HL Deb 23 October 1946 vol 143 cc569-90

2.18 p.m.

Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS (VISCOUNT ADDISON)

My Lords, as your Lordships are aware, the matter of this Bill deals with what might fairly be described as a revolutionary development, which marked the last year of the war and which is unique in its military potentialities, power and dreadfulness, as well as in the economic possibilities to which it might give rise, if properly guided and developed. The world is naturally concerned about the possibilities of frightfulness to which the release and the use of atomic energy might give rise, and I do not propose to detain your Lordships by enlarging on that aspect of the matter. But it is clear that the whole thing is of such prodigious importance that steps must be taken, so far as humanly possible, to safeguard humanity against the danger.

As your Lordships are aware, the United Nations Organization has already set up an Atomic Energy Commission to study the possibilities in this direction, and I need scarcely say that this Government are participating, have participated, and will participate with the utmost goodwill to make the issues of the deliberations of this Commission successful, and to secure that in some way the international agencies that are set up are efficient. At the same time, the possibilities of the case are so great that clearly adequate national safeguards must be taken not only to enable us to play our part in whatever is ultimately desired and agreed upon in consequence of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, but also to see that, as far as possible, good use is made of the possibilities of these discoveries in the economic sense. I understand that in that respect there are already certain products which may be potentially of great value in many directions. Clearly, therefore, we must provide for and encourage the proper type of developments. The Government have already undertaken, and are already setting up, a research establishment at Harwell, and your Lordships are already aware that in general charge of production is Viscount Portal of Hungerford who, I am sure, receives the confidence of every one of us.

I understand that at the present moment the immense costs which this kind of work is likely to involve are counted as £30,000,000; how much more they will prove to be no one can tell, but I think it would be idle to pretend that the costs of the work may be limited to that figure. This Bill does not—using the term in its usual sense—"nationalize" atomic energy. It gives the Minister power to promote and control developments under the best advice that he can obtain, and the Government are aided and assisted now, and have been for some time past, by a very responsible and expert committee over which Sir John Anderson presides. I am sure that on that account alone it will receive the confidence of every one of us.

I do not think I need take your Lordships in detail through the Bill. I will just indicate some of its provisions. It nominates the Minister of Supply as the Minister responsible for the conduct of the work such as there is at Harwell and elsewhere, gives him general charge over that work and the general duty to provide, promote, and control development and research. In that respect it enables him and authorizes him to provide money to encourage and carry out research, to call for information, if need be, in various matters, to inspect premises where research of vital consequence may possibly endanger the safety of the State or of individual persons. It empowers him to search for materials, and if he does any damage in searching for materials it authorizes him to pay the proper compensation. It authorizes the Minister to acquire the right to develop certain minerals which are related to the work in question, and it enables him to enter into arrangements with private persons who are doing work on related subjects and to make appropriate arrangements with them. Particularly in regard to research, we are only at the beginning of the possible developments of this immense topic, but already grants are being provided at universities and elsewhere for research work in many directions which I need not enlarge upon.

There was one particular clause—Clause 11—which was very difficult to draft and which may involve certain difficulties in its administration, but it is quite clear that in a matter of this kind steps must be taken to prevent the disclosure of information and to ensure the necessary secrecy. At the same time, it is of course quite evident that you cannot do anything, and ought not to do anything, which would prevent scientists quite properly exchanging ideas and developing scientific experiments on sound lines. In that respect I might refer, speaking of the precautions about the disclosure of information, to the declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Canada and the United Kingdom, which was issued on the 14th of November last. They laid down the principle that basic scientific information essential to the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes should be made available to the world, but that detailed information concerning practical industrial application should be deferred until effective reciprocal and enforceable safeguards, acceptable to all nations, have been devised. That formula was accepted by the nations concerned, and I am sure it is one that is sound and should be adhered to. At the same time, I recognize the great difficulties, without crippling scientists, of drafting a form of words that would be workable and would be sufficient. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Cherwell, will have some comments to make on this subject, which he was good enough to inform me of beforehand. Therefore I will keep for my reply, if the House will allow me to make one, any observations I have to make on the comments which he will bring before your Lordships.

There are safeguards of like character relating to inventions, and provisions with regard to the acquisition of inventions, and generally, we have sought to cover the case as far as it is foreseeable at the present time. The Bill has been carried through the other place, as your Lordships are aware, without any adverse criticism, but with proper comments, and I hope that your Lordships will be willing to give it a Second Reading.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Viscount Addison.)

