AFFAIRS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

HL Deb 21 May 1946 vol 141 cc343-94

LORD ALTRINCHAM rose to call attention to affairs in the Middle East, and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the Motion which stands in my name this afternoon has been for some time a movable object on the Order Paper. It has been deferred from date to date mainly because we were anxious to meet the convenience of the Government, and I am glad that it is with complete agreement from noble Lords opposite that the debate is being taken this afternoon. The Middle East is a very complex question, and I should detain your Lordships a very long time, which I have no intention of doing, if I were to attempt to deal with the questions of policy which arise in the Middle East as a whole. One of them in particular—the most difficult, perhaps—the question of Palestine, is, I am sure, not appropriate for discussion at the present moment. Negotiations are going on, we have been given to understand, between our Government and the Government of the United States and other Governments, and I am sure your Lordships will agree that it is better for us to refrain from comment on the Palestine question and the report of the Anglo-American Committee until further light is thrown upon what that report is to produce.

The question of Egypt on the other hand, I think, demands immediate debate. Egypt has proved vital to the security of this country in three great crises of its history, from the days of the Battle of the Nile, 150 years ago, until the termination of the life and death struggle from which we have emerged. Naturally we are deeply concerned in what are to be our future relations with Egypt. The announcement made the week before last by the Prime Minister in another place has been provisionally debated in that place, and I believe there is to be another debate later this week. I am sure, therefore, that no one will suppose that, practically alone of all centres of discussion in this country, this subject of Egypt should go undebated in your Lordships' House.

There is one thing to which I attach great importance and would like to emphasize from the start. We have been told from very high quarters—indeed, I quote language used by Sidky Pasha himself, the Prime Minister of Egypt, for whom I have the greatest respect—that those who criticize the recent procedures of His Majesty's Government in Egypt, are imbued with the prejudices of fifty years ago, prejudices based on outworn conceptions of armed domination. That such a thing should be said in such a quarter shows the measure of misunder-standing which has been produced in Egypt, as I believe, by the procedures of His Majesty's Government, and it is of great importance to say that statements of that kind have no basis whatever in truth. They are the very contrary of the truth. It is because we are so deeply concerned with the sovereign independence of Egypt that we are concerned in every question that affects her security in the future as in the past. I wish to say, with all the emphasis at my command, that it is a libel, not only on His Majesty's Opposition but on the whole aim and spirit of British statesmanship, of which we do not yet concede a monopoly to noble Lords opposite; it is a libel also on the aims and ideals of the Empire and on the character of its Governments, to suggest that our desire for alliance and friendship with Egypt is anything but a desire for an alliance and friendship on those equal terms which befit the relations of sovereign States.

It is after all, no reflection on the dignity of Egypt to suggest that the Empire and Egypt have vital interests in common which can best be safeguarded in partnership. Suggestions of that kind may be made to many States, and we are bound to make them in the future without in any way derogating from their dignity as sovereign States. We ourselves have not found it beneath our dignity to lease bases on British territory for one hundred years to the United States. We are, I believe, even discussing—I do not know whether this is true, but I believe it is true—the surrender of sovereignty over certain islands which might prove of value to the defence of the United States. During the war Britain and her capital became a most extensive base for American troops. They were given great areas for training. They were given very wide use of public buildings and other buildings. They were given control of the communications they needed. They were given the practical observance of their own law within their own Service community, and we never thought for a moment that our dignity or our sovereignty was being compromised by accepting the obligations of an alliance in the life and death struggle in which we both then stood.

Are the terms of our alliance with Egypt any different? I repeat that sovereign independence for Egypt is an over-riding consideration, and that: there is nothing in what we have clone, nor, I hope, in what we mean to do or hope to achieve in our future relations with Egypt, which could be incompatible with the dignity, self-respect and liberty of the Egyptian people. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 may really be taken as a model in that respect. If your Lordships will bear with me for a moment, I would like to read to you Article 7, because it is the kernel of that Treaty on which a great deal may depend in the future as it has in the course of the last six years. The Article reads thus: Should, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 6 above,"— which are the provisions for reference to the League of Nations of any international quarrel that might arise— either of the High Contracting Parties become engaged in war, the other High Contracting Party will, subject always to the provisions of Article so below, immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally. The aid of His Majesty the King of Egypt, in the event of war, imminent menace of war, or apprehended international emergency will consist in furnishing to His Majesty The King and Emperor on Egyptian territory, in accordance with the Egyptian system of administration and legislation, all the facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of his ports, aerodromes and means of communication. It will accordingly be for the Egyptian Government to take all the administrative and legislative measures, including the establishment of martial law and an effective censorship, necessary to render these facilities and assistance effective. I would draw your Lordships' attention to one other point. That Article is one of the Articles particularly safeguarded in the last clause but one of the Treaty, which includes this agreement: It is agreed that any revision of this Treaty will provide for the continuation of the alliance between the High Contracting Parties in accordance with the principles contained in, Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7. I ask: In what way do those facilities, which were unstintingly, generously and cordially given to us by the Egyptian Government during the course of the war, differ from the facilities which we offered in this country to the United States of America? They are exactly the same in all respects, and how they can be regarded as derogatory to the dignity of a country I do not understand.

The Treaty was freely negotiated and it was certainly acceptable at that time to all forms of Egyptian opinion. To indicate that, I think I need only ask you to remember the chief signatories. On behalf of Egypt the Treaty was signed by Nahas Pasha (who was then Prime Minister), by Sidky Pasha (the present Prime Minister), by Ahmed Maher (the Prime Minister who was assassinated early last year, to the great regret of his many friends), by Mohamed Mahmoud Pasha (yet another Prime Minister), by Abdel Fattah Yéhia Pasha (yet another Prime Minister), and by Makram Ebeid Pasha, who is the leader of one of the chief political groups in the Egyptian Parliament in opposition to the present Egyptian Government, and also by Nokrashi Pasha, lately Prime Minister. That was a pretty representative delegation. On our side the Treaty was signed by Mr. Eden, by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, my noble friend Viscount Simon, and, I think, by the noble Viscount, Lord Halifax. Viscount Halifax has left his place now, but despite that I am sure your Lordships will all wish me to say how gladly we welcome him back to the service of this House after his long tour of distinguished service in the United States.

That is the Treaty. In what way have we failed to honour it? I am going to admit that we have failed to honour it in one respect, and I will come to that later. It is a minor respect but it has had a very unfortunate consequence. As regards our major obligations under the Treaty, there is no doubt that its provisions have been triumphantly vindicated in the last six years. It is owing to the Treaty that, while Europe has been devastated from end to end, from north to south and from east to west, Egypt is unscathed, rich and free. Egypt, on her side, as I have said, has done her part; everything that she was called upon to do under the Treaty she has done, and that should be acknowledged fully on our side. I think I should also say that we appreciate very deeply the generous gifts which, only a few months ago, were made by the Egyptian people to this country for the permanent care of the disabled in the last war. An establishment exists in this country, which we owe to Egyptian generosity, recording the services which we rendered at the Battle of Alamein. Egypt has done her part, but I repeat that every provision in that Treaty has been justified by the emergency which occurred and by the way in which both countries overcame it. But for the Treaty Egypt would have been overrun very early in the war by the Italian forces and very soon afterwards she would have been under the heel of Germany. Certainly there would not have been in recent weeks an Egyptian taking the chair at a meeting of the Security Council of the free United Nations.

The fact remains that at the present moment Egyptian nationalism is, without question, violently inflamed against us. Only a very short time ago, less than a year ago, we were still the acknowledged heroes of the war in Egypt, but now we are the villains of the peace. How has that come about? It requires investigation. Japan capitulated on the 14th August of last year. When that capitulation took place, the war in the East came to an end, as the war in the West had done already, and we had no further treaty rights in any inhabited part of Egypt. I say "inhabited part" because we still held our Treaty rights upon the Canal Zone. The evacuation of inhabited Egypt, and in particular of the capital, Cairo, and of the other great city, Alexandria, should have been announced immediately after the capitulation of Japan and should have been carried out as expeditiously as conditions allowed. I place the responsibility for the failure to do that fairly and squarely upon the shoulders of His Majesty's Government. They were warned of the danger of not doing it, but they took no action until much too late.

For the benefit of those of your Lordships who have not been in Cairo recently, let me describe the kind of situation which confronted the Egyptian Nationalists there. The statue of their national hero, Saad Zaglul, stands at the western end of the Kasr-el-Nil bridge. Saad Zaglul was a great man; he was first brought into prominence by Lord Cromer, afterwards recognized and treated with great confidence by Lord Milner,, and finally was acknowledged to be the leader of the great Nationalist movement in Egypt which resulted in this Treaty. His statue at the western end of that very central bridge is beset on one side by a military camp (it is still, I believe, there at the present moment) occupying one of the loveliest parks in Cairo. It is beset on the other side—I am talking of the western bank of the Nile—by the Alamein grounds, which are not only places of recreation but which have been usually chosen as the scene of formidable parades. Across the bridge on the left hand side are the old Kasr-el-Nil Barracks, and across the bridge on the right is the Semiramis Hotel, entirely occupied, three years after Alamein, as a Service Headquarters. Saad Zaglul, looking towards the Citadel in Cairo, a very short time ago could see the British flag still flying from it. That was a situation which ought to have been ended the day the war ceased. Why was it not done? I hope the noble Lord will explain why no action of that kind was taken at once.

Think of a similar position in London. Foreign troops in Wellington Barracks; foreign troops in St. James' Park; foreign troops on all sides of Westminster Bridge. That is about a parallel to what Egyptian Nationalists had to watch month after month after the war had completely ceased. In fact Egyptian Nationalists—I know this from what they said to me very shortly before I left—always disliked this investment of a national monument and it became symbolic to Egyptians of the suspicions of our aims which are always apt to grow unless the situation is very carefully watched. It should have been dealt with, as I say, immediately Japan capitulated. Yet no announcement was made and no action was taken of any sort. I will not go through the details, but Nokrashi Pasha's Government first tentatively suggested negotiation of a new treaty, and I do not think that was immediately taken up. In any case, the announcement of the evacuation was delayed.

Then of course the claim mounted and mounted and it was not until Cairo and Alexandria were in violent eruption until xenophobia was rampant everywhere, until the solid advantages of our victory had been forgotten, until the natural dislike of foreign occupation had been fanned by doubt of our intentions to a burning flame, and not moreover until Arab opinion over the whole Middle East had been inflamed by a sense of crisis in Palestine which was bound to become acute at the imminence and ultimate publication of the report of the Anglo-American Committee—it was not until all that had happened and the situation had deteriorated in that terrible way, to that deplorable extent, that His Majesty's Government sent out a Minister to negotiate. I have every sympathy; he has had a most difficult task. I am bound to record an opinion on this. Only strong language, even in your Lordships' House, can meet the case, and I say that the handling of this issue by His Majesty's Government has been fumbling, dilatory, purblind and inept.

