HL Deb 23 May 1946 vol 141 cc427-43

Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Pakenham.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly:

(The EARL OF DROGHEDA in the Chair.)

Clause 1:

Treasury control of borrowing, etc.

1.—(1) The Treasury may make orders for regulating, subject to such exemptions as may be specified in the Orders, all or any of the following transactions, that is to say—

4.1 p.m.

THE EARL OF MUNSTER moved, in subsection (1), after "may," where that word first occurs, to insert "during the period of five years from the passing of this Act." The noble Earl said: The first Amendment which stands in my name on the Order Paper is practically self-explanatory. The object is to secure a limitation of the period during which the Bill shall operate. Thus, instead of the Bill operating for a period of eternity, or until some other Government should amend it, I ask your Lordships to insert, "during the period of five years from the passing of this Act." I explained on the Second Reading of the measure—and I do not wish to go into it again at any length—that we do not think it is really necessary or desirable for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to have power to control investment permanently. As I understand it, the Chancellor already has powers under the Supplies and Services Act, which was limited to a period of five years. During the whole course of the discussion on this Bill in your Lordships' House and in another place it has never been suggested by us that all controls should be immediately dropped. I think I made it clear that we consider that there should be two periods—the transitional phase and the post-transitional phase. As the Bill is at present drafted—and of course all the power is contained in Clause 1—it seems to me that it will become possibly a restrictive measure. It is hardly designed for an expansionist economy. No Government, as far as I am aware, have ever had any experience in peace-time of such powers as are contained in this Bill. It is, therefore, appropriate, it seems to us, that we should ask the Government to limit the period of the Bill to five years, instead of eternity. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 1, line 5, after ("may") insert ("during the period of five years from the passing of this Act").—(The Earl of Munster.)

4.4 p.m.


The noble Viscount, Lord Buckmaster, who spoke from this Bench on the Second Reading of this Bill, drew special attention to the fact that the period of the Bill was unlimited, and expressed the view that strong reasons would have to be given before that should be assented to. The noble Viscount is, unfortunately, absolutely prevented from being here to-day, and I should like to support his plea. The powers given under this Bill are exceedingly wide. It is undoubtedly necessary to continue for the time being powers for the direction of our currency, and to continue the system of managed finances which has been necessary during the war. But after a period of years the matter ought to revert to Parliament, for consideration in the light of the working of the system. My noble friend who has just moved this Amendment originally suggested that the period should be two years. That period, it seemed to me, would have been unduly short, and I am glad to know that he has now moved his Amendment with the figure "five" instead of "two." All the other controls which have been granted for war-time purposes have been extended by recent regulations or recent Statute, so far as necessary. The term of live years has been generally adopted, and it seems to me that an exception should not be made in this case. I trust that the Government will agree to this limitation.

4.7 p.m.


May I add a few words in favour of this Amendment. This is a very remarkable Bill. It is an example of delegated powers of legislation going to a very extreme limit, the sort of limit that you would expect to be reached only in the emergency of war. This matter is one of constitutional importance. A number of eminent writers have complained bitterly of the extension of the delegation of the power of making Orders equivalent to law. The late Lord Hewark wrote a very admirable book on the subject. Professor Carr is the author of a book on delegated legislation, which contains the objections which exist to legislation of this kind in cases where it is not necessary. And finally, there is a very able book by my friend Professor C. K. Allen, entitled, Law in the Making, which contains a chapter devoted to the question of legislation such as I am speaking of.

No sensible person thinks that there should be no delegated legislation, but I think anybody who has a strong regard for consistency in the matter of making laws in this country will agree that there are four matters which should be considered before a Bill of this character is passed. The first is that Orders are not subject to legislative approval. These particular Orders in Council, according to the Bill as it stands, are to be laid upon the Table, but they are not subject to approval of either House. Secondly, they may be changed or repealed without notice. As we all know, a law can only be repealed with the consent of both Houses of Parliament and with the approval of the Crown. Thirdly, and this is a very important matter, under this Bill there is, in a great number of these cases, no adequate publicity. Nobody will really know when these Orders are made by the Treasury, although it is true, as I have already mentioned, that the Orders have to be laid upon the Table and have to lie there for a period. As we all know, if we are not purblind, vast numbers of these Orders made under such authority as we are proposing to give the Treasury in these cases do not come to the notice of anybody at all. I fear very much that people, at any rate in the early stages of the life of this Bill, will be erring, without knowing that they have done anything in contravention of some Order which they have never seen. Finally, and I think that this is perhaps the most important of all—and it is stressed by Professor Carr in his book—there ought to be a limit placed upon all delegated legislation. In other words, the limits within which the delegated power is to be exercised ought definitely to be laid down. I do not believe that any reasonable person can object to that proposition as a general rule.