2.27 p.m.

LORD CHERWELL

My Lords, for rather more than a year now one of the most distressing afflictions which has plagued citizens of this unhappy country has been the atomic energy bore. Many people who know something about nuclear physics, and a great many more who know even less, have been expatiating, often dogmatically and almost always at interminable length, and inflicting their views upon anyone who would listen. I have endeavoured myself to avoid this pitfall, but on this occasion I trust that the House will forgive me if I say one or two general words before coming to the Bill itself.

Whether or not the possession of atomic bombs will decide future wars, their use will certainly render them infinitely more horrible from most points of view. The blast effect, even of the earliest types of atomic bombs, exceeded that of our ten-ton bombs in much the same proportion as the ten-tonners in this war exceeded the very first twenty-pound bombs which were dropped from aircraft thirty years ago. In addition, we have the heat radiation searing all exposed organic matter within about half a mile of the explosion, and the even deadlier gamma rays blighting the marrow of all living creatures within much the same distance, not to mention the lethal radio active products which would poison the whole neighbourhood for a considerable time if such a bomb were detonated on the ground.

The more the effect of these bombs is studied, and the more that is known about possible improvements, the more vital does it seem to reach some work able agreement to prevent the use of this weapon in war. Yet although fourteen months have elapsed since the first nuclear bombs detonated, we seem very little nearer achieving this end. Our failure is not because it is inherently impossible to think out methods of control. On the contrary, the Baruch Plan indicated a perfectly feasible approach. The difficulty is that any workable scheme inevitably involves a certain surrender of that complete sovereignty which some nations are so insistent to preserve. It is perfectly clear that without international inspection there can be no security against individual countries developing and producing and perfecting these bombs. A mere under taking to refrain from their use will give, no more security against their being used than the Kellogg Pact undertaking to refrain from war prevented the war which broke out a few years later. Nor will a mere exchange of such information as a country chooses to divulge carry us much further.

Either an international authority with the powers and the will to act in the case of recalcitrance must be allowed to inspect all the countries of the world and to insist on the stopping of any obnoxious activities concerned with nuclear weapons, or we must make up our minds to an international arms race which will almost certainly culminate in the most disastrous war in human history. To accept such an international authority implies a certain surrender of sovereignty, but I cannot understand why any reasonable country should refuse this when the dread alternative is atomic war. It is almost inconceivable that the nations should stand upon punctilio in such a matter when the stake is so great. I venture to hope that this country at any rate will place no obstacle in the way, always provided that the rest of the countries of the world will accept this essential preliminary to any form of inter national control. I also venture to hope that we shall resist anything calculated to extend the knowledge of how to make and use these bombs unless and until all other nations have shown by deeds as well as by words that they accept the international authority with all its powers of inspection and control. Clearly we cannot have international control and regulation without national control and regulation. One of the main reasons why I welcome this Bill is that it is an essential step which may make the achievement of some form of international control feasible.

Whilst welcoming the Bill in broad outline there are, however, one or two important points which I think I should mention so that the Government may consider them and I hope may be prepared to satisfy us on the Committee stage. In this matter I feel sure that all of us in the House are aiming at the same thing. I also feel sure that the noble Viscount the Leader of the House will believe me when I assure him that any Amendments I may suggest are intended to be constructive and helpful. In the first place, I am a little disappointed, although this is a Bill "to provide for the development of atomic energy", to see how little is said about this aspect of the Minister's duty. We are told in Clause 1 that it will be his general duty to promote and control the development of atomic energy and in subsequent clauses we find set out in great details all the various powers which he shall have to control other people's property and activities. But there seems to be rather a dearth of detail concerning his own constructive activities. I dare say it is unusual to go any further than this in a Bill, but I must confess I was a little uneasy to find so much stress laid upon the powers the Minister has to prevent other people working freely on this topic and how little stress is laid upon the methods he shall use to promote research and development himself.