What of the future? What can we retrieve from the situation which has been brought about? Informed comment seems to me to be impossible until His Majesty's Government give us some further enlightenment. We do not know anything of the character or course of the discussions in Cairo; we do not know what substitute, if any, for the 1936 Treaty is on the stocks. We can only hope that the essential provisions which are safeguarded in that Treaty by the penultimate article will be found to be saved in any future Treaty.

In passing, I would like, if I may, to make a personal observation. I say personal because I have not consulted any of my colleagues about it, but I think it is a pertinent observation at the present time. His Majesty's Government seem to be setting a new and unfortunate precedent in their method of handling international questions of vital consequence. It was; generally uncle' stood by most of us, when the Coalition broke up, when this Government succeeded Mr. Churchill's Government, that a real endeavour would be made on all great international and imperial questions to preserve a united national front. I believe that to be generally accepted and desired What has happened? His Majesty's Government have apparently become entirely indifferent to that. Look at the Paris Conference. The Russian Delegation, of course, contained representatives of all Russian parties—there is no great difficulty about that. The French Delegation represented all the three great parties in France, and Mr. Byrnes, the American Secretary of State, was careful to take a distinguished and most influential Republican Senator with him.

But our Foreign Secretary preferred to ride alone upon that very difficult course. Well, he must choose. I doubt if this new precedent is going to prove of national or imperial interest. We had no courtesy at all in regard to the announcement about Egypt. Apparently the situation in Egypt had deteriorated so rapidly that statements had to be put out without warning or consultation of any sort. I am glad to acknowledge that we received much more courtesy on the question of India. That was communicated well before it was made in either House. But it is not only a question of courtesy. I maintain, and I am sure your Lordships will maintain, that genuine consultation in advance is as essential as courtesy when the Government are dealing with far-reaching questions of international policy and imperial defence.

As to the future, I will make only two observations because I do not want to detain your Lordships any longer. I am not going to enter into such questions, for they are very long questions, as the strategic importance of the Suez Canal zone or the Suez Canal Itself. There may be differences of opinion about the Canal as a waterway but I doubt if there will ever be any difference of opinion about the strategic importance of the area through which the Canal passes whether the canal is closed for a time or not. As to that I will only say that the problem of security of the Canal raises two questions which are not only of importance to the Commonwealth as a whole, but which are important also to the Arab world as a whole, and that should be taken into account. The security of the Canal is an impossible obligation for any single State. It is impossible on geographical grounds in this air age, because the range of defence required for the Canal obviously greatly exceeds the boundaries of any single State, and it is also impossible for any single Government or country because of its cost.

The cost of what is now going to be determined and arranged between Egypt and ourselves is a matter of great importance to Egypt as well as to us, and I hope that it will not be overlooked. We have made vast expenditure in the Canal zone, and if that is to be thrown away, we shall have to incur vast expenditure somewhere else. This is a heavy burden for an Ally, after a great victory, to place upon a friend. But I go further. If Egypt were to attempt the maintenance of what I believe to be necessary in the Canal zone, she would burden her finances to an extent which would be fatal to other even more essential public services. Every State must remember, in these days, that aggression is not always open, that aggression may strike at the welfare of a country, at the stability of its institutions, undermining and sapping underground, and that every State that incurs unnecessary military expenditure is, in that respect, taking a terrible risk.

But, whatever the expenditure, on geographical grounds also in this air age security cannot be given to Egypt by her own efforts alone. I know of no case which is so evidently a case for such a system of regional security as is contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations. The United States has already built up such a system, to which she attaches great importance, in her own hemisphere. Russia has certainly not neglected to build up such a system, and neither the Commonwealth nor the Arab States can afford to be without a genuine co-operative system of regional security in the Middle East. That system must depend on considerations with which I am not adequately familiar after the passing of some months. It must depend on such things as the relations of the Arab States between themselves regarding other questions in the Middle East, as well as on the relations of the Arab States with us. It must also depend on the character of the peace settlement, which seems, unhappily, to recede further and further into the distance with every new international conference.

I deeply regret that these negotiations as to security in Egypt, as to the future of the Canal zone, as to putting something more up-to-date in the place of the 1936 Treaty, have been undertaken in a purely bilateral form between Egypt and Britain. It is a very much wider question than that. I deeply regret also that the Government should have allowed so much of what was useful in the Political Branch as well as in the Economic Branch of the Middle Eastern Office, which proved its utility in the war, to lapse. I make no complaint about the abolition of the post of Minister. There was a strong case for that in peacetime, but the Middle Eastern Office should have been preserved. Its range and status should not have been diminished, and it should have been entrusted, as an advisory body, to the highest possible authority upon the spot. What has happened? The Middle Eastern Office has been decimated, and its political branch does not now exist. We have had a re-centralization in Whitehall. We have had, in consequence, fragmentation of many questions affecting Empire security in the Middle East. In this context, also, I regard the conduct of affairs by His Majesty's Government in the Middle East as ill-judged and deplorable—the result, apparently, of being wedded to ancient and obsolete tradition, of being incapable, it would seem, of fresh constructive thought.

To conclude, my Lords, it is only too evident that the great position which we hold, or held only a few months ago, in the Middle East, is very gravely prejudiced. I can only trust that, before it is too late, British statesmanship in that region will once more be lifted to the higher level which is necessary to the freedom and security of the region itself, to the cohesion of the Commonwealth, and to the still wider cause of world peace. I beg to move for Papers.

3.38 p.m.

THE EARL OF PERTH

My Lords, few people can be better qualified to bring the question of the Middle East before your Lordships than my noble friend Lord Altrincham, who rendered such signal service when he was Minister Resident in the Middle East under the Coalition Government. He has spoken with much authority and with great sincerity and eloquence. Although the Motion deals with the Middle East generally, I intend to follow his example and confine myself exclusively to the question of Egypt. For the reasons which he has given, I think it would be a great mistake if we endeavoured to-day to discuss the question of Palestine, and the question of Persia is still on the agenda of the Security Council of the United Nations. If we were to endeavour to debate it, we certainly should be led to review far wider problems of foreign policy than, I think, properly fall within the scope of this Motion. The question of Egypt as it comes before your Lordships to-day seems to me to have three different aspects, first, the declaration of policy made by the Prime Minister in another place on May 7, secondly the timing of that declaration, and thirdly the consultations which preceded it. I propose to deal shortly with each of those questions in turn, taking them in the order I have mentioned them. I want to make it clear that we on these Benches have no doubt whatever as to the wisdom of the policy announced by the Prime Minister.

Let us look at two or three facts. Egypt is a sovereign nation. She is a member of the United Nations Organization, and the foundation of that Organization is based on the sovereign equality of all the members. It is quite clear that in such conditions we cannot maintain troops on Egyptian soil unless at the specific request of the Egyptian Government and with the consent of the Egyptian people. I will come to the Canal zone in a minute or two. We certainly have not received any such specific request for the retention of our troops. I believe—in fact I think it is quite certain—that the desire both of the Egyptian Government and the Egyptian people is for as speedy a departure as possible of our troops and of our ships. Therefore it seems to me that the announcement made by the Prime Minister, and the quick action which followed it, ought to be strongly commended.

This question of the evacuation of Egypt is no new question. It is a very old one. A few hours after the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir Sir Edward Malet was informed that Her Majesty's Government contemplated shortly commencing the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. This was followed by a circular to the Powers from Lord Granville on January 3, 1883, in which he stated that although for the present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquillity, Her Majesty's Government are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country an-1 the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it. Yet troops are or were recently there in very large numbers. I do not of course fail to recognize the enormous service which those troops have rendered both to Egypt and to the British Empire in times of grave international emergency, but their presence to-day does teem to me to have become an anachronism now that the danger from Hitler and Mussolini has passed away.

What must be the feeling of an Egyptian? I have explained that the suggested evacuation the promise of evacuation, dates from 1882. It is true, certainly, that the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance of 1936 made the position more palatable, but with troops in Cairo, with Alexandria being used as a naval base, and knowing previous history, must not hope deferred have made the Egyptian heart sick? Not only that, but it must have created a spirit of deep resentment and bitterness of spirit. I feel that that spirit can only he allayed by a policy such as has been announced. We want friendship and co-operation instead of enmity and rancour. Let us not forget that the Egyptian Government and the Egyptian people have rendered us very great service in two wars. We cannot lightly set aside the considerations put forward by Sidky Pasta in his letter to The Times of May 13, to which the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, referred. But I do not read that letter in the same light as he does. I do not consider that it contains any insult to the British Government, to the British people or even to His Majesty's Opposition.

LORD ALTRINCHAM

I should very much deplore any idea that I referred to what was said by Sidky Pasha as an insult to the British people. I only said that the facts which he gave about a part of the British people were not in accordance with the truth.

THE EARL OF PERTH

I am glad to have elicited that. Friendship with the Egyptian people on a footing of complete equality is our best hope and our best protection for the future. Now as to the Suez Canal and the Canal zone. It is perfectly true that the 1936 Treaty granted us authority to station forces in Egyptian territory in the vicinity of the Canal. But I gather that the negotiations which are taking place at the present are under Article 16 of that Treaty, and they are undertaken on the initiative of the Egyptian Government with the consent, happily given, of His Majesty's Government. If those negotiations succeed, and I hope they may, the alliance will go on in accordance with the principles contained in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7. I would just ask your Lordships to note, incidentally, that no mention is made of Article 8. Article 7 has already been quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, and I shall not refer to it in detail, but it is of the very greatest importance. Quite clearly the present negotiations will largely turn on how the principles of Article 7 can best be effected once British troops are no longer on Egyptian soil.

From the practical point of view—I am not an expert—can the Canal really he defended by forces stationed in the Canal zone? With the development of high-flying aeroplanes, precision bombing and other devices—I am not going to dwell on the atomic bomb—is it not certain that the Canal itself would be made unusable? I should have thought the real danger to be guarded against lies in the possibility of sabotage in time of tension. If that is so, surely a friendly Egypt is one of the best precautions we can have against sabotage. Egyptian forces, working as Allies, should prove adequate to prevent it, and I hope, to protect the material and dumps and so on which it may be found desirable to keep stored in the vicinity of the Canal for emergency purposes. It is for all those reasons that I believe that the policy announced by His Majesty's Government is right and wise. It is very difficult to conceive any alternative except imposing by force the retention of a large number of troops among an un friendly and hostile population. Such an eventuality, I am sure, would not be contemplated seriously by your Lordships.