The case which no doubt can be supported by the Government is that, just after a terrible war, the economic circumstances are most trying, and it is desired to prevent certain abuses in relation to large sums, of which we had examples after the end of the first world war, and accordingly there is something to be said for the existing Bill. But I wholly deny that any case has been made for this measure as a permanent feature in our legislation. It has been absolutely unsupported by any real argument except that argument of temporary expediency. It cannot be right to give Treasury officials under the Bill, if it becomes law, the right to interfere with all kinds of borrowing however small between private people, and all sorts of proceedings by banks and by the customers of the banks.

This power is conferred by the Bill as it stands, and it is no answer to say, "We do not propose to use the power given to the Treasury except by very reasonable methods and with reference to borrowing of money in excess of £50,000." The Government apparently refuse to put any limit on these egregiously large powers, and, as I have already said, they take up that attitude for the reason that they say, "We are legislating in a case of emergency." Let us be logical and let us make the emergency one which we can define by a period of years. In five years, as my noble friend the Earl of Munster says, the matter can be reconsidered, but there really is in my belief no ground whatever for this as a permanent measure in the circumstances in which we now stand.

4.12 p.m.


I should also like to support my noble friend, the Earl of Munster. With regard to the Bills we have had so far in this House, in not one case have we been asked to put anything on the Statute Book permanently. In the case of the Emergency Laws (Transitional Provisions) Act, we thought the period proposed in the Bill was too long. We sought to limit it to three years. The Government said it must be five. We have never been asked for permanent authority like this. I for one take great exception to giving these very wide powers. I agree that they are needed for the transitional period, but I think five years is sufficient.

4.15 p.m.


With reference to something that the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Maugham, said, I can only assure him that it simply is not so. The Government have never, either in another place or through my humble lips here, suggested that in the case of this measure we were legislating in an emergency. It has been represented throughout as a permanent feature of our arrangements. Noble Lords may not like that, but they have already given this Bill a Second Reading without a Division and, that being so, they have gone some way, if I may say so with respect, to accepting that principle, because that is an essential principle of the Bill. Indeed, on reading through my own remarks in HANSARD after the Second Reading, I was horrified at how long I had taken to develop that point. It has taught me never to read HANSARD again, at any rate when I have contributed to the discussion.


Will the noble Lord give me one moment to ask a question—whether the wideness of the power to interfere with all borrowing, with the exception of borrowing by a man for the purposes of his trade, is justified by anything but an emergency?


The noble Viscount has raised the whole question that we discussed at great length on the Second Reading. Perhaps he will allow me to suggest that he should wait until the end of my remarks this time and then see whether, by summarizing what I said on that occasion, I have made any impression on him. Certainly it was represented to the House—it is in the recollection of everyone who was present—as a permanent feature of our arrangements. I do not think anybody who was present can deny that.


That is perfectly true, I agree.


Well, I am glad to know the noble Viscount accepts that now, because a few minutes ago he was saying this had been represented as an emergency measure. We are advancing. With regard to something that the noble Lord, Lord Wolverton, said, I must protest against the idea that in the ordinary way a measure introduced to your Lordships' House is temporary. The noble Lord, Lord Wolverton, said the House had not yet been asked to pass any permanent measures. No doubt he had in mind measures of control. I do not want to quibble over words, but of course your Lordships passed some permanent measures including the Bank of England Act, the measure repealing the Trades Disputes Act and other measures of that kind. So I am not ashamed to say that this is intended to be what a law usually is—a permanent law, until altered by the Government with the consent of Parliament on a later occasion.