Few people who have not tried it realize how hard it is to carry out research under Treasury auspices. Rules and regulations hamper advance even on well-defined and old-fashioned lines, but nuclear research is so much in its infancy that it really cannot be treated on ordinary Civil Service lines. It is so closely related to fundamental research as opposed to mere technical developments that it will be stifled in the strait jacket of closely-knit red tape which the Treasury so fondly weaves when it has an opportunity. All the rules and procedure very proper in administrative departments must of necessity handicap all Government research. But we are dealing here with a subject so novel and so important that precedent must go by the board. It will be absolutely overlaid if we cannot break through the ordinary restrictions. When we discussed these matters two or three years ago it was universally agreed that nuclear work could only be handled effectively if dealt with on university lines. I do not mean to say in a university, but the head of the department should be allowed the same sort of freedom a university professor enjoys to engage his own staff, to fix their salaries within reasonable limits, and to direct their activities according to their particular aptitudes and interests. He must be allowed to incur expenditure within the ambit of his budget without constant reference to the Treasury or the Ministry, to make his own arrangements about hours of work, leave, and so on.

Above all, it is quite impossible in work of this sort to have scientists selected and appointed by the Civil Service Commission in the ordinary way. Nothing will be done if the head of a research department has to waste his time arguing, as all too often happens in Government establishments, for weeks and months about engaging extra typists or computers or junior men. It is absurd to demand that men who have to advise on matters involving millions of pounds should have to go cap in hand to some minor official in order to be allowed to spend a few hundred or even a few thousand pounds for purposes which, rightly or wrongly, they consider necessary, and about which in any event they are bound to be the best judges. Developments are so rapid that every month counts. I say without hesitation that unless Civil Service regulations are relaxed months may be wasted arguing and explaining instead of getting on with the job. I will give one instance. One of the most important instruments of research in nuclear physics is the "Geiger counter." There may be half a dozen men in England who have had experience in making and using these, and probably most of them are tied up at universities. If the head of one of the departments dealing with atomic energy requires a man of this type, surely it is absurd to ask him to advertise the post, to put an applicant through the regular Civil Service examination, to have a selection board and all the rest of the rigmarole, when it is known from the very beginning that there is only one man who is suitable and available, who he is and on what terms he can be got. Unless we insist upon considerable deviation from ordinary Treasury practice, I am certain that work on atomic energy under Government auspices in this country is condemned to atrophy. We cannot get ahead with research in this way.

For this reason I hope the Government will state quite clearly in this Bill that there is no intention of proceeding on these stereotyped lines and that the Minister shall have the power, and even the duty in suitable cases, to treat this question without any regard to normal Civil Service procedure. Unless progress is to be hamstrung we must see that the heads of the various establishments are given a certain budget at the beginning of the year, for which, of course, they have to account, and are allowed to dispose of it without constant reference back, with the same freedom as is enjoyed in general by the heads of departments in universities.

In the American Act dealing with these matters—the McMahon Act—there is a special clause to take care of this aspect. It provides that the Commission—which corresponds to the Minister in our case—shall appoint and fix the compensation of officers and employees, and so on, according to their Classification Acts, and then comes a notable phrase saying that to the extent that the Commission deem such action necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities personnel may be employed and their compensation fixed without regard to such laws. I hope it may be possible to insert a provision of a similar nature in this Bill, presumably in Clause 2. I know, of course, that in Part II of the Civil Service Regulations, paragraph 3, section 10, power is given to the Commissioners in making appointments to dispense with the normal procedure in cert in conditions. If the Civil Service Commissioners would undertake to accept the advice of the Minister, who would presumably be guided by the senior officials in charge of the various atomic energy establishments, this power, if used comparatively freely, might suffice to meet my difficulty as far as the appointment of officials is concerned. I do not think it would be required in more than a few dozen or perhaps a few score of cases. But when it is necessary, some mechanism of this sort ought to be provided which would enable long-term appointments to be made rapidly and irrespective of normal Civil Service regulations. The sort of men we need for this work are all too rare; they are being offered lucrative posts else-where, at home and abroad., and unless we are to risk losing them the various departments ought to be able to act almost as swiftly and decisively as ordinary industrial concerns.

As to the financial side, I do not think there should be any great difficulty in arranging to give freedom to the heads of the various establishments. This, I imagine, is merely an administrative matter, but if I am wrong and it can only be done by inserting a clause in the Bill, I trust the Government will agree to some such Amendment. I hope the House will not think I am being fussy or pernickety in this matter. I have really had a great deal of experience in this sort of work, both in universities and Government Departments, and I feel that in those circumstances it would be wrong for me to allow to pass without protest a Bill in which no attention appears to have been paid to this very important aspect. The Government are here trying to do something quite unlike anything they have ever attempted before, and I can assure the House that some such break with precedent will have to be made unless we are to jeodardize the future of nuclear work in this country.