Then I want to say just one word about the suggestion that the protection of the Canal should be entrusted to the United Nations. I do not think that is really a practicable proposition at this stage of development of the United Nations. It is true that by the Charter an international force is to be created, but your Lordships will realize that such an international force cannot be used unless all six great Powers consent. That is a result of the veto. It is for that reason that I think we must rule out at present the United Nations and must continue to rely on the British-Egyptian Alliance for the defence of the Canal. So much for the first point.

Now, for the second point—the timing of the Declaration. I agree that this is more open to doubt but here again I hold that His Majesty's Government were right. I notice that in another place it was stated that the advice to proceed on such lines was given not only by the British Mission itself but also by the diplomatic and military people on the spot, and that unless the announcement had been made of the acceptance of the principle of withdrawal, effective or favourable progress in negotiations could not be obtained. That being so I am perfectly content to trust the judgment of the people on the spot. Of course there is a risk, but it is a risk which I feel it is wise to take. I believe that in negotiations of this kind local advice cannot and should not be ignored. I presume that we all want to reach an agreement with the Egyptian Government in order to make as far as is humanly possible effective provision for the defence of the Canal, and if His Majesty's Government came to the conclusion that the immediate announcement of the principle of withdrawal was the best way to secure such agreement, I do not feel that there is any ground for criticism.

On the question of consultation, which preceded the Declaration, I admit I am not nearly so happy. I have carefully read all that was said in another place on this subject, and I find that the position is still obscure. We all agree that the safety of the Canal is of the greatest importance, not only to this country but to the Dominions, and in particular South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and India. I gather that the Governments of the Dominions, including Canada, were fully informed of the position, but I would like to ask: Were their views specifically requested? There is a very great difference between the supply of information pure and simple and a specific request for information and views. I know, of course, that the Government may say, "Well, the final responsibility rests with His Majesty's Government." That is perfectly true, but still surely His Majesty's Government ought to ascertain what are the opinions of those Dominions which are vitally interested in such an important question as this. Personal discussions with Ministers in London are, of course, admirable, but they are not quite on the same footing as the considered views of the Dominion Governments. I hope on this still rather obscure question the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack will be able to throw some additional light. It is a question which troubles some of us considerably.

I personally have pressed on various occasions for closer consultation to be established with the Dominions on questions relating to foreign policy, and I have received much support from many of your Lordships. We maintained that either through the Committee of Imperial Defence or through some similar organ, arrangements ought to be made for the presence of the Dominion High Commissioners or specifically-chosen Ministers from the Dominions to attend discussions and hear arguments for and against. Then they could report to their Governments in the Dominions with full knowledge. In the debate on the machinery of Government which took place on January 23 this year the Lord Chancellor quoted Mr. Mackenzie King in answer to my plea for a better method of consultation. I have the highest admiration and respect for Mr. Mackenzie King; he is not only a great Dominions statesman but also a great Liberal. He will recognise that time does march on, and I hope that an opportunity will be taken of his presence in this country and of the presence of the other Dominion representatives to see whether some better and closer method cannot be found for consultation on matters which interest the Empire and specific Dominions as a whole.

My last point, which has already been referred to by a previous speaker, is that of consultation with the leaders of the Opposition. Of course such consultation must necessarily lie within the discretion of His Majesty's Government. The Party to which noble Lords opposite belong had no mandate for the revision of the 1936 Treaty. In spite of their huge majority, they did not command the support of the majority of the electorate taken globally. It seems to me that they ought to have consulted the leaders of the Opposition on a question of this kind. That appears to me to be a sound democratic doctrine. There was an opportunity—there always has been—through the Committee of Imperial Defence, and I do not know why it was not taken. The Lord Chancellor, in the debate to which I have referred, was good enough to say there was a wholesome tradition that in practice responsible leaders of the Opposition were taken by the Minsters of the Government concerned into their confidence. I wonder why in this particular case that wholesome tradition was not followed.

I do not want to end on a note of criticism. Whatever may have been the omissions of the. Government in the matter of consultation, I would like to assure them that we on these Benches wish them Godspeed in the negotiations which they are now pursuing with the Egyptian Government on a footing of full equality—negotiations, the success, of which are of the highest importance to this country, to the Dominions, to Egypt and to the Middle East.

3.55 p.m.

LORD STRABOLGI

My Lords, I am sure my noble friends of the Government below me are grateful to the noble Earl for the first part of his speech in which he gave us I am sure very valuable support for the policy which His Majesty's Government are pursuing. I am personally grateful to him for reminding me, by his reference to 1882 and our promises at that time, of a very interesting carton that appeared in Punch which I commend him to look up. It portrays the quarter-deck of one of His Majesty's ships at Alexandria. By the command of the Government, the Admiral attended by his Staff in full dress, is engaged in reading out a proclamation on the imminent departure of our troops from Egypt to a detachment of Marines—and those gallant and always well-disciplined sea soldiers are convulsed with laughter.

With regard to the second part of the noble Earl's speech about consultation with the Dominions, I am sure that he knows that my noble friend Viscount Addison is Dominions Minister, that that is his particular duty, and that it is most meticulously carried out on all matters affecting any of the interests of the Dominions. Of course the Dominions were fully informed of what was afoot, and as we know a number of the Dominions Prime Ministers were in London at the time. They could not, of course, commit their Governments. No Prime Minister can commit his Cabinet in their physical absence, but that they were fully informed is self-evident.

THE EARL OF PERTH

If the noble Lord will forgive me for interrupting, I tried to point out that there was a difference between being fully informed by the supply of information, and views being requested. If you tell a person that such and such is the case, that is one thing. If you say, "Please give me your views" that is a very different thing.

LORD STRABOLGI

Surely it is well understood that every one of His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions have the fullest right to make representations on any matters which in any way concern it.

VISCOUNT ADDISON

And they are exercising it.

LORD STRABOLGI

As my noble friend says, they are exercising it. I have the honour to have the personal acquaintance of a number of the High Commissioners for the Dominions in London. I have always found them very forceful and indeed most outspoken gentlemen. I cannot for a moment imagine them neglecting to see that His Majesty's Government were fully informed of their views. But may I, after thanking the noble Earl again for the concluding sentence of his speech, which could not have been better said, if he will allow me to make that remark, refer to the remarkable speech—remarkable for the eloquence of its language—delivered to your Lordships by the mover of this Motion. He began by a rejoinder to Sidky Pasha for saying apparently that His Majesty's Opposition in this country were fifty years out of date. I find myself agreeing with Sidky Pasha except in one respect: I would have said a hundred years out of date. I have read every word of the debate in another place and have listened with the greatest care to the noble Lord to-day. I noticed he was very careful to avoid going too deeply into the strategic implications involved in the new Treaty now to be negotiated. He skated very lightly over that. But his colleagues in another place talked in the language of our great grandfathers. I think Sidky Pasha was entirely justified in his remark.

Then the noble Lord talked about the analogy between British troops in that country and American and other Allied troops who were here during the war, and said that we made no objections; therefore why should the Egyptians object? Later on in his speech, however, he complained loudly and bitterly that we did not immediately after the ending of the fighting in the Mediterranean campaign at once begin to move our troops from Cairo and Alexandria. If the Egyptians were not to object to the presence of our troops any more than we did about the presence of American troops on British soil what was the point of the argument that immediately after the ending of the fighting in the Mediterranean area we should have withdrawn our troops?

LORD ALTRINCHAM

The American troops, I think, were very rapidly withdrawn from this country.

LORD STRABOLGI

There are a great many here still. The noble Lord cannot move very much about the streets of London, or he would see plenty of them. There are plenty of them in this country. There are more taxi cabs—that is the only difference.

LORD ALTRINCHAM

They are not in St. James's Park or Wellington Barracks.

LORD STRABOLGI

Of course there are plenty of them, and we are very glad to have them, too. The point of the whole argument, which is completely false, is that the Americans were here temporarily and that we knew they were here only for the campaign; but how were the Egyptians to know there would not be another excuse made for retaining our garrisons in Cairo and Alexandria? As to whether immediately after the conclusion of the hostilities with Japan we should have begun to evacuate the British troops from Egypt, the noble Lord is perfectly well aware—he had a great responsibility for the policy himself during his service in the Middle East—that Egypt was serving not only as a base for the Armies operating on the African continent; it was also the great depot of arms, the storing place and arsenal, for our troops who moved on to Italy and Austria. A great deal of the supplies for the armies in Europe came from Egypt. We had most valuable accumulations of materials there. How could we at once move the troops out? I do not think any Egyptian expected or demanded it.

Whether there was a flaunting of British uniforms or the British flag all over Egypt as the noble Lord suggests, I do not know, but, after all, they have been there since 1882; and my impression from a recent visit to Egypt and conversations with people of some importance there is that, although there have been riots and disorders and regrettable losses of life and property, generally speaking the relations between Egyptian people and British people, and the regard of the Egyptian people for His Majesty's subjects, are quite good, quite warm and quite friendly.

It is always possible anywhere in the Middle East, as the noble Lord knows only too well, for anyone with a sufficient lack of scruples and enough money, to raise a riot in an Eastern city. There are professional riot raisers whom you can suborn and pay for the purpose, and it is a well-known political manoeuvre in the East to foment artificially a riot for political purposes. No one knows that better than the noble Lord himself. But fundamentally the relations between the Egyptian people as a whole and the British people out there and at home I believe to be good, and capable of great improvement as a result of the policy His Majesty's Government is now pursuing.

The complaint by His Majesty's Opposition in another place, I understand, was quite different from that of the noble Lord. He complains that we did not immediately abandon Egypt and remove every British serving man in uniform from Egypt, whereas I understand his colleagues complained that we were leaving too soon. I do not know how they can reconcile that, or whether the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, who I believe is speaking later in the debate, can reconcile the apparent differences between the two Opposition Front Benches, one in another place and the other here.

This question of the defence of the Canal I think was very admirably summed up by the noble Earl, Lord Perth. I would put it like this. The problem of the defence of the Canal zone, which is what is in dispute now, resolves itself into two separate sections. There is the question of local defence against the blocking of the actual shipway by local action—what the noble Earl calls sabotage, but I think that is an understatement; I believe a much greater attempt than an ordinary sabotage effort would be required. Obviously, however, you want strong police forces to stop interference with the actual Canal itself. Then, if we should be engaged in another great world war, there is the question of the general defence of the Canal zone, and this is where I join issue with the Opposition critics. It is not necessary, I submit, for this general defence under modern conditions, to have British troops on Egyptian soil at all—not even in the Canal zone.