I do not wish to repeat what I said on the Second Reading. I will try to summarize the arguments that I then presented in four propositions, which I will lay before the House, hoping they will at any rate make the position of the Government clear. First of all, the Government in the future must accept in an altogether new sense the responsibility for seeing that full employment is secured. I do not think that such a responsibility was fully accepted by all Parties before the war, but since the publication of the Coalition White Paper on full employment or unemployment policy in 1944, there is general agreement that this new responsibility will adhere to governments in the future.

The second proposition I think is also common ground—certainly it is common ground between those who were responsible for the Coalition White Paper. That is that full employment over a long period is impossible without a far greater degree of stability in the total amount of private investment than was ever the case here or in any other country before the war. Those two propositions I think are common ground between all of us.

Thirdly, stability of private investment involves new methods of Government regulation, aimed alike against inflation and deflation, and calculated to secure a steady rate of expansion. I do not say that that is completely common ground, but, at any rate, I think it will obtain a wide measure of assent from members of all Parties, although there may still be a few dissentients.

As regards what the noble Earl, Lord Munster said, that this clause was hardly compatible with an expansionist economy, there again I am diffident about repeating what I said the last time, but, of course, our intention is to avoid the restriction in practical result that disgraced this country as all other great countries between the two wars. No one can say our economy was expansionist between the wars. We believe that by suitable regulation we can secure stability and in that way promote orderly expansion. It may not be strength through joy, a term which is perhaps more fittingly applied to Clause 2, but it is joy through strength—we shall get the strength first and then the joy comes a little later.

Finally, I would lay before the House the fourth proposition, that this Government regulation should make use of the well-tried machinery of the Capital Issues Committee and of the principle which that Committee has operated with the goodwill of all Parties, the principle of selecting between rival issues according to the respective social urgency of the various issues. That may or may not be acceptable to most noble Lords present, but that, at any rate, is the fourth proposition which will command a very wide assent in the country. Those are the four propositions. They represent a logical case, whether or not the whole House accepts it, for a permanent measure of regulation of this kind, and while I am entirely in the hands of the House, and am ready to defend and to develop the argument further if required, I will say briefly that we are convinced that this measure is essential permanently if we are going to avoid the economic waste and tragedy of the years between the two wars.

4.19 p.m.


I must at once entirely challenge the proposition put forward by the noble Lord, who has just spoken, that, by giving a Second Reading to a Bill, we deprive ourselves of the power—indeed of the duty—of giving the fullest consideration to the Bill in Committee. I must tell him at once that that is not a proposition which we can accept, or that the country would be willing that we should accept with regard to any measure whether it is of a permanent or a temporary character. That by giving a Second Reading to this Bill we should be precluded from considering whether it should be of a permanent or temporary character, is a most extraordinary proposition. The House gave a Second Reading to the Bill for all those powers to which Lord Wolverton referred. That did not prevent us from discussing most fully whether the right period was a two or a fiveyear period. Really the parallel which should be taken with regard to this Bill is not a parallel drawn from a White Paper on the policy of full employment—from which I do not recede in the least. The parallel should be one with what are quite abnormal and entirely unlimited powers.

Let your Lordships observe what is done here. It is represented as though this were a clear and simple Bill giving power of control to the Government, through a Capital Issues Committee, over great issues of capital. It may be argued that over a matter of that kind the Government of the day, through appropriate channels, should have some authority. I think myself that the wise course in regard to large matters of that kind would be to proceed by trial and error; that we should accept the principle for a transitional period, see how it worked, and then continue it if thought desirable. But this is not at all limited in that way. The noble Lord surely has read his own clauses, but he has expounded them with less than his usual lucidity to the House. Clause 1 of the Bill does not: say the Capital Issues Committee shall have power to consider issues in excess of £50,000. On the contrary, what Clause 1 of this Bill says—and I shall be corrected if I am wrong—is: The Treasury may make orders for regulating, subject to such exemptions as may be specified in the orders, all or any of the following transactions, that is to say— (a) the borrowing of money in Great Britain; There is no question of limiting this to great capital issues. Nor really does it lie with the noble Lord to say, "Well, this is what we shall do if we get the powers." That is not the right way to legislate.