I do not wish to criticize at this stage the general organization projected for this work, though it does seem to me to be a little sketchy as it stands. As I understand it, the present arrangements are that research and development should be the responsibility of Professor Cockcroft, whilst production is to be dealt with by Lord Portal of Hungerford. What is to be done about the all-important ordnance side has, so far as I know, not yet been stated, although there have been rumours. It would be an impertinence for me to congratulate the Minister on having selected Lord Portal, but perhaps I might be allowed to say how we must all congratulate him upon having selected Professor Cockcroft. No better man could be found for this particular work. But I must say that I am a little anxious about the apparent, I do not know whether it is dichotomy or dichotomy in a subject which is in its infancy, as this is. I think: it is probably too early to expect these things to have been sorted out. I under stand there is an Atomic Energy Council under the chairmanship of Lord Portal, and I hope this may be a first step towards securing the directed drive which will be essential if this very difficult project is to come to fruition within a reason able time.

Another point is the question of priority. The work here is realty urgent; every month counts. Can we be assured that its priority is recognized and not overridden by sudden ad hoc decisions. I saw in the war how easy it is for some priority to be granted to meet some special need; such as steel for coal mines, or something like that. But with every ton of material controlled as it is today, such a decision may set back atomic energy work, at any rate, the research side of it, by months, although very small Quantities, a few tons of steel, may be involved.

As the noble Lord who introduced the Bill said, most of its clauses call for very little comment. There is, however, as he said, one totally new departure contained in Clause 11 about which I think I should say a few words. In my view, this particular clause can only be justified by the unprecedented measure of the danger which confronts us. The clause is drawn in very sweeping terms. Roughly speaking, it declares that anyone who, without the consent of the Minister, knowingly communicates anything concerning existing or proposed atomic energy plant, its purpose or method of operation or any processes operated therein, shall be guilty of an offence. When we see the extremely broad definition of the word "plant" in Clause 18—namely, "any machinery, equipment or appliance,"—it is clear that if rigidly applied this clause would ham string all discussion or communication, and probably all progress.

The clause, as I understand it, is designed—and properly designed, in my view—to safeguard our vital secrets against three types of indiscretion. In the first place, it is quite possible that individuals might root out a number of secrets by collating indiscretions, cross-examining people who had access to plants, and generally, if I may use the expression, snooping around. Clearly, the publication of that sort of material ought to be prohibited. In the second place, people who have a great deal of knowledge owing to their official connexion with these plants, which they are prevented from disclosing by the Official Secrets Act, might make a perfectly genuine independent invention unconnected with the official secrets, but of great importance in the manufacture or use of fissionable material. Clearly, they should not be at liberty to publish such an invention. Of course, the likelihood of anyone entrusted with these official secrets making such an invention is considerable, but I think we may hope that in general the people in that sort of position would not be likely to disclose it irresponsibly.

Finally, there is the possibility that some person remote from all Government work might, quite independently, in his own laboratory or elsewhere, think out some novel process or plant for producing or using substances important for atomic energy work. That is not very likely, and even if it did happen the odds are that the man would be a decent person who would in the first instance communicate his invention to his own Government. But I really do not think it is wrong to lay down that this is an obligation and to make it plain that failure to do so is an offence. There is, however, no denying the fact that it is a totally new departure. Hitherto, if a man discovered or invented something in his own laboratory or elsewhere, he was entitled to publish it or to communicate it to anyone he pleased. Clause 11 prohibits this as regards discoveries or inventions concerning plant, or methods of operation or processes in plant used or proposed to be used for producing atomic energy. This clause, of course, as the noble Lord said, has been subject to a good deal of criticism and it was, I think, even proposed in another place to delete it altogether. I do not myself go so far as this. It is quite true, of course, that anything preventing the interchange of ideas tends to hamper the progress of science, and as scientists we are therefore bound to regret it.