After all, the Canal itself is for the use of shipping, and our desire and the desire of our Allies would be to have the free passage of the Canal. Unless you command the seas which give access to the Canal zone, you cannot use it. During certain periods of the recent war, we could not use the Canal at all by way of the Mediterranean. We temporarily lost command of the seas in the middle section of the Mediterranean, and also, to a certain extent, command of the air over the sea, which is part of the same command. Unless in any future war, we and our Allies (or the United Nations forces, as I hope) have command of the sea, both in the Mediterranean and the Southern approaches, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the Canal will be useless to us for strategic purposes. Surely that is the problem to be solved. The command of the sea and the command of the air which goes with it, demand bases which need not be within one bundled or two hundred miles of Egypt at all. So long as we or our Allies have the requisite sea bases and bases for land-based aeroplanes within striking distance of the approaches to the Canal, then we can safeguard its use for our Allies or for the United Nations' forces. For that purpose it does not matter whether you have one British soldier or ten divisions of British soldiers on Egyptian soil.

The policing, the local defence to which the noble Earl referred, can be perfectly well and trustworthily carried out by Egyptian forces if we have the goodwill of the Egyptian Government and people. Those seem to be the real strategic problems, and the attacks made in the newspapers under the pens of Lord Altrincham and others, and the extravagant language used in your Lordships' House to-day and in another place, do not alter that problem which I have endeavoured to explain, and I believe I must carry with me the agreement of all your Lordships who have really studied this question. To talk again of having to keep garrisons on Egyptian soil in order to preserve the freedom of the Suez Canal in peace and war is to talk in the language of one hundred years ago. Sidky Pasha is perfectly right, however much he may have annoyed Lord Altrincham.

I noted that both the mover of this Motion and the noble Earl who preceded me said that they had no intention of embarking on a discussion relating to any country in the Middle East other than Egypt and that in particular they were not going to discuss Palestine. How you can discuss the Middle East—which is the terms of the Motion—without discussing Palestine, I do not know. The Motion should have been so drawn as to confine discussion to Egypt. I do not want to enlarge the discussion at all, and I do not propose to discuss Palestine, as the whole debate apparently is centring on Egypt, but I must say that the important announcement made in your Lordships' House by the noble Viscount, Lord Addison, and in another place by the Prime Minister, about the total evacuation of our forces from Egyptian soil does present the whole Palestine problem in quite a different perspective.

It is known—there is no secret about it—that large barracks and other buildings are being erected at Ghaza in Southern Palestine (the home town, as the Americans would say, of Samson), where the troops who are being taken away from the Egyptian cantonments are to be stationed. It is obviously just as desirable to have them surrounded by a friendly population as if they had remained in Egypt. I would also say—and I will leave Palestine on this note, as far as I am at present concerned—that whereas we apparently consider it necessary to have large forces of ground troops in some part of the Middle East for the defence of our interests, the interests of our Allies and eventually, I suppose, the interests of the United Nations, we can have a friendly garrison in Palestine free, gratis and for nothing for the asking.

In these discussions here and in another place very little has been said (except in a derogatory sense—perhaps not derogatory but in an agnostic sense—by the noble Earl, Lord Perth) with retard to the United Nations Organization. I submit to your Lordships that that is an omission. Surely our whole policy (and here there is no conflict between the Parties in this country, and there is no need on this occasion to consult the Leaders of the Opposition because they have fully committed themselves in the past) and that of all our Allies and associates is to develop, strengthen and use the United Nations Organization. It is true that we are in a transitional stage now, and that that transitional stage will probably last a few years, but our whole aim, our goal, is that the responsibility for the defence of certain vital areas, including the great international waterways like the Suez Canal, shall devolve upon the international armed forces of the United Nations Organization. If that is not our policy, where are we going? A third world war is the only alternative and we all know it. In that case, why take up such an agnostic attitude—I do not intend to be offensive to the noble Earl—and not seek ways of strengthening and increasing confidence in the United Nations Organization? I speak of the Suez Canal, but the same arguments apply to such waterways as the Panama Canal, the Dardanelles—

THE EARL OF PERTH

If the noble Lord will allow me to interrupt, may I say that in no way do I wish to say anything derogatory about the United Nations Organization. I would, however, remind the noble Lord that at this present stage there is the veto. If he—and we will do all we can to help—will remove the veto, nobody would be more delighted than we should be.

LORD STRABOLGI

We are in a transitional stage and we are trying to get a better arrangement. I will not attempt to enter now into the question of the veto. I was referring to some of the international waterways which it should be our aim and our desire to have placed under the international guardianship of the United Nations Organization. The Suez Canal is not the most important; I believe the Panama Canal in the future will be of even greater importance. The Straits of Gibraltar is another international waterway for the defence of which I do not see any reason why this country should be for all time responsible. The Straits of Malacca, as the recent war shows, and as we always knew, are of immense strategical importance and a very fit and proper object for defence by the United Nations Organization with a suitable international force.

There is one matter to which I should like to refer very briefly in connexion with the negotiations themselves. I do not expect an answer to this from the Lord Chancellor but I would be very grateful if he would be kind enough to take note of it and, if he thinks fit, to pass it on to the right quarter. In the first place I would refer to what I believe is the fundamental friendship between the Egyptian and the British people. Egypt was spoken of by Lord Altrincham as a rich country, but he knows better than any of us that the economic situation of Egypt can be precarious. There were 250,000 Egyptians employed by that same army which he wanted to be disbanded and taken out of the country directly the fighting finished in the Pacific—250,000 Egyptians employed by the G.H.Q. which he thinks we should have moved over-night, and those men will soon be without employment.

The Egyptian Government are well aware of this and have two main lines of policy to meet the situation. One is the development of secondary industries, which will take some time. Egypt needs more secondary industries. In the programme we can give great technical assistance and I think we should be prepared to do so. The main cotton crop is precarious in the world's markets and it is recognised that these secondary industries will need our help in their development. I believe we can be of immense service there. I was very glad to see the report of the good-will commercial Mission, which seems to have done excellent work on its recent visit to Egypt. The second line of policy is this, There are very great schemes for irrigation and public works of all kinds in the course of preparation. There again we can be 'of immense technical Lssistance. I do hope that as soon as the Treaty is out of the way—and I pray it will be soon—we will have made complete preparations to offer our help and services in solving Egypt's grave economic difficulties. I believe it would repay us a hundred times over if we were prepared to show a generous and helpful attitude, which I am sure His Majesty's Government wish to do.

There is another and a rather more delicate matter. The provisions of the Montreaux Convention come to an end, I think, in 1948 or 1949, in two or three years' time at any rate. 'They followed on the negotiations of the 1936 Treaty. There are in the main Egyptian cities very large religious and racial minorities who have in their hands a good deal of the commerce and industry of the country. In the past it has always been the desire of this country and of other great European Powers to see that these minorities have fair treatment. This sort of thing cannot be written in black and white in a treaty. I do not for a moment doubt that the leaders of the present Egyptian Government and the leaders of the Wafd are perfectly well disposed towards those minorities and do not intend to encourage xenophobia or extreme Moslem nationalism in Egypt.

But they or men like them may not always be in power, and for the future some kind of undertaking I think should be arranged to prevent unfair discrimination against these minorities particularly the racial and religious minorities who have served Egypt well in the past and who have contributed greatly to the wealth and culture of the country. This is a matter which cannot be written into the Treaty. It affects the sovereignty of Egypt which is the last thing upon which we would wish to impinge. What form of undertaking for the future which would give confidence to these law-abiding citizens who stood by us so well when we were in extreme and direst danger during the North African campaign I do not venture to describe. I do not make these remarks in any sort of criticism at all because I cannot imagine that His Majesty's Government have not got these matters very fully in mind and I would be very grateful if the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack would regard them as helpful suggestions.

4.22 p.m.

LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE

My Lords, we have just listened to a most interesting and, if the noble Lord will allow me to say so, a wide and discursive speech which ranged I think from the imperialization of the Panama Canal to the industrial development of Egypt.

LORD STRABOLGI

The international defence of the Panama Canal.

LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE

The international defence of the Panama Canal to the industrial development of Egypt. I must say I tried to follow the point the noble Lord was making at the beginning of his speech when he was criticizing the remarks of my noble friend Lord Altrincham. I take the blame for not following him, and I will read it in Hansard tomorrow. It seemed to me that the noble Lord's speech, if drawn to its logical conclusion, as I understood it, meant that the announcement of our evacuation of Egypt was really unnecessary because we were so universally popular. As far as I can see that is the goal to which the noble Lord was taking us and one which I fear I cannot share with him. Many of us on this side of the House, and many I believe onside this House, feel a two-fold regret at the way the Egyptian situation has been handled by His Majesty's Government.

Our first regret is that we have handled this affair as being one primarily of our own, when I believe the strategic issues are so great that it is one which should have been shared fully—far beyond consultation—in joint responsibility with our partners, the Dominions. The second regret is that it appeared to us that His Majesty's Government have handled this matter primarily from the political angle when it is a case where examination will show that imperial strategic considerations are so great that they should transcend all political issues. I believe that if we had not made this announcement of our willingness for total withdrawal, but had endeavoured first to negotiate military arrangements for the future, in a way that I hope to show your Lordships in a few moments, we might to-day be enjoying more easy consciences as regards our Empire security in the future than many of us to-day can do. As the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, said, Egypt has proved in two wars to be of vital strategic importance, more so in the last war than in the 1914–1918 war.

The defence of the Canal zone is vital not because of the strip of waterway, but because it is the important site, the only important site at the present time, which can provide the bases from which our air-forces can operate instantly to implement any agreements which we may come to in the future with Egypt as regards the protection of our mutual interests. The other possible sites if you look at them are not too good at the moment. We know that the Russians are asking for a position in Cyrenaica. Who would say we are going to be able to have permanent bases in Palestine with security there? It depends largely upon the future of the Arab world as to whether we are going to have security in Transjordan. When we remember that Egypt not only provided our operational bases but at the end of the war was supplying the storage space—I remember the figures because I was in Egypt about a year ago—for approximately 2,000,000 troops fighting in or occupying eleven different theatres of operation, we can see what a nervecentre for the imperial effort Egypt was during the war years. I believe that the defence of the Canal zone is vital because if it is lost to the enemies of freedom not only would that area go, not only would Egypt be gone, but also it would only be a matter of time before the lifeline of the Empire, the Cape route, was actually menaced.