We have not got finality in the proposed Order, nor does the Bill give any finality. A draft Order was produced with the Bill. Various undertakings and cross-undertakings have been given in another place which are going entirely to alter the form in which that Order was presented to Parliament. But even supposing the noble Lord came and presented us with a new White Paper and a new draft Order, what is there to stop an entirely different Order being made at any time? Indeed, the noble Lord would say, I suppose, "In the light of experience, we may find we want to put this or that restriction upon all or any form of borrowing." At all events, let us be under no misunderstanding. What this Bill does—and I am sure the noble Lord will correct me if I am wrong—is to say that the Chancellor of the Exchequer at any time from now till Doomsday may make any regulation he pleases with regard to the borrowing of any sum of money, great or small, by anybody in this country. Is that not right?




With the exception of borrowing from the banker.


In the ordinary course of business.


Except that borrowing on overdraft from the bank. I am not going into the details—that was done by Viscount Maugham and others much better qualified than I am, on Second Reading. The whole business of a pawnbroker may be brought to an end by an Order if the Chancellor of the Exchequer so desires. I have no doubt that if we went into it we would find that every kind of hire purchase would come under it too. I would like to know whether an Order could be made in that regard. Selling on hire purchase may, if looked at from one point of view, be lending. There are all sorts of transactions which have the element of borrower and lender in them. How would they be affected? In fact, except for the transaction of the borrower going to his bank and borrowing by way of overdraft—


In the ordinary course of business.


It must be in the ordinary course of business. It is worse, then, than I had thought. Even that part is limited. The Chancellor of the Exchequer can make any Order he pleases. I hope that the Government will give further consideration to this, because I really do not think we can accept it. Surely if these extraordinary powers are to be taken, the right analogy is not long-term policy but an analogy with a special powers Bill which this House gave the Government. The Lord Chancellor speaking with great sympathy then said: "I do not like having these wide, unlimited, uncertain powers for a long term. I do not like having them for five years, but I think we must take them for five years because we cannot tell how long this or that emergency may last. Therefore we propose to exercise them but for no longer than we need." There were special provisions introduced, which are not introduced here, as to how instruments were to be brought before us. The Government had really great hesitation in asking this House to give those special powers for five years. We met the Government over that. We said: "All right, let it be for five years, but it is exceptional and it is certainly on the long side." I believe that is the exact parallel of this entirely unlimited, arbitrary Bill.

If the Government were rightly proposing some long-term policy which they asked us to accept for all time, surely the right course would be to come with a Bill which would lay down with precision what were the proposals; not with a Bill to give the Chancellor of the Exchequer unlimited powers for an absolutely unlimited time to fetter all borrowing and all ordinary relations of this kind. For my part, I cannot think it is right to give these terribly wide powers for an absolutely unlimited period. What do the Government lose if they follow their own precedent of five years under the Emergency Laws (Transitional Provisions) Act? If that Act works well, and we all agree—and we have been very reasonable in this House on these matters, as the Lord Chancellor has said—then no doubt the Government would bring forward renewed proposals at the end of the five years, and I am sure that Parliament would pass whatever legislation practical experience had shown to be desirable. But it is trying us too hard to ask us to accept these unlimited powers for all time.


There was one matter omitted by the noble Viscount. I am sure inadvertently, and that is that every Order made under the Bill has to lie on the Table. Although the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Maugham, said that very often these things slip through without proper attention, I am certain that with a vigilant Opposition any Order which is oppressive, as has been suggested and described by the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, would be challenged. There is that right. The Order has to lie on the Table for forty Parliamentary days, and if anything is amiss it can be taken up.

The rest of the noble Viscount's speech was really an argument against passing the Second Reading; it was against the whole principle of the Bill. If all he says is true, and all these terrible things can happen, the Chancellor of the Exchequer can make hay of the City of London in the next five years. If all these awful things can be accomplished in the face of an over-awed and frightened Opposition, who dare not challenge the Orders one by one if they are oppressive, what mischief can be done in five years! I fear that the Opposition so hate this Bill that they want to emasculate it in every way possible; yet they had not the courage to vote against it on Second Reading.

4.31 p.m.