We must not forget that there is another side of the picture. The man in the street will say, not without justice, that the main thing Clause 11 will impede and delay will be the construction of still bigger and still better atomic bombs. As he does not know who is going to get them first he may well consider that such a delay is not entirely a matter of regret. There may be many noble Lords in this House who will agree with him. After all, supposing it became plain that processes might be evolved for producing easily from common substances an absolutely deadly poison, whose use could never be detected, would anybody claim that it should be permissible to publish that sort of knowledge in the newspapers in the interests of science? Some people say, of course, that it will be intolerable for scientists to have to obtain permission to publish discoveries in nuclear physics which might well have a bearing on deference. Of course, it is a nuisance. Every physiologist has to get permission before he is allowed to carry out vivisection experiments, and no doubt he considers that a nuisance and would prefer to do what he liked. Parliament has insisted on certain restrictions on physiologists in order to save unnecessary suffering to animals. Therefore, it seems to me that Parliament is entitled to impose restrictions on physicists for the sake of saving suffering to humanity.

In broad principle, therefore, I do not contest the need for something on the lines of Clause 11. It does seem to me, however, to require certain modifications in wording. As it stands it seems to me that it would completely inhibit any discussion on these matters at all, since any communication to any person requires the consent of the Minister. It is perfectly true that the procedure is laid down by which the Minister can by order grant exemption from this to certain classes of cases. For example, he might exempt cyclotrons or Geiger counters, or a whole class of similar instruments. What causes anxiety to my scientific friends and colleagues is that there does not seem to be any mechanism for exempting certain persons from the operation of this clause in the case of highly secret material which has not been exempted under the general clause. Some people hold that this can be done under the clause as it stands. I must say I am very doubtful whether this is correct. In any event, it is by no means evident to anyone who reads the clause, and a great deal of the concern of my scientific colleagues arises, I think, because they read this clause, as I do—namely, as meaning that discussion amongst bona-fide colleagues will be inhibited except in so far as particular topics exempted by the Minister are concerned.

I hope very much that the Government will see their way to relieve this anxiety either by rewording part of the clause or perhaps by adding another proviso saying that it shall not be an offence to communicate to authorized individuals information concerning secret non-exempted material. I hope that the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, will recognize that this is a reasonable request, and that he will examine with his advisers the possibility of framing some Amendment which would take care of this aspect. This would, I am sure, remove a great deal of the objection felt against this clause in scientific circles.

Perhaps I should refer to one other point. It was suggested in another place that a special committee should be set up by the Bill, whose advice the Minister should hear before deciding certain points. I do not press for this myself. There is such a shortage of nuclear physicists in the country that I am sure that practically all of them will be roped in on one or other of the various committees or panels which have been or will be formed. No Minister in his senses could dream of acting without considering their advice, and I shall be very much surprised if in scientific matters he ever goes against it. In certain circles, especially abroad, there has been a tendency to claim that as the physicists discovered and invented these bombs, they ought to have a predominant voice in determining how they should be handled and what should be done about them. I do not think any reasonable physicist in this country takes this view. Indeed, it would be absurd that he should. If a man invented a particularly effective contraceptive, that would not give him the right to decide the country's birth-rate.

My view is that the people who run the country should have some knowledge of science, not that scientists should run the country. As we cannot at this stage count upon this, I think it is very important, especially in a matter of this kind, that the Minister should fortify himself with scientific advice. I am confident he will do so. Although they may be few and far between, there are still enough people in Parliament with sufficient scientific knowledge to make the Minister's life a burden to him if he takes a line in any scientific or technical matter which is repugnant to scientific opinion. On the whole this is a good and necessary Bill. I hope the Government will be able to meet us on the points I have mentioned, and possibly some small Committee points. That being so, I trust the House will give the Bill a Second Reading.

2.56 p.m.

VISCOUNT SAMUEL

My Lords, the purpose of this Bill, as stated by the noble Lord who h[...]s just spoken, is to impose upon the Minister of Supply a general duty to promote and control the development of atomic energy. Those purposes, how ever, are not parallel, and they may be sometimes contrary. The more you promote these developments of atomic energy, the more difficult it may be to control it, and the more strictly you control it the more difficult it may be to promote it. In the short run what we are at present thinking of mostly is control, but in the long run it may prove to be that promotion is for the more important of the two. The term "epoch-making" is often used and abused, and in reference to some quite secondary matters, but literally it may prove that this discovery of the way to utilize atomic energy does open a new epoch, and that the atomic age may be even more different, both in economics and social organization, from the present age as the steam age was from the age of hand labour which preceded it.