The Cape route is a route to Australia and to New Zealand which provides entrance to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Many of your Lordships who were concerned with these matters may remember that in the darkest days of 1940, when invasion threatened this country, when we were short of all our supplies and trying to re-equip our armies and air-force, General Smuts made an appeal to the Prime Minister for diversion, even at that hour, of some of our meagre supplies to the Middle East. His Majesty's Government, to their eternal credit, even hard-pressed as we were, menaced by the Germans, responded and diverted supplies in those months. The reason for that was the conviction that General Smuts brought to us in the picture he painted. I well remember that picture. He drew a picture of Britain invaded, of Britain temporarily subjugated under enemy domination, and yet he said the heart of the Empire entity would still beat and the main arteries would still remain unsevered. He pictured the alternative of this country holding out against invasion but of the Middle East conquered. His description was of hordes coming through Palestine, sweeping down into Egypt, of armies being shipped from Italy across North Africa and congregated in Egypt, then sweeping down southwards through Egypt, through the Sudan, threatening at first and then cutting the life-line of the Empire, the Cape route. As he said that is the route to India, Persia, Australia and New Zealand. When a political announcement is made with absolutely no security as regards our essential defence for the Empire, it is that picture which General Smuts painted in 1940 which remains in my mind.

The Government have offered up this strategic essential, the right to defend the Canal zone, on the altar of political expediency—hoping, I admit freely, to retrieve the position later by political negotiation. I submit that the issue is one of such gravity that we ought not to take the risk of a solution satisfactory to ourselves being reached at subsequent political negotiations. Is the position really one which we have a right to give away? Is it ours to give away? Should we have taken this step on our own—consulting, I grant you, the Dominions? Factually, of course, it can be said we are the High Contracting Parties with Egypt to the 1936 Treaty. We are the main people concerned. Factually, yes. But I would ask whether the moral issue is not so great that we should not have gone forward except as a united Empire with an Empire viewpoint of what is essential for our security. I submit that this was an Empire task, an Empire responsibility, and that informing and consulting is not enough, if you accept the view that the position is of far greater importance than a mere matter of relations with Egypt, but is, in fact, one which actually governs the Cape route.

I believe that we should have planned, that we should have negotiated, and finally decided only imperially. I believe there should have been full discussions between our chiefs of staffs and the staffs of the Dominions, and that these joint staffs should afterwards have put before their respective Governments an agreed plan stating what they consider are the essentials to be retained in negotiations with the Egyptian Government. Instead of that we have gone to negotiate, not knowing what we must retain, but hoping to get something back later. Had that course which I suggested been followed, have we any reason to think that Egypt would not have agreed? Have we any reason to think that Egypt would not have listened and been moved by our appeal and our statement of our requirements? Egypt wants freedom. Egypt wants liberty, and Egypt wants security, as well as do the peoples of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Surely she would have listened to an Empire plea for minimum safety measures in both her own interests and our own.

I conclude by asking the Government, is it too late now to get the Empire view as to what is essential in the way of minimum strategic requirements, and to go to the Egyptian Government and say: "This is what the British Commonwealth of Nations considers is essential. It may be hard luck, it may be politically difficult, but Egypt's geographical position is such that she holds the key to the security of the British Empire." If the ideals of the British Empire and of the Egyptians are finally the same, I believe that we should even now be able to negotiate these minimum safety requirements. Instead, we have followed narrow political lines of our own. I believe that the lines that we have followed have not been worthy of partners in the Empire. I do not believe that they have been worthy of our conception of Empire. I do not think they have had proper regard to the gravity of the issues involved. I trust that the Government, in this matter, will make sure that the security of the Empire is not menaced by purely political considerations between another country and ourselves.

4.35 p.m.

LORD MORRIS

My Lords, I think that the trouble with a debate like this, as with the debate which took place in another place the other day is that it becomes of somewhat academic interest when you know that the chief counter has already been given away, and it does seem to me a little sad that, as head of the delegation to Cairo, should have 'been sent that charming old gentleman, Viscount Stansgate. What his qualifications in the foreign field are I do not know. If he has any, I am certainly unaware of them. I should have thought him about as capable of coping with the wily Orientals in Cairo as a new-born babe. But there it is. The Government have already conceded that our troops, our airmen and our naval forces will be moved out of Egypt. I do not know whether His Majesty's Government imagine that Egypt is going to remain long untenanted. I do not. I think that just as soon as we move out, someone else—I will not mention any names now—will very rapidly take steps to move in. First, there will be the usual infiltration, propaganda and so forth, and then something more sinister will follow.

Those of your Lordships who may have wintered in Cairo, in halcyon days before the war, must surely have been a little startled at the idea that the Egyptians were capable of defending their own country or the Canal area, and have found it perhaps a trifle diverting. I must say that, after two years' residence in Egypt during the recent unpleasantness, I found it indescribably funny. I do not think for one moment that an Army like the Egyptian Army, ten years behind the times in modern equipment, training and technique, hopelessly under strength, would be capable for one week, for one day even, of holding the all-important Canal zone against any foreign invader, and I think it is criminal that the Government should have taken this decision to give away this vital part of the Commonwealth communications without prior consultation with the country. It is perfectly ridiculous to suggest that the mandate given to them at the General Election entitled them to do anything of this sort. It is enough to make people like the late Lord Lloyd turn in their graves to hear that we are handing over the defence of Egypt and the Canal area to the Egyptians.

I have been reading lately, and there has been quite a bit of talk (I have heard some of it in this House this afternoon) about resentment felt in Cairo, Alexandria and Egypt generally at the presence of our troops. Resentment—I like that! If it were not that I have got friends buried in Egypt, very dear friends (I dare say some of your Lordships have also) I should find it very funny. As it is, I do not find it so funny to say that they resent the presence of our troops. Four years ago this summer they were damned glad, I may say, to have British troops there. Damned glad. They were not in the least annoyed at the sight of the Union Jack or of our tanks or aeroplanes or anything else, and I for one do not propose to be mealy-mouthed about that kind of thing. And I will add this. They were our Allies—and I say this speaking as one who had some inside knowledge of these matters—because we were there and saw that they were. It is only ten days since the present King of Egypt went down to receive the discredited ex-King of Italy—the puppet of Mussolini—with every conceivable honour. So I am afraid I am a little slow to accept this talk about conversations with equals and allies, and Egyptian independence and so forth.

The United Nations Organization has not yet quite become a reality, and much blood and treasure—British blood and treasure—have been expended over a great many years on the defence of this vital area. I am quite prepared to concede that the Canal itself as a waterway is not of the great strategic importance that the Canal zone as a whole is and that as a waterway it could quickly be put out of action. Although I know nothing about these things myself and am no strategist, I am assured on high authority that this area is vital to defence of the East. There you have the whole thing.

If you are going to depend on the principle of long-distance rescue, well, the Poles and the Czechs will tell you something of their experience of so-called long-distance rescue. Sometimes it does not come off—the other man gets there first. We have not got Cyrenaica yet. I am told that we have only one airborne division, and that it may well be that it may not be able to be moved, because it may be necessary to keep it at Tel-a-Viv. It does not require much imagination therefore to visualize what would happen in a short time in Egypt. I think, as I have said before, that this is an Imperial sell-out of the worst possible kind. This Government have now been in office a year, and so far in the foreign field I think it is fair to say that they have done extremely well—the Foreign Secretary in particular. It is therefore all the more extraordinary, all the more shameful, that the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, should have gone out on this Delegation, acting presumably under orders, and given away at the very start of these negotiations everything which we ought to be keeping, preserving and defending.

4.41 p.m.

LORD TWEEDSMUIR

My Lords, you will probably recollect that in the early days of the war every time we suffered "some sea change" our critics always said "Too little and too late." I think this is a case of too late and too far. We have started too late and gone too far. I am sorry to see this issue become a Party one. To my mind it should not be a Party issue, but there is no escaping that because negotiations have been conducted between one Party in one country and one Party in another. In Egypt, I will agree, Sidky Pasha did his best to unite the other Parties with him at his end of the agreement. But as the other parties in this country were not consulted first they have no choice but to give their opinions afterwards.

As far as the negotiations have gone, they fall into three phases. First there is the declaration of our withdrawal; secondly, and consequential on the first, the mechanics of that withdrawal; and, thirdly, negotiation for some form of future military alliance with Egypt. I saw Sidky Pasha quoted in this morning's papers as saying that the first phase had been settled, and the second was being settled; the third he described as "not being easy." It is indeed not easy. Apart from the unwisdom of a, form of negotiation where you lay your cards face upwards on the table there is the question of timing. Was it really a wise decision to make this announcement at this moment, such a very short time after the Palestine Report had stirred up the Arab League? I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, when he said that the present fever heat of feeling in Egypt was to a great extent our fault. The 1936 Treaty made it very clear that our troops were not an army of occupation, but the emergencies of war made it necessary to fill both Cairo and Alexandria with large bodies of troops for a long time. Had the British Government, as the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, suggested, made the gesture on or about VJ-Day of offering to withdraw these troops—it would of course have taken a very long time but that could have been completed—then I believe this trouble might never have arisen. But we have to deal with things as they are, and not as they might have been.

There are many noble Lords in this House far more qualified to talk about strategy than myself, but if your Lordships will bear with me I will give you a few conclusions which I have come to, and with which I do not think many people will disagree. In the popular controversy in the Press two catch phrases have grown up. The first is that "the Canal zone no longer matters" and the second is that "it is as easy, if not easier, to defend, the Canal from distant points outside Egypt as it is from the Canal zone itself." What form, of attack could be anticipated on the Canal? There is the attack which is aimed at denying the use of the Canal, and the road and railway which run beside it, to the troops of the British Empire. That attack would come by an air force dropping bombs and mines, dropping paratroopers and by sabotage. But the second, and much more important form of attack, is that in which an aggressor nation endeavours to seize the Canal and the isthmus and to use it: as a base for its own operations—use it, in fact, as a lever with which to destroy the fabric of the whole Empire. Such an attack, to my mind, would be launched by airborne troops in great numbers. But in neither of the two forms of attack that I have mentioned can you dispense with ground troops. In no circumstances can air forces alone guarantee completely to prevent the landing of airborne troops and paratroops.

I think that a lot of confusion arises—and I believe the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, said this—about the Canal itself, as opposed to the Canal zone as a whole. There is no substitute in the Middle East, as a base, for that isthmus, quite apart from the Canal, the road and the railway. At the north there is Port Said; at the south there is Suez. Those ports open on to two seas, which in turn give access to two different oceans. Supposing we could defend it from the outside, where could we firmly set our feet upon the ground and form a base? I see nothing but a collection of very precarious hand holds, any of which might break in one's hand. Take, for instance, Transjordan. That would be subject to many contingencies. In Palestine we are limited, by our mandate, to the minimum of troops necessary to security. Cyprus is small and inadequate, and contingent on a strong Palestine. The fate of Cyrenaica is still in doubt, and I think perhaps even the fate of the Condominium in the Sudan may suffer some damage in the present negotiations. We have offered to take all our troops from Egyptian soil. We are negotiating a military alliance with Egypt by which, as soon as may be when danger threatens, we can go to Egypt's assistance. If we do that we violate the great principle of war laid down on many occasions by the noble and gallant Viscount Montgomery; we react to our enemy. We entirely surrender the initiative.