I think I can reinforce the argument of the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, by showing that the case is even worse than he stated. Let us take the case of a man having a landed property on which he has raised a mortgage in order to pay Estate Duty which is above the Treasury limit. I am appealing to what the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, appealed to, namely, the tried and proved experience of the Capital Issues Committee. That man cannot change his insurance company, under this Bill, without the permission of His Majesty's Treasury, because it will, in the view of the Treasury, constitute new borrowing. He will have to pay back the first insurance company and raise the money from a second. That is already the view taken by the Capital Issues Committee, and I have no doubt that the regulations made under this Bill will follow that precedent.

4.34 p.m.


I have no idea how much weight may be carried by the noble Viscount's observations about what is imported by the Second Reading of a Bill in your Lordships' House, but I daresay that most noble Lords who were present when the Bill was read a second time, would agree with me that my noble friend is entitled to a certain sensation of surprise at the remarks of the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton. In the Second Reading debate, several noble Lords on the Benches opposite laboured under what appeared to be a misconception, namely, that the Bill was a Bill bringing in provisions of a temporary nature to meet a temporary post-war situation. My noble friend, Lord Pakenham, took the utmost pains to dispell that misconception, which, I must say, still seems to haunt the minds of some noble Lords opposite, and to make it perfectly plain that the Bill was intended to be a permanent measure and was regarded by the Government as a necessary instrument for carrying out a long-term function of Government, namely, to attempt to preserve full employment. That being so, it seems to me that this Amendment not only impugns the basis of the Bill, but was justly objected to by my noble friend as something that he might have considered the House had conceded in granting the Second Reading of the Bill. I will waste no further time upon that, but I would like to put it very seriously to your Lordships that the powers of this Bill are necessary for carrying out an essential element of the employment policy.


Without any limitation.


I will come to that in a moment. To carry out an employment policy—in the opinion of economists of the present day—control of investment is absolutely essential. That is the broad aim of the Bill—to provide powers for controlling the volume of investment. The scope of the Bill has been painted as something excessively wide. It is a large power to take control of the entire volume of investment, but it is not an indefinitely large power. You must have it for an employment policy. If that premise is granted, what, then, is the best way of carrying it out? I suppose it is conceivable that you could design regulations for controlling the volume of investment and embody them in a Bill. However, that would be an excessively difficult job, and it would have several grave disadvantages. Once you have put detailed regulations in an Act, you have petrified the situation for some time. It is rather difficult to alter an Act. You will fare very badly if you have put into your Bill provisions which are excessive, ill-conceived, or insufficient. Indeed, in a thing like employment policy, you cannot proceed successfully with an ossified instrument like that; you must have flexible powers; and you must have flexible powers because the thing with which you have to deal blows up very suddenly, and blows up in unexpected forms from unexpected quarters. I am referring to trade depression. Therefore you must have flexibility. Now we come to the noble Viscount's point.

If there is an instrument of policy in which you must have flexibility, what is the best legislative form in which to frame it? I share his views on the rule of law, and his abhorrence of administrative law. I was brought up on Dicey, like the noble Viscount, but in spite of that, I feel that the form in which this Bill is cast is really a necessary form. You take a general power and you place it at the disposal of some Minister. In this case it is placed at the disposal of the Treasury. You then enable the authority you have designated to fill up the details of that power from time to time as the emergency requires by making Statutory Orders under a well understood procedure. Unless you have got something as flexible as that, you cannot grapple with the phenomena of the trade depression, or of the boom, which is just as dangerous because in the long run it leads to depression. Therefore I think you must be content to waive a little of the old views, very soundly based on Blackstone and Dicey. You must be content to waive some part of those in order to get an instrument flexible enough for the emergencies of an enlightened modern economic policy.

I think the Government went a considerable way to meet the natural fears and objections of members of this House and in another place by giving an outline of the kind of thing they proposed for their first Order, and above all, showing the level of exemption, showing that in point of fact in anything like normal times—and these are hardly normal times—they did not propose to prevent people from borrowing ten pounds. They also made it clear that the administration of such Orders as may be made from time to time will be carried out by a body which, if not perfect, is at least a devil we know, namely, the Capital Issues Committee, whose personnel commands some measure of respect. Taking the thing as a whole, I cannot believe that the fears of noble Lords opposite are in any degree justified. To conclude, I think it is abundantly clear that a limit of five years, or any limit of time, in this Bill, will wreck it, because you cannot plan policy ahead under a time limit of that sort. Moreover, five years is a short period. You do not know when these powers will be required to be used. I venture to suggest that it would be very much to the benefit of the country, and of future governments as well as of this Government, if these powers are placed on the Statute Book.