The noble Lord, Lord Cherwell, in previous debates was inclined to rate some what low the prospects of any immense economic or industrial development following from the use of atomic energy. He pointed out that in effect it was only the substitution of one kind of motive force, one kind of fuel as it were, for another, that this might prove to be more costly than coal, and that in the long run it would have very little effect upon industrial developments. But that view is, I believe, not shared by most of those whose scientific reputation is as high even as that of the noble Lord, Lord Cherwell, and I refer to those who have been specially concerned with this development. There was a conference held in London a few months ago on the subject of science and world welfare, which was organized by the Association of Scientific Workers, in co-operation with other bodies, and enjoyed the presence and co-operation of a number of leading scientists from other countries. I was privileged to receive an invitation. I attended the three-day sittings of the conference and heard all the discussions. Among the principal speakers was Professor Oliphant, who is, of course, one of those most prominently concerned with the development of atomic energy. He said that he thought it was reasonable to anticipate that the practical application of atomic energy—at all events in experimental form—might be achieved within five or ten years. If that is so, and if this motive force is made available practically or experimentally within that comparatively short time, we may be sure that international competition and emulation between different countries, and the immense objects to be attained will bring about its development with extreme speed.

Toil, brute labour, has always been the oppressor of mankind, and the machine has come as the great liberator. The machine, however, depends upon motive force and so long as industries are limited by the considerations of the accessibility of coal or oil or hydraulic power then development must be limited, and some countries or vast areas of countries can hardly be developed industrially at all. The moment you have this new form of energy which can be derived from matter and utilized anywhere you may effect an immense revolution in the industrial organization of the world. And once you have, if you do have, this exceedingly cheap and plentiful motive force anywhere you may be sure that the development of machinery will proceed with extreme speed. All that opens up a prospect for the next and succeeding generations of a supply of the necessaries, comforts and amenities of life in abundance, with very much less labour, and gives a prospect of the enjoyment of leisure carried to a point which has never been conceived as possible in previous ages. The amount of energy involved is, of course, quite unlimited. Sir James Jeans a good many years ago pointed out that the amount of energy existing in a piece of coal the size of a pea, if it could all be utilized by scientific methods, would be enough to drive a great liner from Southampton to New York and back again. The power resources of this new force are on that scale.

Here, in this country the only great resource for power that we have lies in our coal, while the other two great empire countries, the United States and Russia, have an abundance of other forms of natural resources for the production of energy which we here have not. It is in the highest degree necessary, therefore, even from a narrow national standpoint, that this motive force should be developed to the utmost in this country. After all, this idea originated here. It came from British scientists such as Thomson and Rutherford in the first instance, and it would be hard if, in the future, as in so many cases in the past, with regard to ideas that have originated here, it should be left to be developed elsewhere and conduce chiefly to the prosperity of other countries.

It should be the object of Ministers of Supply in this country to endeavour to the utmost degree possible to promote the development of atomic energy. Incidentally it is greatly needed also for the sake of research both in physics and in medicine. The essence of scientific progress has always been freedom of communication, the interchangeability of ideas. Secrecy is wholly antipathetic. Therefore, from one point of view any additional restriction is disadvantageous. The Prime Minister, introducing this Bill in another place a few days ago, said: The Government must not hinder the freedom of scientists, indeed they must facilitate it. That is one side of the picture, the side of promotion. But then there is the other side, and the Prime Minister said in the same speech, and quite rightly: The Government must have adequate powers of control. The terrific effects of the atomic bomb must bring home to every one of us, as a matter of the utmost urgency, that such control, and effective control, is absolutely vital. The Minister of Supply, Mr. Wilmot, in another place, giving an example, said that the release of energy weight for weight of an atomic bomb was a million times greater than that from a bomb filled with such an explosive as T.N.T.

The Government sent a Commission to Japan to make a scientific report on the results of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the end of that report the Commission summarize the casualties that were inflicted, and they tell us that in Hiroshima the number killed was between 70,000 and go.000 and in Nagasaki about 40,000. 7Fhey mention that during the whole of the six years of the war throughout Great Britain, the casualties in killed in all the air raids totalled 60,000. So that means that in a moment in Hiroshima nearly half as many again were killed compared with the total of fatal casualties in this country throughout the war. They mention also that the German V2 rocket, which was the latest engine of destruction launched against this country, had an average casualty effect of some fifteen killed for each rocket. They estimate that in the conditions of the British towns, the average casualties from an atomic bomb similar to those used in Japan would be about 50,000 from a single bomb. This weapon is now only in its infancy, and there is very little doubt that its destructive effects will be quickly increased if the nations set them selves to that end. Consequently, it is obvious that control and effective control is absolutely vital to the future of mankind. The United Nations Organization has come into existence just in time to be the authority that should endeavour to establish, and let us hope will succeed in establishing, that control. If there is any one matter which is proper for the United Nations to deal with it is this matter of atomic energy.