I need hardly remind noble Lords that in these days nations do not declare war. They strike first, and strike hard. In future wars I think it may be that the first blow to be struck will be the last. When agreement is made between two partners, on the basis that one should bring its armed forces into a piece of territory when danger of war is imminent, which of those two is to decide when war is imminent? They might disagree. And delay would be fatal. You cannot move large bodies of troops backwards and forwards overnight in these days. I do not suppose any of us will forget those heated and fevered days at the end of August, 1939, when Hitler had massed his troops on the Polish border, to the accompaniment of a deafening discord of propaganda about the alleged aggressive intentions of the Poles towards the Reich. The Polish Government, thus pressed, ordered general mobilization. Hitler cried to heaven that this was an act of aggression, and launched an invasion. That same scene might take place on the sands of Suez. The stage may be well set for it.

We are thrown back first on a hope and then on a last straw. The hope is that the Egyptians—for in spite of the rioting, and in spite of the very understandable national sentiment both the Government and the people are at this moment not ill-disposed towards us—may perhaps see that it is not impossible that this Empire, with its long and bitter experience of war, may perhaps be right in the suggestions which it makes. They may perhaps allow a compromise which will work. But with the number of avenues already closed it is very hard to see one compromise that would work. I have given your Lordships two alternatives. One is to prevent our enemies denying us the use of the Canal zone, and the second is to endeavour to prevent them capturing the Canal zone and using it as a lever against the Empire.

There is a third possibility. It is to pre-suppose the unhappy event of our enemies succeeding in seizing the Canal zone and preparing to build up a base. If they once destroyed the great junction joint of the framework of the Commonwealth, then from outside Egypt it would be our task, by the use of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, so to hamper them in the use of that base that they could only turn it to partial advantage to themselves. That, as things still stand, is a plan that we can make now, and is a plan which is not contingent on anyone else's agreement. I think it is extremely important and vital in negotiations such as these that at all costs strategy and emotion should be divorced from each other. Modern warfare is a very hard task-mistress. Her demands are hard and exact. They must be met by plans that are equally clear and equally exact, and emotion must never be allowed to enter into those plans if they are to succeed.

In conclusion, I would like to say that I think I voice the opinion of the great majority in your Lordships' House, when I say that I fervently hope that this is not the first step in a rearguard action to be fought throughout the territories of the British Commonwealth, by which we sacrifice parts of these territories piece by piece through an insufficient understanding of the greatness of the whole. If the Commonwealth ever loses even one war we shall have no chivalrous or lenient victors. It will be the end for ever of the greatest association of free men for the good of the world that history will ever record.

4.52 p.m.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

My Lords, I think that the House will agree with me that we have listened to a most interesting and eloquent speech from the noble Lord who has just sat down, reminiscent of the speeches which we heard from his noble father in the old days. And we have heard very interesting speeches throughout this debate. The noble Lord who opened the debate was most eloquent, most forceful, and, in my judgment, said nearly everything there was to be said about this subject. But I should like just to delay the House for a few more 'minutes, because while the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, in his opening speech read to us Article 7 of the Treaty of 1936, there is, at least, one other clause that I should like to bring to the notice of your Lordships' House. To begin with Clause 1 of this treaty says: The military occupation of Egypt by the forces of His Majesty The King and Emperor is terminated. That was in 1936. In 1937, by Article 7 which has already been quoted by the noble Lord, we were in a position in this country to send troops with the consent of His Majesty the King of Egypt in the event of war, or the imminent menace of war, and together with Egypt secure the defence of Egypt. This was duly done, with the remarkable results that we already know.

Article 8 says: In view of the fact that the Suez Canal, whilst being an integral part of Egypt is a universal means of communication as also an essential means of communication between the different parts of the British Empire His Majesty the King of Egypt, until such time as the High Contracting Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources… And I ask your Lordships to mark these words— to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of navigation of the Canal, authorizes His Majesty the King and Emperor to station forces in Egyptian territory in the vicinity of the Canal. Leaving out a few lines, it then goes on to say: It is understood that at the end of the period of twenty years specified in Article 16, the question whether the presence of British Forces is no longer necessary owing to the fact that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of navigation of the Canal may, if the High Contracting Parties do not agree thereon, be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for decision. Now what actually happened? In 1936 the intention was to withdraw these forces. In 1939 war broke out and these forces were retained until VE-Day, VJ-Day and until the present time. Further on in Article 16 it says:" At any time after the expiration of a period of twenty years from the coming into force of the treaty, the High Contracting Parties will, at the request of either of them, enter into negotiations "with a view to repealing this Agreement or making some other arrangement under the Council of the League.

This is the important passage: Nevertheless, with the consent of both High Contracting Parties, negotiations may be entered into at any time after the expiration of a period of ten years after the coming into force of the treaty, with a view to such revision as aforesaid. That, no doubt, is the passage of the Article under which His Majesty's Government have been acting recently, but what I wish to submit is this. I speak as one who does know Egypt. I passed through the Suez Canal first, I hardly like to say, forty-eight years ago. I have been through Egypt often since. I was in Cairo only last September and October. I am perfectly well aware, and I think everyone in this House who knows Egypt will agree, that the Egyptians have resented tremendously the fact that our troops have occupied the Citadel in Cairo.

I remember in 1929, when the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, was High Commissioner, standing one day opposite the Menai Bridge, and seeing our troops coming across that bridge, and the Khedive going to Ramadan, with a small escort of twenty or thirty horsemen, going to his Mosque, and my observing the malignant gleam and look of almost hatred in the eyes of Egyptians standing nearby at the idea hat our troops should be there when their Khedive was going off to his Mosque. I understand it. Only last September flying from South Africa we were on the way from Khartoum to Cairo. There was a young Egyptian aboard the aircraft. I discussed this question with him. I had a very frank discussion. He said to me: "How would you like foreign troops to be settled in your country?" I replied: "I agree: I should not like it at all." But then I said, "What about the Canal zone?" "Oh," he said, "that is a different thing." Of course the Canal zone is a different thing. It is recognized under this Treaty that it is an entirely different thing. This Treaty points out that it is a vital spot of Egypt which has to be protected. It do's not leave you to imagine it; the words I have read out show definitely that when this Treaty was being entered into that was the point which was most considered and most thought about at the time.

I want to support what the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, said in the course of his remarks. He asked why the Government did not, directly VJ-Day had arrived, remove the troops from the Citadel. Those, I think, were, his actual words, but I do not believe he meant they should remove them at that moment. The first thing they ought to have done at that time, with the knowledge they ought to have possessed and the advice they received, was to declare their intention to implement this Treaty when they had the opportunity, and say, "We intend to withdraw all our Forces from the Citadel and ultimately from Egypt, except from the Canal zone, which stands in a special position under this Treaty." What happened? No such intimation was made, and the noble Viscount, the Minister for Air, Lord Stansgate, went to Egypt, heading a Mission to negotiate a new treaty with that country. In the position in which that Mission was placed, you would have thought they would have begun to negotiate and talk about things, to get a basis, a starting-off point. That is what Eastern people like, judging from my experience of them. They hate anything to be finished right off without discussion. They like to go on discussing things for ages. Instead of that, we are suddenly confronted by a statement from the Prime Minister in another place to the effect that not only have we agreed with the Egyptian Government to withdraw our Forces from those places from which, under the Treaty, we had to withdraw them, but also to withdraw them from this vital Canal zone which is so necessary to us for the defence of the Canal and the initial defence of Egypt. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, when he says he places that mistake squarely and roundly on the shoulders of the Government.

LORD ALTRINCHAM

I said "fairly and squarely."

VISCOUNT SWINTON

Roundly and soundly.

LORD PAKENHAM

A square peg in a round hole.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

That is what I think the Government is in this case. I believe there has been a great mistake. Now the Prime Minister, in another place, when he made that statement, indicated that the Dominion Premiers had been consulted. He was cross-questioned on that matter. He was almost rude to the Leader of the Opposition when the latter suggested that consultation had not taken place. He turned round and said, "How do you know? You were not there." I heard it; I was listening to the debate. What happened? The next day the Prime Minister—and I give him credit for it, because it is a very difficult thing for a Prime Minister to go back on what he has already said—made a further statement in which he said, to all intents and purposes, that the Prime Ministers of the Dominions had not been consulted; they had been informed. My noble friend the Earl of Perth today, I think very rightly, pointed out to the Government here represented that to be informed is a very different thing from being consulted. I believe in a case of this kind it is most important that the Dominion Premiers should be consulted, and the Indian Government too, because in this very treaty it says, as I read out and I read it again: In view of the fact that the Suez Canal, whilst being an integral part of Egypt, is…also an essential means of communication between the different parts of the British Empire, His Majesty the King of Egypt… It is admitted there that this affects the whole of the British Empire, and yet the Prime Minister and the Government proceed to enter into arrangements with the Egyptian Government to deprive themselves of their negotiating instrument and, at the same time, if this happens, to lay open the whole of Egypt to possible offence without means of security. They do this without giving any indication whatsoever as to what the alternative plans for defence are going to be. It has been argued in this House this afternoon, and I think well argued, that there is no real alternative defence of the Canal zone. The only defence is on the Canal itself. I am not a strategist, but you may have your naval bases away at Haifa, Cyrenaica, Cyprus, or even as far off as Malta, protecting the Mediterranean. But Aden is miles away, at the end of the Red Sea. They are all much farther off than Alexandria, which is to be dismantled—and I agree that under the Treaty that would have to happen. I feel, however, that the Government have made a most heinous mistake. This Government is like a young man in a hurry. They want to go on and do everything at once, both at home and abroad. They have made this mistake in Egypt, they have made a vast mistake in Malaya, and they will go on making these mistakes. If they would just pause a little and think!At home everything is rushed at us. The Ministers in this Cabinet have no time to think—none at all. All the members of the Cabinet are not even here. Three—all principal Secretaries of State—have been sent to India, to Egypt, and to America, and so on. Having regard to all there is on the Government's political plate to-day, I do not understand how they can possibly do their work properly—in fact, I do not think they do. Indeed, I know they do not, because they do not give time for discussion of all these big measures that are before the country to-day. I have no hesitation in supporting my noble friend, Lord Altrincham, in the attack he has made on the Government and on the Government's policy in this matter, while at the same time hoping, with dread in my heart, that they may be able to find some solution of this terribly difficult and very important question.

5.10 p.m.