4.39 p.m.


Let me say at once, in reply to the noble Lord who has just spoken, that I was not aware that anybody on this side of the House laboured under any delusion at all on the Second Reading that this Bill was only of a temporary nature. The whole of our complaint against the Bill was that it was designed by the Government to be a permanent measure to be strung round the neck of industry and enterprise for ever. As the noble Lord mentioned in the course of his remarks, we have had a draft Order submitted with the Bill, which is going to be considerably amended. But a draft Order is quite valueless; it can be changed to-morrow morning, and there will be no reference at all to that except by a negative resolution.

Perhaps I might address my next remark to the Lord Chancellor. As I understand this Bill, the Treasury or the Chancellor of the Exchequer can, tomorrow morning, prohibit me taking out a mortgage if he should think it desirable. I honestly cannot think that that is the intention of His Majesty's Government. They make borrowing a subject of control, but is it really desirable that I should not be allowed to take out a mortgage to-morrow morning if I wanted to? The Treasury have got the power at any

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.

Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 2 agreed to.

Clause 3:

Provisions as to orders.

3.—(1) Any order made under this Act shall be laid before Parliament as soon as may be after it is made, and if either House of Parliament within the period of forty days beginning with the day on which any such order is laid before it, resolves that the order be annulled, the order shall cease to have effect, but without prejudice to anything previously done thereunder or to the making of a new order.

(2) In reckoning any such period of forty days, no account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued, or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days. moment to say that all mortgages are illegal. I was very dissatisfied with the reply which was given to your Lordships by Lord Pakenham, and I think I should leave it to your Lordships whether the Amendment be inserted in the Bill or not.

On Question, Whether the said words shall be there inserted?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 65; Not Contents, 13.

Cholmondeley, M. Long, V. Grenfell, L.
Reading, M. Maugham, V. Hampton, L.
Salisbury, M. Samuel, V. Hazlerigg, L.
Simon, V. Hutchison of Montrose, L.
Abingdon, E. Stonehaven, V. Kenilworth, L.
Albemarle, E. Swinton, V. Llewellin, L.
Cavan, E. Trenchard, V. Lyle of Westbourne, L.
Drogheda, E. Mancroft, L.
Fortescue, E. [Teller.] Amherst of Hackney, L. Meston, L.
Graham, E. (D. Montrose.) Ampthill, L. O'Hagan, L.
Iddesleigh, E. Annesley, L. (V. Valentia.) Rankeillour L.
Lucan, E. Audley, L. Rennell, L.
Mount Edgcumbe, E. Balfour of Inchrye, L. Rotherwick, L.
Munster, E. Bingley, L. Rushcliffe, L.
Selborne, E. Brabazon of Tara, L. Saltoun, L.
Wilton, E. Broughshane, L. Sandhurst, L.
Carrington, L. Sherwood, L.
Chaplin, V. Chesham, L. Shute, L. (V. Barrington.)
Chelmsford, V. Croft, L. Sinha, L.
Elibank, V. Denham, L. [Teller] Somers, L.
Esher, V. Fairfax of Cameron, L. Soulbury, L.
FitzAlan of Derwent, V. Gage, L. (V. Gage.) Wolverton, L.
Hailsham, V. Gisborough, L.
Jowitt, L. (L. Chancellor.) Holden, L. Pakenham, L.
Lindsay of Birker, L. Piercy, L.
Huntingdon, E. Morrison, L. Strabolgi, L.
Mountevans, L. Walkden, L. [Teller.]
Henderson, L. [Teller.] Nathan, L. Winster, L.

3.24 p.m.

THE EARL OF MUNSTER had given Notice that he would move to leave out subsections (1) and (2) and insert: ("(1) Before any order is made under this Act a draft thereof shall be laid before Parliament, and the order shall not be made unless both Houses of Parliament, within the period of forty days beginning with the day on which the draft is laid before them, pass a resolution approving the draft.")

The noble Earl said: I feel that as your Lordships have new decided that the Act should last for a period of five years only, that it will not be really necessary for me to move this Amendment.

Clause 3 agreed to.

Remaining Clauses agreed to.