumstances I believe that Britain could still play a part in Palestine and share with others in a creative and harmonising rôle such as she has endeavoured to carry out during the last thirty years. In such circumstances—but only in such circumstances—would the British people, I believe, be prepared to approve further responsibility in Palestine. I agree with the noble Lord opposite that it is with the United Nations that that partnership must be made, and it is on the United Nations that success depends. The only alternative is bloodshed and choas, under the sun by day and under the stars by night, throughout the lovely summer months, in Jerusalem and the Holy Land. I pray God, my Lords, that reason may still prevail.
6.55 p.m.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, we have had a long series of constructive, earnest and often moving speeches, and I
1240
should like to thank the House very warmly for the support that has been given to the Bill and for the constructive and sympathetic spirit which every speaker has shown towards the problem of Palestine. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, raised among other points the question of the nationality of Palestinians after the termination of the Mandate. That is a legal point, as the noble Marquess himself said. My noble and learned friend, the Lord Chancellor, has been good enough to say that he will deal on the Committee stage with any legal points which noble Lords wish to raise, and I shall therefore leave that task to be discharged by him. The noble Marquess also said that we are washing our hands of the responsibility for the future of Palestine. I think he would have said that we were, like Madame de Pompadour, saying "Après nous le déluge." That view was endorsed by the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, who compared our behaviour to that of a more despicable figure in history. I deny that charge. We should be unworthy of being the Government of this country if we abjured our moral responsibility for the welfare of Palestine and its people—in spite of all we have suffered at their hands and for the peace of the world. I do not believe that the view to which I have referred would be held by those who have had the opportunity of studying what we have been doing in our attempt to find a solution of this problem.
I cannot, of course, cover more than a very small part of the ground. We have been co-operating with the United Nations. We have placed our long experience of the administration of Palestine unreservedly at the disposal of the United Nations Commission and of the Security Council of the General Assembly. The High Commissioner and the Governor of Palestine have been doing their utmost to ensure that chaos does not ensue after the termination of the Mandate. We are allowing British police in Jerusalem to enlist in the international police force which the United Nations Commission is trying to recruit and which will take the place of the British forces that will be disbanded after May 15. Everyone knows that without such a neutral security force in Jerusalem there cannot be peace between the two communities.
LORD ALTRINCHAM: I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord, but can he

1241
say how far recruitment of that neutral police force has gone?
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: I cannot say how far it has gone, but if the noble Lord will be good enough to refer to my first speech he will see the latest information we have received from the United Nations Commission on that point.
Then secondly, in view of the possibility—which is a very real possibility—that no effective central authority will be available to take over from us in Palestine after May 15, His Majesty's Government have taken such steps as they can to retain the power and increase the responsibilities of local authorities so that they may assume the task of maintaining essential services after the dissolution of the central Government. Legislation has been introduced to empower municipalities to levy taxes hitherto levied by the central Government, in order to finance the increased services they will undertake.
Municipal police forces for the maintenance of local order and the suppression of crime have been established in many of the towns. These forces are part of the Palestine Police Force and will be transferred to the control of the local authorities on our departure. Hospitals are being placed in the charge of municipalities, with the exception of two for which the International Red Cross have assumed responsibility. Certain water supplies have been handed over to local authorities for custody and operation. Plans for handing over Arab schools, which have hitherto been the concern of the central Government, to the management of local authorities are in train. The Government farm is to be maintained by the Acre Municipality. In these, and in many other ways, action has been taken and is being taken to ensure, so far as possible, that the disappearance of the central Government will not throw into confusion those vital services which have hitherto been their concern, and on which the, welfare of the inhabitants of the towns and villages of the countryside of Palestine will depend.
Many speakers in the present debate have eloquently endorsed the plea of the Security Council that an immediate truce be effected in Palestine, with a call to Arab and Jewish armed groups in the country to cease forthwith acts of violence. The High Commissioner for Palestine, in a broadcast to the people of the country
1242
on April 3, drew their attention to the text of the Security Council's resolution. He pointed out that, as the case of Palestine is now to be reviewed by the United Nations, those who intend to continue with the policy of violence in face of the United Nations demand should think carefully of the damage which such action may do to their cause when the Assembly meet, and should consider, whichever point of view they take, what possible good am come from a continuance of violence when the future remains doubtful, and when there is still what may-prove to be the last chance of peace On behalf of His Majesty's Government, I would most earnestly endorse the appeals of the Security Council and or the High Commissioner, and the appeal that has been made from all quarters of this House this afternoon. I would urge all Parties and peoples in Palestine to respond to this call, to lay aside their weapons in a supreme effort to reach a settlement of their differences without-further bloodshed. In the remaining weeks of their existence, the Palestine Government are anxious and willing to do everything possible to negotiate and maintain a cease-fire agreement between the communities. They have already called on the civil and military leaders on both sides to discuss the details of negotiation required for the conclusion and enforcement of a truce.
For more than a quarter of a century, we have laboured in Palestine to build up the prosperity and happiness of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants, and it is tragic indeed to think that on our departure our work may be destroyed through the determination of both communities to settle their differences by force. It is still not too late for Arab and Jew to listen to the voice of reason of the United Nations, and indeed to the prayers of mankind, and to seek, even at this last moment, some basis of agreement which will spare the Holy Land from being ravaged by bloodshed and destruction. Not least, let them think of the peace of Jerusalem, a city sanctified by its association with three great faiths. If, by persisting in the course of conflict, they bring ruin and disaster to the Holy City, the memory of mankind will not easily forgive them.
On Question, Bill read 2a and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

SMETHWICK CORPORATION BILL. (PETITION FOR ADDITIONAL PROVISION.)
Examiner's Certificate of non-compliance with the Standing Orders: Referred to the Standing Orders Committee.

CROMER URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL. [H.L.]
The Chairman of Committees informed the House that the opposition to the Bill was withdrawn: The Orders made on February 10 and 26 last discharged, and Bill committed.
House adjourned at five minutes past seven o'clock.