VISCOUNT SWINTON

My Lords, I intervene for a very few moments because I want to put one or two specific questions to the Lord Chancellor, who is going to reply. Before I do that., I should like to emphasize as strongly as I can the one matter on which I think there is complete agreement, and that is that in the mind of no one in any quarter of the House is there any question that in these negotiations both Egypt and ourselves are negotiating as sovereign States. There is no possible question about that, and it is only obscuring the truth to suggest that there is. But that does not in the least mean, as was so well said by the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, that we may not have—and certainly in this instance do have—a common and identical interest. Nor is there anything in the least derogatory of the position of a sovereign State (indeed it is a wise exercise of the whole attributes and functions of sovereignty) to make agreements which will result in lasting peace and security for both sovereign Powers. There is nothing new—one might say it is almost an Order of the Day at the present time—in this. Instances have been quoted and I could quote many more.

The whole of the peace of the Pacific is to be safeguarded by regional pacts freely entered into by sovereign States for the sole purpose of preserving the peace in that area. In the same way, Canada and the United States have, I understand, only recently been negotiating for the common defence of areas upon the Pacific seaboard; they will plan a common defence, they will have exercises in common and the whole of the defence formations and defence arrangements will be laid down and fully agreed beforehand. So there is nothing at all in such arrangements which derogate in any way from the sovereignty of both countries; indeed, it is an essential element of planning.

I think the most serious charge (I speak of course with only that limited knowledge which one can have if one is not in office and a party to the negotiations) is the failure to see ahead in this matter. I do not refer only to the lost opportunity of evacuating the Citadel and the other places as soon as we could, although I think that was a grave error. I refer in particular to the failure to plan what we were going to propose and what we needed for common defence long before the negotiations started. I am terribly exercised over the failure to bring the Dominions into consultation. I can well understand that if you are suddenly faced with a difficult diplomatic situation at 12 o'clock at night or at 9 o'clock in the morning it is very difficult to arrange full consultation. But whose fault was it? I hope I shall be corrected if I am wrong in this, or if I am misrepresenting the true situation.

I am not so much critcizing the difficulties that arose and the action that was taken during the few hours after the arrival of telegrams from the delegation in Cairo, when, I suppose, the Cabinet was constantly sitting and Dominion Ministers were called in. As I see it, that was not where the mischief took place the mischief took place several months before when we knew we were going to enter into these negotiations with Egypt. It was during those months that consultation should have taken place between His Majesty's Government here and His Majesty's Governments in all parts of the Empire; we should not have waited until some Ministers came here on the eve of the negotiations. It was quite essential that these plans should have been hammered out with the Dominions while the Dominion Prime Ministers were still with their Cabinets. I appreciate the difficulty that is always encountered at Imperial conferences, where a Dominion Minister—it may be a Prime Minister or a very senior Minister—sitting in conference wants to refer back to his Government.

The more critical a decision is, the more important it is that the Minister should be able to consult with his Cabinet. If the opportunity had been taken during all the months when it was known we were going to enter into these negotiations there could have been the fullest consultations with the Dominions, with each of the Dominion Governments considering these plans and consulting with its own General Staff. It seems to me that that is where we went wrong and where we failed to ensure consultation which was so necessary on a matter of vital interest to all of us—a matter in which vital interests and sentiments were equally involved. This territory has been saved twice in battle by the liberating and defending forces of the Commonwealth. The graves of Australians, New Zealanders, Indians, South Africans and Englishmen lie side by side the whole way from Alamein to Tunis. If ever there was a case where common consultation, and lengthy consultation, was needed, it was this case. I ask whether I am in any way misrepresenting the position.

Then I want to know what is happening now with regard to consultation. The negotiations are still going on; the General Staffs and the Governments are hammering out together the way in which the defence of this vital strategic area is to be secured. Any proposals we put up must be Commonwealth proposals and we ought all to be agreed upon them. I ask the noble Lord, the Lord Chancellor, most specifically whether, having missed the opportunity during the vital months before the negotiations were entered upon, the approach of His Majesty's Government in this country to-day is one of continuous consultation with the Dominions on every step which is being taken now in these negotiations and in the framing of the treaty which is to follow. It would be tragic, where Egypt's interests and our own are not merely closely interlinked but absolutely identical, if we were not able to arrive at a right and satisfactory agreement These matters are not matters of sentiment; you cannot say "Here is a place and this place is sacrosanct." There is only one rule which you can apply, and that is to get the best scientific and military minds of the day to say what is the way to keep this place secure. That must be a common interest for all of us.

The noble Lord, Lord Tweedsmuir, in the brief but most eloquent speech which he made to the House to-day, said that in a war of the future there would be no warning and that the first stroke with modern weapons might be the last. That is terribly true. There certainly would be no warning. When an aggressor strikes he is going to strike with all his might and with every foul aid of science. What he is going to calculate before he strikes is whether it is worth while, whether that initial blow will succeed. The answer to that question depends entirely on what the aggressor thinks he will be up against at the moment he strikes. It is not a question of moving troops forward to retrieve a situation after some Pearl Harbour disaster. The real way to prevent aggression is to ensure that he will be met immediately, in advance of the spot aimed at, by defenders working from bases fully prepared, and forewarned so that the attack can be met really before it has got home—I almost said, before it develops.

The power of scientific defence is enormously great to-day and everybody I think will agree—I am sure the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, will agree—that in all great modern inventions like Radar and so on, much depends on having the whole apparatus of defence and counter-attack ready on the spot keyed up to the highest point of efficiency and ready to act at a moment's notice. That is the common defence, the common interest of Egypt as well as of the British Commonwealth of Nations. I would say with all the earnestness at my command that, in these negotiations as they go forward to-day, I pray that Egypt in her own interest may realize that the fate of Egypt and the whole future of the Arab League and the whole prosperity of these Arab countries lies in having that defence ready to act immediately.

5.23 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD JOWITT)

My Lords, we have had a most interesting discussion and I shall reply as briefly as may be to the various points which have been raised. I would like at the outset if I may to say this. When we have debates of this sort I always wonder with a little anxiety whether anything which is said in the course of the debate will or will not make the task of the negotiators a little more difficult, and, in the main, I think that has been very well borne in mind with a great sense of responsibility by all your Lordships who have spoken. I would like to emphasize what the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, said in opening and the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, has said in his closing speech—that is, that we regard Egypt as an equal ally with ties which bind her to this country, ties which bind us to her very closely, with a great civilization far older than ours and with no possible conflict of interest between our two countries. Absolutely equal we stand together in full and firm friendship. Our one interest in regard to Egypt is that Egypt should be strong and that her country should be inviolable. That should be said at the outset.

The second point I answer is this. I have heard this discussed by many very able people but I have never heard anybody doubt that the Canal and the Canal zone is an area of immense importance not only to Egypt but to the British Commonwealth. What change of weapons may come about I do not know and I do not prophesy. I have never yet heard anybody say that there has been any change in weapons or methods of warfare which has rendered the Canal or Canal zone unimportant and particularly to the British Commonwealth of Nations. Of course it is right, as my noble friend Lord Strabolgi very rightly said, that everything we do must be dovetailed in with the United Nations Organization, but it is a case where there ought to be agreements between the Egyptians and the Arab countries on the one hand—they are all very vitally interested in this—and Great Britain and the Dominion countries on the other hand.

Now I wish to say something about the Dominions. Will your Lordships take it from me that it is absolutely untrue that at any stage in these discussions or negotiations we have failed to consult the Dominions. There has been for many weeks past a constant stream of information which, following the well-understood practice, has gone to the Dominions so that they may, if they desire, make their observations thereon. That is a privilege and a right which the Dominions very often make use of. Further than that, in more recent times we have taken advantage of the fact that we have eminent Dominion statesmen over here to discuss these matters with them. Nothing has been done without the fullest consultation, and with regard to the conduct of these negotiations your Lordships may remain quite satisfied that nothing will be done without the fullest consultation in regard to matters which both for this country and the Empire as well as for Egypt are vital matter.

The noble Earl, Lord Perth, said, as he said some months ago when we discussed this matter, that he wants some closer and I rather gathered more formal method of consultation, something perhaps which would logically lead to some kind of Federalized Commonwealth. I do not think that the peculiar genius of the British people lies along those lines at all. I believe that this Commonwealth which has grown up is the most wonderful thing that the world has ever seen. I believe that by it we have made a greater contribution to the art of government and civilization than any other country or Empire in its long history has ever made. I believe the various members of the Dominions will be jealous and anxious not to lose any of their own responsibility and rights just as we must keep our responsibility and rights, and that the thing must grow upon the lines of free and complete consultation, understanding each other's point of view and trying to do what we can to meet each other's difficulties, and on those lines, of many more informal consultations, I think we shall progress. I assure your Lordships—an:I I think this will satisfy the question the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, asked me—that: those consultations have been carried on throughout this difficult matter and will be carried on in the future.

THE EARL OF PERTH

The Lord Chancellor indicates that I favour an Empire Federal Government. This is by no means what I suggested and I should be quite content with a speedy development on the lines the Lord Chancellor himself foresees.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I am glad to hear that. I suggested that Federal Government was a logical development of the other conception, and I am sure that we shall not progress on those lines. I will deal with one other matter, if I may, and then I will come to the particular matter of Egypt. Let us look at this problem, not in isolation, but as part of a world problem, as a piece in the whole mosaic. If there is one matter upon which I were asked to give an opinion at the present time, the question as to the greatest benefit we could give is one which I could answer with very great readiness. I would say that the greatest benefit we can give is the removal or the withdrawal of foreign troops from the various countries of the world. I am excepting, of course, Japan and Germany, that is obvious. If we could, for instance, withdraw our troops from Austria, from the countries of the Middle East, and, in time, from Greece (I believe all members of this Government look forward to the day when the last British soldier can leave Greece) then we should make a definite contribution to the setting up of real peace, perhaps a more definite contribution than we could make in any other way. Let us remember that when we come to consider the line of action we ought to have pursued with regard to Egypt.