My noble friend the Earl of Perth drew my attention to the fact that in our debate last week on the subject of the control of defence not a word was said by any speaker—including myself—on the effect on national defence of the discovery of atomic energy. I think that that must have been in the case of most speakers— it certainly was in mine—because it is useless at this stage to consider the relation of atomic energy to national defence. We must wait to see whether the United Nations can devise means of establishing the necessary control. If they do then we can make modifications in our plans on that basis. Even if they do, it will still be necessary to maintain ordinary defensive measures by means of the Army, Navy and Air Force and the necessary Governmental organization at the centre. For clearly the atomic weapon is such a terrific weapon that it could not be used for ordinary international police purposes and the general objects for which a defence organization is maintained.

In the United States there has been the most intense public interest and discussion on this matter; far more than in this country. Fresh organizations have been established to carry on propaganda with regard to the matter, which has been discussed in the Press throughout the land. There have also been numbers of committees created, and there have been two admirable reports, the Lillenthal Report and the Baruch Report, which make practical proposals for the control of atomic energy. Those Reports are admirable not only for their practical suggestions but because of the spirit, the regard for human welfare in general which inspires them.

It is clear, therefore, that a Bill of this character is essential. We must have national control, if only as a means of contributing to international control, to honour or enforce any international agreement to which we may become parties. This control is a question of the greatest possible difficulty. I do not know of any Minister who has had a more difficult task thrust upon him than that of drafting a Bill which will on the one hand establish adequate control and yet not interfere with the proper development. Plants now in use for the production of atomic bombs are, as we all know, vast and necessarily conspicuous, but it may be that the processes will be greatly simplified. In fact, that is generally anticipated by scientists—perhaps "generally" may be an exaggeration; it is certainly anticipated by some scientists.

The raw materials are now somewhat rare; certainly that is true of the isotopes of uranium and thorium and other rare substances. But theoretically it can be derived from almost any elements, and it may be that in the future entirely different methods, much simpler and less conspicuous, will be adopted. In another place, the Minister of Supply said that he had been advised that "it may prove, later on, not to be necessary to use the nuclear fission method at all, and we may find means to liberate atomic energy by different methods altogether." That may make control even more difficult than it is at this moment. When we discussed this matter very briefly a year ago, soon after the discovery of atomic energy and its use, I raised the question of the establishment of world-wide inspection of the plants. The noble Viscount, Lord Addison, who replied in that debate, rather brushed that aside and said that it was not practicable in any circum stances.

VISCOUNT ADDISON

I do not think that I said "in any circumstances."

VISCOUNT SAMUEL

The noble Viscount said that we must depend upon the goodwill and the sense of obligation of the foreign countries. Now, as the noble Lord, Lord Cherwell, said, I think it is realized that inspection is the very essence of the matter. But if you are to have inspection with a view to detecting the illicit or unauthorized manufacture of atomic bombs and similar weapons, is that inspection to extend to the ordinary military establishments of the country, all the dockyards and the industrial establishments which are concerned with the manufacture of submarines, aeroplanes, artillery rockets, and all the instruments of war? In other words, will the agents of other countries be admitted into the most secret military engineering establishment of any other country. If they are, that may be regarded as a serious invasion of national sovereignty. If they are not, how can the world at large be assured that illicit manufacture is not being carried on in the more secret establishments? That is a problem of very great difficulty, which I have not yet seen discussed. It is quite obvious that when the United Nations come to deal with this matter it is one of the first issues which they will be obliged to investigate. We shall all watch with extreme anxiety the course of discussions on this question when it comes before the United Nations.

These two purposes, one of promotion and the other of control, are cross- purposes. They are dealt with in Clause 11 the Bill, to which the noble Lord, Lord Cherwell, has referred. That is the clause which deals with the restriction of disclosure. That has been discussed at great length, both in another place and outside Parliament, and various changes were made in the Bill as it was first drafted, in order to meet criticisms from the standpoint of the scientist. The noble Lord, Lord Cherwell, said that control was somewhat resented by the scientist. Yet control must be drastic, if it is to be effective. Even in such matters as putting down illicit stills or stopping smuggling laws have to be drastic, and the penalty has to be heavy. Here, the difficulty is far greater and the possibilities of evasion are far more formidable than in any other case. It is true that this clause imposes a penalty of five years penal servitude for wrongful disclosure, but scientists concerned an always go to the Minister to obtain permission for communication.

The Minister has given undertakings in another place which I have no doubt will be given here—that he will not interfere with the normal work of the physicists who are discussing the problems that arise here. Indeed, the clause itself does impose very strict limitations upon the Minister, and it seeks to guarantee, so far as possible, that pure scientific investigation shall not be unduly hampered. As I have mentioned, the Prime Minister himself has said that the Government must give to the scientist the greatest freedom, consistent with national and international safety. These are matters which will, no doubt, be dealt with in Committee, when we come to Clause 11. For the rest, I have no points of detail to raise, and nothing further to add. I am certain that your Lordships will give to this measure on Second Reading a unanimous assent.

3.18 p.m.

VISCOUNT ADDISON

My Lords, may I add a few words, particularly with regard to the comments and questions of the noble Lord, Lord Cherwell? I will not follow the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, into his discourse on the character of this danger, and what may be involved in this Bill and the international obligations which everybody will have to assume if we are to be successful in restraining the dangers. I was, however, struck by one phrase which the noble Viscount used, and to which I cannot resist referring. I do so with considerable trepidation, because the noble Viscount is much more learned in philosophy than I am. I noticed that he said "toil has always been an oppressor of mankind." I am not a philosopher, but I know something about physiology, and I do not agree with him at all. I have found that if had not dug in my garden, and done a little useful work whenever I had a chance, I should not be as healthy a man as I am at my age. I will refrain, how ever, from discussing that.

VISCOUNT SAMUEL

You might not feel the same if it were for ten hours a day for 350 days a year.

VISCOUNT ADDISON

It is only a question of the amount; that would be excessive toil. I should have said that toil was an essential part of human physiology. If you do not exert yourself, you will not live very long. However, I will not go into that fascinating theme.

I thank noble Lords for the general welcome which I am sure that the Bill will receive. I have spent some consider able time going into the points which the noble Lord, Lord Cherwell, informed me beforehand he would raise, and I may say that I have very much sympathy with him. First, it is quite evident that the ordinary rules regarding the employment of the high experts and scientists who will be required for this work could not be rules which would be applicable to the ordinary procedure of the Civil Service Commission. I entirely agree. It is manifest that that would have to be so. Also the number of men who would be sufficiently expert is very small. I am informed that the total number that might be expected to be required within the near future is quite small. I will not give it. It is evident, if you are waiting to recruit a physicist or other person who is already eminent in some branch of work, that you cannot expect him to come into this work without receiving a security as good as any he had before. You cannot expect a man of that kind to go through, and com ply with, all the regulations of the Civil Service Commission.

As a matter of fact, I heard a story of one of the chief professors employed in Canada, who voluntarily submitted to the Civil Service Commission examination. He was, as a matter of fact, the head of the whole thing, but he came out bottom in the examination! That is an excellent illustration of the fact that regulations of this kind are not applicable to such appointments. I will say this. Matters are now being discussed between the Civil Service Commission, the Treasury and the Minister, and I hope that when the Bill reaches Committee I shall be able to give the noble Lord a detailed and explicit assurance which would completely satisfy him on this matter.

On the point of secrecy, there again I have great sympathy with the views ex pressed. The provisions about secrecy cannot be interpreted in such a way as to make it a crime for one roan in a laboratory to discuss freely with another man in a laboratory; that would be stupid. Nor can we restrain proper research and discussion of a bona-fide character where-ever it may be. We have given some considerable thought to this matter, too, and, as the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, pointed out, the provisions in Clause 11 are very generous in their scope, and, on the whole, we should be inclined to think that they would provide adequate safe guards as they are. We are very anxious that scientists should be reassured, and I am hoping—I trust the noble Lord will not press me any further to-day—that, when we get into Committee, I shall have a suggestion to make, perhaps in the form of a further proviso, which will really cover the point he ha; in mind. But I am quite sure that we are all desirous of reassuring scientists that they will not be liable to petty persecution for bona-fide conversation or anything of that sort. I think I shall be able to meet the noble Lord's point when we get to the Committee stage.

LORD CHERWELL

I thank you very much.

On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.