We have had much criticism—some of it round, some of it square, all of it very welcome. But what has especially interested me is how entirely different the speeches have been. I say quite frankly that I had expected that my noble friend Lord Altrincham would have made the spear point of his attack the announcement that we were prepared to agree to the principle of evacuation before we came to discuss the question of defence. But never once in his speech did he mention that. He left that to my noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye and he it was who said that we had sacrificed the strategic lamb on the altar of politics. If I may say so to the noble Lord, I think it would be a little foolish to imagine that politics and strategy can be completely divorced from each other. I think, too, that it is foolish to imagine that it is immaterial whether we do or do not have the goodwill of the Egyptian people. But Lord Altrincham made no such point at all. The burden of his speech was something quite different, namely, that we ought to have come out of Cairo and Alexandria earlier. The noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, said he agreed, but also said that he did not mean that. He meant we ought to have said we were going to come out of Cairo and Alexandria.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

May I be allowed to interrupt for a moment? What I contended was that the only possible way to do it was to intimate to the Government that we would come out. We could not come out by any particular date, I agree.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I find myself in complete agreement with the noble Viscount upon that. It cannot be done in the twinkling of an eye. We have built up vast forces out there, and vast stores. We have vast properties with which to deal.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

May I say that the gravamen of my charge is that it was not even intimated that we were coming out. We waited till this moment to say so, and I contend that we ought to have said so at that time.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

But it had been intimated in the Treaty. We were under obligation to do it. Surely one would think that our Allies, the Egyptians, would trust us to that extent. I am not prepared to job backwards and to say, for one moment, that over a very long period of time, when there were other things to do in the way of foreign affairs, we have always made our pronouncements at precisely the right moment. I say no such thing. Perhaps it would have been better—if Lord Altrincham with his very great knowledge tells me that it would, I shall not dispute it—if we had stated plainly that we were going to come out instead of letting it be assumed from our obligations. If Lord Altrincham says that, perhaps he is right, and I am not prepared to say that he is wrong. But surely if that is so, it does not call for criticisms on the ground of "purblind fumbling" and "incompetence."

LORD ALTRINCHAM

I am sure the noble and learned Lord does not intend it, but he is not really dealing with the question. One issue is keeping your troops where they have no right in peacetime, and as to that I said we should have taken action immediately after the end of the war with Japan. The other point is renouncing without negotiation the keeping of troops where you have a perfect right to keep them.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

If the noble Lord will—as I know he will—do me the courtesy of listening to the answer, he will realize that I am dealing with his point as to evacuation from Cairo and Alexandria, an evacuation to which we were committed by the Treaty of 1936. Nothing put an end to our obligation under the 1936 Treaty.

The point is, ought the British Government to have made the express announcement that we were going to implement the Treaty or was it sufficient to let that be assumed? I am giving the noble Lord his point. If he tells me that it would have been better that we had said so plainly instead of leaving it to be assumed, I am not concerned to dispute his point. The Japanese war came to an end, I think, about August 14, and we announced that we would negotiate this Treaty in, I think, January. There was an interval of time—perhaps too long—but as I say, there were other things to consider.

Then there is the other point—the point about the evacuation from the Canal zone to which we were not committed. That is a point which the noble Lord never touched on in his speech, and that is why his speech to me was so remarkable. That point stands out a mile. He did not take it, but the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, did. But before I deal with that point, I want to say just one other thing about Lord Altrincham's speech. I was a little surprised that he referred to our arrangements in the Middle East as though we now had no office to deal with the Middle East and the Arab countries as a whole. Of course, he knows that that is not so. We have got such an office. But listening to his speech I cannot help thinking that many noble Lords would not realize it.

So far as London is concerned, we have arrangements for co-ordination of policies between the Departments and at the Ministerial level relating to the whole of the Middle East, and in Cairo we have established the British Middle East Office, which provides a channel through which our assistance can, if necessary, be made available to all the various Governments in the Middle East. Not that we desire to exercise any sort of control over these various sovereign States. Of course we do not. Nor do we wish to monopolize any branch of economic activity. We do not. But we do want to supply the means of providing information and technical assistance of the very best nature which will be available for all Arab countries, and we sincerely hope that the members of the Arab League will be willing to avail themselves of those service in order that we may do what we particularly want to do, and that is to raise the standard of living, not only of a small group of merchant princes, or something of that sort, but of the common people—the fellaheen, the tillers of the soil. Tint is our ambition.

And now to come to the question were we or were we not right to make this announcement about accepting the principle of evacuation. The treaty of 1935 has been referred to several times. That Treaty also contains Article 16, which provides that the right of occupation of the Canal zone should go on for twenty years, and that thereafter if there was controversy at the end of twenty years the matter should be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations—which I suppose will now he the Security Council. The issue to be submitted was whether or not the Egyptians were able to look after their own area in the Canal zone. We could, of course, have said that we would do nothing for twenty years. We could have said, "We will hold on," and then at the end of ten more-years, having incurred probably the bitter hostility of the Egyptians, have been dragged before the Security Council Then what would our position have been" The ten-year period ends this year. Ten years is the period contemplated in the Treaty when, so long as there is mutual consent, the parties shall consider and revise that Treaty. Were we wrong to accept, as we did, after full consultation, the revision of the Treaty at the: end of ten years?

LORD MORRIS

Yes.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I gather that the noble Lord, Lord Morris, who made a somewhat remarkable contribution to our debate, thinks that we were. Nobody else thinks we were wrong.

LORD MORRIS

As I have been referred to by name, might I explain that what I meant by my interjection was simply this. You have in fact incurred!the hostility to which you yourself just referred, and therefore you have gained: nothing.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

As far as the rest of your Lordships are concerned I do not think I found one discordant or dissident voice. When the Egyptians said "Are you willing to consider this Treaty with a view to its revision now?" I think that the vast majority would say we had the right to say that we would. Let me assume that. We then go on and appoint a delegation. The Secretary of State for Air goes out. The noble Lord referred to him as a political baby or else as a dotard. I am not sure which. He was accompanied by the Ambassador, by Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, who unfortunately became ill. The Secretary of State for Air was also accompanied by the Commanders-in-Chief in the Mediterranean of the Army, Navy and Air Force. They were the men on the spot, and when they arrived and started their negotiations they represented to us that in the prevailing atmosphere the only course we could take, if we wanted a satisfactory arrangement, was to announce in advance that we accepted the principle of evacuation. Those were the men on the spot. Would you have trusted them or not?

I do not pretend to have great knowledge of these matters. When I received the telegrams which we did receive from those people I thought that we had no option but to follow the old adage and "trust the men on the spot." Consider the alternatives. We could of course have insisted on holding on there for ten years. We should have been within our Treaty rights. But we should have sacrificed the goodwill of the Egyptians. I maintain by doing as we have done we have given ourselves the prospect of achieving something which is a condition precedent to a successful defence of the Canal Zone, namely, the goodwill of the people who live there and the plain understanding that their interests and our interests are one and indissoluble. Therefore, my Lords, we accepted the advice given to us.

Having accepted the principle we are now to discuss ways and means. The noble Lord, Lord Tweedsmuir, put it quite rightly. The noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, stated that with the vast stores which we have it cannot be done in the twinkling of an eye. Then, having done that, we must discuss the defence of the Canal zone. I am no strategist but I am, very anxious never to be a party to any arrangement such as we had in Poland at the outbreak of the last war, where we were committed to defend a country and had absolutely no base from which we could do it. Therefore it is a matter of first moment to Egypt and to this country—for as I have said, we have no divergent interests—that the Canal zone should be properly defended. Everything that we can do to make certain that the necessary installations and equipment are there, and that the Egyptian Army is trained in the use of that equipment so that at a moment's notice they can play their part, will be done. The noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, read Article 7 which, as he rightly says, is one of the Articles which will remain. If, again, the danger of war comes, under the Treaty we shall act promptly to render aid to Egypt, who will be prepared by these means to defend her own territory from assault.

I conclude with this consideration. I am one of those who very much hope that foreign policy will not be thrown into the cockpit of Party politics. The issues to-day for this country are so grave, so complicated, so vital to our prestige and to our position, that we want the best men of all Parties to support us. Although that is true, I do not think it is possible to assert that in all cases and at all times you must only pursue a policy if it is agreeable not only to the Government but to the Opposition. That is impossible. There must be full discretion and latitude to the Government in taking the Leaders of the Opposition into their confidence. In some cases that may be done very readily and very fully, but nevertheless in other cases exigencies of time may make it impossible. The broad principle is that in foreign policy, as in other matters, His Majesty's Government must be prepared to govern, although I always hope that in foreign policy we shall all pull together and not let Party divisions disunite us. I have emphasized the position between ourselves and Egypt. I have emphasized the importance of the Canal zone, and have emphasized how closely we are concerned in seeing that the Canal zone remains fortified. I look forward, as a result of the steps we have taken, to long and happy co-operation with the Egyptian people.

5.48 p.m.

LORD ALTRINCHAM

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack for his considered reply. I am sure that he did his best to meet the points made from this Bench and behind us, although I cannot take his reply as altogether satisfactory, for one or two reasons which I will give quite briefly. I know that he was anxious to deal with the real points, and not merely to make a debating speech. The question of the Dominions is a very delicate matter, and I will not deal with it at any length. I do not want to enter into controversy, but I want to make our position clear. In this case, and in all matters of vital importance to Imperial defence; or to international policy, which affect the security of the Empire, we maintain that the ordinary process of what is called consultation and information is not adequate. If we cannot have what worked extremely well until it was put out of court by the League of Nations—that is an Empire Delegation representing at any rate the Dominions, which are closely interested, we ought, at any rate, to go into such negotiation with a common plan, with the principles of the policy we are going to attempt to carry out agreed in advance. These are points in respect of which I am sure the Lord Chancellor will realise that what he says is not a complete answer.

With regard to the Middle East Office, I will not enter into a controversy except to say that no office in Whitehall (and I know very well what is being set up in Whitehall and I have the greatest respect and admiration for what is being done) can carry out the work of a co-ordinating office in a regional area of this kind. That is a point in respect of which I am in considerable disagreement with the policy of the Government. If the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack thinks that the office in Cairo is anything but a wraith of itself his information is misleading.

He took me to task—I apologize if I seem to take his arguments a little unduly to heart—for ignoring the issue which was raised by my noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye—the fact that the Prime Minister had made this Declaration, and that it was absolutely inevitable and inescapable in the circumstances. The whole point of my argument was this. The reason why we were driven to make this Declaration about definite treaty rights was that we had not in time shown that we were not trying to insist on more than our treaty rights. The difference between our rights in the Canal zone and our rights in peacetime anywhere else is very profound, and the reason our right in the Canal zone was called in question was because suspicion of our motives was produced, anger was produced, deep feeling was produced, by the fact that the occupation of Cairo and Alexandria was unduly prolonged. That is the point which I sought to make and I maintain it was fully dealt with, as I think the noble and learned Lord will find, if he looks at my speech in HANSARD to-morrow.

Finally, one word only on this question of a united national front on questions of this sort. Of course, Governments must take absolute responsibility for their actions, and for the conduct of policy day to day, week to week and month to month. But this has to be remembered. With regard to any binding international engagement over a period of years, you are not binding only one Government, you are binding its successor. You are using the honour of the nation as a whole. I have heard noble Lords opposite complain of that being done unfairly in the past, and it is very important, I think, that, when you are going in for binding international agreements, there should be consultation between the Parties in advance, so that really when the honour of the nation is at stake it is the whole nation that is involved. That is the only point I want to make. With that, and with renewed thanks to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack for the answer he gave, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn